The Doctrine of Atonement of Calvin and Turretin

from Their Trinitarian Perspective

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[The Whole Edited Version]

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the theological foundation for the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction within the framework of classical Trinitarian doctrine, with a particular focus on the holistic concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son in the writings of Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin. Recent Trinitarian atonement models have frequently failed to respond adequately to anti-Trinitarian critiques, particularly those posed by Servetus and Socinus, due to these models' insufficient historical and theological engagement with Servetus's and Socinus's understanding of the doctrines of eternal generation and the distinct personality of the Son. This study argues that the holistic Trinitarian perspectives in the writings of Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin provide a necessary theological basis for defending both the consubstantiality of the Son and His incommunicable personality, which in turn grounds the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Chapter 1 investigates Augustine's Trinitarian theology, demonstrating how his notions of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son establish the Son's consubstantiality and distinct personality, effectively countering both Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. Chapters 2 show how Calvin uphold and develop Augustine's framework in their own historical contexts. Calvin counters Servetus and Gentile by maintaining the Son's aseity and the Father's personal generation of the Son. Chapter 3 shows how Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son influences his denial of the doctrine of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. In Chapter 4, Turretin's holistic view of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son is shown to provide a coherent doctrinal response to Socinus's denial of Christ's aseity, unique personality, and satisfaction, thereby clarifying and strengthening Calvin's position. Chapter 5 extends this argument by connecting Turretin's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son to his holistic concept of the distinction between God's essential attributes and the personal attributes of the Son and the Holy Spirit, thereby defending the necessity of Christ's personal vindicatory justice. Chapter 6 further examines how both Calvin and Turretin explain the twofold humiliation of the Son—from the Immanent Logos to the Logos Brought Forth, and from the Logos Brought Forth to the Incarnate Logos—as the necessary means to fulfill the Trinity's eternal decree, conditioned upon Adam's sin.

The dissertation concludes that Calvin's and Turretin's Trinitarian theology, grounded in the holistic idea of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and the Son's aseity, provides a robust theological framework for refuting the anti-Trinitarian positions of Servetus and Socinus. Their approach affirms both the consubstantiality and distinction of the three persons within the Godhead, upholds the mediatorial office of Christ, and defends the hypothetical necessity of His vicarious satisfaction in accordance with the eternal decree of the Trinity.

Propositions

1. Modern Trinitarian atonement theories, which neglect the historical doctrines of Christ's vicarious satisfaction and the Father's eternal generation of the Son, fail to adequately address Servetus's and Socinus's anti-Trinitarian objections regarding the necessity of the atonement. (Introduction)

2. Theologically sound Trinitarian doctrine regarding the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction requires the affirmation of both the consubstantiality and the incommunicable personality of the Son, grounded in a comprehensive understanding of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and the Son's aseity. (Introduction)

3. Augustine's Trinitarian theology demonstrates that the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, together with the eternal Son's aseity, provides a doctrinal safeguard against both Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. (Chapter 1)

4. According to Augustine, the affirmation of both the consubstantiality and the incommunicable personality of the Son, rooted in the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, is indispensable for maintaining the unity of essence and the distinction of persons within the Godhead. (Chapter 1)

5. The anti-Trinitarian critiques of Servetus against the necessity of Christ's satisfaction stem from their rejection of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Son's eternal aseity, leading to a distortion of both the Son's consubstantiality and hypostatic distinction. (Chapter 2)

6. Calvin's Trinitarian doctrine, while employing a distinct methodological approach, affirms the same essential substance as Augustine's Trinitarian theology by upholding both the consubstantiality and the incommunicable personality of the Son through the Father's personal generation of the Son and the Son's aseity. (Chapter 2)

7. Calvin's Trinitarian perspective, rooted in the Father's personal generation of the Son and the Son's aseity, provides a robust refutation of Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism by consistently affirming both the Son's aseity and His incommunicable personality. (Chapter 2)

8. Socinus's denial of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Son's aseity inevitably collapses both the consubstantiality and the distinction of persons within the Trinity into a unipersonal framework, thereby fundamentally departing from Calvin's Trinitarian perspective. (Chapter 3)

9. Socinus's rejection of the Father's natural generation of the Son renders any affirmation of the consubstantiality of the three persons impossible, inevitably resulting in a composite concept of God that stands in direct opposition to Calvin's Trinitarian perspective. (Chapter 3)

10. Socinus's rejection of the Father's natural generation of the Son leads inevitably to his hierarchical and composite concept of God, undermining the essential doctrines of divine simplicity, aseity, eternity, immensity, and incomprehensibility. (Chapter 3)

11. Turretin's holistic concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son strengthens Calvin's Trinitarian perspective and offers a comprehensive defense against Socinus's subordinationism and his denial of the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. (Chapter 4)

12. The inseparability and distinction between God's essential attributes and Christ's personal attributes are well preserved in Turretin's Trinitarian perspective, which is grounded in his reaffirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. (Chapter 5)

13. Calvin and Turretin establish the hypothetical necessity of the incarnation and satisfaction through the doctrine of the Son's twofold humiliation, anchored in the Trinity's eternal decree and the contingency of Adam's sin. (Chapter 6)

14. Calvin's and Turretin's concepts of heaven comprise three inseparable aspects: (1) the heaven of the divine essence, which refers to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father through natural generation; (2) the heaven of Christ's distinct personality, established through the volitional generation of the Son within the Trinity's eternal decree; and (3) the third heaven, wherein the glorified human nature of Christ resides. (Chapter 6)

15. The doctrine of the Trinity, as affirmed by Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin, provides the most coherent theological basis for affirming the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction against the anti-Trinitarian objections of Servetus and Socinus. (Conclusion)

Introduction: Recent Trinitarian Atonement Models

I.1. Recent Discussions on Trinitarian Atonement Models
I.2. Theological Prologue
I.3. Current Status of the Problem
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I.5. Purpose of the Research and Thesis Statement
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Introduction: Recent Trinitarian Atonement Models

I.1. Recent Discussions on Trinitarian Atonement Models

Some recent scholars, including Oliver D. Crisp, Colin E. Gunton, Adam J. Johnson, Robert Sherman, Eleonore Stump, Willem J. van Asselt, Joshua R. Farris, and S. Mark Hamilton, have either overlooked or reinterpreted the historical and theological concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction in their development of Trinitarian atonement models.[1] In their formulations, they have generally avoided discussing the theological relationship between their Trinitarian perspectives and the concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Instead, they have focused on defending one of the various theories of atonement or integrating these theories with their own Trinitarian views.[2]

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[1] For more details on the unified model of atonement, see John McIntyre, *The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992); Colin E. Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; T&T Clark, 1989); Robert J. Sherman, *King, Priest, and Prophet: A Trinitarian Theology of Atonement* (New York: T&T Clark, 2004); Adam J. Johnson, *Atonement: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T&T Clark, 2015); Willem J. Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement: A Multi-Dimensional Approach," *Calvin Theological Journal* 38, no. 1 (April 2003): 52–67; Adam J. Johnson, ed., *T&T Clark Companion to Atonement* (London: T&T Clark, 2017); Oliver D. Crisp, *Approaching the Atonement* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2020); Idem, *The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016). For further discussion on the model of atonement based on Christ's vicarious satisfaction, see Joshua R. Farris and S. Mark Hamilton, "Reparative Substitution and the 'Efficacy Objection': Toward a Modified Satisfaction Theory of Atonement," *Perichoresis* 15, no. 3 (October 2017): 97–110; idem, "The Logic of Reparative Substitution: Contemporary Restitution Models of Atonement, Divine Justice, and Somatic Death," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 83, no. 1 (2018): 62–77; Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement," 52–67; Louis Berkhof, *Vicarious Atonement through Christ* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1936). According to Oliver D. Crisp, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Rashdall may be regarded as predecessors of exemplarism. For more details on exemplarism, see John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993); Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1919); Oliver D. Crisp, "Moral Exemplarism and Atonement," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 73, no. 2 (2020): 137–49; Stephen J. Pope, "Christocentric Exemplarism and the Imitation of Jesus," *New Blackfriars* 101, no. 1093 (2020): 301–10.

[2] Many eminent modern scholars effectively summarize various models of atonement in their works, and numerous renowned academics defend their perspectives in their published writings. However, due to space constraints, the scope of this study is limited to Trinitarian atonement models that synthesize distinct atonement theories with their respective Trinitarian theological structures. I do not aim to evaluate the authors' entire views on atonement. In analyzing these Trinitarian atonement models, I will briefly incorporate evaluations from other scholars to support my analysis and ensure fairness. First, Oliver D. Crisp questions the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction by affirming Aquinas's interpretation of Philippians 2:6–7. According to Cornelis P. Venema, Crisp rejects "the prevalent covenantal representation view of Reformed theology" in favor of "the Eastern Orthodox view of participation in the divine nature ('*theosis*' or 'divinization')." Cornelis P. Venema, "The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ," *Mid-America Journal of Theology* 29 (2018): 231; Idem, "Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ," *Mid-America Journal of Theology* 32 (2021): 196. Also, see Oliver D. Crisp, *The Word Enfleshed*, 6, 130–40. Second, according to Alexander Jeffrey McKelway, Colin Gunton emphasizes that the "sacrifice of Christ" in time is "an eternal activity within the divine life, in which the Father and the Son reciprocally give themselves to each other and to the world." Similarly, Andrew C. Picard contends that Gunton views the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in time as a manifestation of "the [internal] actions of the self-giving God, who acts to restore humanity and creation to relationship with himself by means of himself." These perspectives contrast with understanding Christ's distinct and mediatorial act as being rooted in the eternal decree of the Trinity. McKelway thus concludes that Gunton aligns with "Barth's substitutionary grace," a position that does not affirm the eternal decree of the Trinity or the covenantal representation view of Reformed theology. Alexander Jeffrey McKelway, "The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition," *Theology Today* 48, no. 4 (January 1992): 478; Andrew Picard, "Colin Gunton," in *T&T Clark Companion to Atonement* (London: T&T Clark, 2017), 528; Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement*, (London: T&T Clark, 1988), 126. Third, Johnson's monotheistic Trinitarian atonement model appears incompatible with the doctrine of the Trinity's eternal decree, which—on a hypothetical level—necessitates Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Johnson recognizes that Barth's perspective conflicts with the views of Turretin and other theologians who uphold the traditional distinctions between the communicable and incommunicable attributes of the three persons. Johnson considers Turretin's emphasis on the necessity of satisfaction to be an extreme and illogical position. Johnson's attempt to construct a comprehensive Trinitarian atonement model prompts a critical inquiry into

The definition of atonement in the Trinitarian atonement model has been broadened and obscured due to the neglect of both the historical and theological concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, as well as the relationship between Trinitarian perspectives and the concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Discussing the conflicts over the doctrine of limited atonement in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Muller highlights the consensus on the definition of atonement: "the objective sacrificial death of Christ [was] considered as the atonement or *expiatio* offered to God as the price for sin, upon which all parties in the debate were agreed," as well as "the unlimited value, worth, merit, power, or 'sufficiency' of the *satisfactio,* upon which all parties were also in agreement."[3] The terms "*satisfactio*" or "*expiatio*" can be understood as "atonement" when they refer to the infinite worthiness of Christ's perfect sacrifice as full payment for sin.[4]

Whether Calvin's Trinitarian model of atonement—which appears to maintain the classical distinctions between the communicable and incommunicable attributes of the three divine persons—corresponds more closely with Turretin's Trinitarian framework or with Barth's model of atonement. Johnson, *Atonement*, 17–18, 76, 81–83, 97–101, 119, 129–30. Jane Barter characterizes Johnson's defense of "monotheistic Trinitarianism" as being "rather Docetic." For more details on this issue, see Jane Barter Moulaison, "Atonement: A Guide for the Perplexed," *Theology Today* 73, no. 4 (2017): 409–10. Fourth, Sherman, building on Gunton's argument, contends that the glory of the only begotten Son mentioned in John 1:14 is not the glory associated with the eternal generation of the Son. Rather, it refers to the glory of Jesus manifested during His death and humiliation—the same Jesus whom the Father glorifies and exalts through His death. Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet*, 148; Gunton, *A Brief Theology of Revelation*, Warfield Lectures 1993 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 121. Sherman confines the Father's appointment of the Son as Christ to the moment of Jesus's baptism, aiming to affirm the three distinct wills of the three persons within God's economy without appealing to the concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son. In other words, Sherman rejects the idea that the Father appointed the eternal Son as Christ on the basis of the Trinity's eternal decree. Sherman, "Toward a Trinitarian Theology of the Atonement," 350. Fifth, Eleonore Stump contends, "In His passion and death, Christ brings about a metaphysical alteration in Himself and in every person of grace that enables a metaphysical condition of mutual indwelling between God and human persons." She further argues that "to achieve this mutual indwelling, Christ needs to open Himself to receive the psyches of all human beings, as He does when He bears all human sin on the cross." These arguments implicitly reject the necessity of the Trinity's eternal decree and Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Eleonore Stump, *Atonement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 342–43. Stump interprets "all human sin" as a metaphysical concept that can be quantified and inflicted upon Jesus's psyche. She conceives of sin primarily as a psychological reality rather than as a legal category grounded in the eternal decrees of the Trinity. Consequently, she argues that Christ's cry and death on the cross—arising from the Father's abandonment—enabled the mutual indwelling of God and humanity in Christ. Stump contends that a genuine change occurred in the mind and will of Jesus, who is both God and man. She posits that Christ's divine mind and will could be altered and appeased through His divine nature and human works, based on her belief in a perichoretic communion of the three persons within Christ. This perspective implies that her Trinitarian atonement model does not necessitate the inclusion of the eternal and immutable decree of the Trinity or Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Stump, *Atonement,* 380. Sixth, Willem J. van Asselt argues that Calvin's and Luther's concepts of Christ's punitive and vicarious satisfaction are integrated with a meritorious model by incorporating Anselm's framework of merit. See Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement: A Multi-Dimensional Approach," *Calvin Theological Journal* 38, no. 1 (April 2003): 59–62. Recent Trinitarian atonement models that fail to provide a comprehensive framework affirming both the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality fall short of adequately addressing the Trinity's eternal decrees and the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Notably, Faustus Socinus critiques the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction based on his anti-Trinitarian perspective and his rejection of the Trinity's eternal decrees, a topic that will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4.

[3] Richard A. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 76.

[4] For more details on the English term "atonement", see Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 116, 149, 321–23, 307; Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 74–78. Cf. Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet*, 10 n. 20. For more details on the Latin term "satisfaction," refer to Turrettini, *De Satisfactionis Christi Necessitate*, in *Opera*, vol. 4 (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), 388: Secundo vero sensu, cum satisfactio pro solutione sumitur, non est cuiusquam peccatoris Deo satisfacere; solius Christi hoc est proprium, qui pro peccatis nostris ab initio usque in crucem persolvit, et obedientia usque ad mortem Dei iustitiae plene satisfecit. Et haec est significatio huius loci propria, cum de satisfactione Christi disputamus. Per eam quippe nihil aliud intelligimus quam voluntariam Christi perfectam obedientiam et passionem, qua se ipsum obtulit Deo per Spiritum aeternum in sacrificium immaculatum, ut pro nobis impleret omne legis postulatum et omnes poenas ex ordine divinae iustitiae nobis debitas in se transumpsit, tamquam fideiussor noster luens. Atque ita propitiatione perfectissima pro peccatis nostris praestita, liberationem a morte et maledictione, simulque ius ad vitam aeternam

The aforementioned scholars do not address Faustus Socinus's critique of the historical and theological doctrine concerning the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.[5] Some agree with Socinus's critique, asserting that the doctrine of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction is unwarranted.[6] Others respond to Socinus's criticisms by offering an alternative perspective on Christ's vicarious satisfaction, acknowledging that the value of Christ's sacrificial death, as criticized by Socinus, might be perceived as imperfect or unnecessary.[7] As we will explore below, the rejection or modification of the historical and theological significance of Christ's vicarious satisfaction appears to be significantly influenced by the specific Trinitarian perspective a theologian holds.

The debate over the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction has historically been spurred by anti-Trinitarians like Michael Servetus (1511–1553) and Faustus Socinus (1539–1604).[8] As

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absolutissima iustitia sua nobis acquisivit. Unde constat ad hanc satisfactionem tum actiones tum passiones Christi concurrere, quibus plenissime legem implevit, tum faciendo quae iubebat, tum patiendo quae interminabatur. Cum enim utrumque ab homine peccatore lex requireret et utrumque ad perfectam salutem necessarium esset, utrumque etiam pro nobis solvi ab ipso debuit, ut in eo perfectum habemus, quo non modo impunitatem respectu poenarum a sanctione legis denunciatarum consequeremur, sed et positive ius vitae aeternae, quam facientibus lex promittit, adipisceremur. Licet autem haec Christi satisfactio in morte potissimum eminuerit, unde illi in scriptura saepe salus et redemptio tribuitur, quia fuit cumulus et corona eius obedientiae, ad totam tamen vitam extendenda est, in qua Christus iustitiam omnem implevit, et sic merendo satisfecit et satisfaciendo meruit.

[5] For more details on Sherman's avoidance of Socinus's criticisms, see Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet*, 197 n. 32.

[6] For instance, see Crisp's acceptance of Socinus's critiques, see Crisp, *Approaching the Atonement*, 109–12.

[7] For instance, see Joshua R. Farris and S. Mark Hamilton, "Reparative Substitution and the 'Efficacy Objection': Toward a Modified Satisfaction Theory of Atonement," 97–110; Idem, "The Logic of Reparative Substitution: Contemporary Restitution Models of Atonement, Divine Justice, and Somatic Death," 62–77; Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement," 52–67.

[8] For a brief overview of the historical background on how Faustus Socinus doctrinally opposed the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, Alan W. Gomes, "De Jesu Christo Servatore: Faustus Socinus on the Satisfaction of Christ," *The Westminster Theological Journal* 55, no. 2 (1993): 209–31. It is widely recognized that Faustus Socinus (1539–1604) was influenced by his uncle, Laelius Socinus (1525–1562), who critically engaged with and rejected several of Calvin's doctrines. Hillar Marian, "Laelius and Faustus Socini: Founders of Socinianism, Their Lives and Theology," *The Journal from the Radical Reformation*, no. 10 (2002): 1–30; Alan W. Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," *Reformation & Renaissance Review* 12, no. 2–3 (August 2010): 189–205; Earl Morse Wilbur, *A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 239–257, 384–407. However, there remains ongoing debate over whether Socinus—Laelius and Faustus— explicitly rejected Calvin's views on the Trinity, Christology, and the so-called *extra calvinisticum*, or whether they aligned more closely with the ideas of Michael Servetus (1511–1553). Several theologians, such as Ludwig Oeder and Herbert John McLachlan, affirm and further develop Calvin's claim that there exists a significant affinity between Servetus and the Italian reformers—such as Laelius Socinus—in their rejection of Calvin's doctrinal positions. Herbert John McLachlan broadly assesses that Socinianism represents a combination of Italian rationalism and Polish Anabaptist thought, with its origins traceable to Michael Servetus of Spain. For more details on this topic, see Jerome Friedman, "Servetus and Antitrinitarianism: A' Propos Antonio Rotondo," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 35, no. 3 (1973): 543–45; Idem, "The Reformation Merry-Go-Round: The Servetian Glossary of Heresy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 7, no. 1 (1976): 73–80; Antonio Rotondo, "Calvin and the Italian Anti-Trinitarians," trans. John & Anne Tedeschi, *The Foundation for Reformation Research*, Reformation Essays and Studies, no. 2 (1968): 1–28; Herbert John McLachlan, *Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 5. For instance, in his commentary on John 1:1, Calvin accuses Servetus of falling into the Arian error of subordinationism. John Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, in *Ioannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. 47, ed. Wilhelm Baum, Eduard Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1891), col. 2; CO 47:2. Also, in his *Defensio Orthodoxae Fidei de Sacra Trinitate* (1554), Calvin argues that "the Italians [the Socinians] were automatically repeating the teachings of the Spanish heretic [Servetus]." John Calvin, *Defensio doctrinae de trinitate*, CO 8:459; Rotondo, "Calvin and the Italian Anti-Trinitarians," 11. Turretin argues that the Socinians, who aligned themselves with the views of the ancient Arians, denies the notion that "the Son received from the Father, through ineffable generation, the same numerical essence as the Father, not in time, but from eternity." Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxviii.3. Given Calvin's and Turretin's assertion that the views of the Italians [Laelius Socinus and his followers] are essentially aligned with Servetus's anti-Trinitarian perspective, it seems reasonable to presuppose

discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Servetus and Socinus either distorted or rejected Augustine's notions of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their shared aseity, as well as Calvin's clarification of these concepts.[9] Since Augustine's teachings on the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their shared aseity provide a comprehensive framework that affirms both the essential unity and the distinct, incommunicable identities of the three persons of the Trinity, rejecting these doctrines results in the denial of the Trinity's shared essence and distinct wills. This, in turn, results in either a monotheistic or a tritheistic model of atonement. Denying the shared essence and distinct wills within the Trinity in the Trinitarian atonement model undermines the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Without a comprehensive theological framework, it becomes challenging to substantiate two key presuppositions: first, that the only begotten Son of God is both fully God and Mediator; and second, that the three distinct persons of the Trinity fulfill different roles and wills—the Father as the originator, the Son as the executor, and the Holy Spirit as the applier.[10] In other words, the debate over the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction is theologically connected to Augustine's understanding and Calvin's clarification of the Father's eternal begetting of the Son and their shared aseity.[11]

Recent scholarly disregard for the theological debate concerning the necessity of "the objective sacrificial death of Christ" during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has resulted in insufficient exploration of how the Trinitarian views of those times relate to the doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.[12] On the one hand, recent scholars who attempt to ignore or revise the historical and theological concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction in their Trinitarian atonement models do not explain how their underlying Trinitarian perspectives differ substantially from the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus.[13] On the other hand, contemporary Trinitarian

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that Socinus's critique of the historical and theological concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, though Socinus and Servetus may appear different in methodology or form, are essentially aligned with that of Servetus.

[9] For further details on the terms "the Father's eternal generation of the Son" and "their shared aseity," see I.4.

[10] Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, ed. Anthony Uyl (Ingersoll: Devoted Publishing, 2019), 266. For more details on the discussions of this topic, see Brannon Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 244–45 nn. 66–70; R. Scott Clark and David VanDrunen, "Covenant before the Covenants," in *Covenant, Justification, and Pastoral Ministry: Essays by the Faculty of Westminster Seminary California*, ed. R. Scott Clark (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 2007), 167–69.

[11] For example, Oliver D. Crisp overlooks Calvin's clarification of the Nicene concept of God's eternal generation. This oversight leads Crisp to imply that the second person of the Trinity lacks a distinct personality and will. Crisp does not adopt Calvin's view that Christ, as God, humbled Himself by assuming the form of a servant in eternity, in accordance with the eternal decrees of the Trinity. Instead, Crisp denies the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction and rejects the distinct personality and will of the eternal Son, favoring Aquinas's interpretation of Philippians 2:6-7. Willem J. van Asselt's idealistic Trinitarian atonement model diverges not only from the Nicene concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son but also from Calvin's interpretation of it. Van Asselt argues that the Reformed understanding of satisfaction evolved into a meritorious and punitive model by combining Anselm's concept of merit with an early Reformed notion of penal substitution. For further discussion, see Crisp, *The Word Enfleshed*, 6. Also, see Johnson, *Atonement*, 17–18, 76, 81–83, 119, 129–30. Also, see Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement," 59–62. Chapter 6 will demonstrate that Calvin's concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son coheres with his understanding of Christ's self-humiliation as the eternal God who assumed the form of a servant, as articulated in John 6:33, 38, and 51. For more details on the term "eternal generation," see I.4.

[12] The classic Reformed theologians distinguish between several forms of necessity, including absolute necessity (*necessitas absoluta*), hypothetical or consequential necessity (*necessitas consequentiae*), and the necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*), among others. In this study, I refer specifically to the Trinity's eternal decrees and promises as constituting a form of hypothetical necessity. For further details, see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 229–31.

[13] For those theologians in this group who tend to overlook or reinterpret the historical and theological concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction in their Trinitarian atonement models, see Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement*; Sherman, *King, Priest and Prophet*; Johnson, *Atonement*; Johnson, *T&T Clark Companion to Atonement*; Crisp,

atonement models that present Christ's vicarious satisfaction as the complete and necessary fulfillment of God's righteousness do not address the theological distortions and denials of Augustine's concept of eternal generation, as advanced by Servetus and Socinus, along with their critiques of the doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.[14] Due to the theological difficulty and complexity of analyzing the relationship between sixteenth and seventeenth-century Trinitarian (or anti-Trinitarian) perspectives and the doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, recent scholars often refrain from addressing Servetus's distortion and Socinus's denial of Augustine's concepts of eternal generation and aseity, as well as their critiques of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

One group aims to uphold the historical and theological importance of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction without challenging Socinus's and Servetus's denials of it. However, if this group intends to support this notion, they need to confront Socinus's criticisms and Servetus's misrepresentations of Augustine's concepts concerning the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their shared aseity, or they should consider Calvin's interpretations of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. The other group accepts Socinus's and Servetus's objections to the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction but does not explain how their Trinitarian perspectives, as embedded in their Trinitarian atonement models, can avoid the same fallacies found in the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus.

I.2. Theological Prologue

The doctrines of the Trinity and Christ's mediatorship were affirmed as orthodox by authoritative church councils.[15] The two presuppositions concerning the Trinity, upheld by church councils, are: 1) the consubstantiality of the three persons, and 2) the distinct personalities of the three persons. Both Trinitarian presuppositions are openly acknowledged. Nonetheless, since the relationship between Christ's divine nature and mediatorship hangs on the relationship between the first and second presuppositions of the Trinity, the relationship between these two Trinitarian presuppositions have been consistently sought to clarify: 1) how to uphold the consubstantial essence (essential aseity) of the three persons, as Augustine emphasized, "through the Father's

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Approaching the Atonement; Idem, *The Word Enfleshed*; Idem, "Moral Exemplarism and Atonement," 34–46; Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*; Rashdall, *The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology*; Farris and Hamilton, "Reparative Substitution and the 'Efficacy Objection': Toward a Modified Satisfaction Theory of Atonement," 140–57; Idem, "The Logic of Reparative Substitution," 427–44; Van Asselt, "Christ's Atonement," 52–67; Kyle C. Pope, "Christocentric Exemplarism and the Imitation of Jesus," *Restoration Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2020): 125–39.

[14] For an example of certain theologians within this group who do not address how their own—or the Reformed—Trinitarian view, as implied in such a Trinitarian atonement model, can counter the anti-Trinitarian arguments of Servetus and Socinus, see Carl R. Trueman, "The Necessity of the Atonement," in *Drawn into Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates within Seventeenth-Century British Puritanism*, ed. Michael A. G Haykin and Mark Jones (Oakville: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 204–22; J. I. Packer, "The Necessity of the Atonement," in *Atonement* (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2010); Berkhof, *Vicarious Atonement through Christ*, 69–78; Richard A. Muller, *Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008).

[15] The doctrines of the Trinity and the necessity of the incarnation and death of Christ were progressively clarified and affirmed over time, beginning with the First Council of Nicaea in 325 and culminating, at least doctrinally, with the Fourth Council of Chalcedon in 451 For further details on this topic, see J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, rev. ed. (New York: HarperOne, 1978), 233; Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, vol. 1, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 206; Justo L. González, *A History of Christian Thought*, vol. 1, *From the Beginnings to the Council of Chalcedon*, rev. ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987), 284.

naturally voluntary generation of the Son";[16] and 2) how to maintain the distinction of the three persons, as Calvin emphasized "through the Father's personally voluntary generation of the Son,"[17] namely, through which God the Son, who is the Immanent Logos (the Logos *endiathetos*), hypothetically and voluntarily veiled himself to be Christ the Son, who is the Logos Brought Forth (the Logos *prophorikos*) in the constitution of the Trinity's eternal decree.[18]

The crux of the Trinitarian issue is whether there exists a theological manner by which two presuppositions may coexist without giving rise to any logical conflict. Significant conflicts between these two Trinitarian presuppositions may occur unless one offers a holistic idea to reconcile them. If any Trinitarian atonement model is obliquely grounded on the first Trinitarian presupposition, it must conflict with a Trinitarian atonement model based mainly on the second trinitarin presupposition, which stresses the three person's distinct personalities (the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeded), offices (the originator, the executor, and the applier), and wills (the Father's giving or sending, the Son's redeeming, the Spirit's applying).[19] If any Trinitarian

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[16] For a more detailed discussion of the term "Augustine's emphasis on the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son," see I.4 of this study. It may be debatable whether Augustine's concept of the Father's eternal and natural generation of the Son suggests that the eternal Son of God received the same substance or essence through the Father's eternal generation of the Son. There may be two schools of thought. One understands Augustine's concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son as mainly emphasizing the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father through eternal generation. Another understands it as primarily emphasizing the Son's distinct personality from the Father via eternal generation. On the one hand, Keith E. Johnson understands Augustine's concept as prioritizing the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father rather than the eternal Son's distinct personality from the Father. Keith E. Johnson, "Eternal Generation in the Trinitarian Theology of Augustine," in *Retrieving Eternal Generation*, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 163–79. On the other hand, Brannon Ellis understands it as the prioritization of the eternal Son's distinct personality from the Father over the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. See Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 70–78. Especially, see Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 90 n. 86.

[17] For further details on the term "Calvin's emphasis on the Father's personally voluntary generation of the Son," see I.4 of this study.

[18] Regarding terminology, I will endeavor to use historical terms wherever possible. However, for the sake of convenience and to enhance clarity in the discussion of historical concepts, I have chosen to substitute certain terms with expressions such as "the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son," "the Immanent Logos," and "the Logos Brought Forth." As we will see, especially in Chapters 1, 2, and 6, Augustine's and Calvin's interpretations of Philippians 2:6-7, John 3:13, and 6:33 provide an important theological foundation for the immanent Logos's voluntary humiliation to be the Logos Brought Forth in the constitution of the Trinity's decree. In this thesis, I use the term "voluntary emptying" as meaning "voluntary veiling" or "voluntary humiliation." According to Richard A. Muller, the relationship between the Immanent Logos (the Logos *endiathetos*) and the Logos Brought Forth (the Logos *prophorikos*) signifies "the distinction between the Word, or Logos, as eternally immanent in the Godhead and the Word Brought Forth as the firstborn of all creation (cf. Col. 1:15)." The term "the Trinity's decrees" in this thesis may be replaced with the theological term *pactum salutis*, which, according to Muller, refers to "the pretemporal, intra-Trinitarian agreement between the Father and the Son concerning the covenant of grace and its ratification in and through the work of the incarnate Son." For further details on the terms "*pactum salutis*," "*Logos asarkos*," "*Logos ensarkos*," "Immanent Logos (*endiathetos*)," and "Logos Brought Forth (*prophorikos*)," see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 205, 252. For more details on the difference between absolute necessity and voluntary necessity, see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 229–31. Also, refer to 6.2 of this study.

[19] We will observe in Chapters 1, 3, and 6, that Augustine and Calvin employ the concept of the Father's eternal and personal generation of the Son in the same way as the Father's eternal sending of the Son. Therefore, the eternal and distinct personalities of the three individuals—the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeded—figuratively represent the distinct offices (originator, executor, and applier) or wills (the Father's sending, the Son's redeeming, the Spirit's applying). For instance, according to Calvin, John 6:33 confirms that "he [Christ] is sent by the Father, in order that he may feed men in a manner far more excellent than Moses." His statement "He was sent by the Father" can be interpreted as meaning that He, who was in heaven (namely, God), was personally generated or eternally sent by the Father to be the author of eternal life (since the heavenly bread (namely, the mediator) must come down from heaven (namely, God)). In other words, Christ's descending from heaven (specifically, God) as heavenly bread (namely, mediator) is interpreted metaphorically as the Father's eternal and personal generation of the Son or the Father's eternal sending of the Son. Furthermore, Calvin's comments on John 17:3 confirm that "the Father of Christ is

atonement model falls into a tritheistic fallacy, it cannot be compatible with the first Trinitarian presupposition, which guarantees the same essence of the three persons (*homoousios*).

Servetus's modalistic Trinitarian perspective, which equates the Logos, as preformed by the Father's contemplative reasoning of the eternal Logos, with the temporal Logos, as emanated by the Father's willful utteranace of that eternal Logos,[20] results in a monotheistic understanding of

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the only true God; that is, he is the one God, who formerly promised a Redeemer to the world; but in Christ the oneness and truth of Godhead will be found, because Christ was humbled, in order that he might raise us on high. When we have arrived at this point, then his Divine majesty displays itself; then we perceive that he is wholly in the Father, and that the Father is wholly in him." The following three things are clear: The first is the two persons' distinct personalities, offices, and wills, such as the Father's promising and the Son's redeeming. The second is that Christ possesses both the Godhead and a unique personality (specifically, as mediator), since Christ, who is the Godhead, humbled himself. The third is the communication of the Godhead among the three persons, since, as God, Christ is wholly in the Father and the Father is wholly in him. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:143, on John 6:33: "Interea vero confirmat quod prius dixit, nempe se a patre missum esse, ut longe exoellentius homines pascat quam Moses." Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:377, on John 17:3: "Unus ergo verus est Deus, Christi pater: hoc est, Deus ille, qui pridem mundo redemptorem promiserat, unus est: sed in Christo reperietur deitatis unitas et Veritas, quia ideo humiliatus fuit Christus, ut nos in altum eveheret. Ubi eo perventum est, tunc divina eius maiestas se profert: tunc ipse totus in patre, et totus in eo pater agnoscitur." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, CO 17:3, on John 6:33. Cf. See Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, IV.xx.29, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 42, col. 908; PL 42:908: "non tamen dixit: "Quem mittet Pater a me", quemadmodum dixit: Quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, videlicet ostendens quod totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur deitatis, principium Pater est. Qui ergo ex Patre procedit et Filio, ad eum refertur a quo natus est Filius." For more details on this topic, see Clark and David, "Covenant before the Covenants," 172.

[20] A close examination of his writings reveals that Servetus employs nature and will with dual meanings. He uses nature both as the essence in eternity and as a form or appearance in time, while will is used to refer both to the eternal willing in essence and to a volitional dispensation in time. First, regarding nature as the essence in eternity, Servetus argues, "Either CHRIST is not God by Nature, or he did not reply to the point; for the question there was concerning his deity. … Thus no plurality is shown as they suppose, for he is God, a kind of deity being shared by him with the Father." Michael Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem* (Haguenau, 1531), 15b; Michael Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, trans. Earl Morse Wilbur (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 26. Here, Servetus is clearly using "nature" to mean "essence." Second, regarding nature as the form of God or the appearance of God, he argues, "And if we are called sons (that is, by the gift and grace given us through him), the author of this sonship is therefore called a Son in a far higher sense. … For he is a son *by nature* [by form of essence or by appearance of essence], while others are not sons originally: they become sons of God, they are not born sons of God. We are made sons of God, through faith, in JESUS CHRIST. Hence we are called sons by adoption." Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, 9a; Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 16. Here, Servetus is clearly using "nature" to mean "form of the essence" or "appearance of the essence." Based on the following evidence, it can be observed that, overall, he tends to reject the use of "nature" or "substance" as synonymous with "essence." He contends, "In the first place, some interpret it as meaning that the second Person, apart from robbery, thought itself to be equal with the first. And again, they warp this ignorant explanation and make it refer to philosophical Natures, saying that he did not think that to be a matter of robbery which belonged to his Nature." Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, 17b; Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 28. When examining his interpretation of Philippians 2:6, it is evident that Servetus clearly recognizes that "nature" is being mistakenly translated or misunderstood in the sense of "essence." Third, regarding "willing" as an act of essence in eternity, Servetus argues, "Reasoning is natural as is cognition, will, and knowledge in God. According to these, He decided naturally and willfully." Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, (1553), 207; Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity: An English Translation of Christianismi Restitutio*, trans. Christopher A. Hoffman and Marian Hillar (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), 297. Elseshere, Servetus's book states, "Peter: How is it possible that Christ is eternal and always new? Michael: The spirit is called new because of the invocation of creation and because of the new glory, and it [the Spirit] exists eternally in God's substance." Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 209–10; Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 300–301. Fourth, regarding will as an external act of God in time, Servetus argues, "Therefore, naturally and willfully there was Logos, the ideal faculty of reasoning, and the utterance, Christ's shining with God, his light with God." Here, "naturally" indicates the ideal faculty of reasoning, while "willfully" signifies that eternal reasoning becomes the temporal utterance—Christ's shining with God in time, His light with God in time. In summary, Servetus clearly argues that just as the Spirit is eternal will in eternity and temporal will within God's substance, so Christ is eternal Logos in eternity and the temporal utterance (Elohim) in God's substance. Here, I am not evaluating the accuracy of Servetus's understanding of either the eternal Son, as begotten by Augustine's understanding of the Father's natural generation, or the eternal Son, as begotten by Eunomius's understanding of the Father's willful generation. Instead, I am simply pointing out that he acknowledges a distinction between the Father's naturally voluntary act of generation of the Son and the Father's volitionally voluntary act of generation in the historical debates

Trinitarian atonement. This perspective especially rejects the distinction between their personalities, offices, and wills.[21] The monotheistic Trinitarian atonement model that does not hold a holistic approach to counter Servetus's modalism cannot be compatible with the second Trinitarian presupposition: that the Immanent Logos, who is God, must humble (or veil) Himself to be the Logos Brought Forth, possessing a distinct personality within the constitution of the Trinity's eternal decree. According to the second Trinitarian presupposition, it is specifically the second person of the Trinity, rather than the first or third, who must satisfy God's eternal wrath and righteousness through His obedience and objective sacrificial death, in accordance with the Trinity's eternal decree. Rejecting this second presupposition entails denying the theological framework that upholds the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Calvin's Trinitarian perspective, shaped by his concepts of the Father's personally voluntary generation of the Son and their aseity, appears tritheistic and seems to emphasize the distinct personalities, offices, and wills of the three persons. According to Calvin, these distinct personalities in eternity are based on the second Trinitarian presupposition: that the distinct personalities of the three persons—defined by eternal generation and procession (the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding)—should not be communicated.[22] However, this type of Trinitarian perspective must explain how the essential aseity of the three persons can be communicated among them if it is to avoid the accusation of a tritheistic fallacy and maintain the consubstantial essence of the three persons. Therefore, the second Trinitarian presupposition is incompatible with the first Trinitarian presupposition unless it incorporates a comprehensive concept of eternal generation that overcomes the tritheistic error, or unless it upholds a holistic framework that integrates both the first and second Trinitarian presuppositions.

No recent Trinitarian atonement model can maintain a comprehensive framework that simultaneously upholds the one consubstantial essence of the three persons and their distinct properties, offices, and wills unless it maintains a holistic concept within its Trinitarian perspective that embraces both presuppositions at once. Consequently, any contemporary model of Trinitarian atonement that lacks a comprehensive framework to uphold both Trinitarian presuppositions implicitly denies either the consubstantiality of the second person with the Father or the necessity of the second person's vicarious satisfaction and office in relation to divine wrath and righteousness.

I.3. Current Status of the Problem

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around the Trinity. Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207–8; Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 296–98. Berkhof's assessment indicates that during the period of Origen, Athanasius, and Augustine, the concept of God's will was split into two categories: the necessary and natural will, and the dependant and optional will. He argues, "Origen, one of the very first to speak of the generation of the Son, regarded it as an act dependent on the Father's will and therefore free. Others at various times expressed the same opinion. But it was clearly seen by Athanasius and others that a generation dependent on the optional will of the Father would make the existence of the Son *contingent* and thus rob Him of His deity. Then the Son would not be equal to and *homoousios* with the Father, for the Father exists necessarily, and cannot be conceived of as non-existent. The generation of the Son must be regarded as a necessary and perfectly natural act of God. This does not mean that it is not related to the Father's will in any sense of the word. It is an act of the Father's necessary will, which merely means that His concomitant will takes perfect delight in it." Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 63–64.

[21] For further details on the term "Servetus's modalistic concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son," see 3.2.3 of this study.

[22] I am not asserting in this statement that Calvin's trainitarian atonement model is entangled in a tritheistic error, but rather that it may give the impression of being so. Calvin's commentaries on John 1:1 show the following points: As to the nature of order, the Father occupies the first order by eternal generation, while the Son occupies the second. This indicates that the Father and the Son have their own distinct personalities. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2, on John 1:1.

The recent Trinitarian atonement models, which either overlook or alter the historical concept of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, fail to provide a compelling refutation of the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus. These models implicitly distort or reject Augustine's ideas of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son and their shared aseity, as well as Calvin's clarification of these concepts.[23] Before evaluating the validity of recent scholars' dismissal or revision of the concept of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, it is important to examine how Calvin and his successors, whose Trinitarian formulations were influenced by Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity, responded to the anti-Trinitarian perspectives of Servetus and Socinus, which strongly opposed the notion of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. One should note that the relationship between Augustine's and Calvin's Trinitarian perspectives on key points remains a subject of debate. I will provide a concise overview of the theological issues related to the fundamental continuity and discontinuity between Augustine's and Calvin's views on the Trinity, as emphasized in recent academic studies, in order to clarify the current status of the issues concerning their Trinitarian perspectives.

First, Warfield demonstrates that although Augustine's emphasis on equalization in his construction of the Trinitarian relations significantly weakens the Nicene phraseology, elements of that phraseology still persist in his writings.[24] He asserts:

> We are astonished at the persistence of so large an infusion of the Nicene phraseology in the expositions of Augustine, after that phraseology had really been antiquated by his fundamental principle of equalization in his construction of the Trinitarian relations: we are more astonished at the effort which Calvin made to adduce Nicene support for his own conceptions: and we are more astonished still at the tenacity with which his followers cling to all the old speculations.[25]

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[23] In this study, the "anti-Trinitarian atonement model" is defined as either a monotheistic or tritheistic model that does not fully grasp the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their shared aseity, thereby failing to support the two key Trinitarian presuppositions simultaneously. For more details on the term "the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son," see I.4 of this chapter. Cf. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 138.

[24] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 279. The following statements illustrate Augustine's use of Nicene phraseology: Quid ergo mirum si mittitur, non quia inaequalis est Patri, sed quia est manatio quaedam claritatis omnipotentis Dei sinceris? Ibi autem quod manat et de quo manat, unius eiusdemque substantiae est. Neque enim sicut aqua de foramine terrae aut lapidis manat sed sicut lux de luce. Nam quod dictum est: Candor est enim lucis aeternae, quid aliud dictum est quam Lux est lucis aeternae? Candor quippe lucis quid, nisi lux est? Et ideo coaeterna luci de qua lux est. Maluit autem dicere Candor lucis, quam Lux lucis, ne obscurior putaretur ista quae manat quam illa de qua manat. Cum enim auditur candor eius esse ista, facilius est ut per hanc lucere illa quam haec minus lucere credatur. Sed quia cavendum non erat, ne minor lux illa putaretur quae istam genuit (hoc enim nullus umquam haereticus ausus est dicere nec credendum est aliquem ausurum), illi cogitationi occurrit Scriptura, qua posset videri obscurior lux ista quae manat, quam illa de qua manat, quam suspicionem tulit cum ait: Candor est illius, id est lucis aeternae; atque ita ostendit aequalem. Si enim haec minor est, obscuritas illius est, non candor illius. Si autem maior est, non ex ea manat; non enim vinceret de qua genita est. Quia ergo ex illa manat non est maior quam illa; quia vero non obscuritas illius, sed candor illius est, non est minor; aequalis est ergo. Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, IV.xx.27; PL 42:906; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 83. Furthermore, the following statements illustrate that Augustine primarily conceives eternal generation as the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son: Nos enim filios Dei gratia fecit, illum natura, quia ita natus est. Et non est ut dicas: Non erat antequam natus erat: nunquam enim non natus erat, qui Patri coaeternus erat. Qui sapit capiat; qui non capit credat, nutriatur, et capiet. Verbum Dei semper cum Patre, et semper Verbum: et quia Verbum, ideo Filius. Semper ergo Filius, et semper aequalis. Non enim crescendo, sed nascendo aequalis est, qui semper natus est de Patre Filius, de Deo Deus, de aeterno coaeternus. Pater autem non de Filio Deus: Filius de Patre Deus; ideo Pater Filio gignendo dedit ut Deus esset, gignendo dedit ut sibi coaeternus esset, gignendo dedit ut aequalis esset. Hoc est quod maius est omnibus. Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XLVIII.x.6; PL 35:1743; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 267.

[25] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 279.

Warfield defines the Nicene speculation (or phraseology) of eternal generation as Beza's meaning of eternal communication or Simler's use of God from God (*Deum de Deo*). He says:

> Concerning this speculation differences early manifested themselves. Immediate successors of Calvin, such as Theodore Beza and Josiah Simler, were as firm and exact in their adhesion to it as Calvin was dubious with reference to it. "The Son," says Beza," is of the Father by an ineffable communication from eternity of the whole nature." "We deny not," says Simler, "that the Son has His essence from God the Father; what we deny is a begotten essence.[26]

According to Warfield, Augustine and many Calvin's followers continue to employ the Nicene phraseology, asserting that the Father imparted the same essence to the Son through eternal communication (*manatio*). The above descriptions by Warfield suggest the following: Augustine's fundamental principle of equalization in his construction of Trinitarian relations contradicts his use of Nicene speculation regarding eternal generation.[27] Warfield suggests that Calvin rejected the Nicene speculation of eternal generation to avoid this contradiction.

Warfield seeks to distinguish Calvin's Trinitarian perspective from any association with the Nicene speculation of eternal generation. Warfield suggests that Calvin admits only the relational differentiation between the unbegotten Father and the only begotten Son via eternal generation, while disregarding the natural sameness between them through the Nicene speculation of eternal generation. Distinguishing Beza's affirmation of the Nicene phraseology from Calvin's disapproval of it, Warfield describes that "Beza is only explaining the differences between himself and Calvin which are expressed in Calvin's denial that the Son has His essence from the Father and Beza's affirmation that He has His essence from the Father."[28] Warfield mentions:

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[26] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 274–75.

[27] However, Calvin, following Augustine, affirms both the consubstantiality and distinct personalities of the three persons, stating that "Ecclesiastical writers do not concede that the one is separated from the other by any difference of essence, by these appellations which set forth the distinction (says Augustine) is signified their mutual relationships and not the very substance by which they are one. In this sense the opinions of the ancients are to be harmonized, which otherwise would seem somewhat to clash." Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), I.xiii.23, in Corpus Reformatorum, vol. 2, ed. Wilhelm Baum, Eduard Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1863), col. 105-6; CO 2:105-6. English translation in Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I.xiii.19. Augustine also seeks to maintain both the consubstantiality of the three persons and their distinct personalities simultaneously, in an effort to harmonize these two seemingly contradictory elements. He states, "But the Master really reproved the disciple because He saw into the heart of his questioner. For it was with the idea, as if the Father were somehow better than the Son, that Philip had the desire to know the Father: and so he did not even know the Son, because believing that He was inferior to another. It was to correct such a notion that it was said, 'He that seeth me, seeth the Father also. How sayest thou, Show us the Father?' I see the meaning of thy words: it is not the original likeness thou seekest to see, but it is that other thou thinkest the superior. 'Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?' Why desirest thou to dis cover some distance between those who are thus alike? why cravest thou the separate knowledge of those who cannot be separated?" Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, LXX.xiv.3; PL 35:1819-20; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 327-28. Also, he mentions, "And so likewise, if in saying, 'The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works,' He is on that account not to be regarded as distinct in person from the Father, let us listen to His other words, 'What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.'" Here, Augustine employs John 5:19-21 and 14:10 as evidence to demonstrate the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, LXXI.xiv.2; PL 35:1821; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 328.

[28] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 281 n. 140.

He [Calvin] seems to have drawn back from the doctrine of "eternal generation" as expounded by the Nicene Fathers. They were accustomed to explain "eternal generation" (eternal in its very nature) not as something which has occurred once for all at some point of time in the past - however far back in the past - but as something which is always occurring, a perpetual movement of the divine essence from the first Person to the second, always complete, never completed.[29]

On this point, Warfield appears to define "the Nicene speculation of eternal generation" as the Nicene phraseology used by Beza or Lombard, which states that "He has His essence from the Father, always complete, never completed."[30] For instance, Warfield emphasizes that Calvin expressly rejected the Nicene speculation of the Father's eternal generation of the Son when he refutes Lombard's examination of whether eternal generation is complete, ongoing, or both. In short, Warfield attempts to separate Calvin's Trinitarian perspective from anyone's use of Nicene speculation of eternal generation.

Warfield is even more astonished by the fact that so few of Calvin's followers adhere to Calvin's interpretation of the Nicene phraseology.[31] Warfield explains that Keckermann understands the phrase "the Son has His essence communicated from the Father" not as a Nicene speculation concerning "the essence considered absolutely, since the Son (as also the Holy Spirit) has this a se ipso," but rather in Calvin's sense: "the second mode of existence in the Trinity, which is called the Son, … is communicated from the Father."[32] He considers Keckermann's understanding of essential communication to be synonymous with Calvin's, arguing, "This [Keckermann's view] is, as we have seen, apparently Calvin's own view."[33] Warfield understands that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective includes both "the postulation of an 'order' in the Persons of the Trinity, by which the Father is first, the Son second, and the Spirit third" and "a doctrine of generation and procession by virtue of which the Son as Son derives from the Father, and the Spirit as Spirit derives from the Father and the Son."[34] Keckermann's idea of essential communication does not indicate that via it, the second person's essence can be fully communicated from the Father's in an absolute sense of essence, but rather that through it, the second person is distinguished by eternal generation as a distinct mode of existence in the Trinity.

Although Warfield attempts to differentiate Calvin's Trinitarian perspective from any association with the Nicene speculation of eternal generation, it is important to note that Warfield acknowledges that the Nicene doctrine of eternal generation supports not the (free) voluntary existence of the Son by generation but rather the necessary existence of the Son by generation. Warfield argues that "the Nicene doctrine that the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are necessary movements in the divine essence and not voluntary acts of God the Father,

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[29] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 247 n. 85.

[30] Lombard understands that eternal generation can be interpreted not only as an occurrence in eternity but also as a continuous occurrence in the present tense when he attempts to interpret Psalm 2:7. Although Lombard engages with Augustine's statements, his reasoning ultimately leads to a rejection of Augustine's notion of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son, which affirms the Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), I.v.1, p. 30. Also, see Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 247 n. 85.

[31] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 279.

[32] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 275–76.

[33] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 276.

[34] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 244.

carries with it the ascription of necessary existence, in the sense of that term applicable to God, that is of "self-existence," to the Son and Spirit and requires that each be spoken of as *autoθeos*."[35] The terms "the *necessary* movements in the divine essence" and "the *voluntary* acts of God the Father" refer to what are explained in I.4 as "the Father's *naturally* voluntary generation of the Son" and "the Father's *spontaneously* voluntary generation of the Son."[36] Warfield asserts:

> He [Calvin] left, therefore, little Biblical basis for the doctrine of "eternal generation" [namely, Beza's Nicene phraseology] except what might be inferred from the mere terms "Father," "Son," and "Spirit," and the general consideration that our own adoption into the relation of sons of God in Christ implies for Him a Sonship of a higher and more immanent character, which is His by nature and into participation in the relation of which we are admitted only by grace.[37]

It is also important to note that Warfield acknowledges that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective clearly distinguishes between Christ's inherent and natural sonship, which He possesses by nature, and our adopted sonship, which is not natural but is granted to us solely by grace and God's mere good pleasure. Setting aside Warfield's interpretation of Augustine's and Calvin's views on eternal generation, it is essential to examine whether Calvin's and Augustine's understandings of eternal generation and aseity share fundamental similarities or exhibit significant differences within their Trinitarian perspectives.

Second, Torrance appears to demonstrate that Augustine and Calvin share equivalent viewpoints on fundamental aspects of the Trinity. Torrance believes that Augustine and Calvin use the doctrine of eternal generation primarily to emphasize the distinct mode of existence of the second person, followed by affirming the consubstantiality of the three persons through their personal communication via the Spirit. Torrance quotes Calvin's interpretation of John 14:10, referring to Augustine's interpretation: "By those names which denote distinction is signified the reciprocal relations they have between one another, not the very substance by which they are one."[38] Torrance argues that "it is the teaching of Gregory Nazianzen that St. Augustine takes over here" and further explains that "Gregory Nazianzen points out that 'Father' is not a name for being (*ousia*) but for the relation (*schésis*) of the Father and the Son."[39] As Warfield does,[40] Torrance observes that Augustine and Calvin first emphasize the relational distinction between the unbegotten Father and the only begotten Son through eternal generation, while giving less attention to their natural oneness as established through eternal generation. Torrance recognizes that this approach fundamentally differs from the Nicene Constantinopolitan Creed's phrase of "true God

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[35] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 272.

[36] I do not intend to debate here whether Warfield precisely used "the voluntary acts of God the Father" to mean "the Father's spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son" or "the Father's indifferently voluntary generation of the Son." Rather, my intention is to emphasize that he distinguishes between natural generation and volitional generation. For more details on the terms "the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son" and "the Father's spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son," see I.4 of this study.

[37] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 277–79 nn. 135–137.

[38] Thomas F. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," *Calvin Theological Journal* 25, no. 2 (November 1990): 178.

[39] Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," 178 nn. 53, 55.

[40] Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine*, 282.

from true God,"[41] which first emphasizes the consubstantiality of the three persons in terms of essence and then addresses the distinct mode of the second person in terms of their relational roles. In other words, Torrance understands that Augustine and Calvin do not use the the Nicene Constantinopolitan idea of eternal generation and procession (*Deum de Deo*) in Beza's sense. According to Torrance, Augustine and Calvin employ it to emphasize a distinct mode of being through the concepts of personal generation and procession.

Torrance states that Calvin accepts the Western and Augustine's understanding of the Procession of the Holy Spirit as a means to overcome "a significant distinction of order."[42] Based on Athanasius's argument,[43] Torrance continues to argue that "he [Calvin] hastens to add that "far from interfering with the utterly simple unity of God, it [Torrance's definition of the Western understanding of the Procession of the Holy Spirit] serves to prove that the Son is one with God the Father, because he [the Son] constitutes one spiritual Being with him [the Father], while the Spirit is not something other than the Father and different from the Son, because he is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son" (*Inst*, 1.13.19)."[44] Furthermore, Torrance describes Augustine's alignment with Gregory Nazianzen's Trinitarian doctrine, underscoring that the second person of the Trinity not only possesses a distinct mode of existence but also shares the same *Principium* as God.[45] After examining the Nicene Creed of 325, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, and the writings of Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, and Athanasius, Torrance concludes that although the Son is begotten of the Father as a distinct mode of being, He, along with the Spirit, shares equal honour, majesty, consubstantiality, and eternal sovereignty with the Father.[46] In summary, Torrance believes that Augustine and Calvin use the doctrine of eternal generation to prioritize ensuring the distinct mode of the second person, followed by affirming the consubstantiality of the second person through the Western understanding of the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

Torrance recognizes that this approach fundamentally differs from the Nicene Constantinopolitan Creed's phrase of "true God from true God," which first emphasizes the consubstantiality of the three persons in terms of essence and then addresses the distinct mode of the second person in terms of relationship.[47] However, Torrance's assumption that Augustine did not affirm the Nicene Constantinopolitan Creed's phrase of "true God from true God", as employed by Baza, is contradicted by Warfield's arguments and Augustine's writings.[48] At this point, it is

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[41] Thomas F. Torrance, *Trinitarian Perspectives: Towards Doctrinal Agreement* (London: T&T Clark, 1994), 132.

[42] Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," 177 n. 48.

[43] Both Athanasius and Augustine emphasize the role of the Spirit in affirming the consubstantiality of the three persons of the Trinity. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," 177.

[44] Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," 177.

[45] Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," 172 n. 30.

[46] Torrance, *Trinitarian Perspectives*, 132.

[47] Torrance, *Trinitarian Perspectives*, 132.

[48] For more details on this issue, see 1.3.2 of this study. Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220: "Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intellegere, nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium." Also, see Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XLVIII.x.6; PL 35:1743; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 267-268: "Non enim crescendo, sed nascendo aequalis est, qui semper natus est de Patre Filius, de Deo Deus, de aeterno coaeternus. Pater autem non de Filio Deus: Filius de Patre Deus; ideo Pater Filio gignendo dedit ut Deus esset, gignendo dedit ut sibi coaeternus esset, gignendo dedit ut aequalis esset." Also, see Augustine, *In*

crucial to examine whether Augustine and Calvin accept or reject the Nicene phraseology (or the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed's concept) of "true God from true God" as a means of affirming *homoousios*, which is further followed by a relational approach to affirming the distinct relational mode of the second person simultaneously.

Third, Arie Baars's historical research necessitates an explanation of how Calvin's emphasis on the individuality of the Father, Son, and Spirit aligns with the Latin tradition, as seen in Augustine or Luther. His research challenges Torrance's claim that Augustine's and Calvin's Trinitarian models were heavily influenced by the Greek tradition. First, Baars describes that modern historians frequently interpret Augustine's position as leaning toward modalism, which they view as an "extreme" interpretation of the Latin tradition.[49] Baars argues, "While Augustine strongly stresses the unity of God, Calvin deviates from this to a certain degree and puts more emphasis on the individuality of the Father and the Son and Spirit."[50] Second, according to Baars, although Luther is more closely aligned with the Latin tradition than the Greek tradition, Calvin places a stronger emphasis on the distinct individuality of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by interpreting the Nicene Creed's "*Deum de Deo*" in his unique manner.[51] Baars writes, "Luther teaches that the Son is generated from the essence of the Father, while Calvin is of the opinion that the Father only generates as a person."[52] Nonetheless, Baars explains that Calvin's perspective aligns with the Latin tradition on the most crucial aspect: the unity and consubstantiality of the three persons.[53] Based on Baars's comprehensive analysis, Calvin appears to align more closely with the Greek theological tradition than Augustine does with the Latin tradition.[54] At this point, it is

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Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor, XLVIII.x.6-7; PL 35:1743-44; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 268: "Sed quia ille cuius est Verbum non est de Verbo, Verbum autem de illo est cuius est Verbum; ideo ait: Quod dedit mihi Pater, id est, ut sim Verbum eius, ut sim unigenitus Filius eius, ut sim splendor lucis eius, maius est omnibus. Ideo: Nemo rapit, inquit, oves meas de manu mea. Nemo potest rapere de manu Patris mei. De manu mea, et de manu Patris mei: quid est hoc: Nemo rapit de manu mea, et: Nemo rapit de manu Patris mei? Utrum una manus est Patris et Filii, an forte ipse Filius manus est Patris sui? Si manum intellegamus potestatem, una est Patris et Filii potestas; quia una est divinitas: si autem manum intellegamus, sicut dictum est per prophetam: Et brachium Domini cui revelatum est, manus Patris ipse est Filius." Here, Augustine uses "begetting" as a holistic concept with two meanings: natural begetting and personal begetting. It is understood as a comprehensive idea with two interpretations: the Son of God is either the hand of the Father (the Son Himself, distinct from the Father) or the same divinity as the Father Himself.

[49] According to Arie Baars's research, recent scholars generally note that while the Latin formula emphasizes the consubstantiality of the three persons, the Greek formula highlights the Father's sole principium and the three distinct personalities. Reinhold Seeberg, *Lehrbuch Der Dogmengeschichte* (Basel: Stuttgart, 1960), II:163; Adolf von Harnack, *Lehrbuch Der Dogmengeschichte* (Tübingen, 1910), II:307; Friedrich Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1906), 364vv; Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 493–94. Also, see Colin E. Gunton, "Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43, no. 1 (1990): 45.

[50] Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 704.

[51] As mentioned above, Baars argues that Luther rejected Lombard's assertion that "the divine Being neither generates nor is generated." Baars further observes that Luther disagreed with the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which condemned Joachim's criticism of Lombard's denial of the so-called Nicene speculation regarding the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son. Instead, Baars emphasizes that Luther interprets the Nicene Creed's phrase "God from God" to mean "it is clearly legitimate to affirm that the divine Being of Christ was generated from the Being of God." Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 576–77. Therefore, Torrance's assertion that Lombard advocates the so-called Nicene speculation regarding the Father's natural generation of the Son does not stand in line with Baar's historical research.

[52] Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 704.

[53] Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 466–79, 704.

[54] Baars contends that Augustine endeavored to refute both Sabellian modalism and Arian subordinationism, whereas Calvin challenged not only Servetus's modalism but also Gentile's conception of subordinationism. Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 495–96.

essential to analyze how Calvin's focus on the distinct identities of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit corresponds with Augustine's emphasis on the unity of the three persons.

Fourth, Brannon Ellis's research calls for clarification on whether Calvin acquiesces to or rejects Augustine's use of the so-called Nicene speculation that the Father's essential life (*vita Dei essentialiter*) in Himself (aseity) can be shared with the Son by the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son.[55] To strengthen Warfield's argument that Calvin distanced himself from Augustine's use of the Nicene speculation of eternal generation,[56] Ellis highlights that Calvin's use of the adverbial autothean terminology does not merely distinguish between personal generation and essential communication but, in fact, entirely eliminates the latter.[57]

Ellis argues that the traditional explanation of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, termed as "the essential communication" (which he asserts Calvin rejected), has been employed to affirm both the distinction and consubstantiality of the three persons.[58] According to Ellis, the traditional doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son posits that the Son's distinct personality logically precedes His consubstantiality with the Father. Ellis contends that "for classical exposition, Father and Son are one by virtue of the manner of their distinction."[59] He describes that this understanding aligns with the teachings of Augustine, Lombard, the Fourth Lateran Council, Hilary, and Aquinas.[60] In other words, the eternal Son's distinct personality, established in relation to the Father through eternal generation, logically precedes the Son's consubstantiality, which is realized through the essential communication between the Father and the Son.[61] Ellis contends that the classical doctrine of eternal generation, which supports the adjectival sense of aseity, implies subordinationism, as it posits that the eternal Son is "the God who is essentially self-existent" by virtue of essential communication. He, thus, argues that Calvin's notion that "the Son is self-existently God" may be unacceptable for traditionalists who believe that "the Son eternally possesses the self-existent divine essence" through essential communication.[62]

To enhance his argument that Calvin further developed Augustine's appropriation of the Nicene doctrine of eternal generation, Ellis attempts to interpret Augustine's use of the so-called Nicene speculation of eternal generation as a concept of personal generation—one that entails a perichoretic unity while maintaining the logical priority of the distinctions among the three persons. He contends that "it is by (Augustine's idea of) eternal generation that the Father has given to the

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[55] The term "*Vita Dei Essentialiter*" denotes "the divine essence itself, insofar as God is αθτοζωος (*autozoos*) and self-moved." While I understand the term "Calvin's concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son" as referring to "the Father's personal activity within the Godhead (the *operationes* or *opera ad intra*)," I interpret the term "the Nicene concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son" as indicating "the divine essence itself (*vita Dei essentialiter*)." For more details on the terms "*Vita Dei Essentialiter*" and "*Vita Dei Efficaciter* (*opera ad intra*)," see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 244, 245, 395. Also, refer to Benjamin W. Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, and Communication of Essence: A Reexamination of His Views," *Kerux* 25, no. 1 (May 2010): 26.

[56] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 9.

[57] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 127.

[58] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 11, 88–89.

[59] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 84.

[60] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 84 n. 70.

[61] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 69–72.

[62] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 34.

Son to be his Son, a personal generation understood to involve an essential giving as its 'substantial' basis."[63] Ellis quotes Augustine, stating:

> It is by birth that He is equal, who was always born, the Son of the Father, God of God, coeternal of the Eternal. But the Father is not God of the Son: the Son is God of the Father; therefore in begetting the Son, the Father 'gave' Him to be God, in begetting He gave Him to be coeternal with Himself, in begetting He gave Him to be His equal. This is that which is greater than all."[64]

Ellis seeks to interpret Augustine's concept of eternal generation exclusively as personal generation, emphasizing the perichoretic unity within distinction. Ellis defines the perichoretic unity within distinction as an "ordered unity."[65] While this "ordered unity" acknowledges the relationship between the Father's logical priority as the first order and the Son as the second order, it effectively negates the eternal Son's immanent identity—namely, *the Principium*—in eternity and,[66] therefore, fails to function as a concept that resolves the tension between this ordered unity and the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. As we will examine later, Augustine here explains eternal generation from two perspectives: first, in terms of essence, as the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son, stating that "He is equal by birth, having always been born, the Son of the Father, God from God, coeternal with the Eternal"; and second, in terms of relationship, as the Father's personally voluntary generation of the Son, noting that "But the Father is not God from the Son; the Son is God from the Father."

Ellis's exclusion of Augustine's concept of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son from the doctrine of eternal generation stems from a misinterpretation of Augustine's use of it, wherein he (Augustine) primarily affirms the eternal Son's immanent identity as *the Principium*. Ellis's distortion of Augustine's notion of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son is evident in both his critique of Berkhof's articulation of the Reformed understanding of the covenant of redemption and his endorsement of Barth's critiques of the covenant of redemption.

On the one hand, Ellis advocates Barth's view that there is a single internal and external redemptive will shared by the three modes of subsistence within a monistic God.[67] Ellis argues:

> There are not three eternal redemptive wills in God-something Barth with all propriety might label 'mythology'-but three in God who eternally will redemption in time. The Father redeems, but always through the Son in the Spirit; the Son redeems, but always from the Father in the Spirit; the Spirit redeems, but always from the Father through the Son, so that

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[63] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 89.

[64] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XLVIII.x.6; PL 35:1743: "Semper ergo Filius, et semper aequalis. Non enim crescendo, sed nascendo aequalis est, qui semper natus est de Patre Filius, de Deo Deus, de aeterno coaeternus. Pater autem non de Filio Deus: Filius de Patre Deus; ideo Pater Filio gignendo dedit ut Deus esset, gignendo dedit ut sibi coaeternus esset, gignendo dedit ut aequalis esset. Hoc est quod maius est omnibus." English translation in Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 89.

[65] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 223.

[66] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 224, n. 68.

[67] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 224, nn. 68, 69.

the Father together with the Son and the Spirit pursue and accomplish the redemption that belongs to God alone (Is. 45:21-5; Rom. 14:11; Phil. 2:10).[68]

Ellis's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son fails to account for the voluntary agreement and concurrence of wills among the persons of the Trinity in eternity. His position implicitly suggests a single redemptive will among the three persons, as it does not uphold Augustine's formulation, which provides a theological basis for the consubstantiality of the three immanent identities of the Trinity. Therefore, Ellis argues that the covenant of redemption neither affirms the inherent identities of the three persons nor the immanent relationships among them, nor does it establish three distinct wills within the Trinity.[69]

On the other hand, Ellis critiques Berkhof's articulation of the Reformed doctrine of the covenant of redemption, specifically challenging the notion that the three immanent persons within the Godhead can simultaneously share one essence through essential communication and possess three distinct wills and offices through personal generation.[70] Berkhof articulates:

> It is better to say that the Father generates the personal subsistence of the Son, but thereby also communicates to Him the divine essence in its entirety. But in doing this we should guard against the idea that the Father first generated a second person, and then communicated the divine essence to this person, for that would lead to the conclusion that the Son was not generated out of the divine essence, but created out of nothing. In the work of generation there was a communication of essence; it was one indivisible act. And in virtue of this communication the Son also has life in Himself. This is in agreement with the statement of Jesus, "For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself," John 5:26.[71]

Berkhof's argument stands in direct opposition to Ellis's position in four key aspects. First, he affirms that eternal generation is God's "necessary" and "natural" act and will.[72] Second, he acknowledges the twofold aspect of eternal generation, namely essential communication and personal generation. Third, he interprets John 5:26 in a manner that is fundamentally consistent with Augustine's interpretation.[73] Fourth, he explicitly asserts that essential communication is logically prior to personal generation.

Without adequately considering the historical context, Ellis maintains that Calvin uniquely interprets the Son's adverbial aseity as signifying that the Son is from no one. He quotes Calvin's statement that "before he clothed himself in our flesh, this eternal Word was begotten from the Father before the ages. He is true God, one with the Father in essence, power, majesty-even Jehovah, who has always possessed it of himself that he is, and has inspired the power of subsisting in other beings."[74] Ellis argues that Calvin's statement, "Jehovah, who has always possessed it of

[68] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 224.

[69] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 225.

[70] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 224, nn. 67, 68.

[71] Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, ed. Anthony Uyl (Ingersoll: Devoted Publishing, 2019), 64.

[72] Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, ed. Anthony Uyl (Ingersoll: Devoted Publishing, 2019), 63.

[73] See 1.3 of this study.

[74] Calvin, *Confessio de Trinitate*, CO 11:706. English translation in Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 42: "Quod ad Christum peculiariter attinet, duabus ipsum naturis constare affirmamus. Nam

himself that he is," should be interpreted as meaning "the one who exists self-existently," deriving this understanding from Calvin's application of the name Jehovah to the Son. However, relying on a limited selection of both Calvin's own writings and Baars's analysis of Calvin, Ellis asserts that "Calvin plainly claimed that, with respect to His divine nature, Christ is essentially and from eternity the one God 'who has always possessed it of Himself that He is.' As true God, together with the Father and the Spirit, the Son does not receive the one divine essence that He simply is; He is God self-existently."[75]

Nonetheless, Ellis seems to overlook the rationale behind Calvin's assertion that "the Son does not receive the one divine essence" within that specific context. Even though Ellis presents such writings by Calvin, Calvin conveys his unique nuance in his engagement with Chaponneau's argument. Ellis states:

> Chaponneau contends that Christ, because He is of the substance of the Father, is not *a se ipso*, since He has a beginning from another. This I allow to him of the person. What more does he want? ... I confess that the Son of God is of the Father. Accordingly, since the person has an order [*ratio*], I confess that He is not *a se ipso*. But when we are speaking of His divinity or simply of the essence (which is the same thing) apart from consideration of the person, I say that it is rightly predicated of Him that He is *a se ipso*.[76]

Calvin highlights the historical context of the time, where the phrase "*Deum de Deo*" was being misused as a basis for subordinationism. A similar historical context faced by Calvin is evident in his interpretation of "*Deum de Deo*" in response to Valentino Gentile.

Setting aside Ellis's understanding of Calvin's and his successors' views on eternal generation and aseity, it is necessary to examine the Trinitarian perspectives of Augustine and Calvin individually in order to discern the essential continuity or discontinuity in their understandings of eternal generation and aseity. In order to comprehend Calvin's teachings of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity, one should investigate how Calvin understand Augustine's concepts of the so-called Nicene speculation of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and the aseity.[77] The central issue is whether Augustine himself understands the term "eternal generation" as primarily emphasizing either the consubstantiality of the three persons (*vita Dei essentialiter*) or the incommunicable personalities of the three persons (*opera ad intra*), or possibly both. If both, the question then becomes which aspect [either the consubstantiality of the three persons or the incommunicable properties of the three persons] takes logical precedence.

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antequam carnem indueret, verbum illud aeternum fuit ex patre ante saecula genitum, verus Deus unius cum patre essentiae, potentiae, maiestatis, adeoque Jehova, qui a se ipso semper habuit ut esset, et aliis subsistendi virtutem inspiravit."

[75] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 45 n. 35.

[76] Calvin, *Thesauri epistoliei*, CO 11:16. English translation in Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 46: "Contendit Christum, quia sit ex substantia patris, non a se ipso esse, quum aliunde principium habeat. Haec illi de persona confiteor. Quid amplius petit? ... Sed ad rem ipsam redeo. Fateor Dei filium esse a patre. Itaque quum personae ratio habetur, fateor eum non esse a se ipso. Quum autem absque personae intuitu de eius divinitate, vel simpliciter de essentia, quod idem est, habetur sermo, dico hoc vere de ipso praedicari quod sit a se ipso."

[77] For more details on this issue, see Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, a Communication of Essence," 26-49; Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 480, 506–7, 532.

The recent scholars who disregard the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction in their trinitarian perspective do not examine the theological roles of the doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity in the theological context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To respond to Servetus's and Socinus's rejection of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, it is crucial to investigate whether the Trinitarian perspectives of Calvin, Servetus, Turretin, and Socinus include a comprehensive idea that supports the following: The Father generated the Son to share the same essence with Him by nature, hereafter termed as either "the Father's naturally voluntary act of generation of the Son" or the Father's natural generation of the Son."[78] Furthermore, this same eternal Son (or the Immanent Logos, who is God by "the Father's natural generation of the Son") had to conceal (or veil) Himself to be the Logos Brought Forth in the constitution of the Trinity's eternal decree, hereafter referred to as either "the Father's freely (or spontaneously) voluntary generation of the Son" or "the Father's volitional generation of the Son."[79]

Thus far, no one has thoroughly examined how Calvin's holistic understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity effectively addresses Servetus's anti-Trinitarian views, which reject the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, nor how Calvin's Trinitarian framework establishes the (hypothetical) necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Furthermore, the extent to which Turretin's reintroduction of Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity not only enhances Calvin's Trinitarian theology but also counters Socinus's unitarian perspective and his objections to the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction remains unexplored.[80] I will explore whether Calvin's and Turretin's Trinitarian views encompass a comprehensive concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son

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[78] For more details on the terms "the Father's naturally or spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son," see I.4 of this chapter. Also, refers to Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22: "Necessarium et voluntarium utcunque in Deo quoad nostrum concipiendi modum distinguantur, realiter tamen non opponuntur. Unde Pater necessario et voluntarie Filium genuisse dicitur; necessario quia natura genuit, ut est natura Deus, sed voluntarie, quia non coacte, sed lubenter genuit; non voluntate antecedente, quæ notat actum volendi liberum ad extra, sed concomitante, quæ notat naturalem volendi in Deo facultatem; non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis." English translation in Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr, trans. George Musgrave Giger (New Jersey: P & R Publishing, 1992), III.xxix.22.

[79] According to Richard Muller, the theological concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son is an act of God occurring in eternity (prior to creation) and can broadly be categorized as a voluntary act of God. In other words, eternal generation may be classified as part of the *voluntas Dei* (the will of God), which Muller divides into two categories: *voluntas necessaria sive naturalis* (necessary or natural will) and *voluntas libera* (spontaneous or free will). To avoid confusion and ensure clarity in this discussion, I will classify the term "the Father's eternal generation of the Son" into two categories: "the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son" and "the Father's spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son," or, more succinctly, "the Father's natural generation of the Son" and "the Father's volitional generation of the Son." Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 244–45, 399.

[80] For the following three reasons, I propose Francis Turretin as one of those who accurately identifies the differences between Calvin's and Socinus's Trinitarian atonement perspectives: First, Adam J. Johnson critiques Turretin's Trinitarian atonement perspective, but does not address Socinus's. Johnson admits that Barth's view is incompatible with the positions of Turretin or any other theologian who maintains the traditional distinction between the communicable and incommunicable attributes of the three persons. In other words, Johnson considers Turretin's advocacy of the necessity of satisfaction to be an extreme and illogical stance. Johnson's attempt to construct a new comprehensive Trinitarian atonement model raises the important question of whether Turretin aligns with Calvin's idea of eternal generation in his Trinitarian decree. Second, Turretin is a systematic theologian who was fully aware of Calvin's and Socinus's arguments on the Trinity and atonement. Turretin addressed specific issues in his *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, pointing out where Socinus diverged from Calvin. Finally, while many theologians refuted Socinus's denial of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Turretin was one of those who published a comprehensive systematic theology that could address the issue of atonement in relation to the Trinity. Cf. see Johnson, *Atonement*, 97–101.

and their aseity, a concept that could provide a theological foundation for the doctrine of the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.[81]

I.4. Classification of Terms: Eternal Generation and Essential Communication

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[81] Refers to Tutrretin's view: "Quidam enim necessariam quidem fatentur fuisse satisfactionem, sed ex hypothesi tantum decreti divini, quatenus hoc apud se statuit Deus, et hanc suam voluntatem in verbo patefecit, nimirum ut per satisfactionem sponsoris et Mediatoris nostri liberaremur: necessitatem etiam congruentiae hic agnoscunt, quia maxime congruum erat divinae maiestati, ne impune violari dicerentur ius praecepta, adeoque ipsi iustitiae praeiudicium aliquod fieri, peccata non aliter dimitti, quam accepta Christi satisfactione. At non ita absolute necessariam eam censent, quin alii modi liberationis et salutis Deo possibiles fuerint, qua in sententia videtur fuisse Augustinus, cum diserte dicat, lib. xiii. de Trinitate c. x., 'Alium modum Deo possibilem non defuisse cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiaceant, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse nec esse potuisse.' Alii vero non tantum necessitatem quandam hypotheticam urgent quae sola voluntate Dei nitatur, sed et absolutam quae fundetur in iustitia; unde perpendunt Deum mortem filii sui decrevisse in redemptionis pretium, non modo quia nolit peccata remittere sine satisfactione, sed et quia non possit per iustitiam; et hanc sententiam nos libenter amplectimur, tum quia Scripturae sacrae magis est consentanea, tum quia commodior est ad retundendam pestilentissimi haeretici pervicaciam, cui non parum, imprudentes licet, qui aliam insistunt viam, gratificantur." Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), vol. IV, p. 390. Given his statements above, Turretin appears to present two conflicting views on the necessity of Christ's satisfaction: one, supported by Augustine, holds that it was hypothetically necessary based on God's decree, in that another mode of salvation was possible but less fitting; the other asserts an absolute necessity rooted in divine justice, arguing that God could not remit sins without satisfaction—a view Turretin seems to endorse as more scripturally sound and more effective against heresy. However, I will demonstrate that Turretin's claim does not contradict Augustine but rather supports Augustine's hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction while simultaneously affirming the absolute necessity of Christ's vicarious death within the realm of time and space, due to Adam's actual sin and God's decree. He argues, "However, this is not to be understood as if we wish to restrict God's omnipotence in any way; for the question here is not properly what God could have done by His absolute power, but what He decreed to do within Himself and what was necessary for our salvation. Therefore, we say that Christ's satisfaction was necessary not only hypothetically, based on the decree and counsel of God, who appointed Christ as our sponsor so that, having been made sin for us, we might become the righteousness of God in Him, but also from the very nature of the matter itself, because no other means could be given that was better or more fitting for accomplishing the work of redemption." In his arguments above, Turretin never seeks to refute the relationship between the hypothetical necessity and the absolute necessity (indeed, Turretin aligns with Augustine on this point, as I will demonstrate later). Rather, Turretin explicates the relationship between Christ's twofold humiliation—namely, the humiliation of the Immanent Logos in becoming the Logos Brought Forth in eternity, and, as a consequence of Adam's sin, the humiliation of the Logos Brought Forth in becoming the Incarnate Logos. Since Turretin, in XIV-XX of the *Disputation on Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction*, primarily focuses on the second type of humiliation, the first type can be discerned through his comprehensive view of the relationship between his Trinitarian perspectives and atonement. For example, Turretin discusses universal and perpetual justice, which Socinus acknowledges, and vindictive and perpetual justice, which Socinus simultaneously denies, asserting that both are encompassed within God's nature. However, he does not explain how the foundation of this connection is theologically linked to the Father's natural and volitional generation. Only at the very end does Turretin briefly affirm that the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction is a matter of the doctrine of the Trinity; however, he neither provides a detailed explanation of this necessity nor explicitly connects it to his concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. He argues, "Moreover, because it was not fitting for either the Father or the Holy Spirit to become incarnate and take on the role of Mediator—since the Father could not be sent, as He exists from Himself, nor could He humble Himself economically below the Son and the Holy Spirit, who proceed from Him, and act as Mediator; nor could the Spirit undertake this role, because He was to be sent by the Mediator and to be engaged in the application of the salvation that had been obtained—only the Son could properly sustain this office." Refer to Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), vol. IV, p. 390-405: "Quod tamen ita intelligendum non est quasi Dei omnipotentiam ullatenus restringere velimus; Neque enim hic quæritur proprie quid Deus potuerit absoluta sua potentia, sed quid facere apud se statuerit, quidve ad salutem nostram necessarium fuerit. Dicimus ergo necessariam fuisse hanc Christi satisfactionem, non modo ex hypothesi decreti et consilii Dei, qui Christum in sponsorem nobis destinavit ut peccatum pro nobis factus nos essemus iustitia Dei in ipso; sed etiam ex ipsius natura rei, quia nullum aliud melius vel convenientius dari poterat medium ad opus redemptionis peragendum; … Porro quia non decebat vel Patrem vel Spiritum S. incarnari et Mediatorem fieri, siquidem nec Pater potuit mitti cum sit a se ipso, nec infra Filium et Spiritum S. qui ab ipso sunt oeconomice humiliari et Mediatorem agere; Nec Spiritus id muneris poterat obire quia debuit a Mediatore mitti et versari circa applicationem salutis acquisitæ; solus Filius potuit commode hoc munus sustinere qui ut medius inter Patrem et Spiritum, Mediator potuit esse inter Deum et homines; et ut natura erat Filius per gratiam filios nos facere, redimendo per iustitiam quos per potentiam creaverat; Sic ut necesse fuit Λόγον incarnari et θεάνθρωπον fieri, necesse etiam fuit ad redemptionem nostram Christum θεάνθρωπον pro nobis satisfacere: ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι."

The complexities involved in discussing the doctrine of the Trinity arise from scholars' differing interpretations of the terms "eternal generation of the Son" and "aseity," as well as their interrelation. Their various perceptions of the terms "the eternal generation of the Son" and "aseity" must be identified and classified if one is to resolve these complexities. However, providing concise yet precise definitions of these terms within this introduction is impractical, especially given the difficulty of reaching a consensus on their definitions among contemporary scholars. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of the theological debates surrounding Augustine's and Calvin's concepts of eternal generation and *Principium*—which were distorted or challenged by the anti-Trinitarian beliefs of Servetus and Socinus during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—allows us to achieve a clearer and more historically informed understandings of eternal generation and aseity. Additionally, given Calvin's and Turretin's attempts to clarify Augustine's notions of eternal generation and *Principium*, a detailed analysis of how they applied Augustine's concepts could provide a deeper insight into the interpretation of the relationship between the Father's eternal generation of the Son and aseity during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In this initial phase, I aim to explore the historical and theological issues regarding the relationship between eternal generation and aseity, as presented by Augustine, John Calvin, Michael Servetus, Faustus Socinus, and Francis Turretin. Calvin, Servetus, Socinus, and Turretin were chosen as representatives because they held significantly opposing views on the Trinitarian disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Additionally, Augustine was selected as a crucial figure for investigation, as both Calvin and Servetus referenced him to either affirm or develop their Trinitarian perspectives.

Calvin appears to acknowledge Augustine's notion of the Father's eternal generation of the natural Son. He states in his catechism (1545), "We are the children of God not by nature, but only by adoption and by grace, in that God wills to regard us as such (Eph. 1:5). But the Lord Jesus, who was born from the substance of His Father and is of one essence with the Father, is correctly called the only Son of God, since he is a natural (one) alone."[82] Calvin exposes two distinguished conceptions by which one can be either the Son of God or the son of God: The Father's natural Son by nature, and the Father's adoptive children by grace.[83] Calvin appears to distinguish two aspects of God's will (*voluntas Dei*) here. It is through the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son that the Son of God is of the same essence as the Father.[84] It is by grace—that is, through the

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[82] Calvin, *Le Catechisme De Geneve* (1545), CO 6:24: "Cur filium Dei unicum nuncupas, quum hac quoque appellatione nos omnes dignetur Deus? Quod filii Dei sumus, non id habemus a natura, sed adoptione et gratia duntaxat: quod nos eo loco habeat Deus. At Dominus Iesus, qui ex substantia patris est genitus, uniusque cum patre essentiae est, optimo iure filius Dei unicus vocatur: quum solus sit natura." Cf. Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, a Communication of Essence," *Kerux* 25, no. 1 (May 2010): 26–49.

[83] Augustine employs the same logic as Calvin in his commentaries on John 10:22-24, stating, "Of us such a thing may be said: there was a time when we were the sons of men, but were not the sons of God. For we are made the sons of God by grace, but He by nature, for such was He born. And yet not so, as that one may say, He did not exist till He was born; for He, who was coeternal with the Father, was never unborn. Let him who is wise understand: and whoever understands not, let him believe and be nourished, and he will come to understanding. The Word of God was always with the Father, and always the Word; and because the Word, therefore the Son. So then, always the Son, and always equal." Augustine's commentaries on John 10:22-24 clearly assume the following three points: 1. The sons of men are born according to temporal wills, while the sons of God are born by grace in accordance with God's eternal decrees. 2. The Son of God, by nature, is substantially different from the sons of God by grace. 3. The natural birth of the Son, by which the Son is coeternal and equal with the Father, is substantially different from the eternal birth of the sons by grace.

[84] Muller distinguishes between God's *voluntas necessaria sive naturalis* (necessary or natural will) and *voluntas libera* (spontaneous or free will). He characterizes the necessary and natural will as an essential act of God, which forms the basis for all *opera ad extra*, while the spontaneous and free will is described as a hypothetical act of

Father's spontaneous pleasure and will—that God decided to regard us as His children.[85] If so, we can be called the children of God based on the Father's spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son (namely, by grace) (John 1:1).[86] The second aspect of God's will may be described as the Trinity's freely or spontaneously voluntary act, wherein the three persons of the Trinity—or at minimum, the Father and His naturally begotten Son—freely choose to regard us in this manner. Absent such a voluntary determination, the Trinity would not have willed it.[87] Considering the above writings of Calvin, it is necessary to analyze whether Calvin rejects or embraces Augustine's presupposition that the eternal Son of God, by nature, signifies that the only begotten Son of God, who was born naturally from the essence of his Father, shares the same essence as the Father.

In order to correctly understand Calvin's notions of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity, it is essential to analyze Augustine's ideas of them. Augustine states:

> Therefore, the logic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics arose, should be ridiculed. Since he could not understand, nor did he want to believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by whom all things were made, is the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten of the substance of the Father, he stated that He was the Son, not of His own nature, substance, or essence, but the Son of the will of God; since of course he wishes to assert that the will by which God begot the son is accidental to God.[88]

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the Trinity, serving as the foundation for all *opera Dei personalia*. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 244–45, 399. Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xiv.1,2: "I. Intellectum Dei sequitur necessario Voluntas, cujus objectum est tantum bonum, ut intellectus est verum. Quia vero bonum vel est increatum et infinitum, vel finitum et creatum; hinc duplex voluntati objectum. assignatur, primarium nimirum Deus, ut bonum infinitum; secundarium vero res omnes creatæ extra Deum, quæ rationem habent boni finiti, quas etiam extra se vult Deus, sed non eodem modo; se quidem necessario per complacentiam, alia vero omnia libere ex decreto: Unde quæstio proposita oritur. II. Ad statum quæst. observa 1. necessarium duplex esse: Aliud absolutum quod simpliciter et per se suaque natura non potest aliter se habere, ut Deum esse bonum, justum &c. Aliud hypotheticum, quod non ita est ex se et simpliciter tale, quin possit aliter se habere, sed tamen posito aliquo necessario sequitur, nec potest aliter se habere; ut si ponas Deum prædestinasse Jacobum ad salutem, necesse est Jacobum salvari, nimirum ex hypothesi decreti; quia alias potuisset non prædestinari, et non salvari. Quando ergo quæritur, An Deus velit quædam necessario, quædam vero libere; non agitar tantum de necessitate hypothetica: sic enim ea quæ Deus vult libere, posito decreto non potest amplius non velle; sed de necessitate absoluta."

[85] Ellis offers a critique of Swinburnson's work but does not provide any theological evidence to support his argument. Ellis presents a different interpretation of Calvin's statement than Swinburnson, arguing that "Although Calvin was willing to allow traditional language of the Son's generation 'of the substance of the Father', and even of the Son being from the Father 'with respect to his eternal essence', this was because the comparative context of such statements demands they be taken according to a strictly relative meaning." Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 171 n. 5. However, Ellis's argument that "the comparative context of such statements … demands a strictly relative meaning" should be examined to determine whether Calvin's statement that "the Lord Jesus, who … is of one essence with the Father, since he is a natural (one) alone" gives logical priority to the comparative context of such statements over the traditional meaning of the Son's generation. It is more persuasive to suggest that Calvin understands the natural Son to be of the same essence as the Father, while also recognizing that the personal Son was begotten by an act of the spontaneous will of the Father simultaneously.

[86] Calvin's commentary on John 1:1 clearly assumes the following three points: Eternal generation is God's act that occurred once in eternity, independent of the temporal world; in other words, it is a purposeful act that took place within God. Regarding the nature of order, the Father occupies the first position by eternal generation, while the Son occupies the second, indicating a comparative relationship between the Father and the Son. The eternal generation that occurred in this infinite and eternal era must be revealed and manifested, whether in a vague or clear manner, within temporal periods. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2, on John 1:1.

[87] Calvin often uses the terms "free" (voluntatis libera) and "contingent" (contingenter) will interchangeably. Cf. "Neque tamen hic etiam error tolerabilis est. Hac enim Providentia quam universalem appellant, nihil impediri tradunt, vel creaturas omnes, quominus contingenter moveantur, vel hominem, quo minus libero voluntatis suae arbitrio huc atque illuc se convertat." Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), I.xvi.4; CO 4:147.

[88] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38: PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220:

Eunomius, whose Trinitarian view Augustine seeks to refute, considers the eternal generation of the Son to be merely an accidentally (or contingently) voluntary generation. However, Augustine attempts to accuse Eunomius of his denial of the naturally and necessarily voluntary generation by which the Father naturally begot the Son, who has the same nature, substance, or essence as the Father. According to Augustine, the Father's eternal generation of the Son must first be understood as being initiated and established through the concept of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son.

Setting aside Eunomius's view of the Son as being generated by the accidental will of God, it is important to examine whether Augustine distinguishes between a naturally voluntary generation, which is both necessary and immutable, and a spontaneously voluntary generation, which is hypothetical yet immutable.[89] Augustine's following argument suggests that, just as there is a relationship between human nature, which is changeable, and human will, which is likewise changeable, so too there exists a relationship between God's naturally voluntary generation, which is necessary and immutable, and His spontaneously voluntary generation, which is hypothetical yet immutable. Augustine asserts:

> For it is written, "Many are the thoughts in the heart of man, but the counsel of the Lord abideth for ever," for no other reason except that we may understand or believe that as God is eternal, so is His counsel for eternity, and therefore unchangeable, as He himself is. … But that other, with great wakefulness, demanded of him in turn, whether God the Father was God willingly or unwillingly; in order that if he answered unwillingly, that misery would follow, which to believe of God is sheer madness; and if he said willingly, it would be replied to him, Then He is God too by His own will, not by His nature. What remained, then, except that he should hold his peace, and discern that he was himself bound by his own question in an insoluble bond?[90]

"Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intelligere, nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium." It is essential to examine Augustine's understanding of the term "the Son of God by nature," which underscores the consubstantiality of the two persons.

[89] Given Muller's description of the will of God (*voluntas Dei*), God's necessary or natural will (*voluntas necessaria sive naturalis*) indicates that "God must necessarily will to be himself, to be who and what he eternally is. … God wills his own goodness, justice, and holiness, necessarily or naturally so." Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 399. From this perspective, the Reformed concept of essential communication pertains to God's necessary, though not spontaneous, voluntary activity, "since the divine essence is simple… the divine will is both one (unica) and simple (simplex)." God's free or spontaneous will (voluntas libera) refers to the fact that "God determines all things" in eternity. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 245. The internal and personal works of God (*opera Dei personalia*) refer to "the activity of the Father in begetting the Son; the activity of the Father and the Son in spirating the Spirit; the relation of the Son to the Father through being begotten (passive generation); and the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son through being spirated (passive spiration)." Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22. From this standpoint, the Reformed concept of *opera Dei essentialia* (the essential works of God) could refer to the combined relationship between God's necessary and spontaneously voluntary activity, since since "although the three persons work as one, there is nevertheless a manner of working that corresponds with the interpersonal relations of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

[90] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38: PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220: " Neque enim ob aliud scriptum est: Multae cogitationes in corde viri; consilium autem Domini manet in aeternum; nisi ut intellegamus sive credamus, sicut aeternum Deum, ita in aeternum eius esse consilium, ac per hoc immutabile, sicut ipse est. ... At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens an nolens sit Deus: ut si responderet: "Nolens", sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret: "Volens", responderetur ei: "Ergo et ipse Deus est sua voluntate, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret?"

While Augustine distinguishes between God's "naturally unchangeable essence" and "sponteanously unchangeable counsel," he simultaneously emphasizes that there is an inseparable relationship between the two. The fundamental distinction between Eunomius's concept of an "accidentally voluntary act" and Augustine's notion of a "spontaneously voluntary act" lies in whether the voluntary act is indifferent and thus unrelated to His essence, or spontaneous and therefore inherently related to His immutable essence. Augustine's argument suggests that, while the Father's spontaneously and unchangeably voluntary act is distinct from, yet inherently connected to, the Father's naturally and necessarily voluntary act, the former may be regarded as hypothetical yet immutable. However, since this spontaneous voluntary act arises from God's immutable nature, which is both eternal and unchanging, it is itself eternal and, therefore, unchangeable. Given the arguments of Augustine discussed thus far, a thorough examination is required to determine whether Augustine accepts or rejects the possibility of a spontaneous, hypothetical, and unchangeable will of God, namely, the Trinity's eternal decrees or the counsel of the Lord.[91]

Even during the Reformed and Post-Reformed periods, the distinction between a naturally and necessarily voluntary generation and a spontaneously and unchangeably voluntary generation was often misinterpreted by theologians. For instance, Servetus, in refuting Arius's heresy of subordinationism, distorted that distinction, thereby contributing to this misunderstanding. On the one hand, he argues:

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[91] Augustine seems to identify two aspects of the Word. The first is characterized as "the counsel or will itself of the Father," highlighting the distinct personality of the Son in contrast to the Father. The second aspect emphasizes that the Word, or the Son, shares the same essence as the Father. Based on his belief in the Son's having the same nature as the Father, Augustine argues that "[the same Word is] counsel of counsel, and will of will, as substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom." Likewise, Augustine explains that the Holy Spirit can be associated with two aspects of God's will: as God, the Holy Spirit is the natural will of God, and as the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit is the personal will of God. In discussing the Spirit's distinct personality, Augustine argues that "if any person in the Trinity is also to be specially called the will of God, this name, like love, is better suited to the Holy Spirit; for what else is love, except will?" Regarding the Spirit's natural and necessary aspect, he asserts that "the Holy Spirit is God, and not of another substance [but of the same substance as the Father and the Son], nor less than the Father and the Son." Thus, Augustine outlines three types of will: first, there is the inadvertently accidental (and thus changeable) will of humans, which would render God's will the most absurd; second, there is God's spontaneous and free will, which is nonetheless unchangeable and eternal; finally, there is the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the essence of the Father and the Son and represents God's natural and necessary will, thereby sharing the same essence as the Father and the Son. "Quidam ne filium consilii vel voluntatis Dei dicerent unigenitum Verbum, ipsum consilium seu voluntatem Patris idem Verbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius, quantum existimo, dicitur consilium de consilio, et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia: ne absurditate illa quam iam refellimus, Filius dicatur Patrem facere sapientem vel volentem, si non habet Pater in substantia sua consilium vel voluntatem. Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens an nolens genuerit: ut si diceret: "Nolens", absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem: "Volens", continuo quod intendebat velut invicta ratione concluderet, non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens an nolens sit Deus: ut si responderet: "Nolens", sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret: "Volens", responderetur ei: "Ergo et ipse Deus est sua voluntate, non natura." Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret? Sed voluntas Dei si et proprie dicenda est aliqua in Trinitate persona, magis hoc nomen Spiritui Sancto competit, sicut caritas. Nam quid est aliud caritas, quam voluntas? Video me de Spiritu Sancto in isto libro secundum Scripturas sanctas hoc disputasse, quod fidelibus sufficit scientibus iam Deum esse Spiritum Sanctum, nec alterius substantiae, nec minorem quam est Pater et Filius, quod in superioribus libris secundum easdem Scripturas verum esse docuimus." Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38-39: PL 42:1087-1088. English translation in Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: First Series, Volume Three*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 220. Cf. There are two distinct categories of "contingency" (or accident). According to Turretin, "A thing may be contingent in two ways: either with respect to the first cause (inasmuch as it can be produced or not produced by God, and thus all creatures are contingent with respect to God, because He might not have created any had He so willed); or with respect to second causes (which can produce or not produce their effect, and are thus distinguished from necessary causes)." Refer to Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xii.8.

But I say that He has been a man, a Son, by nature and by will. God did not at some point decide to will, but He eternally willed: and, as He willed through the act of contemplation, it followed naturally. Reasoning is natural as is cognition, will, and knowledge in God. According to these, He decreed both naturally and willfully. … Therefore, the Logos was naturally and willfully, the ideal reason and expression, the radiance of Christ with God, his light with God."[92]

Servetus's concept of the relationship between the Father's natural reasoning of Christ and His natural willing of Christ neither corresponds to nor affirms Augustine's understanding of the relationship between the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son and the Trinity's spontaneously and immutably determined counsel and decrees in eternity, since Servetus obscures the distinction between "by naturally voluntary generation" and "by accidentally voluntary generation" by asserting that "reasoning is natural, as are cognition, will, and knowledge in God." In an effort to refute Arius's heresy of subordinationism, Servetus seems to seek to blur the distinction between the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son and His accidentally voluntary generation, thereby rendering the hypothetical necessity of Christ's sacrificial death on the cross either *unnecessary* or *accidental*. Servetus's concept of the relationship between Father's natural reasoning of Christ and His natural willing of Christ does not correspond to or affirm Augustine's idea of the relationship between the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son and the Trinity's spontaneously and immutably counsel and decrees in eternity. If Servetus interprets the term "by nature" not in accordance with Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, but rather as a reference to the eternal reasoning within God or some other meaning, it is essential to thoroughly examine whether his understanding of the "natural Son of God" in relation to eternal generation is substantively identical to or distinct from that of Augustine.

On the other hand, Servetus at times employs the term "by nature" in the sense of "by emanation of the Word from the eternal Logos (or Reasoning) to the temporal Word." According to Calvin, Servetus argues, "I say that God has produced this Son from His own substance from eternity. Hence, He is said to be from God *naturally*. Now, the Word is the flesh of Christ by hypostatic union. Thus, I plainly say that the flesh of Christ is from heaven, according to the essence of the deity, and that this very flesh is called the manna given from heaven."[93] The flesh of Christ, being from heaven (i.e., derived from the essence of the deity), is indeed the manna given from heaven as divine substance. The manna, in which such divine substance can exist, comes through the twofold meaning of the natural Word, since the eternal and natural reasoning of the Word, having been naturally generated from the Father in eternity, was likewise naturally generated and given to the flesh of Christ through the temporal and natural Word. This process may be

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[92] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207–8: "PET. Voluntarie ergo genuit Deus filium, non naturaliter. MICH. Inter Athanasium et Arrium, inter Basilium et Eunomium, inter Augustinum et Maximinum, ac eius, farinae reliquos, fuit acerrima quaestio, An filius Dei sit natura filius, an sit patris voluntate filius? Leguntur haec in Athanasio, libro de fide sua, et in disputationibus contra Arrium, in Basilio contra Eunomium, in Augustino contra Maximinum, lib. 15. de trinit. contra sermonem Arrianorum, quaestione septima ad Orosium, et aliis quaestionibus. Arriani patrem dicebant libera voluntate genuisse filium nulla necessitate aut lege naturae coactum, atque ita filium aliquando caepisse. Nolebant concedere, esse filium naturae, ne videretur æqualis et coeternus patri: de separato quodam reali filio semper intelligentes. Nolebat Athanasius, Basilius et Augustinus concedere, esse filium voluntate, ne videretur non coaeternus, et ne esset mutatio in Deo, si aliquando caeperit velle. At ego dico, fuisse hominem filium natura et voluntate. Non caepit Deus aliquando velle, fed ab aeterno voluit: et vt cogitando voluit, est naturaliter sequutum. Naturalis est ratio, cognitio, voluntas, et scientia in Deo. Secundum ea naturaliter et voluntarie decreuit. … Naturaliter ergo, et voluntarie erat logos, idealis ratio, et prolatio, relucentia Christi apud Deum, lux eius apud Deum."

[93] Calvin, *Defensio doctrinae de trinitate contra Servetum*, CO 8:516.

understood as the emanation of eternal reasoning into the temporal Logos.[94] By this, the meaning of hypostatic union in one person becomes entirely different from that of Calvin. Servetus's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son neither aligns with nor affirms Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son, which is spontaneously and immutably determined by the Trinity in eternity. This divergence arises from Servetus's use of the term "by nature" with a dual meaning: the natural reasoning within the Father's essence and the natural, temporal manifestation of the Father's essence.

Faustus Socinus proposed a concept of eternal generation as a form of regeneration, which, in accordance with the Father's internal wills and attributes, may apply to both Jesus and all other human beings. On the one hand, Socinus appears to acknowledge the Father's eternal generation of the Son in a different sense than Servetus. Socinus argues, "We deny that Servetus was our progenitor."[95] Socinus accuses Servetus's heirs, especially Jakub Wujek (1541-1597), with being proteges of Mahometan.[96] Socinus claims that Servetus is willing to confess that Jesus is the "son of the eternal God" but denies that He is the "eternal Son of God."[97] Here, Socinus seems to acknowledge the notion of the Father's eternal generation of the Son because he affirms that Jesus is the eternal Son of God. On the other hand, Socinus explicitly rejects the concept of the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son, a doctrine by which Augustine affirms the Son's consubstantiality with the Father.[98] He argues, "I confess willingly and acknowledge that singularity [therefore, it is necessary that he was born from God in this singular reason, apart from all the other sons of God]: but I do not therefore concede that it [singularity] consists in the fact that Christ was generated from the substance of God himself, while others not at all."[99] Since Socinus believes that the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son results in two distinct essences, he rejects this idea to uphold the view that only the Father possesses the one essence.[100] Socinus, in his concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, removes the notion of "by nature" or "by the Father's natural generation of the Son," as employed by Augustine, restricting it instead to signify Jesus's or others' regeneration as effected through the Father's internal wills and qualities. Therefore, Socinus's concept of eternal generation can be defined as the Father's renewal of human beings, occurring not in eternity but in temporality,[101] and devoid of the Father's naturally voluntary

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[94] For more details on this process, see 2.2.1-3 of this study.

[95] Faustus Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki, De Divinitate Filii Dei & Spiritus Sancti*, in *Opera Omnia in Duos Tomos Distincta*, vol. 2 (Irenopoli, 1656), 535: "Negamus Servetum fuisse progenitorem nostrum."

[96] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki*, II:535.

[97] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki*, II:535.

[98] Socinus, *De Coena Domini Tractatus Brevis, Ad Argumenta Pro Trinitate F. S. Responsio*, I:799.

[99] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Hic fateor libenter, atque agnosco singularitatem istam [Quamobrem necesse est, illum singulari aliqua ratione ex Deo esse natum praeter reliquos omnes Dei filios.]: sed non propterea concedo, eam in eo consistere, quod Christus ex ipsa subfiantia Dei sit generatus, alii vero minime. Iam enim ostensum est, Dei substantiam nec dividi, nec multiplicari, nec eandem ipsam unam numero pluribus personis communem esse posse."

[100] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Iam enim ostensum est, Dei substantiam nec dividi, nec multiplicari, nec eandem ipsam unam numero pluribus personis communem esse posse."

[101] As observed in the case of Augustine, it is only through the Father's naturally and necessarily voluntary generation of the Son that the Son can share the same nature as the Father; in this context, both the Father and the Son, being of the same essence, can possess a will that is contingent yet simultaneously unchangeable. If one were to claim only the Father's spontaneously and contingently voluntary generation of the Son, without acknowledging the naturally and necessarily voluntary generation, such a claim would lack the logical basis for asserting an eternal and, therefore,

generation of the Son. If Socinus interprets the term "by the Father's eternal will (i.e., generation)" not in accordance with Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, but rather as a reference to the Father's internal wills and qualities, it is essential to critically assess whether Socinus's concept of the relationship between the Father and His internal wills and qualities neither corresponds to nor affirms Augustine's understanding of the relationship between the Father's naturally voluntary generation of the Son and the Father's spontaneously and immutably determined counsel and decrees in eternity.

Turretin provided a more precise notion of the inseparable relationship between Father's naturally and necessarily voluntary generation of the Son and the Father's personally and spontaneously volunatary generation of the Son. On the one hand, Turretin argues:

> Necessary and voluntary may in a measure be distinguished in God as to our manner of conception, yet they are not really opposed. Hence the Father is said to have begotten the Son necessarily and voluntarily; necessarily because he begat by nature, as he is God by nature, but voluntarily, because he begat not by coaction (*coacte*), but freely.[102]

Turretin posits that the Father's necessary and natural will is equivalent to the Father's necessarily and naturally voluntary generation of the Son. Turretin's idea of the necessary and necessary generation is found in Augustine's idea of the natural and necessary generation of the Son.[103] On the other hand, he continues to describe another form of generation, namely, the Father's personally and spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son. He states that "Although the Son may be said to be begotten by the Father, it does not follow that the Son is the Son of himself because the essence does not generate an essence, but a person (the Father, the Son, who is another one, although not another thing)."[104] The concept of the Father's personally and spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son implicitly refers to the idea that God the Trinity has a will that is not necessary or natural but rather free and spontaneous, likely attributed to the Trinity's eternal decrees.[105] It can be

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unchangeable will.

[102] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22: "Necessarium et voluntarium utcunque in Deo quoad nostrum concipiendi modum distinguantur, realiter tamen non opponuntur. Unde Pater necessario et voluntarie Filium genuisse dicitur; necessario quia natura genuit, ut est natura Deus, sed voluntarie, quia non coacte, sed lubenter genuit; non voluntate antecedente, quæ notat actum volendi liberum ad extra, sed concomitante, quæ notat naturalem volendi in Deo facultatem; non libertate indifferentiæ, sed spontaneitatis." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.22.

[103] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xii.8. Also, see Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xiv.3. Turretin mentions, "Free is said either with reference to spontaneity or indifference: the former what is done spontaneously and without compulsion, but the latter what is so disposed that it can be done and not be done. When it is asked whether God wills some things freely, not only the will of spontaneity is meant (for so the things which God wills most necessarily, he wills also freely, i.e., without coaction), but properly the liberty of indifference (i.e., whether he so wills that he could have nilled them)." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xiv.3.

[104] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.23. "Licet Filius a Patre genitus dicatur, non sequitur Filium fore sui ipsius Filium, quia Essentia non generat Essentiam, sed Persona Personam; Pater Filium, qui ab ipso est alius, licet non aliud." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.23.

[105] According to Turretin's definition of God's free will, the Father's personally voluntary generation of the Son could be confined to the following two cases: Either the liberty of spontaneity or the liberty of indifference. Turretin mentions, "Free is said either with reference to spontaneity or indifference: the former what is done spontaneously and without compulsion, but the latter what is so disposed that it can be done and not be done. When it is asked whether God wills some things freely, not only the will of spontaneity is meant (for so the things which God wills most necessarily, he wills also freely, i.e., without coaction), but properly the liberty of indifference (i.e., whether he so wills that he could have nilled them)." Turretin states, "The cause of indifference is not mutability, but liberty. The will of God could be indifferent before the decree, but after the decree it cannot be mutable." Therefore, there are two types

inferred that the Son, begotten of the Father in a natural and necessary manner, possesses a spontaneous will, as He, being God, decreed with spontaneity in eternity. If the eternal Son of God, who is God with the same nature and essence as the Father, had spontaneously decreed, this decree of God can be called the eternal Son's free and spontaneous will, which will hereafter be referred to as either "the Father's personally and spontaneously voluntary generation of the Son" or "the Immanent Logos's self-humiliation to be the Logos Brought Forth."[106]

In summary, the definition of eternal generation, as outlined by the aforementioned theologians, can be categorized into three distinct types: 1) a naturally and necessarily voluntary generation, followed by a spontaneously and unchangeably voluntary generation in eternity (Turretin); 2) an eternal generation without a spontaneously and unchangeably voluntary generation in eternity (Servetus); and 3) an eternal generation without a naturally and necessarily voluntary generation (Socinus). In light of Muller's *Voluntas Dei* and recent debates concerning the Trinity (I.3), as well as the 16th- and 17th-century understandings of eternal generation and *Principium* (I.4), it is important to examine the theological roles of both the Father's necessarily and naturally voluntary act of generating the Son and the Father's spontaneously and personally voluntary act of generating the Son. To simplify the terminology, I will henceforth refer to these as *the Father's natural generation of the Son* and *the Father's volitional generation of the Son*.

To better understand these terms and controversies, it is essential to investigate whether Augustine's and Turretin's Trinitarian perspectives are substantially different from Calvin's. Furthermore, it is crucial to evaluate whether the Trinitarian perspectives of Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin provide a holistic notion that integrates the interrelationship between the three persons' shared consubstantiality, their incommunicable personalities (the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding), their distinct offices (the originator, the executor, and the applier), and their respective wills (the Father's giving or sending, the Son's redeeming, and the Spirit's applying). Chapters 1 through 6 explore the extent to which Calvin's Trinitarian perspective aligns with Augustine's and Turretin's concepts of natural and volitional generation within their respective Trinitarian frameworks. Additionally, these chapters examine whether the three Trinitarian perspectives, as opposed to those of Servetus and Socinus, provide a robust theological foundation for the doctrine of the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

I.5. Purpose of the Research and Thesis Statement

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of "contingent" or "accidental." Turretin states that "a thing may be contingent in two ways-either with respect to the first cause (inasmuch as it can be produced or not produced by God, and so all creatures are contingent with respect to God because he might not have created any if he had so willed); or with respect to second causes (which can produce or not produce their effect and are thus distinguished from necessary causes)." Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xiv.3. Also, see Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xii.8. The necessary and natural will of God aligns with the Father's necessary and natural generation of the Son. The Son or the Spirit was generated or proceeded by the necessary and natural will of God before the Trinity had decreed His purpose. The Son or the Spirit, who was generated or proceeded necessarily and naturally, decreed His purpose through His free and spontaneous will in eternity. Thus, the decree of God, which the Trinity constituted by employing their free and spontaneous wills, can be called God's purposeful, eternal will.

[106] I will examine this topic in greater detail in Chapter 6. Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.9: "Frustra etiam opponitur, talem esse generationem quæ sit pars decreti, aut effectum ejus, atque ideo opus mere arbitrarium; Narrabo, inquit, decretum, Dominus mihi dixit, Tu es Filius meus, hodie genui te, Pete a me, et dabo tibi in hæreditatem gentes; Nam generatio ista non proponitur ut pars decreti istius, sed tantum ut ejus fundamentum, quo nititur Regnum universale quod illi conceditur; Nam nisi Christus fuisset verus et æternus Dei Filius, ab ipso ab æterno genitus, nunquam potuisset in Mediatorem destinari, et regnum universale obtinere."

Due to space constraints, this study will not address how the doctrine of eternal generation, as reflected in Calvin's and Turretin's Trinitarian perspectives, either supports or challenges contemporary Trinitarian atonement models that disregard or revise the doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. This study does not aim to prove that any recent Trinitarian atonement model lacking the historical doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is necessarily rooted in the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus or Socinus. Instead, this study seeks to examine the theological role of the doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity in elucidating the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity in Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin, and their respective understandings of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Especially, this study will examine whether Calvin, and later Turretin in a more comprehensive manner, present a unifying idea in their Trinitarian perspectives that unites the two presuppositions of the Trinity enumerated above. This study will also explain how their Trinitarian views can counter the anti-Trinitarian critiques of Servetus and Socinus, who deny the hypothetical necessity of the second person's vicarious satisfaction and work for divine justice and eternal wrath. While acknowledging the minor differences between Calvin and Turretin within their historical contexts, I will highlight the substantial continuity between their doctrines of eternal generation and aseity by examining the doctrinal issues that set Calvin apart from his opponents, Servetus and Gentile, and Turretin from his opponent, Socinus.

I will demonstrate that Calvin's and Turretin's holistic Trinitarian perspectives effectively incorporate two fundamental Trinitarian principles: (1) preserving the one consubstantial essence (essential aseity) by emphasizing either the Son's absolute aseity (in Calvin's view) or the Father's natural generation of the Son (in Turretin's view); and (2) upholding the distinct personality of the Son through the Father's volitional generation of the Son as Mediator, within the theological framework of the Trinity's eternal decrees, as articulated by both Calvin and Turretin. This historical and theological account indicates that the second Trinitarian presupposition involves the (not absolute but hypothetical) necessity for the humiliation of the Immanent Logos (*Logos endiathetos*) to be the Logos Brought Forth (*Logos prophorikos*), as determined by the Trinity's eternal decrees (*pactum salutis*). It also implies that the necessity of Christ's sacrificial death, or satisfaction, is hypothetical rather than absolute and is primarily rooted in the eternal decrees of the Trinity, with Adam's fall serving as a subsequent condition.

I.6. Primary Sources

To support my arguments, I will utilize the following primary sources. First, I will conduct a detailed analysis of Augustine's *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim* and *Johannis Evangelium Tractatus*,[107] as well as Calvin's *Institutio Christianae Religionis* and *Commentaries* in his *Opera Omnia*.[108] This analysis aims to uncover how Augustine's and Calvin's Trinitarian perspectives

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[107] I will translate all Latin texts longer than five lines found in Chapters 2–7 into English. I will use the following Latin texts from Augustine's works: Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, in *Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: Garnier et Migne, 1887); idem, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, in *Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina* ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: Garnier et Migne, 1887). English translation in Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: First Series, Volume Three*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956); idem, *Tractates on the Gospel According to St. John*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: First Series, Volume Seven*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956).

[108] I will use the following Latin texts from Calvin's works: John Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), in *Joannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*, ed. Guiliemus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, and Eduard

maintain both Christ's consubstantiality with God the Father and his subordination to the will of the Father. Second, I will examine Turretin's *Institutio Thelogiae Elencticae* in his *Opera Omnia* to investigate his application of the concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.[109] Third, I will analyze the primary sources of Servetus and Socinus to fairly evaluate the

Reuss, vol. 2 (Brunsvigae: Schwetschke, 1863); idem, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, in *Joannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*, ed. Guiliemus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss, vol. 47 (Brunsvigae: Schwetschke, 1863); idem, *Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli ad Philippenses*, in *Joannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*, ed. Guiliemus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss, vol. 52 (Brunsvigae: Schwetschke, 1863). English translation in John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006); idem, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 1, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1847); idem, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1847); idem, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews*, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. John Owen (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979); idem, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Philippians*, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979); idem, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans*, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. John Owen (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979). In the introduction, I noted that recent scholars' differing understandings of the Father's eternal generation of the Son result in distinct perspectives on Christology and atonement. Therefore, I need to focus not only on the Christologies and doctrines of atonement in the works of Augustine, Calvin, Servetus, Socinus, and Turretin, but also on their respective Trinitarian perspectives. Since the primary methodology of the recent theologians discussed in the introduction is to analyze their understanding of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, it is essential to identify how Augustine, Calvin, Servetus, Socinus, and Turretin understand the relationship between their Trinitarian perspectives and Christologies—a relationship that is theologically connected to the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction—in their comprehensive works, such as their Institutes or commentaries. Although I rarely quote Calvin's *Defensio doctrinae de Trinitate contra Servetum* or Turretin's *Disputationum de Satisfactione Christi*, I have found that these works are not substantially different from Calvin's *Institutes* (or commentaries) and Turretin's *Institutes*. I aim to focus on investigating the theological connection between their Trinitarian perspectives and Christologies as presented in their comprehensive theological works.

[109] I will use the following Latin texts from Turretin's works: Franciscus Turretinus, *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* (Geneva, 1687); Franciscus Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848). English translation in Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger (New Jersey: P & R Publishing, 1992). One should notice that Turretin, in volume IV of his *Opera Omnia*, specifically in the section "De Christo Satisfactio," identifies Servetus and Faustus Socinus as explicit opponents of this doctrine and defends its necessity. He argues, "It is well known what Michael Servetus—a man shaped by the very furies for every kind of wickedness—blasphemously declared about this; what Georgius Blandrata, Valentinus Gentilis, and David Georgius impiously thought concerning it; Laelius Socinus, Bernardinus Ochinus, and finally that infamous Faustus Socinus, the nephew of Laelius, followed them—he who, just as he attacked the divinity of Christ, also attempted to assail and tear down the satisfaction of Christ with execrable and plainly diabolical boldness; and in this regard, they erred far more dangerously than even the Papists: [Notum est quid Michael Servetus, homo ad omnem improbitatem ab ipsis furiis effictus, blaspheme de hoc pronuntiaverit; quid Georgius Blandrata, Valentinus Gentilis, David Georgius circa istud impie censuerint; accesserunt Laelius Socinus, Bernardinus Ochinus ac tandem infaustus ille Faustus Socinus, Laelii nepos, qui ut Christi divinitatem ita et satisfactionem execrabili et diabolica plane audacia impugnare et convellere sunt moliti; et longe periculosius hac in parte ipsis Pontificiis errarunt.]." Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), 386. However, his primary focus is not on demonstrating the explicit connection between the doctrine of atonement and the doctrine of the Trinity, particularly that of eternal generation, but rather on explaining the relationship between Christ's satisfaction and the divine nature from the perspective of divine attributes. He argues that "the question is not properly turned into a controversy as to whether God, from that supreme right which He holds over the creature, and by absolute power, can remit sins without satisfaction; for we are not those who would set limits to the Omnipotent, nor is it ours to define how far that infinite fairness and equity which He holds (ἐπιείκεια) over the creature extends. But the question is about the authority tempered by virtues and the ordered power according to which He not only can act but wills to act, especially in this matter: [Non vertitur proprie in controversiam, an Deus ex summo illo jure quod in creaturam obtinet, et potentia absoluta peccata remittere possit absque satisfactione; neque enim ii sumus qui limites Omnipotentis statuere velimus; neque nostrum est definire quousque infinita illa et ἐπιείκεια quam in creaturam obtinet potestas extendatur. Sed quaestio est de jure virtutibus temperato et potentia ordinata, secundum quam non tantum potest agere, sed agere vult et agit in hoc praesertim negotio.]." Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), vol. IV, p. 389. Given that Turretin's work above begins with an analysis of the relationship between his contemporary theologians' views of atonement and their Trinitarian perspectives—specifically, the doctrine of eternal generation as employed in contemporary theological methodology—it should be examined which among the comprehensive and doctrinal works of Augustine, Servetus, Socinus, Calvin, and Turretin (i.e., *Institutes*) provides a more objective and theologically grounded foundation for establishing the logical connection between eternal

critiques made by Calvin and Turretin against them, focusing specifically on Servetus's *Cristianismi Restitutio* and others,[110] and Socinus's *De Jesu Christo Servatore* and others in his *Opera Omnia* (1656).[111]

I.7. Outline of the Research

I will show in Chapters 1 and 2 that Calvin's notions of the Father's personal (or volitional) generation of the Son and their aseity are substantially identical to Augustine's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. In doing so, I will describe that Calvin's Trinitarian viewpoint is essentially, if not methodologically, identical to Augustine's.

In Chapter 1, I will describe how Augustine's terms regarding the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity encompass a holistic idea of a natural and volitional generation to refute Arius's subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism. In other words, I will demonstrate how Augustine maintains a comprehensive understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, highlighting the relationship between the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality from the Father. I will show that, considering Augustine's historical context and his interpretations of Scripture, his Trinitarian perspective holds a holistic notion that the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son occurred in the form of God the Father (the *Principium*), effectively countering both Arius's subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism.

Chapter 2 will examine why, within Calvin's historical and theological context, he seems to emphasize Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity over Augustine's reliance on the Nicene speculation (or phraseology) of eternal generation (*Deum de Deo*). I will examine whether Calvin simply acquiesces to Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son without frequently utilizing it, in order to counter Gentile's subordinationism. I will particularly seek to determine whether Calvin accepts only Augustine's ideas of the Father's volitional generation of the Son and their aseity as a logical consequence of the coherence of two Trinitarian presuppositions: (1) the shared essence of the three persons when affirming the aseity of the Son and the Spirit, and (2) the distinct personalities of the three persons (including functional and orderly subordination) through the Father's volitional generation of the Son within the framework of the Trinity's eternal decree. While identifying possible theological continuities and discontinuities, I will describe how Calvin's interpretation of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity fundamentally differs from those of Valentine Gentile and Michael Servetus, who based their anti-Trinitarian formulations on the essential aseity of the Father alone. Additionally, I will examine how Augustine's and Calvin's scriptural interpretations support their respective Trinitarian

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generation and satisfaction. Also, refer to Turrettini, *Opera*, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), vol. IV, p. 385-405.

[110] I will use the following Latin texts from Michael Servetus's works: Michael Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem* (Haguenau, 1531); idem, *Christianismi Restitutio* (1553). English translation in Michael Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, trans. Earl Morse Wilbur (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932); idem, *The Restoration of Christianity: An English Translation of Christianismi Restitutio*, trans. Christopher A. Hoffman and Marian Hillar (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007).

[111] I will use the following Latin texts from Faustus Socinus's and Laelius Socinus's works: Faustus Socinus, *Opera Omnia* (Irenopoli, 1656); Lelio Sozzini, *Opere*, in *Studi e Testi per La Storia Religiosa Del Cinquecento*, vol. 1 (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1986). I will refer to the following English translations of Faustus Socinus's works: Alan W. Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' *De Jesu Christo Servatore*, Part III: Historical Introduction, Translation and Critical Notes" (PhD diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, 1990); idem, "Faustus Socinus's 'A Tract Concerning God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit,'" *Journal for the International Society of Christian Apologetics* 1, no. 1 (2008): 37–58.

perspectives. Through this analysis, I will demonstrate that Augustine's Trinitarian view is fundamentally identical to Calvin's, albeit differing in methodology.

Chapter 3 investigates how Socinus's denial of the concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son entails his belief in a composite deity rather than a simple and self-existent God. Also, I will examine how Socinus's Trinitarian perspective, which rejects Augustine's concept of "the Father's natural generation of the Son," fundamentally differs from Calvin's Trinitarian framework, which is rooted in the concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity. Socinus assumes that there is a hierarchy among the Father, His internal decrees and qualities, Jesus in His exalted state, and the temporal Holy Spirit. Socinus's notion of hierarchy within God arises from his rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Socinus's belief in a composite and temporal god leads to his denial of three essential attributes of God: immensity, eternality, and incomprehensibility. In short, since Socinus rejects Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity (the *Principium*), he ultimately denies God's incomprehensible and transcendent essence and decrees. Consequently, Socinus's notion of the Father's internal decrees aligns with his conception of the Father's monistic and temporal decrees, whereas Calvin's idea of God's mere good pleasure corresponds to the Trinity's eternal decrees. Furthermore, Socinus's interpretations of the Father's internal decrees and Christ's mediating role in the third heaven directly oppose Calvin's understandings of the Trinity's eternal decrees and Christ's incommunicable personality and mediatorship, which are both distinct from and derived from the eternal heaven—often referred to as the Father or the divine essence.

Chapter 4 investigates how Turretin's concepts of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, along with their aseity, counter Socinus's subordinationism and his notion of a composite god. First, I will demonstrate that Turretin's views on the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity are supported by his scriptural interpretations of passages that Augustine employs to affirm Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality, and that Calvin utilizes to support his understanding of Christ's aseity. Second, I will explain how Turretin's reintroduction of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son effectively counters Socinus's subordinationism. In conclusion, I will demonstrate that by employing a comprehensive concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, Turretin effectively argues that the eternal Son shares the same essence as the Father while retaining a distinct personality. This framework allows the Son to retain His divine essence while possessing the authority to grant eternal life and forgive the sins of all the saints in both the New Testament and the Old Testament.

Chapter 5 examines how Turretin's Trinitarian view, which includes the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, supports the relationship between the Trinity's one essence and the three distinct personalities, offices, and decrees of the three persons. It also examines the relationship between God's absolute attributes, such as rectitude and equity, and the relative attributes of the distinct personalities, including Christ's vindicative justice and mercy. I will demonstrate how Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son counters Socinus's notion of a composite god and his critique of the relationship between Christ as the author and Christ as the executor of the decree. Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son provides a theological foundation affirming that the eternal Son, who is both God and Christ, must necessarily and hypothetically be both the author and the administrator of the decree, as He possesses both God's absolute attributes, such as rectitude and

equity, and the relative attributes of the distinct personalities, such as Christ's vindicative justice and benevolence.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how Calvin and Turretin's concept of the Son's twofold humiliation in the constitution of the Trinity's eternal decree logically necessitates Christ's sacrificial satisfaction or death upon the condition of Adam's fall. First, I will demonstrate that their Trinitarian doctrines reveal a twofold self-abasement of the eternal Son of God: (1) as God, the eternal Son humbled Himself by transitioning from the Immanent Logos to the Logos Brought Forth in the eternal constitution of the Trinity's decrees, and (2) as Christ, the eternal Son further humbled Himself by descending from the Logos Brought Forth to the Incarnate Logos, according to the Trinity's eternal decree, in response to Adam's sin. These two are not separable but are distinguished. On the one hand, both Turretin's and Calvin's Trinitarian views suggest that, in the form of God the Father, the Immanent Logos veiled His essence—identical to that of the Father—in order to become the Logos Brought Forth (or to acquire His distinct personality), through whom He would establish spiritual communion with the elect. On the other hand, Turretin's and Calvin's Trinitarian perspectives both maintain that God's vengeful justice and eternal benevolence must be executed according to the Trinitarian decree in response to the Fall; the sin of Adam necessitated the incarnation of the Logos Brought Forth because God had already established the Trinitarian decree prior to the incarnation and even creation. Both theologians believed that Christ could not have fulfilled His mediatorial office without His human nature or solely by means of His human nature. In their Trinitarian views, Christ's satisfaction of God's vengeful justice was hypothetically necessary according to the Trinity's eternal decrees, as His sacrifice and death as the Mediator—being both fully God and fully human—were the only means by which He could satisfy God's justice after the Fall.

Finally, I will elucidate how Turretin counters Socinus's confused understanding of heaven by distinguishing it into three distinct categories: heaven as the essence of God, heaven as the eternal decrees of the Trinity in which Christ's incommunicable personality or His divine knowledge exists, and the third heaven where the glorified Christ dwells. In conclusion, I will demonstrate that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective aligns closely with those of Augustine and Turretin, while standing in sharp contrast to the Trinitarian framework proposed by Socinus. To support my argument, I will demonstrate that Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son not only contradicts Socinus's notions of a composite deity and subordinationism but also clarifies Calvin's categorization of heaven into three distinct types, treating aerial heaven and the firmament as separate categories: (1) the third heaven, (2) the heaven as the locus of the Trinity's eternal decrees, encompassing Christ's incommunicable personality and His divine knowledge, and (3) the heaven as the shared essence of the Son and the Father.

Chapter 1: Augustine's Trinitarian Perspective

1.1. Introduction
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Chapter 1: Augustine's Trinitarian Perspective

1.1. Introduction

In his *Institutes* and commentaries, Calvin addresses the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Gentiles, defending his doctrine of the Trinity by referencing and interpreting Augustine's teachings on the subject. To fully comprehend Calvin's stance on the Trinity, it is crucial to examine the theological role of Augustine's doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity in his response to the Sabellian and the Arian anti-Trinitarian critiques.[1] These critiques ultimately lead to rejection of the necessity of the second person's vicarious satisfaction for divine justice and eternal wrath. In this chapter, I will explain the theological significance of the doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity in Augustine's Trinitarian theology, and how this doctrine affirms either the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father, His distinct personality from the Father, or both. In Chapter 2, I will outline Calvin's interpretation of Augustine's view regarding the Father's eternal generation of the Son and their aseity.

The primary objective of Chapter 1 is to explore whether Augustine's Trinitarian perspectives can encompass a comprehensive idea or method that upholds the two Trinitarian presuppositions outlined in the introduction. In Chapter 1, I will begin by exploring Augustine's theological foundation to better understand his Trinitarian perspective, focusing on his interpretations and definitions of specific relevant theological terms. I will then demonstrate, through Augustine's interpretations, how his Trinitarian perspective indeed provides a comprehensive notion of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and effectively counters both Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. Especially, I will explore how he interprets John 1:1-2, 5:26-27, 10:29-30, and Philippians 2:6-7. The evidence will demonstrate that Augustine discusses the Father's eternal generation of the Son not only as the Father's volitional generation of the Son, highlighting their distinct personalities, but also in terms of the Father's natural generation of the Son, emphasizing the singular substance or essence of God. In doing so, Augustine's Trinitarian perspective not only avoids the criticism of being merely speculative and lacking a biblical foundation, but it also effectively counters the ontological flaws of Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism.

The primary aim of Chapter 2 is to examine whether Calvin acquiesces to Augustine's comprehensive concept of the natural and volitional generation and procession, which suggests a connection between the consubstantiality and the incommunicable personalities of the three persons. Based on Calvin's interpretations of Augustine's Trinitarian perspectives, I will demonstrate that,

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[1] Some recent scholars, such as Thomas F. Torrance, Benjamin B. Warfield, Arie Baars, and Brannon Ellis, disagree on whether Augustine's and Calvin's Trinitarian views align more closely with the Latin or Greek traditions, even though many scholars appear to believe that Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity permeates Calvin's Trinitarian perspective. For further discussion of this issue, see Thomas F. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," *Calvin Theological Journal* 25, no. 2 (November 1990): 165–93; Thomas F. Torrance, *Trinitarian Perspectives: Towards Doctrinal Agreement* (London: T&T Clark, 1994); Chad Van Dixhoorn, "Post-Reformation Trinitarian Perspectives," in *Retrieving Eternal Generation*, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 186 n. 23; Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), IV:72-3, 326; Benjamin W. Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, a Communication of Essence : A Reexamination of His Views," *Kerux: The Journal of Northwest Theological Seminary* 25, no. 1 (May 2010): 26–49; Benjamin B. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity," in *Calvin and Augustine*, ed. Samuel Craig (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publication Company, 1956); Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 494–95; Baars, "The Trinity," in *The Calvin Handbook*, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 245–57.

although Calvin may present a different explanation, his concepts of "the Father's personal generation of the Son" and "their aseity" are not fundamentally different from Augustine's notions of "the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son" and "their aseity."

1.2. Augustine's Definitions of Theological Terms: Essence, Substance, and Person

Many of Augustine's contemporaries were forced to defend both the *homoousios* and the distinct personality of Christ.[2] Augustine, like Athanasius and other church fathers, was on the alert for the Arian subordination of the Son as well as Sabellius's modalism. In his own theological context, Augustine's ideas of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's eternal generation can refute both Arius's subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism, since Augustine's comprehensive concept can uphold two key Trinitarian presuppositions: the consubstantiality and the incommunicable personalities of the three persons, within the form of God the Father (the *Principium*).

The first major issue concerning Augustine's Trinitarian perspective is whether his doctrine of the Trinity offers an interpretation, methodology, or principle that is sufficiently based on Scripture to effectively refute the heresies he faced.[3] The heretics Augustine encountered attempted to redefine certain ontological concepts, such as divine essence, substance, or person. In response, Augustine had no choice but to clearly define and affirm these ontological concepts based on Scripture. Arius defined his ontology by asserting that the Father is the primary origin or cause of all things,[4] whereas the Sabellians argued that there is only one divine essence and person that manifests in three distinct "appearances." Both teachings suggest the Son's inferiority in the ontological realm. Like many other church fathers, Augustine was heavily engaged in countering the teachings of Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. To defend his Trinitarian views, he relied on ontological principles supported by scriptural evidence. I will examine how Augustine defines his ontological or philosophical understanding of essence (*essentia*), substance (*hypostasis* or *subsistere*), and person (*persona*), exploring his interpretations of biblical texts.

First, Augustine acknowledges that in context the term "essence" (*essentia*) could mean either an incomprehensible being (transcendental essence) or a comprehensible being (a revealed transcendental essence). Augustine prefers to define essence as a revealed being who subsists (a

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[2] Refer to Shedd's introduction to Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: First Series, Volume Three*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1956), 3–9.

[3] Some contemporary scholars (e.g., Warfield and Ellis), who argue that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective departs—at least in part theologically—from Augustine's, contend that Augustine's concept of the Father's eternal generation is speculative rather than grounded in Scripture.

[4] According to Arius, God the Father is the sole originator, possessing an essence that is ineffable and incomprehensible—even to the Son. He wrote, "Understand that the Monad [eternally] was; but the Dyad was not before it came into existence. It immediately follows that, although the Son did not exist, the Father was still God. Hence the Son, not being [eternal], came into existence by the Father's will." According to the original Greek text, "Σύνες ὅτι ἡ μονὰς ἦν· ἡ δυὰς δὲ οὐκ ἦν, πρὶν ὑπάρξῃ. Αὐτίκα γοῦν, Υἱοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ὁ Πατὴρ Θεός ἐστι. Λοιπὸν ὁ Υἱὸς οὐκ ὢν (ὑπῆρξε δὲ θελήσει πατρῴᾳ)." The text, meaning, and significance of *Thalia* are found in Rowan Williams, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 62-66-98–116; Athanasius, *Historical Writings of St. Athanasius According to the Benedictine Text*, ed. William Bright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), 259–60. Thus, Athanasius summarizes Arius's argument as follows: "They say: 'God was not always a Father: The Son was not always: But whereas all things were made out of nothing: And since all things are creatures, he also is a creature, and a thing made: And since all things once were not, but were afterward made, there was a time when the Word of God himself was not; and he was not before he was begotten, but he had a beginning of existence: For he has then originated when God has chosen to produce him: for he also is on among the rest of his works.'" Athanasius, Ad Episcopos Aegypti, §12; Thomas G. Weinandy, *Athanasius: A Theological Introduction* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2018), 56. Also, see Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, vol. 3, 114 n. 656.

revealed transcendental substance) rather than as an incomprehensible essence which transcends the human mind. Augustine conceptualizes essence (*essentia*) as a revealed being, grounded in his interpretation of Exodus 3:14:

> He is, however, without doubt, a substance, or, it is, if more properly, called essence, which the Greeks call οὐσία. Just as wisdom is called from understanding, so knowledge is called from that which is knowing, so essence is called from being. And who is greater than the one who said to His servant, Moses, "I am who I am;" and "you shall say to the sons of Israel, He who is has sent me to you?"[5]

Augustine describes God as a "substance" or "essence," the comprehensible being revealed to Moses with characteristics including knowledge and wisdom. In other words, Augustine believes that "a comprehensible being" (in this context *ousia* or essence) refers to God's attributes or nature of knowledge, goodness, wisdom, and being. Augustine considers God's essence (*essentia*) as the effable realm of God's attributes, namely, a revealed being or comprehensible substance.

In his mind Augustine recognizes the three persons subsisting in one substance, arguing:

> Again, it was not able to say that there are not three somethings; Sabellius, because he said this, fell into heresy. It is known most certainly and from the scriptures, that it must be piously believed and is concluded by the sight of the mind by indubitable perception that there is the Father, and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that He who is the Father is not the same as the Son, and the Holy Spirit is not the same as the Father or the Son.[6]

On the one hand, Augustine makes it clear that the three persons can be perceived mentally, meaning one is fully able to perceive such substances, ideas, or persons. His argument implies that in one sense the persons are not transcendental since the Bible speaks intelligibly of the three persons. Thus, the existences of the three persons should be seen as in a revealed realm which can be indubitably "grasped by the mental eye," not in the incomprehensible realm of God's transcendental essence.

On the other hand, Augustine attempts to distinguish between the terms "essence" (*essentia*) and "substance" (*substantia*). He believes that God's essence should properly be defined as a being incomprehensible to and independent of all changeable and dependent creatures, including all human beings. He argues:

> Therefore, it is manifest that God is improperly called substance, in order that by the more usual name he may be understood as essence, which he is so truly and properly called, that possibly only God ought to be called essence. He is indeed truly alone because he is immutable, and He enunciated that as His name to His servant, Moses, when he said "I am

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[5] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.ii.3; PL 42:912: "Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia, vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci οὐσία vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est, quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum; et, Dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos (*Exod*. III, 14)?"

[6] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, VII.iv.9; PL 42:941-42: "Rursus non esse tria quaedam non poterat dicere, quod Sabellius quia dixit in haeresim lapsus est. Certissime quippe et de Scripturis cognoscitur quod pie credendum est, et aspectu mentis indubitata perceptione perstringitur et Patrem esse, et Filium esse, et Spiritum Sanctum, nec eundem Filium esse qui Pater est, nec Spiritum Sanctum eundem Patrem esse vel Filium."

who I am, and you shall declare to them that He who is has sent me to you." But whether he be called essence, which he is properly called, or substance, which [is called] improperly, he is called both to himself, not relatively to anything. Thus, to God, to be is the same thing as to subsist, and so, if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance. Therefore, they are more fittingly called three persons than three substances.[7]

Augustine acknowledges that the terms "substance" and "essence" may both be used to describe the nature of God. However, he also recognizes the inherent limitations of human understanding in fully comprehending God. Thus, he says God is truly and properly called by the more usual term "essence" because he is uniquely alone and unchangeable. The following presuppositions are clearly seen in Augustine's interpretation of Exodus 3:14. First, Augustine understands one of God's essential attributes is his independence (aseity), because God is the only first being never derived from any other. Second, Augustine understands another of God's essential attributes to be his unchanging and unchangeable nature, explaining that as the first being, God must be the one immutable being unaffected in any way by any other beings. Because these essential attributes of God are ineffable, these terms can only be defined in negative terms such as "in-dependence" (aseity) or "un-changing" (immutability). Augustine seems to believe that, when referring to God, the terms "essence" or "incomprehensible being" are preferable to "substance" or "comprehensible being." In other words, God's ineffable essence means that God himself is the only independent and immutable being who cannot be grasped by any dependent and mutable creature.

Second, Augustine recognizes that the word "substance" (*substantia*, *subsistere*) has a dual meaning, i.e., "essence" (*essentia*) and "person" (*persona*). On the one hand, substance or subsistence (*hypostasis*) can also indicate essence (*essentia*). Augustine thinks the verb *subsistere* is used as the verb form of *substantia*. He argues, "For if it is the same thing with God to be (*esse*) as to subsist (*subsistere*), they were not to be called three substances, in such sense as they are not called three essences."[8] Augustine further argues, "They indeed use also the word hypostasis; but they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between οὐσία and hypostasis."[9] Here Augustine recognizes that the term "substance" (*substantia* or *hypostasis*) can be used as a synonym for the term "essence" (*essentia*).

On the other hand, when *substantia* is distinguished from *essentia*, the term *substantia* can refer to a "person" (*persona*). Augustine recognizes the contemporaneous use of the term "substance" (*hypostasis*) as a person. He argues that "most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language, are accustomed to say, μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις or in Latin, one essence,

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[7] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, VII.v.10; PL 42:942-43: "Unde manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus quia incommutabilis est, idque suum nomen famulo suo Moysi enuntiavit, cum ait: Ego sum qui sum, et: Dices ad eos: Qui est misit me ad vos. Sed tamen sive essentia dicatur quod proprie dicitur, sive substantia quod abusive, utrumque ad se dicitur, non relative ad aliquid. Unde hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere, et ideo si una essentia Trinitas, una etiam substantia. Fortassis igitur commodius dicuntur tres Personae, quam tres substantiae."

[8] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, VII.iv.9; PL 42:942: "Nam si hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere, ita non erant dicendae tres substantiae, ut non dicuntur tres essentiae, quemadmodum quia hoc est Deo esse quod sapere, sicut non tres essentias, ita nec tres sapientias dicimus."

[9] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.viii.10; PL 42:917: "Dicunt quidem et illi υποστασις, sed nescio quid volunt interesse inter ουσια et υποστασις."

three substances."[10] Augustine acknowledges that if substance indicates person, the phrase "three substances" could be acceptable.

Nevertheless, it seems inappropriate for Augustine to replace the word *substantia* with the word *persona* while accepting the meaning of substance (*substantia* or *hypostasis*) as a person would be more precise for him to avoid using "substance" and "person" interchangeably, as "person" is defined relationally, whereas "substance" does not inherently possess such a relational property. As Augustine himself argues:

> He is called "which He is" to Himself, but "the Father" to the Son, and He is called "the Lord" to the creature serving [Him], therefore He subsists relatively, just as He begets relatively and rules relatively, so substance will no longer be substance, because it will be relative. Just as from what it is to be is called "essence," so we call "substance" from what it is to subsist. It is absurd that substance should be called relatively; everything indeed subsists to itself. How much more God?[11]

Augustine believes that the term "substance" is inadequate to describe the Trinitarian distinction since such a distinction must be used relatively, whereas "substance" has an absolute and complete meaning in and of itself.[12]

Third, Augustine believes that while the term "person" (*persona*) mainly indicates a relative property, the term could also mean two things at once i.e., both a substance (*substantia* or *essentia*) and person (not *essentia*). On the one hand, while Augustine could accept the expression "three persons," he would not use the expression "three substances" because substance does not have the property of relativity. On the other hand, considering the relationship between substance and person, Augustine believes that the idea of the one substance of the three persons is the same idea of the Father as the *Principium* in which the Son and the Spirit subsist. Augustine argues:

> However, he did not say, "Whom the Father will send from me." He said in this way, "Whom I will send to you from the Father," clearly revealing that the Father is the beginning [*principium*] of the whole divinity, or if it is said better, of the whole deity. [The Holy Spirit], thus, the one who proceeds from the Father and the Son, is referred back to Him [the Father] from whom the Son was born.[13]

For Augustine, the term "beginning" (*principium*) is employed in terms of substance (a revealed being) and not incomprehensible or transcendental essence. The Father, the beginning of the whole deity, guarantees the same type and degree of deity of the Son and the Spirit. Augustine

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[10] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.viii.10; PL 42:917: "ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio dicere consuerint μιαν ουσιαν, τρεις υποστασεις, quod est latine: unam essentiam, tres substantias."

[11] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, VII.vi.9; PL 42:942: "quod enim est ad se dicitur, Pater autem ad Filium, et Dominus ad servientem creaturam dicitur; relative ergo subsistit, sicut relative gignit et relative dominatur; ita iam substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus. Absurdum est autem ut substantia relative dicatur; omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit. Quanto magis Deus?"

[12] For more details on this issue, see Shedd's footnote to Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, VII.iv.9, p. 111 n. 648.

[13] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, IV.xx.29; PL 42:908: "non tamen dixit: "Quem mittet Pater a me", quemadmodum dixit: Quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, videlicet ostendens quod totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur deitatis, principium Pater est. Qui ergo ex Patre procedit et Filio, ad eum refertur a quo natus est Filius."

denominates the Father as '*fons trinitatis*' (the source of the Trinity), and, at times, as '*fons deitatis*' (the source of the deity).[14] In Augustine's view, as *Principium*, God the Father affirms the consubstantiality of the three persons. Furthermore, if Augustine supports the distinction of three persons in this passage, he should not have asserted that the Holy Spirit, who proceeded from the Father and the Son, was referred back to the Father, from whom the Son was eternally born. Due to their distinct personalities between the three persons (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) in terms of the relationship, the Holy Spirit cannot be referred back to the Father. This argument demonstrates Augustine's affirmation of the Father's natural generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit, confirming the consubstantiality of the three persons.

In the same vein, Augustine attempts to explain the consubstantiality of the three persons using the analogy of the consubstantiality of the mind, the knowledge (or Word), and the love. He argues, "And so there is a kind of image of the Trinity in the mind itself, and the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one, and one substance."[15] Shedd comments that this analogy of the Trinity indicates that "the knowledge and the love being only two activities of the mind."[16] Here Shedd does not mean to imply that these three (mind, knowledge and love) constitute the one substance, but rather that "the mind alone is the substance."[17] Likewise, Augustine would agree that God the Father alone is the *Principium,* the one substance in which the Son and the Spirit subsist.

In short, Augustine believes that God is an essence (from *esse* "to be"), an immutable and independent being in an ineffable realm. God also subsists as one substance revealing himself and at the same time as three persons in the Trinity in an effable and revealed realm inseparable from God's transcendental essence in eternity. Augustine would acknowledge that God's essence "is" (from "to be") yet God "subsists" as one substance because God is called both essence and substance with respect to himself. God is called "substance" with respect to Himself as one person (the Father or the *Principium*) while God the three persons "subsist" relative to the other persons. For Augustine, God's one essence may also subsist as one revealed substance who is the Father or the *Principium* in which the other two persons also subsist as God. In other words, God's one essence is identified with the Father as the *Principium*, in whom the other two persons also subsist as the *Principium*, sharing the same essence or substance, both of whom are ontologically rooted in the *Principium*.

1.3. The Biblical Foundation and the Role of the Father's Eternal Generation of the Son

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[14] Turretin adopts the latter phraseology. See Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XXX.i.8; cf. John Owen, *Communion with the Triune God* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2007), 107. See similar claims in Shedd, Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, IV.xx.29, p. 85 n. 555.

[15] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, IV.xii.18, p. 133.

[16] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, IV.xii.18, p. 133.

[17] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, IV.xii.18, p. 133. Thomas Aquinas offers further support and clarification of this idea, which Richard Muller explains in detail. Aquinas argues that "the primacy of the Father is said to be the *principium* of the Son and the Spirit." He is careful to say that "the Father is said to be the 'cause' of the other two persons."Aquinas, *Contra errores graecorum*, I, as cited in Gilby, § 98; cf Summa theologiae, la, q. 33, a. 1; Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:46-7. Also, Aquinas argues that "the Son is one with the Father in substance: to avoid reckoning the Son as of different substantial nature from the Father, we prefer to use, instead of cause, such terms as fount, head, and so forth, which signify both origin and identical substance." Aquinas, *Contra ermres graecorum*, I, as cited in Gilby, § 98; Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:46-47.

As mentioned in I.4, Augustine made a distinction between the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Father's volitional generation of the Son. For instance, when Augustine emphasizing the Son's distinct personality, the eternal Son may be referred to as "the counsel of the Father."[18] On the other hand, while Augustine highlights the Son's identical nature with the Father, the eternal Son can be described as either "the substance of the substance" or "the will of the will."[19] Similarly, when highlighting the distinct personality of the Spirit, Augustine explains that the Spirit can be referred to as "the will of God."[20] While affirming the Spirit's identical essence with the Father, Augustine identifies the Spirit as "God."[21] I will, now, show how Augustine's interpretations of John 1:1-3, 5:26-27, 10:29-30, and Philippians 2:6-7 clearly support his holistic idea of eternal generation to hold the *homoousios* and the incommunicable personality of the Son. I will, then, explicate how Augustine used both the Father's natural generation of the Son to affirm Christ's deity and the Father's volitional generation of the Son to establish Christ's role as mediator.

First, Augustine uses John 1:1-3 and Philippians 2:6-7 to support his holistic idea that upholds both the *homoousios* and the incommunicable personality of the Son. Augustine points out that the Arianists erred in viewing the unbegotten Father as the only "first cause" in the sense of God's essence; this error led the Arians into subordination. Augustine describes the Arians' heresy of subordinationism thusly:

> They seem to propose a very subtle mechanism when they say, "Whatever is said or understood of God is said not according to accident but according to substance. Therefore, to be unbegotten belongs to the Father according to substance, and to be begotten belongs to the Son according to substance. However, to be unbegotten is different from to be begotten; therefore, the substance of the Father is different from that of the Son.[22]

The Arians, by attributing the relational property of 'to be unbegotten' to the term 'the Father,' which denotes an absolute attribute of substance, essence, or principium, collapse and conflate the distinction between the ontological aspect of God and the relative properties of the economic Trinity. Augustine believes that the Arians use the term 'substance' in a sense opposite to his use of 'substance' or 'essence.' In Arianism, the term 'substance' or 'essence' appears to be understood as relative rather than essential or consubstantial. Augustine argues, "Here can be no accident of this kind in respect to God; and therefore He who is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence, to whom certainly being itself, whence comes the name of essence, most especially and most truly belongs."[23] While Augustine believes that the Father and the Son have a single essence or

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[18] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220.

[19] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220.

[20] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220.

[21] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220. On this point, Augustine distinguishes between the term "by nature," which upholds the concept of the three persons' consubstantiality, and the term "by spontaneous will of God," which affirms the distinct personalities of the three persons.

[22] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.iii.4; PL 42:913: "hoc sibi maxime callidissimum machinamentum proponere videntur, cum dicunt: "Quidquid de Deo dicitur vel intelligitur, non secundum accidens, sed secundum substantiam dicitur. Quapropter ingenitum esse Patri secundum substantiam est, et genitum esse Filio secundum substantiam est. Diversum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diversa est ergo substantia Patris et Filii"."

[23] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.iii.4; PL 42:912: "Deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest. Et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, quae Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia

consubstantiality, Arianism asserts that they also have two distinct essences or substances. In other words, Arianism assigns the unbegotten Father to the ineffable realm of God's essence, while they relegate the begotten Son to the accidental realm of it. Muller writes, "Speaking of the Father as 'cause' implies that the Son is 'effect' and belongs to the created order: the terminology is unacceptable."[24] In order to refute the Arians' subordinationism, Augustine defines the Son as God the Creator from John 1:1-3, and the Son as one substance with and in the form of and thus equal to God the Father from Philippians 2:6. Augustine criticizes the Arian teaching thusly:

> Because if the Father, whom the Son Himself did not make, made even the Son, all things were not made through the Son. Thus, He Himself was not made, so that with the Father, He might make all things that were made. Nonetheless, Apostle was not silent from the very word itself, but he said very openly, "He, when he was in the form of God, has thought it not robbery to be equal with God, properly calling God here the Father, as elsewhere: However, the head of Christ is God."[25]

Augustine understands the Son to be equal to the Father who is the creator, the form of God and the *Principium*. Augustine's idea becomes clearer when he links the phrase "all things were made by the Son" from John 1:3 to the phrase "Christ being in the form of God the Father" from Philippians 2:6. Augustine may connect the latter phrase to the phrase "the Word was in God the Father, the *Principium*" from John 1:1, since he interprets 'God' in the phrase 'the form of God' as 'Divine essence' and not as 'the distinct personality of the Father.'[26] Augustine interprets Christ as 'the *Principium*' in the form of Divine essence, the *Principium*. Nevertheless, Augustine's interpretations of John 1:1-3 and Philippians 2:6-7 does not fully affirm the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son which would be one way to guarantee both the consubstantiality and the distinct personalities of the three persons.

Second, Augustine's interpretation of John 5:26-27 conveys the idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Father's appointing act of Christ's mediatorship (implicitly through the Father's volitional generation of the Son). On the one hand, emphasizing the phrase "in Himself," Augustine asserts that God the Father has an aseity which corresponds to God's essential attribute. Augustine writes:

> What does it mean that the Father has life in himself? He has life not elsewhere but in himself. His own living is indeed in him: it is not elsewhere, not someone else's, it [his own living] does not sort of borrow life: it does not become a sort of participant in life, in that life that is not what he is; but he has life in himself, so that he himself should be the life itself for him.[27]

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nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit."

[24] Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:46.

[25] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, I.vi.12; PL 42:827: "Quia si vel Filium fecit Pater quem non fecit ipse Filius, non omnia per Filium facta sunt. At omnia per Filium facta sunt. Ipse igitur factus non est ut cum Patre faceret omnia quae facta sunt. Quamquam nec ab ipso verbo tacuerit Apostolus et apertissime omnino dixerit: Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo, hic Deum proprie Patrem appellans, sicut alibi: Caput autem Christi Deus."

[26] Shedd clarifies Augustine's interpretation, saying that "God must surely denote the Divine Essence, not the first Person of the Essence." Shedd's footnote to Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, I.vi.12, p. 23 n. 49.

[27] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XIX.v.11; PL 35:1548: "Quid

On the one hand, Augustine interprets the phrase from John 5:26 "he has given life to the Son" to explain that the Son can have life "in Himself" due to the Father's natural generation of the Son. Augustine argues, "This He said, therefore: 'hath given life to the Son, that He might have it in Himself.' Just as if He were to say, 'The Father, who is life in Himself, begot the Son, who should be life in Himself.' Indeed, He would have this *dedit* (has given) to be understood for the same thing as *genuit* (has begotten)."[28] He identifies the Son, described as "life in Himself" (the *Principium*), as being generated through the Father's natural generation, thus affirming the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, who is the *Principium*.

On the other hand, Augustine interprets John 5:27 to develop his holistic idea of eternal generation for integrating Christ's sonship and mediatorship:

> So that we might not seem to conjecture this rather than to prove it certainly, we proffer a certain and manifest sentence of the same Lord, by which we may show that this was the reason that he said, "Father does not judge on anyone but he gave all judgment to the Son," because the judge will appear in the form of the Son of Man, which form is not that of the Father but of the Son, nor in the form of the Son in which he is equal to the Father but in which he is less than the Father, in order that he may be visible in the judgment to the good and the evil. … Because he is the Son of God and he is equal to the Father, he does not receive the power of making judgment but he has it with the Father in secret; however, he accepts it, so that the good and the evil may see him judging because he is the Son of Man.[29]

Augustine asserts that it is not because the Son of God, who is equal to the Father, received the power to judge the good and the evil. Rather, it is because Christ, who is lesser than the Father, accepted this authority and holds it with the Father in secret. Augustine's phrase "he gave all judgment to the Son" in John 5:27 suggests that he had in mind a different type of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, although he did not explicitly clarify this. This is evident because in John 5:26, he interpreted "gave" as referring to the Father's natural generation of the Son. Augustine explains that in the form of God, Christ has two distinct statuses: His equality in nature with the Father and His lesser status in relation to the Father. From John 5:26, Augustine asserts that the Son shares co-existence and consubstantiality with the Father in eternity through the Father's natural generation of the Son (*vita Dei essentialiter*). From John 5:27, Augustine further explains that the Son holds a lesser status in eternity than the Father through the Father's volitional generation of the Son (*opera Dei personalia*). The authority to judge, which He receives from the Father in secret, is not granted solely because He is the Son of God and equal to the Father. Rather,

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est, *habet vitam Pater in semetipso*? Non alibi habet vitam, sed in semetipso. Vivere quippe suum in illo est; non aliunde, non alienum est: non quasi mutuatur vitam, nec quasi particeps fit vitae, eius vitae quae non est quod ipse; sed *habet vitam in semetipso,* ut ipsa vita sibi sit ipse."

[28] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XIX.v.13; PL 35:1550; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol, VII. p. 127: "Hoc ergo dixit: Vitam dedit Filio, ut haberet eam in semetipso; tamquam diceret: Pater qui est vita in semetipso, genuit Filium qui esset vita in semetipso. Pro eo enim quod est genuit, voluit intellegi dedit. Tamquam si cuiquam diceremus: Dedit tibi Deus esse."

[29] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.xiii.30; PL 42:842: "Quod ne conicere potius quam aperte demonstrare videamur, proferimus eiusdem Domini certam manifestamque sententiam qua ostendamus ipsam fuisse causam ut diceret: Pater non iudicat quemquam sed omne iudicium dedit Filio, quia iudex forma Filii hominis apparebit, quae forma non est Patris sed Filii, nec ea Filii in qua aequalis est Patri sed in qua minor est Patre, ut sit in iudicio conspicuus et bonis et malis. … Nam quia Filius Dei est et aequalis est Patri, non accipit hanc potestatem iudicii faciendi sed habet illam cum Patre in occulto; accipit autem illam ut boni et mali eum videant iudicantem quia Filius hominis est."

it is because He exists both in the form of God and as a servant—being both equal to and lesser than the Father—that He is given the power to judge.

It is evident that Augustine expressly associates the Son's mediatorship with the Son of Man. He argues, "But because 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,' having been made man from the Virgin Mary, he is the Son of man. Accordingly because he is the Son of man, what did he receive? The power also to do judgment. What judgment? At the end of the world; and there you will have a resurrection of the dead, but of bodies."[30] Nonetheless, one should notice that Augustine's phrase "He has it [the power of judgment] with the Father in secret (*occulto*)" does not imply that Christ possessed the authority to judge only due to his incarnation in time. Rather, the phrase 'He has it with the Father in secret' suggests that the eternal second person of the Trinity received authority from the eternal Father, based on their secret conversation in eternity. Also, that phrase implies the idea of the eternal conversation of the three persons who ratified the eternal decree of redemption in the *Principium* (*opera Dei essentialia*). Regarding the phrase 'in the secret of the Father (*in secreto Patris*)' as synonymous with 'in the bosom of the Father (*in sinu Patris*),'[31] Augustine asserts, "the secret of the Father is called the bosom of the Father. … He who knew the Father, being in the secret of the Father, He declared Him."[32] It can be seen that He who was in the secret of the Father, knowing and declaring the Father, is distinct from the Father. This is the second person of the Trinity, also known as the wisdom or will of the Father. In the same line, Augustine describes:

> If those rejoiced whose bodily eyes were opened by the Lord, what joy was his who saw with the eyes of his soul the light ineffable, the abiding Word, the brilliance that dazzles the minds of the pious, the unfailing Wisdom, God abiding with the Father, and at some time come in the flesh and yet not to withdraw from the bosom of the Father? All this did Abraham see.[33]

The eternal Wisdom, who is God and the second person of the Trinity, revealed the Father's wisdom by becoming man within time to fulfill the Father's will. In other words, the second person of the Trinity, who is the Wisdom of the Father, was given the authority to judge good and evil within the eternal Godhead through their secret conversation. Therefore, the bosom or secret of the Father represents the wosdom or will of the Father, or the shared wisdom or will of both the Father and the Son. As a being equal to the Father, the Son is able to have a secret conversation with the

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[30] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XIX.v.15; PL 35:1552; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 129: "Sed quia Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, ex virgine Maria homo factus, filius hominis est. Proinde quia filius hominis est, quid accepit? Potestatem iudicium facere. Quod iudicium? In fine saeculi: et ibi erit resurrectio mortuorum, sed corporum."

[31] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, III.i.17; PL 35:1403; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol, VII. p. 23: "Sed unigenitus, inquit: Filius qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit. Quid est, in sinu Patris? In secreto Patris."

[32] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, III.i.17; PL 35:1403; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol, VII. p. 23: "Sed unigenitus, inquit: Filius qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit. Quid est, in sinu Patris? In secreto Patris. ... In secreto Patris, qui Patrem novit, ipse enarravit."

[33] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XLIII.viii.16; PL 35:1712; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 244: "Si gavisi sunt illi quibus Dominus oculos carnis aperuit, quale gaudium fuit videntis cordis oculis lucem ineffabilem, Verbum manens, splendorem piis mentibus refulgentem, sapientiam indeficientem, apud Patrem manentem Deum, et aliquando in carne venturum, nec de Patris gremio recessurum? Totum hoc vidit Abraham."

Father. By their secret conversation, the Son was designated as Christ in the eternal decree for providence and salvation (*opera Dei personalia*). One can see that Augustine suggests the Father, the form of God, has given the eternal Son—who shares the same divine form—a mediatorial authority to judge both the good and the evil. This can be understood as the Father's volitional generation of the Son, who took on the form of a servant in eternity.

In summary, Augustine asserts that the phrase from John 5:26, "the Father has granted the Son to have life in Himself," refers to the Father's natural generation of the Son. Augustine then interprets the phrase from John 5:27, "the Son of Man who receives the power to execute judgment," as referring to the office of the second person of the Trinity, suggesting that the Father's appointment of the Son as Christ in eternity is revealed through the work of the incarnate Christ in time.

Third, Augustine's holistic idea of eternal generation can be drawn from his interpretation of Philippians 2:6-7. Augustine writes:

> Thus, he is the Son of God, equal to God the Father by nature but less so by "condition [*habitu*]." For in the form of a servant, which He accepted, He is less than the Father; however, in the form of God, in which He was also before he had accepted this condition, He is equal to the Father. In the form of God, [he was] the Word through which all things are made, but in the form of a servant, He was made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem those who were under the law.[34]

The central theological issue in Augustine's argument concerns when the eternal Son of God assumed the condition of a servant: whether it occurred at His incarnation in time or during His act of self-humiliation as Christ in eternity. Augustine's statement, "in the form of God, in which He was also before He had accepted this condition, He is equal to the Father," necessarily implies that the eternal Son of God took on the form of a servant in eternity, since the eternal Son of God was, is, and will always be in the form of God. The phrase "form [*morphe*] of God the Father" can indicate the *Principium*, and thus the phrase does not mean God's incomprehensible essence but a revealed being (or essence) as the *Principium*. However, the "form [*morphe*] of a servant" must indicate not the human essence or nature but rather the mediatorship or office in eternity, since "the form of a servant" was taken by the natural Son of the Father in "the form of God the Father."[35] The phrase "in the form of God [the Father], in which He existed before taking the form of a servant," indicates that the Son of God (who was in the *Principium*) took on the role (or authority) of a servant during His eternal communion with the Father. Through this secret counsel in eternity, the eternal Son of God, the *Principium*, chose to humble Himself to be the one and only mediator (the Logos *Brought*

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[34] "Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, I.xvii.14; PL 42:829: "Est ergo Dei Filius Deo Patri natura aequalis, habitu minor. In forma enim servi quam accepit minor est Patre; in forma autem Dei in qua erat etiam antequam hanc accepisset aequalis est Patri. In forma Dei Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia; in forma autem servi factus ex muliere, factus sub lege ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret."

[35] Muller points out Augustine's emphasis, saying, "Significantly, Augustine uses the Philippian hymn in order to explicate the subordination of Christ to the Father in connection with his statement, 'He is Mediator, then, in that he is man' (cf. *De peccato originali*, cap. 33) indicating in this late work (A.D. 418) not that the name of the mediator belongs to the human nature only but that the Son of God becomes mediator only when he subordinates himself in the form of a servant and thereby becomes, officially, 'inferior to the Father.' This type of formulation-moving away from the declaration that Christ is mediator according to his human nature only-appears also in the letter to Volusianus (Ep. 137, sec. 9, 12, dated A.D. 412)." Richard A. Muller, *Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 195 n. 156.

Forth). The eternal Son, who was God in the *Principium*, determined in eternity to assume His role as mediator, which would be revealed in time when He was born of a woman, suffered under the law, and redeemed those who were under the law.

Fourth, in his commentary on John 10:29-30, Augustine more explicitly supports the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, affirming both the consubstantiality of the three persons and their distinct modes (or order) of existence. Augustine argues:

> For we are made the sons of God by grace, but He by nature, for such was He born. Let him who is wise understand: and whoever understands not, let him believe and be nourished, and he will come to understanding. The Word of God was always with the Father, and always the Word; and because the Word, therefore the Son. So then, always the Son, and always equal. For it is not by growth but by birth that He is equal, who was always born, the Son of the Father, God of God, coeternal of the Eternal. But the Father is not God of the Son: the Son is God of the Father; therefore in begetting the Son, the Father "gave" Him to be God, in begetting He gave Him to be coeternal with Himself, in begetting He gave Him to be His equal. This is that which is greater than all.[36]

On the one hand, Augustine clearly uses the Father's natural generation of the Son for affirming the consubstantiality of the three persons.[37] The phrase, "it is not by growth but by birth that He is

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[36] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XLVIII.x.6; PL 35:1743; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 267: Nos enim filios Dei gratia fecit, illum natura, quia ita natus est. Et non est ut dicas: Non erat antequam natus erat: nunquam enim non natus erat, qui Patri coaeternus erat. Qui sapit capiat; qui non capit credat, nutriatur, et capiet. Verbum Dei semper cum Patre, et semper Verbum: et quia Verbum, ideo Filius. Semper ergo Filius, et semper aequalis. Non enim crescendo, sed nascendo aequalis est, qui semper natus est de Patre Filius, de Deo Deus, de aeterno coaeternus. Pater autem non de Filio Deus: Filius de Patre Deus; ideo Pater Filio gignendo dedit ut Deus esset, gignendo dedit ut sibi coaeternus esset, gignendo dedit ut aequalis esset. Hoc est quod maius est omnibus.

[37] Keith E. Johnson seems to argue that Augustine's interpretation of John 5:26 shows that Augustine understands the begotten Son as the divine essence begotten by the Father's natural generation of the Son. He argues, "The eternal generation of the Son plays an integral role in Augustine's Trinitarian theology. First, it provides the basis for affirming the equality of the Son to the Father. One of Augustine's central concerns in *De trinitate* is affirming the unity and equality of the Son to the Father-particularly in response to Latin Homian denials of the Son's equality." However, These two statements—"Because the Father has begotten the Son as his equal, Father and Son share one nature," and "Thus it is clear that the Son has another from whom he is and whose Son he is, while the Father does not have a Son from whom he is, but only whose Father he is"—cannot coexist without a logical order of priority. In fact, Johnson himself acknowledges that the first claim depends on the second when he writes, "His argument proceeds on the assumption that like begets like." In other words, the phrase "the relationship between the Father and the Son by eternal generation" necessarily implies a logical sequence. Therefore, the Son cannot possess the attribute of aseity (independence), nor can he be the principium. As a result, Johnson ends up advocating a view of perichoretic communion that arises from the logical priority of the distinction among the three persons over the one of their essence. As he explains, "Building on the previous point, the perichoretic communion that exists among the divine persons is rooted in the Father's act of generating the Son." Keith E. Johnson, "Eeternal Generation in the Trinitarian Theology of Augustine," in *Retrieving Eternal Generation*, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 175-77. In the same way, D.A. Carson appears to argue that Augustine's interpretation of John 5:26 indicates that Augustine understands the begotten Son as possessing the divine essence by virtue of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Carson argues, "The best response remains that adopted by Augustine and other fathers of the church: this is an eternal grant. It is not as if there was a moment when God granted to the Son to have life in himself, before which the Son did not have life in himself, if such were the case, then whatever it was that the Son was granted could not have been divine, independent, selfexistent life. In other words, this grant does not establish a certain time in chronological sequence when the grant took place; rather, if it is an eternal grant, it establishes the nature of the Father-Son relationship. In short, there is a way of establishing the eternal generation of the Son." At first glance, Carson appears to emphasize both the divinity of the Son and the distinction of his person through his interpretation of John 5:26, which states that the Father "has granted the Son also to have life in himself." However, upon closer examination, it becomes

equal, who was always born, the Son of the Father, God of God, coeternal of the Eternal," reflects his affirmation of the Father's natural generation of the Son, supporting the concept of the shared essence among the three persons of the Trinity. In the same line, Augustine argues:

> Nor did He beget the Son less than Himself to become equal by growth. For surely He by whom, being perfect, the times were created, was not assisted by time towards His own perfection. Before all time, He is co-eternal with the Father. For the *Father* has never been without the Son; but the Father is eternal, therefore also the Son co-eternal."[38]

Augustine affirms that the Father's aseity and perfection are shared with the Son of God in an ineffable manner through the Father's natural generation of the Son. In the same vein, Augustine argues, "Therefore, if the Son is the truth, what is the Father but what the Truth Himself says, 'He that sent me is true'? The Son is the truth, the Father [is] true. I inquire which is the greater, but find equality. For the true Father is true not because He contained a part of that truth, but because He begat it entire."[39] In this context, Augustine employs the Father's eternal generation of the Son to emphasize the Son's identical nature with the Father. In other words, Augustine would agree that just as the true one tells the truth, God the Father begat God the eternal Son by the Father's natural generation of the Son.

On the other hand, Augustine explicitly affirms a different kind of eternal generation, specifically the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Augustine's statement, "the Father is not God of the Son: the Son is God of the Father," seems to imply that aseity is attributed exclusively to the Father. Elsewhere, he argues, "For it is not that He existed without life, and received life, but He is life by being begotten. The Father is life not by being begotten; the Son is life by being begotten. The Father is of no father; the Son is of God the Father."[40] Augustine, by interpreting the phrase "*Deus de Deo*" in a different way, emphasizes the distinction between the three persons of the Trinity.

I described that Augustine's interpretations of John 1:1-3, 5:26-27, 10:29-30, and Philippians 2:6-7 clearly indicate his holistic idea of eternal generation to hold the *homoousios* and the incommunicable personality of the Son. In conclusion, Augustine employs the doctrine of

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evident that Carson ultimately highlights the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son rather than the Son's divine independence, as he understands eternal generation to express this eternal relationship. Carson's statements— "this grant does not establish a certain time in chronological sequence" and "it [the eternal grant] establishes the nature of the Father-Son relationship"—are ultimately incompatible. This is because the term "Father-Son relationship," even if not implying a chronological sequence, necessarily involves a logical sequence. As a result, the Son cannot fully possess the attribute of aseity (independence) and therefore cannot be the principium. D. A. Carson, "John 5:26: Crux Interpreturn for Eternal Generation," in *Retrieving Eternal Generation*, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 82.

[38] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XIX.v.13; PL 35:1551; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 128: "Nec minorem Filium genuit, qui crescendo fieret aequalis. Non enim ad sui perfectionem adiutus est tempore, per quem perfectum creata sunt tempora. Ante omnia tempora Patri coaeternus est. Non enim unquam Pater sine Filio: aeternus autem Pater est; ergo coaeternus et Filius."

[39] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXXIX.viii.7; PL 35:1685; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 224: "Ergo si Filius veritas; Pater quid, nisi quod ait ipsa veritas: Qui me misit, verax est? Filius veritas, Pater verax: quid plus sit quaero, sed aequalitatem invenio. Verax enim Pater non ab ea veritate verax est cuius partem cepit, sed quam totam genuit."

[40] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XIX.v.13; PL 35:1550; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 127: "Genuit Filium. Neque enim erat sine vita, et accepit vitam; sed nascendo vita est. Pater vita est non nascendo; Filius vita est nascendo. Pater de nullo patre, Filius de Deo Patre."

eternal generation to clarify two essential Trinitarian principles, reconciling two seemingly contradictory assertions: the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, as He has life in Himself through the Father's natural generation of the Son, and the Son's distinct mode or order of existence, as He possesses eternal life and authority to judge the good and the evil through the Father's volitional generation of the Son.

1.4. The Biblical Foundation and the Role of the Eternal Son's and the Holy Spirit's Aseity

1.4.1. The Biblical Foundation and the Role of the Eternal Son's Aseity

I will now describe, based on his interpretation of the scriptures, how Augustine uses the concept of the Son's (and the Spirit's) essential aseity to affirm both the Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality from the Father, in order to refute Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism.

First, Augustine employed the concept of the eternal Son's aseity to eliminate the potential misuse of the Nicene understanding of the Father's eternal generation of the Son—a potential misuse that could suggest the eternal Son's inferiority to the Father's being. In his commentary on John 8:25-27 Augustine argues:

> "Who are you?" and he said, "The beginning, since I also say to you." If the Lord has said that he is the beginning, it can be inquired whether the Father also is the beginning. If the Son who has the Father is the beginning, how much more easily should God the Father be understood as the beginning, who has indeed the Son to whom He is the Father but has no one from whom He is? Is it possible that there will be two beginnings? We must beware of saying so. What then? If both the Father is the beginning and the Son is the beginning, how aren't there two beginnings?[41]

Acknowledging that the Father is the *Principium*, Augustine emphasizes that Jesus, the eternal Son of God, also says that He Himself is the *Principium*, and thus Jesus lays claim to the same aseity as God. Wary of the subordinationism implied by the preposition "*de*" in "*Deus de Deo*," Augustine confirms theologically that there cannot be two beginnings (the *Principium*). Augustine believes *Principium* means "the beginning", i.e., one who has no one from whom He Himself proceeds. "The beginning" is merely another way to describe God's aseity [*a se ipso*]. In *De Trinitate*, Augustine uses the term *Principium* to affirm the consubstantiality of the three persons of the Trinity. He argues:

> It must be acknowledged that the Father and the Son are the *Principium* of the Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings; but just as the Father and Son are one God, and in relation to creation, one Creator and one Lord, so also in relation to the Holy Spirit, they are one *Principium*.

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[41] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXXIX.viii.1; PL 35:1682: "Tu quis es? et ait: Principium, quia et loquor vobis. Si se dixit Dominus esse principium, quaeri potest utrum et Pater principium sit. Si enim Filius principium est qui habet Patrem, quanto facilius intellegendus est Deus Pater esse principium, qui habet quidem Filium cui Pater sit, sed non habet de quo sit?" Cf. John Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, XXXIX.viii.1; CO 47:197-98; Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), I.xiii.19; CO 2:105-6.

But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one *Principium* in respect to the creature, just as they are one Creator and one Lord.[42]

When Augustine discusses the relationship between the Triune God (or the single person of the Trinity) and creation, he uses the term *Principium* to refer to the one essence, divine power, splendor, substance, or form through which heaven and earth were created from nothing.[43] Augustine attempts to obviate the possible side-effect of the Nicene understanding of the Father's eternal generation of the Son by affirming the eternal Son's aseity.

Second, Augustine acknowledges the use of the term *Principium* to affirm both the personal order among the three persons and the subordinate sense of the preposition "*de*" in the phrase "*Deus de Deo.*" On the one hand, Augustine argues that "the Father is a beginning in relation to the Son, because He begets Him. … the Father and the Son are a Beginning of the Holy Spirit."[44] On the other hand, Augustine argues, "For the Son is the Son of the Father, and the Father certainly is the Father of the Son; but the Son is called God of God,—the Son is called Light of Light; the Father is called Light, but not, of Light,—the Father is called God, but not, of God."[45] On this point, Augustine theologically defines "God of God" or "truth of truth" as meaning the Father's personal generation of the Son, affirming the Son's derived personality from the Father. Furthermore, the phrase "But the Father is not God of the Son: the Son is God of the Father" indicates the Father's unbegottenness as an incommunicable personality and refers to the Father as the first order of the other two persons. Here, Augustine acknowledges that the grammatically correct sense of the Father's eternal begetting the Son also implies a subordinate relationship between the Father and the Son in proper order. In consequence, he affirms both the consubstantiality and the distinct personalities of the three persons. Augustine argues:

> The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; however, He who is the Son is not the Father, and He who is the Father is not the Son. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, is neither the Father nor the Son. The Trinity is one God. The Trinity is one eternity, one power, one majesty—three, but not three gods. For I complete three when I say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For what the Father is to himself is God, and what He is to the Son is Father. What the Son is to Himself is God, and what He is to the Father is Son. … Will there be two beginnings? That must be avoided. What then? If both the Father is a beginning and the Son is a beginning, how are there not two beginnings? Because they are not two, but one beginning.[46]

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[42] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.xiii.14; PL 42:920; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 95: "fatendum est Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus Sancti, non duo principia, sed sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus, et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum Sanctum unum principium; ad creaturam vero Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unum principium sicut unus Creator et unus Dominus."

[43] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.xiii.14; PL 42:920; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 94.

[44] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, 95 n. 598.

[45] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXXIX.viii.1; PL 35:1682; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 222: "Filius enim Patris est Filius, et Pater utique Filii Pater est: sed Deus de Deo Filius dicitur, lumen de lumine Filius dicitur: Pater dicitur lumen, sed non de lumine; Pater dicitur Deus, sed non de Deo." Cf. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, XXXIX.viii.1, CO 47:197-98; Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed., I.xiii.19; CO 2:105-6.

[46] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXXIX.viii.1; PL 35:1682; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 222: "Deus est Pater, Deus est Filius Deus est Spiritus sanctus: et tamen Pater non est qui Filius, nec Filius est qui Pater, nec Spiritus sanctus Patris et Filii Spiritus aut Pater est aut Filius. Trinitas unus Deus:

The Father, as the unbegotten Father and the first mode in relation to the others, is the *Principium*. The Son, the second mode in relation to the Father by the Father's volitional generation of the Son, is the *Principium* through the Father's natural generation of the Son. The Spirit, the third mode in relation to the second mode (the Son) through the Father's and the Son's volitional procession of the Spirit, is the *Principium* who proceeds from the *Principium* through the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit. The Son and the Holy Spirit are God and the *Principium* because they existed in the *Principium* while maintaining distinct personlities from the Father, who is the *Principium* in relation to others. They are distinguished from the Father in terms of order.

In summary, just as Augustine's comprehensive concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son is theologically understood to affirm both the Son's consubstantiality with the Father and the Son's distinct personality, his dual use of the Father as the *Principium* similarly affirms both a shared origin and a distinct order. In doing so, Augustine highlights the distinct orders and roles of the Father and the Son in response to Sabellius's modalism, while asserting the consubstantiality of the three persons when countering Arian subordinationism.

1.4.2. The Biblical Foundation and the Role of the Holy Spirit's Aseity

I will describe, based on his interpretation of the scriptures, how Augustine uses the concept of the Spirit's essential aseity to affirm both the Spirit's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality from both the Father and the Son, in order to refute Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. The following three statements clarify Augustine's affirmation of the Spirit's aseity.

First, given his affirmation of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Augustine cannot but affirm the natural procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son. As mentioned in I.4, Augustine agrees with the Nicene understanding of "by nature," saying, "Since he [Eunomius] could not understand, nor did he want to believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by whom all things were made, is the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten of the substance of the Father, he stated that He was the Son, not of His own nature, substance, or essence, but the Son of the will of God.[47] Likewise, he argues, "How, then, would He not be most absurdly called the Son of both, although, just as the generation from the Father gives to the Son essence without any changeableness of nature and without a beginning of time, so also the procession from both gives to the Holy Spirit essence without any changeableness of nature and without any beginning of time?"[48]

Trinitas, una aeternitas, una potestas, una maiestas; tres, sed non dii. : nam ego compleo tres, cum dico, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Id enim quod Pater ad se est, Deus est; quod ad Filium est, Pater est: quod Filius ad seipsum est, Deus est; quod ad Patrem est, Filius est. ... numquid duo erunt principia? Cavendum est hoc dicere. Quid ergo? si et Pater principium et Filius principium, quomodo non duo principia? Quia non duo, sed unum principium."

[47] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220: "Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intellegere, nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium." On this point, Augustine, as Servetus astutely noted, distinguishes between the term "by nature," which upholds the concept of the three persons' consubstantiality, and the term "by free will," which affirms the distinct personalities of the three persons.

[48] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.46; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Quomodo ergo non absurdissime filius diceretur amborum, cum sicut Filio praestat essentiam sine initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de Patre generatio; ita Spiritui Sancto praestet essentiam sine ullo initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de utroque processio?" This paragraph does not yet explain why it would be absurd to say that the

On the one hand, Augustine used to employ the phrases "without a beginning of time" or "by nature" to affirm the consubstantiality of the three persons. Based on his definitions of "by nature" and "without a beginning," Augustine acknowledges that, just as the Father imparts the same essence to the Son "by granting Him an unchangeable and eternal nature" (referred to as "by the Father's natural generation of the Son"), so too the Father and the Son impart the same essence to the Holy Spirit "by bestowing upon Him the unchangeable and eternal nature" (referred to as "by the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit"). When Augustine emphasizes that there is no order in eternity, he seeks to affirm that both the eternal Son and the eternal Spirit share consubstantiality (aseity) with the Father through the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit. For example, Augustine guarantees the Spirit's *Principium* (aseity) by saying, "Therefore let him who can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, understand also the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time."[49] According to him, the Spirit, like the Son, has essential aseity since the natural procession of the Spirit, like the Father's natural generation of the Son, occurs without time. The eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son, being beyond the bounds of time, can be described as a natural procession from the one God—whether from the Father (as *Principium*), the Son (as *Principium*), or both. Since either the Father's natural generation of the Son or the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit take place within God (the *Principium*), all are considered to be *Principium*.

On the other hand, Augustine acknowledges that the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit is followed by their volitional procession of the Spirit.[50] He contends that it would be entirely illogical to refer to the Spirit as the Son of both when he argues, "How, then, would it not be most absurd to call Him the Son of both?"[51] In order to affirm the distinct personality of the Spirit, Augustine points out that the Spirit should be called not the Son of both, but rather the Spirit of both. When he affirms the distinct personality of the Spirit or the Son, only the Father should be called "the one not from another" or "the unbegotten who is "the *Principium*." In the same sense, he asserts:

Spirit is the Son of both. Rather, it explains why the Spirit shares the same essence with both the Father and the Son. When used with a subjunctive verb, *cum* can mean either "since" or "although." In this sentence, *praestet* at the end of the *cum* clause is in the subjunctive mood and serves as the main verb of that clause, whereas *praestat* is indicative and appears inside the *sicut* clause, which is itself nested within the *cum* clause. Thus, the sentence could be interpreted as: "Although procession confers the same effects on the Spirit as generation does on the Son, it is still absurd to say that the Spirit is the Son of both." This paragraph does not yet explain why it would be absurd to say that the Spirit is the Son of both. Rather, it explains why the Spirit shares the same essence with both the Father and the Son. Accordingly, the *cum* clause introduces a concession—namely, that the Spirit shares the same essence with the Father and the Son by natural procession. However, the following paragraph also shows why the Spirit should not be called the Son of both the Father and the Son.

[49] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Quapropter, qui potest intelligere sine tempore generationem Filii de Patre, intellegat sine tempore processionem Spiritus Sancti de utroque. Et qui potest intelligere in eo quod ait Filius: Sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio vitam habere in semetipso; non sine vita exsistenti iam Filio vitam Patrem dedisse, sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse, ut vita quam Pater Filio gignendo dedit, coaeterna sit vitae Patris qui dedit: intellegat sicut habet Pater in semetipso ut de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus, sic dedisse Filio ut de illo procedat idem Spiritus Sanctus, et utrumque sine tempore; atque ita dictum Spiritum Sanctum de Patre procedere, ut intellegatur, quod etiam procedit de Filio, de Patre esse Filio."

[50] Cf., Chungman Lee, *Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque* (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 231–34.

[51] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.46; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Quomodo ergo non absurdissime filius diceretur amborum ... ?"

For while we do not say that the Holy Spirit is begotten, yet we do not therefore dare to say that He is unbegotten, lest any one suspect in this word either two Fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not from another. For the Father alone is not from another, and therefore He alone is called unbegotten. This term is not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the custom of theological debate, and of those producing such a great matter as best they could.[52]

Augustine's emphasis on "by procession from both" affirms the Spirit's distinct personality from the Father and the Son.

Augustine's statements above serve to guarantee both the consubstantiality and distinction of the Holy Spirit without negating each of them. He argues, "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, the Father giving the procession without any interval of time, yet in common from both. But He would be called the Son of the Father and of the Son, if—a thing abhorrent to the feeling of all sound minds—both had begotten Him. Therefore the Spirit of both is not begotten of both, but proceeds from both."[53] While affirming the natural procession of the Spirit from both to affirm the same nature of the Spirit by the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit, Augustine never forgets elucidating the personal procession of the Spirit from both to affirm the distinct personality of the Spirit established by the Father's and the Son's volitional procession of the Spirit.

Second, just as Augustine interprets John 5:26 to affirm the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, established by the Father's natural generation of the Son, he also uses John 5:26 to affirm the Spirit's consubstantiality with the Father, guaranteed by the natural procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son.

On the one hand, the phrase "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself" implies that there is no logical sequence between the life of the Father and the of the Son; rather, the Father and the Son are one by virtue of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Augustine warns that John 5:26 should not be misunderstood as meaning "that the Father gave life to the Son already existing without life."[54] He continues to argue, "the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting Him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it."[55] At this point, he equals the immanent life of the Father with the Son Himself established by the Father's natural generation of the Son.

On the other hand, Augustine asserts that "Let him understand that, just as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, so has He given to the Son that the same Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, and be both apart from time."[56] Is Augustine suggesting that

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[52] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Ideo enim cum Spiritum Sanctum genitum non dicamus, dicere tamen non audemus ingenitum, ne in hoc vocabulo vel duos patres in illa Trinitate, vel duos qui non sunt de alio quispiam suspicetur. Pater enim solus non est de alio, ideo solus appellatur ingenitus, non quidem in Scripturis, sed in consuetudine disputantium, et de re tanta sermonem qualem valuerint proferentium."

[53] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Filius autem de Patre natus est: et Spiritus Sanctus de Patre principaliter, et ipso sine ullo temporis intervallo dante, communiter de utroque procedit. Diceretur autem filius Patris et Filii, si, quod abhorret ab omnium sanorum sensibus, cum ambo genuissent.Non igitur ab utroque est genitus, sed procedit ab utroque amborum Spiritus."

[54] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "non sine vita exsistenti iam Filio vitam Patrem dedisse."

[55] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "ut vita quam Pater Filio gignendo dedit, coaeterna sit vitae Patris qui dedit."

[56] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224:

the immanent life of the Father holds the first position, the immanent life of the Spirit holds the second position, and the immanent life of the Son holds the third position in a logical order? Negative. One can conclude that for Augustine, the immanent life of the Father, which is the same as the immanent life of the Son, is the same as the immanent life of the Holy Spirit. He persists in asserting that "For if the Son has of the Father whatever He has, then certainly He has of the Father, that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him. But let no one think of any times therein which imply a sooner and a later; because these things are not there at all."[57] In short, the immanent life of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit is one immanent life of God. The phrase "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, giving without any interval of time, yet proceeds from both in common" should be understood to mean that the Spirit's immanent life originates primarily from the immanent Father, but also from the immanent Son, without any temporal separation.[58]

Third, Augustine employed the Nicene concept of *Deus de Deo* to affirm both the eternal Spirit's aseity and distinct personality. In other words, Augustine affirms the Spirit's shared aseity by establishing an inseparable relationship between the personal Spirit, who was breathed (or proceeded) from Jesus on earth as a gift, signifying His distinct personality for the love of neighbor, and the immanent Spirit, who proceeded from heaven as God Himself for the love of God.

On the one hand, Augustine asserts, "Jesus Christ, in order to signify this, gave to them the Holy Spirit, once upon earth, on account of the love of our neighbor, and a second time from heaven, on account of the love of God. … It is therefore He [the Holy Spirit] who was also given from heaven [i.e., the Father] on the day of Pentecost, i.e., ten days after the Lord ascended into heaven [i.e., the Father]. How, therefore, is He [the ascended Jesus] not God, who gives the Holy Spirit? On the contrary, how great a God is He [the ascended Jesus] who gives God [the Spirit]!"[59] Augustine here understands that just as Jesus, who ascended into heaven [i.e., the Father] and gave the Spirit from heaven [i.e., the Father], is God the *Principium*, so too the Holy Spirit, who came from heaven [i.e., the Father], is God the *Principium*.

On the other hand, Augustine believes that, just as the Son who ascended to and descended from heaven (i.e., the Father as *Principium*) signifies both God as *Principium* and the mediator, so too the Holy Spirit, who came down from heaven (i.e., the Father as *Principium*) and was breathed forth as a gift from the distinct personality of Jesus Christ on earth, is both God as *Principium* and the gift as the Spirit's distinct personality. He argues, "Therefore also the Lord Jesus Christ Himself [who is the *Principium*] not only gave the Holy Spirit as God [who is the *Principium*], but also received it [the gift of the distinct personality of the Spirit] as man, and therefore He is said to be

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"intelligat sicut habet Pater in semetipso ut de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus, sic dedisse Filio ut de illo procedat idem Spiritus Sanctus, et utrumque sine tempore."

[57] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.47; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Si enim quidquid habet, de Patre habet Filius; de Patre habet utique ut et de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus. Sed nulla ibi tempora cogitentur, quae habent prius et posterius: quia omnino nulla ibi sunt."

[58] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.46; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Filius autem de Patre natus est: et Spiritus Sanctus de Patre principaliter, et ipso sine ullo temporis intervallo dante, communiter de utroque procedit." For more details on Turretin's and Shedd's interpretations of Augustine's phrase "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, see 5.2 of this study. Cf. Lee, *Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque*, 231–34.

[59] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.46; PL 42:1094; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224.: " Hoc significans Dominus Iesus, bis dedit Spiritum Sanctum; semel in terra propter dilectionem proximi, et iterum de caelo propter dilectionem Dei. ... Ipse est igitur qui de caelo etiam datus est die Pentecostes, id est, post dies decem quam Dominus ascendit in caelum. Quomodo ergo Deus non est qui dat Spiritum Sanctum? Imo quantus Deus est qui dat Deum? Neque enim aliquis discipulorum eius dedit Spiritum Sanctum."

full of grace, and of the Holy Spirit [the gift of the distinct personality of the Spirit]."[60] In this context, the Holy Spirit can be understood as grace, frequently seen as a gift from the Son, the second person of the Trinity. One can notice that the Father's and the Son's natural procession of the Spirit does not conflict with but rather is followed by the Father's and the Son's volitional procession of the Spirit.

It is important to note that, just as Augustine defines the Son as having two distinct aspects—God as the *Principium* and as a person of the Trinity—he similarly distinguishes between two types of "heaven": God as the *Principium* and Christ as the mediating unity of His distinct divinity and human nature.

On the one hand, in his commentary on John 6:32, Augustine interprets the "heaven" from which Christ descended as symbolizing the Father, while the "bread" represents Christ, who is eternal life. Augustine argues:

> Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, not Moses gave you bread from heaven, but my Father gave you bread from heaven. For the true bread is He that cometh down from heaven, and giveth life to the world." The true bread then is He that giveth life to the world; and the same is the meat of which I have spoken a little before,—" Labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that which endureth unto eternal life." Therefore, both that manna signified this meat, and all those signs were signs of me. Ye have longed for signs of me; do ye despise Him that was signified? Not Moses then gave bread from heaven: God gives bread. But what bread? Manna, perhaps? No, but the bread which manna signified, namely, the Lord Jesus Himself. My Father giveth you the true bread.[61]

The expression "the true bread is the one who comes down from heaven" refers to the Lord Jesus, who descended from heaven, as the true bread. It can be inferred that the phrases "the true bread that my Father giveth you" and "the true bread that cometh down from heaven" convey the same meaning. Augustine, here, explains that Christ, the bread of life, came from the Father to bring eternal life to humanity. In short, the heaven that provides the bread symbolizes that God is the one who gives the bread. Also, regarding the "bread" coming from heaven as "grace" given by the Father, he argues, "But no man fulfills the law but he whom grace assists, that is, whom the bread that cometh down from heaven assists."[62] Augustine interprets bread (or grace) as God's will, i.e., Christ's mediatorial status, deriving from God's essence.

On the other hand, in his commentary on John 6:50, Augustine interprets the second type of "heaven" where the bread is found as symbolizing Christ's mediating role, uniting both the distinct

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[60] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.26.46; PL 42:1093; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 224: "Propter hoc et Dominus ipse Iesus Spiritum Sanctum non solum dedit ut Deus, sed etiam accepit ut homo; propterea dictus est plenus gratia (Joan 1:14) et Spirtu sancto (Luc. xi, 52, et 4,1)."

[61] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXV.vi.13; PL 35:1602-3; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 165: "Dixit ergo eis Iesus: Amen, amen dico vobis, non Moyses dedit vobis panem de caelo, sed Pater meus dedit vobis panem de caelo, sed Pater meus dedit vobis panem de caelo. Verus enim panis est qui de caelo descendit, et dat vitam mundo. Verus ergo ille panis est qui dat vitam mundo; et ipse cibus est de quo paulo ante locutus sum: Operamini cibum non qui perit, sed qui permanet in vitam aeternam. Ergo et illud manna hoc significabat, et illa omnia signa mea erant. Signa mea dilexistis; qui significabatur, contemnitis? Non ergo Moyses dedit panem de caelo: Deus dat panem. Sed quem panem? forte manna? Non, sed panem quem significavit manna, ipsum scilicet Dominum Iesum. Pater meus dat vobis panem verum."

[62] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXVI.vi.1; PL 35:1607; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 168: "Nemo autem implet Legem, nisi quem adiuverit gratia, id est panis qui de caelo descendit."

personality of the Son and His human nature. Commenting on John 6:62 and John 3:13, Augustine says, "In heaven He was when He spoke on earth. He was Son of man in heaven in that manner in which He was Son of God on earth; Son of God on earth in the flesh which He took, Son of man in heaven in the unity of person."[63] On this point, Augustine interprets "the heaven where the Son of Man is" as a mysterious grace and will of God, encompassing both the distinct personality of the Son and His human nature.

In summary, just as the term "*Principium*," when applied to the Son, does not suggest that the Father created the Son within time, so too does the term "*Principium*," when applied to the Spirit, not imply that the Father and the Son created the Spirit within time.[64] It signifies that just as the Son was begotten in eternity as the *Principium* (being both Creator and of the divine essence), so too the Spirit proceeded in eternity as the *Principium* from both the Father and the Son (since the Spirit shares the same "one uncreated and indivisible substance of the Godhead").[65] On the one hand, when "*Principium*" is understood in an abstract context, it indicates that the Son, through His natural generation by the Father, receives the essential self-existence, a shared essence from the Father, who is the *Principium*. On the other hand, the term "*Principium*," when referred to the relationship between the Father and the Son, indicates their different order of existence. The term "*Principium*," in this context, affirms that the Son, being the *Principium* within the *Principium*, occupies the second order (or mode) of existence. It also asserts that the Father, as the *Principium*, holds the first order (or mode) of existence in relation to the Son, since the Father begets the Son. Thus, it can be concluded that the procession of the Holy Spirit from both *Principium*, beyond the constraints of time, is meant to explain not only the distinct personalities of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit but also their consubstantiality.[66] Thus, Augustine's ideas of the *Principium* and eternal generation play a crucial role in securing both the consubstantiality and distinct order of the three persons.

1.5. Conclusion

Chapter 1 aims to explore whether Augustine's Trinitarian perspective includes a comprehensive idea of upholding the consubstantiality and distinct, incommunicable personalities of the three persons. In Section 1.2, I highlighted Augustine's definitions of theological terms: essence, substance, and person; I investigated whether Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity is founded on an appropriate interpretation, method, or Scriptural-based terms for refuting the heresies of Arius and the Sabellians. In Section 1.3, I investigated whether Augustine's Trinitarian perspective implies a holistic notion of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, a notion deriving from his interpretations for his Trinitarian perspective. Lastly, in Section 1.4, I explored how Augustine's holistic idea of the Son's and the Spirit's aseity supports both the consubstantiality and distinct personality of the three persons. In doing so, I demonstrated how Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity has a comprehensive concept to refute both Arian subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism.

In Section 1.2, I explored Augustine's definitions of theological terms. Augustine states that

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[63] Augustine, *In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor*, XXVI.vi.1; PL 35:1607; tr. NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 175.

[64] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, 95 n. 598.

[65] Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, 95 n. 598.

[66] Cf. Lee, *Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque*, 231–34.

the essential attributes of God are "independence" (aseity) or "immutability," which are defined in negative terms such as "in-comprehensible" or "in-effable." Augustine finds that God's unfathomable essence entails that God is the sole independent and immutable being who cannot be comprehended by dependent and mutable human beings. As the first being, God must be the sole immutable One who is never influenced by others. Therefore, Augustine believes that when referring to God, the terms "essence" or "incomprehensible being" are more applicable than "substance," "person," or "comprehensible being." On the one hand, Augustine contends that God's sole essence may exist as one revealed substance (either the Father or the *Principium*) in which the other two persons also exist as either God or the *Principium*. Since Augustine refers to God as both essence and substance with regard to himself, Augustine would agree that God's essence "is" and that God's sole substance "subsists." On the other hand, Augustine refers to God as both person and substance in relation to each other, acknowledging that the three persons "subsist" in mutual relation to one another.

In Section 1.3, I analyzed Augustine's interpretation of John 1:1–3, 5:26–27, 10:29–30, and Philippians 2:6–7 to elucidate his comprehensive concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Augustine's holistic understanding of eternal generation affirms both the Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality, effectively countering the theological challenges posed by Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism. Augustine utilizes the doctrine of eternal generation to elucidate two fundamental Trinitarian principles, harmonizing two apparently conflicting assertions: the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father—grounded in the Son's possession of life in Himself through the Father's natural generation of the Son—and the Son's distinct mode of existence, as He possesses eternal life and the authority to judge both the righteous and the wicked through the Father's volitional generation of the Son.

In Section 1.4, I demonstrated how Augustine's concept of aseity affirms both the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit (the *Principium*) and their distinct personalities. The term "the *Principium*" is necessary for Augustine to preserve both the Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct mode of existence. Just as Augustine affirms the Son's aseity to support the consubstantiality of the Son, which is also established by the Father's natural generation of the Son, so too he concedes that the Father's and the Son's eternal procession of the Spirit is theologically understood as meaning their natural procession of the Spirit to support the aseity of the Spirit. Drawing on his dual interpretation of "heaven," Augustine affirms both the Son's consubstantiality (or aseity) with the Father, established through the Father's natural generation of the Son, and the Son's distinct personality, defined by the Father's volitional generation of the Son.

In summary, Augustine employs the theological concepts of eternal generation and the *Principium* to elucidate how the three distinct, eternal persons ultimately reflect both the sameness (*homoousios*) of God's essence and the distinctions among the three persons. Augustine affirms that the three real eternal modes of being "is" one essence through the Father's natural generation and procession, and "are" three persons through their internal relationship, i.e., the Father's and the Son's volitional procession of the Spirit. The essential Father, the *Principium*, eternally begat the essential Son, the *Principium*, within Himself, the *Principium*; this is the Father's natural generation of the Son. The personal Father eternally generates the personal Son, as Christ, within God's own being; this reflects the Father's volitional generation of the Son, who, as Christ, is sent by the Father and is thereby made lesser in order. The essential Father and Son, the *Principium*, eternally proceeded the essential Holy Spirit, the *Principium*, within Himself, the *Principium*; this is the natural procession of the Holy Spirit. The personal Father and Son eternally proceeded the third

person of the Holy Spirit as another counselor within God's own being; this reflects the Father's and the Son's volitional procession of the Spirit.

Chapter 2: Trinitarian Perspectives of Servetus and Calvin

2.1. Introduction
2.2. Servetus's Modalism and Subordinationism
    2.2.1. Servetus's Modalism
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Chapter 2: Trinitarian Perspectives of Servetus and Calvin

2.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 explains in further detail why Calvin's Trinitarian perspective is substantially identical to Augustine's Trinitarian perspective. Had Calvin denied the two Trinitarian presuppositions inherent in Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity, his view would have aligned with either the modalism of Servetus, the subordinationism of Gentile, or a combination of both. Calvin appears to use Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son sparingly.[1] Calvin emphasizes on the idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son in order to refute Servetus's modalism, using it in an attempt to prove that there are in fact three real eternal distinguished persons in the essence of God. On the other hand, Calvin uses the Son's aseity to mainly refute the subordinationism of Gentile rather than the modalism of Servetus.[2] Calvin's hesitation to apply Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son must be understood within the context of this intricate theological landscape.

The complication referred to above is chiefly rooted in the concerns surrounding modalism and subordinationism. Not only Calvin but also Servetus affirm the maxim that "essence does not

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[1] Cf. Calvin, *Le Catechisme De Geneve (1545),*" CO 6:24: "Cur filium Dei unicum nuncupas, quum hac quoque appellatione nos omnes dignetur Deus? Quod filii Dei sumus, non id habemus a natura, sed adoptione et gratia duntaxat: quod nos eo loco habeat Deus. At Dominus Iesus, qui ex substantia patris est genitus, uniusque cum patre essentiae est, optimo iure filius Dei unicus vocatur: quum solus sit natura." Calvin at times appears to fully grasp the Nicene concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son as "by nature." His understanding that the eternally begotten Son, naturally generated by the Father, shares the same essence with the Father suggests an alignment with Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son. For further discussion of Calvin's acknowledgment of the Nicene doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, see Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, a Communication of Essence," 41.

[2] Arie Baars points out that Calvin emphasizes the distinct manifestations of the three persons (the Source, the Wisdom, and the Power) based on his understanding of God's eternal generation rather than emphasizing the consubstantiality of the three persons based on Augustine's idea of the Father's eternal generation. Baars argues that Calvin's Trinitarian viewpoint may lead some to misunderstand it as being substantially similar to Servetus's modalism or Arius's subordinationism. Indeed, Pierre Caroli's accusation of Calvin as not just an Arian but also a modalist may suggest that Calvin's viewpoint contains modalistic characteristics. Arie Baars, *Om Gods Verhevenheid En Zijn Nabijheid*, 706. For examples of misunderstandings of Calvin's view, see Philip Walker Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response: Calvin's Trinitarian Understanding of the Divine-Human Relationship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 5, 79–85, 130; Brannon Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 49 n. 54; F. P. Van Stam, "Le Livre de Pierre Caroli de 1545 et Son Conflict Avec Calvin," in *Calvin et Son Contemporains*, ed. O. Millet, Cahiers d'Humanisme et Renaissance (Genève: Droz, 1998), 27–28. However, Caroli's accusation that Calvin followed Servetus's modalism was rejected, since Servetus regarded the spoken Word—or Jesus—as a subordinate to Jehovah, whom he identified exclusively with the Father—whereas Calvin did not. Calvin explicitly refuted Servetus's modalism by appealing to the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, thereby affirming that the three persons possess truly and eternally distinct personalities within the one divine essence. In short, Calvin affirms not only the distinct personality of the Son through the Father's eternal generation of the Son—against Servetus's modalism—but also the Son's aseity and consubstantiality with the Father—against Servetus's and Gentile's Arianism. Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 89; Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 125; Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I.xiii.10, I.xiii.20, I.xiii.24. For further discussion on the perichoretic model—that is, the interpenetration of the persons within the one indivisible Godhead—see Cornelius Plantinga, "Social Trinity and Tritheism," in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical & Theological Essays*, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 36–37, 42; Fred Sanders, "The State of the Doctrine of the Trinity in Evangelical Theology," *Southwestern Journal of Theology* 47, no. 2 (2005): 169 n. 52-53.

beget essence, person begets person."[3] However, their applications of the maxim serve quite different ends.

On the one hand, when pointing out Gentile's heresy, Servetus argues that "Moreover, they say that one Essence is derived from another; yet the Essence does not beget, while the Demiurge does beget."[4] Servetus rejects Gentile's misapplication of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, as he believes it leads to the fallacy of Gentile's subordinationism. Avoiding that fallacy, Servetus attempts to confuse Augustine's concept of the Son as being generated by the natural will of the Father and Eunomius's view of the Son as being generated by the accidental will of God, in order to establish his modalistic notion that God's essence contains a single being (or person).[5] The fact that Servetus begins with a vehement condemnation of the subordinationism of Gentile seems to suggest that Servetus's modalistic beliefs and the subordinationism of Gentile are incompatible.[6] Contrasting the misapplication of Servetus, Augustine's Trinitarian perspective opposes both Arian subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism. Highlighting Jesus's statement "I and the Father are one" in John 10:30, Augustine argues that the eternal Son has a distinct being and person from the eternal Father.[7] For Augustine, the word "are" indicates that there are two distinct personal beings. However, Servetus interprets 'the eternally begotten Son by nature' as God's eternal contemplation in the eternal mind of God.[8] Servetus believes the idea of "person" is neither a real being nor the real person of the eternal Son. Servetus contends that Christ, as the person of the eternal Son by nature, should rather be understood as the ideal reason or Logos within the mind (or essence) of God.[9]

On the other hand, Calvin uses the maxim "essence does not beget essence, person begets person" to refute Gentile's concepts of the three essences and the Son's subordinate essence; Calvin does not use Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son to maintain the Son's consubstantiality with the Father. In his disputation *Impietas Valentini Gentilis* (1561), Calvin contends, "For whoever says that the Son has been given his essence from the Father denies that he has his being from himself."[10] For instance, Gentile argues, "God the Father alone is the one God

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[3] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 209.

[4] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, 40a: "Dicunt praeterea esse essentiam de essentia, tamen essentia non generat, sed Demiurgus generat." English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 62.

[5] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207.

[6] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, pp. 13a-13b, Lib. VII, p. 119b; Jerome Friedman, "The Reformation Merry-Go-Round: The Servetian Glossary of Heresy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 7, no. 1 (1976): 74.

[7] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, I.ix; PL 42:918; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 92; "Revera enim quod Pater non sit Filius, et Filius non sit Pater, et Spiritus Sanctus ille qui etiam donum Dei vocatur, nec Pater sit nec Filius, tres utique sunt. Ideoque pluraliter dictum est: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Non enim dixit: 'Unum est', quod Sabelliani dicunt, sed unum sumus. Tamen cum quaeritur quid Tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen 'tres personae', non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur."

[8] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207.

[9] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. IV, 94a: "quia quicquid demonstres ab initio fuit personaliter filius, non realiter, imo, ex rerum absentia dicuntur personae, et rebus personae repugnant, nulla igitur ex hoc concluditur fuisse inter Deos illuc sursum realis generatio, nam bestialis multum & perniciosa est hæc philosophia & tanta derisione digna, ut non indigeat commendatione." According to Servetus, the notion that any real begetting occurred among the Gods is untenable.

[10] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), I.xiii.23; CO 2:110: "Nam quisquis essentiatum a patre filium esse dicit, a se ipso negat esse. Reclamat autem Spiritus Sanctus, illum Jehovah nominans." Also, see Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, p. 39b: "Dicunt praeterea esse essentiam de essentia , tamen essentia non generat, sed Demiurgus generat: [Moreover, they say that one Essence is derived from another; yet the

that is, the only one without any beginning or derivation from an origin."[11] Gentile thinks that while the Son is essentiated from the Father, the Father is never essentiated.[12] Thus, Calvin's phrase "whoever says that the Son has been given essence (*essentiatum*) from the Father" refers pointedly to Gentile's argument. Calvin asserts that "whoever imagines that Christ is essentiated from the Father is not without sacrilegious blasphemy."[13] Ellis points out Gentile's belief that "there is a sense in which the Son's existence constitutes another lower 'level [gradus]' of deity."[14] Likewise Muller argues that Gentile could admit "a single divine nature or essence, a single generic Godhead" rather than the numerical oneness (or consubstantiality) of the three persons.[15]

Calvin seems to recognize that if the misapplication of Augustine's concept of the Father's eternal generation by Servetus and Gentile was allowed to persist, it could lead to the denial of both the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality. In his incisive disputations, Calvin addresses both Servetus's modalism and Gentile's subordinationism by presenting a precise interpretation of Augustine's Trinitarian perspective, grounded in the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity. Recognizing how Augustine's idea of the Father's eternal generation had been misapplied, Calvin appears to use another approach to counter Servetus's modalism and subordinationism and Gentile's unique subordinationism. Although Calvin does not frequently employ Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son directly, he is nonetheless required to demonstrate how the eternal Son is both consubstantial with the Father and possesses a distinct personality from Him. This historical context complicates an accurate interpretation of Calvin's understanding of Augustine's Trinitarian perspective and, in some instances, may contribute to Calvin's Trinitarian perspective appearing similar to Servetus's modalism or Arian subordinationism.

Chapter 2 will demonstrate how Calvin's view of the Trinity differs from both Gentile and Servetus by exploring how Calvin rejects these two extremes for their lack of a holistic concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity. Specifically, I will show how Servetus misapplies Augustine's idea of the Father's eternal generation to support his anti-Trinitarian modalism and subordinationism. I will then demonstrate how Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and the aseity of the Son provide critical evidence to prove that Calvin's Trinitarian viewpoint differs fundamentally from Gentile's and Servetus's anti-Trinitarian perspectives which deny the aseity of the Son and deviates from Augustine's ideas of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity. I will demonstrate how Calvin's Trinitarian perspective based on Augustine's ideas of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their aseity is much the same as Augustine's Trinitarian viewpoint confirming both the eternal Son's consubstantiality with and distinct personality from the Father.

Essence does not beget, while the Demiurge does beget]." English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 62.

[11] Calvin, *Impietas Valentini Gentilis Detecta et Palam Traducta*, CO 9:374: "Solus pater est unus Deus, id est, sine ullo principio aut origine inventus. Quia ludis in vocibus Originis et Principii, falso et perperam infers unum esse patrem Deum, quia origine careat. Christi enim origo non nisi personae aptatur."

[12] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 55; Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:77-78.

[13] Further discussion of the interpretation of the verse above can be found in Benjamin W. Swinburnson, "John Calvin, Eternal Generation, and Communication of Essence: A Reexamination of His Views," *Kerux* 25, no. 1 (May 2010): 48–49, 49 n. 64.

[14] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 55.

[15] Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:77–78.

I will show that any anti-Trinitarian position which rejects Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity is fundamentally different from Augustine's Trinitarian perspective. It will be demonstrated that Calvin's emphasis on both the Father's personal generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity differs from Augustine's holistic view of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son not in substance, but only in methodology.

2.2. Servetus's Modalism and Subordinationism

In this chapter, I will take a closer look at how Servetus arrived at his anti-Trinitarian perspective by analyzing his interpretations of key biblical passages. First, I will begin by demonstrating how Servetus conflates the theological concepts of "by nature" and "by will" to his own idea of monism. Second, I will explain how Servetus distorted Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son to establish the theological foundation for the Father's sole aseity and modalism. It will be demonstrated that Servetus's distortion of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son allows him to deny Augustine's notions of the Son's essential aseity and His consubstantiality with the Father, thus arriving at a combination of Arius's subordinationism and modalism.

2.2.1. Servetus's Modalism

Servetus attempts to reformulate Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity into a form of modalism by converting Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation and procession into the Father's natural reasoning and predetermination of Christ. As mentioned above, Servetus interprets the term "the Son by nature and will in God" as an eternal reasoning and predetermination in God (I.4). In doing so, he removes Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son from his anti-Trinitarian formulation. In the end, Servetus arrives at his denial of Augustine's original intention of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, which asserts that the Son is both a real essence and a subsistence (or his distinct personality).

First, Servetus bases his idea of monism on his interpretation of the eternal Logos as reasoning which occurs only in the mind of the eternal Father. Servetus claims:

> In fact, Augustine himself, in question 46 of the book of the Eighty-Three Questions and in many other places in the books of the City of God, said that the λογος was an idea, a reasoning of the mind, an imagination. And, thus, truly the λογος was in God as ideal reasoning, the image that represents.[16]

Servetus admits that the idea of God which is the Father's eternal reasoning, i.e., the eternal Logos, is the idea of God that will appear in time as a spoken oracle (the Son) which will be emanated or will be spoken from the Father from eternity to time. In other words, Servetus believes that the idea of God, preformed as the eternal Logos in God the Father (John 1:1), is not an actual being as the *Principium* but rather the Father's reasoning in eternity. In short, Servetus interprets the eternal Logos as an eternal idea (λογος) in God's essence.

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[16] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 141: "Quin et Augustinus ipse lib. 83. quaestionum, quaest. 46. et plerisque locis librorum de ciuitate Dei, ideam ait esse λογον, mentis rationem, imaginationem. Atque ita erat in Deo vere λογος idealis ratio, imago repraesentans."

Second, Servetus, then, thinks that the prefiguration of the Son in the divine intellect can be born [*natus*] and manifested as the temporal Son or temporal oracle in the space of time. In other words, Servetus did not believe that there is an eternal generation of the Son in God the Father, namely, God's essence, arguing that the Father is only self-existent and does not have an internal birth. He argues:

> First, it should be noted that the term 'nature' is improperly applied to God, for that which is innate and proper to anything from birth is called its nature. Hence one ought to declare that this flesh of Christ, since it is born of God, has a divine nature, even until death. But God in himself has neither nature nor origin, as His Son does. No concept of nature was appropriate to God, but rather something ineffable.[17]

Servetus understood *natus* not as the Father's natural generation of the Son (*ad intra*), but as an appearance or emanation from the essence. In other words, the term "nature" implies birth from another origin, namely, essence. For Socinus, since there is no eternal Son in the Father through the Father's natural generation of the Son, God the Father is the only genuine eternal being. Neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit can be eternal beings. He maintains that the Father has a single essence in eternity.

In addition, Servetus distorts Augustine's concept of the natural generation of the Son into his own interpretation of the Father's emanation of the Son, which represents a form of modalism in the pantheistic sense of "an actual efflux of the divine being."[18] Servetus affirms, based on his interpretation of John 10:35-36, that Jesus Christ can be considered God not by nature, but by God's adoption, that is, by the grace and will of God. Servetus argues:

> Because I said, 'you are gods,' Christ there declares that he is God not by nature [*natura*] but by form [*specie*], not by nature [*naturam*] but by grace [*gratiam*]. For when he was accused of making Himself God, he spoke of God in his reply in the same way that the prophet spoke of gods, ascribing that sort of deity to himself. He further adds, 'if he called them gods to whom the word of God came, how much more shall the Son of man, whom the Father sanctifies, be called not merely Son, but even God.' By way of privilege, therefore, it was given to him to be God, because the Father sanctifies him; he was anointed by grace, exalted because he humbled himself, exalted above his fellows.[19]

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[17] Servetus, *Dialogorum de Trinitate libri duo; De iustitia regni Christi* (Hagenau: [Johannes Setzer], 1532), Lib. II, sig. B6: "Primo hoc notandum, abusiue Deo tribui naturae nomen, nam id quod cuiq rei a natiuitate inatum est, & proprium, dicitur eius natura Unde hanc Christi carnem, quia ex Deo nata est, natura habere diuinam, usque; ad mortem oportet clamare. Deus tamen in se ipso nullam habet naturam nec origenem, qualem habet eius filius. Nulla Deo conuenit naturae ratio, sed quid aliud ineffabile."

[18] For more details on the term "emanation," see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 105.

[19] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, p. 12b: "Quia ego dixi, dii estis, declarat ibi Christus se Deum non natura, sed specie, non per naturam, sed per gratiam. Nam cum argueretur, quia se deum faciebat, de Deo respondit eo modo, quo propheta deos dixit, eam sibi deitatis rationem attribuens. Etiam quia subdit, si eos dixit deos, ad quos sermo Dei factus est, quanto magis filius hominis, quem Pater sanctificat, nedum filius dicetur, sed etiam Deus. Ex privilegio igitur ei datum est ut sit Deus, quia Pater eum sanctificat, per gratiam unctus est, exaltatus, quia se humiliauit, exaltatus prae consortibus suis."

Here, Servetus clearly asserts that "he [the Son] is God not by nature but by grace," thereby rejecting Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, while simultaneously using it to describe the Father's actual emanation of the Son from eternity into time. In the same line, Servetus argues, "For that which has emanated from God [*emanauit a Deo*] is Christ himself, who came forth from the Father. But in God, within (*ad intra*), there are no goings forth, nor emanations; but Christ was preformed in the divine mind [*mente*]."[20] Therefore, Servetus understands Christ (or the Spirit) to be a twofold Logos: 1) the Immanent Logos, which was eternally preformed in the essence of God the Father [*ad intra*] and thus is considered God's essence, and 2) the temporal Logos, which was spoken temporally at the beginning of time from the eternal essence of God the Father and thus is not considered God's essence. Servetus asserts that an eternal idea (Logos) in the eternal mind of God can be emanated (*natus*) from the Father (or from His eternal mind) as a temporal Logos, namely, Christ. Thus, Christ the temporal Logos is subordinated to the essence of God the Father.

Third, Servetus believes that the person of the Son or the Spirit can represent symbols or signs to represent the incomprehensible essence of the one God with various modes of appearance in time. Regarding the actual procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, Servetus also argues, "Nor will other passages of Scripture indicate to you those metaphysical, internal emissions of things, but rather that the visible person proceeds from the Father, being sent by Christ, and came to the Apostles, and Christ sends Him."[21] Consequently, the term three persons, according to Servetus, refers to "the seen manifestation of His image; and the gift coming from Him," who is "God, the Father, an invisible in the infinite."[22] In the end, by rejecting Augustine's concepts of the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, Servetus seeks to disprove both the consubstantiality and the distinct personalities of the three persons.[23]

One should notice that Augustine's notion that the eternal Father begot the eternal Son "by nature" suggests that the Son has the same substance or essence as the Father by the ineffable means of the Father's eternal generation.[24] Also, the notion that the eternal Father begot the Son

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[20] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. VII, p. 110b: "id enim quod emanauit a Deo, est ipse Christvs qui exiuit a patre. At in Deo ad intra nulli sunt exitus, nec emanations, sed erat CHRISTVS in mente diuina praeformatus." English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 171.

[21] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. II, p, 62b: Nec alii Scripturae loci metaphysicas illas et interiores rerum emissiones tibi indicabunt, sed visibili persona a Patre proficiscens, Christo mittente, ad Apostolos venit, et Christus mittit. English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 97.

[22] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 24: "Ecce veriffimam trinitatem ex prisca doctrina: inuisibilem in infinito Deum patrem, speciem imaginis visam, et munus inde procedens. Vtinam hunc intellectum seruasset semper Hilarius, et vtinam haec eius verba non obscurasset Augustinus Lib. 6. de Trini. cum reliqua sophistarum turba, vt habetur libro primo senten, distin. 31." Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, V.ix; PL 42:918; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 92. Here Augustine interprets the phrase "I and the Father are one" as implying God's eternal generation. Augustine's interpretation implies that there are three real, distinct persons or beings.

[23] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 24–25: "Hoc constat esse vnam ousian, et vnam exousian. Vsiam solum legimus in Euangelio Lucae ca. 15. et proprie significat substantiam domesticam, facultates, opes, et diuitias. Exousia passim legitur, et vbi de potestate sibi a patre tradita loquitur Christus, ponitur dictio exousia, quæ in Christo fere vt vsia , significat potestatem , facultates et potentiae diuitias; [It supports the idea that there is one *Ousia* and one *Exousia*. We encounter *Ousia* only once in the Gospel of Luke, chapter 15, and it properly refers there to household property, resources, wealth, and riches. *Exousia* is found throughout and, when Christ talks about the power that was bestowed upon him by the Father, the word "*exousia*" is used. For Christ it means practically the same thing as ousia, power, resources, wealth of power.]" English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 34–35.

[24] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38; PL 42:1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. VII, p. 220: "Qui, cum non potuisset intellegere nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium; [For when he [Eunomius]

having the same substance as the Father "by nature" implies that the Spirit also has the same substance or essence as the Father and the Son by nature, namely, by the ineffable way of the Spirit's natural procession. Servetus recognizes Augustine, in his refutation of the Arians, as understanding the phrase "by nature" to signify that the eternal Son (or the Spirit) is begotten (or proceeds) through the Father's natural generation (or procession), thereby affirming the eternal Son's (or the Spirit's) consubstantiality with the Father.[25] Servetus also acknowledges that the Arians, opposing Athanasius and Augustine, argue that the eternal Son (or the eternal Spirit) was manifested by God's accidental will, affirming the eternal Son's (or the eternal Spirit's) inferiority, derived from the Father.[26] Servetus also acknowledges that Arius accepts the concept of "by accidental will" rather than "by nature" in order to refute the Son's co-eternity and consubstantiality. However, Servetus does not acknowledge Augustine's distinction between the term "by nature," which supports the consubstantiality of the three persons, and the term "by spontaneous (or free) and unchangeable will," which affirms the incommunicable personalities of the three persons. Servetus reinterprets Augustine's concepts of "by nature" and "by will" within a monistic framework, envisioning the eternal Son and the eternal Spirit as the eternal idea and will within God.[27] Furthermore, he reinterprets Augustine's concepts of "by nature" and "by will" as temporal emanations from eternity into time, conceiving of the temporal Word and the temporal Spirit as emanations from God.

In summary, Servetus seeks to revise Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son in order to establish his idea of a monistic God appearing in various modes. On the one hand, Servetus argues that the term "by nature in God" implies "by the internal and intellectual acting of a monistic God," and "by will in God" indicates "by the internal predetermination of a monistic God." On the other hand, he asserts that the three persons of God are distinct manifestations of the one essence of God, emanating both naturally and willfully through time. On the contrary, Augustine believes that "by nature" means both "by the natural generation of the Son" and "by the natural procession of the Spirit," while "by grace" indicates "by the unchangeable and eternal decrees (or wills) of the Trinity."

2.2.2. Servetus's Subordinationism

Servetus does not admit a real existence or an incommunicable personality of the eternal Logos; he believes that aseity belongs to God the Father alone. I will now explicate why Servetus's view inevitably results in subordinationism formulated within modalism once he affirms that the

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could not understand, and would not believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by which all things were made, is the Son of God by nature,—i.e. born of the substance of the Father,—he alleged that He was not the Son of His own nature or substance or essence, but the Son of the will of God; so as to mean to assert that the will by which he begot the Son was something accidental [and optional] to God.]"

[25] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207: "Inter Athanasium et Arrium, inter Basilium et Eunomium, inter Augustinum et Maximinum, ac eius, farinae reliquos, fuit acerrima quaestio, An filius Dei sit natura filius, an sit patris voluntate filius?; [Between Athanasius and Arius, ... between Augustine and Maximinus ... there was the fiercest inquiry into whether God's son was a son by nature or a son by the father's will.]" English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 297.

[26] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207.

[27] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207: "At ego dico, fuisse hominem filium natura et voluntate. Non caepit Deus aliquando velle, sed ab aeterno voluit: et vt cogitando voluit, est naturaliter sequutum. Naturalis est ratio, cognitio, voluntas, et scientia in Deo. Secundum ea naturaliter et voluntarie decreuit." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 297.

temporal Logos is inevitably derived and subordinately communicated from the eternal essence of God the Father. Servetus's theological ground for the Father's sole aseity (and thus subordinationism) is more clearly seen in the following arguments.

First, while Servetus identifies Jehovah as the creator and eternal God, he also refers to Elohim as manifestations of an eternal God or gods.[28] He claims:

> Many hold that the name Jehovah signifies essence, while others think it refers rather to generation. But we say that both these and other things are included by that name, but primarily essence, not only the essence itself but "eesentiating essence," or the one who makes to be [*esse*]. God is not like a point, but an infinite sea of substance, essentiating all things, making all things to be, and sustaining the essences of all things.[29]

Regarding the idea of the person of God, Servetus argues, "he [Elohim] who said, 'Let us make man,' was Christ, was Elohim, the person of the Word, which was the person of God."[30] Servetus identifies Jehovah as God's essentiating essence [*essentiantem essentiam*] and Elohim as His outward forms "containing the very being of God."[31] Servetus believes that God the Father's eternal essence is superior to his temporal manifestations, i.e., his voice, divine power, all things that exist, or Christ. Jehovah in eternity is superior in terms of essence to the temporal Speech (John 1:1) or Elohim (Genesis 1:1) in time, but all His outward forms are identical in terms of their nature. His concept of the person of God is also implied in his reading of Exodus 3:14 where he claims, "It was the angel who appeared and spoke, but it was God's voice."[32] Servetus thinks the present being of God in time is not equivalent to the eternal God the Father in terms of quality or essence. God's temporal speech and Christ, the temporal Logos, and "angel" are all names for God's present beings in time, but they do not encompass the eternal God, the Father.[33] In so many words, Servetus is suggesting that God's speech, as the person of God within time, is inferior to God the Father in eternity.

Thus, by interpreting the *Principium* in John 1:1 as the temporal point preceding the formation of the world, Servetus shows his modalistic idea of the Father's single aseity. In so doing, Servetus seeks to divorce God the Father's transcendental essence from the Logos's temporal nature in order to support his idea of the Father's single aseity in eternity. He writes:

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[28] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 133.

[29] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 125: "Nomen illud Iehovah essentiam significare plerique tradunt, alii potius generationem. Verum nos et ea, et alia eo nomine comprehendi dicimus, et essentiam potius: nec essentiam simpliciter, sed essentiantem essentiam, seu esse facientem. Non est Deus instar puncti, sed est substantiae pelagus infinitum, omnia essentians, omnia esse faciens, et omnium essentias sustinens."

[30] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio,* 105: "Immo ille qui dixit, 'Faciamus hominem,' erat Christus, erat Elohim, persona illa Verbi, quae erat persona Dei." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 148.

[31] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 116.

[32] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio,* 106. "Quod totum vel ex vno loco colligitur, exo. 3. Nam Christus dixit, Ero qui ero: angelus apparens loquebatur et erat vox Dei." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 150.

[33] Commenting on Servetus's argument, Marian Hillar observes that "Servetus deviated from the usual interpretation of this text as defining the essence of God." In contrast, Augustine maintains that the essence of God can be manifested in time and space in an ineffable manner, while remaining identical in nature and essence with God. Cf. Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 150 n. 64.

Mich. We have it from Moses that there was Elohim in the beginning, creating all things and seen as Elohim; and we have it from John that there was in the beginning the Word that shines, through which all were made. Pet. What was before? Mich. You interrupt. Pet., I would like to know first that which was first, so that from there everything might proceed in order. Mich. There was the predetermination of the generations, which God made in Christ, as Paul asserts. Just as all things are now in God, so they were before creation in him by the same order, and the first of all was Christ: who was the sole figure of the substance of God and the visible light of his glory. Thus what was before, if it is possible to say before, was a sort of moment of eternity, or rather before God, it is not said that "it was," but it is said that "it is." God, by his own eternal reasoning eternally discerning the Son visible and corporal to him, presents Himself visible in the substance of such an appearance through speech, in which was the Spirit. Through the same speech and the Spirit, he creates this corporeal world and the inheritance for the Son, the shadow of a better generation.[34]

On the one hand, Servetus strives to distinguish the eternal Logos in the eternal essence and mind of God the Father from the spoken Logos in time in which was the Spirit;[35] he then connects John 1:3 and Genesis 1:3 to claim that the temporal Logos is a subordinated creator.[36] Servetus believes that the temporal Logos as creator is a temporally spoken oracle from God's essence, i.e., the Father. This temporal Logos was *natus,* subordinately emanated or temporally communicated or born from God's eternal essence. One can observe that Servetus subtly employs the concept of "by nature" in two distinct ways: first, to denote an immanent (eternal) and intellectual reasoning and determination within a monistic God, and second, to signify an actual efflux of the divine being.[37] On the other hand, given Servetus's argument that "there was the predetermination of the generations, which God made in Christ," he appears to use "eternal reasoning in Christ" and "eternal predetermination in Christ" almost interchangeably, just as he considers "by nature" and "by will" to be essentially equivalent. Furthermore, in light of his assertion that "God, by His own eternal reasoning, eternally discerning the Son as visible and corporeal to Him, presents Himself visibly in the substance of such an appearance through speech, in which was the Spirit," it follows that eternal reasoning (by nature) and eternal predetermination (by will) are manifested in time as the audible form of speech and the perceptible form of the Spirit.

Second, given his understanding of the relationships between essence and form and between *ousia* and *exousia*, Servetus's view can be classified as an explicit form of subordinationism.

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[34] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 205-6: "Mich. Ex Mosis habemus, quod erat initio Elohim omnia creans, visus Elohim, Ex Ioanne, quod erat initio relucens verbum, per quod omnia facta sunt. Pet. Quid antea? Mich. Interpellas. Pet. Prius scire velim id quod prius fuit, vt illinc ordine cuncta prodeant. Mich. Erat præfinitio seculorum, quam fecit Deus in Christo, vt ait Paulus. Sicut res omnes nunc sunt in Deo, ita eodem ordine ante creationem erant in eo, et primus omnium Christus: qui solus erat figura substantiae Dei, splendorque visibilis gloriae. Id quod antea fuit, si antea dici potest, fuit velut aeternitatis momentum, Imo coram Deo non dicitur, fuit: sed dicitur, est. Deus ratione sua aeterna corporalem sibi et visibilem filium aeternaliter decernens, talis speciei substantia se ipsum visibilem praebet per sermonem, in quo erat spiritus. Per eundem sermonem et spiritum, haereditatem filio, corporalem hunc mundum creat, umbram seculi melioris."

[35] Here, Servetus also appears to make a subtle distinction between the Logos—understood as temporal Speech—and the Spirit—understood as temporal Power.

[36] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. II, p, 50b: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Omnia fecit Deus verbo suo, id est, prima illa res per secundam. Prima illa res per secundam operabatur, manu capiebat illam tanquam beluam vel tanquam securim, et cum ea scindebat et portabat ligna.

[37] For more details on the term "emanation," see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 105.

Commenting on Philippians 2:6, Servetus argues that "Christ is God, for he is said to be God in appearance [*species*], because, as the Apostle says, he was in the form [*formam*] of God [Philippians 2:6]."[38] According to Servetus, Christ in the form [*formam*] of God in time is none other than the appearance of God's essence in time. Likewise, he argues that "Christ had possession of the divine appearance [*species*] and the divine form [*formam*] from eternity."[39] Servetus contends that Christ, preformed as the ideal reason within the eternal mind of the Father,[40] is manifested as the temporal Logos, deriving from the eternal intellect of the Father. Servetus does not accept the notion that the Son, who was eternally generated by the Father, is a real being with the same substance as the Father. While Augustine interprets the form of the Father in Philippians 2:6 as the nature, that is, the eternal essence of the eternal Father as the *Principium*, Servetus understands "the form of God" in Philippians 2:6 as the temporal form or appearance of the eternal Father, derived from an eternal idea within God's eternal mind.

One should notice that, for Servetus, the temporal appearance coming from God's essence is inferior to an eternal idea in God's eternal mind, which is God Himself. Remarkably, Servetus conceives of Christ's bestowed life in Himself from John 5:26 as the form or appearance of God in Philippians 2:6. Servetus argues that "he [Jesus Christ] had in himself an equal power with God by reason of the authority that was given him in equal measure with God."[41] In other words, Servetus argues that the "*Exousia*" derived from "*Ousia*" might be considered a united one with Jesus, a human being. Servetus believes that even though Christ was born equal to God in terms of power and authority, Christ should not be considered equal to God in terms of essence.[42] Christ in *appearance* is inferior to the essence of God. While Augustine interprets Christ's life in Himself, as described in John 5:26, as the essential life of God the Father, Servetus views Christ's life in Himself as a bestowed power or authority granted by God, rather than as the same essence as the eternal Father.

Third, Servetus's subordinationism can also be observed in his explanation of the relationship between the Father and the third heaven, which he identifies as the glory of the Word. According to Servetus, the Father is above the third and glowing heaven since the Father is an inaccessible realm where no individual can meet an inaccessible Father except through the Word. Servetus claims:

> But the third, beyond all these, is the heaven of divinity, light inaccessible, which Father inhabits, which is said to be the heaven of heavens. In this third heaven, Paul was raptured. Christ inhabits this heaven, and from him, angels, far inferior to Christ, receive the light; they are those who see this shortly, which is given to them by Christ. This light and fiery

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[38] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, p, 9b: "*Tertio, istam dixi esse veram, CHRISTVS est Deus, dicitur enim esse specie Deus, quia, ut inquit Apostolus, erat in forma Dei.*" English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 17.

[39] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 19: "*Speciem et formam diuinam habebat Christus, etiam ab aeterno, vt dicemus postea.*" English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 27.

[40] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 141: "Quin et Augustinus ipse lib. 83. quaestionum, quaest. 46. et plerisque locis librorum de ciuitate Dei, ideam ait esse λογον, mentis rationem, imaginationem. Atque ita erat in Deo vere λογos idealis ratio, imago repraesentans."

[41] Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, p, 18b: "Haec igitur est aequalitas, quam existens in forma Dei habebat, aequalitatem virtutis Dei in se habebat, scilicet ratione potestatis sibi ad Dei aequalitatem datae, dicto cap. 5." English translation in Servetus, *The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity*, 29–30.

[42] See Servetus, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*, Lib. I, p, 17b–19a.

heaven is the glory of the Word, the universal example of things, divinity itself made accessible by Christ, just as God, invisible in himself, was made visible by Christ even to the angels.[43]

Servetus subtly distinguishes the Father, who is the inaccessible and eternal essence and mind of God, from the heaven of divinity (the third heaven), made accessible in time through Christ. The third heaven of divinity is not God the Father Himself, as it is made accessible and visible through Christ, while the invisible divinity of the Father remains inaccessible and invisible without Christ. Servetus believes that the third heaven is where the Word is spoken. He writes, "This light and fiery heaven is the glory of the Word."[44] According to Servetus, God is inherently invisible, and he has only been made visible to the angels via Christ the Word. In short, Servetus believes that the third heaven has a subordinate divine nature and the presence of God the Father through His temporal Word.

Servetus believes that while the Father is an inaccessible, eternal essence of God the Father, the third heaven is the Word in time, a subordinate divine nature deriving from the eternal Father's essence.[45] From this, one can deduce that Servetus believes God the Father, the origin of the third heaven, continues to create the glowing heaven through the Word, allowing Him to persistently exist and dwell therein. However, Servetus does not assert that the Father is the third heaven itself; he identifies the spoken Word or the third heaven as God the Father's subordinate deity. In his view they are both inferior to the eternal God the Father, and as a result, the origin of the third heaven is God the Father's essence. When the temporal Word is pronounced, the earthly area is transformed into the glowing third heaven deriving from the origin, namely, the essence of God the Father.

2.2.3. The Final Form of Servetus's Modalism

In his *Christianismi Restitutio*, Servetus describes the Logos as both the eternal reasoning of the Father and the one who dwells in the third heaven. On the one hend, Servetus's view of the third heaven, i.e., the "new heaven", points to manifestation of the Father's eternal reasoning in His essence. Servetus supports this idea with the following argument:

The substantial form of Christ's body has now no participation of the created solar light, which Christ still had before the resurrection, not only in flesh but also in soul, just as we do. Just as in the final resurrection, this corruptible light of the sun and moon will be abolished, and no other light will survive than the brightness of God's essence (Isaiah 60, Revelation 21-22), so with regard to Christ, in his resurrection, it occurred that Christ's resurrected

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[43] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 158: "Tertium vero, ultra haec omnia est caelum diuinitatis, lux inaccessa, quam pater inhabitat, quod dicitur caelum caelorum. In hoc tertium caelum raptus est Paulus. Hoc caelum inhabitat Christus, et ab eo splendorem accipiunt angeli longe inferiores, qui hoc tantum vident, quod eis per Christum datur. Hoc luminosum et igneum caelum est verbi fulgor, rerum exemplar uniuersale, deitas ipsa per Christum facta accesibilis: sicut invisibilis in se Deus est per Christum factus visibilis etiam angelis. 1. Timot. 3."

[44] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 158: "Hoc luminosum et igneum caelum est verbi fulgor."

[45] It should be noted that the "third heaven" as defined by Servetus differs not only from the aerial heaven, where birds dwell, and the firmamental heaven, where the sun and stars reside, but also from the definitions given by Ursinus and Turretin, who conceive of the third heaven as a spiritual yet spatial and temporal realm—namely, the place to which Christ ascended with His resurrected body. See Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.ix.6; Ursinus, *The Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism*, 247.

body has only the substantial form of God's uncreated light, just as he was the substantial light of the divine Word from eternity.[46]

Here Servetus describes Christ's resurrected body as having "the brightness of God's essence" which is "the substantial form of God's uncreated light" or "the divine Word's substantial light." The substantial form of God's uncreated light is not identical to the essence of God the Father, yet it remains present within the temporal realm. In the same line, he claims that "we say that Christ is in that heaven where angels do not reach. He is in the 'third heaven' where and from whence 'he fills everything.' Outside every place and outside every finite body there is his 'spiritual body' in a 'new heaven,' which 'is within us.' In Christ alone there is God, and in him there is the source of every divine quality."[47] Servetus argues similarly, "Essences flow from Christ into all creation's objects"[48] because he believes that Christ the Logos consists of both the eternal Logos (the Father's eternal reasoning) and the temporal Logos (the spoken Word in time). Therefore, the Father, as God's uncreated light, is the origin of the temporal Logos, which is embedded in the substantial form of both Christ's incarnate body and His resurrected body.

On the other hand, a little later Servetus defines God's uncreated light as Christ's eternal mind as well as the Father's eternal reasoning. He argues, "In Christ, however, there is the full substantive divinity and the original, uncreated light itself. In him there are the first forms of things, that is to say, in his mind, then in the objects themselves."[49] His following statement seeks to show that Christ is the same as the Father's eternal reasoning in his essence. He claims:

> Consider this eternal order in God, and Christ Himself constituted above all. Truly, we are not able to understand what the Word was in God a priori unless we begin a posteriori, by entering through the gate, through Christ himself. All the Sophists have erred in this matter. I say that we ought to understand Christ to have been the first thought of God, or rather, ideal reason of God. In Christ, we ought to think that there is the fullness itself of God's light and that formerly the same thing in the same form is called logos and Elohim.[50]

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[46] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 275–76: "Forma substantialis corporis Christi nullam creatae solaris lucis participationem nunc habet: quam tamen ante resurrectionem habuit Christus, non solum in carne, sed in anima, quemadmodum et nos habemus. Sicut in finali resurrectione abolebitur corruptibilis haec lux solis et lunae, nec alia lux supererit, quam ipsa essentiae Dei claritas (Esa. 60, Apoc. 21 et 22), ita quod ad Christum adtinet, in eius resurrectione id factum est, ut corpus Christi resuscitatum solam habeat increatae lucis Dei substantialem formam, qualis ab aeterno erat substantialis lux verbi divini."

[47] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 280–81: "Nos autem dicimus, quod sit Christus in eo caelo, ad quod angeli non pertingunt. Est in tertio caelo, ubi et unde omnia implet. Etra omnem locum, et extra omne quantitatis corpus, est spirituale corpus, in nouo caelo, quod intra nos est. In solo Christo est Deus, et in eo est omnis deitatis origo." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 398.

[48] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 283: "ab ipso Christo in creaturas omnes fluunt essentiae." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 400.

[49] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 282–83: "In Christo vero est substantialis tota deitas, et lux ipsa primaria increata. In eo sunt rerum ideae primae scilicet in eius intellectu, deinde in rebus ipsis." English translation in Servetus, *The Restoration of Christianity*, 400.

[50] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 283–84: "Hunc ordinem in Deo aeternum cogita, et Christum ipsum super omnia constitutum. Nos vere, quid fuerit logos in Deo, intelligere a priori non possumus, nisi a posteriori exordiamur, intrando per ostium, per Christum ipsum. In qua re est a Sophistis omnibus erratum. Hoc dico oportere nos Christum intelligere, fuisse primam Dei cogitationem seu idealem rationem. In Christo nos cogitare debemus ipsam lucis Dei plenitudinem, et eandem olim in eadem forma dicere logon et Elohim."

Here, the eternal Logos, as the first thought of God, or more precisely, the ideal reason of God, is positioned above all. Consequently, the "form of the Logos" refers to the manifestation of God's essence through the temporal Logos, while "Elohim" denotes the manifestation of Jehovah's essence. The final significant idea formulated by Servetus is that the relationship between the eternal Logos within God's essence and the temporal Logos in the manifestation of God's essence still entails a certain hierarchy. Servetus's conception of God's essence implies a composite god; he must therefore inevitably deny the notions of God's aseity, simplicity, and infinity. Such denial also leads him inexorably to neglect or ignore God's immensity, eternity, and incomprehensibility.[51]

Servetus distorts Augustine's conception of the Son through the Father's natural generation to support his modalistic tendencies. Furthermore, he misconstrues the concept of "the Son by nature from eternity" to advance his notion of the actual and temporal emanation of the eternal reasoning of God the Father. Only the Father has aseity in Servetus's Trinitarian perspective, and an eternal Logos is an eternal reasoning or idea of the Father, while the temporal Logos is a subordinate status of God's essence. Thus, he rejects both the aseity of the revealed Logos in time and His consubstantiality with the Father, thereby rendering his view susceptible to a composite conception of God and Arian subordinationism.

2.2.4. Summary

Servetus's notions of modalism and subordinationism are summarized as follows:

1) The Father is the only God who originated from nothing and exists independent of everything.

2) Christ, the eternal Logos, is understood as an eternal idea within the Father's eternal intellect, rather than as an eternal being via the Father's natural generation of the Son. Consequently, this interpretation of the relationship between God the Father in eternity and the eternal Logos within the Father's mind risks leading to monism.

3) Christ, the temporal Logos, can be understood as the temporal spoken oracle of God at the beginning of time. Consequently, the temporal Logos (the Son) shares the same nature in appearance as the eternal Logos (the Father's eternal reasoning) but not in essence.

4) The relationship between God the Father (or the eternal Logos) in eternity and the spoken Word in time leads to the Arians' subordinationism.

5) A monotheistic God can be manifested in and merged with the universe through the one Logos with a twofold aspect; as a result, the abstract communication between God the Father and other creatures can take place anywhere on earth through this one Logos with a twofold aspect, i.e., eternal and temporal.

6) The eternal Logos, which is the Father's eternal reasoning, can be represented everywhere on the earth because it is a spiritual realm where humans in time can hear and know the idea in the eternal intellect of God the Father through the one Logos with a twofold aspect.

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[51] Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms,* 42; Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.viii.8.

One can deduce that by admitting the abstract communication between God the Father and the creatures through the Word and the Will, Servetus's confused idea of modalism combined with Arian subordinationism falls into the notion of pantheism.[52] In other words, God's essence is abstractly communicated to created beings through the Word and the Will, which, in turn, manifest God's essence. However, Servetus thinks the temporal Logos is essentially inferior to the eternal God the Father.[53] Servetus combines elements of modalism and subordinationism by proposing that the Father communicates with other created beings through the Logos and the Will in an abstract manner. His formulation suggests a form of pantheism, where the Word and the Will unite the invisible God with the visible universe, merging them into one in the third heaven.

2.3. Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity in Opposition to Gentile and Servetus

Calvin constantly strives to avoid the modalism of Servetus and the subordinationism of both Gentile and Servetus.

Acknowledging Servetus's and Gentile's misinterpretation of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Calvin seems to recognize that if the doctrine of the Father's eternal generation of the Son affirms only the consubstantiality of the eternal Son with the Father, without also affirming His incommunicable personality, it risks being reduced to Servetus's modalism. This modalism asserts that the one essence of God merely manifests in different modes, thereby undermining the distinct personal relations within the Trinity. Calvin should prove the doctrine of Christ's incommunicable personality by emphasizing different aspect of the Father's eternal generation of the Son. In other words, if he understands the three modes of being as three distinct concepts—such as essence, reason, and will—within God's essence, rather than as three distinct personalities—such as unbegotten, begotten, proceeded—distinguished from God's essence, this perspective leans toward the modalism of Servetus or, at the very least, a Sabellian view. In such a view, the three persons are not real, distinct beings but are instead conceptual distinctions (the Father, the Ideal Reason, and the eternal Will within God's essence), all belonging to the same essence and manifesting as the Father, the temporal Logos, and the external Will. Calvin opposes Servetus's modalism in *Institutes of the Christian Religion* 1.13.22.

> This was indeed the summary of his speculation: God is assumed to be three things when, in his essence, three persons are said to reside; this is an imaginary triad because it contradicts God's unity. Meanwhile, he wanted persons to be some external ideas, which do not truly subsist in the essence of God but represent God to us by one or another appearance; moreover, in the beginning, no distinction was made in God because the Word was formerly the same as the Spirit, but from Him Christ emerged as the God of God, and the Spirit also flowed from Him as another God.[54]

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[52] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 226.

[53] Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 133–36.

[54] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, final ed. (1559), I.xiii.22; CO 2:108: "Haec quidem speculationum eius fuit summa, tripartitum induci Deum ubi in eius essentia residere dicuntur tres personae, triademque hanc esse imaginariam, quia cum Dei unitate pugnet. Interea personas voluit esse externas quasdam ideas, quae vere non subsistant in essentia Dei, sed Deum nobis hac vel ilia specie figurent; ac initio quidem nihil in Deo fuisse distinctum, quia olim idem erat verbum quod spiritus; sed ex quo emersit Christus Deus de Deo, spiritum etiam alium ex ipso Deum fluxisse."

Calvin completely rejects Servetus' idea that the eternal persons are not the real beings subsisting in God's essence but are rather the external ideas of God's essence. Calvin recognizes the personality of the Son as an eternal being with a distinct mark from the Father, and defines a *hypostasis* of the Son of God subsisting in God's essence. Calvin argues:

> For although John declares that the Logos was God when the world was not yet created, he distinguishes it completely from an idea (John 1:1). If that Logos who was God was with the Father then and also from ultimate eternity, and he was distinguished from the Father by his own glory (John 17:5), his splendor could not be external or figurative, but it follows necessarily that he was a *hypostasis* who resided in God himself.[55]

Calvin first acknowledges that the Word, who is God, has the same essence as the Father and is not merely an imaginary concept. He acknowledges that the Word is a distinct, personal being truly subsisting within the essence of God and distinguished from the Father.

On the other hand, Calvin understands that if his concept of the Father's eternal generating of the Son affirms only the eternal Son's incommunicable personality without confirming His consubstantiality with the Father, his position would be reduced to Gentile's subordinationism. Refuting subordinationism in the essence of God, Calvin argues, "Indeed, they do not refrain from this dreadful manner of speaking: the Father is distinguished from the Son and the Spirit by this mark, that he is the only 'essence giver.' First they allege the specious argument that Christ is commonly called the Son of God and infer from this that no other than the Father is, properly speaking, God."[56] Gentile argues that there are the three hierarchical essences in eternity by the Father's essential generating of the Son and the Spirit. Refuting Gentile's fallacy, Calvin immediately explains why the Bible often attributes par excellence to the Father, despite the fact that the name "God" is also held in common by the Son. Calvin explains that the Father's excellency is used in the Bible to represent "the simple unity of essence" since he is "the fountainhead" and the "beginning of deity."[57] Calvin acknowledges above all that the Word was a real *essence* of God and then he says the Word is a real *person* of God.

In summary, if Calvin rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and interprets Christ's personality as having a distinct aspect from, and as excluding an equivalent aspect to, God's essence, his perspective could potentially align with Gentile's subordinationism. This view posits that the three persons of the Trinity are eternally arranged in a hierarchical order. If, like Servetus, Calvin distorts Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and reduces Christ's personality as an appearance of being only, Calvin's view would lead to Servetus's modalism, wherein the three persons are understood as mere symbols or external expressions emanating from one essence and person of God in eternity.

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[55] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:109: "Nam quum Ioannes nondum creato mundo λογον fuisse Deum pronuntiet (Ioann. 1, 1), longe ab idea discerne. Si vero tunc quoque et ab ultima aeternitate λογοσ ille, qui Deus erat, fuit apud patrem, et propria sua gloria apud patrem insignisfuit (Ioann. 17, 5), non potuit certe extemus esse aut figurativus splendor; sed necessario sequitur fuisse hypostasin, quae in Deo ipso intus resideret."

[56] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:109: "Nec vero abstinent ab horrendo loquendi genere, patrem hoc nota distingui a filio et spiritu, quia sit solus essentiator. Colorem hunc primo obtendunt, passim Christum vocari Dei filium; unde colligunt non alium proprie Deum esse nisi patrem." English translation in Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I.xiii.22.

[57] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:109: "Atqui non observant, quamvis Dei nomen filio quoque sit commune, tamen κατα εξοχην patri interdum adscribi, quia fons est ac principium deitatis; idque ut notetur simplex essentiae unitas." English translation in Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I.xiii.22.

In the next section, I will demonstrate how Calvin seeks to avoid Servetus's modalism and any sort of subordinationism. First, I will show through an examination of Calvin's opposition to Gentile's subordinationism that Calvin's conception of the Son's *Principium* (or aseity) is identical to Augustine's ideas of the Son's aseity (2.3.1). Second, I will describe, through an examination of Calvin's refutation of Servetus's modalism and Gentile's subordinationism, how Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity is substantially identical to Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, which Augustine used to refute both positions (2.3.2-3). In doing so, I will demonstrate how Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity can effectively support his broader theological arguments, particularly regarding the Trinity's essential communication and personal decrees.

2.3.1. Calvin's Conception of the Son's Aseity in Opposition to Gentile

I will examine, through an examination of Calvin's arguments in the *Institutes*, whether Calvin's ideas regarding the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity are essentially the same as Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity. First, I will demonstrate, through an analysis of Calvin's refutation of Gentile's subordinationism, that Calvin's concept of the Son's aseity must align with Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity in order to affirm the Son's consubstantiality with the Father.

Calvin refutes Gentile's concept of the eternal Son's subordination, arguing that the eternal Son's aseity indicates that He is identical to the eternal Father who is a real eternal being existing from Himself [*ex se ipso esse*]. He argues (1.13.23):

> To this are added the testimonies that the apostle recites: "You, God, founded the heaven and the earth [Hebrews 1:10; Psalm 102:25-26]. Also, let all the angels of God adore him [Hebrews 1:6; Psalm 97:7], which can be compatible only with one God, though he also contends that they are the proper titles of Christ. The quibble is not valuable that what is belonging to God is transferred [*transferri*] to Christ because he is the reflection of his glory [Hebrews 1:3]. For since the name of Jehovah is placed everywhere, consequently, with respect to his deity, he is from himself. For if he is Jehovah, it is not possible to negate that he is that same God who elsewhere shouts through Isaiah 44:6: I, I am; and there is no God except me. … For whosoever says that the Son has his essence from the Father, denies that he is from Himself … if they explain that in essentiating, the Father remains, nonetheless, one God, in whom there is an essence: Christ thus will be a figurative God, and only in appearance or in name, not in reality; because to God nothing is more proper than to be, according to that [text]:, "he who is has sent me to you [Exodus 3:14]."[58]

[58] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.23; CO 2:110-11: "Huc accedunt quae recitat apostolus (Hebr. 1, 10 et 6) testimonia: tu Deus fundasti caelum et terram (Psal. 102, 26). Item: adorent eum omnes angeli Dei (Psal. 97, 7), quae nonnisi in unicum Deum competunt:, quum tamen propria Christi elogia esse coniendat. Nec valet cavillum illud, transferri ad Christum quod Dei proprium est, quia sit relucentia gloriae ipsius. Nam quum ubique ponatur nomen Iehovae, sequitur deitatis respectu ex se ipso esse. Nam si est Iehovah, negari non potest quin idem sit ille Deus qui per Iesaiam alibi (44, 6) clamat: ego, ego sum, et praeter me non est Deus. … Nam quisquis essentiatum a patre filium esse dicit, a se ipso negat esse. … Si excipiant, patrem essentiando manere nihilominus unicum Deum, penes quem sit essentia: Christus ergo figurativus erit Deus, ac specie tantum vel nomine, non re ipsa; quia Deo nihil magis proprium quam esse, iuxta illud: qui est, misit me ad vos (Exod. 3, 14)."

Calvin argues that, although Christ is referred to as the "splendor of God's glory" in Hebrews 1:3, it is not appropriate to conclude that, because what inherently belongs to God is transferred (*transferri*) to Christ, Christ therefore shares the same essence as the Father. Based on Isaiah 44:6 and Exodus 3:14, Calvin argues that Christ is the same God who "hast founded heaven and earth" and "He is, and apart from Him there is no God." He also contends that Jesus is the same as God the Father because the Bible describes the Son as having the same aseity of the Father (*ex se ipso esse*) Jehovah. According to Calvin, Gentile who asserts that the Son has been given his essence from the Father rejects the idea that he has existence from himself [*a se ipso esse*]. Strictly speaking, Calvin differentiates the eternal Son's aseity in the *Principium* in Exodus 3:14 from the eternal Son's incommunicable personality in Hebrew 1:3. Calvin argues that Gentile's idea that what belongs to God is transferred (*transferri*) to Christ cannot be justified by Hebrews 1:3, which states that Christ is "the reflection of His glory." Hebrews 1:3, for Calvin, emphasizes Christ's distinct personality, rather than justifying Gentile's idea. In brief, Calvin does not employ Gentile's understanding of the Father's essential generation of the Son as a basis for his argument that Christ is the same God as the Father. Instead, he asserts the aseity of Christ based on Scripture and the fact that the name of Jehovah is attributed to Christ.

Calvin points out that when Gentile argues that "the Father in bestowing essence nonetheless remains the sole God,"[59] he effectively reduces the Son to a being with an essence subordinate to that of the Father. Calvin affirms the idea of the eternal Son's aseity and confesses that the eternal Son is a real eternal essence in the essence of God the Father. Calvin's rejection of the subordination of the Son in terms of divine essence does not contradict Augustine's conception of the eternal Son's shared aseity through the Father's natural generation of the Son. In this context, Calvin's argument is directed solely at refuting Gentile's claim of the eternal Son's subordination. However, it does not challenge Augustine's doctrine of the Father's natural generation of the Son, which affirms the eternal Son's real existence and consubstantiality with the Father.

Calvin argues for the consubstantiality of the three eternal persons by employing the term "the *Principium*" to refer to the Father.[60] Calvin argues (1.13.29):

> And elsewhere, he [Augustine] cleanses himself from this accusation, where he calls the Father the beginning [*Principium*] of all deity, because he is from nothing; obviously wisely judging that the name of God is ascribed in particular to the Father, because unless the beginning is made from Himself, the simple unity of God cannot be conceived.[61]

Calvin emphasizes that the Father is the *Principium* here in order to demonstrate that the Son and Spirit's consubstantiality is assured in the Father, the *Principium*. Calvin argues, "Hilary also teaches the same thing, indeed speaks more sharply, that eternity is in the Father. Is that to deprive the Son of the divine essence? Yet he is wholly concerned with the defense of the very faith to

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[59] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.23; CO 2:110.

[60] Turretin classifies the term *person* in two ways: first, in its concrete sense, and second, in its abstract sense. In its concrete sense, the person as *principium* signifies that "the Son is said to be *hyparchein* ("to be in the form of God," Phil. 2:6)." In its abstract sense, the person, understood as having an incommunicable distinction, is described as "the express image of the person of the Father" (Heb. 1:3). Refer to Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxiii.8.

[61] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.29; CO 2:116: "Atqui alibi ab hac calumnia se purgat, ubi patrem vocat principium totius deitatis, quia a nullo est; prudenter scilicet expendens specialiter patri adscribi Dei nomen, quod nisi ab ipso fiat initium, concipi nequeat simplex Dei unitas."

which we adhere."[62] Calvin does not depart from Augustine's emphasis on the consubstantiality of the other two persons in the *Principium*.

Although Calvin rarely employs or reinterprets Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son in the *Principium* when refuting Gentile's subordinationism, his reference to Augustine's notions of the Father and the Son as the *Principium* suggests an implicit agreement with Augustine's view. Both Trinitarian perspectives affirm the consubstantiality of both the eternal Son and the Spirit within the *Principium*.

2.3.2. Calvin's View of the Father's Personal Generation of the Son in Opposition to Servetus's Ideas of Modalism and God's Actual Efflux

I will demonstrate how Calvin's notion of the Father's personal generation of the Son differs from Servetus's concepts of modalism and the actual efflux of God's essence. Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son diverges from Servetus's in two distinct ways. First, Calvin presupposes that, since this generation occurred in eternity, it is not conflated with but rather mysteriously united to its manifestation in time. Second, Calvin believes that the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son, including the Son's subordination to the Father in terms of order and office, is directly linked to the divine decree—specifically, Christ's priestly office, appointed by the Father in eternity and manifested in time. In the end, I will show how Calvin's notion of the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity refutes Servetus's concepts of modalism and the actual efflux of God's essence.

First, in his commentary on John 1:1, 10:30, 10:38, and Psalm 2:7, Calvin points out the relationship between the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity and its glorious manifestation in time. In his commentary on John 1:1, he asserts that the Son, who had been hidden through the eternal generation from the beginning in the sacred bosom of the Father, was revealed and declared to be the Son of God by His manifestation and resurrection in time. He argues, "This is the eternal generation, which indeed lay hidden in God for an infinite space of time before the world was established (so to speak), foreshadowed obscurely to the fathers under the law through long succession of years, and finally was more fully manifested in the flesh."[63] Also, Calvin's commentary on Psalm 2:7 emphasizes this relationship between the Father's personal generation of the Son in the Father's eternal bosom and its manifestation in time. He argues:

> This begetting (in Psalm 2:7) must not to be understood of the mutual love which exists between the Father and the Son; it only signifies that He who had been hidden from the beginning in the mysterious bosom of the Father, and who afterwards had been obscurely adumbrated under the law, was known to be the Son of God from the time when he came forth with clear and extraordinary sings of Sonship, according to what is spoken in John 1:14, "we have seen his glory, as of the only begotten Son."[64]

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[62] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.29; CO 2:116: "Idem Hilarius quoque docet, imo asperius loquitur, aeternitatem esse in patre. An ut filio auferat Dei essentiam? Atqui in eius fidei quam sequimur defensione totus est." English translation in Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I.xiii.29.

[63] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:3, on John 1:1: "Atque haec aeterna est generatio, quae ante conditum mundum immenso spatio latuit quidem in Deo (ut ita loquar), longis annorum successionibus obscure patribus sub lege adumbrata, tandem plenius in carne exhibita fuit."

[64] Calvin, *Commentarius in Librum Psalmorum Pars I*, CO 31:47, on Psalm 2:7: "Denique haec genitura non de mutuo Patris et Filii respectu intelligi debet, sed tantum significat eum qui fuerat ab initio absconditus in arcano

Calvin's statement, "This begetting (in Psalm 2:7) must not be understood of the mutual love which exists between the Father and the Son," does not literally deny the eternal generation that implies the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son. Rather, Calvin acknowledges that Psalm 2:7 presupposes the doctrine of eternal generation and affirms a mutual relationship of love between the Father and the Son through this eternal generation. On the one hand, Calvin's statement, "He who had been hidden from the beginning in the mysterious bosom of the Father," implies that the eternal generation of the Son took place within the Father's eternal bosom. On the other hand, he places greater emphasis on the inseparable relationship between the Father's personal generation of the Son within the Father's eternal bosom and the "manifestation of Christ's heavenly glory" to humanity in time. Therefore, Calvin's concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity reflects the reciprocal love between the Father and the Son, or the mutual relationship that affirms their distinct personalities.

The mutual relationship between the Father and the Son is much clearly articulated in Calvin's commentary on John 10:30 and John 10:38. He argues:

> *That the Father is in me, and I in him.* He repeats the same thing he had said earlier in other words: "I and my Father are one." Everything points to this, that in his ministry there is nothing contrary to his Father. He says, "The Father is in me," that is, divine power is manifested in me. "And I am in my Father," that is, I do nothing but by the command of God, so that there is a mutual relationship between me and my Father. For here the discourse is not about the unity of essence, but about the manifestation of divine power in the person of Christ, from which it was evident that He was divinely sent.[65]

The statement "that He was divinely sent" conveys the same meaning as "He was divinely begotten," which is inherent in the concept of eternal generation. Accordingly, the phrases "That the Father is in me, and I in him" and "I and my Father are one" imply that, in the internal act of eternal generation, a mutual relationship exists between Christ and the Father. The mutual relationship between the Father and the Son does not deny the unity of essence in eternity. Rather, it presupposes the unity of essence in eternity and indicates the manifestation of divine power in the person of Christ. The manifestation of divine power in the person of Christ means the manifestation of His divine power in both His divine personality in eternity and His human nature in time. Therefore, Calvin's statement, "This begetting (in Psalm 2:7) must not be understood as the mutual love which exists between the Father and the Son," does not, in any way, literally deny the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son. Rather, Calvin's reference to "He who had been hidden from the beginning in the mysterious bosom of the Father" (in Psalm 2:7) signifies the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son, highlighting the Son's subordination to the Father in terms of office and order, rather than a unity of essence. In the same line, he argues, "The ancients made a wrong use of this passage [I and the Father are one in John 10:30] to prove that Christ is (*homoousios*) of the same essence with the Father. For Christ does not argue about the

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Patris sinu, et obscure deinde sub lege adumbratus, ex quo prodiit cum claris insignibus, cognitum fuisse Dei filium: sicuti etiam dicitur Iohan. 1, 14: Conspeximus gloriam eius tanquam unigenity Filii."

[65] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:254, on John 10:38: "In me est Pater. Idem repetit quod supra aliis verbis dixerat: "Ego et pater unum sumus." Huc tendunt omnia, quod in sua administratione nihil a patre diversum habeat. Pater, inquit, in me est: hoc est, divina virtus se in me profert. Et ego in patre sum: hoc est, nihil ago nisi auspiciis Dei, ita ut mutua sit inter me et patrem coniunctio. Neque enim hic de essentiae unitate sermo habetur, sed de manifestatione divinae potentiae in Christi persona, unde constabat divinitus missum esse."

unity of essence, but about the agreement which he has with the Father, so that whatever is done by Christ will be confirmed by the power of his Father."[66] Calvin's phrase, "the agreement which He has with the Father," does not refer to Christ's shared essence with the Father, but rather to His voluntary (spontaneous) subordination to the Father's will. However, since this agreement occurred within the Father's eternal bosom, it signifies both Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and His volitional subordination to the Father's will.

Second, Calvin links the Father's personal generation of the Son, which implies the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son, to the Father's appointment of the Son as Priest in his commentary on Hebrew 1:5, 5:5. He asserts:

> This testimony might seem far-fetched, for even if Christ was begotten by God the Father, it doesn't necessarily follow that He was ordained as a priest. But if we consider the end for which Christ was manifested to the world, it will plainly appear that this quality [priesthood] necessarily belongs to Him [the only begotten Son]. ... Therefore, the mutual relation between the Father and the Son is not what is only intended here; but regard is rather had to men to whom he was manifested. Now, what sort of Son did God manifest to us? Was he without any honor or power? Nay, He was revealed to be a Mediator between Himself [God] and humanity; priesthood is contained within His begetting.[67]

This passage [Hebrew 5:5] appears to acknowledge that, at first, stating that Christ was begotten of the Father might not necessarily imply that the Son was ordained as a priest. However, it then proceeds to explain why the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity indeed includes His priesthood both in eternity and in time. In doing so, Calvin attempts to emphasize the relationship between the Father's eternal generation of the Son and Christ's glorious manifestation as the mediator, spanning from eternity to time. In the same line, he argues in his commentary on Hebrew 1:5:

> Concerning generation, it must be briefly held that it is to be understood relatively in this passage: for Augustine's argument is frivolous, who imagines that "today" is eternal and perpetual. Christ doubtless is the eternal Son of God, for his wisdom was born before time. However, this has nothing to do with the present passage, where reference is made to men, among whom Christ was recognized as the Son of God after the Father had manifested him. Therefore, this declaration, which Paul also mentions in Romans 1:4, was, so to speak, a sort of the eternal generation. For the hidden and internal [generation]

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[66] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:250, on John 10:30: "Testatur ergo sibi ita coniunctas esse cum patre rationes, ut eius auxilium sibi ac suis ovibus nunquam defuturum sit. Abusi sunt hoc loco veteres, ut probarent Christum esse patri ὁμοούσιον. Neque enim Christus de unitate substantiae disputat, sed de consensu quem cum patre habet: quidquid scilicet geritur a Christo, patris virtute confirmatum iri."

[67] Calvin, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, CO 55:60, on Hebrew 5:5: "Filius meus es tu: Videri posset longe petitum hoc testimonium. Neque enim si a Deo patre genitus fuit Christus, ideo et sacerdos ordinatus. Verum si reputamus ad quid revelatus fuerit Christus mundo, facile constabit, illi qualitatem hanc necessario convenire. Primo tamen memoria repetendum est quod primo capite diximus, hanc Christi genituram, de qua psalmus loquitur, fuisse testimonium quod illi pater reddidit apud homines. Itaque non est hic mutua inter patrem et filium relatio: sed potius hominum respectus habetur, apud quos illustratus est. Nunc qualem nobis filium manifestavit Deus: At nullo honore, nullaque facultate praeditum? Imo ut inter se et homines mediator esset. Ergo sacerdotium continet genitura."

which had preceded, was unknown to men and could not be understood unless the Father had approved it by a visible manifestation.[68]

The sentence, "Christ doubtless is the eternal Son of God, for His wisdom was born before time," implies that Calvin does not reject the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son in eternity— a relationship grounded in the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity. Rather, based on the mutual relationship between the Father and the Son by the Father's personal generation of the Son, Calvin argues that it encompasses the eternal Son's priesthood, which was granted by the Father in eternity and will be manifested through Jesus Christ's office in time.

One should notice that Calvin, in rejecting Lombard's argument—that the Father's personal generation of the Son occurred in eternity and that the Father always begets the Son in time— asserted that "the three persons have subsisted in God from eternity."[69] In light of Calvin's argument, his statement "the priesthood is contained within His begetting" should be understood to mean that "the Father's eternal appointment of the Son as priest is contained within His eternal begetting." Thus, His priesthood is an eternal event occurring within the process of eternal begetting, and this office is united with, but not confused with, either the divine nature of the eternal Son or the human nature of the incarnate Logos. Thus, His eternal priesthood is directly connected to Christ's voluntary subordination to the Father's will, and the Father's will and the eternal Son's will are distinct, yet together they constitute the decree of the Trinity. In short, the eternal decrees of God the Trinity, grounded in both the natural and personal generation of the Son and the natural and personal procession of the Spirit, reflects the eternal unity (*homoousios*) and the distinct personalities of God the Trinity.

In the end, it becomes evident, based on the two arguments presented above, that Calvin's concept of the eternal Son, grounded in his notions of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity, markedly diverges from Servetus's conception of the eternal and temporal Logos, which underpins Servetus's modalism and Arian subordinationism.

On the one hand, Calvin frequently accuses Servetus of Arian subordinationism, as Servetus views the Logos as temporal speech, subordinate to God in eternity. Calvin argues:

> Servetus, the proudest scoundrel from Spanish nation, imagines that this eternal Word only then appeared when he was revealed in the creation of the world, as if he was not truly before his power was recognized by an external operation. The evangelist teaches something far different here: for he does not assign to the Word a beginning of time, but by saying that he was from the beginning and transcends all ages. Nor am I unaware of what this dog barks and what the Arians of old mocked: namely, that God created the heaven and the earth in the

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[68] Calvin, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, CO 55:15, on Hebrew 1:5: "De generatione sic breviter habendum est: relative hoc loco accipi. Frivola enim Augustini argutia est, qui hodie aeternum et continuum fingit. Christus certe aeternus est Dei filius: quia sapientia eius est ante tempus genita. Sed hoc nihil ad praesentem locum, ubi respectus habetur ad homines: a quibus agnitus fuit Christus pro filio Dei, postquam eum pater manifestavit. Haec igitur declaratio, cuius etiam Paulus meminit ad Romanos cap. 1, 4, species quaedam fuit aeternae (ut ita loquar) generationis. Nam arcana illa et interior, quae praecesserat, hominibus erat incognita: nec in rationem venire poterat, nisi eam pater visibili revelatione approbasset."

[69] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.29; CO 2:116: "Nam quos oblectat speculandi intemperies, minime placandos suscipio. Certe nihil astute praeterii quod mihi adversum esse putarem; sed dum ecclesiae aedificationi studeo, multa non attingere consultius visum est, quae et parum prodessent, et lectores gravarent supervacua molestia. Quid enim disputare attinet an semper generet pater? Quando stulte fingitur continuus actus generandi, ex quo liquet ab aeterno tres in Deo personas subsistisse."

beginning, which yet are not eternal, because the term *Principium* refers more to order than it indicates eternity. … But the evangelist cuts off the occasion for such insane delusions when he affirms without exception that the Word was with God: for he clearly calls us back from all temporal moments.[70]

Calvin could potentially advocate for the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father through two common approaches: by invoking Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son or by emphasizing Augustine's idea of the Son's aseity. Considering the following, he chose the latter.

Calvin's comments on John 5:26 offer the ground to refute Servetus's Arians's subordinationism. His interpretation of John 5:26 does not differ greatly from Augustine's exposition, except that Calvin does not directly employ Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son to affirm the consubstantiality of the three persons. Rather, it seems that Calvin intends to avoid employing Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Calvin states, "He [Jesus] shows whence his voice derives such efficacy; namely, that he is the fountain of life, and by his voice pours it out on men; for life would not flow to us from his mouth, if he had not in himself the cause and source of it."[71] Calvin does not provide an explanation for how the Son possesses the source of eternal life in Himself in the same manner as the Father, as he does not adopt Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Calvin distinguishes between two aspects of the life of God: the cause or source of eternal life, and the eternal life imparted to humanity. The Father, as the cause and source of life, possesses this immanent life in Himself and is, therefore, the *Principium* in Himself. It remains uncertain whether Calvin fully adopted Augustine's notion that the Father conferred this immanent life upon the Son, thereby enabling the Son to possess this immanent life in Himself.

Unlike Augustine, Calvin does not draw a distinction between the Father and the Son in his commentary on John 5:26, but rather seeks to subsume both the Father and the Son under the unified concept of God. Calvin argues, "God is said to have life in himself, not only because he alone lives by his own inherent power, but because, containing in himself the fullness of life, he communicates life to all things. And this, indeed, belongs peculiarly to God, as it is said, With thee is the fountain of life (Psalm 36:9)."[72] Once more Calvin divides life in two: the life generated by

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[70] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2, on John 1:1: "Servetus, superbissimus ex gente hispanica nebulo, aeternum hunc sermonem tunc demum exortum esse fingit, quum in mundi creatione exsertus est. Quasi vero non prius fuerit, quam virtus eius externo opere fuit cognita. Longe aliud hic docet evangelista: neque enim sermoni assignat temporis initium, sed ab initio fuisse dicens, saecula omnia transscendit. Nec me latet quid oblatret hic canis, et quid olim cavillati sint Ariani : nempe Deum creasse principio caelum et terram, quae tamen aeterna non sint: quia principii nomen magis ad ordinem respiciat, quam aeternitatem designet. … Sed ansam insanis eiusmodi deliriis praecidit evangelista, quum sine exceptione affirmat, sermonem fuisse apud Deum: nam ab omnibus temporum momentis aperte nos revocat."

[71] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:118, on John 5:26: "Ostendit unde tanta voci suae efficacia, quod scilicet ipse sit fons vitae et eam voce sua in homines effundat. Neque enim nobis ex eius ore proflueret vita, nisi penes ipsum esset eius causa et origo. Neque enim Deus vitam in se habere dicitur tantum, quod propria virtute et intrinseca solus vivat, sed quia vitae plenitudinem in se continens omnia vivificat. Atque hoc quidem proprie in Deum competit quemadmodum Ps. 36, 10 habetur." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 1, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1847), 120, on John 5:26.

[72] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:118, on John 5:26: "Neque enim Deus vitam in se habere dicitur tantum, quod propria virtute et intrinseca solus vivat, sed quia vitae plenitudinem in se continens omnia vivificat. Atque hoc quidem proprie in Deum competit quemadmodum Ps. 36, 10 habetur." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, 120, on John 5:26.

his own inherent power, and the life communicated to all things. In this context Calvin understands God the Son as the *Principium*. Calvin calls the first type of life the *Principium* from John 1:1 rather than God's transcendental essence seemingly because he does not want to go beyond the Scripture. Calvin affirms that "essence does not beget essence, person begets person."[73] For Calvin, this first type of life should not be one person of God the Trinity, i.e., the begotten Son, because God, who has life in himself, i.e., from no one else, is beyond Christ's distinct personality. Calvin understands that the Son of God possesses essential aseity in Himself, which is the *Principium* or the Godhead, as expressed in the phrase "He alone lives by His own inherent power." In short, Calvin seeks to overcome Servetus's Arian subordinationism by emphasizing Augustine's concept of the eternal Son's aseity.

On the other hand, Calvin's concept of the Son's incommunicable personality effectively refutes Servetus's idea of modalism. In opposing Servetus's modalism, Calvin attempts to underline the Son's distinct personality by making a distinction between the Word, who *was* God, and the Word, who was *with* God. Calvin maintains that, even though the Son in the *Principium* is God himself, the Son has a distinct personality according to His eternal glory, will, and office. Calvin comments on John 1:1-2, saying:

> For when John proclaims that the Logos was God while the world was not yet created, he distinguishes [it] far from an idea (John 1:1). But if, then, that Logos from the ultimate eternity, who was God, was with the Father (John 17:5), and was distinguished by his own glory with the Father, the splendor was certainly not able to be an external or figurative splendor; but it necessarily follows that he was a hypostasis, who resided within God himself.[74]

Servetus assumes that the eternal Logos merely signifies the Father's reasoning (idea) within the eternal mind of God; thus, Calvin feels compelled to oppose Servetus's modalism. Calvin attempts to refute Servetus's modalism by underlining the eternally distinct glory of the second person. According to Calvin, the Son exists as a true eternal being with His own distinct glory, rather than merely as the Father's eternal idea (the eternal Logos) or external radiance (the temporal Logos), because the eternal Son resides as both God and a distinct person (*hypostasis*) within the Godhead. Commenting on John 17:5, Calvin argues, "Besides, a manifest distinction between the person of Christ and the person of the Father is here expressed; from which we infer, that he is not only the eternal God, but also that he is the eternal Word of God, begotten by the Father before all ages."[75] Here Calvin interprets the Father's eternal begetting of the Son as the Father's personal act of generation, through which the eternal Son possesses His incommunicable personality, specifically referred to as "His own glory" or "His own property."

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[73] Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, 209.

[74] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:109: "Nam quum Ioannes nondum creato mundo λογον fuisse Deum pronuntiet (Ioann. 1, 1), longe ab idea discernit. Si vero tunc quoque et ab ultima aeternitate λογος ille, qui Deus erat, fuit apud patrem, et propria sua gloria apud patrem insignis fuit (Ioann. 17, 5), non potuit certe externus esse aut figurativus splendor; sed necessario sequitur fuisse hypostasin, quae in Deo ipso intus resideret."

[75] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:378, on John 17:5: "Adde quod inter eius et patris personam manifesta hic distinctio statuitur: unde colligimus non modo aeternum esse Deum, sed aeternum quoque Dei sermonem ex patre ante saecula genitum." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1847), 100, on John 17:5.

Furthermore, Calvin interprets the phrase "the eternal Word was with God" in John 1:2 as a reference to the second person of the Trinity. He argues, "For it would have been absurd in the Evangelist to say that the Speech was always with God, if he had not some kind of subsistence peculiar to himself in God. This passage serves, therefore, to refute the error of Sabellius [Modalism]; for it shows that the Son is distinct from the Father."[76] Since Servetus denies the eternal Son's distinct personality, Calvin charges Servetus with modalism. Calvin's affirmation that the eternal Son's distinct personality, generated from the Father in eternity, was with the Father serves to refute Servetus's modalism. He demonstrates that the eternal Son, though consubstantial with the eternal Father, also possesses a distinct personality, distinguished from the Father through the Father's personal generation of the Son.

In summary, Calvin's comprehensive understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son, combined with his idea of the Son's aseity, shapes his Trinitarian perspective, effectively refuting both Servetus's modalism and Arius's subordinationism. Since Calvin seeks to avoid accusations of modalism and subordinationism by distancing himself from Servetus's misuse of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, he appears to affirm Augustine's position: just as the Father, as the *Principium*, possesses inherent, self-existent life in Himself, so too the eternal Son—naturally begotten by the Father—possesses inherent, self-existent life in Himself as the *Principium*, while maintaining His distinct personality—volitionally begotten by the Father—from the Father. One may conclude that Calvin implicitly concurs with Augustine's Scripturally-based concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son (*vita Dei essentialiter*) within the realm of the *Principium*.

2.3.3. Calvin's Acquiescence to Augustine's Idea of the Father's Natural and Volitional Generation in Opposition to both Gentile's Subordinationism and Servetus's Modalism

I will show, through an examination of Calvin's rejection of both Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism, that even though Calvin's view of eternal generation underscores the distinct personality of the eternal Son, his Trinitarian view suggests that He, who is still God, is subject to the Father in terms of order and office but not of essence. In doing so, I will demonstrate that Calvin's idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity necessarily acquiesces to Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity.

First, Calvin's concept of the Son of God having two identities, i.e., the essential and personal Son, refutes both Gentile's subordinationism in terms of God's essence and Servetus's modalism in terms of Christ's personality distinct from the Father.

On the one hand, Calvin's commentary on John 1:14 demonstrates that he employs the term *the only begotten Son of God* in the Nicene sense of *"Deus de Deo"* (God from God). He argues, "The Evangelist therefore means, that in Christ was beheld a glory which was worthy of the Son of God, and which was a sure proof of his Divinity. He calls him the Only-begotten, because he is the only Son of God by nature; as if he would place him above men and angels, and would claim for him alone what belongs to no creature."[77] Calvin uses the term *divinitatis* to signify God's divine

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[76] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:3, on John 1:1: "Absurde enim diceret evangelista, semper cum Deo vel apud Deum fuisse, nisi propria quaedam illi subsistentia in Deo foret. Ergo ad refellendum Sabellii errorem valet hic locus, quia ostendit filium a patre differre." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 1, 14, on John 1:1.

[77] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:15, on John 1:14: "Intelligit ergo evangelista

nature.[78] Therefore, when Calvin states, "He calls Him the Only-begotten, because He is the only Son of God by nature," he affirms that the divine nature and glory of the eternal Son of God are identical to the divine nature and glory of the Father. On the other hand, in his following phrase "as if he would place him above men and angels, and would claim for him alone what belongs to no creature," it is inferred that Christ not only possesses a divine nature distinct from all created beings but also holds a unique position as a distinct person within the divine nature. Regarding grace and truth as related to His distinct personality, Calvin continues to argue, "Therefore, I simply interpret that Christ was recognized by the apostles as the Son of God because He had in Himself the fulfillment of things belonging to the spiritual kingdom of God. In short, in all things, He showed Himself to be the Redeemer and Messiah, which is the most remarkable mark by which He ought to have been distinguished from all others.[79] Therefore, Calvin's use of the term *the only begotten* strongly emphasizes the essential unity (*homoousios*) between the Father and the Son while also highlighting their personal distinction.

Second, Calvin, refuting Gentile's subordinationism, seems to invoke Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son to confirm the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Calvin argues (*Institutes* 1.13.23):

> They [who follow Gentile] object that if truly he is the Son of God, it is absurd to think of him as the Son of the Person. I respond that both are true; truly, he is the Son of God, because the Word was born from the Father before the ages (it is not yet the discussion for us concerning the person of mediator), and yet for the purpose of explaining it, the regard of person must be held, in order that the name of God may not be taken simply but for the Father. For if we understand that God is no other than the Father, the Son is not subtly [thus, clearly] cast down from this rank. Thus, whenever mention is made of deity, it ought not to allow the antithesis between the Son and the Father, as if the name of the true God may be attributed to the latter [the Father] only.[80]

Those who follow Gentile believe that the Son of God and the Son of the Person are incompatible, but Calvin accepts that both can coexist within the essence of God. Calvin's argument, "He is the

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conspectam fuisse in Christo gloriam quae filio Dei congrueret, certumque esset divinitatis testimonium. Unigenitum vocat, quia unicus est natura filius: ac si eum supra homines et angelos locaret, atque illi uni assereret quod in creaturam nullam competit." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 1, 25, on John 1:14.

[78] See Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:1, on John 1:1: "Hoc exordio aeternam Christi divinitatem praedicat: ut sciamus aeternum esse Deum, qui manifestatus est in carne." Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:4, on John 1:3: "Ubi sermonem esse Deum asseruit et aeternam eius essentiam praedicavit, nunc ab operibus divinitatem eius probat." Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:14, on John 1:14: "Alterum vero, non obstare personae unitatem, quin distinctae naturae maneant, ita ut divinitas quidquid sibi proprium est retineat, humanitas etiam seorsum habeat quod in eam competit."

[79] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:15-16, on John 1:14: "ergo simpliciter interpretor, Christum apostolis inde agnitum fuisse pro filio Dei, quod complementum omnium, quae ad spirituale Dei regnum pertinent, in se haberet. Denique quod in omnibus vere se praestiterit redemptorem et Messiam: quae maxime insignis est nota, qua discerni ab aliis omnibus debuit."

[80] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.23; CO 2:109-10: "Excipiunt, si vere est Dei filius, absurdum esse censeri personae filium. Ego utrumque verum esse respondeo, Dei nempe esse filium, quia sermo est a patre ante saecula genitus (nondum enim de mediatoris persona nobis sermo est), et tamen explicandi causa habendam esse rationem personae, ut nomen Dei non simpliciter sumatur, sed pro patre. Nam si non alium censemus Deum quam patrem, non obscure deiicitur filius ab hoc gradu. Ergo quoties deitatis fit mentio, minime admitti debet antithesis inter filium et patrem, quasi huic tantum conveniat nomen veri Dei."

Son of God, because the Word was born from the Father before the ages, … in order that the name of God may not be taken simply but for the Father" is to emphasize that God should not be restricted solely to the Father. Calvin provides three arguments to refute Gentile's denial of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. First, Calvin's phrase that "the Word was born from the Father before the ages" represents the Nicene sense of "*Dues de Deo*," thus rejecting Gentile's idea of the hierarchical rank between the Father and the Son in the essence of God and asserting that there is no antithesis of deity between the Father and the Son. Second, in his effort to correct Gentile's distortion of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Calvin effectively employs Augustine's doctrine of natural generation to demonstrate the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Third, Calvin says that the Son of the Person (*personae filium*) is distinguished from the Son of God (Dei *filius*). In summary, Calvin's conception of the eternal Son's personality, established through the Father's personal generation of the Son, together with his assertion that "the Word was born from the Father," is essentially aligned with Augustine's conception of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Calvin's use of the Nicene sense of "*Dues de Deo*" and his own idea of the Son of the Person begotten from the Father before all ages is identical to Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.

Third, Calvin, refuting Servetus's modalism, attempts to highlight another aspect of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and confirms the eternal Son's incommunicable personality. He explains that the Father came before the Son in order by the Father's personal begetting of the Son, thus refuting Servetus's modalism and proving the real (but eternal) subsistence of the eternal personality of the Son. He comments on John 1:1, saying:

> Servetus objects that the Word cannot be comprehended any earlier than when God is introduced by Moses as speaking, as if he is not subsisting in God, because he did not know [him] plainly, that is, as if he were not within, until he began to bring forth externally. … Thus, Augustine correctly reminds that this beginning [*Principium*], which is mentioned now, lacks a beginning [i.e., it has no beginning]. Even if indeed the Father by order is earlier than his wisdom, yet those who imagine any temporal point in which He preceded His Wisdom deprive Him of his glory. And this is the eternal generation, which was hidden in God (so to speak) in an immense space indeed before the world was constituted, which for a long succession of years was adumbrated under the law obscurely to the fathers, and finally was more fully exhibited in incarnation.[81]

Calvin's statement, "this beginning [*Principium*], which is mentioned now, lacks a beginning," implies that the Father's personal generation of the Son in the beginning occurred in eternity. Based on his concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son, Calvin understands the Father's personal generation of the Son as primarily affirming the eternal Son's distinct personality from the Father. Calvin does not employ Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son when he emphasizes the order of persons, in which the Father existed in eternity prior to his Wisdom.

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[81] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2-3, on John 1:1: "Excipit Servetus, non prius comprehendi sermonem posse, quam quum Deus a Mose loquens inducitur. Quasi vero non substiterit in Deo, quia palam non innotuit. Hoc est, quasi non fuerit intus, donec extra prodire coepit. … Recte ergo Augustinus, principium hoc, cuius nunc fit mentio, principio carere admonet. Tametsi enim pater ordine prior est quam sua sapientia, illum tamen sua gloria spoliant, qui ullum temporis punctum imaginantur, quo sapientiam suam praecesserit. Atque haec aeterna est generatio, quae ante conditum mundum immenso spatio latuit quidem in Deo (ut ita loquar), longis annorum successionibus obscure patribus sub lege adumbrata, tandem plenius in carne exhibita fuit."

Rather, Calvin explains in further detail how the eternal Word, who was God the *Principium*, was eternally generated as the eternal Wisdom from the *Principium*, possessing His incommunicable personality, distinct from the *Principium*. In doing so, Calvin intends to refute Servetus's denial of the eternal Son's distinct personality by affirming the eternal subsistence (personality) rather than the consubstantiality of the eternal Wisdom. Calvin contends that this eternal Wisdom came *after* the Father as the second person of God, therefore Calvin's idea of eternal Wisdom refers to the eternal Son's incommunicable personality. Calvin's idea of eternal generation must not be regarded as identical to Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation, which affirms the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father, the Godhead, and the *Principium*.

Fourth, Calvin uses Augustine's notion of the Spirit's aseity to affirm the consubstantiality of the three persons.[82] He argues in his *Institutes* (1.13.19):

> Again, this distinction does not at all hinder the most simple unity of God so that, from this, it is allowed to prove that the Son is one God with the Father, because he exists in one and the same Spirit with him, but that the Spirit is not something different from the Father and the Son, because he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Accordingly, in each hypostasis, the whole nature is understood, with the result that its own property subsists.[83]

On the one hand, Calvin clearly identifies the Spirit as the cause for the consubstantiality of the three persons. Due to the Spirit's role in causing the three persons to have the same nature, the Spirit is essentially the same as the Father and should be characterized as a self-existent being, just like the Father. Calvin's statement, "in each *hypostasis* the whole divine nature is understood," suggests that the full divine nature is communicated through the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit.

On the other hand, he continues to address the logical sequence or relationship between Father and Son in this context. His statement, "its own property subsists," suggests that, in their mutual relationship, the eternal Son is subordinate to the eternal Father in terms of order and role, but not in essence.

Fifth, Calvin understands that the eternal Son's aseity relates to the *Principium* and God Himself while the second person of God denotes his incommunicable personality. Calvin states in his *Institutes* (1.13.19):

> The whole Father is in the Son, and the whole Son is in the Father, just as he himself asserts [John 14:10]; I am in the Father, and the Father is in me; neither the writers of the church concede that one is differentiated from another by any difference of essence. By these appellations, which indicate distinction, Augustine says, is signified this with respect to which they are related to themselves in turn, not the substance itself, by which they are one. In this sense, the opinions of the ancients are to be reconciled among themselves; otherwise, they appear to be somewhat in conflict with one another. Now they teach that the Father is

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[82] For a more detailed discussion of Augustine's views on the aseity of the Son and the Spirit, as well as the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, see sections 1.3.3–4 of this study.

[83] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.19; CO 2:105: "Porro simplicissimam Dei unitatem adeo non impedit ista distinctio, ut filium inde probare liceat unum esse cum patre Deum, quia uno simul cum eo spiritu constet; spiritum autem non aliud esse a patre et filio diversum, quia patris et filii sit spiritus. Siquidem in unaquaque hypostasi tota intelligitur natura, cum hoc, quod subest sua unicuique proprietas."

the beginning of the Son, and now they assert that the Son has divinity and essence from Himself, to the point that he is the one beginning with the Father.[84]

Calvin explicitly addresses both the consubstantiality and the incommunicable distinction of the three persons when he interprets the phrase, "The whole Father is in the Son, and the whole Son is in the Father."

On the one hand, Calvin's argument, "the Son has the same essence from himself [*a se ipso*] and thus one beginning [*unum principium*] with the Father," indicates that the eternal Son has consubstantiality with the Father, since he is in the Father, the *Principium*. Calvin's interpretation of John 14:10 is identical to Augustine's interpretation of John 15:26, in which Augustine employs the Father's natural generation of the Son to confirm the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. In his *De Trinitate*, Augustine argues that the Father is the origin [*Principium*] of the whole divinity, in which the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, is returned to the Father from whom the Son was born.[85] Calvin further supports Augustine's idea of the eternal Son's asiety in his *Institutes* (1.13.19). Quoting Augustine, Calvin writes:

> Thus, when we speak of the Son simply without the Father, we well and properly assert him to be from Himself: and therefore we call him the single beginning; but when we speak of the relation that he has with the Father, we rightly make the Father the beginning of the Son. The whole fifth book of Augustine on the Trinity is involved in the explanation of this thing.[86]

Calvin's use of the phrase "the Son without regard to the Father" refers to the eternal Son's essence, "to be of himself [*a se esse*]" and "the sole beginning [*Principium*]." Calvin finds that holding the idea of the eternal Son's aseity is critical to claiming the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. In doing so, Calvin can refute Gentile's subordinationism by affirming that the Son, who is called God in relation to Himself and Son in relation to the Father, shares the same divine essence with the Father. Therefore, both are the one and sole *Principium*.

On the other hand, Calvin's phrase "the Father is the beginning of the Son" implies the idea of the eternal Son's incommunicable personality. Elsewhere, Calvin points out that the different appellations of the three persons imply the idea of the eternal Son's incommunicable personality.

> Augustine well and insightfully explains the cause of this diversity in another place, when he speaks thus; 1) Christ to Himself is called God, and to the Father he is called the Son. 2)

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[84] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.19; CO 2:105-6: "Pater totus in filio est, totus in patre filius, quemadmodum ipse quoque asserit (Ioann. 14, 10 seq.): ego in patre, et pater in me; nec ulla essentiae differentia seiungi alterum ab altero scriptores ecclesiastici concedunt. His appellationibus quae distinctionem denotant, inquit Augustinus, hoc significatur quod ad se invicem referuntur; non ipsa substantia qua unum sunt. Quo sensu conciliandae sunt inter se veterum sententiae, quae pugnare alioqui nonnihil viderentur. Nunc enim patrem filii principium esse tradunt; nunc filium a se ipso et divinitatem et essentiam habere asseverant, adeoque unum esse cum patre principium."

[85] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, IV.xx.29; PL 42:908: "non tamen dixit: "Quem mittet Pater a me", quemadmodum dixit: Quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, videlicet ostendens quod totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur deitatis, principium Pater est. Qui ergo a Patre procedit et Filio, ad eum refertur a quo natus est Filius."

[86] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.19; CO 2:106: "Ergo quum de filio sine patris respectu simpliciter loquimur, bene et proprie ipsum a se esse asserimus; et ideo unicum vocamus principium: quum vero relationem quae illi cum patre est notamus, patrem filii principium merito facimus. In huius rei explicatione quintus liber Augustini de Trinitate totus versatur."

The Father to Himself is called God, and to the Son he is said the Father. 3) Insofar as he is called the Father to the Son, he is not the Son; Insofar as he is called the Son to the Father, he is not the Father, 4) Insofar as he is called the Father to Himself, and the Son to Himself, He is the same God.[87]

Calvin can oppose Servetus's modalism by arguing that the Son had another characteristic mark from the Father, the *Principium*, through the appellations of the three persons. Elsewhere, he argues:

We would understand by the term subsistence something different from essence. If indeed the Word simply is God, while having nothing of its own, John would have wrongly said that he had been always with God (John 1:1). Immediately after, he adds to you that the Word was God Himself; he recalls us as to one essence. But because he could not have been with God without residing in the Father, thus emerges that subsistence, which has been, though, connected with the essence by an individual connection, is not able to be separated, yet has a special mark by which it is distinguished from the thing itself [*essentia*].[88]

Calvin acknowledges that as the second person, the Son "was with" God, because the Word, who was God Himself, resides with a special mark in the Father. Consequently, Calvin identifies a logical distinction between the eternal Word, eternally generated as God within the Father, the *Principium*, and the eternal Word, eternally generated as the second person from the Father, the first person.

It should be noted that if Calvin merely adopts Augustine's concept of the aseity of the eternal Son and Spirit, without accepting Augustine's ideas of the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, Calvin's view risks being reduced to tritheism, portraying the Father, Son, and Spirit as three self-existent beings. If Calvin does not acquiesce to Augustine's idea of the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, his view has no theological method to explain how these three real eternal beings can be one, although it must be explained in some ineffable realm. Calvin must explain how the three real eternal beings can be one to avoid being branded a tritheist. One can infer that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective inevitably acquiesces to Augustine's concepts of the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit to affirm the consubstantiality of the three distinct, eternal persons in a concrete sense.

In summary, Gentile, on the one hand, believes that, through the Father's begetting of the Son, there are the three eternal beings, one the essentiator and the other two essentiated from the essentiator.[89] Calvin's affirmation of the Father's personal generation of the Son, along with his emphasis on their aseity, presupposes the Son's consubstantiality with the Father as well as His subordination in terms of order and role. This concept may align with Augustine's view of the

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[87] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.19; CO 2:106: "Eius diversitatis causam bene ac perspicue explicat Augustinus alibi, quum ita loquitur: Christus ad se Deus dicitur, ad patrem filius dicitur. Rursusque pater ad se Deus dicitur, ad filium dicitur pater. Quod dicitur ad filium pater, non est filius; quod dicitur filius ad patrem, non est pater; quod dicitur ad se pater et filius ad se, est idem Deus."

[88] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.6; CO 2:94: "Subsistentiae nomine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quam essentiam. Si enim sermo simpliciter esset Deus, interea non haberet aliquid proprium, perperam dixisset Ioannes fuisse semper apud Deum (Ioann. 1, 1). Ubi continuo post addit, Deum quoque fuisse ipsum sermonem, ad unicam essentiam nos revocat. Sed quia apud Deum esse non potuit quin resideret in patre, hinc emergit illa subsistentia, quae etsi individuo nexu cum essentia coniuncta est, nec potest separari, specialem tamen habet notam qua ab ipsa differat."

[89] Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:193.

Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, while contrasting with Gentile's notion of eternal generation, which lacks affirmation of the three persons' *homoousios*. Servetus, on the other hand, presents a variation of Gentile's argument, asserting that only the Father exists independently and of Himself. For Servetus, Christ, the eternal Logos, is an eternal idea in the Father's eternal intellect, but is not a real eternal being guaranteed by the Father's natural generation of the Son. Calvin's concept of the Son's real and eternal personality can be distinguished from Servetus's view of the Son as merely a real and eternal reasoning or idea in the Father's eternal mind. Calvin upholds the notion of the Son's distinct personality and consubstantial being through his affirmation of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity. In short, Calvin's belief in both the Son's *Principium* (aseity) and the Father's personal generation of the Son implies that his Trinitarian perspective is substantially identical to Augustine's, which is grounded in his holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.

2.4. Conclusion

In Chapter 2, I described that any anti-Trinitarian position which rejects Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity is fundamentally different from Augustine's Trinitarian perspective. By examining how Servetus and Calvin employ specific Scriptural texts to support their respective Trinitarian perspectives, I demonstrated that Calvin's emphasis on both the Father's personal generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity closely aligns with Augustine's holistic view of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, differing primarily in methodology.

In Section 2.2, I showed how Servetus established his idea of a monistic God appearing in various modes by distorting Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, which upholds both the consubstantiality and distinct personality of the eternal Son. On the one hand, Servetus denies the idea of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and understands "the Logos in nature" as "an eternal reasoning of the Father," arguing that the eternal Logos is an eternal idea in the Father's internal intellect but not a real eternal being by the Father's natural generation of the Son. On the other hand, Servetus's concept of natural generation is the emanation of God's eternal essence into time and space, a notion which is similar to Arius's subordinationism. Servetus defines "by nature" as "by emanation," and thus his idea of "by emanation" is different from Augustine's concept of "by the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son." Servetus, therefore, understands the form (*morphe*) of God as an actual temporal appearance (*species*) derived from God's eternal essence, rather than as the *Principium* or the revealed essence of God in time—that is, the manifestation of God's being. In short, Servetus believes that an eternal Logos is the Father's eternal reasoning or idea, whereas the temporal Logos has a status subordinate to God's essence. Servetus's denial of Augustine's ideas of the Son's essential aseity and His consubstantiality with the Father results in Servetus's yielding to both modalism and subordinationism. Since Servetus believes that the Father's essence can be directly shared with any creature in heaven or on earth through the one Logos with a twofold aspect (the eternal Logos and the temporal Logos), Servetus must inevitably dismiss the need for a unique atoning work of Christ's incommunicable personality based on the Trinity's eternal decree.[90]

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[90] Anthony McRoy, "The Theology of Arius," *Foundations (Affinity)* 59 (May 2008): 19–22; Williams, *Arius*, 95–116, 181–98.

In Section 2.3, I showed how Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity can refute Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism and subordinationism.

In Section 2.3.1, I showed how Calvin's notion of the eternal Son's aseity against Gentile's three hierarchical essences are substantially identical to Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity. Calvin introduces Augustine's idea of the Son's aseity to refute Gentile's idea of three hierarchical essences. However, Calvin's introduction of Augustine's idea of the Son's aseity may leave room for tritheism, since Calvin believes that three distinct beings residing in one essence of God are distinguished from the one essence of God by the Father's personal generation of the Son. If Calvin combines Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity with his own concept of the Son's distinct personalities established by the Father's personal generation of the Son, these two distinct persons become the two distinct and essential beings from Himself (*a se ipso*), and the result of this combination contradicts Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. However, Calvin intends to introduce Augustine's idea of the Son's aseity in order to assert the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Thus, I have demonstrated that Calvin's notion of the eternal Son's aseity is essentially identical to Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son.

In Section 2.3.2, by examining the differences between Servetus's modalistic view of the actual efflux of God's essence and Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity, I demonstrated that Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity—encompassing both the consubstantiality and distinct personalities of the three persons—is fundamentally aligned with Augustine's comprehensive concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. On the one hand, Servetus thinks that Christ, the eternal Logos, is an eternal idea in the eternal and natural intellect of the Father, but that he is not a real eternal being. Calvin's idea of the Son's real and eternal personality is different from Servetus's idea of the Son as an eternal reasoning, because Calvin, based on his notion of the Father's personal begetting of the Son, holds the idea of the eternal Son's unique personality. On the other hand, Servetus contends that the temporal Logos was *natus,* subordinately emanated or temporally communicated or born from God's eternal essence, employing the concept of "by nature" in two ways: the first indicates "by an immanent (eternal) and intellectual acting of a monistic God," and the second points to "by an actual efflux of the divine being." I showed that Calvin links the Father's personal generation of the Son to His eternal priesthood from the Father in his commentary on Hebrew 5:5. In doing so, I demonstrated that Calvin's idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son, which depends on the Son's volitional subordination to the Father's will in terms of order and office, is essentially identical Augustine's idea of the Father's volitional generation of the Son and different from Servetus's idea of an actual emanation from God's essence. Thus, Calvin's belief in both the Son's *Principium* (aseity) and the Father's personal generation of the Son suggests that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective is identical to Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, not to Servetus's modalistic view of the actual efflux of God's essence.

In Section 2.3.3, I demonstrated that in Calvin's effort to refute both Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism, his Trinitarian perspectives substantially align with Augustine's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. On the one hand, I showed that Calvin's interpretation of Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son in eternity substantially differs from Gentile's belief that there are three essential beings. Gentiles asserts that the Father gave birth to the Son, positing that while one is the essence, the other two are essentiated essences. I demonstrated that in his refutation of Gentile's

subordinationism, Calvin also corrected Gentile's misuse of the Nicene phrase "*Deus de De*o" to affirm his claim that the Son of God, naturally begotten of the Father before all ages, is naturally identical to the Father. Calvin's use of the Nicene concept "*Deus de Deo*" aligns with Augustine's doctrine of the Father's natural generation of the Son. On the other hand, in opposing Servetus's modalism, Calvin argues that the Father's personal generation of the Son affirms the three distinct persons residing in one essence of God yet distinguished from God's essence. Calvin argues that the idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son shows that there are two distinct persons in the one essence of God, but the generation is not ongoing in time. Calvin refutes both Servetus's modalism and the emanating sense of eternal generation at the same time by identifying the Father's personal generation of the Son as the ground for the Trinity's eternal decree. Calvin's ideas of the Father's personal generation of Son and the eternal Son's aseity imply the following presuppositions: 1) The three persons have the consubstantiality among them through Calvin's affirmation of the three person's aseity in eternity. 2) The three persons have the three distinct personalities by the personal generation and procession. Unlike Augustine, Calvin selectively employs either the Son's aseity to affirm the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father, refuting Gentile, or the Father's personal generation of the Son to affirm the eternal Son's distinct personality, countering Servetus's subordinationism.

In summary, Calvin's Trinitarian perspective would virtually be indistinguishable from those of Gentile or Servetus unless he acquiesces to Augustine's holistic concepts of both the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity. Calvin refutes both Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalistic idea of one personal being of the Father by affirming that there is the consubstantiality of the three distict persons in eternity. Calvin's holistic concepts of the eternal Son's aseity (or *Principium*) and the Father's personal generation of the Son are substantially identical to Augustine's holistic concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.

Chapter 3: Socinus's Trinitarian Perspective

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Socinus's Rejection of Augustine's Ideas on the Father's Natural Generation of the Son and the Eternal Son's Aseity, and Its Implications

    3.2.1. Socinus's Rejection of Augustine's Ideas on the Father's Natural Generation of the Son and the Eternal Son's Aseity

    3.2.2. The Final Form of Socinus's Monism and Subordinationism

3.3. Socinus's Theological Concerns Regarding the Relationship Between the Trinity's Eternal Decrees and the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

    3.3.1. Socinus's Rejection of Calvin's Concepts of the Twofold Heaven and the Third Heaven

    3.3.2. Socinus's Rejection of Calvin's Concept of the Relationship Between the Trinity's Eternal Decrees and the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

3.4. Socinus's Concept of a Composite Being of God

3.5. Conclusion

Chapter 3: Socinus's Trinitarian Perspective

3.1. Introduction

Calvin employed his concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity to affirm the orthodox beliefs in the eternal Son's consubstantiality and incommunicable personality, thereby countering both Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism and subordinationism. Over time, the debate surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity has grown increasingly contentious, largely due to the emergence of anti-Trinitarian perspectives that challenge traditional interpretations, regardless of whether those interpretations are considered correct or incorrect. A notable example is Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), who, in his critique of Servetus's interpretation of the Logos and following the theological path of his uncle, Laelius Socinus, questioned both the Lutheran concept of the *communicatio idiomatum in abstracto* and Calvin's understanding of the *communicatio idiomatum in concreto*.[1] Socinus's inquiries intensified the theological debates of the post-reformation period, particularly concerning the eternal Son's aseity and his relationship to the Father.

It is exceedingly difficult to determine whether Faustus Socinus's Trinitarian perspective aligns more closely with that of Calvin, with Servetus, or reflects a distinct position developed independently by himself or inherited from his uncle, Laelius Socinus (1525–1562).[2] At first glance, Faustus Socinus seems to present a constructive revision of Calvin's Trinitarian theology by critically engaging its perceived inconsistencies,[3] while purposefully distancing himself from the views of Michael Servetus.[4] While Socinus sought to distance himself from Servetus, Calvin, in his commentary on John 1:1, accused Servetus, whose teachings had infected other Italian theologians, of committing the same subordinationist error as Arius.[5] It has been challenging for scholars to

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[1] For more details on the term "the *communicatio idiomatum*," see Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 72–74.

[2] It remains a matter of scholarly debate whether Michael Servetus (1511–1553) or Laelius Socinus exerted greater influence on Faustus Socinus's unique anti-Trinitarianism and his denial of Calvin's ideas, such as Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and His incommunicable personality from the Father. On the one hand, Calvin argues in his *Defensio Orthodoxae fidei de sacra Trinitate* (1554) that "the mass of impieties which Michael Servetus spewed forth in his published books is particularly detestable. … I came to recognize this and was not greatly surprised to learn that many in Italy had been infected by this disease." Calvin, *Defensio Orthodoxae Fidei De Sacra Trinitate*, *Contra Prodigiosos Errores Michaelis Serveti Hispani*, CO 8:457-59: "Quanquam inter alia errorum portenta, quibus Satan renascentis evangelii lucem hac aetate obruere conatus est, apprime detestabilis est impietatum congeries quam Michael Servetus libris editis evomuit: antehac tamen hominem non putavi ex professo refutandum, quia tanta suberat eius deliriis absurditas, ut nullo contra pugnante, ultro in fumum abitura sperarem. ... Hoc quanquam non in tempore (ut decebat) remedii adhibendi causa meditatus sum: ubi tamen re ipsa edoctus agnovi, non adeo miratus sum, multos esse in Italia tabe ista infectos." On the other hand, it has been suggested that Faustus Socinus (1539–1604) was primarily influenced by his uncle, Laelius Socinus (1525–1562), in his distortion or rejection of Calvin's doctrines concerning the Trinity and Christology. Given their similar interpretations of John 1:1–18, Laelius Socinus and Faustus Socinus appear to have shared the same anti-Trinitarian perspective as the scholars mentioned below. For more details on this topic, see Marian Hillar, "Laelius and Faustus Socini: Founders of Socinianism, Their Lives and Theology," *The Journal from the Radical Reformation*, no. 10 (2002): 1–30; Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 49, no. 2 (2006): 345–366; Earl Morse Wilbur, *A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 239–257, 384–407.

[3] Refer to Faustus Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, in *Opera Omnia in Duos Tomos Distincta*, vol. 2 (Irenopoli, 1656), 202-6.

[4] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki, De Divinitate Filii Dei & Spiritus Sancti*, in *Opera Omnia in Duos Tomos Distincta*, vol. 2 (Irenopoli, 1656), 535: "Negamus Servetum fuisse progenitorem nostrum."

[5] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2, on John 1:1: "Servetus, superbissimus ex gente hispanica nebulo, aeternum hunc sermonem tunc demum exortum esse fingit, quum in mundi creatione exsertus est.

determine the final form of Socinus's Trinitarian perspective, as he diverged from Servetus's modalism and criticized Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity.[6]

On the one hand, Socinus argues, "We deny that Servetus was our progenitor."[7] Socinus accuses Servetus's heirs, especially Jakub Wujek (1541-1597), with being proteges of Mahometan.[8] Socinus claims that Servetus is willing to confess that Jesus is the "son of the eternal God" but is not the "eternal Son of God."[9] If, from Socinus's doctrinal perspective, Servetus's view of the Trinity qualifies as modalism,[10] then Socinus's own Trinitarian understanding—especially in light of his critique of Servetus—cannot rightly be classified as modalism.

On the other hand, Socinus's definition of Jesus's eternal sonship seems to differ significantly from that of Calvin.[11] Socinus's rejection of the Trinity's eternal decrees, rooted in his emphasis on the Father's internal decrees, leads him to deny the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Fundamentally, Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son reflects his emphasis on the Father's internal decrees and his challenge to the doctrine of the Trinity's eternal decrees—a doctrine affirmed in Calvin's holistic understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity,[12] as discussed in Chapter 2.

There appears to be a lack of substantial research comparing Socinus's Trinitarian perspective with those of Calvin and Servetus. If Calvin does not fully align with Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, his Trinitarian perspective may bear striking similarities to that of Socinus, particularly regarding the origin of Christ's mediatorship, which is understood to be rooted in the Father's internal decrees and qualities.[13] The

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Quasi vero non prius fuerit, quam virtus eius externo opere fuit cognita. Longe aliud hic docet evangelista: neque enim sermoni assignat temporis initium, sed ab initio fuisse dicens, saecula omnia transscendit. Nec me latet quid oblatret hic canis, et quid olim cavillati sint Ariani: nempe Deum creasse principio caelum et terram, quae tamen aeterna non sint: quia principii nomen magis ad ordinem respiciat, quam aeternitatem designet. Sed hanc calumniam evangelista praevertit, quum dicit fuisse apud Deum." According to Herbert John McLachlan, Socinianism represents a development of Servetus's anti-Trinitarianism, combined with Italian rationalism. McLachlan argues that Socinianism originated with the Spanish theologian Michael Servetus. McLachlan, *Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England*, 5. For more details on this topic, see Jerome Friedman, "Servetus and AntiTrinitarianism: A' Propos Antonio Rotondo," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 35, no. 3 (1973): 543–45; Rotondo, "Calvin and the Italian Anti-Trinitarians," trans. John and Anne Tedeschi, in *Reformation Essays and Studies*, no. 2 (St. Louis: Foundation for Reformation Research, 1968), 1-28; Friedman, "*The Reformation Merry-Go-Round: The Servetian Glossary of Heresy,*" *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 7, no. 1 (1976): 73–80."

[6] For more details on this topic, see Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," 199–203; McLachlan, *Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England*, 5–6.

[7] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki, De Divinitate Filii Dei & Spiritus Sancti*, in *Opera Omnia in Duos Tomos Distincta*, vol. 2 (Irenopoli, 1656), 535: "Negamus Servetum fuisse progenitorem nostrum."

[8] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki*, II:535.

[9] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki*, II:535.

[10] Cf. Michael Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, 207.

[11] Faustus Socinus assumes that the Servetians, influenced by Mahometan teachings, believed that an individual could approach God the Father directly, without invoking Christ. However, he also believes that one can receive divine spiritual power through the Holy Spirit by invoking Christ, the true and eternal Son of God. Socinus believed that every person could attain salvation by fulfilling the divine revelations given to and through Jesus. Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki*, II:535.

[12] Cf., Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Quod etiam repetit in precatione ad patrem, inquiens de illis Joh. 17.8, 'Et cognoverunt vere, quia a te exivi, et crediderunt quia tu me misisti.' Quodsi quis ita hebes est, ut ex locorum circumstantiis non intelligat, quo sensu dicantur Apostoli credidisse et vere cognovisse quod Jesus a Deo exivisset, id saltem secum animo reputet, fieri non posse, ut jam tum vere agnovissent, (etiamsi id verissimum esset) eum ex patris substantia ab aeterno fuisse generatum."

[13] For more details on the modern debate over the view of the origin of Christ's merit, see Paul Helm, *John*

relationship between the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, the origin of Christ's mediatorship, the Trinity's eternal decree, and the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son appears to be an underexplored area in theological research. Exploring this study could offer deeper insights into the interplay between the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and the Trinity's eternal decrees, thereby enriching our understanding of the relationship between the eternal Son's mediatorial role and the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Section 3.2 offers a detailed examination of how Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son influences his reinterpretation of Calvin's Trinitarian perspective, particularly in relation to the Father's personal generation of the Son, their aseity, and the Trinity's eternal decrees. Section 3.3 examines how Socinus's critique of Calvin's understanding of the Trinity's eternal decrees influences his denial of the connection between the necessity of the Trinity's eternal decrees and the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. This section underscores the significant differences between Socinus's Trinitarian perspective and that of Calvin. I will show in Sections 3.4 how Socinus's idea of God can be identified as a composite god, who is a finite being, rather than a simple and self-existent God, who is an infinite being in terms of essence, space, and time. In the end, this chapter will show why the views of Servetus and Socinus share essential continuity in content but differ in method and final form, and why Socinus's perspective fundamentally diverges from those of Augustine and Calvin.

3.2. Socinus's Rejection of Augustine's Ideas on the Father's Natural Generation of the Son and the Eternal Son's Aseity, and Its Implications

I will demonstrate that the Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus are fundamentally aligned in their underlying concept of monism. However, their perspectives diverge in both method and outcome, as Servetus develops a form of modalism, while Socinus adopts a subordinationist approach. First, I will show in Section 3.2.1 that Socinus's conception of a monistic God aligns closely with that of Servetus, as both reject Augustine's notions of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the aseity (or *Principium*) of the eternal Son. In Section 3.2.2, I will demonstrate that Socinus's Trinitarian perspective methodologically diverges from that of Servetus. Specifically, Socinus distinguishes between the Father's essence and His internal decrees and attributes, whereas Servetus conceptualizes a twofold Logos, comprising both eternal and temporal aspects. Based on the descriptions of Socinus and Servetus, I will conclude that the Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus exhibit a fundamental continuity in their rejection of Augustine's doctrine of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the aseity of the eternal Son. Both assert that aseity belongs exclusively to the Father.

3.2.1. Socinus's Rejection of Augustine's Ideas on the Father's Natural Generation of the Son and the Eternal Son's Aseity

While both Augustine and Calvin attempt to reconcile the apparent tension between the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's generation of the Son,[14] Socinus entirely rejects the concepts

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Calvin's Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 335–39; Alan W. Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," *Reformation & Renaissance Review* 12, no. 2–3 (August 2010): 195-6 n. 18-19; Gordon Alexander, "The Sozzini and Their School," The Theological Review, 66 (1876): 293–322; Alister E. McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 75–78.

[14] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:812.

of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's natural generation of the Son, even in his commentary on passages such as John 1:1-3 and others.

First, Socinus explicitly denies Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, which affirms the Son's consubstantiality with the Father.[15] Although Socinus does not directly reference Augustine, he critiques the concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, a view endorsed by Augustine.[16] Socinus assumes that when one applies the concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, one must also acknowledge that God is comprised of three essences. He argues:

> Here I confess willingly and acknowledge that singularity [therefore, it is necessary that He was born from God in this unique way, beyond all other sons of God]: but I do not, for that reason, concede that it [singularity] consists in the fact that Christ was generated from the substance of God, while others not at all. For it has already been shown that the substance of God is neither able to be divided, nor multiplied, nor can the one same substance be, numerically, common to many persons.[17]

Socinus argues that natural generation and procession result in the production of three distinct essences, as he understands natural generation and procession to be inherently tied to temporal processes rather than eternal ones. He rejects Augustine's notion of natural generation, asserting instead that the Father alone possesses the one undivided and absolute essence. Elsewhere, rejecting any form of the Nicene concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Socinus argues:

> He also repeats this in prayer to the Father, saying of them in John 17:8, 'And they have truly known that I came from You, and have believed that You sent Me.' But if anyone is so dull as to not understand, from the circumstances of these passages, in what sense it is said that the Apostles believed and truly knew that Jesus had come from God, let him at least consider that it could not have been possible for them, even if it were absolutely true, to have truly known at that time that He was generated from the substance of the Father from eternity.[18]

Jesus explicitly stated in John 17:8, "they have truly known that I came from You, and have believed that You sent Me." According to Socinus, it was evident that the Apostles genuinely understood the meaning of Jesus's statement, "I came from You." Socinus posits two interpretations that contradict his rational inference: The first, an irrational interpretation, is that the

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[15] Socinus, *De Coena Domini Tractatus Brevis, Ad Argumenta Pro Trinitate F. S. Responsio*, I:799.

[16] Calvin refrains from openly employing this approach to avoid appearing as if he is falling into the fallacy of Gentiles.

[17] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Hic fateor libenter, atque agnosco siugularitatem istam [Quamobrem necesse est, illum singulari aliqua ratione ex Deo esse natum praeter reliquos omnes Dei filios.]: sed non propterea concedo, eam in eo consistere, quod Christus ex ipsa substantia Dei sit generatus, alii vero minime. Iam enim ostensum est, Dei substantiam nec dividi, nec multiplicari, nec eandem ipsam unam numero pluribus personis communem esse posse."

[18] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Quod etiam repetit in precatione ad patrem, inquiens de illis Joh. 17.8, 'Et cognoverunt vere, quia a te exivi, et crediderunt quia tu me misisti.' Quodsi quis ita hebes est, ut ex locorum circumstantiis non intelligat, quo sensu dicantur Apostoli credidisse et vere cognovisse quod Jesus a Deo exivisset, id saltem secum animo reputet, fieri non posse, ut jam tum vere agnovissent, (etiamsi id verissimum esset) eum ex patris substantia ab aeterno fuisse generatum."

Apostles neither believed nor truly knew that Jesus had come from God, which directly opposes Jesus's own assertion, "they have truly known it." The second irrational interpretation is that the Apostles believed He was generated from the substance of the Father from eternity, a view that diverges from the original intent of Jesus's words, "I came from You."[19]

Socinus contends that the concept of the Father alone possessing the one undivided and absolute essence also includes the idea that the Father is a single, undivided, and absolute person. He claims, "Besides, from the mere fact that it is clearly indicated that God is one, a person can rightly conclude that he is neither three nor two. For to be One and Three are mutually exclusive; likewise, to be One and Two."[20] He refutes the notion that two consubstantial persons exist within the Father who is the *Principium*, an idea advocated by Augustine. He argues in like manner:

> For from the agreement of all Trinitarians and from plain logic, it can be understood that the substance of God, that is, the essence, cannot be divided or multiplied. However, this clearly shows that the whole and numerically one and utterly the same cannot be common to many persons, which we said above. Clearly, it is necessary that there be no fewer individual essences than persons.[21]

Socinus believes that one essence equals one person and *ipso facto* three essences must equal three persons. Augustine uses the idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son to assert that the three consubstantial persons possess one essence. However, since Socinus denies Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, he explicitly rejects the idea that the three consubstantial persons are one God.

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[19] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:379-80, on John 17:8: "Et ipsi acceperunt. Exprimit modum huius notitiae: quia traditam ab ipso doctrinam receperint. Sed ne quis doctrinam eius putaret humanam esse vel in terra natam, Deus eius autorem esse profitetur, quum dicit, verba quae dedisti mihi, dedi eis. Loquitur autem suo more in mediatoris vel ministri persona, quum dicit se tantum docuisse, quod a patre acceperat. Nam quia humilis adhuc erat ipsius in carne conditio, et sub forma servi divina eius latebat maiestas, Deum potius sub patris persona designat. Interea tenendum est quod initio testatus est Ioannes, quatenus Christus aeternus erat Dei sermo, unum fuisse semper cum patre Deum. Sensus est igitur, Christum fidelem fuisse Dei testem apud discipulos, ut eorum fides nonnisi in una Dei veritate fundata esset, quum pater ipse in filio loquutus fuerit. Caeterum inde receptio de qua loquitur, quia efficaciter per spiritum manifestavit illis patris nomen." Calvin, in discussing Jesus's statement in John 17:8, "I came from you," interprets it as: "He speaks in His usual manner in the person of a mediator or minister," because, according to Calvin, "His condition in the flesh was still humble, and His divine majesty was hidden under the form of a servant." At the same time, Calvin asserts that "it must be held, as John testified at the beginning, that insofar as Christ was eternally the Word of God, He was always one with the Father as God." Here, in explaining why Christ, the Word of God, is indeed God, Calvin draws on the Nicene concept of "*Deum de Deo*" (God from God), thereby affirming the eternal Word's divinity. Consequently, Calvin's assertion that "in summary, faith must rightly regard Christ; but in such a way that it perceives nothing earthly or contemptible about Him, but rather is lifted up to His divine power, so that it may firmly establish that God and everything of God is perfectly present in Him" stands in stark contrast to Socinus's interpretation of the eternal Son's mediatorship. This divergence arises because Calvin, following Augustine, acknowledges the eternal Son's equality with God the Father.

[20] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:811: "Caeterum vel ex eo solo, quod Deus unus esse aperte traditur, merito concludi potest, eum non esse nec trinum, nec binum. Opposita sunt enim inter se Unus, & Trinus; sive Unus & Binus." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus's A Tract Concerning God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit," 42–43.

[21] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Namque ex ipso consensu omnium Trinitariorum, exque ratione manifesta intelligi potest, Dei substantiam, id est essentiam, nulla ratione dividi aut multiplicari posse. Ipsam autem totam & numero unam ac prorsus eandem pluribus personis communem esse non posse, id evidenter demonstrat, quod supra diximus. Videlicet necesse esse, ut non pauciores sint individuae essentiae, quam personae."

Faustus Socinus's denial of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son may be understood in the light of his uncle Laelius's interpretation. In his *Confessio Fidei*, Laelius Socinus (hereafter referred to as Laelius or "his uncle") neglects the phrase "so he has given the Son to have life in himself" (*sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semet ipso*) when interpreting key traditional terms, such as *trinitatis, personarum, ὑποστάσεως, consubstantialitatis, unionis,* and *distinctionis*. In the same line, he argues that "God the Father is not the same as the Son and the Holy Spirit and is not one of the three co-essential gods."[22] In response to Laelius's challenge to these traditional terms and ideas, Heinrich Bullinger attempts to defend the Trinity's consubstantiality in his letter by employing Cyril's interpretation of John 5:26–27.[23] Here Bullinger quotes Cyril to support the notions of Christ's consubstantiality and distinct personality, saying, "Wherefore, he immediately shows the reason why he [Jesus] said that these things were given to him by the Father, saying, 'Because he is the son of man,' so that we can understand that all things were given to him, as to a man who since he is creature, has nothing from Himself, but as the only begotten Son is not a partaker of life, but is life itself by nature, just as the Father is (life itself by nature)."[24] Both Bullinger and Cyril concur with Augustine's view that the Father naturally endowed the eternal Son with His divine nature (or essence), and thus the Father and the Son are of the same essence and substance. Laelius Socinus's claim also implies that everything except the consubstantial life of the Father is given to the Son of Man, such as a subordinate wisdom, power, and authority. In contrast to Bullinger's and Cyril's interpretations of John 5:26, and in line with Laelius's affirmation of the Father's sole aseity, Faustus Socinus denies both Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and Christ's aseity.[25] Socinus's ideas stand in opposition to the

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[22] Lelio Sozzini, *Opere* (Florence: Leo S Olschki, 1986), 96: "... quia non contendo Patrem esse eundem qui Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, non imaginor tres Iehovas deos nostros coessentiales ..."

[23] Lelio Sozzini, *Opere*, 242: "Circumspectius videtur et illud esse ponendum quod a Deo cupis servari per hominem Christum Iesum, Filium eius unigenitum, qui a Deo habeat naturam, sapientiam et potentiam universam. Scis enim in Christo considerandam esse naturam utramque, divinam et humanam, iuxta illam Patri esse consubstantialem, iuxta hanc nobis esse consubstantialem. Ergo, iuxta divinam naturam, Patri est per omnia coaequalis; iuxta humanam, minor est Patre ac legitur accepisse potentiam et reliqua, sed non naturam." [It seems more prudent to say that the man Christ Jesus [is] his only begotten Son who from God has nature, wisdom and all power. For you know that in Christ both natures, divine and human, are to be considered; according to [the former] he is consubstantial with the Father, according to [the latter] he is consubstantial with us. Therefore, according to the divine nature, he is equal in all things to the Father. He is less than the Father according to the human nature.]

[24] Lelio Sozzini, *Opere*, 242: "Vide autem quam probe contextum servarit Cyrillus recteque dixerit: Quapropter causam, quare haec sibi data a Patre dixerit, illico subiecit dicens: 'Quia filius hominis est', ut intelligamus omnia sibi data fuisse ut homini, qui cum creatura sit, nihil habet a se ipso; unigenitus vero Filius, non vitae particeps, sed vita naturaliter, ut Pater, est." Given the following three arguments, one can observe that Cyril's interpretation of John 5:26–27 aligns with those of Augustine and Calvin. First, Cyril distinguishes between Christ's essential life and power by nature, and the authority He receives from the Father through the Incarnation. Second, building on Cyril's affirmation of the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, Calvin differentiates between our blessedness in eternal life, eternal life itself as it is connected with both Christ's flesh and His Godhead, and the Godhead itself. Third, according to Cyril, Christ's life by nature is equivalent to His consubstantial life with the Father—an idea rooted in Augustine's concept of the Father's eternal generation of the Son. Therefore, one can conclude that Cyril's interpretation of John 5:26–27 is consistent with that of Augustine. Cf. Cyril, *A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, Anterior to the Division of the East and West: The Catechetical Lectures of S. Cyril* (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1839), I.iii, vol. 1, pp. 22–23, 271-72; Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, IV.xvii.9; CO 2:1008.

[25] Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki,* II:536: "Itaque nos quidem, ut dixi, id potissimum quaerimus, ut solus pater Jesu Christi domini nostri, ille unus Deus esse agnoscatur: sed tamen non per contumeliam ipsius Christi, quae enim contumelia, esse in eo potest; quod emnino necessarium est; aut quid Christo adimitur, cum negatur, illum eum esse, qui nullo pacto esse potest si Christus est? An non potius hoc est ipsi manifeste detrahere atque aperte negare, eum esse Christum, si quis contendat eum esse illum unum Deum? Hoc, inquam, est Christum abolere, non autem Christo gloriam tribuere, & quicunque maxima illa, quae Christus habet, adorationem, invocationem, and c.

views of Augustine and Calvin, who argue for the consubstantiality and aseity of the eternal Son based on their understandings of either the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son (Augustine) or the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity (Calvin).

Second, Socinus argues that Augustine's interpretation of the eternal Son as the *Principium*, wherein the eternal Son has the same substance as the eternal Father, is incorrect. Alluding to Augustine and Calvin's interpretation of the *Principium* in John 1:1 as eternity,[26] Socinus opposes the notion that the eternal Son, who was in the *Principium*, existed as the *Principium* in eternity. According to Socinus, the term *Principium* does not refer to eternity but rather to the point in time of the proclamation of God's gospel at the beginning of Jesus's ministry.[27] Socinus believes that "the world was made through him" in John 1:3 means that the turning of the sinful old world into a spiritual new world began when Jesus proclaimed his gospel. Socinus contends that "What wonder, then, if also Christ, not because of his substance or nature, but because of the office he fulfilled, acting in a certain way as God's representative he died on earth, is said to be the Word of God by our Evangelist who greatly delights in these ways of speaking."[28] Here, Socinus denies the idea of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father as the *Principium*. In like manner, he claims that "but what contributes most to understanding this passage is, that all the names [the family name], or surnames [the branch of the family], which are found as imposed on Christ, were placed on Him, not because of any of His nature or divine and eternal substance, but only because of His office and the power and wonderful works accomplished by Him."[29] Socinus argues that Jesus possesses a subordinate form of divinity, conferred upon Him through the Father's internal decree, which was granted to Christ in the third heaven before He executed His divine office.[30]

Hoc, inquam, est Christum abolere, non autem Christo gloriam tribuere, & quicunque maxima illa, quae Christus habet, adorationem, invocationem, and c. negat illi convenire, nisi fit ille unus Deus, is simul imprudens, vel Christum isa habere, vel eum, Chrisum revera esse, negat."

[26] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:2, on John 1:1: "neque enim sermoni assignat temporis initium, sed ab initio fuisse dicens, saecula omnia transscendit."

[27] Faustus Socinus, *Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Evangelistae Iohannis*, I:78: "Qua propter nomen principii in his verbis, non aeternitatem. … ita et Johannes, cum de spirituali mundo per Christum creato scripturus esset, usus est illa ordinis voce, non autem aeternitatis nota, ut intelligamus verbum hoc fuisse, non quidem ab omni aeternitate, sed ante res creatas omnes Novi mundi, paucisque comprehendere voluit, quod deinceps pluribus enarraturus est."

[28] Socinus, *Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Evangelistae Iohannis*, I:78: "Quin (ut exemplis ad hanc rem explicandam quam accommodatissimis, imperitorum caussa utamur) videmus, Johannem Baptistam Vocem in Sacris Literis appellatum fuisse, quod certe nullo modo substantiam, vel naturam ejus indicat, sed munus tantummodo quo fungebatur, cum in diserto clamans omnes ad poenitentiam invitaret. Aharon quoque datur a Domino Mosi pro ore; num hoc ad ipsius Abaronis vel substantiam vel naturam pertinere dicemus? Quid absurdius existimari posset? An non clare patet de munere, quod, pro Mose Pharaonem et Israeliticum populum alloquendo, obiturus erat, intelligi debere? Quid igitur mirum, si & Christus, non ob ipsius substantiam vel naturam, sed propter munus, quod Dei quodammodo vice in terris obiit, ab Euangelista nostro, qui mire his loquendi modis delectatur, Dei verbum esse dicitur?"

[29] Socinus, *Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Evangelistae Iohannis*, I:78: "Verum quod huic loco intelligendo potissimum confert, est, quod omnia nomina, seu cognomina, quae Christo imposita inveniuntur, non propter naturam ejus aliquam vel substantiam divinam et aeternam, sed tantummodo ob ejus munus, ac potestatem admirandaque opera ab ipso patrata, illi fuerunt indita."

[30] According to Sarah Mortimer, Faustus Socinus believed that Christ's divinity should be understood in "legal terms" as a "delegated sovereignty," rather than in "philosophical terms" as a "shared essence." Mortimer explains that Socinus did not regard God as "a specific" being, but rather as something "common to a number of" different beings. In this way, he embraced a more flexible notion of divinity by allowing for the idea of subordinate divinity—namely, that God's power, authority, or attributes deriving from the divine essence could be "transmitted and transferred." Sarah Mortimer, *Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35–36. Cf. Socinus, *Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Evangelistae Iohannis*, I:79.

Laelius Socinus's interpretation of the *Principium* is similar to that of his nephew. Laelius also attempts to refute the claim that Calvin understands the *Principium* as eternity based on John 1:1, thereby rejecting the notion of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Laelius claims that "from the *Principium*" in John 1:1 refers not to the *Principium* in eternity, (as Calvin asserts), nor to the temporal time before the creation of heaven and earth, (as Servetus contends), but rather to the temporal beginning of Jesus Christ's proclamation of the gospel.[31] Laelius cites John 16:4 to support his claim.[32] He contends that the Logos referred to in John 1:1 is neither the eternal Son of God or God Himself. Laelius claims that the Son of God is not the eternal Son of God hidden in the *Principium*; instead Laelius believes that the Logos is the spoken gospel which emanates from the Father's internal counsel and is announced first by Jesus Christ.

Both Socinus and his uncle do not believe that the Immanent Logos in John 1:1 can exist in eternity as a self-existent being; they maintain instead that the Logos was proclaimed by Jesus as the temporal propagation of the gospel. By rejecting the notions of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the aseity (*Principium*) of the eternal Son, they challenge Augustine's concept of the consubstantiality of the three eternal persons. They do not attribute the Father's singular essence to the Son. Rather, they believe that the Son was predestined in the Father's internal counsel and will, which differ from the temporal will of the Holy Spirit.

Third, both Socinus and his uncle ascribe the name "Jehovah" only to the Father and not to the Son, just as Servetus does. Socinus argues:

> The Word, God, is accepted in the Holy Scriptures in a twofold manner chiefly. The former mode is, when it signifies him who dominates and precedes over others, both in heaven and on earth, and who is the author and origin of things, in such a way that He has no one superior or prior, and he does not rely on anything. And, in this first way, God is said to be one. … For hence, the one God, that is, Jehovah, is said to be the God of gods in Psalm 50:1. In this other mode, in the Holy Scriptures themselves, the Son, or Christ, is often called God. This is wholly evident from the words of Christ himself in John 10:35. … Christ is consequently indeed God, but nevertheless not the one God.[33]

Socinus references John 10:35, which states, "those to whom the Word of God came can be called gods," to argue that while Christ may be referred to as God, this does not imply that He is the supreme God. For Socinus, no one has superiority or primacy over God the Father, who is not dependent on anyone or anything; only the Father exists independently (*a se ipso*).

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[31] Sozzini, *Opere*, 103-105: "Voce principii aeternitatem quidam significari volunt, alii vero tempus ante conditum mundum sed nihil horum intelligit Iohannes. ... Sic Act., II, [1-4]: illapsus est Spiritus Sanctus in eos, quemadmodum et in nos, εν αρκη, ab initio, certe non ab aeterno nec ante conditum mundum, sed tempore ministerii, quando missus fuit."

[32] In this study, I do not attempt to assess whether Laelius Socinus's biblical commentary is correct or incorrect. Rather, the primary aim is to demonstrate the extent to which his interpretations diverge from the historical readings accepted by his contemporaries, and how these interpretations contributed to the development of Unitarianism as later articulated by Faustus Socinus.

[33] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:811: "Vox Deus, duplici modo potissimum in sacris literis accipitur. Prior modus est, cum significat illum, qui tum in caelo, tum in terra ita aliis dominatur ac praeest, rerumque auctor est & origo, ut neminem superiorem aut principem habeat, nec ab ullo pendeat. Atque hoc priore modo dicitur Deus esse unus. ... Hinc enim ille unus Deus, id est Jehova, Deus deorum dicitur, Psal. 50.1. Hoc altero modo in ipsis sacris literis vocatur nonnunquam Filius, seu Christus, Deus Patet totum hoc ex verbis ipsius Christi, Joh. 10.35. ... Est igitur quidem Christus Deus: sed non tamen ille unus Deus."

Socinus's claim is also supported by his uncle Laelius Socinus. Laelius contends that while the Bible commonly assigns the name of God to Jesus, the essential sense of the name God should be applied only to the Father.[34] Laelius thinks God the Father is the one and only God, the One who self-exists.[35] Laelius says, "He [the Father] alone is also said to be above all people, through all things and in all [Ephesians, 4, [6]); He was made by no one, nor constituted, nor elected, nor preordained, nor sanctified by anyone, nor exalted, nor sent, nor made obedient to anyone. For he has no one greater than himself."[36] Laelius also maintains, "From him [the Father] was made the Lord and Christ [Acts, 2:36], to whom the Father gave a name above every name, that he might be adored, because he was obedient to the Father to the death of the cross [Phil., 2:9]; became for us wisdom, justice, peace from God [1 Cor., 1:30]."[37] By insisting on the sole aseity of the Father, Laelius implies that Christ must be reliant on the Father's counsel, in which the Father foreordained Jesus to be the eternal Son of God after his resurrection and ascension. Laelius contends that "Consequently, all the rest, whosoever they are, whether of God or of the lords, ultimately ought to be from him [the Father]. All people owe this to him, but he himself depending on nothing, owes this to no one. Therefore, he is also called God of gods, and the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and his head."[38] According to both Socinus and his uncle, only God the Father can rightly be credited with having essence and aseity because, according to them, the Father is the founder and beginning of all things.

In conclusion, in refuting Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and Calvin's concept of the aseity of the eternal Son, Socinus argues that the eternal act of appointing the Son as Christ is solely part of the Father's internal decree, rather than a collective eternal decrees of the Trinity. He argues, "The only sense in which that glory [of Christ] existed beforehand is in the counsel of God [the Father]. In this sense, we can affirm that Jesus Christ has been revealed to be the Son of God through the resurrection. He had evidently been appointed by God to be a blessed immortality from the very beginning, even before the world was in existence (Jn. 17:5)."[39] Given Socinus's denial of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Socinus opposes the idea of the Trinity's eternal decree. Socinus interprets the Son's glory before creation in John 17:5 to means that Jesus was promised to be the eternal Son of God by the Father's internal and perpetual decree rather than by the Trinity's eternal decree. Socinus shows his belief that Jesus was foreordained as the eternal Son of God by the Father's sole decree.

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[34] Sozzini, *Opere*, 110: "Absolute nomen Dei in Scripturis tribuitur plerumque typice Christo, Patri vero per se primo, ..."

[35] Sozzini, *Opere*, 110: "quia unus et solus Deus est, praeter quem nullus est alius, qui sit a seipso altissimus et ex quo omnia.

[36] Sozzini, *Opere*, 110–11: "Dicitur et solus esse super omnes, per omnia et in omnibus [Ephes., IV, [6]); a nullo factus nec constitutus nec electus nec praeordinatus nec sanctificatus a quoquam nec exaltatus nec missus vel oboediens alicui factus. Nullum enim se maiorem habet."

[37] Sozzini, *Opere*, 111: "Ab eo est factus dominus et Christus [Act., II, [36]), cui Pater dedit nomen supra omne nomen, ut adoretur, eo quod Patri oboediens fuit ad mortem crucis [Phil., II, [9]); factus nobis sapientia, iustitia, pax a Deo [I Cor., I, [30])."

[38] Sozzini, *Opere*, 110: "Reliquos ergo omnes, quicunque sint, tandem sive dii sive domini, ex illo esse oportet, hoc illi omnes debent, ipse autem a nullo pendens, nemini hoc debet (I Cor., VIII, [5]). Quare et Deus deorum dicitur et Deus et pater domini nostri Iesu Christi caputque eius [Ephes., I, [3]; I Cor., XI, [3])."

[39] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:198-99: "Nec enim alia ratione ea ipsa gloria iam antea fuisse dici poterit, quam Dei destinatione. Atque hoc sensu, Iesum Christum per resurrectionem patefactum Dei filium fuisse affirmare possumus. Quia scilicet iam ab ipso initio, immo antequam mundus fieret, beatissimae immortalitati a Deo destinatus fuerat, Ioh. 17. v. 5." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 158.

3.2.2. The Final Form of Socinus's Monism and Subordinationism

Servetus's monism and subordinationism are based on the supposed hierarchical relationship between the eternal Logos as God and the temporal Logos as His spoken word. Servetus maintains that the eternal Logos (divine reasoning) within the eternal and invisible Father is always superior to any temporal or visible manifestations of His essence, including the temporal Logos. Since Servetus asserts a hierarchical relationship between the Father's eternal reasoning (the eternal Logos) and His temporal manifestations (the temporal Logos) in the third heaven, his Trinitarian view is consequently classified as a synthesis of subordinationism and modalism. Likewise, Socinus's subordinationism holds a specific hierarchical order: the distinction between the Father's essence, His internal attributes and will, and the glorified Jesus in the third heaven is maintained without confusion or disorder.

To fully grasp Socinus's ultimate formulation of monism and subordinationism, it is essential to examine whether, in his view, the Father's internal decree and qualities—distinct from the Holy Spirit (understood as the external will of God)—occupy the same ontological level as the Father Himself or aligns with a subordinate status to Him. If Socinus believes that the Father's internal decree and qualities are on the same essential level as God's essence, then his concept of God is essentially the same as Servetus's notion of a monistic God, in which the Father's eternal reasoning or decree is equivalent to God's essence. If Socinus adopts the view that the Father's internal decree and qualities hold a subordinate status relative to the Father, then his concept aligns closely with Gentile's subordinationism, in which the eternal Son, derived from the Father, is therefore subordinate to the Father.

This section will focus on demonstrating how Socinus's concept of the Father's internal quality and will (the third heaven) leads to his view of God being a variation of Arian subordinationism. I will demonstrate that, since Socinus does not acknowledge the natural and necessary will of God (i.e., the natural generation of the Son or the natural procession of the Spirit), his conception of God—as a being in which a hierarchical relationship exists between the Father's essence and His internal attributes and decrees—becomes a composite entity, existing perpetually but not eternally, ultimately reducing God to a non-transcendent deity.

First, one should ask whether Socinus believes that God's divine being, including His absolute attributes such as eternity and aseity, can be communicated to the glorified Jesus. I will describe that Socinus rejects both Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the notion that the Father shares His divine being with the glorified Jesus. Thus, Socinus does not affirm that the glorified Jesus possesses the divine being of God in terms of His divine essence. Second, one should ask whether Socinus regards the Father's divine qualities as His immutable qualities distinct from both God's essence and His temporal qualities (i.e., vindictive justice and mercy), because he believes that God is the source of all essential attributes.[40] Thus, through an analysis of his reasoning, it is necessary to examine whether Socinus logically prioritizes the divine being of God over His internal wills and attributes, considering His internal decrees and attributes as subordinate entities.

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[40] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:196: "Is, qui omnis aequitatis & rectitudinis fons est, cuiusque omnia opera aequissima & rectissima perpetuo sunt, tam iniquum & pravum facinus contra suum ipsius decretum admiserit." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 136.

First, Socinus argues that God's divine being, such as eternity and aseity, cannot be communicated to the glorified Jesus, since he rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Socinus argues:

> But let us grant that everything ought to be referred to Christ. What then, follows? Can it not be certain that God gave a name to Christ, which is over all names in Philippians 2:9, and that he placed him, raised from the dead, at his right hand in heavens over all principle, power, virtue, and dominion, and every name, which is named not only in this generation but also in the future, and subjected all under his feet, and gave him as a head over all churches in Ephesians 1:20? Christ is consequently over all, neither from eternity nor from his nature, but after he was raised from the dead by God and by the grace of God Himself.[41]

His statement, "Christ is consequently over all, neither from eternity nor from his nature," indicates a rejection of any form of eternal generation, particularly Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Here, he not only rejects the eternal Son's aseity, which is based on Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, but also denies the distinct personality of the eternal Son, grounded in the Father's volitional generation of the Son.[42] His statement, "he [God] placed him, raised from the dead, at his right hand in heavens over all principle, power, virtue, and dominion, and every name," suggests that God, through His grace, bestowed upon Christ an authoritative name or power situated at His right hand in the heavens, specifically in the third heaven. In other words, Socinus argues that, as the resurrected Christ was elevated to the third heaven by God's internal decree and qualities, the glorified Christ holds supremacy over all things in the third heaven, with the sole exception of the Father. Socinus believes that Christ was born of a virgin, sanctified by the heavenly doctrines of the Father in the third heaven before assuming his office, and yet remained subordinate to the Father. Furthermore, Socinus maintains that the same Christ, who is now the glorified Christ in the third heaven by the Father's internal decree—namely, by the grace of God—nevertheless remains subordinate to the Father.[43] Socinus's commentary on the the phrase "in the beginning was the Word" in John 1 is perfectly aligned with that of his uncle. Both nephew and uncle believe that the Father is superior to the glorified Jesus in the third heaven. Socinus might agree that a glorified Jesus in the third heaven is the second god of gods and can be called the eternal Son of God according to the Father's internal decree and qualities. Thus, the third heaven, which contains the second god among gods, is a composite god. Thus, the third heaven represents the Father's internal decrees and qualities, originating from within Himself.

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[41] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Sed demus, ad Christum omnia reserri debere. Quid tum postea? An non certum est, Deum Christo dedisse nomen quod est supra omne nomen Philip, 2, 9, & eum a se a mortuis excitatum, posuisse in dextera sua in caelestibus supra omnem principatum, & potestatem, & virtutem, & dominationem, & omne nomen, quod nominatur non solum in hoc seculo, sed etiam in futuro, & omnia subjecisse sub pedibus ejus, & ipsum dedisse caput super omnia Ecclesiae Ephes. 1.20? Est igitur Christus super omnia non ab aeterno, nec natura sua, sed postquam a mortuis a Deo excitatus fuit, & ipsius Dei beneficio."

[42] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Namque ex ipso consensu omnium Trinitariorum, exque ratione manifesta intelligi potest, Dei substantiam, id est essentiam, nulla ratione dividi aut multiplicari posse. Ipsam autem totam & numero unam ac prorsus eandem pluribus personis communem esse non posse, id evidenter demonstrat, quod supra diximus. Videlicet necesse esse, ut non pauciores sint individuae essentiae, quam personae."

[43] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:195. Also, see Socinus, *Responsionis ad Libellum Jacobi Vujeki,* II:536: "Itaque nos quidem, ut dixi, id potissimum quaerimus, ut solus pater Jesu Christi domini nostri, ille unus Deus esse agnoscatur."

Socinus's concept of the inferiority of a glorified Christ in the third heaven represents his idea of the hierarchical relationship between the Father, His internal decree and quality (the third heaven), and the glorified Christ in the third heaven, as he believes that the third heaven represents the Father's internal decree and quality rather than His essence, Christ's distinct personality, or the glorified Jesus in the third heaven. Socinus argues:

> As, when Christ himself says that the Father is greater than him in John 14:28; when he confesses that the Son does not know the day and hour of divine judgment but the Father only knows that in Mark 13:32; when he was already aroused from the dead, he testifies that the Father is no less his [God] than God of disciples in John 20:17. Which same thing he affirms four times in one verse, Rev. 3:12, already translated and plainly glorified in heaven; When then, to not recount every place, he states that he received his doctrine, his words, his signs, and all his works, together with his authority and power, from God the Father. So much so that, elsewhere, he says they are not his own, but that they are of Him who had sent him, that is, of the Father.[44]

Socinus believes the Christ, who was sanctified by the doctrines of the Father in the third heaven before assuming His office, is still inferior to the Father who is in the third heaven. According to Socinus, even after Christ's glorification and ascension into the third heaven, he remains subordinate to the Father in both essence and authority. Socinus upholds the hierarchy between the Father (the origin of the third heaven), the third heaven itself, and a glorified Son in the third heaven.[45]

Second, Socinus argues that the Father's internal qualities are distinct from both God's essence and His temporal attributes (e.g., vindictive justice and mercy), as he maintains that God is the source of all essential attributes. Socinus's arguments indicate that God's qualities encompass two distinct aspects: (1) perpetual and internal attributes, such as equity, rectitude, and wisdom, and (2) temporal and external attributes, including vindictive justice, mercy, and the administration of temporal punishment and forgiveness. Socinus argues:

> For there is in God no justice that absolutely commands sins to be punished, from which he himself is not able to renounce entirely. There is indeed in God perpetual justice, but this is nothing else than equity and rectitude. … For just as that justice, so called by the common name, which is opposed to mercy, is not the quality of God but merely the effect of his will, so mercy, which is opposed to that justice, is not God's proper quality but merely the effect of his will.[46]

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[44] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:812: "Ut, cum ipse Chrisus ait, Patrem se majorem esse, Joh. 14.28; cum fatetur, Filium ignorare futuri divini judicii diem & horam sed Patrem solum illam scire, Mar. 13. 32. cum, iam a mortuis excitatus, Patrem non minus suum, quam discipulorum Deum esse testatur, Joh. 20. 17. quod idem, jam in caelum translatus & plane glorificatus, affirmat quater in uno versiculo, Apoc.3. 12; cum denique, ne singula recenseam, suam doctrinam, sua verba, sua signa, sua opera omnia, una cum auctoritate ac potestate sua, Deo patri accepta refert; adeo, ut alicubi non sua, sed ejus esse dicat, qui ipsum miserat, id est Patris."

[45] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:812: "Nam etsi Christus nonnunquam, ut dictum est supra, Deus appellatur: tamen tunc Dei nomen subsistentiam ipsam non significat, sed subsistentiae tantum attributum."

[46] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:566: "Neque enim in Deo ulla justitia est, quae peccata puniri omnino jubeat cui ipse renunciare non possit. Est quidem in Deo perpetua justitia: sed haec nihil aliud est, quam aequitas et rectitudo. … Quemadmodum enim justitia ista, vulgari nomine sic appellata, quae misericordiae opponitur, Dei qualitas non est, sed effectum tantum voluntatis ipsius: sic misericordia quae isti justitiae opponitur, Dei qualitas non est: propria, sed effectus tantum voluntatis eius."

Socinus says God's qualities are divided into two categories, internal and external. God is the source of both all his internal and absolute qualities including equity and rectitude (fairness and uprightness) and all his external and relative qualities including vindictive justice and mercy.

It should be examined whether Socinus regards the Father's internal qualities as subordinate and internal ones deriving from God Himself. According to him, perpetual justice (rectitude and equity) is an internal quality of the Father, first originating from and then residing within His essence.[47] If perpetual goodness is understood to mean perpetual holiness, then the Father's internal quality of justice is equivalent to a perpetual quality of goodness.[48] Thus, the Father's internal justice and goodness are perpetual and include perpetual holiness and equity. Socinus concedes that the Father's internal quality not only derives from but also resides in His essence,[49] but he also believes the Father's internal qualities are subordinate to the essence of the Father, who is the origin of all things. Socinus argues, "God, who is the source of all fairness [equity] and uprightness [rectitude], who always does what is fair [equity] and upright [rectitude], could never commit such a perverse and vicious crime against his very own decree."[50] According to him, God, who is the source of all fairness [aequitatis] and uprightness [rectitudinis], always does what is fair [aequissima] and upright [rectissima] in the third heaven. Given Socinus's assertion that the glorified Jesus in the third heaven—described as being integrated into the third heaven—can never become the Father, the Principium, it follows that the status of the third heaven, in Socinus's understanding, is not equivalent to the status of the Father as the Principium. The Racovian Catechism similarly states, "Since wisdom belongs naturally to God, he can never do anything contrary to it, but whatever he does, he does wisely."[51] Socinus and the Racovian Catechism both imply that God's internal qualities of rectitude and equity, which constitute the invisible third heaven, derive from God and are subordinate to His essence. Socinus's concept of God, which includes a hierarchical relationship between God's essence and His essential attributes, introduces elements that disrupt divine simplicity. For Socinus, God's absolute qualities, such as equity and rectitude, are not essential attributes on the same level as God's being but are instead classified as subordinate attributes.

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[47] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:187: " Ea justitia divina, quae nullum terminum habet, non haec est de qua loquimur, sed ea quae sola, ut supra visum fuit, hoc praeclaro Justitiae nomine apud sacros Scriptores insignitur, et alio nomine rectitudo et aequitas nuncupari potest. Haec vere in Deo residet, et in omnibus ejus operibus valde conspicua est; atque hujus solius vi, ut postea videbimus, etiam si nullam aliam probationem haberemus, humanum istud commentum satisfactionis Jesu Christi penitus detegeretur atque evanesceret."

[48] The Racovian Catechism says, "To what do you refer the goodness of God? His goodness, if it be taken to mean his holiness, has been already included under his justice: but if it be understood of his mercy and benignity, as it very frequently is in the Scriptures, it is to be referred to the divine Will." Thomas Rees, *The Racovian Catechism: With Notes and Illustrations* (London: Princeton Theological Seminary Library, 1818), 32. Turretin argues, "The word "justice" (to speak of it first) is generally used in two senses: either for the universal comprehension of all virtues (as injustice is taken for every kind of sin) and is called universal justice (*justitia universalis*) by which, as God is in himself perfectly holy and just, so in all his works he preserves an incorruptible rectitude and justice." Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xix.2; Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xix.2.

[49] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:566: "Est quidem in Deo perpetua justitia: sed haec nihil aliud est, quam aequitas et rectitude."

[50] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:196: "Is, qui omnis aequitatis & rectitudinis fons est, cuiusque omnia opera aequissima et rectissima perpetuo sunt, tam iniquum & pravum facinus contra suum ipsius decretum admiserit." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 136.

[51] Rees, *The Racovian Catechism*, 308. Cf. Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:187, 196.

Third, one must consider whether the Father's internal qualitiess align with His perpetual and free decrees regarding future salvific events.[52] At first glance, Socinus does not seem to make an essential distinction between the Father's internal quality (rectitude) and His internal decree (the Father's immutable decree of the office of Jesus),[53] except to impose certain conditions on the internal decree. I will demonstrate that, because Socinus rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son—a concept that establishes the theological basis for the necessity of the Son's spontaneous will for salvation—his understanding of God's perpetual and free decree ultimately reduces to the Father's indifferent and free decree, rather than to the spontaneous and free decree of the Trinity.

Socinus appears to affirm the existence of an internal and immutable decree originating within the Father. He contends that "it is human beings who change; God's immutable decree remains constant."[54] Also, he argues:

> Peter affirms nothing else than that Christ, who was sacrificed, was foreknown before the creation of the world, which we also confess, but yet not as much as he should be sacrificed. Then we say that it was decreed by fates before the creation of the world that Christ should be sacrificed, if God decided to hand over Christ to sinful humans to be sacrificed. For the condition does not delete the decree, and it can be said simply that it was decreed at the arrival of the condition. When, therefore, humans sinned, it can also be said simply that it was decreed before the world was made that Christ should be sacrificed, even though it would have been decreed under that condition, obviously, if humans had sinned. And, if the decree had been made under that condition, it would now be certain, clearly, that our sins had not been foreseen before the creation of the world.[55]

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[52] To understand the subtle strategy Socinus employs on this topic, it is essential to recognize that theologians distinguish between two types of God's free will concerning future contingent events: God's spontaneous and free will regarding future contingents related to salvation, and God's indifferent and free will regarding future contingents related to creation. Socinus, by attempting to blend these two categories of divine will, seeks to deny the necessity of the eternal decrees of the Trinity. This discussion will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6. Cf., Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xiv.2,3,5. Turretin argues, "Free is said either with reference to spontaneity or indifference: the former what is done spontaneously and without compulsion, but the latter what is so disposed that it can be done and not be done. When it is asked whether God wills some things freely, not only the will of spontaneity is meant (for so the things which God wills most necessarily, he wills also freely, i.e., without coaction), but properly the liberty of indifference (i.e., whether he so wills that he could have nilled them)." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xiv.3.

[53] The Racovian Catechism explains that God's absolute goodness, holiness, and justice are His perpetual and internal divine will and attributes, whereas His mercy and benignity reflect His temporal and external divine will and attributes. Rees, *The Racovian Catechism*, 32.

[54] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:190: "sed hominem mutari, Dei decreto immutabili usque permanente." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 93.

[55] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:549: "Petrus quidem nihil aliud affirmat, quam Christum, qui mactatus fuit, ante mundi constitutionem praecognitum fuisse, quod nos etiam confitemur: sed non tamen, tanquam mactandum. Deinde dicimus, fatis ante conditum mundum decretum fuisse, ut Christus mactaretur, si Deus decrevit, hominibus peccantibus Christum mactandum tradere. Neque enim conditio decretum tollit, et adveniente conditione decretum fuisse simpliciter dici potest. Cum igitur homines peccaverint, jam simpliciter dici potest, decretum fuisse ante orbem conditum, ut Christus mactaretur, etiamsi sub ea conditione decretum fuerit, videlicet, si homines peccassent. Atqui, si sub ea conditione decretum factum esset, jam aperte constaret, nostra peccata ante mundi constitutionem praevisa non fuisse."

Socinus argues that the Father issued His internal decree before the creation of the world. At first glance, this decree appears eternal and immutable, yet neither external nor subject to change. To examine whether Socinus views the Father's internal decree as immutable and eternal, one must consider whether his concept of God—who knows and wills all future events—includes His spontaneous foreknowledge and predetermination of all salvific events for the elect within Himself.

Socinus's assertion that our sins—decreed by the Father before the creation of the world—were not foreseen by the Father reflects his belief that the Father did not spontaneously foresee or foreknow our sins, but rather decreed them indifferently, based on future conditions. For Socinus, if the Father spontaneously foresees and reasons our sins and eternal life, it should be that the Father spontaneously predetermines our sins and eternal life. However, Socinus, who rejects Augustine's concepts of the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, lacks a theological framework to affirm the notion that the Father spontaneously foresees and predetermines our sins and eternal life in His Son and Spirit.

When Socinus addresses God's foreknowledge of future salvific events in eternity, he seeks to deny the Father's spontaneous and free knowledge of the elect's future salvation, thereby effectively removing such foreknowledge from God. Socinus argues, "Since, therefore, there is no reason, nor any passage from Sacred Scripture, from which it can be clearly gathered that God knew all things that happen before they would happen, it must be concluded that such foreknowledge of God is by no means to be asserted by us."[56] He affirms only the indifference of free will—its freedom from any hypothetical necessity—by rejecting the Father's spontaneous foreknowledge, particularly the hypothetically necessary and spontaneous foreknowledge of future events related to salvation. Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son leads him to deny the hypothetical necessity of the eternal Son's spontaneous self-humiliation to foreknow and choose the elect in eternity. In conclusion, like his uncle,[57] Socinus believes that the Father internally and temporally preordained the temporal office of Jesus according to the Father's own internal and indifferent decrees, rather than through the Trinity's eternal and spontaneous decrees.

Fourth, Socinus's concept of the third heaven reflects his idea of a hierarchy between the Father, His internal qualities (the third heaven), and the glorified Jesus in the third heaven, as the third heaven is understood to represent the Father's internal qualities rather than His essence. Socinus argues, "If, indeed, that servant of Christ, Paul, was taken up into the third heaven before his death and was in paradise itself (2 Cor. 12:2), we cannot imagine that Christ was not in heaven before his death as well, and that the servant obtained greater things in life than the Lord."[58] The

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[56] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:549: "Cum igitur nulla ratio, nullus Sacrarum Literarum locus sit, ex quo aperte colligi possit, Deum omnia quae fiunt scivisse antequam fierent, concludendum est minime asserendam esse a nobis istam Dei praescientiam." Cf., Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xii.7.

[57] Sozzini, *Opere*, 107: "Qui Christum aeternum tuentur, his verbis abutuntur, ut statuant Christum fuisse realiter in caelo ante mundum conditum, cum nulla Scriptura hoc doceat. Pii vero facile vident, I Pet., I, [10-11], ad praeordinationem hoc referri, tum ad promissionem et figuras et umbras, sacrificia et oblationes, in quibus praenuntiatus et praefiguratus fuit Christus."

[58] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:380: "Si enim homo ille Paulus Christi servus ad tertium usque caelum ante mortem raptus est 2 Cor. 12. 2. & in ipso paradiso fuit; nullo pacto nobis verisimile sit, Christum ipsum, hominem scilicet illum, ante mortem in caelo non fuisse, et servum majora in hac vita adeptum fuisse, quam dominum; sive unigenam atque carissimum Dei filium non eo honore ac beneficio ab ipso Deo affectum fuisse, quo alius multo minus insignis et carus affectus fuit." English translation in George Huntston Williams, "The Christological Issues between Francis David and Faustus Socinus during the Disputation on the Invocation of Christ, 1578-1579," in *AntiTrinitarianism in the Second Half of the 16th Century*, ed. Robert Dan and Antal Pirnat (Budapest, 1982), 315.

following arguments show that Socinus's conception of the third heaven indicates neither God's essence nor Christ's divine knowlege. Socinus claims:

> But there are those who entirely from this suppose that the two natures, divine and human, are gathered in Christ, because he is called and is the Son of God. To this, I respond as follows: If it were certain that God is able, in the same way humans and other animals are, to give birth to one similar to him from his substance itself, this reason would appear to have some power. But not only is this not certain, but the opposite is easily proved. For, from the agreement of all Trinitarians itself, and from a clear reason, it can be understood that the substance of God, that is, his essence, can by no means be divided or multiplied.[59]

> Similarly, that the Son of Man was in heaven before he visibly ascended to it, he can and ought to be referred to actually and properly as that man, Jesus of Nazareth. … Now in the place of John 3:13, although it is generally read "he who is in heaven," it can be nevertheless from Greek to be read "he who was in heaven," just as Erasmus, Beza, and others have noted. … But when this, from which, as I said, all things are made clear, is not recognized, it happens that most people have interpreted "the ascension into heaven" as "the penetration to the knowledge of divine things (so to speak)." So, then, similarly, we will interpret "to be in heaven" as "the knowledge of divine things already obtained.[60]

Socinus acknowledges that the phrase could be misinterpreted as a metaphorical reference to heaven representing the Father's divine essence, from which Christ's divine essence was produced. Socinus is also cautious of the phrase "who is in heaven," fearing it could potentially be misconstrued. He is concerned that the phrase might be misinterpreted as referring to Christ's penetration into the knowledge of divine matters within His distinct personality—particularly the connection between Christ's unique personality and the eternal decree of the Trinity, as upheld by Calvin.[61] Eschewing both potential misrepresentations, Socinus believes that the third heaven consists of the Father's internal decrees, doctrines, or qualities rather than either Christ's divine knowledge or God's essence. Socinus argues that Jesus of Nazareth, as a human, needed to acquire the heavenly doctrines from the Father in the third heaven in order to deliver and reveal them to humanity on earth. Socinus thinks the third heaven in John 3:13 refers to the Father's internal and

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[59] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Sed sunt, qui omnino ex eo maxime putent colligi duas in Christo naturas, divinam & humanam, quod Filius Dei ac appclletur, et sit; ... Ad hoc sic respondeo. Si constaret fieri posse, ut Deus, quemadmodum homo, & caetera animalia, ex sua ipsius substantia gigneret sibi similem, vim aliquam videretur habere haec ratio. Verum non modo id non constat, sed contrarium facile probatur. Namque ex ipso consensu omnium Trinitariorum, exque ratione manifesta intelligi potest, Dei substantiam, id est essentiam, nulla ratione dividi aut multiplicari posse."

[60] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813. "Similiter, quod Filius hominis in caelo fuerit antequam eo conspicue ascenderit, revera & proprie ad hominem illum Jesum Nazarenum referri et potest, et debet. ... Iam in loco Joh. 3. 13. licet vulgo legatur, qiu est in caelo, potest tamen ex Graeco legi, qui erat in caelo, quemadmodum Erasmus, Beza, et alii monuerunt. ... At vero, cum hoc, unde, ut dixi, omnia plana fiunt, licet verissimum, non agnoscatur factum est, ut plerique istum ascensum in caelum, penetrationem (ut ita loquar) ad rerum divinarum cognitionem sint interpretati. Sic igitur similiter, Esse in caelo, ipsam jam adeptam rerum divinarum cognitionem interpretabimur."

[61] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:62, on John 3:13; idem, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, ed. Calvin Translation Society, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), Vol. 17, 120-121, on John 3:13.

subordinate decrees and qualities, not the relationship between Christ's unique personality and the eternal decree of the Trinity.

Fifth, Socinus's concept of the Father's external quality and will, which he identifies as the Holy Spirit, reflects a hierarchy between the Father, His internal will (the third heaven), the glorified Jesus within the third heaven, and the Holy Spirit's external power on earth. Socinus claims:

> Concerning the Holy Spirit, it is nowhere clearly and literally (as it is said) called God in the scriptures. But in no way, the properties of God are attributed to it, or what is attributed to the Holy Spirit somewhere, is found attributed to God in the same place or in another place. The reason for this is that the Holy Spirit is the virtue and efficacy of God. What is attributed to the virtue and efficacy of God, that is without doubt, is attributed to God himself. But the virtue and efficacy of God is not, therefore, some divine person, just as the goodness, justice, mercy, or judgment of God, and the other efficacies or properties of God are not some divine persons. Otherwise, it would be necessary for there to be even more than three.[62]

Socinus refers to the Holy Spirit as an external attribute of the Father—His will, power, or quality—rather than as an internal will, power, quality, or even as part of His person or essence. The Father's internal will, indicating His intrinsic properties and qualities, is perpetual and immutable, whereas His external will, refering to external properties like mercy and vindictive justice, is temporal and mutable. In short, Socinus thinks the Holy Spirit is neither the Father's divine essence nor His internal quality and decree.[63] Socinus might concur that, since the Father's essence gives rise to His internal decree and attributes, which are distinct from those of the Holy Spirit, a hierarchical relationship still exists between the Father's essence, His internal decree and attributes, and His external will and attributes.[64]

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[62] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:811: "Quod ad Spiritum sanctum attinet, is nusquam diserte atque ad literam (ut dicitur) in Scriptura Deus appellatur. Sed tantum haud raro ea illi tribuuntur, quae Dei sunt propria; vel quod Spiritui sancto alicubi tribuitur, id aut ibidem, aut alibi Deo tributum invenitur. Hujus rei caussa est, quod Spiritus sanctus virtus est atque efficacia Dei. Quod enim virtuti atque efficaciae Dei tribuitur, id sine dubio ipsi Deo tribuitur. Sed non est propterea Dei virtus et efficacia persona aliqua divina; sicut nec Dei bonitas, aut justitia, aut misericordia, aut judicium, aliique Dei vel effectus vel proprietates, sunt personae aliquae divinae. Alioqui multo plures etiam, quam tres, eas esse oporteret."

[63] Socinus defines the role of the Holy Spirit in the process of salvation as (1) the inscription of the divine law on the hearts of sinners who first hear and repent, and (2) the bestowal of perseverance and hope leading to their immortality. Cf. Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:191-92: Postquam Lex divina in hominis corde inscripta foret, consecuturam ea de causa peccatorum remissionem; quemadmodum superius ostensum est. Ubi etiam dictum a nobis fuit, idem esse hanc divinae Legis in mentibus nostris inscriptionem, quod est poenitentia et resipiscentia. … Postremo, ut, quemadmodum ipse Baptista ait, non aqua tantum abluerentur, sed spiritu quoque sancto perfunderentur. Poterant quidem, ut reipsa compertum fuit, ad Ioannis praedicationem, poenitentiam delictorum agere; sed ut in ea vitae innocentia, quam vera poenitentia necessario secum coniunctam habet, et sic in ipsa poenitentia ad finem usque perseverarent, sine qua perseverantia peccatorum remissio illa, id est vera salus, contingere non potest (Matth. 10.22; Heb. 3.6 et 14), id Spiritus Sancti, quem ii, qui in Christum credidissent, eique nomen dedissent, adepturi erant (Ioh. 7.39; Act. 2.38), munus atque opus erat futurum. Cuius vi ea, quae nobis resipiscentibus Deus per Christum promisit, in cordibus nostris adeo inscribuntur et imprimuntur, ut tanta bona consequendi firma spe sustentati, ne ipsius quidem mortis formidine ab ea vitae sanctitate demoveamur. At vero in Christum credere, nihil aliud esse, quam Deo ad ipsius Christi normam et praescriptum obedientem se praebere, idque faciendo ab ipso Christo vitae sempiternae coronam exspectare, infra, Deo adiutore, a nobis planissimum fiet.

[64] The Racovian Catechism implies a distinction between God's perpetual power and the external Holy Spirit by asserting that "the Holy Spirit ... does not comprise all the power of God." Rees, *The Racovian Catechism*, 295–97. In other words, God's temporal will (i.e., the Holy Spirit) cannot encompass God's internal and perpetual will and

In summary, both Servetus and Socinus reject Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the aseity of the eternal Son, attributing aseity exclusively to the Father. Just as Servetus's Trinitarian perspective can be classified as a form of monism and subordinationism due to its composite conception of God (encompassing both the eternal and temporal Logos), so too Socinus's Trinitarian perspective can be classified as a form of monism and subordinationism due to its composite conception of God (consisting of the eternal Father and the third heaven). Like Servetus, Socinus attributes aseity solely to the Father. In other words, both Trinitarian models lean toward monism due to their rejection of Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the eternal Son's possession of aseity.[65] Nevertheless, a methodological distinction exists between the two perspectives. On the one hand, Servetus's view permits a modalistic interpretation, suggesting that the essence of the eternal Father is communicated to all created things through the mystical union of the twofold Logos—namely, the Father's eternal reasoning of the Son and His temporal utterances. Thus, Servetus upholds that the eternal Father, the glorified Jesus, and all created things will all be in the essence of the Father through the mystical works of the twofold Logos. Consequently, Servetus's Trinitarian view tends toward modalism and his idea of God reduces to either an absent or abstract concept of god or a pantheistic god. On the other hand, Socinus establishes a logical hierarchy: first, the Father; second, His internal decrees and qualities, third, the glorified Jesus; and fourth, the external wills and qualities of the Holy Spirit. Socinus maintains the hierarchy between the Father's essence and His internal quality and decree, and thus his concept of God turns into the notion of a composite god. Since Socinus holds that the glorified Son of God can perpetually remain in the third heaven even after his ascension, he maintains the notion of a hierarchy between the Father's essence, His internal quality and decree (referred to as the third heaven), and the glorified Son of God in the third heaven. Socinus's notion of God, which includes a hierarchical relationship, inevitably results in a composite being. Consequently, his view of a composite god is characterized as transient rather than transcendent.

3.3. Socinus's Theological Concerns Regarding the Relationship Between the Trinity's Eternal Decrees and the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

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power. Also, John Biddle, an adherent of Socinianism, understands "the Holy Spirit" as "a finite intermediary," neither merely as an "essential omnipresence" nor simply as a perpetual "power of God." According to Richard A. Muller, Biddle's idea of the intrinsic Holy Spirit is distinct from "the more typical Socinian exegesis of the Spirit as a power of God." Biddle seems to recognize a hidden aspect of the Holy Spirit as the Father's internal and subordinate will distinct not only from the effect of the Father's temporal will but also from His essence. Biddle, Confession of Faith, VI:44, 56-58; Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:363. In the same vein, the Racovian Catechism says, "The Holy Spirit is a virtue or energy flowing from God to men and communicated to them, whereby he separates them from others and consecrates them to his own service. … Is the Holy Spirit promised to all believers in perpetuity? Yes: It ought however to be observed that this gift, as respects its effects, is twofold, the one continuing for a time only, the other perpetual; whereof the former may be called visible, the latter invisible." Rees, *The Racovian Catechism*, 285–87; Przypkowski Samuel, Smalcius Valentin, and Moskorzewski Hieronim, *Catechesis Ecclesiarum Quæ in Regno Poloniae* (London: William Dugard, 1651), 160–61. The "invisible" and "perpetual" power of the Holy Spirit described in the Racovian Catechism appears to be not only distinct from the external power of the Holy Spirit, but also conceptually separate from the very essence of the Father God. According to Muller, Turretin argues against the Socinians in his historical context by claiming that "such passages [1 Peter 1:12 and Matthew 3:16] refer to 'the presence of his [the Holy Spirit's] essence and not only of his power, as was proved above, in the question concerning the immensity of God.'" Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:372.

[65] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378. Also, see Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:812.

I will provide a more detailed comparison of Socinus's view of the Father's internal wills and qualities with Calvin's concept of the Trinity's eternal decrees in Section 3.3. In doing so, I will show how Faustus Socinus's anti-Trinitarian perspective differs substantially from Calvin's concept of the Trinity, the self-existent and simple God. In Section 3.3.1, I will demonstrate how Socinus's rejection of Calvin's concepts of Christ's aseity and His distinct personality undermines Calvin's Trinitarian concept of a twofold heaven—namely, the Immanent Logos and the Logos Brought Forth. In Section 3.3.2, I will outline how Socinus's denial of Calvin's concept of the *communicatio idiomatum in concreto* compels him not only to endorse his monistic view of the relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities (the third heaven) but also to reject the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. In conclusion, I will demonstrate that even though Calvin does not often employ Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son in his own historical context, Calvin's Trinitarian perspective implicitly affirms: 1) the twofold eternal heaven (the Immanent Logos and the Logos Brought Forth) rather than the internal and perpetual third heaven, 2) the eternal decrees of the Trinity rather than the perpetual decrees of the Father, and 3) the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction rather than its non-necessity, which is based on the Father's internal and perpetual will.

3.3.1. Socinus's Rejection of Calvin's Concepts of the Twofold Heaven and the Third Heaven

I will show how Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, as well as Calvin's concepts of the eternal Son's aseity and eternal generation, leads him to critique the doctrines of the Trinity's eternal decrees and Christ's self-descent from His essence. To thoroughly compare the logical coherence of Socinus's monistic concept of God with Calvin's Trinitarian view, it is first essential to examine Calvin's understanding of Christ's self-descent from His essence and the various meaning of "heaven."[66] In contrast to Calvin's distinction between Christ's twofold heaven and the third heaven within his Trinitarian framework, Socinus's view of the third heaven reflects the Father's internal counsel and power.

Socinus eliminates the possibility that the first meaning of "heaven" could be translated as "the Father's being" or "God's essence." Socinus argues, "From all these passages [especially, John 6:51], it is apparent that to descend from heaven is the same as to proceed from God Himself, in which sense Christ could rightly say that His flesh descended from heaven, as it was created by the unique and marvelous counsel and power of God, and thus in that sense proceeded from God Himself."[67] Although Socinus stated that "to descend from heaven" is the same as "to proceed from God Himself," he qualified this phrase to mean that "it [His flesh] was created by the unique and marvelous counsel and power of God, and thus in that sense proceeded from God Himself." Therefore, Socinus interprets "the Heaven," which he translates as "God Himself," as referring to the Father's internal counsel and power. Therefore, the phrase in John 6:51, "I am the living bread which came down from heaven," according to Socinus, is symbolically understood as that Jesus, the

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[66] For more details on Calvin's definition of the threefold meaning of "heaven," see Chapter 6.4.

[67] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Ex quibus omnibus locis apparet, De caelo descendere idem esse, atque a Deo ipso proficisci, quo sensu merito dicere potuit Christus, suam carnem e caelo descendisse, cum singulari ac mirabili Dei consilio et virtute fuerit creata, atque ea ratione ab ipso Deo profecta."

living bread, including His flesh, came from and was taught by the Father's internal wills and qualities.[68]

Socinus also interprets the "heaven" mentioned in John 6:62 as referring to the same "heaven"—understood as the internal wills and qualities of the Father—as referenced in John 3:13 and consequently rejects any form of the *communicatio idiomatum*. He argues:

> But they will say that certain things cannot at all be explained without the *idiomatum communicatione* and further acknowledgment of the two natures in Christ. For instance, when it is said that all things were created by God through Jesus Christ (Eph. 3:9), as indeed the Greek manuscripts state; or when it is said that the Son of Man was in heaven before he ascended there before his disciples (John 6:62); or even that he was in heaven while he was speaking on earth (John 3:13).[69]

Socinus seeks to entirely remove any implication of Christ's divine essence in the interpretation of "heaven" as referenced in John 3:13 and 6:62. Socinus argues:

> But if anyone tenaciously insists on strictly keeping the common reading, it still will not imply that there was any other essence or nature in Christ besides the human one, according to which, evidently, he would have truly been in heaven at that time. For in that case, [the expression] "to be in heaven" must be understood in such a way that it can be attributed to the human nature itself, or to the man Himself, about whom the words are distinctly spoken.[70]

Socinus's assertion that "it still would not imply that there was any other essence or nature in Christ besides the human one" strongly cautions against interpreting heaven as Christ's divine essence. Given Socinus's identification of "the heaven where Christ now is" in John 3:13 with "the heaven where He was before" in John 6:62, he interprets Christ's previous dwelling in heaven as His ascent to the third heaven, where He received and experienced the Father's internal counsels and attributes for a while. Socinus argues:

> And thus, let him understand that Christ's coming forth from the Father entirely different from you suppose, and thus it cannot either favor you or oppose us. For, whatever you say on this matter, it is certain that Christ's Apostles, before His resurrection, did not hold Christ as the true, eternal, and consubstantial God with the Father (which they did not

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[68] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Dicis, Christum saepius expresse et sine troporum involucris testari, se de caelo descendisse. Sed quomodo audes affirmare, sine tropo ullo ita locutum fuisse Christum, cum in eodem sermone dicat, panem, quem ipse daturus sit, esse carnem suam, quam dabit pro mundi vita (Joh. 6:51); et hunc panem vivificum de caelo descendisse, antea identidem testatus fuerit?"

[69] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "At enim dicent, quaedam esse, quae omnino sine ista idiomatum communicatione, et porro duarum in Christo naturarum agnitione explicari nequeant. Ut, cum dicuntur omnia a Deo per Jesum Christum creata, Ephs. 3.9, ut quidem Graeci codices habent; aut, cum dicitur Filius hominis in caelo fuisse antequam conspicientibus ipsius discipulis, eo ascenderet, Joh. cap. 6. 62; aut etiam in caelo esse, dum tamen in terra loqueretur, Joh. 3.13."

[70] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813: "Quod si quis tamen vulgatam lectionem mordicus retinere velit, non tamen sequetur aliam, praeter humanam, fuisse in Christo naturam sive essentiam, secundum quam scilicet fuerit tunc revera in caelo. Istud enim, Esse in caelo, ita accipiendum erit, ut ipsi humanae naturae, seu ipsi homini, de quo diserte verba fiunt, convenire possit."

even imagine after the resurrection), but rather recognized Him as the eternal King appointed by God for the Church.[71]

Socinus argues that the will of the One who sent Christ does not signify the Trinity's eternal decree within the Godhead but rather the Father's internal counsels and attributes, which were bestowed by the Father alone on Jesus, the human being. According to Socinus, the heaven referred to in John 3:13, 6:51, and 6:62 signifies the Father's perpetual and internal counsels and qualities.

In summary, Socinus seeks to interpret the term "heaven" in John 3:13, 6:51, and 6:62 exclusively as referring to the counsels and qualities of the Father, while rejecting its primary meaning as denoting the Father's being or God's essence. Especially, Socinus's failure to comprehend Calvin's Trinitarian concept of the relationship between Christ's divine essence and incommunicable personality is evident in his confused understanding of Calvin's notion of the twofold heaven. Socinus concludes that, since "heaven" represents the Father's internal wills and attributes rather than Christ's eternal and consubstantial essence with the Father, it is neither necessary nor possible for Jesus to possess a divine essence or a distinct divine personality (or mediatorship) and to be the eternal Son of God. Socinus's monistic perspective on the relationship between the Father's internal decree and Christ's human obedience diverges from Calvin's understanding of the relationship between Christ's self-descent from His divine being and His role as the eternal mediator.

3.3.2. Socinus's Rejection of Calvin's Concept of the Relationship Between the Trinity's Eternal Decrees and the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

Socinus's refutation of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction stems from his rejection of the eternal decree of the Trinity, which is intrinsically connected to his denial of Christ's aseity and distinct personality. Here, I will demonstrate that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective affirms the eternal decrees of the Trinity, whereas Socinus, by rejecting Calvin's concepts of Christ's divine nature and distinct personality, ultimately denies the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

First, Socinus attempts to refute the Lutheran concept of *communicatio idiomatum* in an abstract sense by employing Calvin's reasoning. He argues that "Calvin just takes it for granted that one nature could not merit reward for the other," hence "Christ could not merit reward for himself as God for God or as man for man."[72] Socinus points out that there is a paradox in the Lutheran idea that Christ's merit is obtained by the *communicatio idiomatum* in the abstract sense.[73] Socinus

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[71] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Et ita aliud omnino esse intelligat Christum a patre exivisse, quam tu opineris, quamque ut vel vobis favere, vel nobis adversari queat. Nam, quidquid tu hac de re dicas, certum est, Christi Apostolos ante ipsius resurrectionem non modo pro vero, aeterno, et patri consubstantiali Deo Christum non habuisse (quod nec post resurrectionem unquam somniarunt quidem), sed pro aeterno rege ecclesiae a Deo designato non agnovisse."

[72] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:203: "Immo id satis aperte a Calvino negatur, cum negat, ipsum sibi meruisse, & Scholasticos, qui id afferebant, reprehendit. Nam, quacumque ratione sibi Christus meritus fuisset, iniusta omnino esset eius reprehensio. Verum illi satis fuit, ostendisse, Christum nec, ut, Deum Deo, nec, ut hominem homini, sibi aliquid mereri potuisse; nimirum quia pro concesso tacite sumpsit, fieri non posse, ut altera natura alteri quidquam mereatur. Nec sane iniuria." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III, 197–98. For more details on this issue, see Gomes, "Faustus Socinus's A Tract Concerning God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit," 88–89.

[73] For more details on the modern debate over the origin of Christ's merit, see Paul Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 335–39; Alan W. Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of

refutes the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto* by arguing that Christ's essence, if it could exist independently, does not require merit, either for Himself or for any human nature, in order to grant eternal merit to Jesus and others. Socinus cites John 6:38, 4:34 and 10:18 to assert the following: "If you argue that he gained merit for us as God and in the power of the divine nature, that would be ridiculous. As we said, God, or the divine nature, does not merit but bestows, paying deserved rewards for any so-called merits."[74] Here, Socinus considers the relationship between Christ's divine and human natures unnecessary, emphasizing the absurdity of the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto*. Disagreeing with the Lutheran idea of *in abstracto*, Socinus argues that the Father's essence does not need merit or reward in order for Jesus to obtain the Father's reward. For Socinus, the Father can provide a divine reward for Jesus if He [the Father] wills. Simply put, Socinus argues that the Lutheran assertion of the "necessity for Christ to possess a divine nature" is an irrational claim.

Second, criticizing any form of communication of attributes, Socinus argues that "they will say that certain things cannot at all be explained without the *idiomatum communicatione* and further acknowledgment of the two natures in Christ."[75] Socinus not only condemns the Lutheran view that Christ's merit derives from the *communicatio idiomatum* in an abstract sense (the communication between the divine and human natures); he also rejects Calvin's perspective that Christ's merit is based on the *communicatio idiomatum* in a concrete sense (the communication within the person of Christ). Socinus, who denies Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity, thinks that Christ's divine mediatorship, which is established by Calvin's idea of the Trinity's eternal decree, is both untenable and unnecessary, as he believes that Calvin's concept of *in concreto* fails to fully resolve the contradiction inherent in the Lutheran idea of *in abstracto*. Socinus says:

> Moreover, if you say that Christ is not divided from you and that His divine and human natures are not distinguished in His actions, but rather that all His works are considered as performed by the concrete union of human and divine natures, this claim is weak when it comes to explaining the power of Christ's obedience. For it still remains to be investigated: where did this supposed great power of obedience come from? The divine nature cannot obey any more than it can suffer, and this power cannot stem from the human nature alone, which is naturally obedient but lacks divine power. Therefore, it must be concluded that Christ's obedience lacks such strength altogether.[76]

Christ," *Reformation & Renaissance Review* 12, no. 2–3 (August 2010): 195-6 n. 18-19; Gordon Alexander, "The Sozzini and Their School," The Theological Review, 66 (1876): 293–322; Alister E. McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 75–78.

[74] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:203: "Quod si dicatis, eum, ut Deum, & vi naturae divinae nobis meruisse; istud ridiculum plane est, cum, ut dictum fuit, Deus seu natura divina non mereatur; sed donet, ac largiatur; & meritis, si qua sunt, digna praemia rependat." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III," 196.

[75] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto,* I:813: "At enim dicent, quaedam esse, quae omnino sine ista Idiomatum communicatione, et porro duarum in Christo naturarum agnitione explicari nequeant."

[76] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:203: "Caeterum, si a vobis Christum non dividi dicatis, nec in iis, quae Christus fecit, ab humana divinam naturam distingui; sed omnia eius opera, ut ab humanae, & divinae naturae concreto facta considerari; hoc item, quod ad vim obedientiae Christi pertinet, valde frivolum est. Nam adhuc inquirendum relinquitur, undenam tanta vis, quam vos illi tribuitis, proficisci potuerit; praesertim cum ipsa natura divina non magis obedire possit, quam perpessiones experiri. Et cum ab humana natura, cuius proprium est obedire, neque per se, neque divinae naturae ope ea provenire possit; concludendum est, Christi obedientiam eiusmodi vi prorsus carere." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III," 197.

Socinus argues that this divine power attributed to Christ's perfect obedience and merit can come neither from human nature (since human nature is naturally obedient but lacks divine power) nor from divine nature (since divine nature does not obey or suffer).

Third, Socinus dissociates himself from Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. He argues:

> Do you not acknowledge that Jesus of Nazareth, that man, was appointed by God as Lord and Christ—that is, as King (Acts 2:36)—so that He might reign over us, govern, protect, deliver us from all evils, and confer upon us the highest and eternal blessings, and furthermore, be our God? … From this, it follows that Jesus Christ is rightfully to be adored and must be adored by us, even though He was not begotten from the substance of the Father from eternity.[77]

Socinus's assertion that "He was not begotten from the substance of the Father from eternity" clearly repudiates Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Furthermore, as examined in Chapters 1 and 2, rejecting Augustine's notion of natural generation is intrinsically connected to rejecting Calvin's idea of the Trinty's eternal decrees.[78] Therefore, it is evident that Socinus's statement ultimately negates Calvin's concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son, which is the theological foundation of the Trinity's eternal decrees.

Fourth, Socinus asserts that this divine power attributed to Christ's exaltation and merit can come from the Father's internal wills and qualities, namely, the third heaven. He argues:

> His power [the Father's internal power] is shown because He [the Father] exalted man to such a degree that, except for Himself [the Father], all things are subject to him [Christ]. His wisdom [the Father's internal counsel] is shown because this was the most absolute means by which pious people continually consider and obey God. His goodness [the Father's internal quality] is shown because He [the Fahter] converted us, who are unworthy, even deserving of the harshest punishment, and His enemies, reconciled us to Himself, saved us from the punishment of sin, and granted us eternal life.[79]

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[77] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "An non meministi, virum illum Jesum Nazaraenum, dominum, & Christum, id est regem, a Deo fuisse factum (Act. 2. 36), ut scilicet nos regat, gubernet, tueatur, ab omnibusque malis vindicet, & supremis ac sempiternis beneficiis afficiat, & porro noster Deus sit? ... Hinc apparet, merito Jesum Christum a nobis adorari, & adorandum esse, quamvis ex patris substantia ab aeterno non fuerit genitus."

[78] Calvin, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, CO 55:94, on Hebrew 7:25: "Quale hoc et quantum amoris erga nos pignus est: quod nobis Christus non sibi vivit, quod receptus est in beatam aeternitatem ut in caelo regnet: id causa nostra factum apostolus pronuntiat. Ergo et vita, et regnum, et gloria Christi in salutem nostram, tanquam in suum scopum, destinantur: nec quidquam habet Christus quod non in usum nostrum accommodare liceat: quia hac conditione semel nobis a patre datus est, ut omnia illius nostra sint." The condition that "all that is His should be ours" is an eternal promise, in which all that belongs to Him has been credited by God to be ours. This phrase indicates that everything Christ possesses—His life, kingdom, and glory—is granted to believers by the Trinity's eternal will. Cf., Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xii.7; CO 2:345-47; Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:203. Therefore, in Calvin's assertion that "both the life, kingdom, and glory of Christ are directed toward our salvation… because He was once given to us by the Father on the condition that all that is His should be ours," the phrase "because He was once given to us by the Father on the condition that all that is His should be ours" directly reflects the claim Socinus denies. Socinus argues that someone possessing the dignity to bestow all that is his upon others does not necessarily need to fulfill obedience to the law in order to do so.

[79] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: "Agnosce aliquando Dei potentiam, sapientiam, & bonitatem. Potentiam in eo, quod hominem adeo extulit, ut, praeter seipsum, ei omnia subjecerit. Sapientiam, quia haec omnibus numeris absolutissima ratio fuit, qua homines pii ipsi Deo perpetuo considerent, atque

According to the text, the Father's power, wisdom, and goodness signify the most absolute means, rather than relative means. Therefore, these are the perpetual attributes of the Father and the characteristics of the third heaven. These attributes are those that human beings on earth—such as Jesus before His resurrection or the Apostle Paul—could possess only temporarily, while the saints, after death, and particularly Jesus Christ after His resurrection, can possess them permanently as the absolute attributes of the Father. Nevertheless, the glorified Jesus remains inferior to the Father in terms of nature and essence, since, according to Socinus, the Father's internal and perpetual will, power, and attributes can exalt Jesus and humanity to such a degree that, except the Father Himself, all things are subject to Jesus Christ. Socinus, elsewhere, writes, "Christ could not satisfy divine justice on our behalf by fulfilling those things that we were required to do according to the law of God. If you [Covetus] affirm that Christ obtained something for us in His entirety, it is not due to the power of His obedience itself, but rather due to the dignity of the person who performed that obedience. I [Socinus] say that no person could possess such dignity that, if they were bound to obey, they could, by that obedience, truly and properly merit anything either for others or even for themselves."[80] Socinus contends that Jesus Christ could not have the divine dignity to grant eternal merit to others if he himself is bound to obey. Socinus argues that if Covetus and other Calvinists assert a connection between the necessity of Christ's fulfillment of God's law in His humanity and the necessity of His divine person or office, they should fall into the same fallacy as the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto*. Therefore, Socinus suggests that if Jesus were merely a human being who wished to earn divine merit by submitting to the law, then he would be unable to earn divine merit either for himself or for others. However, if Jesus were assisted by the Father's internal will and attributes, He would be exalted to such a degree that, apart from the Father, all things would be subject to Him. As noted above, Socinus interprets the "heaven" mentioned in John 6:62 as the same as the "heaven" referenced in John 3:13, rejecting both the plausible interpretation of Christ's divine essence in John 6:62 and Calvin's notion of Christ's penetration into the knowledge of divine matters in John 3:13.[81]

Fifth, Socinus's denial of Calvin's notion of the relationship between the Trinity's eternal decree and Christ's vicarious satisfaction can be observed in his quantitative concept of divine merit and wrath.[82] As mentioned above, Calvin asserts that, since it was a human who sinned and is therefore subject to God's eternal punishment, Christ's divine office (or authority)—rooted in the Trinity's eternal decree and connected to Christ's human nature's obedience—must support His human nature in fully enduring God's eternal punishment, not for His own transgressions, but on behalf of others. However, Socinus argues, "Christ's observance of the divine law could not be so great—either through the power of the divine nature or the dignity of the person—as to exceed the

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obedirent. Bonitatem vero in eo, quod, ut nos immerentes, immo quovis acerbo supplicio dignissimos et inimicos suos, ad se converteret, sibi reconciliaret, & a morte peccati poena assereret, & vita aeterna donaret."

[80] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:202: "Christum eorum, quae nos ex lege Dei facere debebamus, praestatione, divinae iustitiae pro nobis satisfacere non potuisse. ... Iam si totum quidem Christum nobis meruisse affirmetis: non tamen propter ipsius obedientiae vim, sed propter dignitatem personae, quae eam obedientiam praestitit; Dico, nullius personae tantam dignitatem esse posse, quae, si obedire teneatur, eo quod obedierit, vel aliis, vel etiam sibi ipsi, aliquid vere et proprie mereri possit." Even though Socinus counters this argument by assuming the logical premises considered by Covetus, the claim was, in fact, asserted by Calvin himself. Cf. Calvin, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, CO 55:94, on Hebrew 7:25.

[81] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:813.

[82] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:203. Also, for more details on Socinus's concept of the sum total of the countless debts of all humanity, refer to the introduction in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 48–49.

perfection that God's law demands. His obedience could hardly take the place of what countless individuals were obliged to do."[83] Socinus argues that the perfection required by God's law is fulfilled not by Christ's individual observance of the divine law, but by what innumerable individuals were obligated to do. Socinus evaluates "the perfection that God's law demands" as quantitative, i.e., the sum of the righteous works of all humans, rather than as a qualitative element, determined by the Trinity's eternal decree. Thus, he rejects the eternal value of the Trinity's eternal decree and the perfect quality of Christ's divine mediatorship and office. Socinus believes that any finite creature could not make anything of finite worth possess infinite and eternal value without God's internal wills and qualities.

Socinus concludes that Jesus, who was bound to render obedience as a man, could not possess any kind of divine personality, authority, or perfect quality, in order to distribute eternal life to others. If Christ's perfect obedience were to satisfy the demands of God's law, it would secure merit only for Himself, not for others. Socinus denies Calvin's concepts of the Trinity's eternal decree and Christ's divine mediatorship, since he believes that the perfection which God's law demands is a quantitative value consisting of the sum of the righteous works of all humans. Consequently, in Socinus's comments on Galatians 4:4, he rejects the notion of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. He argues, "And it becomes plain that there is nothing in these passages [Gal. 2:21, 4:4; Col. 2:14] which can persuade that Christ has made satisfaction for our sins to divine justice."[84]

3.4. Socinus's Concept of a Composite Being of God

I will demonstrate why Socinus's concept of God reduces to a composite being—finite rather than simple and self-existent—contrasting with the infinite nature of God in terms of essence, space, and time. Ultimately, this chapter explains why Socinus and Servetus share a common foundation in their ideas but differ in approach and outcome, and how Socinus's theology fundamentally departs from the views of Augustine and Calvin.

Socinus's idea of the hierarchy in God is basically a result of his denial of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, which affirms the consubstantiality of the three eternal beings, i.e., the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Socinus believes that the Father is the sole origin and beginning of all things.[85] Socinus's notion of a hierarchy between the Father and His internal qualities suggests that the Father has aseity but lacks simplicity, as Father's essence is separated from His internal wills and qualities, including rectitude and equity. Socinus's idea of prioritizing the Father's essence over His internal wills and qualities results in his advocating a composite god who has hierarchical levels. This prioritization also leads Socinus to deny God's essential attribute of infinity—namely, His incomprehensible essence, eternity, and immensity—since a composite deity is necessarily constrained by external factors, including other essences, time, and space.

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[83] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:204: "Satis ut abitror, a nobis demonstratum est, neque propter divinae naturae vim, neque propter ipsius personae dignitatem, potuisse divinae legis conservationem illam, ne aliquanto quidem perfectiorem esse quam ipsa lex, et Deus requirat. Tantum abest, ut innumerabilium loco esse potuerit." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 200.

[84] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:179: "Examinantur tria Pauli Apostoli testimonia, quae pro Adversarii sententia afferri solent: nempe Gal. 2. 21, et cap. 4. 4, Col. 2. 14. et planum fit, nihil in illis esse, quod suadere possit, Christum pro peccatis nostris divinae iustitiae satisfecisse." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 396.

[85] Socinus, *Tractatus De Deo, Christo, & Spiritu Sancto*, I:811.

First, Socinus's concept of the Father's one person and essence no longer requires an unfathomable way to explain how three consubstantial persons can be one God. Socinus says that only the Father has an essence. However, he attempts to prioritize the Father's essence over His internal will and qualities in the realm of God, namely, the perpetual third heaven, in order to support his idea of the Father's sole aseity. In Socinus's conception of God, the Father must be constrained by His internal attributes, such as His will and essential qualities, because He has chosen to be so—namely, by existing in the third heaven. Thus, the Father has *aseity* but lacks *simplicity* and *infinity*. Socinus believes in a composite god, and thus he rejects the idea of the Trinty's incomprehensible one essence.

Second, when Socinus denies the idea of a simple and self-existent God, he rejects the concept of God's *eternity*. Socinus's notion of the Father's preordaining Jesus as the eternal Son of God before the creation is reduced to the Father's perpetual and non-transcendental decree rather than the Trinity's eternal and transcendental decree. Socinus believes that the Father's preordination of Jesus before the world began was not confirmed by His eternal decree but would instead be confirmed by temporal outcomes, i.e., Jesus's resurrection.[86] Since Socinus admits that the Father has an essential aseity but not an essential simplicity, his view of the Father is reduced to the idea that God is dependent on the temporal outcomes and limited by time and space. As a result, Socinus's definition of God's eternal decree is restricted to the temporal and changeable rather than the transcendental and unchangeable.

Third, Socinus denies a simple and self-existent God, thus rejecting the concept of God's immensity even in space. Socinus's notion of a composite and temporal god can be ultimately understood by human beings because such a god must be contained in the third heaven and can be understood by not only the glorified Jesus in the third heaven but also the human Jesus who was in the third heaven before his visible ascension.[87] Socinus argues that even though the Father is the source of all good things and therefore inaccessible to us, the Son, who was and is in the third heaven, is like a stream flowing from the source in the third heaven, drawing us to approach God.[88] Even though ordinary human beings on earth cannot access the Father who is in the third heaven, we can access the Father in the third heaven if we are sanctified by Christ's heavenly teachings, just as the sanctified Jesus could access the Father in the third heaven while He was on earth.

In the end, Socinus believes in a composite god rather than a simple and self-existent God. Socinus's belief in a composite and temporal god results in his denials of the following three essential attributes of God: His immensity, eternity, and incomprehensibility. Socinus's view leads to a denial of the Trinity's incomprehensible and transcendent one essence, as it contradicts either Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son or Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity. In the end, Socinus's conception of a monistic God and His internal will and attributes fundamentally differs from Calvin's understanding of Christ's self-existent essence and incommunicable personality, which aligns with the idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, a concept supported by Augustine.

3.5. Conclusion

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[86] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:549.

[87] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378.

[88] Socinus, *De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378.

In Chapter 3, I aim to fundamentally demonstrate why Socinus rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, and how Socinus's anti-Trinitarian perspective differs not only from Augustine's Trinitarian views but also from Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity. Through this analysis, I showed how Socinus ultimately denies the connection between the eternal Son's mediatorial role and the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Section 3.2 provides an in-depth analysis of why Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son shapes his anti-Trinitarian theology. Socinus entirely rejects both the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's natural generation of the Son, based on his own biblical interpretations of the passages Augustine and Calvin use to support these doctrines, as well as his own rational arguments against them. Socinus seeks to reject the notion of a simple, self-existent Trinity by attributing the aseity exclusively to the Father. Socinus believes that the Father's internal wills and qualities (but not His essence or aseity) can be communicated to and transferred into certain entities in the third heaven by His bestowal. Socinus asserts that the Father's internal wills and qualities constitute the third heaven, into which the glorified Jesus has entered. Socinus also believes that the Father's external qualities (but not His essence or His internal qualities) can be communicated to and transferred into other entities on earth through the external Holy Spirit. Unlike Augustine and Calvin, Socinus contends that the eternal Son of God was foreordained by the Father's indifferent and free will, not by the Trinity's eternal decree. Consequently, Socinus asserts that only the Father is self-existent, while Christ possesses only the Father's internal qualities and power for eternal life, which He fully received in the third heaven, rather than the Father's divine essence.

Socinus's arguments above imply the following: the Father's internal wills and qualities, though attributes that existed in the Father's essence prior to creation, can be perpetually possessed by Jesus as invisible qualities only after His visible ascension to the third heaven. Therefore, the invisible qualities that Jesus possesses in the third heaven are not of the same essence as those the Father held alone before creation but are instead subordinate attributes. Socinus's assertion indicates that the Father is above the third heaven. Also, his assertion above implies that since the Father's internal wills and qualities are still inferior to the essence of the self-existent Father, there is in God an essential separation and hierarchy between the Father's essence and His internal wills and attributes. In short, Socinus's rejection of both Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and Calvin's affirmation of the eternal Son's aseity leads to his critique of the Trinity's incomprehensible unity of essence, their shared aseity, and the eternal decrees of the Trinity.

In Section 3.3, the discussion shifts to Socinus's critique of Calvin's understanding of the Trinity's eternal decrees, highlighting how this critique leads him to deny the link between the hypothetical necessity of the Trinity's decrees and the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. This section emphasizes the key differences between Socinus's and Calvin's views on the Trinity.

Since Socinus denies the Father's natural generation of the Son and their aseity, his anti-Trinitarian view cannot sustain the notion of the eternal Son's transcendental essence, as referenced in John 6:62. Additionally, by rejecting Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity—which affirm both the consubstantiality and the distinct divine persons of the eternal Trinity (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit)—Socinus also opposes Calvin's interpretation of the second aspect of heaven (John 3:13), in which Christ is presented as the mediator capable of penetrating divine knowledge and counsel. Therefore, Socinus asserts that Christ's divine power is derived exclusively from the Father's internal wills and qualities, rather

than from Christ's human or divine nature, or from the eternal decree of the Trinity. He argues that if Covetus and other Calvinists give priority to the necessity of Christ's incommunicable, divine personality (or His distinct divine office) over the requirement of Christ's human accomplishment of obedience, they do not have to assert that it is necessary for Christ's human nature to obey all the requirements of the law, in order to either obtain His divine merit or suffer God's eternal wrath. Socinus concludes that Calvin's conception of the relationship between the Trinity's eternal decree and Christ's vicarious satisfaction—grounded in the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity, contingent upon Adam's sin—is unnecessary, as it fails to address the inherent contradiction in the Lutheran concept of *communicatio idiomatum* in *abstracto*.

In Section 3.4, I demonstrated that Socinus's belief centers on a composite god, rather than a simple and self-existent one. His view of a composite god leads him to reject three fundamental attributes of God: immensity, eternity, and incomprehensibility. Consequently, Socinus's perspective ultimately denies the one incomprehensible and transcendent essence of the three persons, as he rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, as well as Calvin's idea of the aseity (*Principium*) of both the Son and the Holy Spirit. Socinus's rejection of Augustine's concept of natural generation and Calvin's notion of the Son's aseity has two clear implications. First, Socinus's concept of the Father's internal and absolute wisdom, will, and power differs from Augustine's conception of the Son's internal and absolute wisdom, will, and power. Socinus holds that the Father's internal and absolute counsel and will are subordinate to His essence, whereas Augustine asserts that the Immanent Son and Spirit, as the Father's internal and absolute counsel and will, are identical to His essence. Second, Socinus's idea of the Father's internal wills is completely contrary to Calvin's idea of Christ's divine mediatorship and authority based on the Trinity's eternal decrees. While Socinus's concept of the Father's internal wills is limited to an invisible but not eternal decree, Calvin equates God's internal decree with the Trinity's eternal decree—God's mere good pleasure, or *prothesis*. When Socinus affirms the Father's twofold will, i.e., His perpetual and internal will working in the third heaven and His temporal and external will working on earth, he is really denying both Augustine's idea of the natural and volitional procession of the Spirit and Calvin's notions of the personal procession of the Spirit and the Holy Spirit's aseity.

The Trinity's essential attribute of aseity must be followed by another essential attribute of simplicity because the Trinity who is "not originated from previously existing things" cannot be a composite.[89] However, Socinus does not accept the idea that the Trinity has both aseity and simplicity, as he rejects Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. These two essential attributes of the Trinity must also be accompanied by yet another essential attribute of infinity, because the Trinity, who is both simple and is not originated from previously existing things, is not limited by anything and therefore by definition must be infinite.[90] The Trinity's essential attribute of infinity is expanded by at least three other essential attributes: incomprehensible essence, eternity, and immensity.

In conclusion, just as Servetus's modalistic view combines elements of both monism and subordinationism, so too does Socinus's anti-Trinitarian view. In Servetus's framework, while the Father remains perpetually superior to any manifestation of His essence within space and time, His essence can be communicated to and imparted into all things in the third heaven, particularly

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[89] Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 42.

[90] Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 42; Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.viii.8.

through the interaction between the twofold Logos. Similarly, though not entirely, in Socinus's view, in order to maintain that only the Father has essential aseity, Socinus assumes that there is a hierarchy between the Father, His internal decree and qualities, Jesus in His glorified state, and the temporal Holy Spirit. Since Socinus posits a hierarchy between the Father and His internal wills and attributes, his conception of God constitutes that of a composite being. His view ultimately synthesizes the monism inherent in Servetus with the subordinationism characteristic of Gentile thought. Socinus's anti-Trinitarian perspective, which lacks a comprehensive framework to affirm both the eternal Son's divine essence and the Trinity's eternal decrees, fails to account for the relationship between the hypothetical necessity of the eternal Son's mediatorial role and the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Chapter 4: Turretin's Trinitarian Perspective

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Turretin's Affirmation of the Aseity of the Eternal Son and the Holy Spirit
4.3 Turretin's Affirmation of the Relationship Between the Father's Natural and Volitional Generation of the Son and the Trinity's Eternal Decree
4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Turretin's Trinitarian Perspective

4.1. Introduction

Socinus's concept of a composite god is demonstrated in two ways. The first way, as shown in 3.3-4, is evidenced by his notion of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities. Socinus's notion of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities leads to the reduction of God's eternal and absolute attributes, such as rectitude and equity, to perpetual yet relative attributes. According to this view, the glorified Jesus, by virtue of God's promise and decree, can possess these perpetual yet relative attributes of rectitude and equity in the third heaven through sharing in God's internal wills and qualities. However, he cannot be the self-existent God who inherently possesses the eternal and absolute attribute of aseity. The issue with Socinus's notion of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities arises from his Trinitarian perspective lacking the methodology of the Father's natural generation of the Son. To refute Socinus's notion of a composite god, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective must uphold the Father's natural generation of the Son, thereby ensuring that the eternal Son can inherently possess God's eternal and absolute attributes, such as rectitude, equity, eternity, and aseity.

The second way is affirmed by Socinus's omission of the notion of God's free and spontaneous wills, which I interpret as referring to the Father's spontaneously volitional (or personal) generation of the Son or the Trinity's eternal decrees concerning salvific events. Socinus's omission of the concept of God's free and spontaneous will gives rise to his distinctive Trinitarian perspective, wherein the traditional understanding of God's eternal yet relative attributes—such as vindictive justice and mercy—is reduced to God's free and arbitrary attributes and wills, such as the will to create the world. This omission arises from his denial of the Father's spontaneously volitional generation of the Son. By denying the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, Socinus's Trinitarian view redues to his distinct view that God's essence, His internal qualities (rectitude), and His free and arbitrary will (vindictive justice) are not only distinct from one another but are also regarded as fundamentally separate from one another.

The primary issue stems from Socinus's rejection of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Socinus's perspective implies that God's perpetual yet relative qualities, such as rectitude or equity, are derived from the Father and are not equivalent to His essence but are instead subordinate to it. The secondary issue arises from Socinus's neglect of the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence and their hypothetical decrees and personal (and thus incommunicable) attributes. Socinus maintains that God's temporal qualities, such as vindictive justice or mercy, do not originate from the consubstantial essence and qualities of the Trinity or from its free and spontaneous wills and qualities, but instead arise from His free and arbitrary wills and qualities.[1] Therefore, Socinus affirms only the free and indifferent will and decree—free apart from the Father's nature and essence—by denying the relationship between the Trinity's essence and their free and spontaneous wills of future events concerning salvation.[2]

Turretin's critique of Socinus's concept of a composite god appears analogous to Augustine's critique of Eunomius. On the one hand, Augustine argues that Eunomius rejects the belief that the only begotten Son of God, through whom all things were made, is the Son of God by

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[1] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:566.

[2] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:549.

nature, begotten of the Father's substance. On the contrary, Eunomius asserts that the Son is not begotten from God's nature, substance, or essence but solely from the will of God, claiming that the will, by which God begot the Son, is an accidental will of God.[3] Eunomius considers the Father's eternal generation of the Son to be merely the Father's accidentally (or arbitrarily) voluntary generation of the Son. On the other hand, when Turretin opposes Socinus's concept of a composite god, he argues:

> Concerning these decrees [which, according to Turretin, are the counsels of God regarding future events outside Himself], the question is: are they in God essentially, or only inherently and accidentally? The orthodox maintain the former; Socinus and Vorstius, however, hold the latter view, asserting that they are true accidents. They do so to undermine the simplicity of God and to argue for a real composition in Him.[4]

Turretin assumes that if God's eternal decrees were inherent and accidental rather than inherent and essential, then Socinus's conception of God would undermine God's simplicity and, in effect, imply a composite deity. Although Turretin's critique of Socinus's concept of a composite god appears similar to Augustine's critique of Eunomius, a significant and noteworthy distinction lies in their respective focuses. Augustine addresses Eunomius's denial of the Father's natural generation of the Son, whereas Turretin critiques Socinus's rejection of the Trinity's eternal counsels or decrees, specifically understood as the Father's personal (or spontaneously volitional) generation of the Son (4.2). The omission of the underlying process may make it challenging for readers to fully comprehend the primary issue concerning the two Trinitarian presuppositions outlined in the introduction. Therefore, by closely examining the contrast between Turretin's Trinitarian view and Socinus's anti-Trinitarian perspective, I will demonstrate that denying the Father's natural generation of the Son ultimately leads to a rejection of the Trinity's eternal counsels and decrees. This ultimately leads to a perceived distinction between God's essence, His essential qualities (such as rectitude), and His accidental will—encompassing, in Socinus's view, attributes like vindictive justice and mercy, as well as His will to create or refrain from creating.

If Turretin's Trinitarian perspective is grounded in the Father's naturally and spontaneously volitional generation of the Son, it ensures that the eternal Son fully possesses God's eternal and absolute attributes, including rectitude, equity, eternity, and aseity, without any theological inconsistency. Furthermore, it allows for the eternal Son to possess God's eternal yet relative attributes, such as vindictive justice and mercy, without any conceptual difficulty.

In Chapters 4-6, I will demonstrate how Turretin's Trinitarian perspective must provide a robust theological foundation not only to refute Socinus's anti-Trinitarian claims but also to affirm the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction as essential for both the forgiveness of sins and the

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[3] Augustine, *De Trinitate Libri Quindecim*, XV.xx.38, PL 42, p. 1087; tr., NPNF, 1st ser., vol. III, p. 220: "Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intelligere, nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium." It is essential to examine Augustine's understanding of the expression "the Son of God by nature," as the phrase "by nature" elucidates how the three persons share and establish the consubstantiality and the one essence of the Trinity.

[4] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.5: "Circa ista Decreta quaeritur, Quomodo sint in Deo, An essentialiter, An vero inhaesive et accidentaliter? Prius statuunt Orthodoxi; Posterius Socinus et Vorstius, qui, ut Dei simplicitatem evertant, et in eo compositionem realem dari evincant, pertendunt esse veri nominis Accidentia; adversus quos ita disputamus." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.i.5.

granting of eternal life to believers. In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate Turretin's affirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, presenting it as a comprehensive framework to effectively counter Socinus's concept of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's exclusive aseity and His internal wills and attributes, as well as Socinus's notion of a divided relationship between God's essence and His vindictive justice. In Section 4.2, I will demonstrate how Turretin, based on his interpretation of Scripture, upholds both the aseity and simplicity of the three persons by using the notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son, thereby refuting Socinus's concept of a composite god, which posits a hierarchy between the Father's essence and His perpetual yet relative wills and attributes. In Section 4.3, I will demonstrate Turretin's affirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, which directly counters Socinus's elements of Gentile's subordinationism and his rejection of Calvin's concept of Christ's incommunicable personality.

4.2 Turretin's Affirmation of the Aseity of the Eternal Son and the Holy Spirit

Turretin faced a different historical context from Calvin's, and as a result Turretin seemed to need to employ Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son to refute Socinus's subordinationism. At the same time, Turretin appeared to have to defend Calvin's clarification of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity when he hoped to rebut Socinus's denial of Christ's incommunicable personality. I will now demonstrate, based on his interpretations of the Scriptures, how Turretin affirms the aseity of the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit. I will also examine how Turretin uses the natural and volitional generation of the Son and the natural and volitional procession of the Spirit to affirm both the consubstantiality of the three persons and their distinct personal identities.

If Turretin wishes to oppose Socinus's implication of Gentile's subordinationism and his denial of Christ's incommunicable personality,[5] he should say that the eternal Wisdom of God and the eternal Will of God have both consubstantiality with and distinct personalities from the Father.

First, in order to refute the hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and the eternal Son's (or the eternal Wisdom's) deity,[6] Turretin appears to reintroduce Augustine's ideas of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's natural generation of the Son. Turretin considers the eternal wisdom of God to be both "the essence of God" and "the person of the eternal Son of God." He argues:

> That Christ is said to have been born of a virgin, to have suffered and died, not to be present everywhere, and to be less than the Father, shows indeed that he was a true man, similar to us in all things, but it does not negate that he was God. On the contrary, he is displayed as born of a virgin in time, just as he was begotten from eternity through God, Proverb 8:22. He is so less than the Father by reason of voluntary self-emptying (*exinanitionis*) and

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[5] Cf., see *Socinus, De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia*, II:378: Dicis, Christum saepius expresse et sine troporum involucris testari, se de caelo descendisse. Sed quomodo audes affirmare, sine tropo ullo ita locutum fuisse Christum, cum in eodem sermone dicat, panem, quem ipse daturus sit, esse carnem suam, quam dabit pro mundi vita (Joh. 6:51); et hunc panem vivificum de caelo descendisse, antea identidem testatus fuerit?" Certe Christi caro in Mariae virginis utero formata est, non autem de caelo revera delapsa.

[6] Turretin interprets John 5:26 in the same way as Augustine, asserting that the eternal Son possesses the same essence as the Father because the Father imparts His essential life through the natural generation of the Son. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.28.

assumed flesh, yet is equal to him with respect to eternal deity communicated to him from eternity (Jn. 5:18).[7]

> And this Wisdom cannot be only some quality or virtue, but it ought to be necessarily subsisting in a person, because whatever personal things are attributed to him, that is, so that he teaches, shouts, calls and constitutes kings (Proverbs 9), build a house, kills animals, arranges a feast, and sends maidservants to call men, and the like (Proverb 9), which are able to be compatible with a person only.[8]

Turretin asserts that, by reason of voluntary self-emptying, He is indeed lesser than the Father and is manifested in time as born of a virgin. Simultaneously, Turretin maintains that the Son was begotten from eternity through God, possessing the eternal deity communicated to Him from eternity, thus affirming that He is, indeed, God. Based on his idea of the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son, Turretin says that the eternal Wisdom of God in Proverbs 8:22 is God Himself and is also the eternal Son of God (the second person).

Affirming the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father as do Calvin and Augustine, Turretin insists that the eternal Son of God also has the essential attribute of aseity (the *Principium*) and therefore bears the name and title of Jehovah. Turretin argues:

> It belongs to the same that he is called the first and the last in Isaiah 41:4 and in Revelation 1:8, Alpha and Omega; the beginning without the beginning, because although he is the beginning of all things, he himself is without a beginning. He is the end without the end, because although he is the end to which all are referred, he can have no end. And what is without the beginning is also without succession, because succession depends upon the beginning, and it says order according to before and after. The name Jehovah necessarily includes this eternity because, as has been said, it designates that God is the first and independent being, not susceptible to mutation.[9]

Turretin's term "the beginning without beginning" refers not to succession but eternity. In contrast to Gentile and Servetus who do not agree that God's name Jehovah or the Father's property of aseity should ever be ascribed to the Son, Turretin identifies the eternal Son as the *Principium* who is self-existent from Himself. Thus, he affirms that the eternal Son should rightly be designated as Jehovah, attributing both aseity and the divine name Jehovah to the Son. Furthermore, he maintains

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[7] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.41: "Quod Christus dicitur ex Virgine natus, passus et mortuus, non ubique praesens, et minor Patre, ostendit quidem eum fuisse verum hominem nobis per omnia similem, sed non negat fuisse Deum; imo ita proponitur natus ex Virgine in tempore, ut sit genitus ab aeterno a Deo, Prov, viii. 22. Ita est Patre minor ratione voluntariae exinanitionis et assumptae carnis, ut sit tamen ei par respectu aeternae Deitatis ipsi ab aeterno communicatae, Jo. v. 18."

[8] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.10: "Sapientia autem ista non potest esse tantum qualitas, aut virtus aliqua, sed necessario debet esse Persona subsistens, quia quaecunque illi tribuuntur personalia sunt, ut quod doceat, clamet, Reges vocet et constituat, c. viii. aedificet domum, mactet animalia, convivium paret, et mittat ancillas ad vocandos homines, et sim. c. ix. quae nonnisi personae competere possunt."

[9] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.x.4: "Eodem pertinet, quod dicitur primus et novissimus apud Isa. cap. xli. 4, et apud Joan. Apoc. c. i, Alpha et Omega; principium sine principio, quia cum sit omnium rerum principium, ipse principio caret, et finis sine fine, quia cum sit finis ad quem omnia referuntur, nullum potest habere finem; quod autem est sine principio, est etiam sine successione, quia successio pendet ex principio, et ordinem dicit secundum prius et posterius. Hanc Aeternitatem nomen Jehova necessario includit, quia ut dictum, designat Deum esse Ens primum et independens, nulli mutationi obnoxium."

that no hierarchical distinction exists between the aseity of the eternal Father and that of the eternal Son.

Second, Turretin's Trinitarian view also opposes Socinus's implication of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities. Socinus's concept of the third heaven implies that the Father's internal wills and qualities are subservient to the Father. This opinion is clearly shown in Socinus's belief that the glorified Jesus is subordinate to the Father in the third heaven. Socinus's subordinationism differs from that of Arius in one peculiar aspect.[10] While Arius similarly emphasizes the subordinate relationship between the Father and the Logos, Socinus's Trinitarian perspective suggests a subordinate connection between the Father and His internal qualities. Socinus and Gentile agree in substance when they assert a hierarchical relationship in God. Socinus upholds the idea of the hierarchical relationship between God the Father, His internal attributes, and the glorified Jesus in the third heaven, and Gentile conceives of a hierarchical relationship between God the Father, the Son essentiated from the Father, and the Spirit essentiated from the Father and the Son.

Turretin deems it essential to refute not only Socinus's contention that the Father's absolute will and attribute of rectitude are subordinate to His essence, but also Socinus's ascription of God's eternal yet relative attribute of vindictive justice to his distinctive conception of the external attribute of the Holy Spirit. Turretin addresses the issue of the Father's absolute and relative attributes in direct connection to Socinus's critiques of the Holy Spirit. He asserts:

> The question concerning the divine attributes as distinct from the divine essence is agitated with us by the Socinians (who, the more easily to prove that the Holy Spirit is not God or a divine person-although he may be called a virtue of God-maintain that the attributes of God are really distinct from his essence). The orthodox teach that they are really the same with his essence, but are to be distinguished from it virtually and eminently.[11]

Turretin aims to refute the Socinian portrayal of the Father's absolute and relative attributes—often referred to by Augustine as both the necessary and natural attributes of the Holy Spirit (such as rectitude) and the relative and personal attributes of the third person of the Holy Spirit (such as vindictive justice)—as being subordinate to His essence. Specifically, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective must provide a theological ground to affirm that the Father's eternal and absolute attribute of rectitude is identical to His essence, while His eternal and relative attribute of vindictive justice is distinguished from His essence by a virtual and eminent distinction.

On the one hand, Turretin argues that the Holy Spirit, through the natural procession, shares full consubstantiality with the Father, thereby dismantling the subordinationist framework proposed by Socinus. He asserts:

> It is not inquired about the external and temporal procession, which is terminated on creatures, through which the Spirit is sent to sanctify us and to complete the work of salvation; but of the eternal and internal procession, which is terminated within, and it is

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[10] Alan W. Gomes, "The Rapture of the Christ: The 'Pre-Ascension Ascension' of Jesus in the Theology of Faustus Socinus (1539-1604)," *Harvard Theological Review* 102, no. 1 (January 2009): 80.

[11] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.v.5. "Quaestio de distinctione Attributorum ab Essentia Divina movetur nobis a Socinianis; qui ut facilius probent Spiritum S. non esse Deum, aut Personam divinam, etsi vocetur virtus Dei, volunt Attributa Dei ab essentia realiter distingui. Orthodoxi docent Attributa realiter idem esse cum ipsa essentia Dei; distingui vero ab ea virtualiter, et eminenter."

nothing else than the mode of communication of the divine essence, by which the third person of the Trinity from the Father and the Son has the same essence in number as the Father and the Son have.[12]

Turretin's concept of "the eternal and internal procession" of the Holy Spirit indicates Augustine's idea of the natural procession of the Holy Spirit. Turretin defines the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as the eternal communication of the divine essence, whereby the third person of the Trinity shares the same "numerical essence" as the Father and the Son.[13]

On the other hand, by interpreting Augustine's argument that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally" in a different way, Turretin continues to assert, "If the mode of subsisting is considered (according to which the Father is the fountain of deity from whom the Son emanates), not improperly in this sense is he said to proceed from the Father through the Son as to the order and mode of procession."[14] According to Turretin, Augustine suggests not only that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son as if the Spirit proceeds as the *Principium* (as the immanent Holy Spirit) from the Father and the Son principally, but he also suggests that the distinct personality of the Holy Spirit proceeds secondarily and less principally from the second person of the Son, the Logos Brought Forth.

Third, it is noteworthy that Turretin regards the aseity of both the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit as "a self-existent God" existing from Himself.

On the one hand, Turretin, following Augustine, acknowledges the notion that the eternal Son (the eternal Wisdom or the eternal Word) possesses His essence (or aseity) in and of Himself. He argues:

> Although the Son is from the Father, yet he is no less called a self-existent God (*autotheos*), not with respect to the person, but with respect to the essence. Not relatively as the Son, for he indeed is from the Father, but absolutely as God, since he has the divine essence existing from itself, and not divided or produced from another essence, but not as having that essence from himself. So the Son is God from himself, though he is not the Son from himself.[15]

Turretin denies that the essence of the Father generates or begets the essence of the Son. He also rejects the notion that the essence of the Son derives its existence from itself. However, he acknowledges that the Son possesses an essence that exists of itself. In doing so, he underscores the limitations and complexities inherent in theological terminology. Nevertheless, as previously examined, he affirms that the manner in which the essence of the Father is communicated to the Son occurs through the essential communication of the divine essence between the Father and the Son. Given Turretin's affirmation of the essential communication of the divine essence, his

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[12] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.2: "Non quaeritur de Processione temporali et externa, quae terminatur ad Creaturas, per quam Spiritus S. mittitur ad nos sanctificandos, et ad perficiendum opus salutis; Sed de Processione aeterna et interna, quae terminatur ad intra, et nihil aliud est quam modus communicationis Essentiae divinae, quo tertia Persona Trinitatis a Patre et Filio eandem numero essentiam habet, quam Pater habet et Filius."

[13] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.2; Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxxi.2.

[14] Turrettini, *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae*, III.xxxi.8.

[15] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.40: "Licet Filius sit a Patre, non minus tamen autotheos dicitur, non ratione Personae, sed ratione Essentiae; non relate qua Filius, sic enim est a Patre, sed absolute qua Deus, quatenus habet Essentiam divinam a se existentem, et non divisam vel productam ab alia essentia, non vero qua habens essentiam illam a seipso. Sic Filius est Deus a seipso, licet non sit a seipso Filius."

statement, "Although the Son is from the Father," implies the Father's volitional generation of the Son.[16] In other words, he explains the Father's natural generation of the Son as having logical priority.

More importantly, Turretin notes how Calvin uses Augustine's idea of the eternal Son's aseity to counter Gentile's subordinationism. Turretin argues:

> Therefore, it is patent how unjustly Genebrardus and other priests ascribe heresies to Calvin because, when refuting the impiety of Valentine Gentile, who attributed divine essence to the Father alone, whom he thus called the primacy God and self-existent God (*autothen*), but the Son and the Holy Spirit he called essentiated (*essentiatos*) from the Father, Calvin said that the Son is no less the self-existent God (*autotheon*) than the Father, but with respect to the essence only, which is no less the self-essence (αυτουσια) in the Son than in the Father, but not [with respect to] the person, which Bellarmine himself acknowledged and to have been said correctly in "*De Christo*," 2.19 in *Opera* [1856], 1:217-19).[17]

Here, Turretin suggests that, to counter Gentile subordinationism within the essence of God, Calvin implicitly aligns with Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity, thereby acquiescing to the Father's natural generation of the Son. Calvin appears to have been concerned that Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son could be misinterpreted—by figures such as Gentile—as implying an essential generation of the Son by the Father, thereby affirming three distinct essences within God.

Turretin, connecting John 5:26 to Colossians 2:9, embraces not only Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son but also Calvin's emphasis on Christ's aseity ("Godhead"). He argues:

> Finally, the full deity is said to dwell in him, that is, the essence with attributes, in Colossians 2:9, and the life of God is attributed to him in John 5:26. If it is said that it has been given to him from the Father, his dignity thus is not lessened, because this denotes the order only, not inferiority, since he accepted the same with the Father in number, not from grace but from nature, not in time but from eternity.[18]

Turretin concurs with both Augustine's interpretation of John 5:26 and Calvin's interpretation of Colossians 2:9 that there is no difference in the essential equality between the Father and the Son.

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[16] For more details on his idea of the natural and voluntary generation of the Son, see, Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22: "Necessarium et voluntarium utcunque in Deo quoad nostrum concipiendi modum distinguantur, realiter tamen non opponuntur. Unde Pater necessario et voluntarie Filium genuisse dicitur; necessario quia natura genuit, ut est natura Deus, sed voluntarie, quia non coacte, sed lubenter genuit; non voluntate antecedente, quae notat actum volendi liberum ad extra, sed concomitante, quae notat naturalem volendi in Deo facultatem; non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.22.

[17] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.40: "Unde patet quam injuste dicam hic haereseos scribant Calvino, Genebrardus et alii ex Pontificiis, eo quod impietatem Valentini Gentilis confutaturus, (qui Essentiam divinam soli Patri tribuebat, quem ideo Deum primarium vocabat, et autotheov, Filium vero et Spiritum S. essentiatos a Patre,) Filium non minus ac Patrem autotheov dixit, sed respectu Essentiae tantum, quae non minus est autoousia in Filio quam in Patre, non vero Personae; quod recte dici ipse Bellar, agnovit, li. ii. de Christo c. 19."

[18] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.20: "Denique Plenitudo Deitatis in ipso habitare dicitur, id. essentia cum attributis, Col. ii. 9, et vita Dei ipsi tribuitur, Jo. v. 26. Nec si dicitur illi data a Patre, ideo minuitur ejus dignitas, quia hoc ordinem tantum notat, non inferioritatem; quippe accepit eandem numero cum Patre, non ex gratia, sed ex natura, non in tempore, sed ab aeterno."

On the one hand, Turretin, following Calvin, uses Colossians 2:9 to affirm Christ's aseity when he writes, "[T]he fulness of the Godhead is said to dwell in him."[19] On the other hand, just as Augustine does, so Turretin employs John 5:26, "The life of God is attributed to him," to prove the idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son and thus affirming the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Turretin agrees with Augustine, based on his interpretation of John 5:26, that the Father gave His essence to His eternal Son.

At first glance, Turretin seems to be caught in an apparent contradiction. Like Augustine, Turretin holds that the concurrent ideas of the Father's natural generation of the Son (*vita Dei essentialiter*) and the eternal Son's aseity mean that the eternal Son has consubstantiality with the Father. Yet, like Calvin, Turretin acknowledges that, since the life of the Son is said to have been given to Him from the Father, there exists an orderly distinction between the Father and the Son. However, given his subsequent statements individually, this orderly distinction does not fundamentally affect their essence or nature. One the one hand, Turretin's statement that "If it is said that it has been given to him from the Father, ... because this denotes the order only" clearly emphasizes the eternal Son's distinct personality through the Father's volitional generation of the Son. On the other hand, his statement that "his dignity thus is not lessened, ... since he accepted the same with the Father in number, not from grace but from nature, not in time but from eternity" underscores the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father through the Father's natural generation of the Son. Turretin ascribes logical priority to the latter— the Son's consubstantiality with the Father through the Father's natural generation—over the former, the Son's distinct personality through the Father's volitional generation. In short, Turretin clarifies Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and Calvin's emphasis on the eternal Son's aseity by linking the Son's consubstantiality with His distinct personality.

Turretin argues that the Word was God as the *Principium*, since the eternal Word was in the *Principium* (John 1:1). He asserts:

> In the New Testament, he is more clearly called God in John 1:1, the Word was God, which cannot be understood about a secondary or artificial God by reason of office, as the adversaries might wish, but about the true God by reason of nature, because he does not say εγενετο (he becomes) as [it does] in John 1:14, when it is speaks of the incarnation, which he might have noticed previously, but "he was," to designate as his eternal existence. Therefore, he ought to be God by this mode, by which he was able to be in the beginning before the creation of all things in John 1:1, as much as its author in John 1:3, and this, however, is compatible with nobody but God the highest.[20]

Turretin's Trinitarian perspective decisively refutes Socinus's depiction of the glorified Jesus as a subordinate god by contrasting "by reason of nature" with "by reason of office," thereby indicating "the Father's natural generation of the Son." Turretin's phrase "by reason of nature" implicitly refers to Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, whereby Augustine

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[19] Cf. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:101, on John 5:26; Calvin, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Colossenses*, CO 52:104, on Col. 2:9; Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.13; CO 2:100-1.

[20] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.7: "In N. T. clarius adhuc Deus vocatur. Joan. i. 1, Sermo erat Deus, quod de Deo secundario et factitio, ratione muneris intelligi nequit, ut vellent Adversarii, sed de vero Deo ratione naturae; quia non dicit τγενετο, ut v. 14, quando loquitur de incarnatione, quod prius notasset; sed ην erat, ad ejus existentiam aeternam designandam. Deinde, eo modo debet esse Deus, quo potuit esse in principio ante rerum omnium creationem, v. 1, tanquam ejus author, v. 3, hoc autem nemini nisi Deo summo competit."

claims that the Father, as the *Principium*, eternally begat the Son, who was also *Principium*. Turretin appears to assume that, since the eternal Word exists within God the Father, who is the *Principium*, He Himself must also be God the Son as the *Principium*.

On the other hand, Turretin, affirming the *Principium* of the Holy Spirit, argues, "The Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit not as two diverse principles [*principia*] (since the breathing power [*spirativa*] is the same in both), but as two self-existent (*supposita*) concur in that procession by the same power."[21] Turretin further clarifies by identifying the consubstantiality of the Trinity when he writes, "[B]reathing virtue [*spirativa*] is numerically one in the Father and the Son."[22] Turretin stresses that the Holy Spirit possesses the same quality of aseity as the Father and the Son.[23] Accordingly, the *Principium* the Spirit was from the Father the *Principium* principally and also from the Son the *Principium* principally since the spirative power indicates a numerical one in the Father and the Son. In the same line, Turretin asserts, "Since spirative power is numerically one in the Father and the Son, it is not good to say that in this respect the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (as if he was principally from the Father, but secondarily and less principally from the Son)."[24] In other words, Turretin holds that the Spirit proceeds principally from both the Father and the Son. William G. T. Shedd, quoting Turretin's interpretation of Augustine's phrase "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally," asserts that "the spiration and procession of the Holy Spirit is not by two separate acts, one of the Father, and one of the Son—as perhaps might be inferred from Augustine's remark that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally."[25] According to Shedd, Augustine's argument should be interpreted, as Turretin says, that The Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit not as two separate persons acting independently, but as the one self-existent essence sharing the same spirative power.[26] Turretin argues that the procession from both is not from two distinct beginnings (*principia*) but rather from a single beginning (*principium*), as they share the same spirative power. Thus, the two self-existent persons here signify a single origin and beginning, concurring in that procession through the same power.

Following Augustine and Calvin,[27] Turretin holds that the immanent Holy Spirit—as the immanent life of the Father—proceeds from the Father and enables the Son to possess the Father's immanent life, which is the immanent Holy Spirit. Turretin's Trinitarian perpective affirms the consubstantiality of the three persons through the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit. His argument does not correspond to the Hegelian pneumatological

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[21] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.6: "Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum S. non ut duo principia diversa, siquidem vis spirativa est eadem in utroque, sed ut duo supposita, quae eadem virtute concurrunt ad istam processionem." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxxi.6.

[22] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.8: "Cum vis spirativa sit una numero in Patre et Filio, ..." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxxi.8.

[23] Muller points out that the main point raised by Turretin and Socinus is the Holy Spirit's "eternal and internal procession" rather than the Holy Spirit's "temporal and external procession." Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, IV:372.

[24] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.8: "Cum vis spirativa sit una numero in Patre et Filio, non bene diceretur hoc respectu Spiritus procedere a Patre per Filium, quasi esset principaliter a Patre, secundario vero et minus principaliter a Filio."

[25] Shedd's footnote to Augustine, "On the Holy Trinity," I.vi.12 (p. 23 n. 49).

[26] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.6: "Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum S. non ut duo principia diversa, siquidem vis spirativa est eadem in utroque, sed ut duo supposita, quae eadem virtute concurrunt ad istam processionem."

[27] Refer to Sections 1.4.2 and 2.3.3 of this study.

Trinitarian perspective in which the Father conflicts with the Son and will be united with the Son by the Holy Spirit, but rather it corresponds to Augustine's affirmation of the consubstantiality of the three immanent persons of God by the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Father and Son's natural procession of the Spirit.

In summary, Socinus's conception of God and the third heaven imply that in God there is an intrinsic hierarchy between the Father's essence and His internal decree and qualities (or His internal wisdom and attributes),[28] thus allowing the concept of a composite god. Socinus believes that this hierarchy serves to maintain the theological tenet that a transcendental Father is the only God of gods. However, Socinus's idea of a composite god in the perpetual third heaven does not preserve God's transcendence because a composite god cannot hold infinity because such a god would be affected by other parts. Contrary to Socinus's intent, a composite god becomes accessible and comprehensible rather than transcendental, i.e., the Trinity. In contrast to Socinus's notion of a composite god, which posits a hierarchy between the Father's essence and His internal wisdom and qualities, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective upholds the aseity and simplicity of the Trinity by affirming both Calvin's concept of the eternal Wisdom's aseity and Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Turretin asserts that the Father, the eternal Son, and the Holy Spirit are consubstantial yet distinct, and that all three persons are self-existent God, each possessing incommunicable personalities that distinguish them from one another.

4.3 Turretin's Affirmation of the Relationship Between the Father's Natural and Volitional Generation of the Son and the Trinity's Eternal Decree

Socinus denies Augustine's ideas of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity; his refutation also implies his rejection of Calvin's notions of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity, as well as Christ's incommunicable personality. Socinus's denial of the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son leads to his denial of the relationship between the Trinity's eternal decrees and Christ's distinct personality. Due to this rejection, Socinus cannot explain the conundrum of how the Father's internal quality of rectitude can be intrinsically united with His temporal quality of vindictive justice. It should be examined whether Turretin provides a theological foundation to uphold the relationship between the Father, His absolute qualities of rectitude and goodness, and His relative qualities of vindictive justice and mercy, in order to resolve this conundrum using his concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Before delving into Turretin's use of the concepts of natural and volitional generation in Chapter 5, I will first demonstrate how Turretin affirms a comprehensive understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son within his Trinitarian perspective.

First, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation is evident in his twofold concept of God's immanent and intrinsic acts. In contrast to Socinus's fallacy regarding the Father's singular aseity and his misunderstanding of the Father's eternal generation as regeneration, Turretin's Trinitarian view affirms that the Father's singular essence genuinely signifies the one essence and the three distinct persons of the Trinity, grounded in the notion of the natural and volitional generation and procession. Turretin argues:

The acts of God are distinguished threefold. 1. They are the immanent and intrinsic acts,

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[28] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:566.

which have no respect for the outward; such are the personal acts, to beget, to breathe, of which there is the absolute necessity, without any power to the opposite. 3. There are the immanent and intrinsic acts in God, but connoting respect and cleaving to the things outside God; such are decrees, which are nothing else than the counsel of God concerning future things outside themselves. 2. There are other extrinsic and transient acts, which are not in God but actively from God, and subjectively in creatures, such as to create and to govern; these are temporal acts, and God is denominated externally only by them.[29]

Turretin states that God performs two immanent acts: (1) the Father's natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, in which the Trinity shares one essence; and (2) the Trinity's volitional act, with distinct wills, such as the eternal Son's self-emptying and the eternal Holy Spirit's procession secondarily.[30] With regard to God's extrinsic and transient acts (3), Turretin refers to the Son as "the *Principium*," denoting the Creator who shares the same "indifferent and free will and power" as the Father. Elsewhere, he argues:

> Christ is called προτοτοκος, not πρωτοχτιστος. The firstborn of every creature (Col. 1:15) by reason of dominion (because as all things were made by Him, so he had an authority over all; but not by reason of creation (as if he were first produced among the creatures). Otherwise it would not be said that he was even in the beginning and [that he] made all things. In this sense, he is called the beginning of the creation of God (Rev. 3:14); not passive (as if it was the first creature), but active because from Him all creatures take origin as Paul explains in the place cited.[31]

Turretin asserts that, since Christ, who is God, the *Principium*, made all things, He possesses the authority to rule over all things.

Turretin's idea of the absolute necessity of the first of these immanent acts is found in Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son. In his effort to intrinsically relate God's twofold immanent acts of generation, Turretin distinguishes between "necessary generation" and "voluntary generation" in God, as understood through our mode of conception.[32] Turretin would agree that just as the "Son begotten by nature" indicates the Immanent Logos who received the essence of the Father by the Father's natural generation of the Son, so the "Holy Spirit

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[29] Given the logical order, I revised the original text's order of 1-2-3 to 1-3-2. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.4: "Necessarium et voluntarium distinguuntur. 1. Sunt actus immanentes et intrinseci, qui nullum habent respectum ad extra; Tales sunt actus personales, gignere, spirare, quorum est absoluta necessitas, sine potentia ad oppositum. 2. Alii sunt actus extrinseci et transeuntes, qui non sunt in Deo, sed a Deo effective, et in creaturis subjective, ut creare, gubernare; Isti sunt actus temporales, et Deus extrinsecus tantum ab iis denominatur. 3. Sunt actus immanentes et intrinseci in Deo, sed connotantes respectum et σχεσιν ad extra; qualia sunt Decreta, quae nihil aliud sunt quam Consilia Dei de rebus extra se futuris."

[30] For more details on the relationship between the Trinity's eternal decree and the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, see Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.9: "Nam generatio ista non proponitur ut pars decreti istius, sed tantum ut ejus fundamentum, quo nititur Regnum universale quod illi conceditur; ..."

[31] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.37: "Christus dicitur προτοτοκος, non πρωτοχτιστος, Col. i. 15. Primogenitus omnis Creaturae ratione dominii, quia ut omnia per ipsum facta sunt, ita imperium habet in omnia; sed non ratione creationis, quasi primus inter Creaturas productus esset, alias non diceretur, jam fuisse in principio, et omnia condidisse. Hoc sensu vocatur, Principium creaturae Dei, Apoc. iii. 14, non passivum, quasi esset prima Creatura, sed activum, quia ab eo omnes creaturae originem ducunt, ut Paulus loco citato exponit." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxviii.37.

[32] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22.

proceeded by nature" indicates the Immanent Holy Spirit who received the essence of the Father and the Son by the natural procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Furthermore, Turretin would agree that just as the "Son begotten voluntarily" indicates the Logos Brought Forth who had the incommunicable personality distinct from the Father by the Father's volitional generation of the Son, so the "Holy Spirit proceeded voluntarily" indicates the third person of the Holy Spirit who had the incommunicable personality distinct from the Father and the Son by the volitional procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

Unlike Calvin who affirms the eternal Son's consubstantiality with and His distinct personality from the Father by emphasizing both the Father's personal generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity, Turretin employs not only Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son but also Calvin's emphasis on the Father's personal generation of Son to assert both the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality from the Father. Turretin argues:

> As every generation indicates a communication of essence on the part of the begetter to the begotten by which the begotten becomes like the begetter and shares the same nature with him, so this wonderful generation is rightly expressed as a communication of essence from the Father by which the Son possesses indivisibly the same essence with him and is made perfectly like him.[33]

Turretin attempts to reconcile the eternal Son's consubstantiality *with* the Father and His distinct personality *from* the Father simultaneously by substituting 'eternal communication' for 'eternal generation.' Turretin similarly implies the idea of the Father's natural and voluntary generation of the Son when he argues, "The begetter generates in himself and not out of himself. Thus, the begotten Son (although distinct) still is never divided from him. He is not only of a like (*homoiousios*), but also of the same essence (*homoousios*)."[34] Turretin's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son implies that the same essence the Son possesses is caused by the Father's natural generation of the Son, while the perfect likeness that the Son also possesses is His incommunicable personality which is based on the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Turretin could not have explained how the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father (*homoousios*) and His incommunicable personality (*homoiousios*) exist simultaneously without affirming either two types of generation (natural and volitional). Furthermore, Turretin's twofold generation (or twofold communication) is seen when he argues:

> It is properly said that person generates person, because they are actions of self-existence (*suppositorum*); but not that essence [generates] essence, because what generates and is generated is necessarily multiplied, and thus the way is laid out into tritheism. Essence is

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[33] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.4: "Ut omnis generatio dicit communicationem essentiae a parte gignentis genito, per quam genitus fiat similis gignenti, et eandem cum ipso naturam participet; Ita Generatio ista admirabilis recte exponitur per communicationem essentiae a Patre, per quam eandem cum illo essentiam Filius indivisibiliter possidet, et illi fit simillimus: ..."

[34] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.4: "sed in ista gignens in se et non extra se generat; Ita Filius genitus licet sit distinctus, nunquam tamen est ab eo divisus, non modo ὁμοιοντιος sed et ομοούσιος." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.4.

communicated by generating, but as generation is originally made from a person, so it is terminated on the person.[35]

The crucial criterion for distinguishing between the Father's natural generation of the Son (*homoousios*) from the Father's volitional generation of the Son (*homoiousios*) is not found in either the term "communication" or "generation." The distinction is found in the phrase the *end* of generation (or communication) which can be designated as either "essential unity" or "personal distinction," or defined as either "eternal and consubstantial unity" or "eteral yet modal distinction." Turretin's expression "essence is indeed communicated by generating" alludes to an *essential* generation (natural generation or natural communication) rather than a *personal* generation (volitional generation or volitional communication). The first type is natural generation, in which essence is communicated. The second type is volitional generation, in which the Father remains unbegotten while the Son is begotten. Turretin's idea of essential communication indicates that the Father's essence (aseity) is shared with the eternal Son of God by natural generation. His idea of personal generation indicates that Christ's incommunicable personality is established by the Father's volitional generation of the Son, i.e., His begotten status, His mediatorial office, or His divine authority to bestow eternal life or eternal wrath, is neither shared nor communicated with the Father. One should notice that the Nicene understanding of the Father's natural generation of the Son (*homoousios*) can embrace the Father's volitional generation of the Son (*homoiousios*) if it is not distorted. Given that Turretin defines "person" as having a twofold meaning: concrete sense (Ursinus) and abstract sense (Calvin),[36] Turretin is said to believe one generation by the person of the Father, in which the essence is communicated and remains one by nature (the Father's natural generation of the Son or the Nicene understanding of the Father's eternal generation), and in which the persons are multiplied by their free and spontaneous wills (by Calvin's emphasis on the Father's personal generation of the Son). In the same vein, Turretin argues that "the personal property of the Son does not make his essence different from that of the Father, nor of a simple essence make a composed, for nothing real is added to the essence, rather it only makes the Son distinct from the Father. Distinction is not composition."[37] Turretin continues:

> When the Son is said to be one God with the Father and yet to be a distinct person from him, there is no contradiction. Although he has the same essence (according to which he is said to be one with the Father), yet he does not have it in the same mode of subsisting. If in finite and created things a diverse essence is required for a diverse person, it [this principle] does not have its place in divine things [persons] where the same numerical and singular essence can nevertheless be communicable to more than one because [the persons are] infinite.[38]

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[35] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.6: "Persona bene dicitur generare Personam, quia actiones sunt suppositorum; sed non Essentia Essentiam, quia quod gignit et gignitur necessario multiplicatur, et sic via sterneretur ad Tritheismum. Essentia quidem generando communicatur; sed generatio, ut a Persona fit originaliter, ita ad Personam terminatur."

[36] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxiii.7.

[37] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.viii.16.

[38] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.25: "Quum Filius dicitur unus esse cum Patre Deus, et tamen esse distincta Persona ab ipso, nulla est contradictio; quia licet eandem essentiam habeat, secundum quam unus cum Patre Deus dicitur, non habet tamen eam cum eodem modo subsistendi: Nec si in finitis et creatis ad diversam personam diversa requiritur essentia, continuo hoc in Divinis locum habet, ubi Essentia eadem numero et singularis, potest tamen pluribus esse communicabilis, quia infinita."

Turretin conceives of the coexistence of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with and distinct personality from the Father not as a case of two alternatives but rather as a matter of harmonization.

Second, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation is also evident in his interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Turretin contends that the eternal Son has consubstantiality with the Father through the Father's natural generation of the Son and therefore is one of the Authors of the Trinity's eternal decrees. Thus, Turretin interprets Psalm 2:7 to mean that the Father's eternal decree is the Trinity's eternal decrees based on the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son. Turretin argues:

> It is also uselessly opposed that such a generation is a part of the decree or its effect, and thus the only arbitrary work; "I will declare," says he, "the decree, God said to me, You are my Son, Today, I have begotten you, ask from me, and I will give to you the gentiles for the inheritance [Psalm 2:7-8]; for this generation is not proposed as a part of that decree but only as its foundation on which the whole kingdom rests, which is granted to him; for if Christ had not been the true and eternal Son of God, born from Himself from eternity, he could have never been able to be designated Mediator and obtain the universal kingdom.[39]

Turretin says Psalm 2:7-8 refers to the volitional generation of the Son [*homoiousios*] rather than the natural generation of the Son [*homoousios*]. At first glance, Turretin's view of the eternal decree might refer to the Father's sole decree since he thinks the Father's personal generation of the Son is the foundation of the decree. However, Turretin's statement "unless Christ had been the real and eternal Son of God, begotten from himself from eternity [*ab ipso ab aeterno genitus*]" implies that the Father's eternal determination found in Psalm 2:7 is composed not only of the Father's but also the Son's eternal determination [*homoousios*]. Thus, the Father's personal generation of Christ must be established by the Father's natural generation of the Son, and the Trinity's eternal decree must be founded on the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Turretin would affirm based on his idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, albeit with less precise wording, that the eternal Son generated Himself to be Christ. It could be properly argued that the eternal Son, as God, emptied Himself of His essence to be the Christ. In other words, the eternal Son, who is God, spontaneously made Himself to be Christ.

In his interpretation of John 5:27, Turretin implicitly acknowledges the concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son. He states:

> When it is said that the authority was given to him to exercise the judgment [because he is the Son of Man] in John 5:27, the particle "oti" is *not* to be taken in reduplicate for "insofar as," [meaning] that Christ not only as God but also as man may be said to be a judge appointed by God, as the Apostle says in Acts 17:31, *but rather* "causally" for "because", [meaning] that the cause of this authority conferred on the Son is noted, of course, the mediator's office, which he entered through incarnation. Thus, the Son of Man here denotes not the human nature *in abstracto,* but it denotes the person *in concreto*, in relation to his

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[39] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.9: "Frustra etiam opponitur, talem esse generationem quae sit pars decreti, aut effectum ejus, atque ideo opus mere arbitrarium; Narrabo, inquit, decretum, Dominus mihi dixit, Tu es Filius meus, hodie genui te, Pete a me, et dabo tibi in haereditatem gentes; Nam generatio ista non proponitur ut pars decreti istius, sed tantum ut ejus fundamentum, quo nititur Regnum universale quod illi conceditur; Nam nisi Christus fuisset verus et aeternus Dei Filius, ab ipso ab aeterno genitus, nunquam potuisset in Mediatorem destinari, et regnum universale obtinere."

office, but it signifies nothing else than that such a power was given to him, because he is Messiah, who is called by Daniel the Son of Man in Daniel 7:14, and to whom Daniel saw the kingdom and the power given by the Ancient of Days, because he is that person which was chosen for such a great and sublime office of the mediators.[40]

Turretin links the phrases "[God] hath given him authority to execute judgment" in John 5:27 with "the empire and power given [to the Son of Man] by the Ancient of Days" from Daniel 7:13. Turretin associates the phrase *because he is the Son of Man* with the *Son of Man* in Daniel 7:14, explaining that it does not refer to a repetitive expression emphasizing the authority of a judge, which pertains to the role of the Mediator as both God and man. Rather, it denotes the *mediator's office*, which is granted to the eternal Son of God from eternity, specifically referring to the *person in concreto*. In other words, since Turretin, in his commentary on John 5:26, affirms that the Father, the eternal Son, and the Holy Spirit all possess both aseity and consubstantiality, he interprets John 5:26–27 as indicating that the authority conferred upon the eternal Son pertains to His mediatorial office from eternity. As will be addressed in Section 5.1, Turretin holds that the three persons of God ratified the eternal decrees based on the Trinity's volitional acts, such as generation and procession. Based on Turretin's arguments, the Trinity eternally designated the eternal Son as having the Mediator's office, granting Him the divine authority to bestow eternal life and execute judgment from eternity. Since Turretin affirms the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, he can interpret the Father's appointment of the Son as the foundation of the Trinity's eternal decrees rather than part of the Father's sole decree.

In his interpretation of Heb. 5:5, Turretin argues that Christ was constituted a priest not in time but in eternity by the Father. He argues:

> In Heb. 5:5, it is not taught the temporal time when Christ was appointed as the Priest, but by whom (to wit, by the Father, who acknowledged him as his Son). Therefore, it marks the divinity, not the time of his calling. If the declaration of Christ's priesthood pertains to the resurrection, it is not at once to be denied that he was already a Priest. For the thing is not to be confounded with the manifestation of the thing.[41]

In Hebrews 5:5, it is taught not the temporal time of Christ's appointment as the Priest, but rather by whom—namely, by the Father, who acknowledged Him as His Son and appointed Him as Christ in eternity. Turretin emphasizes here that Christ was constituted a priest not in time but in eternity by the Father. As described above, Turretin argues that the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son is proposed as the foundation of the the Trinity's eternal decree on which "the whole

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[40] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.viii.33: "Quum dicitur authoritas illi data judicium exercendi [οτι υιος ανθροπον] Joh. v. 27, particula [οτι], non tam reduplicative sumenda est pro quatenus., ut Christus non tantum, qua Deus, sed etiam qua homo dicatur judex a Deo constitutus, ut Apostolus loquitur, Act. xvii. 31, quam causaliter per quia, ut causa notetur collatae Filio hujus authoritatis, nimirum officium Mediatoris, quod per Incarnationem obivit. Sic Filius hominis, hic non in abstracto naturam humanam, sed personam in concreto notat, relate ad offiicium ejus, nec aliud innuitur, quam potestatem talem illi datam esse, quia est Messias, qui a Daniele vocatur Filius hominis, cap. vii, et cui Daniel vidit imperium et potestatem ab Antiquo dierum datam, utpote qui sit persona illa, quae ad tantum, tamque sublime Munus Mediatorium est delecta."

[41] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIV.viii.11: "Heb. v. 5, Non docetur quando constitutus fuerit Sacerdos Christus, sed a Quo, nimirum a Patre, qui illum agnovit pro Filio. Notatur ergo divinitas vocationis, non tempus. Nec si declaratio Sacerdotii Christi pertinet ad resurrectionem, statim negandum est eum iam ante fuisse Sacerdotem. Non confundenda enim res est cum eius manifestatione."

kingdom rests, which is granted to him; for if Christ had not been the true and eternal Son of God, born from Himself from eternity, he could have never been able to be designated Mediator and obtain the universal kingdom."[42] If the eternal Son had not been designated an eternal priest through the eternal generation of the Son, He could have never been manifested as the high priest in time. Turretin points out that this constitution of Christ in eternity is not to be confounded with 'the manifestation of the thing.' Turretin appears to argue that the eternal constitution of Christ as a priest originates from the Father's acknowledgment of Him as the Son. This constitution, he suggests, is intrinsically belonging to the Father's volitional act of generating the Son. If the Father's volitional (personal) generation of the Son signifies the relationship between the Father and the Son in terms of their distinct modes, orders, and offices of subsistence, it may also encompass the idea of the eternal appointment of the Son as Mediator and Surety within the *pactum salutis* or the Trinitarian decrees.

  Third, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation can be seen in his concept of the Trinity's eternal decree. Turretin believes that the Trinity's eternal decree is founded first on the Father's natural generation of the Son and is followed by the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Turretin contends:

> Because this promise is nothing else than the most absolute and immutable will of Christ, according to the eternal counsel of the Father, of substituting himself in the place of elect and satisfying for their sins, it necessarily implies by itself a true translation of the debts onto him and the full deliverance and immunity of them for whom he has promised; and thus, surety (*fidejussio*), as distinguished from the promise (*expromissione*), cannot have a place here simply, but the promise (*expromissio*).[43]

Turretin holds that the eternal Son, as God, voluntarily decided to substitute Himself as Christ, who is the guarantor of a covenant or promise, according to the eternal counsel of the Father. Turretin argues that the Son's self-humiliation and subjection to the Father's eternal counsel serve to constitute the Trinity's eternal counsel. Thus, Turretin believes that the decree is not an arbitrary or singular will of the Father. Rather, he acknowledges that Christ was preordained as the Mediator by the Trinity's eternal counsel in order to make satisfaction for the sins of and bestow eternal life on the elect. Thus, Turretin's Trinitarian view—that the Trinity's eternal decree and counsel, established through the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, serves as the foundation for the universal kingdom of Christ—is also reflected in his belief that the Father's eternal counsel represents the Trinity's immutable and consubstantial decrees, consisting of the three persons' distinct wills.

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[42] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.9: "Frustra etiam opponitur, talem esse generationem quae sit pars decreti, aut effectum ejus, atque ideo opus mere arbitrarium; Narrabo, inquit, decretum, Dominus mihi dixit, Tu es Filius meus, hodie genui te, Pete a me, et dabo tibi in haereditatem gentes; Nam generatio ista non proponitur ut pars decreti istius, sed tantum ut ejus fundamentum, quo nititur Regnum universale quod illi conceditur; Nam nisi Christus fuisset verus et aeternus Dei Filius, ab ipso ab aeterno genitus, nunquam potuisset in Mediatorem destinari, et regnum universale obtinere."

[43] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XII.ix.5: "Quia cum Sponsio ista nihil aliud sit, quam absolutissima et immutabilis Christi voluntas, se juxta aeternum Patris consilium substituendi in locum Electorum, et pro peccatis ipsorum satisfaciendi, necessario importat eo ipso veram translationem debitorum in ipsum , et plenam liberationem et immunitatem eorum pro quibus spopondit; Atque ita fidejussio prout ab expromissione distinguitur, non potest simplic. hic locum habere, sed expromissio."

In summary, Turretin understands the Father's eternal generation of the Son to be divided into two types: natural and volitional. His idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son implies not only the eternal Son's consubstantiality *with* the Father but also His incommunicable personality *from* the Father. Thus, the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son forms the foundation of the Trinity's eternal decree or counsel, or, in Calvin's terminology, "God's mere good pleasure." Turretin's understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son suggests that God, as the Immanent Logos, veiled His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth, in accordance with the eternal counsel of the Trinity. In other words, the Son voluntarily emptied Himself to fulfill this role as Christ. In short, the immutable and consubstantial wills of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit established the distinct roles and offices of the three persons through the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, designating the Son as Christ to take the place of the elect.

4.4 Conclusion

Socinus contends that the Father's perpetual and internal qualities were applied to the glorified Jesus in the third heaven, and the Father's perpetual and internal qualities of rectitude and equity will be applied to and fulfilled in anyone who follows and conforms to the teachings of Jesus Christ.[44] Socinus's concept of a hierarchy between a monistic God and His subordinate internal wills and qualities, which was applied to the glorified Jesus in the third heaven, ultimately amounts to the concept of a composite god dwelling perpetually in third heaven. Furthermore, Socinus believes that God's temporal qualities of vindictive justice or mercy do not originate from the Father's essence or internal (and therefore perpetual) qualities, but rather from His temporal will and qualities.[45] Therefore, Socinus's concept of a composite god in his anti-Trinitarian view cannot hold a holistic concept to maintain the relationship between the Father's essence, His absolute and perpetual qualities (rectitude), and His relative and temporal qualities (vindictive justice). According to him, the Father's internal and perpetual attributes, such as rectitude, are subordinate to His essence and separated from His free and accidental will.[46] Consequently, the difference is vast between Socinus's idea of a non-transcendental god (such as an angel) and Turretin's concept of a transcendental God. Turretin understands that Socinus's concept of a composite and non-transcendental god must be contained in the third heaven, namely, the perpetual and internal wills and qualities of the Father.[47]

In contrast to Socinus, I explained how Turretin, based on his interpretations of Scripture, affirms both the aseity of the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit and the simplicity of the three persons. First, Turretin affirms the idea of the eternal Son's aseity by quoting from Colossians 2:9 used by Calvin to supports the eternal Son's aseity. Turretin, also, interprets John 5:26 used by Augustine to affirm the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father. Turretin, furthermore, argues that the Word *was* God the *Principium* because the eternal Word *was in* the *Principium* (John 1:1) "by

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[44] According to Socinus, the human nature of those who have followed and conformed to the teachings of Jesus Christ will be resurrected only after the Last Judgment of Jesus Christ, and before that, they remain in an intermediate state in which they do not even dwell in the third heaven. Marian Hillar, "Laelius and Faustus Socini: Founders of Socinianism, Their Lives and Theology.," *The Journal from the Radical Reformation*, no. 10 (2002): 17.

[45] Socinus, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, I:566.

[46] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:196.

[47] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.ix.7; Socinus, *Francisa Davidis Defensio, et Ad Eam F. Socini Responsio*, II:709-66.

reason of nature," which refers to the Father's natural generation of the Son. Turretin insists that the Father, the eternal Son, and the Holy Spirit all have aseity and are also consubstantial. Like Calvin and Augustine, Turretin demonstrates that there is no hierarchy between the aseity of the eternal Father and Son. Turretin's affirmation of the aseity of the Son and the Spirit effectively counters Socinus's heretical conception of a composite god characterized by a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal wills and attributes. Turretin combines Augustine's view with Calvin's perspective to conclude that the concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their shared aseity virtually demonstrate that the eternal Son possesses aseity from Himself as *Principium* and consubstantiality with the Father, also as *Principium*. In these arguments, Turretin opposes Socinus's concept of a composite god, which denies that the divine name Jehovah and the attribute of aseity should be ascribed to the Son. In contrast to Socinus's concept of a composite god, Turretin argues, based on his affirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity, that the Trinity is simple and self-existent, and therefore absolutely infinite, not to be limited by anything.[48] Turretin asserts that God's essential attribute of infinity manifests through three other fundamental attributes: (1) His incomprehensible essence, (2) His eternality, and (3) His immensity.

Based on Turretin's scriptural interpretations, I have demonstrated how he affirms a comprehensive understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son within his Trinitarian perspective.

First, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation is apparent in his twofold concept of God's immanent and intrinsic acts. By synthesizing his following statements, the above conclusion can be derived. He describes the internal acts of God as being distinguished in a twofold manner: The first type of immanent and intrinsic acts refers to actions within God that do not pertain to anything external. These include the essential and necessary acts of begetting and spirating, which occur with absolute necessity and allow no possibility of the contrary. The second type of immanent and intrinsic acts encompasses those that, while originating within God, inherently involve a relation to things external to Himself. These acts include decrees, which are essentially the Trinity's counsel concerning future events external to His essence.[49] Turretin distinguishes between two types of immanent acts: the first type, referred to as necessary generation, and the second type, identified as volitional generation. He argues that necessary and voluntary, though distinguishable in God according to our limited human conception, are not truly opposed in their essence. Thus, the Father is described as having begotten the Son both necessarily and voluntarily. He begat the Son necessarily because this act arises from his divine nature—he is God by nature and thus begets by nature. At the same time, he begat the Son spontaneously because this act was not compelled or forced (not by coaction), but rather, it proceeded freely. He argues that these two aspects of generation are aptly characterized as the communication of essence from the Father, whereby the Son indivisibly shares the same essence with the Father and is rendered perfectly like Him.[50] Thus, generation, as it entails the communication of essence, ensures that the one begotten possesses 'the same nature as the begetter' and is 'like the begetter.'

Second, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation is also apparent in his interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. When interpreting Psalm 2:7, he asserts that Christ is

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[48] Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 42; Turretinus, *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae*, III.viii.8.

[49] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.4.

[50] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.4.

the true and eternal Son of God, 'born of Himself from eternity,' so that He may be designated as Mediator and obtain the universal kingdom. In short, Christ is God born of Himself from eternity, so that He can be designated as Mediator. Additionally, Turretin distinguishes between two aspects of generation in his analysis of John 1:1: "by reason of office" and "by reason of nature." He argues that "by reason of office," Christ's second personality is emphasized in light of John 5:27 and Daniel 7:14, which highlight the kingdom and power given to Christ by the Ancient of Days. Christ is the second person chosen for the great and exalted office of Mediator. In contrast, "by reason of nature" refers to Christ's true divinity, as seen in John 1:1, where the Word was God, which cannot be understood as referring to a secondary god by reason of office, but rather as referring to the true God by reason of nature. In his interpretation of Hebrews 5:5, Turretin further emphasizes that Christ was appointed as Priest not in temporal time, but in eternity by the Father, who acknowledged Him as His Son. Taken together, these examples demonstrate that Turretin provides a comprehensive explanation of the twofold aspects of eternal generation—natural and volitional—within the context of Trinitarian theology.

Third, Turretin's affirmation of natural and volitional generation is reflected in his concept of the Trinity's eternal decree. Turretin places the most absolute and immutable will of Christ on equal footing with the eternal counsel of the Father. This is evident in his assertion that Christ voluntarily substituted Himself in the place of the elect and satisfied for their sins. Accordingly, Turretin argues that the Son's self-humiliation and submission to the eternal will of the Trinity serve to actualize the Trinity's eternal counsel. All of these arguments demonstrate that Turretin believes the Trinity's eternal decree is founded primarily on the Father's natural generation of the Son and subsequently on the Father's volitional generation of the Son.

In summary, Turretin's Trinitarian view suggests that the Immanent Logos, who was God, existing in the form of the Father through the Father's natural generation of the Son, obtained His incommunicable personality (including Christ's authority and suretyship) through His own voluntary subjection (or through the Father's volitional generation of the Son). This was done to grant eternal life and forgive the sins of all the saints in both the Old and New Testament eras. Turretin believes that the Trinity's eternal decree is established through 1) the Father's natural generation of the Son and 2) the Father's appointment of the Son as Christ, which is understood as the Immanent Logos's self-emptying to become the Logos Brought Forth. Thus, the concept of the Father's eternal decree does not suggest that the Father alone ordained Jesus as the Christ, whether in eternity or time. Rather, it affirms that all three persons of the Trinity, in eternity, decreed that the Immanent Logos would be the Christ.

Chapter 5: Turretin's Utilization of Natural and Volitional Generation

5.1 Introduction
5.2 Natural and Volitional Generation: The Relationship between the Consubstantial Essence and Distinct Persons and Decrees
5.3 Natural and Volitional Generation: The Relationship between the Absolute and Relative Attributes
5.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Turretin's Utilization of Natural and Volitional Generation

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, I analyzed Turretin's writings to illustrate how he affirmed both the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. In Chapter 5, I will illustrate how Turretin's affirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son successfully refutes Servetus's modalistic errors and Socinus's Arian subordinationism. In Section 5.2, I will demonstrate that Turretin's holistic understanding of natural and volitional generation and procession not only elucidates the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence and their personal and incommunicable decrees but also refutes Socinus's concepts of a composite god and the hierarchical relationship between the Father and His internal wills. In Section 5.3, I will show that Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son explains the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence and their essential yet relative qualities of vindictive justice and mercy. This challenges Socinus's notion of a division between the Father's exclusive essence, His internal attributes, and His temporal and external attributes—specifically by affirming the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence, their absolute attributes of rectitude and equity, and their personal and relative attributes of vindictive justice and mercy.

5.2 Natural and Volitional Generation: The Relationship between the Consubstantial Essence and Distinct Persons and Decrees

To prevent the concept of God from being criticized as a composite god, no accidents should be attributed to this concept of God. Without a holistic framework to connect the relationships between God's essence and His inherent decrees and qualities in Socinus's Trinitarian perspective, his concept of God should be inherently composite. As discussed in Chapter 3, Socinus's conception of the Father can be characterized as that of a composite deity—not merely because he asserts that God possesses a free and contingent will and power to create the world, as well as a free and contingent will and power to execute His vindictive justice, but more fundamentally because he fails to maintain a holistic understanding that affirms both the identical relationship between God's essence and His natural and absolute attributes, such as rectitude and equity, and the consequent relationship between these attributes and His natural and relative attributes, such as vindictive justice and mercy.

A key question is how Turretin can explain that the eternal Son of God can possess both a natural and necessary will (*voluntas Dei necessaria sive naturalis*) and a free and spontaneous will (*voluntas Dei libera*), or both an essence with absolute qualities—such as an absolute quality of rectitude—and relative qualities—such as vindictive justice and mercy. I will demonstrate that Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son bridges the "infinite" gap identified by Socinus: the gap between the Father's exclusive essence and His natural wills (the natural generation and procession) and qualities (rectitude), as well as between His internal qualities (rectitude) and external qualities (vindictive justice). In other words, I will show that Turretin's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son provides a theological foundation to refute Socinus's notion of a subordinate relationship between the Father's exclusive essence, His internal qualities, and His external qualities.

To avoid Socinus's fallacy concerning the Father's exclusive aseity and decrees, Turretin affirms that the Father's one essence and decrees often indicate that the Trinity shares one

consubstantial essence while possessing distinct wills, grounded in natural and volitional generation and procession.[1] Turretin clearly seeks to counter Socinus's denial of God's natural and volitional act of generation. He argues, "But the question is whether he was begotten of God from eternity, and whether he may be called Son on account of the secret and ineffable generation from the Father. The Socinians blasphemously deny this; we affirm it."[2] He continues to assert that since all generation signifies a communication of essence from the begetter to the begotten (through which the begotten resembles the begetter and shares the same nature), this extraordinary generation is appropriately described as a communication of essence from the Father, whereby the Son indivisibly possesses the same essence as the Father and is rendered perfectly like him.[3] I will further demonstrate, through the examination of his three claims employing the two aspects of eternal generation, how Turretin elucidates the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence and their personal and incommunicable decrees.

First, as discussed in Sections I.4 and 4.3, Turretin seeks to elucidate an indivisible and distinguished relationship between the Trinity's absolute and essential wills and their personal and incommunicable wills through an analysis of the two aspects of God's immanent acts.[4] The first aspect of God's immanent acts, though termed "personal acts," is characterized as "an absolutely necessary act of God," signifying the natural generation and procession within the Godhead. The second aspect is the decree or counsel of the Trinity concerning the future, since, in logical sequence, it follows the natural generation and procession. Consequently, the second type of God's immanent acts, such as the counsel of the Trinity, may rightly be termed personal and volitional generation and procession as follows:

> Necessary and voluntary may in a measure be distinguished in God as to our manner of conception, yet they are not really opposed. Hence, the Father is said to have begotten the Son necessarily and voluntarily; necessarily because he begat by nature, as he is God by nature [namely, *voluntas Dei necessaria sive naturalis*], but voluntarily, because he begat not by coaction (*coacte*), but freely; not by an antecedent will, which denotes an act of willing (free outwardly), but by a concomitant, which denotes the natural faculty of willing in God; not by the liberty of indifference, but of spontaneity [namely, *voluntas Dei libera*].[5]

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[1] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxxi.2.

[2] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.2: "Sed, an sit genitus ab aeterno a Patre, et, An vocetur Filius propter arcanam et ineffabilem ex Patre generationem? Quod blaspheme negant Sociniani; Nos affirmamus."

[3] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.4: "Ut omnis generatio dicit communicationem essentiae a parte gignentis genito, per quam genitus fiat similis gignenti, et eandem cum ipso naturam participet; Ita Generatio ista admirabilis recte exponitur per communicationem essentiae a Patre, per quam eandem cum illo essentiam Filius indivisibiliter possidet, et illi fit simillimus: ..."

[4] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.4. "Actus divini trifariam distinguuntur. 1. Sunt actus immanentes et intrinseci, qui nullum habent respectum ad extra; Tales sunt actus personales, gignere, spirare, quorum est absoluta necessitas, sine potentia ad oppositum. 2. Alii sunt actus extrinseci et transeuntes, qui non sunt in Deo, sed a Deo effective, et in creaturis subjective, ut creare, gubernare; Isti sunt actus temporales, et Deus extrinsecus tantum ab iis denominatur. 3. Sunt actus immanentes et intrinseci in Deo, sed connotantes respectum et σχεσιν ad extra; qualia sunt Decreta, quae nihil aliud sunt quam Consilia Dei de rebus extra se futuris."

[5] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22: "Necessarium et voluntarium utcunque in Deo quoad nostrum concipiendi modum distinguantur, realiter tamen non opponuntur. Unde Pater necessario et voluntarie Filium genuisse dicitur; necessario quia natura genuit, ut est natura Deus, sed voluntarie, quia non coacte, sed lubenter genuit; non voluntate antecedente, quae notat actum volendi liberum ad extra, sed concomitante, quae notat naturalem volendi in Deo facultatem; non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.22.

Turretin argues that the Father is described as having begotten the Son necessarily—necessarily, because he begot the Son by nature, as he is God by nature (namely, *voluntas Dei necessaria sive naturalis*).[6] Turretin would agree that just as the "Son begotten by nature" indicates the Immanent Logos receiving the essence of the Father by the Father's natural generation of the Son, so the "Holy Spirit proceeded by nature" indicates the Immanent Holy Spirit receiving the essence of the Father and the Son by the natural procession of the Spirit.

On the one hand, Turretin connnects the natural and absolute will of essence to the free and spontaneous will of God. He argues:

> The liberty of the divine decree does not hinder it from being God himself because it is free only terminatively and on the part of the thing, but not subjectively and on the part of God. It is free in the exercised act inasmuch as it resides in the liberty of God to decree this or that thing. It is not free in the signified act because to decree anything depends upon the internal constitution of God by which he understands and wills. It is free as to the respect and relation (*schesin*) outside himself, but not as to the absolute existence within.

He asserts that the free and spontaneous will of God is considered free because it resides in the liberty of God to decree this or that, and because nothing external can compel or influence God. However, he explains that the free and spontaneous will of God is not entirely free in the sense that decreeing anything depends upon the internal constitution within Godhead, through which He understands and wills. Turretin clarifies that the free and spontaneous will, while intrinsically connected to God's essence, is distinct not only from arbitrary will but also from God's essence itself. Thus, Turretin's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son serves as the foundation for his understanding of God's mere good pleasure as the Trinity's decree (*prothesis*).

On the other hand, Turretin seeks to identify a distinguished relationship between God's natural and absolute will of generation and His free and spontaneous will of generation. Turretin defines free and spontaneous will of generation as an immanent act of God's relative essence, since it is intrinsically connected to His essence. According to Turretin, 'the natural faculty of willing in God' is neither God Himself nor the essence itself, but rather God's spontaneous will or decree. He argues, "Thus it is rightly said that no action proceeding from free will can be God absolutely and in itself, but it can rightly be called God considered relatively (*schetikos*), as a vital act determining itself spontaneously. In this sense, the decree is nothing other than God himself decreeing."[7] Also, Turretin argues, "As God is an absolutely necessary being, so the decree is intrinsically necessary from the perspective of its principle, yet this does not prevent it from being free extrinsically and terminatively. Nor does this imply any real distinction in God, as it is merely a relation (*schesis*) and respect toward the external, which modifies but does not compound."[8]

In short, God's essence is defined as an absolute necessary will, and God's decree is identified as God decreeing, which can be understood as the hypothetical necessary will of God or

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[6] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22.

[7] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.15: "Cum ergo non, quod nulla actio a libera voluntate procedens, possit esse Deus absolute et in se, sed potest tamen bene dici Deus σχετικως spectatus, per modum actus vitalis sese sponte determinantis: hoc sensu Decretum nihil aliud est quam Deus ipse decernens." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.22.

[8] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.16: "Ut Deus est Ens absolute necessarium; Ita Decretum est necessarium intrinsece a parte principii, sed non obstat quominus sit liberum extrinsece et terminative; neque hoc ullum discrimen reale infert in Deum, quia est mera σχεσις et relatio ad extra, quae modificat, non componit."

the personal and volitional will of God. He identifies an indivisible yet distinguished relationship between the consubstantiality and the eternal decrees of the Trinity as follows:

> Since therefore they [the decrees which, according to Turretin, are the counsels of God regarding future events outside Himself] cannot belong to God accidentally, it is necessary that they are said to be in God essentially, as the immanent acts of His volition with a relation and termination out of Him. Therefore, they do not really differ from the very essence of God, since the will of God, with which they are identified, is nothing else than the very essence willing, being apprehended as an inadequate concept by us. In this sense, the decrees are rightly said to be identified with the essence itself, as it is conceived after the mode of a vital act determining itself to producing this or that outside him.[9]

Turretin distinguishes free and spontaneous will from God's natural and absolute will,[10] yet defines it as God's relative essence because it is intrinsically connected to His essence.

Second, Turretin uses the idea of the natural and volitional generation and procession to prove that there is a relationship between the Trinity's mere good pleasure (the origin of the eternal decree of the Trinity) and the personalities of both Christ and the Holy Spirit, i.e., the self-humiliation of the Immanent Logos to be Christ and the predestination of the Immanent Holy Spirit to be the personal application of the Spirit.

On the one hand, Turretin affirms from Scripture that the term "God's mere good pleasure" indicates both God's eternal counsel (Ephesians 1:11) and His eternal purpose (Romans 8:28, 9:11).[11] According to Turretin, God's eternal counsels (*prothesis*) corresponds to the Trinity's eternal counsels, as it must be understood as positioned after the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit. Thus, God's eternal counsels (*prothesis*) is composed of the foreknowledge of the Immanent Logos as Christ (*prognosis*) and the predestination of the Immanent Holy Spirit as the third person of the Holy Spirit (*proorismos*).[12] Turretin argues:

> For this decree can be conceived either by reason of the principle from which it originates, or by reason of the object about which it is engaged, or by reason of the means through which it is fulfilled. By reason of the former, προθέσεώς or ευδοκίας (which denotes the counsel and good pleasure of God) is made mention of as the first cause of that work; by reason of the next, it is called πρόγνωσις or εκλογη, which is engaged in the seperation of certain persons from others for salvation; and by reason of the last, the word "προορισμόν" is used, according to which God has prepared the necessary means to obtain the end.

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[9] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.7: "Cum ergo non possint accidentaliter Deo competere, necesse est ut in Deo dicantur esse essentialiter, ut actus immanentes voluntatis ipsius cum σχεσει et terminatione ad extra, quique ideo non differunt realiter ab ipsa Essentia Dei, cum voluntas Dei, cum qua identificantur, nihil aliud sit quam ipsa Essentia volens, inadaequato conceptu a nobis apprehensa: hoc sensu Decreta recte dicuntur identificari cum ipsa Essentia, prout concipitur ad modum actus vitalis sese determinantis ad hoc vel illud extra se producendum."

[10] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.22: "Necessarium et voluntarium utcunque in Deo quoad nostrum concipiendi modum distinguantur, realiter tamen non opponuntur. Unde Pater necessario et voluntarie Filium genuisse dicitur; necessario quia natura genuit, ut est natura Deus, sed voluntarie, quia non coacte, sed lubenter genuit; non voluntate antecedente, quae notat actum volendi liberum ad extra, sed concomitante, quae notat naturalem volendi in Deo facultatem; non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis."

[11] Turretin understands the eternal counsel of God as "an act of will or election in God" or "a constant, determined, and immutable purpose of God." Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.12.

[12] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.13.

Πρόθεσις regards the end; πρόγνωσις, the object; προορισμός, the method; Πρόθεσις, the certainty of the result, πρόγνωσις and εκλογη, the singularity and distinction of persons, προορισμός, the order of means, so that election would be certain and immutable through πρόθεσιν, determined and defined through πρόγνωσιν, and ordered through προορισμόν.[13]

Turretin explains that the principle of "the counsel and good pleasure of God" is *prothesis*, its object is *prognosis*, and its means is *proorismos*.[14] Considering Turretin's following explanation, God's eternal decrees is composed of the distinct works of the three persons: the Father's glorification, the Son's redemption, and the Spirit's calling. Turretin argues:

> But regarding these three grades [πρόθεσις, πρόγνωσις, and προορισμός], if it is permitted so to speak so, of the eternal decree, [πρόθεσις, πρόγνωσις, and προορισμός] correspond three works in temporal execution, such as calling, justification, and glorification: For as we will be glorified with the Father, redeemed through the Son, and called through the Holy Spirit, so the Father proposed to glorify us with Himself from eternity; this is πρόθεσις; he [the Father] elected in the Son, this is πρόγνωσις; he [the Father] predestinated us to the grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, who seals the image of the Son in us through the holiness and suffering of the cross, this is προορισμός.[15]

Prothesis denotes the Father's eternal work directed toward glorification in time, *Prognosis* signifies the Son's eternal work directed toward redemption in time, and *Proorisis* represents the Spirit's eternal work directed toward calling in time. God's mere good pleasure should thus be considered the Trinity's mere good pleasure, as it was established by the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit, then it was specified by the volitional generation of the Son and the volitional procession of the Spirit. Thus, the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), based on the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Holy Spirit, is the principle of the Trinity's eternal decree, which was specified by the volitional generation of the Son and the volitional procession of the Holy Spirit. The Trinity's foreknowledge (*prognosis*) is also the Immanent Logos's foreknowledge (or the Immanent Logos's self-emptying to be the Logos Brought Forth from eternity) in Christ, who was personally generated by the Father. Finally, the Trinity's preordination (*proorismos*) refers to the Immanent Holy Spirit's predestination regarding the personal application of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds personally from the Father and the Son.

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[13] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.13: "Nam ut decretum istud potest concipi, vel ratione principii a quo oritur, vel ratione objecti circa quod versatur, vel ratione mediorum, per quae impletur, ratione prioris mentio fit προθέσεώς vel ευδοκίας, quae consilium et beneplacitum Dei notat, ut primam causam istius operis; ratione posterioris dicitur πρόγνωσις, vel εκλογη, quae versatur in secretione certarum personarum ab aliis ad salutem; ratione vero postremi usurpatur vox προορισμόν, secundum quem Deus praeparavit media ad finem obtinendum necessaria; πρόθεσις respicit finem, πρόγνωσις objecta, προορισμός media; πρόθεσις certitudinem eventus, πρόγνωσις et εκλογη personarum singularitatem, et distinctionem, προορισμός mediorum ordinem; ut Electio sit certa et immutabilis per πρόθεσιν, determinata et definita per πρόγνωσιν, et ordinata per προορισμόν."

[14] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.13.

[15] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.14: "Hisce vero tribus gradibus, si ita loqui licet, decreti aeterni, ex adverso tres actus in executione temporali respondent, vocatio, justificatio, et glorificatio: Ut enim glorificabimur apud Patrem, redempti per Filium, et vocati per Spiritum Sanctum; Ita Pater nos glorificare proposuit apud seipsum ab aeterno, haec est πρόθεσις; elegit in Filio, haec est πρόγνωσις; ..."

Given Turretin's prioritization of natural generation and procession over volitional generation and procession,[16] the Father's eternal counsel or mere good pleasure implicitly refers to the Trinity's eternal counsel or mere good pleasure of their external works. Just as the natural generation and procession connect God's essence to the Trinity's mere good pleasure, so the Father's personal generation of the Son links the Trinity's mere good pleasure to the Immanent Logos's election in Christ, which is identical to the Immanent Father's eternal appointment of Christ. Confirming the Immanent Trinity's mere good pleasure,[17] the Immanent Father volitionally begat the Son, just as the Immanent Logos volitionally debased Himself to be the Christ. Thus, God's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*) should be understood as the volitional wills of the three persons, grounded in the volitional generation and procession. The Immanent Trinity has three distinct personalities based on the volitional generation and procession which denotes the Father's sending, the Son sent by the Father, and the Spirit sent by the Father and the Son. The phrase "He [the Father] elected us in His Son" implies the election of the Immanent Logos (or the Immanent Trinity), since, as God, the eternal Son existed in the beginning as the *Principium* (John 1:1).[18] The Trinity's mere good pleasure, election, and predestination can be distinguished but they are connected rather than separated or contradictory.

Just as the natural procession connect God's essence to the Trinity's mere good pleasure, so the Father and the Son's personal procession of the Holy Spirit connects the Trinity's mere good pleasure with the Immanent Holy Spirit's sealings of Christ's election by means of the application of the personal Holy Spirit. Turretin continues, "He [the Father] predestinated us to grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (who seals the image of the Son in us through his holiness and the suffering on the cross). This is *proorismos*. For as the Father sends the Son, the Son with the Father sends the Holy Spirit. And vice versa, the Holy Spirit leads us to the Son, and the Son at length conducts us to the Father."[19] Given Turretin's concept of natural and volitional generation and procession, the Immanent Father, the Immanent Logos, and the Immanent Holy Spirit together predestined the elect to receive the grace of the Logos Brought Forth and the gifts of the personal Holy Spirit. As both God and distinct persons, the Son and the Holy Spirit are within both the *Principium* (John 1:1) and the bosom (namely, the counsel) of the Father (John 1:18).[20]

On the other hand, as a result of Turretin's definition of the relationship between God's natural will of generation and His spontaneous will of generation, his Trinitarian perspective effectively counters Socinus's fallacy of attributing the decree solely to the Father. Turretin argues that God's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*) is, in fact, identical with the Trinity's eternal decrees. He asserts:

Having established the Trinity of divine persons, it must now be discussed concerning their distinction both from the essence itself and from each other. It is evident that the persons are distinguished from the essence because the essence is one only, while the persons are three.

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[16] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.4.

[17] The term "the Immanent Trinity" denotes the consubstantiality of the three persons.

[18] Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.7.

[19] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.14: "praedestinavit ad gratiam et dona Spiritus Sancti, qui Filii obsignat imaginem in nobis per sanctitatem et patientiam crucis, is est προορισμός. Sicut enim Pater mittit Filium, Filius cum Patre Spiritum Sanctum; Ita vice versa Spiritus S. nos ad Filium ducit, et Filius ad Patrem deducet tandem." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.vii.14.

[20] Cf. Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxix.14.

The former is absolute, the latter are relative; the former is communicable (not in terms of multiplication, but in terms of identity); the latter are incommunicable; the former is a something broader and the latter are narrower.[21]

Turretin distinguishes the personal and incommunicable properties of the Trinity from essence, explaining that this distinction is not a real and essential distinction but rather a modal distinction. He continues to argue:

Since the personal properties, by which the persons are distinguished from the essence, are certain modes by which they are characterized; not formally and properly (as modes are said to be in created things, which, as finite, can be variously affected and admit modes that are really distinct and posterior to the modified substance, which cannot befall the infinite and most perfect essence of God); but eminently and analogically, with all imperfection being removed. Thus, the person may be said to differ from the essence not really (realiter), i.e., essentially (*essentialiter*), as thing from thing, but modally (*modaliter*)—as a mode from a thing.[22]

The distinct properties of the three persons correspond to their different modes and wills. In other words, God's essence is characterized by an absolute and necessary will, while the decrees of the Trinity are understood as distinct modes particular to the personalities of the Trinity.

Consequently, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective can hold a theological foundation to explain how the Trinity's mere good pleasure, established by volitional generation and procession within the essence of God, is manifested in time. First, God the Father, as one of the three persons, is both the author and executor of His own mere good pleasure. The Immanent Father determined to glorify the elect in Christ in eternity according to the eternal decree of the Trinity (*prothesis*). The personal Father then glorifies His people in time through His volitional condescension aligned with the Trinity's mere good pleasure. Second, God the Immanent Logos is also one of the three persons and as such is the author and executor of His own mere good pleasure; He determined to foreknow (or elect) some humans in eternity according to the eternal decree of the Trinity (*prothesis*). The Logos Brought Forth then justifies and redeems His people in time based on the Immanent Logos's subjection to the Trinity's mere good pleasure. Third, God the Immanent Holy Spirit is one of the three persons and as such is also the author and executor of His own mere good pleasure; He determined to predestine His personality and gifts to be applied to believers in eternity according to the eternal decree of the Trinity. The personal Holy Spirit applies his gifts by calling, sealing, and sanctifying His own people in time to transform believers into Christ's image according to the Immanent Spirit's voluntary submission to the Trinity's mere good pleasure. The logical sequence of God's internal acts is as follows: (1) the natural generation and procession, and (2) the Trinity's

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[21] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxvii.1: "Asserta Personarum Divinarum Trinitate; Nunc de earum distinctione, tum ab Essentia ipsa, tum inter se, agendum. Personas ab Essentia distingui patet, quia Essentia est unica, Personæ vero tres: Illa absoluta; istae relativae: Illa communicabilis, non quidem secundum multiplicationem, sed secundum identitatem; Istae incommunicabiles: Illa est quid latius; Istae vero habent se ut quid angustius."

[22] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxvii.3: "quia proprietates personales, quibus Personae distinguuntur ab Essentia, sunt modi quidam quibus characterisatur; non quidem formaliter et proprie, quomodo modi dicuntur esse in rebus creatis, quae, cum finitae sint, diversimode affici, et modos realiter distinctos et posteriores re modificata admittere possunt, quod in Dei Essentiam infinitam et perfectissimam cadere nequit; sed eminenter et analogice, sublatis omnibus imperfectionibus. Ita Persona differre dicetur ab Essentia, non realiter, id est essentialiter, ut res et res; sed modaliter, ut modus a re."

mere good pleasure, or eternal counsel and decree. This latter aspect comprises (a) the Immanent Father's glorification of the elect in His personality, (b) the Immanent Logos's foreknowledge of the elect in Christ, and (c) the Immanent Holy Spirit's predestination of the elect in His personality. The logical sequence of the Trinity's temporal operations is: 1) The Holy Spirit's calling, 2) Christ's justifying, 3) The Father's glorifying. These are the sequences revealed in Romans 8:28-30.[23] In short, Turretin distinguishes God's immanent acts into the two aspects: natural generation and procession, and the Trinity's eternal decrees. These two aspects, while distinguishable, are not contradictory but are intrinsically connected. Turretin affirms that the concept of natural generation and procession establishes that the Trinity possesses a single essence, while the concept of spontaneous generation and procession correspond to the Trinity's eternal decrees.

Third, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective embraces a holistic concept of natural and volitional generation and procession, enabling his view to counter Socinus's fallacy of a hierarchical distinction between the Father's essence, His internal decree before creation, and His external execution of vindictive justice. He does this to demonstrate the connection between the consubstantiality, distinct personalities, and external acts of the three persons—namely, to call, to justify, and to glorify. He argues:

> Observe regarding the state of the question. 1. There are two kinds of necessity: 1) One is an absolute necessity, which simply and by itself and its own nature cannot have itself otherwise; like God is good, just, and so on. The other is hypothetical necessity, which is not so from itself and simply such, but it could have itself differently, but nevertheless by positing something, it necessarily follows that it cannot have itself otherwise, as if you posit that God predestined Jacob to salvation, it is necessary for Jacob to be saved, namely, by the hypothetical decree, because otherwise he could have not been predestined and not been saved. Thus when it is asked whether God wills some things necessarily, but other things freely, I refer not only to the hypothetical necessity, for the things which God wills freely, once the decree has been posited, he cannot but will anymore, but also to the absolute necessity.[24]

Here Turretin explains that the internal act of God is divided into two cases of necessity. The first case is the absolute necessity of the natural generation and procession, and the second case is the hypothetical necessity of volitional generation and procession. Turretin contends that God's hypothetical necessity of decree has a connection to His external act of doing future things. He writes, "Hypothetical of the event or dependence through which a thing, although naturally mutable and contingent, cannot but be (on account of its dependence upon the ordination of God whose will cannot be changed nor his foreknowledge be deceived)."[25] God's hypothetical will for future

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[23] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.vii.12.

[24] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xiv.2: "Ad statum quæst. observa 1. necessarium duplex esse: Aliud absolutum quod simpliciter et per se suaque natura non potest aliter se habere, ut Deum esse bonum, justum &c. Aliud hypotheticum, quod non ita est ex se et simpliciter tale, quin possit aliter se habere, sed tamen posito aliquo necessario sequitur, nec potest aliter se habere; ut si ponas Deum praedestinasse Jacobum ad salutem, necesse est Jacobum salvari, nim. ex hypothesi decreti; quia alias potuisset non praedestinari, et non salvari. Quando ergo quaeritur, An Deus velit quaedam necessario, quaedam vero libere; non agitar tantum de necessitate hypothetica: sic enim ea quae Deus vult libere, posito decreto non potest amplius non velle; sed de necessitate absoluta."

[25] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.iv.2: "Hypothetica eventus seu dependentiae, per quam res, licet sit natura sua mutabilis et contingens, non potest non esse propter dependentiam a Dei ordinatione, cujus nec voluntas mutari, nec praescientia falli potest." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.iv.2.

contingencies must occur since it is inextricably linked to the volitional generation and procession of the three persons. If the Trinity's eternal counsel [*prothesis*] is specified, it should be done, not by any coaction but by the volitional generation and procession. The hypothetical necessity will be realized once it is ratified by the Trinity's eternal counsel (*prosthesis*), foreknowledge (*prognosis*), and predestination (*proorismos*).

The difference between God's absolute and hypothetical necessity is that the former indicates the natural generation and procession, while the latter denotes the volitional generation and procession. Due to the relationship between God's absolute and hypothetical necessity, the Trinity's divine simple essence cannot be affected or changed by the Trinity's hypothetical decrees. Simply put, the volitional generation of the Son and the volitional procession of the Spirit are the volitional condescendence of a transcendental God in order to interact with His elect.

Regarding God's accidental will to create the world, Turretin attempts to endorse God's indifferent and free will apart from His two internal wills, i.e., absolute and hypothetical wills. Turretin asserts that "others are extrinsic and transient acts that are not in God but from him effectively and in creatures subjectively (as to create, to govern)-these are temporal acts, and God is denominated extrinsic only from them."[26] He argues that, although creation arises from God's indifferent and free will rather than His inherent and essential will, the act of creation does not alter God's essence or His internal wills (whether absolute or hypothetical) in any way. God did not become more perfect through creation, as creation is an act arising from God's indifferent and free will, not an intrinsic part of His being. Creation was accomplished without any change or new decision in God.[27]

In summary, Turretin's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son accurately describes the relationship between the Trinity's one essence and the Immanent Trinity's mere good pleasure of our glorification (*prosthesis*). Unlike Socinus, who lacks a holistic idea to connect the Father's exclusive aseity to His internal decrees, Turretin believes that the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prosthesis*) is inextricably linked to God's essence because God's mere good pleasure (*prosthesis*) is placed after the natural generation and procession. However, since Socinus believes in a monistic God, he does not distinguish the Trinity's eternal decree (*prosthesis*) into the three degrees as Turretin does (*prothesis*, the Immanent Trinity's (especially, the Immanent Father's) mere good pleasure of our glorification, *prognosis,* the Immanent Trinity's (especially, the Immanent Logos's) foreknowledge in Christ, and *proorismos,* the Immanent Trinity's (especially, the Immanent Holy Spirit's) predestination of the gifts of the personal Holy Spirit). Turretin's holistic concept of natural and volitional generation and procession describes the relationship between the one essence and the distinct personalities of the three persons (*prothesis*, *prognosis*, and *proorismos*), while his idea of the hypothetical necessity of volitional generation and procession affirms the relationship between the distinct personalities of the three persons in eternity and the external redemptive acts of the three persons in time, i.e., calling, justification, and glorification. However, his concept does not affirm any intrinsic relationship between the hypothetical necessity of volitional generation and procession and God's indifferent and free will regarding creation.

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[26] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, IV.i.4: "Alii sunt actus extrinseci et transeuntes, qui non sunt in Deo, sed a Deo effective, et in creaturis subjective, ut creare, gubernare; Isti sunt actus temporales, et Deus extrinsecus tantum ab iis denominatur." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.i.4.

[27] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, V.i.12.

5.3 Natural and Volitional Generation: The Relationship between the Absolute and Relative Attributes

Socinus acknowledges that since rectitude, equity, and wisdom are internal and perpetual attributes of God,[28] He would be compelled to eliminate all sinners immediately, without allowing them the opportunity to repent, if He were to exercise rectitude in an absolute and unyielding manner.[29] Socinus prioritizes the Father's internal and perpetual qualities, such as wisdom and rectitude, over His temporal qualities, such as vindictive justice and mercy. At the same time, Socinus also asserts that the Father's internal and perpetual decrees and qualities can be suspended on earth even when an unjust and wrong deed occurs on earth against his internal and perpetual decrees and qualities.[30] In order to avoid conflict between God's perpetual quality and His temporal quality, Socinus attempts to separate God's internal quality of rectitude in the third heaven from His temporal quality of vindictive justice on earth. Socinus's concept of a separation between God's internal and perpetual quality of rectitude in heaven and His external and temporal quality of vindictive justice on earth sugg,ests that God does not simultaneously possess His internal quality of rectitude and His temporal quality of vindictive justice in the same time and place. Thus, Socinus's conception of God's internal and perpetual qualities is confined and measured within specific realms, such as the third heaven.

Socinus argues that Christ's sacrificial life serves as an example of a righteous man who is sanctified by God's internal wills and qualities. Christ's sacrificial life itself is unrelated to the immortal life since the immortal life will be granted through God's internal decree and qualities. He contends that "God had both decreed and promised that if Christ should pour out his life in accomplishing the work which God commanded him to do, both Christ himself and all who conform their lives to him will obtain eternal salvation."[31] Socinus believes that immortal life will

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[28] Socinus regards God's internal wisdom as part of the Father's internal decree and attributes, holding that all of these denote God's internal qualities. Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:212. "Summa enim illi misericordia, & beneficentia, ac liberalitas, atque dem entia cum summa turn iustitia, id est, rectitudine & aequitate, turn sapientia coniuncta ascribitur; [It assigns to him the highest mercy, kindness and graciousness connected with the highest justice—that is, uprightness and fairness—and wisdom.]" English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 271.

[29] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:188: "Et certe, quamvis revera nulla sit rectitudo sive aequitas, quae resipiscentibus veniam dari omnino postulet, et ob eam rem, ut supra dictum fuit, sola Dei voluntas condonationis delictorum quam ab ipso consequimur causa sit; Tamen, posteaquam decretum est a Deo, ut resipiscentibus venia detur, iustum est ut tanta ipsius benignitate ii, qui vere resipiscunt, non defraudentur; [It is certain that, in an absolute sense, uprightness and fairness do not actually force God to pardon the penitent. God's will alone is the cause of such pardon, which we obtain from him alone. Nevertheless, once God has decreed that he will show mercy to the penitent, it is just that those who do genuinely repent are not deprived of his great kindness]." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 76.

[30] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:196: "Is, qui omnis aequitatis et rectitudinis fons est, cuiusque omnia opera aequissima et rectissima perpetuo sunt, tam iniquum et pravum facinus (ab homine uno caeterorum hominum, quibus cum nullam praeterea coniunctionem habuit, nisi quod homo erat, iniquitatis poenas perfecte exegisse?) contra suum ipsius decretum admiserit; [God, who is the source of all fairness and uprightness, who always does what is fair and upright, could never commit such a perverse and vicious crime (that is, demanding the complete penalty for iniquities from one human being out of all other human beings) against his very own decree]." English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 135–36.

[31] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:204. "Cum enim Deus, ut ibi explicatum fuit, et decrevisset, et promisisset, si Christus animam suam, ut opus, quod ei mandaverat, peragret, profudisset, futurum, ut et ipse, et quicumque ei obtemperassent, aeternam salutem adipiscerentur, ac praeterea ipsemet eam salutem sibi obedientibus dandi potestatem consequeretur; …" English translation in Gomes, "Faustus Socinus' 'De Jesu Christo Servatore', Part III," 198.

be given to believers according to God's internal decree and qualities because God had internally decreed and promised immortality to Christ and his followers on the condition of obedience. Thus, Socinus concludes that Christ's vicarious satisfaction is neither necessary nor tenable for obtaining either His immortal life or God's internal qualities, such as rectitude and equity.

Given this theological context, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective appears to provide a theological foundation to refute Socinus's notion that God's vindictive justice and mercy are temporal qualities rather than eternal or essential attributes. To refute Socinus's separation of God's internal quality of rectitude from His temporal quality of vindictive justice, Turretin should demonstrate how his holistic idea of the natural and volitional generation and procession can explain the relationship between the Trinity's essence, the Trinity's mere good pleasure, and the Trinity's personal qualities. I will now examine how Turretin's idea of the natural and volitional generation and procession proves that the Immanent Logos can possess God's absolute quality of rectitude and His essential but personal and relative qualities of vindictive justice and benevolence at the same time. Specifically, I will examine whether Turretin's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son affirms the relationship between the Father's absolute quality of rectitude, the Immanent Logos's absolute quality of rectitude, and the Logos Brought Forth's relatively eternal quality of vindictive justice.

First, Turretin's concept of the twofold meaning of God's virtue and necessity implies his holistic idea of natural and volitional generation and procession. He argues:

> However, since that necessity which demands the punishment of sin is neither physical, as is usual in those things which are driven by brute instinct or by the blind impulse of nature, nor indeed coercion, as happens in those who suffer something by force, but rather ethical and rational, deriving its origin from virtue, justice, and holiness, and exercised with intervening free will: it must not be so stubbornly pressed as if it admitted no relaxation whatsoever. Instead, God, who is bound to act with us according to supreme justice as much as possible, can admit various measures in the administration of this virtue, provided it is done in accordance with His eternal and immutable law. Hence, He tempers the exercise of this justice with goodness and mercy in diverse ways—either by postponing punishment in consideration of time, mitigating or altering penalties, or transferring them from one person to another.[32]

If this passage is analyzed with strict logical and hierarchical precision, a distinction emerges between the "absolute virtue," from which "ethical and rational" justice derives, and the "relative virtue," which has "its origin from virtue, justice, and holiness." While "ethical, rational, and free will" indicate the spontaneous and free will of God's vindictive justice, "brute instinct" or "the blind impulse of nature" implies the natural and absolute will of God's absolute justice. Thus, virtue, along with justice and holiness, is the ontological or foundational principle that gives rise to the

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[32] Turrettini, *Opera*, (Edinberg: John D. Lowe, 1848), vol. 4, Disp. XI, XLVI: "Caeterum cum necessitas illa, quae paenas peccati exigit, nec physica sit, qualis esse solet in iis quae vel bruto instinctu, vel caeco naturae feruntur impetu, nec vero coactionis ut in iis occurrit qui per vim aliquid patiuntur, sed ethica potius et rationalis, quae a virtute, justitia puta et sanctitate, originem ducit, et libera intercedente voluntate exeritur: non ita praefracte est urgenda, quasi nullam hic penitus relaxationem admitteret, sed semper ex summo jure quantum potest, agere nobiscum Deus teneretur; cum enim idem ille Deus qui justissimus est sit etiam summe misericors, multiplicem in virtutis istius administratione modum επιεικειαν admittere potest, modo id fiat salvo aeterno et immutabili jure suo; Unde diversimode justitiae hujus exercitium bonitate et clementia temperat, vel ratione temporis differendo supplicium, vel ratione paenarum eas mitigando vel immutando, vel ratione personarum eas ab una in aliam transferendo."

ethical and rational (thus, hypothetical) necessity of punishment. This suggests that this ontological virtue is an abstract, inherent quality in God's nature, forming God's vindictive justice. In the phrase "the administration of this virtue," this virtue represents the second type of virtue, referring specifically to God's vindictive justice. The expression "as much as possible" suggests that this divine justice is applied in a measured manner and that God considers it alongside other factors, such as mercy, goodness, and the possibility of transferring punishment. This second type of vindictive virtue is essentially identical to God's eternal and immutable law, as His eternal and immutable will was established by God's vindictive justice. While eternal and immutable, this law is part of the administration of God's vindictive justice rather than an ontological necessity.

Second, Turretin's Trinitarian view necessitates a holistic understanding of natural and volitional generation and procession to counter Socinus's concept of a hierarchical distinction between the Father's internal and temporal qualities. This holistic idea may explain not only how the Father's absolute attributes of rectitude and goodness are eternally communicated with the other two immanent persons of the Trinity, but also how God's relative attributes of vindictive justice and mercy are eternally connected with the other two persons of the Trinity. Turretin is aware of Socinus's belief that God's vindictive justice (which, according to Socinus, is temporal) has no logical connection with either the Father's essence or His internal qualities.[33] However, Turretin's concept of the two aspects of eternal generation offers a theological foundation for understanding the relationship between the Immanent Father's rectitude, the Immanent Logos's rectitude, and the Logos Brought Forth's vindictive justice. Turretin argues:

> Again, divine justice can be considered either absolutely in itself, in which manner it is nothing else than the rectitude and perfection of divine nature, which was called by us universal justice and by others justice of God, which is compatible with Him in that he is God, or relatively, with respect to the egress and exercise which he has through the divine will, according to the rule of his supreme right and eternal wisdom. It can be observed twofold: either in the rule and government of creatures, ... or in judgments, and these are either rewarding or punishing, and this latter is either chastisement or vengeance, which is called either vindictive or vengeful justice, which the proposed question addresses.[34]

Turretin argues that God's absolute quality of rectitude belongs to His essence, i.e., the essence of the Father, the Immanent Logos, and the Immanent Holy Spirit, while God's vindictive justice belongs to His relative divinity.

On the one hand, given Turretin's affirmation of the Father's natural generation of the Son, he would agree that the Father's rectitude (an absolute attribute of God), which is the divine nature itself, can be communicated to the Immanent Logos and the Immanent Holy Spirit. Implying the concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, Turretin's Trinitarian view holds that the

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[33] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xix.8. Cf. Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:186-88.

[34] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xix.3: "Rursus, Justitia Divina potest considerari, vel absolute et in se, quo pacto nihil aliud est, quam Naturae Divinae rectitudo et perfectio, quae dicta est a nobis Justitia universalis, et ab aliis Justitia Dei, quae competit ipsi qua Deus est: Vel relate respectu egressus et exercitii quod habet per voluntatem divinam, secundum regulam juris sui supremi ac sapientiae aeternae. Duplex vero potest observari: Vel in regimine et gubernatione creaturarum, ... Vel in judiciis, iisque vel praemiantibus, vel vindicantibus, et hoc vel ad castigationem, vel ad ultionem, quae Justitia vindicatrix vel ultrix dicitur, de qua quaestio proposita agit; ..."

Immanent Logos, who exists within the essence of the Father, possesses God's absolute attributes, including perfection, goodness, and rectitude.

On the other hand, the phrase "the rule of His supreme right and eternal wisdom" refers to either "the divine will" or the Trinity's mere good pleasure, wherein the three distinct personalities are specified and distinguished by the volitional generation and procession. Turretin's assertion suggests that while God's rectitude is an essential and absolute quality, God's vindictive justice is a subordinately essential and personal quality derived by the Father's volitional generation of the Son.

Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son offers a theological foundation for understanding how the Immanent Logos not only shares the Immanent Father's divine attribute of absolute rectitude but also possesses the personal attributes of vindictive justice and eternal benevolence. Thus, Turretin's Trinitarian view, including the concepts of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, can effectively refute Socinus's concept of a separation between the Father's essence, His perpetual quality of rectitude, and His temporal quality of vindictive justice.

Third, Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son may serve as the theological foundation for refuting Socinus's denial of the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, which arises from God's relative and vindictive justice. He argues that it is necessary for the Mediator to satisfy God's eternal and relative justice, understood as an essential and personal attribute of His vindictive justice. Turretin thinks that since "the decree [was] being set aside and antecedently to it [the incarnation], it was necessary for the Son of God to become incarnate in order to redeem us."[35] Turretin sees this as a question of whether Christ's satisfaction of God's relative and vindictive justice is hypothetically necessary; if not, there may be another way to satisfy God's essential and personal vindictive justice to redeem sinners apart from the eternal mediatorship of the Son of God. He answers:

> The reasons are: 1. Because as God cannot deny his justice, he could not free humans unless first he be satisfied. Infinite justice could not be satisfied unless through some infinite ransom, and that infinite ransom could not be found elsewhere than in the Son of God. However, we have proved in I. III. XIX, concerning God, that the exercise of this justice was necessary, not free or arbitrary, depending on the good pleasure of God alone.[36]

Turretin's phrase, "the exercise of this justice was necessary …, depending on the good pleasure of God alone," suggests that this infinite ransom must be grounded in the mediatorial office of the Logos Brought Forth according to God's mere good pleasure—that is, the Trinity's eternal counsel. In this context, Turretin defines "His justice" as God's relative and vindictive justice, an essential and personal quality of God—not in the absolute sense of God's essence, but in the relative sense of Christ's distinct personality. Turretin concludes that the only place an infinite ransom (*lytron*) may be found is in Christ, who was generated naturally and volitionally (or personally) by the Father.

Fourth, countering Socinus's fallacy of a separation between the Father's absolute qualitive of goodness and the eternal Son's relative quality of benevolence, Turretin's idea of the natural and

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[35] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.iii.14.

[36] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.16: "Rationes sunt, 1. Quia ut Deus justitiam suam abnegare nequit, non potuit homines liberare, quin prius illi satisfactum esset. Non potuit satisfieri justitiae infinitae nisi per λύτρον aliquod infinitum, nec λύτρον illud infinitum potuit uspiam reperiri, quam in Dei Filio. Justitiae autem istius exercitium necessarium esse, non liberum seu arbitrarium, quod a solo Dei beneplacito pendeat, probavimus P. I. Loc. III., de Deo, Q. XIX."

volitional generation may affirm that God's absolute quality of goodness can be essentially communicated among the three persons of the Trinity, and that God's relative quality of benevolence can be applied to the second person of God. The following argument suggests that, as God, the Immanent Logos can possess not only an absolute quality of goodness by the Father's natural generation of the Son but also the personal qualities of vindictive justice and eternal benevolence by the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Turretin argues:

> The goodness of God is that, by which [by goodness] He is conceived not only absolutely and in itself as the supremely good and perfect one, the only goodness (αυτοαγαθον) in Mark 10:18 because it is so originally, perfectly, and immutably, but also relatively and extrinsically, as beneficent towards creatures; which is also called benevolence, because it is of the motive of good, that it may be communicative of itself.[37]

On the one hand, given Turretin's notion of the natural generation and procession, God's absolute quality of goodness can be essentially shared and communicated between the Immanent Father, the Immanent Logos, and the Immanent Holy Spirit. On the other hand, Turretin believes that God's essential and personal quality of eternal benevolence and mercy can also be eternally bestowed upon the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit on the basis of the volitional generation and procession. Equating relative goodness with eternal benevolence, Turretin argues that "there is the love of benevolence by which God willed good to the creature from eternity."[38] Also, equating relative goodness with eternal mercy, Turretin argues, "The greatness of mercy is gathered from various things, 1. By reason of the lamenting principle, namely, God, who is the happiest in Himself and in need of nothing, does not condescend to be compassioned for us, yet moved by his good pleasure [*eudokia*] alone."[39] The Trinity's relative and eternal mercy is established by God's mere good pleasure, which is grounded in volitional generation and procession. Thus, the Trinity's eternal decree for the good of creatures implies the idea of the volitional generation and procession.[40] On that basis, he can assert that just as Christ's eternal benevolence and the Spirit's eternal mercy are God's essential and personal attributes originating from His absolute rectitude and goodness, so Christ's eternal vindictive justice and the Spirit's eternal holiness are God's essential and personal attributes deriving from His absolute rectitude and goodness. Both God's relative and personal benevolence, such as Christ's eternal benevolence, come from the absolute goodness, justice, mercy and perfection of the Immanent Trinity.

In summary, I have shown that Turretin's holistic idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son enables him to explain how the eternal Son can simultaneously possess both the Father's essence and Christ's distinct personality including eternal benevolence and vindictive justice. Turretin would not have been able to explain how Christ's eternal vindictive justice arises from the essence of the Father unless his Trinitarian perspective could rely on both Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son and Calvin's idea of the Father's personal (or

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[37] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xx.2: "Bonitas Dei est, qua concipitur non modo absolute et in se, ut summe bonus et perfectus tanquam αυτοαγαθον, et solus bonus, Marc. x. 18, quia talis est originaliter, perfecte, et immutabiliter, sed etiam relate et extrinsece, ut beneficus erga Creaturas; quae benignitas etiam dicitur, quia de ratione boni est ut sit sui communicativum."

[38] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xx.5.

[39] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxi.13.

[40] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.i.4.

volitional) generation of the Son. Thus, Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son does not divide but rather connects the Trinity's divine essence with the Trinity's personal attributes. The Immanent Father's absolute qualities of rectitude, goodness, and mercy are communicated with the Immanent Logos and the Immanent Holy Spirit through the natural generation and procession, and His relative qualities of rectitude, goodness, and mercy, i.e., eternal vindictive justice and benevolence, are bestowed upon the distinct personalities of the Son and the Holy Spirit based on the volitional generation and procession. Turretin concludes that while remaining in the essence of the eternal Father and having the absolute qualities of rectitude, goodness, and mercy, the Immanent Logos also possesses His personal qualities of eternal vindictive justice and eternal benevolence. Both the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit can have the same qualities and attributes as the Father and different qualities and attributes from the Father simultaneously.

5.4 Conclusion

In Chapter 5, I have examined how Turretin defines God's eternal decree as the Trinity's eternal decrees, rather than as the internal will of the Father. Socinus affirms the notion of a composite deity and a subordinate relationship between the Father's essence and His internal decrees and attributes. Consequently, it becomes necessary for Turretin to demonstrate how his Trinitarian perspective, which is grounded in the concept of natural and volitional generation and procession, addresses and overcomes Socinus's views on a composite deity and the subordinate relationship between the Father's essence and His internal decrees and attributes. I demonstrated that the critical difference between Socinus and Turretin lies in Socinus's rejection and Turretin's reaffirmation of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Through a comparative analysis of two key arguments from Turretin and Socinus, I demonstrated that Turretin's Trinitarian view, which encompasses a holistic understanding of natural and volitional generation and procession, effectively explains the relationship between God's singular essence, His sovereign good pleasure, and the distinct yet relative personalities, wills, and attributes of the three divine persons.

First, Socinus's concept of the Father's internal decree, though acknowledged by him as established before creation, applies only to those who sincerely repent and thereby possess the Father's internal quality of rectitude. Thus, his notion of the Father's internal decree is, in effect, identical to His internal quality. Furthermore, a hierarchy exists between the divine essence and the Father's internal decree and qualities, as aseity is attributed to the Father, while rectitude is attributed to the glorified Son. Therefore, Socinus adheres to a monistic view of God and a composite deity, which leads to Arian subordinationism, as he lacks a comprehensive concept of natural and volitional generation and procession to establish the Trinity's eternal decrees.

In contrast to Socinus, who lacks a comprehensive framework to connect the Father's exclusive aseity with His Son's aseity, Turretin employs his comprehensive concept of natural and volitional generation and procession to affirm the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence, the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), the Immanent Logos's foreknowledge in Christ, and the Immanent Holy Spirit's predestination in His personal application. First, Turretin demonstrates that there is no hierarchy between the aseity of the eternal Father and the Son by affirming the eternal Son's aseity in Colossians 2:9 and the doctrine of natural generation and procession addressed in John 5:26. Then, Turretin positions natural generation and procession above God's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), foreknowledge (*prognosis*), and predestination (*proorismos*), which are established through volitional generation and procession. Turretin holds

that the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*) is inherently connected to God's essence. This connection, he argues, exists because God's mere good pleasure follows the natural generation of the Son and the natural procession of the Spirit. Additionally, Turretin's concept of the hypothetical necessity of volitional generation and procession establishes a connection between the volitional generation and procession in eternity and the Trinity's outward acts of salvation in time—namely, calling, justification, and glorification. In short, Turretin's holistic idea of the natural and volitional generation and procession describes the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantiality, the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), and the distinct operations and wills of both Christ and the Holy Spirit (*prognosis* and *proorismos*).

Second, Socinus's concept of a separation between the Father's essence, His internal rectitude, and His external vindictive justice undermines divine simplicity. According to Socinus, God's internal qualities of rectitude and wisdom, which constitute the third heaven, derive from the Father's being and are therefore subordinate to it. Furthermore, Socinus separates the Father's internal and perpetual quality of rectitude from His temporal quality of vindictive justice. In Socinus's view, just as God could will either to create or not to create the world according to His external and accidental will—since His will to create is accidental and temporal—so too could He will either to punish or not to punish, in accordance with His external and accidental vindictive justice. Thus, Socinus categorizes God's vindictive justice or mercy as part of God's temporal and accidental will and qualities.

Turretin's comprehensive concept of natural and volitional generation and procession convincingly connects God's essence not only to His absolute qualities but also to the relative and personal attributes of Christ and the Holy Spirit. First, Turretin uses the idea of the natural generation and procession to emphasize the relationship between the Trinity's essence and absolute qualities, refuting Socinus's separation of God's essence from His internal quality of rectitude. Second, Turretin employs his concept of volitional generation and procession to affirm the relationship between the Trinity's absolute attribute of rectitude and the temporal attribute of vindictive justice. In doing so, he refutes Socinus's claim that God's vindictive justice is merely a temporal attribute and, therefore, neither eternal nor essential. Turretin's concept of natural and volitional generation enables him to demonstrate that the Immanent Logos can possess both God's absolute qualities of rectitude and goodness, as well as His personal qualities of vindictive justice and eternal benevolence. In other words, Turretin, opposing Socinus's concept of a separation between the Father's exclusive aseity, His internal qualities, and His temporal qualities, argues that the Immanent Trinity remains within the essence of God, possessing God's absolute rectitude and goodness through natural generation and procession, as well as the personal attribute of vindictive justice through volitional generation and procession.

In conclusion, Turretin effectively refutes Socinus's concept of a composite god, which is based on a hierarchical relationship between the Father's being, His internal and perpetual decrees and attributes, and His external and temporal decrees and attributes. Turretin's comprehensive concept of natural and volitional generation and procession provides a theological foundation to affirm the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence, the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), the Immanent Logos's foreknowledge in Christ, and the Immanent Holy Spirit's predestination in His personal application. Also, his concept of natural and volitional generation and procession effectively maintains the connection between the essence and rectitude of the Father, the essence and rectitude of the Immanent Logos, and the essence, rectitude, and vindictive justice of the Logos Brought Forth.

Chapter 6: Calvin and Turretin's Affirmation of the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

Chapter 6: Calvin and Turretin's Affirmation of the Necessity of Christ's Vicarious Satisfaction

6.1 Introduction

As noted in Chapter 3, Socinus contends that both Gentile's misuse of the concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and some Calvinists' understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son are unfounded, whether biblically or rationally. Based on these assertions, Socinus claims that if Jesus attained divine immortality solely by the Father's good pleasure—understood by Socinus not as Calvin's concept of the Trinity's eternal decree but as his idea of the Father's internal wills and qualities—then Christ's vicarious satisfaction, which Socinus mistakenly interprets as the cause of Jesus's immortality,[1] becomes unnecessary.[2] Consequently, Socinus contends that some Calvinists' notion of the relationship between God's good pleasure and Christ's vicarious satisfaction is contradictory.[3]

Socinus argues against the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction by raising two critical questions.[4] First, if Christ already possessed either a divine nature or divine authority, why was it necessary for Him, as God, to fulfill all the requirements of the law in order to obtain eternal merit or to satisfy eternal punishment on behalf of humanity? Second, if Jesus is merely a human being required to obey all of God's commandments, how can He attain eternal merit or satisfy eternal punishment for the eternal salvation of others without the aid of God's internal wills and attributes, which render Christ's temporal works perpetual?[5] Socinus's inquiries can be rearticulated in the following theological terms: Why must the Immanent Logos condescend to become the Logos Brought Forth in order to attain divine personality? Furthermore, why must the Logos Brought Forth in eternity become the Incarnate Logos? Without employing Augustine's and Calvin's concepts of eternal generation, Socinus concludes that, just as Jesus, the human who endured temporal suffering and death, obtained divine immortality through God's internal and perpetual wills and attributes, so too will the elect receive divine immortality through God's internal and perpetual wills and attributes, provided they repent and conform the teachings of Jesus.

Given Socinus's rejection of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, it is essential to examine the following two presuppositions, which could provide a theological foundation for affirming the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. 1) The Immanent Logos was required to empty or veil His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth on behalf of the elect. In other words, the

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[1] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:205.

[2] David Willis summarizes Socinus's argument, saying: "If the justification of men depends on the sheer mercy of God, how is it necessary that Christ's merit should at the same time intervene? How can one say both that God freely forgives and that Christ merits our forgiveness?" David E. Willis, "Influence of Laelius Socinus on Calvin's Doctrines of the Merits of Christ and the Assurance of Faith," in *Italian Reformation Studies in Honor of Laelius Socinus*, ed. John A. Tedeschi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1965), 234.

[3] Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:204: "Ad alteram illam sententiam deflexerunt; et ideo satisfecisse Christum crediderunt, quia Deus ita decreverit, et ipsius obedientiam pro satisfactione acceptaverit: non autem quia ilia per se vim satisfaciendi habuerit." [Consequently, they have turned aside to the other opinion. Accordingly, they would believe that because God decreed so and accepted his [Christ's] obedience as satisfaction, but not because it [Christ's obedience] had the power of satisfaction by itself.] For more details on this topic, see Willis, "Influence of Laelius Socinus on Calvin's Doctrines of the Merits of Christ and the Assurance of Faith," 234; Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," 197–99.

[4] For more details on this topic, see Faustus Socinus, *De Christo Servatore, Contra Covetum*, II:221-313; Gomes, "De Jesu Christo Servatore: Faustus Socinus on the Satisfaction of Christ," 209–31; idem, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," 189–205.

[5] Faustus Socinus, *De Deo, Christo & Spiritu Sancto*, I:812.

Immanent Logos had to be the Logos Brought Forth according to the Trinity's eternal counsel to secure eternal life not for Himself but for the elect. 2) Had Adam been confirmed as righteous by successfully triumphing over the test in the primitive period, the Logos Brought Forth, established by the Trinity's eternal counsel, would not have required incarnation. The first type of descent refers to the hypothetically necessary descent of God, whereby the Immanent Logos becomes the Logos Brought Forth for the elect, who are finite beings. Since God is under no obligation to establish a relationship with any creature, including angels and humans, this first descent can rightly be described as the hypothetical necessity of God's condescension.[6] The second type of descent means that, as an eternal being, the Logos Brought Forth consequently and necessarily humiliated Himself to become the incarnate Logos for those who became sinners on account of Adam's guilt in his first transgression. Since Christ would not have needed to become the incarnate Logos to satisfy God's relative and personal attribute of vindictive justice had Adam not broken the covenant with God, it is appropriate to describe the second descent as the consequent (or conditional) necessity of the humiliation of the Logos Brought Forth.

I will now examine whether Calvin and Turretin successfully demonstrate the relationship between the hypothetical necessity of the Immanent Logos, who spontaneously emptied Himself of His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth for His election, and the consequent (or conditional) necessity of the Logos Brought Forth's vicarious satisfaction on behalf of the sinful elect. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, I will demonstrate that both Calvin and Turretin articulate the relationship between hypothetical and consequential necessity by affirming the twofold humiliation of the eternal Son of God. In Section 6.4, I will demonstrate that Calvin's and Turretin's definition of the twofold aspect of heaven is identical with their concepts of the Immanent Logos's twofold humiliation. In comparing Turretin's definition of the three distinct types of heaven with Calvin's, I will evaluate whether Calvin's Trinitarian view aligns more closely with Turretin's Trinitarian perspective than with Socinus's.

6.2 Calvin's Affirmation of the Immanent Logos's Twofold Humiliation

In his historical context, although Calvin actively opposed the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Gentiles during his time—and, to a lesser extent, engaged with Laelius Socinus—no direct debate occurred between Calvin and Faustus Socinus, particularly regarding the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Nevertheless, through his debates with the principal adversaries in the following two cases, Calvin indirectly demonstrates that two types of humiliation are necessary for the fulfillment of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

On the one hand, the first type of the eternal Son's humiliation, whereby He maintained His distinct personality, can be observed through His debates with Servetus and the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto*. Calvin seeks to avoid the fallacies arising not only from Servetus's notions of modalism and emanationism but also from the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto*. Especially, he

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[6] The natural and necessary act of God is that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit share consubstantiality as a result of natural generation and procession. The hypothetical and spontaneous (or free) act of God is that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit possess their distinct persons as a result of volitional generation and procession. Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, IV.i.4. For more details on the term "*hypothetical* necessity of Christ's vicarious satisafaction," see Turrettini, *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae*, XIV.x.17-29; idem, *The Atonement of Christ* (New York: The Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, 1859), 13–195; Carl R. Trueman, "The Necessity of the Atonement," in *Drawn into Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates within Seventeenth-Century British Puritanism*, ed. Michael A. G Haykin and Mark Jones (Oakville: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 204–22; Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 369–71.

emphasizes the eternal Son's aseity to counter Servetus's modalism and emanationism (*Institutes* 1.13.7-22). Calvin counters Servetus's notions of modalism and emanationism. The former claims that "[the] person is nothing else than a visible manifestation of the glory of God,"[7] while the latter posits an emanation from God's essence to the world through the twofold Logos. To refute these related fallacies, Calvin's Trinitarian perspective must theologically demonstrate that the Immanent Logos veiled Himself to become the Logos Brought Forth in eternity, acting on behalf of humanity rather than for Himself. Calvin asserts that the Logos Brought Forth must become the Incarnate Logos for the sake of the sinful elect, in accordance with the Trinity's eternal decrees, but only contingent upon Adam's fall. Calvin disputes Servetus's view by demonstrating that the eternal Word of God possesses both His aseity and incommunicable personality, grounded in the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity.[8] It has already been discussed, in Chapter 3, that Calvin, in refuting Servetus's notions of modalism and emanationism, established both Christ's aseity and distinct personality.

On the other hand, the reason why it is crucial that the eternal Son retains aseity despite undergoing the first type of humiliation is that He remains the author of the eternal decrees. Both the aseity and distinct personality of the eternal Son affirm that He voluntarily humbled Himself from God to Christ. His humiliation and aseity, in turn, underscore the necessity of Christ's mediatorship, which entails His vicarious satisfaction as essential for the salvation of the elect, rather than attributing this necessity to the internal wills and attributes of the Father. This argument is primarily embedded in Calvin's polemics against Gentile's subordinationism. Calvin emphasizes the eternal Son's aseity to counter radical heresies, such as Gentile's subordinationism (*Institutes* 1.13.23-29). To refute Gentile's subordinationism, Calvin asserts the eternal Son's aseity by demonstrating that the eternal Word of God is not only distinguished from the Father, the *Principium*, but is, in fact, the *Principium*.[9] This section will analyze whether Calvin's Trinitarian perspective upholds the twofold humiliation of the eternal Son of God, with particular emphasis on the first aspect of this humiliation.

First, Calvin's subsequent arguments indicate that he affirms the eternal Logos can be identified not only as (1) the *Principium*, properly referred to as the first aspect of Heaven or the Immanent Logos, but also as (2) the second person of the Trinity, designated as the second aspect of Heaven or the Logos Brought Forth. The Logos Brought Forth is neither an external form in time, an appearance in time, nor a temporal expression of God's eternal reasoning; rather, it serves as the foundation of the Trinity's eternal counsel. Calvin argues:

> They [the Manichees and the Marcionites who deny Christ's incarnation] also push this as absurd to us: if the Word of God put on flesh, it is mere impudence that he was imprisoned in a narrow prison of the earthly flesh. For even though the immense essence of the Word coalesced with human nature in one personality, we do not imagine any confinement. Marvelously the Son of God descended from heaven while nevertheless not relinquishing the heaven; marvelously, he willed to be born in the womb of the virgin, to exist on the earth, and to hang on the cross, that he might always fill the world, just as from the beginning.[10]

[7] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:108-9.

[8] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.22; CO 2:108-9.

[9] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, I.xiii.23-29; CO 2:109-16.

[10] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xiii.4; CO 2:352: "Quod etiam pro absurdo nobis obtrudunt, si

According to Calvin, Christ willed *in eternity* to be born in the womb of the virgin, to exist on the earth, and to hang on the cross, that he might always fill the world. It can be inferred that what the Immense Essence of the Word willed in eternity signifies His distinct personality rather than His essence. Thus, Calvin's statement, "Marvelously the Son of God descended from heaven," signifies the Father's personal generation of the Son in eternity, while his assertion, "while nevertheless not relinquishing heaven," implicitly affirms that the Son shares the same essence as the Father through the Father's natural generation of the Son. In Calvin's interpretation of John 6:33, he posits that the heaven from which the Logos Brought Forth (the divine bread) came can be understood as a reference to God Himself, equating heaven with the essence of God and the Immanent Logos. He argues:

> He now calls it the bread of *God*, which He previously called the bread of *heaven*: not because it comes from anywhere else than from God, who sustains us with bread in this present life, but because that bread is truly considered divine, as it gives life to souls for blessed immortality. Furthermore, this passage teaches that the whole world is dead to God unless Christ quickens it to life, for life is found nowhere except in Him.[11]

The bread coming from God (or Heaven) signifies 'divine' life, representing eternal life and blessed immortality for the soul. Therefore, Calvin asserts that the eternal Son already had His essential being from Himself and therefore He did not need to descend from heaven, i.e., from His essence, to obtain something new, including Christ's mediatorial authority or eternal life. Calvin concludes that the eternal Son, who already possessed God's essence, did not need to descend from heaven for Himself, but for the sake of others.[12]

Considering both quoted paragraphs above, the eternal descent of the Son of God from heaven is intrinsically linked to His divine will, including His will to be conceived in the virgin's womb, to live on earth, and ultimately to be crucified. The theological fact that He did not relinquish heaven underscores that the immense essence of the Word, which was united with human nature and was humiliated into His distinct personality, remains unchangeable even in both His distinct personality and human nature. Therefore, Calvin in no way, whether implicitly or explicitly, refutes Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son—a notion that affirms the relationship between the Immanent Logos and the Logos Brought Forth. Rather, Calvin may implicitly align with Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son when he asserts that the Word of God has eternally been identical to the Father.

In his commentary on John 3:13, Calvin also alludes to the distinction between the heaven from which Christ came and the heaven in which Christ now resides. On the one hand, regarding

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sermo Dei carnem induit, fuisse igitur angusto terreni corporis ergastulo inclusum, mera est procacitas, quia, etsi in unam personam coaluit immensa verbi essentia cum natura hominis, nullam tamen inclusionem fingimus. Mirabiliter enim e caelo descendit filius Dei, ut caelum tamen non relinqueret; mirabiliter in utero virginis gestari, in terris versari, et in cruce pendere voluit, ut semper mundum impleret, sicut ab initio."

[11] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:143, on John 6:33: "Panem Dei nunc vocat quem prius dixit panem caeli: non quod aliunde sit quam a Deo, qui nos in praesenti vita panis sustentat, sed quia ille demum censetur divinus, qui ad beatam immortalitatem animas vivificat. Caeterum hic locus docet, totum mundum Deo esse mortuum nisi quatenus eum Christus vivificat, quia nusquam nisi in ipso reperietur vita."

[12] For more details on this topic, see Gomes, "Faustus Socinus and John Calvin on the Merits of Christ," 189–205.

heaven as the pure knowledge of God, he states, "For the ascent into heaven signifies pure knowledge of the mysteries of God and the light of spiritual understanding."[13] He argues:

> Yet it seems absurd that he calls Him to be in heaven while at the same time dwelling on earth. If you were to reply that this is true with respect to His divinity, the manner of speaking suggests something different, namely that the man Himself was in heaven. It could be said that no mention is being made of any place but rather that Christ is only distinguished from others by His condition, since He is the heir of the kingdom of God, from which the entire human race is exiled. However, since in Christ, due to the unity of His person, it is both frequent and customary for what is proper to one nature to be transferred to the other, no alternative explanation is necessary.[14]

Calvin agrees that "Christ who is in heaven" may refer to Him with respect to His divinity; however, he clarifies that it is more precisely related to Christ's distinct personality, as he asserts that "He is the heir of the kingdom of God." On the other hand, Calvin bypasses defining "the heaven from which the Logos Brought Forth came down" as God, instead emphasizing that only the Son of Man can offer the elect eternal life, as only He possesses the distinct personality to penetrate heaven— namely, His divine knowledge of God. As demonstrated in Calvin's interpretation of John 6:33, he suggests that the eternal Son, who came down from heaven, embodies Christ's incommunicable personality and divine knowledge,[15] granted through the Father's personal generation of the Son for the sake of the elect. Thus, in Calvin's commentary on John 3:13, one may infer that the first reference to "heaven," from which Christ descended, signifies the essential being of the Immanent Logos, whereas the second reference to "heaven," where Christ is, represents the eternal life or divine knowledge of the Logos Brought Forth.

Second, based on Calvin's refutation of Osiander through the following arguments, it appears that Calvin acknowledges the twofold humiliation of the eternal Son of God. He argues that the Logos Brought Forth, to whom the Immanent Logos humbled Himself to become in eternity, must further become the Incarnate Logos in time on behalf of the sinful elect, rather than on behalf of innocent humanity.

On the one hand, Osiander maintains that even if Adam had not sinned, Christ would still have needed to be incarnated, as he rejects the connection between Adam's transgression, the guilt of all humankind, and God's eternal wrath imposed on all men.[16] Osiander argues, "If the

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[13] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:62, on John 3:13.

[14] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:62, on John 3:13: "Videtur tamen hoc esse absurdum, quod se dicit esse in caelo, quo tempore in terra habitat. Si respondeas, verum esse illud respectu divinitatis, loquendi modus aliud sonat, quod scilicet homo ipse in caelo fuerit. Dici posset non fieri loci mentionem, sed conditione tantum discerni Christum a reliquis, quia haeres sit regni Dei, a quo totum genus humanum exsulat: sed, quum in Christo propter unitatem personae satis frequens ac tritum sit, quod unius naturae proprium est ad alteram transferri, non alia solutio quaerenda est."

[15] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:62, on John 3:13.

[16] Osiander assumes that the death of Jesus, apart from Christ's divine essence, is merely the work of his limited humanity and therefore has limited value. He cannot explain how the death of Jesus, wrought in his human nature, can effectively secure the forgiveness of sins and the removal of the eternal punishment of the elect. Thus, he argues that Jesus's sacrifice must be elevated by Christ's divine essence in order to remove eternal guilt and avert the eternal wrath of God. Osiander believes that Christ's divine essence must indwell believers in order to advance their sanctification and righteousness. He disagrees with Calvin's position that the mediator's righteousness—derived solely from Christ's unique person and office—is sufficient to fulfill all the demands of God's righteous law, appease his vindicatory justice, grant eternal life, and remove the eternal punishment of the elect. Osiander's arguments suggest that

question be asked what is righteousness, one must answer: Christ dwelling in us by faith is our righteousness according to His divinity; and the forgiveness of sins, which is not Christ Himself, but merited by Christ, is a preparation and cause that God offers us His righteousness which He is Himself."[17] Here, Osiander divides the process of salvation into two steps: 1) the forgiveness merited by Christ's human nature, and 2) our righteousness or Christ's divine essence indwelling us by our participation or faith. Osiander views the completeness of our salvation as based on both Christ's human nature's merit and His divine essence.[18] Osiander does not suggest that Christ's eternal mediatorship between God and man is required to complete our redemption. Instead, he argues that the forgiveness of the sins of the sinful humanity is merited by Christ's humanity as a prerequisite for completing our redemption and that the righteousness of human beings will be achieved by Christ's divine righteousness, a natural and absolute attribute of God. Osiander argues that participation in Christ's essential righteousness is necessary for the forgiven elect to achieve complete sanctification and to be led into the essential righteousness and life of God the Father.

On the other hand, Calvin maintains that Christ's distinct personality would not require incarnation for the innocent Adam and his posterity; however, it becomes necessary for the sinful elect. As noted above, Calvin asserts that even if the first man had not transgressed the covenant concerning the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the Immanent Logos would still have veiled His essence to become Christ, in accordance with the Trinity's eternal decree, to fulfill the divine intention of establishing a relationship between Christ and His creatures. This relationship would enable angels and humanity to partake in His eternal kingship. Thus, Calvin may conclude that Christ, possessing God's aseity, descended from His essence to assume His mediatorial authority, power, and office on behalf of others. Elsewhere, Calvin argues:

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the eternal Son's immanent (or essential) righteousness undermines the necessity of Christ's incommunicable person and incarnation. He rejects the idea that the immanent Logos had to veil his essence in order to be the Logos Brought Forth, established by the Trinity's eternal decree. Osiander misunderstands Luther's interpretation of John 3:13 when he contends that the eternal Son's *exinanitio* in John 3:13 or 16:10 cannot refer to the eternal Son as the Christ. I will not engage here in the debate over Luther's interpretation of John 3:13. However, I note that Luther's reading allows for another possibility: the first aspect of the twofold righteousness (God's inner righteousness) may indicate either Christ's eternal essence or his incommunicable person (as mediator), while the second aspect (an effused and revealed righteousness) may refer to the Christ revealed in the gospel. Thus, according to Luther, the term "essential righteousness of Christ" may refer not only to Christ's divine essence but also to his incommunicable person. Andreas Osiander, *Gesamtausgabe* (Gutersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1988), X:407.13-18; Martin Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883), XXI:548.7–16; Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 262 n. 90.

[17] Cf. Friedrich Bente and William Herman Theodore Dau, *Concordia Triglotta: Die Symbolischen Bücher Der Evangèlisch-Lutherischen Kirche, Deutsch-Lateinisch-Englisch* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1921), 156.

[18] Timothy J. Wengert's research substantially contributed in discovering Osiander's interpretation of Christ's ascension to heaven or Father in John 3:13 and 16:10. Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 261 n. 89, 262 n. 90. For more primary sources, see Osiander, *Gesamtausgabe*, X:407.13-18; Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke*, XXI:548.7–16. Osiander denies that the Mediator, the Son of God, must descend from heaven and then ascend back to it. He does not believe that Christ's divine authority, called "the heaven" in John 3:13, is essential for the salvation of the elect. He states, "The return of Christ to the Father . . . is not our righteousness. … [But] the divine nature in Christ—in the power of which he defeated and opposed sin, death, and hell, and which has gone to the Father—is our righteousness, and it is in us and will also lead us into heaven to the Father." Osiander's phrase "the divine nature in Christ" refers to God's essential quality—namely, God's essential nature in Christ's human nature. However, his notion of Christ's essential righteousness cannot explain why and how God's vindicatory righteousness must be propitiated by the sacrifice of the incarnate Logos Brought Forth. In emphasizing God's essential nature in Christ's human nature, Osiander neglects the requirement of Christ's incommunicable personality, incarnation, and vicarious satisfaction. Osiander concludes, "That Christ descends and ascends does not help us in the least." Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 261 n. 89, 262 n. 90; Osiander, *Gesamtausgabe*, X:407.13-18; Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke*, XXI:548.7–16.

Indeed, both in one and brief passage (Colossians 1:16-18), the apostle proposes that each must be considered: that through the Son all things were created, that he may rule over angels, and that he was made human in order that he might commence to be the redeemer. It is ignorance of this same thing that says that humans would not have had Christ the King unless he had been human, as if truly the Kingdom of God could not have been established by the eternal Son of God, although not clothed with human flesh, having possessed supremacy himself over angels and human beings gathered into the fellowship of his heavenly glory and life. But in this false principle he wanders always, or he makes for himself deceptions that the church would have been headless (ακεφαλον) unless Christ had appeared in flesh. Just as angels delighted in him as the head, could he not, by his divine power, rule over men also, and by the secret power of his Spirit, quicken and support them as his body, until, gathered into heaven, they enjoyed the same life with angels? Which nonsenses I refuted so far, Osiander considers them to be the most stable oracles.[19]

Calvin here assumes that the Immanent Logos, already possessing Immanent Life for Himself, must undergo humiliation to become the Logos Brought Forth in order to bestow eternal life upon human beings.[20] The phrase "His [Christ's] heavenly life and glory" refers to Christ's divine authority, through which the angels acknowledged Him as their head. Calvin affirms that the "place" where angels and glorified saints will be gathered through Christ's eternal mediatorship and authority is the third heaven. Thus, those who are quickened by the divine work of the Holy Spirit can even now partake in Christ's heavenly life and glory until they will be gathered into the third heaven to enjoy the same glory as the angels. In other words, those quickened by the Holy Spirit, having received divine knowledge through Christ's eternal mediatorship and authority, will be gathered into the third heaven rather than into Christ's eternal essence. Given his distinction between Christ's divine essence, His heavenly authority, and the third heaven, the Immanent Logos, who already possesses self-existent life within Himself, must undergo humiliation to become the Logos Brought Forth, thereby making possible the bestowal of eternal life upon humanity.

Calvin also assumes that the Logos Brought Forth would not have needed to descend to become the Incarnate Logos unless Adam had sinned, as the eternal Son already possesses divine authority to rule over all His creatures. Calvin argues, "What was the necessity for the only Son of God to descend in order to acquire something new for Himself? And by exposing his counsel, God banishes all doubtfulness. It is not said that the Father acted for the benefit of the Son in his merit, but that he delivered him into death and did not spare him (Romans 8:32) because he loved the world."[21] Calvin believes that the fallen state of humanity resulting from Adam's sin caused Christ

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[19] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xii.7; CO 2:346: "Utrumque enim uno et brevi contextu considerandum proponit apostolus (ibid. I, 16. 18), per filium creata fuisse omnia, ut angelis dominetur; et hominem esse factum ut redemptor esse inciperet. Eiusdem inscitiae est quod homines dicit carituros fuisse Christo rege, nisi homo fuisset. Quasi vero non potuerit constare regnum Dei, si aeternus Dei filius, licet non indutus humana carne, angelis et hominibus in societatem caelestis gloriae suae et vitae collectis, primatum ipse tenuisset. Sed in hoc falso principio semper hallucinatur, vel sibi praestigias facit, ecclesiam fuisse ακεφαλον futuram nisi apparuisset in carne Christus. Quasi vero, sicuti eo capite fruebantur angeli, non etiam divina sua virtute praeesse hominibus potuerit, et arcana virtute spiritus sui vegetare ipsos et fovere, instar corporis sui, donec in caelum collecti eadem cum angelis vita fruerentur. Quas hactenus refutavi naenias, pro firmissimis oraculis ducit Osiander; ..."

[20] Cf. Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xvii.6; CO 2:390-92.

[21] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xvii.6; CO 2:390: "Quid enim opus fuit descendere unicum Dei filium ut sibi acquireret quidquam novi? Et consilium suum exponens Deus omnem dubitationem eximit. Non enim filii utilitati consuluisse dicitur (Rom. 8, 32) pater in eius meritis, sed eum tradidisse in mortem, neque ei pepercisse, quia mundum diligeret."

to become the incarnate Logos who helped Jesus's human nature propitiate God's vindictive justice, based on the Trinity's eternal decree. Thus, Calvin concludes that since Adam, the first man, broke the covenant concerning the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the incarnate Logos and His vicarious satisfaction must be made essential to complete His mediatorial office. Calvin finds that any human effort or merit, apart from the mediatorship of the incarnate Christ, is insufficient to complete the salvation of the sinful elect. In other words, Christ, who already possesses mediatorial and heavenly glory by virtue of the Trinity's eternal decree, would not have descended into the incarnation if Adam, the first man, had not sinned. According to the Trinity's eternal decree, the Logos Brought Forth would have remained invisible and could have united with others through an alternative means had Adam not violated the covenant concerning the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.[22]

In summary, Osiander argues that for humanity to attain righteousness, the Immanent Logos must directly relate to human beings, thereby negating the necessity of the first aspect of the Immanent Logos' humiliation in becoming the Logos Brought Forth. Furthermore, Osiander contends that even if Adam had not sinned, the Immanent Logos would still have needed to become human, as the merit derived from the human acts of Christ is essential for the forgiveness of sins. In contrast, Calvin believes that God, the Immanent Logos, must veil His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth according to the Trinity's eternal decree on behalf of the elect in eternity, then Christ's mediatorship, in which His human nature is united with His incommunicable personality, must endure and satisfy God's vindictive justice on behalf of the sinful elect in time. Calvin maintains that if Adam had not sinned, the Logos Brought Forth would not have needed to become the Incarnate Logos.

6.3 Turretin's Affirmation of the Immanent Logos's Twofold Humiliation

Turretin, in his historical context, demonstrates that he not only had to avoid the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto* but also Socinus's denial of *in concreto*—that is, Socinus's denial of the necessity of Christ's incommunicable personality for the elect and His vicarious satisfaction for sinners. To avoid these related fallacies, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective must affirm that the Immanent Logos veiled His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth for humanity according to the Trinity's eternal counsel, and that the Logos Brought Forth in eternity must become the incarnate Logos on behalf of the sinful elect. Thus, Turretin had to refute the main fallacy, i.e., the non-necessity of Christ's incommunicable personality and vicarious satisfaction.

First, given the Immanent Logos's humiliation, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective appears to show that the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction is established by the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, and thus by the Trinity's eternal decree. Turretin argues:

> If Christ satisfied, he did not immediately satisfy for himself precisely speaking as Christ, but as God and the Son of God: Thus it is not that the same gives and the same accepts the

[22] I do not intend to argue that Calvin strictly distinguishes between active and passive obedience. However, I argue that Calvin affirms a holistic concept of righteousness that rests on the eternal Son's active passion and passive action—namely, that Christ's active passion is grounded in his passive action according to the Trinity's eternal decree. See the following article to examine whether Calvin affirms this holistic concept of righteousness and whether he holds to the embryonic concept of the covenant of works. Sungkyu Joo, "Justification in the Heidelberg Catechism: The Latency of the Active Obedience of Christ," *Journal of Reformed Theology* 15, no. 1–2 (May 28, 2021): 86–109.

solution: he gives it as God and man, he accepts it as the Logos, he gives it as the Mediator, and he accepts it as the judge. It is not absurd that he satisfies the same thing to the same Himself when it does not concern the private satisfaction, by which the private penalty is compensated, … but of the public satisfaction, by which the public injury is repaired, ...[23]

Turretin's term "God and the Son of God" refers to the Immanent Logos, who was naturally generated by the Father within God's essence; the role of the Immanent Logos is that of judge. The term "the Mediator" indicates the Logos Brought Forth, who was volitionally and personally generated by the Father; the role of the Logos Brought Forth is as a mediator between God and humanity, appointed for our salvation in due time. Thus, the concept of the eternal Son of God as both judge and executor is supported by Turretin's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. As the God-man and Mediator, Christ satisfies the eternal wrath of the Logos Brought Forth, while as God and Judge, He receives satisfaction in accordance with both His absolute justice (rectitude) and His relative justice (vindictive justice). The value of Christ's vicarious satisfaction must be understood not only on the essential level of the Immanent Logos, but also on the mediatorial level of the Logos Brought Forth, who is the mediator in eternity.

Second, considering the Logos Brought Forth's humiliation, Turretin's idea of the relationship between Christ's mediatorship and His threefold office proves that Christ's unique personality must be united with a human nature. Turretin contends that "the work of redemption could not have been performed except by a God-man (*theanthropon*) associating by incarnation the human nature with the divine by an indissoluble bond."[24] He continues to write:

> For since, in order to redeem us, two things were required above all: the acquisition of salvation and the application of the same; the suffering of death for satisfaction, and victory of the same for the enjoyment of life; our mediator ought to be *theanthropos* (God and man) in order that he might execute these things, a man who would suffer, God who would conquer, a man who would carry penalties owed to us, God who would endure them and drain them off; a man who would acquire salvation for us by dying; God who would apply it to us by conquering; a man who would become ours through the assuming of flesh; God who would make us similar to him through conferring of the Spirit. Which neither a plain man nor God alone could [do]. Neither could God only experience death, nor could a man only overcome it; only a man could die for humans, and only God could overcome death. Thus, both natures ought to be united, so that in both in combination, the highest infirmity of humanity for suffering and the highest power and majesty of divinity for victory must exert themselves.[25]

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[23] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIV.xi.27: "Si Christus satisfecit, non statim satisfecit sibi ipsi praecise loquendo ut Christo, sed ut Deo, et Dei Filio: Non ergo idem, et secundum idem dat et accipit solutionem; dat eam, ut διανθρωπος, accipit eam, ut λογοσ, dat eam, ut Mediator, accipit eam ut Judex. Non absurdum est autem eundem sibi ipsi satisfacere, quando non agitur de satisfactione privata, qua compensatur damnum privatum, ...; Sed de publica, qua reparatur injuria publica, ..."

[24] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.iii.19.

[25] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.19: "Cum enim ad nos redimendos duo potissimum requirerentur, acquisitio salutis, et ejusdem applicatio, mortis perpessio ad satisfactionem, et ejusdem victoria ad vitae fruitionem ; Mediator noster debuit esse (θεανθρωπος) ut haec exequeretur, Homo qui pateretur, Deus qui vinceret, Homo qui paenas nobis debitas ferret, Deus qui eas perferret et exhauriret, Homo qui moriendo salutem nobis acquireret, Deus qui vincendo nobis eam applicaret, Homo qui noster fieret per carnis assumptionem , Deus qui nos sibi similes redderet per Spiritus collationem. Quod nec homo merus, nec Deus solus poterat. Nec enim mortem solus Deus sentire, nec solus homo superare potuit; solus homo potuit pro hominibus mori, solus Deus potuit mortem vincere. Utraque ergo

Turretin does not ascribe the role of either Christ's distinct personality or humanity independently to the satisfaction of Christ's eternal and personal vindictive justice and righteousness; instead, he assigns the indissoluble role of the mediator who is both God and man to satisfy Christ's personal vindictive justice. Turretin argues that all humans should receive Christ's eternal and personal punishment which they deserve. However, Turretin also recognizes that no ordinary human could ever satisfy or overcome Christ's eternal and personal punishment, thus Turretin contends that only the mediator can provide such satisfaction. Christ's distinct personality apart from His human nature could not be bound to die, nor could a man who lacked Christ's divine personality defeat death.

Turretin concludes that only the mediator can satisfy Christ's eternal and personal vindictive justice and righteousness. Turretin says:

> If Christ did not bear eternal death but merely a temporal and three-day death, he nonetheless dissolved what was owed by us, up to the infinity of punishment. Because although it was not infinite as to duration, it was nevertheless such equivalently as to value on account of the infinite worth of the person enduring, because it was not the passion of a mere man but of the true God, who acquired the church with his blood in Acts 20:28, so that what is lacking in finite time can be made up through the condition of the divine person, which adds infinite weight to the temporal suffering, … But the death only corresponds to the law and is fitting to the righteousness.[26]

The infinite punishment or eternal vindictive justice that the sinful elect deserve can be borne by Christ's divine person, who alone can endure it—a person established by the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Vindictive justice is a relative quality of Christ's eternal and personal attributes, and as such it is still in eternity. However, rectitude is an absolute quality of God's essence. The eternal death or wrath endured by Christ should not be understood in the absolute sense as involving the essential (or immanent) death of the eternal Son or an essential (or immanent) separation within the essence of God. Such notions are theologically untenable, as the divine essence is characterized not by essential death or immanent separation but rather by essential life and immanent communication within the unity of the three persons. Thus, the eternal death that the Logos Brought Forth had to suffer indicates a relative sense of Christ's personal vindictive justice, imposed on the Incarnate Logos according to the Trinity's eternal decree. The Immanent Logos veiled His essence to become Christ for the sinful elect in accordance with the Trinity's eternal decree. Therefore, the phrase "the suffering not of a mere man but of the true God" should be understood, in light of Exodus 34:6, as referring to the longsuffering that is a personal and relational attribute of Christ's incommunicable personality. It is neither the longsuffering of the essence of the Immanent Logos nor that of the human nature of the Logos Brought Forth. No one other than Christ, who is distinguished from the essence of the Immanent Logos, can satisfy divine

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natura sociari debuit, ut in utraque conjunctim et summa infirmitas humanitatis ad passionem, et summa virtus et Majestas divinitatis ad victoriam sese exererent."

[26] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIV.xi.28: "Si Christus mortem aeternam non tulit sed temporalem tantum et triduanam, non minus tamen solvit quod a nobis debebatur quoad infinitatem paenae. Quia si non fuit infinita quoad durationem, fuit tamen talis aequivalenter quoad valorem, propter personae patientis infinitam dignitatem, quia non fuit passio meri hominis, sed veri Dei, qui suo sanguine Ecclesiam acquisivit, Act. xx. 28, ut quod deest finito tempori, suppleatur per personae divinae conditionem, quae passioni temporali pondus addit infinitum. … At mors sola respondet legi et justitiae convenit."

wrath and righteousness—not even sinless Adam before the Fall.

Third, Turretin's affirmation of the Immanent Logos's twofold humiliation is profoundly reflected in Christ's threefold office as exercised in both natures. Turretin argues, "All the parts of the mediatorial work demand both natures. Christ is Mediator as to the same nature in which he is a Prophet, Priest and King. And yet according to both, he could and was bound to exercise that threefold office."[27] Turretin believes that Christ's threefold office should also be fulfilled by and for both Christ's divine personality and His human nature. Turretin affirms that Christ's threefold office cannot be fulfilled solely by either a human in time or by the Logos Brought Forth in eternity; he believes the three-fold office must be fulfilled by both the divine and human natures of Christ. As to his prophetic officer Christ must be a human prophet for men "taken from his brethren" so he may approach men and they may approach him,[28] yet as a divine prophet for God, Christ should receive and send the personal Holy Spirit to enlighten and instruct our hearts and minds.[29] As to His priestly office, Christ must stand in the place of human beings not as "angelic" but "rational and human" because angels do not die,[30] yet Christ should be more than human and celestial in order to offer a divine sacrifice and add an "infinite weight and merit" to His finite suffering.[31] Given the eternal punishment of abandonment that Christ had to suffer, He should render a divine sacrifice because His torment comes from "a most oppressive sense of God's wrath resting upon him on account of our sins."[32] As to Christ's kingly office, His divinity must be united to our humanity from us in order to bear all of our punishment,[33] yet the punishment and Satanic power to which humans were to be subjected is so overwhelming that only Christ as a divine being could bear and overcome them.[34] Thus, Turretin contends that Christ, as mediator, must fulfill His threefold office. He writes:

> Because the mediator ought to be a Prophet, who would illuminate the mind not only externally but also internally and soften the heart; a King, who should watch over the church against the attacks of satan and the world and powerfully rule it by his Spirit; a Priest, who by the infinite merit of death and obedience should satisfy the infinite divine righteousness and acquire eternal redemption for us. All these things could not be done by a mere man, but they demanded one who should be endowed with infinite essence and power, as will be proved in its place.[35]

As a prophet, Christ should strive to enlighten the mind and soften the heart. As a king, Christ must

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[27] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.ii.6.

[28] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[29] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[30] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[31] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[32] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.xiv.6.

[33] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[34] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[35] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.30: "Quia Mediator debuit esse Propheta, qui non tantum externe, sed et interne mentem illuminaret, et cor flecteret, Rex qui Ecclesiam adversus Satanae et mundi insultus tueretur, et Spiritu suo potenter eam regeret, Sacerdos qui merito mortis et obedientiae infinito infinitae Justitiae divinae satisfaceret, et redemptionem aeternam nobis acquireret. Quae omnia ab homine mero fieri non potuerunt, sed eum postulabant, qui essentia et potentia infinita praeditus esset, ut suo loco probabitur."

protect His church from the assaults of Satan and his armies. As a priest, Christ is directly connected to both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. On the one hand, Christ, the priest, must be human to suffer the eternal punishment humans deserve because we are bound by the covenant of works.[36] On the other hand, Christ, the priest, must also be the Logos Brought Forth, the maker and minister of the covenant of grace, by which we can be united with Christ's incommunicable personality based on "an eternal and unbreakable bond," which is the Trinity's eternal decree.[37] Thus, Christ, the High Priest, who satisfies "the infinite divine justice by His infinite merit of his death and obedience" should be the Logos Brought Forth, united with His human nature and personally distinct from the person or essence of the Father.

In summary, Turretin affirms that the Son of God is personally generated by the Father, or that the Immanent Logos humbled Himself to be the Logos Brought Forth. Turretin affirms these two aspects of God's humiliation: that the Immanent Logos, as Judge and God, shall receive satisfaction in eternity for the sake of His absolute sense of divine rectitude, while Christ, as Mediator, must suffer and make satisfaction for the sake of God's eternal wrath and punishment in its relative sense. Turretin argues that, since God established the Trinity's eternal decree prior to the incarnation, the Son of God, as God, must first have been the Logos Brought Forth for the elect before becoming the Incarnate Logos. This order was necessary to provide eternal life and forgiveness to the sinful elect by satisfying God's eternal and personal attributes, including Christ's eternal and punitive righteousness. If Christ's satisfaction of God's vindictive and eternal justice is established by the Trinity's eternal decree, there is no other way to satisfy God's vindictive justice and bestow His eternal benevolence than through the mediatorial work of the Son of God. Thus, as the mediator between God and man, the Son of God must exclusively complete His mediatorial work through His threefold office.

6.4 Turretin's and Calvin's Concepts of the Three Distinct Meanings of Heaven

I will now demonstrate that Turretin's and Calvin's definition of the three distinct meanings of heaven are reflected in their concepts of the Immanent Logos's twofold humiliation. Especially, I will explicate how Turretin's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son provides theological grounds for classifying the concept of heaven into three distinct types. I will compare Turretin's classification of the three distinct types of heaven with Calvin's and examine whether Calvin's understanding of heaven aligns more closely with Turretin's perspective than with that of Socinus. This examination will serve as a demonstration that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective implicitly presupposes Augustine's notion of the Father's natural and volitional generation.

Turretin attempts to classify the concept of heaven into four types, if including the visible heaven and the firmament: 1) the tangible heaven and firmament; 2) the invisible third heaven; 3) Christ's distinct personality and divine knowledge in the eternal decree; 4) and Christ's consubstantiality with the Father. When I refer to the "three distinct meanings of heaven," I am speaking of 2), 3), and 4). However, when I mention the "twofold aspect of heaven," I am referring specifically to 3) and 4).

First, Turretin, in his comments on Ephesians 4:10, understands that there are a visible heaven and an invisible third heaven. He argues that "Christ is said to have ascended above all heavens (Eph. 4:10) (to wit, the visible-namely, the aerial heaven) and the firmament (to wit, in

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[36] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

[37] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.iii.20.

order that he might enter into the third heaven or paradise)."[38] Turretin finds from Ephesians 4:10 that the "aerial heaven" is the first visible heaven; referring to Genesis 1:6, he says the "firmament" is the second visible heaven.

Second, in his comments on 2 Corinthians 12:2-4, Turretin says the "third heaven" or "paradise" is the invisible, literal, created, immaterial, spatial and temporal heaven. He rejects the Lutherans' symbolic, mystical notion of the third heaven, affirming the concept of the invisible, created, spatial and temporal third heaven. He argues:

> But we hold that Christ was carried locally, visibly, and bodily from the earth into the third heaven, or the seat of the blessed over the visible heavens, not only by the withdrawal of his visible presence or familiar conversation, but by a true and local translation of his human nature, where he will remain until the day of judgment, so that although he is always present to us by his grace, Spirit, and divinity, he is no longer with us by the presence of his bodily flesh.[39]

Turretin believes that the heaven to which Christ ascended, above all the heavens—i.e., above the first visible and second visible heavens—is the third heaven. He interprets John 14:3 to mean that "the third heaven and paradise" is a singular (local) heaven and the Father's house, while in Hebrews 9:24, he understands it as a "heavenly sanctuary." Turretin further promotes the idea of the third heaven by saying that "Paul is indeed said to have been raptured into the third heaven, but whether in the spirit or in the body cannot be told (as Paul confesses he did not know himself)."[40] Turretin believes that the resurrected bodies and souls of believers will be like that of Christ in the third heaven.

On the one hand, Turretin believes the third heaven was created and restricted in time and space in order that some created angels might exist there. He writes:

> "Under this highest heaven, we think the angels (its inhabitants) are contained. And although Moses (adhering rather to the description of sensible and visible things) does not expressly mention their creation, still he sufficiently intimates it by "the host of the heavens" (Gen. 2:1) and by that heaven which was to be their habitation (Jd. 6; Lk. 2:13; Mt. 24:36). Hence they are said to have applauded God (as already created) when he founded the earth (Job 38:6, 7), which was made on the first day. They are also reckoned in the first place among creatures before the sun, moon and stars (Ps. 148:2)."[41]

On the other hand, based on his interpretation of John 14:2-3, 2 Corinthians 12:2-4, and Ephesians 4:10, Turretin refutes the Lutheran idea of a merely symbolic third heaven. From these passages, he defines the third heaven as literal, created, invisible, immaterial, spatial and temporal. He argues:

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[38] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.xviii.7.

[39] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIII.xviii.3: "Nos vero Christum localiter, visibiliter, et corporaliter e terra in caelum tertium, seu sedem Beatorum supra caelos aspectabiles evectum fuisse statuimus, non per praesentiae visibilis vel familiaris conversationis tantum subductionem, sed per veram et localem naturae suae humanae translationem, ubi mansura sit usque ad diem Judicii, ut licet praesens semper sit nobiscum gratia sua, et Spiritu, ac divinitate, non amplius sit tamen nobiscum praesentia corporali carnis suae."

[40] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.viii.8.

[41] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, V.vi.5.

Third, the heaven into which Christ was carried is described to us as a certain place, into which he entered and into which we will enter after him. It is called the house of the Father, in which there are many mansions, to which Christ ascended, about to prepare the place for us in John 14:2–3, the third heaven and paradise in II Corinthian 12, in which Christ entered as our forerunner in Hebrew 6:20, and into which we ought to exalt our eyes, by seeking those things which are above, where Christ sits at the right hand of God, but not those which are upon the earth in Colossian 3:1-2. Therefore, Brentius and others among the Lutherans incorrectly persist that this heaven is nothing else than happiness itself, which is incomprehensible to us.[42]

Turretin rejects the Lutheran ideological view of Christ's mystical ascension into God's incomprehensible essence, maintaining instead that Christ ascended bodily to a supreme, yet localized, heavenly home of the blessed—namely, the third heaven and paradise.[43] He distinguishes "the third heaven and paradise" from the Lutheran's idea of incomprehensible happiness and blessedness in God's incomprehensible essence. He writes, "This must be opposed to the Lutherans who hold that heaven to be uncreated and feign that it is illocal (*illocale*) and incorporeal and everywhere (in order to weaken the argument drawn from the ascension of Christ to heaven against the ubiquity of his body)."[44] Thus, Turretin refutes the Lutheran idea of the omnipresence of Christ's body and soul directly connected to God's eternal essence. Turretin might conclude that even though the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit can be present in the third heaven, the third heaven cannot contain them. Instead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, all of whom are infinite, immense, eternal, and transcendent, remain above the third heaven.

Third, Turretin understands the concept of the heaven where Christ was (John 6:62) as meaning a transcendental heaven, namely, Christ's divine essence (John 1:1 or Colossians 2:9), which should be grounded in the Father's natural generation of the Son, while he defines "the Son of Man who is in heaven" (John 3:13) as referring to the union of Jesus's human nature with His incommunicable personality, which should be grounded in the Father's volitional generation of the Son and Christ's incarnation. Turretin defines "heaven" as both Christ's divine essence and His unique personality. Turretin, as Calvin does,[45] interprets John 6:33 as indicating that the heaven from whence Christ came refers to God's essence. He argues, "It [the bread] is called such now in relation to the divine nature when he is said to have come down from heaven; then in relation to the human, as when the flesh of Christ is said to be given for the life of the world."[46] The heaven from which the bread came can be understood as Christ's divine essence, as Christ, the Living Bread, was from the divine nature of God the Father. The bread that came from heaven can be understood

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[42] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XVIII.viii.6: "Tertio, Caelum in quod Christus evectus est, describitur nobis, ut locus aliquis, in quem ingressus est, et in quem post ipsum ingressuri sumus. Vocatur domus Patris, in qua sunt multae mansiones, quo Christus ascendit paraturus nobis locum , Joh. xiv. 2, 3, caelum tertium et paradisus, 2 Cor. xii., in quem Christus intravit tanquam praecursor noster, Heb. vi. 20 et in quem oculos attollere debemus ea quae sursum sunt quaerendo, ubi Christus sedet ad dexteram Dei, non vero ea quae sunt super terram , Col. iii. 1 , 2. Perperam ergo Brentius, et alii ex Lutheranis pertendunt Caelum istud nihil aliud esse quam ipsam felicitatem, quae nobis est incomprehensibilis."

[43] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.viii.3.

[44] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, V.vi.4.

[45] Cf. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:143, on John 6:33; Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel according to John*, vol. 17, 248, on John 6:33: "In descensu e caelo duo notanda sunt, nempe quod in Christo divinam habemus vitam, quia a Deo profectus est ut nobis sit autor vitae."

[46] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.v.14.

as referring to Christ's divine personality because Christ, the "bread" who is in heaven (John 3:13), is united with His human nature.

On the one hand, Turretin asserts, "If the Son of man is said to ascend where he was before after his resurrection (Jn. 6:62), this is not to be understood of his humanity, but only of his divinity where the Word (*ho Logos*) was before when he was with God (*pros ton theon*, Jn. 1:1)."[47] It should be examined whether Turretin's phrase "his divinity where the Word (*ho Logos*) was before when he was with God" indicates Christ's divine essence or His distinct personality, as it is unclear whether it refers to the essence of the Immanent Logos, who was *from and then in* the Father, or to the personality of the Logos Brought Forth, who was *from and then with* the Father. Turretin frequently uses the phrase "from the Father" interchangeably with "through the Father's natural generation of the Son" and "through the Father's volitional generation of the Son." Given the following arguments, it is more likely that Turretin sees the divinity of the Word coming from the Father as the essence of the Word. When identifying heaven as Christ's divine essence, Turretin asserts, "the Son can be said to have received all things from the Father either as the Word (*Logos*) (by a communication of the same essence from eternity) or as God-man (*theanthropos*) and Mediator in time by the imposition of office (in respect to which he confesses that he is less than the Father)."[48] He continues, "Although the Son is from the Father, nevertheless he may be called God-of-himself (*autotheos*), not with respect to his person, but essence."[49] In the same vein, he argues:

> But He is also the proper Son, as in Romans 8:32: "He who did not spare His own Son," who has His own Father, as in John 5:18: "who therefore begot the Son from His essence"; the Only-begotten Son, as in John 1:14: "We saw His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten," and verse 18: "The Only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father," and Matthew 3:17: "the Beloved Son." … Therefore, there must necessarily be some other mode of filiation that is proper and unique to Him, which can only be through generation, so that by nature He possesses what is granted to others by grace. This the Apostle emphasizes in Hebrews 1:5, where he teaches that Christ is so the Son that, in comparison to Him, not even the angels can be, or can be called, sons."[50]

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[47] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.vi.6.

[48] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.xxviii.35: "Aliquid accipi potest vel in tempore, vel ab aeterno, vel ex gratia, vel ex natura. Prior accipiendi modus revera inferioritatem arguit et naturae inaequalitatem, et in verum Deum cadere nequit; At posterior Personis divinis competere potest sine ulla inaequalitate; quia ordo subsistendi Personarum non tollit aequalitatem essentiae. Ita Filius omnia potest dici accepisse a Patre, vel qua λογος per ejusdem essentiae communicationem ab aeterno, vel qua θεανθρωπος et Mediator in tempore per officii impositionem, cujus respectu se Patre minorem fatetur." English translation in Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxviii.35.

[49] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxviii.40.

[50] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, III.xxix.14: "sed etiam Filius proprius, Rom. viii. 32, qui proprio Filio non pepercit, qui proprium habet Patrem, Joan. v. 18, qui proinde ex essentia genuit Filium; Filius Unigenitus, Jo. i. 14, Vidimus gloriam ut unigeniti, et 18, Unigenitus qui est in sinu Patris, et Matt. iii. 17, summe dilectus. Jam si Filius tantum diceretur propter gratiosam communicationem existentiae et gloriae, respectu naturae humanae, sive in miraculosa conceptione, sive in resurrectione et exaltatione, sive in vocatione, non posset vel proprius, vel unigenitus vocari Dei Filius, quia Filiatio ista et aliis posset competere, si non in eodem gradu, at in eodem genere. Nam et Angeli Filii vocantur propter excellentiam naturae, et Magistratus propter dignitatem muneris, et Adamus propter miraculosam creationem, et Fideles tam propter adoptionem et regenerationem, quam resurrectionem. Ergo necesse est dari aliquem alium filiationis modum illi proprium et singularem, qui non alius potest esse quam per generationem, ut per naturam obtineat quod per gratiam caeteris confertur, quod urget Apost. Hebr. i. 5, ubi docet Christum ita esse Filium, ut ipsius respectu, ne Angeli quidem, sint aut dici possint Filii."

Turretin affirms the "intimate communication" between the Father and the Son "in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18),[51] specifically referring to the consubstantiality of the three persons through the Father's natural generation of the Son.[52] Thus, "the heaven where Christ was before" or "Christ's divinity, from which His divine personality originated," indicates Christ's consubstantial essence with the Father, based on the Father's natural generation, rather than His incommunicable personality distinct from the Father, which is based on the Father's volitional generation. In short, Turretin acknowledges that "heaven" often denotes the essence of God.

On the other hand, Turretin, as Calvin does,[53] in his comments on John 6:33 interprets that "the bread which cometh down from heaven" is "the person in the concrete."[54] Turretin defines the "bread" as Christ's incommunicable personality united with His human nature, asserting that, "the bread which gives is the person of Christ; the bread which is given is the flesh of Christ."[55] Turretin claims that the bread represents Christ's incommunicable personality united with His human nature. Furthermore, Turretin asserts, "But as to the words 'the Son of man is in heaven,' this must be understood of the person in the concrete, not of the human nature in the abstract."[56] The person, in the concrete sense, signifies a mystical union between Christ's distinct personality and human nature without confusion, whereas the person, in the abstract sense, suggests a confusion between Christ's human and divine natures. In his comments on John 3:13, Turretin argues that the heaven where the Son of Man dwells refers to the realm of divine knowledge accessible through Christ's unique, incommunicable personality, where His distinct personality unites with His human nature in a concrete sense. Refuting Socinus's argument that "it is one thing for Christ to have ascended to heaven properly and locally in respect of his humanity,"[57] Turretin argues:

> Christ is not said to have ascended in the former sense ("No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven," Jn. 3:13) because the same one who ascended is said to have descended (thus he could not be said to be still in heaven), but concerning the mystical ascent (as he is said to ascend up to heaven who penetrates the secret of heaven [Prov. 30:4] because as far as heaven is distant from earth, so far are divine counsels distant from human [Is. 55:9]).[58]

Here, Turretin asserts that the heaven in which the Son of Man is signifies the divine counsel of the Trinity, in contrast to the interpretation offered by Socinus. Turretin argues that the Son of Man,

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[51] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.vi.7.

[52] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.vi.5.

[53] Cf. Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:143, on John 6:33; Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 17, 248, on John 6:33.

[54] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.v.14.

[55] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIII.v.14.

[56] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.vi.5.

[57] Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, XIV.vi.5.

[58] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIV.vi.5: "Christus non dicitur ascendisse in caelum priori sensu, Joh. iii. 13, 'Nemo ascendit in caelum nisi ille qui descendit de caelo, Filius hominis qui est in caelo,' quia idem qui ascendit, descendisse dicitur, et sic non posset dici esse adhuc in caelo; sed de ascensu mystico, ut ascendere in caelum dicitur, qui arcana caeli penetrat, Prov. xxx. 4, quia quantum caelum a terra distat, tantum consilia divina ab humanis, Isa. lv. 9, …"

who is united with His human nature and remains in heaven, must be understood as referring to "the person in the concrete," rather than "the human nature in the abstract."[59]

One can conclude from these arguments that Turretin clearly distinguishes between the heaven from which the Immanent Logos's *essence* was, the heaven where His *incommunicable personality* is, and the third heaven where His glorified *human nature* is. Regarding God's essential quality of immensity, Turretin writes:

> Therefore, God is then said to be in a filling way everywhere on account of the immensity of his essence, so much so that this is understood the most differently from the bodies' mode of being in a place, i.e., without regard to the occupation of space, and his multiplication, extension, division, or mixture with other things, but without regard to space and inseparably; because wherever he is, he is whole, whole in everything, whole outside of everything, contained in no place, excluded from no place, nor as much in a place, because the finite does not capture the infinite, as in himself, to which it belongs that Rabbis call God as above the place, because God is not so much as contained by place as that he contains all places in Himself, and what Theophylus ad Autolycum, says in the book i, "God is the place of all, and he is place to himself. [60]

Although Christ's exalted human nature resides in the third heaven, created by God for believers and angels, He remains fully God in His essence, possessing a distinct personality from the Father according to the Trinity's eternal decree, through the natural and volitional generation and procession.[61]

I will evaluate whether Calvin's view of heaven aligns more closely with Turretin's. Calvin also attempts to classify the concept of heaven into three types. Setting aside Calvin's affirmation of the visible heaven and the firmament, three remain: (1) Christ's consubstantiality with the Father, (2) Christ's incommunicable personality and divine knowledge within the eternal decree, and (3) the invisible third heaven.

First, Calvin interchanges John 6:33, "The heavenly bread is that which hath come down from heaven, giveth life unto the world," with his interpretation that "He has come from God to be the author of life."[62] Considering the matching of the words, "he that has come from God" is "the heavenly bread," which "has come down from heaven." Thus, God is the heaven, while "the

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[59] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, XIV.vi.5: "Caeterum quod Filius hominis dicitur esse in caelo, hoc de Persona in concreto, non de natura humana in abstracto est intelligendum."

[60] Turrettini, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, III.ix.6: "Ita ergo Deus dicitur esse repletive ubique, propter essentiae immensitatem, ut hoc intelligatur diversissime a modo essendi in loco corporum, id. citra spatii occupationem, et sui multiplicationem, extensionem, divisionem, vel cum aliis rebus commixtionem, sed illocaliter et impartibiliter; quia ubicunque est, totus est, totus in omnibus, totus extra omnia, nullo loco inclusus, nullo etiam exclusus, nec tam in loco, quia finitum non capit infinitum, quam in seipso, quo pertinet quod Rabbini Deum vocant (מקום) locum, quia Deus non tam loco continetur, quam omnia in seipso continet, et quod Theophylus ad Autolycum, lib. i. ait, (ο θεος τοπος ιστι των ολων, χαι ιαυτω τοπος ιστι) Deus locus est omnium, et sibi ipse locus est."

[61] In the same vein, I Kings 8:27 (KJV) clearly states, "But will God indeed dwell on the earth? behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded?" Thus, the Reformers' proposition that "the finite cannot contain the infinite" holds true because the idea that our Father dwells in the third heaven does not conflict with the idea that the Father and the Son are also outside the third heaven, remaining in the eternal abode of God.

[62] "In descensu e caelo duo notanda sunt, nempe quod in Christo divinam habemus vitam, quia a Deo profectus est ut nobis sit autor vitae." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 17, 248, on John 6:33.

heavenly bread" is "the author of life." Calvin interprets the heaven from which Christ descended as signifying His divine essence, while the term "author of life" reflects His mediatorship, rooted in the eternal decrees of the Trinity. As seen in Section 6.2,[63] Calvin argues that while the Son of God descended from His immeasurable essence without departing from it, He thereby becomes one person of the Trinity, characterized by Christ's incommunicable personality within His divine essence. Calvin's argument is founded on the following premise: The eternal Word, without leaving his immeasurable essence, is the Logos Brought Forth, who is still the Immanent Logos.

Second, Calvin understands "heaven" in John 6:38 as representing Christ's divine essence. The phrase "*Quia descendi e caelo*" ("Because I descended from heaven") in John 6:38 implies Christ's self-descent from the status of His divine being. Calvin interprets the phrase "*Quia descendi e caelo*" (Because I descended from heaven) in John 6:38 as directly signifying that "God appointed His Son to be the protector of our salvation."[64] Calvin's argument indicates that it was not only the Father but also the eternal Son of God, the Immanent Logos, who appointed the Son to be Christ. Alluding to the Father's eternal command in John 6:38 as having been issued from eternity, Calvin, in his commentary on John 10:38, argues: "He recalls us to the eternal counsel of the Father, so that we may know that He had such care for our salvation that He appointed His only begotten Son, great and excellent as He is, for us. And Christ himself who came into the world that he might offer obedience to the Father, confirms that he has no other goal in all things than that he may benefit us."[65] Elsewhere, Calvin argues, "Christ fully explains what is that will of the Father to which he is devoted; namely, to fulfill the commission which had been given to him."[66] Based on Calvin's interpretation of the verses above, the "will of the Father" in John 6:38 is not the moral law, such as the Ten Commandments, but rather the eternal decree of the Trinity, through which the Trinity (or the Immanent Logos) appointed the Son (or Himself) to be Christ (or the Logos Brought Forth). This appointment involves descending from His essence to assume a distinct office and personality, for the sake of others rather than solely for Himself. In short, the Immanent Logos, who is God, appointed Himself to be Christ in the eternal decree of the Trinity. Therefore, Calvin's statement that "the will of Him who sent me" in John 6:38 refers to the eternal decree of the Trinity rather than the internal decree of the Father alone.

Third, in Calvin's commentary on John 3:13, he interprets the "heaven where the Son of Man is" as representing either the Trinity's divine knowledge (or decree) or Christ's mediatorship. He argues that "Christ, who is in heaven, clothed Himself with our flesh, that by extending His brotherly hand to us, He may lift us up to heaven along with Himself."[67] He asserts that Christ is in heaven, and that He may lift us up to that heaven. The heaven we may attain refers to the heaven where Christ resides— not His divine essence, but rather His distinct mediatorship or divine knowledge for our salvation. According to Calvin, the Immanent Logos must possess Christ's

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[63] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xiii.4; CO 2:352.

[64] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:146, on John 6:36.

[65] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:246, on John 10:18: "Revocat nos ad aeternum patris consilium, ut sciamus tantam illi fuisse curam salutis nostrae, ut filium suum unigenitum, tantus quantus est, nobis dicaverit: et Christus ipse qui in mundum venit, ut patri se obedientem praeberet, confirmat se non alium habere in omnibus scopum quam ut nobis consulat." English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 17, 409-10, on John 10:18.

[66] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:94, on John 4:34. English translation in Calvin, *Commentaries on the Gospel According to John*, vol. 17, 169-70, on John 4:34.

[67] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:62, on John 3:13: "Christus ergo qui in caelo est carnem nostram induit, ut porrecta nobis fraterna manu secum nos ad caelum evehat."

incommunicable personality on behalf of others, rather than for Himself. In Calvin's view, Christ's descent from heaven is necessary for Him to possess the authority to bestow either eternal life or eternal wrath for others, not for Himself.

Elsewhere, Calvin argues that the divine counsel of the Trinity is the ground of eternal life, which was established at the hypostatic level in eternity and manifested at the appointed time. In his commentaries on John 6:51, Calvin argues:

> He often mentions the descent from heaven, because spiritual and incorruptible life will not be found in this world, whose figure passes away and vanishes, but only in the heavenly kingdom of God. … "The bread which I will give." Because that hidden power of bestowing life, of which he spoke, could be referred to his divine essence, he now descends to a second grade, teaching that this life resides in his flesh, so that it may be drawn from there. Indeed, it is a marvelous counsel of God, who has offered life to us in that flesh, where previously there was only the material of death.[68]

In Calvin's interpretation of the descent from heaven, he asserts that *spiritual and incorruptible life*—which is the eternal life offered to us—cannot be found in this world but only in the heavenly kingdom of God. Calvin identifies the origin of this eternal life as the heavenly kingdom of God, equating it with heaven, though he remains somewhat ambiguous on the precise definition of the heavenly kingdom of God. However, immediately following this claim, Calvin clarifies by describing "that hidden power of bestowing life, of which he spoke," as referring specifically to "Christ's *divine essence.*" He further explains that Christ descended from this divine essence, describing this descent as Christ's movement to a "second level." At this second level, Calvin emphasizes that eternal life is placed in and united with Christ's flesh or human nature. Additionally, Calvin's statement that "it is a marvelous counsel of God, who has offered life to us in that flesh" demonstrates that the *eternal counsel of God* is, in effect, the *eternal life he has offered to us.* Calvin's assertion reflects that the divine counsel and the bestowal of eternal life were established at the second level in eternity and manifested at the appointed time. According to Calvin, the heavenly kingdom of God, which is synonymous with heaven, represents God's divine essence. The second level of the heavenly kingdom of God, however, is the counsel of God, through which immortal life has been offered to us.

Fourth, with respect to the third heaven as the place where angels and saints will be gathered, Calvin argues that "just as angels delighted in him as the head, could he not, by his divine power, rule over men also, and by the secret power of his Spirit, quicken and support them as his body, until, gathered into heaven, they enjoyed the same life with angels?"[69] On the one hand, the phrase "His divine power" refers to Christ's eternal mediatorship and authority, through which the angels acknowledged Him as their head. In this way, those who are quickened by the divine work of the Holy Spirit can even now partake in Christ's heavenly life and glory until they will be gathered into

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[68] Calvin, *Commentarius in Evangelium Ioannis*, CO 47:152, on John 6:51: "Descensum caeli subinde commemorat, quia in hoc mundo, cuius praeterit figura et evanescit, non reperietur spiritualis et incorruptibilis vita, sed tantum in caelesti Dei regno. ... Panis quem ego dabo. Quia vis illa arcana conferendae vitae, de qua loquutus est, ad divinam eius essentiam referri poterat, nunc descendit ad secundum gradum, ac vitam illam in sua carne positam esse docet ut inde hauriatur. Mirificum sane Dei consilium, quod in ea carne, ubi sola prius mortis materia erat, vitam nobis proposuerit."

[69] Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, II.xii.7; CO 2:346: "Quasi vero, sicuti eo capite fruebantur angeli, non etiam divina sua virtute praeesse hominibus potuerit, et arcana virtute spiritus sui vegetare ipsos et fovere, instar corporis sui, donec in caelum collecti eadem cum angelis vita fruerentur."

the third heaven to have the same life as the angels. On the other hand, those quickened by the Holy Spirit will be gathered into the third heaven, rather than into Christ's eternal essence, as mentioned in John 6:38, or into the penetration of divine knowledge through Christ's eternal mediatorship and authority, as referenced in John 3:13. Based on his distinction between Christ's heavenly authority and the heavenly place, Calvin affirms that the "place" to which angels and glorified saints will be gathered.

In summary, I have demonstrated that Calvin's perspective on heaven aligns more closely with Turretin's than with Socinus's. Turretin's categorization of heaven into three types provides a theological basis for refuting Socinus's concept of a composite God in the perpetual third heaven. Furthermore, it signifies his acquiescence to the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Turretin's classification of heaven into three types is as follows: (1) Christ's divine essence, (2) Christ's distinct personality as determined by the Trinity's eternal decree, and (3) the third heaven, a spiritual, invisible, spatial, and temporal realm. By doing so, Turretin refutes Socinus's concept of a composite God, which consists of (1) the Father's essence, (2) His internal decree and attributes, and (3) the glorified Jesus in the third heaven. Calvin similarly seeks to categorize the concept of heaven into three distinct types. Apart from his affirmation of the visible heaven and the firmament, he identifies three aspects: (1) Christ's consubstantial unity with the Father, (2) Christ's unique, incommunicable personality and divine knowledge as grounded in the eternal decree, and (3) the invisible third heaven.

6.5 Conclusion

Socinus's denial of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction arises from his anti-Trinitarian arguments. Socinus believes that the Father's internal wills and attributes are the primary cause of Jesus's immortality. Consequently, he argues the Calvinists' concept of a connection between God's mere good pleasure—misinterpreted by Socinus as referring solely to His internal wills and attributes—and Christ's vicarious satisfaction to be unnecessary and redundant. Since he appeared to affirm Calvin's Trinitarian theology while deliberately distancing himself from the views of Servetus and Gentile, and given that he was not, strictly speaking, directly engaged in debate with Calvin, a precise analysis of his views is best achieved through his own writings or through an examination of Turretin, who critically engaged with Socinus's theology and sought to reinterpret Calvin. To determine whether Socinus aligns with Calvin's Trinitarian perspective, it must be examined whether both Calvin and Turretin argue that the eternal Son of God was humbled in two distinct ways: (1) by humbling Himself from the Immanent Logos to the Logos Brought Forth within the eternal decree, and (2) by further humbling Himself as the Logos Brought Forth to become the incarnate Logos under the condition of Adam's sin.

Calvin, in his refutations of Servetus's modalism and the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto*, argues that the Immanent Logos, as God, must veil His essence to become the Logos Brought Forth, in accordance with the Trinity's eternal decree for the elect. His argument implies that Christ already possesses God's infinite, unchangeable, and eternal life, as the aseity of the eternal Son did not require Him to descend from His perfect being to acquire eternal life for Himself; rather, Christ descended on behalf of the elect. Calvin concludes that the Immanent Logos's self-emptying of his essence is required in order for others to acquire Christ's eternal life. Furthermore, in rebutting Osiander's claim, Calvin suggests that, only after Adam broke the covenant, the mediatorship of Christ needed to be united with His human nature to fulfill God's vengeful justice. Osiander contends that regardless of whether or not Adam sinned, Christ's essential righteousness is

necessary to complete our sanctification and redemption. Osiander argues that Christ's essential attributes of righteousness, rather than His eternal mediatorship between God and man, are required for our sanctification and glorification. In refutation of Osiander's claim, Calvin asserts that the Immanent Logos veiled His divine essence to assume His mediatorial role for others rather than for Himself, and thus the Trinity assigned the mediatorial role to the second person. Calvin also contends that the fall of Adam from his original righteous estate necessitated the incarnation of the Logos Brought Forth in order to appease the divine wrath of God and accomplish the eternal decree of the Trinity. Vicarious satisfaction by Christ's mediatorship, is necessary because Adam sinned. Calvin believes that salvation for the elect can be achieved only through Christ's mediatorial office, not through any human effort or merit or through Christ's divine essence.

Turretin also supports Calvin's idea of Christ's incommunicable personality to avoid the Lutheran notion of *in abstracto*. Turretin distinguishes between the Immanent Logos, who receives the same essence as the Father through natural generation, and Christ, who is required to satisfy the demands of God's righteousness in accordance with the Trinity's decrees. First, Turretin asserts that the Son of God was constituted as Christ by the Father, meaning that the Immanent Logos veiled Himself to be the Logos Brought Forth. Second, Turretin argues that since Adam broke the covenant of works, the Logos Brought Forth, who was without flesh, had to become the incarnate Logos to satisfy eternal wrath and death for the elect. According to him, after Adam sinned, there was no other way to satisfy God's vindictive justice and bestow His eternal benevolence except through the accomplishment of the mediatorial work of the Son of God, since God had instituted the eternal decree prior to the incarnation. He concludes that since Christ's satisfaction of God's vindictive justice is determined by the eternal decree of the Trinity, only the One who mediates between God and man can and must fulfill His mediatorial role through His three offices.

Finally, I examined whether Calvin's concept of heaven fundamentally aligns more closely with that of Turretin or Socinus. By clarifying Calvin's concept of the twofold aspect of heaven, I demonstrated that Socinus's interpretations of "heaven" in John 3:13 and 6:62 in Chapter 4 differs from Calvin's interpretations of "heaven" in John 3:13, 6:33, and 6:38, where Calvin understands heaven as representing either God Himself (John 6:33 and 6:38) or the divine counsel of the Trinity (John 3:13). In short, Calvin affirms that the term "heaven" has three different meanings in relation to the Trinity: 1) heaven is God's essence where Christ *was* God Himself (John 6:33); 2) heaven is the eternal decree where Christ's incommunicable personality was established (John 3:13); and 3) heaven is the heavenly place where the glorified Jesus, the angels, and the saints *are* (Colossians 1:16–18).

Furthermore, I conducted an analysis of the three aspects of heaven to examine whether Turretin's concept of the twofold heaven fundamentally aligns with Calvin's and whether Calvin's notion of the twofold heaven should be anchored in Augustine's framework of natural and volitional generation. Turretin's concept of the three different meanings of heaven includes: (1) Christ's consubstantiality with the Father, (2) His incommunicable personality and divine knowledge within the eternal decree, and (3) the third heaven. Based on his holistic concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation, Turretin refutes Socinus's misconception of the third heaven and affirms the three distinct meanings of heaven, i.e., heaven as God's essence, heaven as Christ's divine knowledge based on the Trinity's eternal decree, and the third heaven where Christ's human nature is glorified. For Turretin, the heaven from which the Father's divine essence is communicated to the Son signifies Christ's consubstantiality with the Father, grounded in the Father's natural generation of the Son, rather than His distinct personality, which is rooted in the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Turretin clearly distinguishes between the heaven which

is the Immanent Logos's essence, the heaven which is the Logos Brought Forth's incommunicable personality and divine knowledge, and the third heaven where the Logos Brought Forth's human nature now is. Although Christ's exalted human nature is glorified in the third heaven, created by God for believers and angels, He is both God in terms of essence and Christ in terms of His unique personality, through the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.

In sum, Calvin and Turretin both elucidate why the Immanent Logos must veil His essence in order to be the Logos Brought Forth according to the Trinity's eternal decrees, and why only He can be the sole mediator as both God and man. On the one hand, Calvin and Turretin believe that the eternal Son, who was in the form of the Father, had an incommunicable personality based on the Trinity's eternal decree. On the other hand, they both believe that Adam's sin necessitated the incarnation of the Logos Brought Forth because God established the Trinitarian decree prior to the incarnation. Since Adam broke the covenant of works, the Logos Brought Forth without flesh had to become the Incarnate Logos mediating between God and man. Calvin and Turretin would agree that as both the author and administrator of the decree, the Immanent Logos must also be the Logos Brought Forth in eternity to give eternal life for others, and the Logos Brought Forth must also be the Incarnate Logos to fulfill and satisfy God's eternal and vengeful justice. After Adam sinned, only the Mediator, established by the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and united with His human nature, can fulfill Christ's vengeful justice and eternal benevolence through His threefold office. Through all this analysis, the following fact has been revealed. Calvin's view on heaven aligns more closely with that of Turretin than with Socinus. Thus, the alignment between Calvin's view of heaven and Turretin's indicates that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective is consistent with Turretin's, as both are grounded in Augustine's framework of natural and volitional generation and procession.

Conclusion

Conclusion

Some recent scholars have sought to formulate, develop, or defend various Trinitarian atonement models. However, they generally do not address their Trinitarian perspectives inherent in their models, nor do they examine the theological relationship between the Trinitarian perspective and Christ's vicarious satisfaction as it pertains to their models. Notably, many recent scholars overlook the theological significance of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, which affirms both the Son's consubstantiality and His incommunicable personality. Consequently, some recent Trinitarian atonement models do not appear to respond effectively to the anti-Trinitarian perspectives of Servetus and Socinus. Since these models fail to provide a compelling response to the anti-Trinitarian views of Servetus and Socinus, they effectively concede to their critiques regarding the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. In short, their lack of a historically and theologically valid Trinitarian perspective prevents them from providing a theological foundation that supports both the distinct personalities and consubstantiality of the three persons—namely, a holistic understanding of eternal generation or the Trinity's eternal decrees, which underpins the hypothetical necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Some recent Trinitarian atonement models should have addressed the objections raised by Servetus and Socinus to the concept of the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son. This need to address these objections is particularly relevant because Servetus and Socinus either rejected or distorted Augustine's original understanding of the Father's natural generation of the Son, as well as Calvin's emphasis on both the Father's personal generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity—both foundational to the Trinity's eternal decree. Thus, Servetus and Socinus were able to deny the following presuppositions: 1) the hypothetical necessity of the Immanent Logos's self-emptying (or veiling) to be the Logos Brought Forth in the Trinity's eternal decree, and 2) the consequent-necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. However, these recent models seem to align with the criticisms of Calvin's Trinitarian perspective raised by Servetus and Socinus, particularly concerning the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's natural and personal generation of the Son. Given that Servetus and Gentile are Calvin's main theological opponents, it is incumbent upon contemporary scholars to examine whether and how Calvin's Trinitarian viewpoint avoids the fallacies of Servetus and Gentile, and how Calvin addresses their objections to his Trinitarian perspective. Additionally, since Socinus is a primary opponent of Turretin, recent scholars should assess how Turretin's comprehensive view of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, as integral to his Trinitarian framework, effectively refutes Socinus's subordinationism and his objections to the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. Few scholars have thoroughly examined how Calvin's Trinitarian framework refutes the rejection of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, as embedded in the anti-Trinitarian arguments of Servetus and Gentile. Similarly, little attention has been given to how Turretin's reintroduction of Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son not only clarifies Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity but also systematically addresses the objections to Christ's vicarious satisfaction raised by Servetus and Socinus.

I demonstrated that Calvin's comprehensive ideas of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity and Turretin's holistic notion of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, as implied in their Trinitarian views, can ultimately provide a theological foundation for affirming the notion of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction. This theological foundation is valid because it successfully incorporates the following presuppositions: 1) the consubstantiality of the three persons through natural generation and procession; and 2) the hypostatic distinction of the second person through the volitional generation, which affirms the eternal Son's role as

Mediator in the Trinity's eternal decrees. This, in turn, logically leads to the hypothetical (not absolute) necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, contingent upon Adam's first sin. To demonstrate the thesis mentioned above, I analyzed how Calvin's views on the Trinity conflict with those of Gentile and Servetus. Furthermore, I explored how Turretin's perspective on Trinity counters Socinus's distortion of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity. In doing so, I examined whether the doctrine of the Trinity in Calvin and Turretin provide a theological foundation to resolve the fundamental dilemma that recent Trinitarian atonement models fail to solve. While I did not overlook minor discrepancies, I focused on the substantial continuity between the Trinitarian perspectives of Calvin and Turretin by evaluating the theological issues they addressed within their respective historical contexts, including Calvin's controversies on the Trinity with Servetus and Gentile, as well as Turretin's debates on the Trinity with Socinus and the Lutherans.

In Chapter 1, I conducted an analysis of Augustine's definitions of key terms and his interpretations of Scripture to examine how his comprehensive understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, along with the eternal Son's aseity, reinforces his Trinitarian framework, effectively refuting both Arius's subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism.

Augustine states that since God is the first being, He must be the sole immutable being who is never affected by any other. Augustine also believes God is an essence ("to be"), i.e., an immutable and independent being in an ineffable realm. God's essence, as revealed in Scripture, can subsist as a singular, self-existent substance in relation to Himself (Exodus 3:14) while concurrently existing as three distinct persons in relation to one another (John 5:27). This substantive and revealed essence remains intrinsically united with God's ineffable essence from all eternity. Such an essence could be one substance, the Father (the *Principium)*, in which as God the other two persons subsist in eternity according to the natural generation and procession. When Augustine refers to the "three persons," he emphasizes that they "subsist" in relation to one another, in accordance with his idea of volitional generation and procession.

I also explained how Augustine grounded the Nicene concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son in Scripture. His exegesis of John 1:1–3, 5:26–27, 10:29–30, and Philippians 2:6–7 demonstrates that the eternal Son possesses both consubstantiality and a distinct personality within the *Principium*. Augustine rejects both Arius's subordinationism and Sabellius's modalism. Augustine explicitly designates both God the Father and God the Son as *Principium*, interpreting John 5:26—"the Father has granted the Son to have life in Himself"—as a theological affirmation of the Father's natural generation of the eternal Son. Augustine subsequently interprets the phrase in John 5:27, "[the Father] hath given him authority to execute judgment," as signifying the Father's appointment of the Son as Christ. Augustine draws similar interpretations from John 10:29-30 and Philippians 2:6-7. For Augustine, the three actual eternal beings are the *Principium* because two are essentially and naturally generated and proceed from and within God the Father, who is the *Principium*.

I demonstrated that Augustine, in using the term *Principium*, primarily affirms the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit, rather than emphasizing their distinct personalities. The eternal Father the *Principium* naturally begat the eternal Son the *Principium* within Himself, and the Father also personally and relationally begat the incommunicable personality of the eternal Son. Considering all the available evidence, it seems clear that Augustine's notions of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son demonstrate the consubstantiality and distinct personalities of the three persons.

In Chapter 2, I attempted to explain exhaustively why and how Calvin's ideas of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's personal generation of the Son do not differ significantly from

Augustine's concepts. Taking into account Calvin's historical and theological context, this study has presented evidence from his writings to demonstrate that his articulation of the eternal Son's aseity and the Father's personal generation provides a substantive refutation of Gentile's subordinationism, as well as the combined modalism and subordinationism of Servetus. Moreover, it has been established that while Calvin's Trinitarian doctrine is consistent with Augustine's in substance, it departs from it in methodological approach.

Servetus distorts Augustine's holistic understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son to construct his own concept of a monistic God manifesting in various forms. He rejects Augustine's assertion that the eternal Son is a truly eternal being and person, brought forth through the Father's natural and volitional generation. Since Servetus's definition of the natural Son simultaneously encompasses two contradictory aspects of natural generation, he asserts that the eternal Logos is an eternal and natural reasoning (or idea) within the Father's eternal intellect, while the temporal Logos is naturally generated from the invisible Father. In other words, since Servetus rejects Augustine's holistic concepts of the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father and His distinct personality, he defines the natural generation of the Son as God's eternal reasoning, emanating certain substances by natural emanation into time and space in a manner akin to Arius's subordinationism. Servetus contends that the Father communicates His essence into time and space through a twofold mode of the eternal Logos—namely, eternal reason (*ratio aeterna*) and natural emanation (*emanatio naturalis*). As a result, Servetus perceives God's form (*morphe*) as a visible appearance (*species*) in time, derived from God's eternal essence, rather than as the *Principium* or the revealed essence of God in time. In summary, Servetus contends that the eternal Logos represents the Father's natural reasoning or idea, while the temporal Logos indicates God's borne and subordinate essence. Servetus's modalism and subordinationism arise from his rejection of Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and their shared aseity. In Servetus's framework, the Father's essence can be directly imparted to every creature in heaven or on earth through the dual aspects of the one Logos. This idea eliminates the necessity for the unique atoning work of Christ's incommunicable personality, as grounded in the Trinity's eternal decree.

Calvin's Trinitarian concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and the eternal Son's aseity align with Augustine's holistic understanding of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son, as evidenced by their respective engagements with theological controversies within their historical contexts. On the one hand, Calvin counters Gentile's subordinationism by employing his concept of the Son's *Principium* (or aseity), which is essentially consistent with Augustine's notion of the Father's natural generation of the Son. On the other hand, Calvin refutes Servetus's modalistic conception of a singular essential being in eternity by asserting the existence of three distinct personalities within one essence.

First, Calvin employs Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity to refute Gentile's subordinationism, which posits three distinct "grades" of essence. However, Calvin's use of Augustine's concept of the Son's aseity might be misconstrued as supporting tritheism, as his view of the Father's personal generation of the Son could imply that the Son is a distinct being, differentiated from and subordinated to the Father's essence. If Calvin combines his concept of the personal generation of the Son and the personal procession of the Spirit with Augustine's notion of the aseity of the Son and the Spirit, this could risk presenting the three distinct, eternal persons as three separate, essential beings in themselves (*a se ipso*). Such a synthesis of ideas by Calvin might appear to contradict Augustine's doctrine of the Father's natural generation of the Son. However, Calvin's intention in addressing the aseity and distinct personality of the Son is to demonstrate both

that the eternal Son shares the same essence as the Father and that the three eternal persons are distinct, thereby affirming Augustine's concepts of the Son's *Principium* and the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. Consequently, Calvin's understanding of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity aligns fundamentally with Augustine's views on the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son.

Second, Calvin highlights another aspect of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son to refute Servetus's modalism and subordinationism. Calvin argues that the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity means that there are three distinct personalities residing in one essence of God yet distinguished from that one essence. Calvin's idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son and their aseity means that there are three distinct and personal beings in the one essence of God, and thus that it is not an ongoing emanation. Identifying the Father's personal generation of the Son as a foundational element of the Trinity's eternal decrees in Hebrews 5:5, Calvin refutes both Servetus's modalism and the emanationist interpretation of eternal generation. Calvin's concepts of the Father's personal generation of the Son and the Son's aseity implies the following presuppositions:

1. The three divine persons possess consubstantiality by virtue of the Father's natural generation of the Son, through which they are numerically identical with the one, undivided essence of God.
2. The three divine persons, possessing consubstantiality, subsist as distinct hypostases through the Father's personal generation of the Son within the unity of the divine essence.
3. God's eternal decrees, grounded in both natural and volitional generation, are not solely the Father's decrees but rather the eternal decrees of the Trinity as a whole.

Calvin's interpretations of John 6:33 and 6:38 suggest that Christ willingly and freely humbled Himself in obedience to the eternal decree of the Trinity. The Immanent Logos was Himself subordinated to the Trinity's decree, holding a distinct office separate from the essence of God.

Calvin's Trinitarian perspective would be indistinguishable from that of Gentile or Servetus if he had not acquiesced to both Augustine's concept of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and to the idea of the Son's aseity. Furthermore, Calvin simultaneously refutes both Gentile's subordinationism and Servetus's modalism. In conclusion, Calvin's Trinitarian framework coheres with Augustine's conception of the Father's natural and volitional generation. Both theological models affirm the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father while simultaneously upholding His incommunicable personality as distinct from that of the Father.

In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that, on the one hand, Socinus's conception of God reflects a composite deity rather than a simple and self-existent Trinity; on the other hand, this conception of a composite deity serves as the foundation for his rejection of God's incomprehensible and transcendent essence, along with His essential attributes of immensity, eternity, and incomprehensibility.

First, Socinus's concept of God is revealed to be the notion of a composite god rather than a simple and self-existent Trinity. Socinus believes that the Father is the one and only origin and beginning of all things; according to Socinus, all visible and invisible things are generated by the Father's internal and temporal decrees. In contrast to Servetus, Socinus maintains that when God makes a decision internally and confirms it permanently, He uses both subordinate and internal wills and qualities. In order to affirm the Father's sole aseity, Socinus assumes that there is a hierarchy between the Father and His internal wills and qualities. However, if there is in fact such a

hierarchy, then Socinus's notion of God is essentially the same as to Gentile's subordinationism. Socinus's idea of the hierarchy in God is fundamentally caused by his denial of Augustine's idea of the Father's natural generation of the Son, which affirms the consubstantiality of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.

Second, Socinus's conception of a hierarchical relationship between the Father's essence and His internal decrees and attributes leads to his advocacy for a composite god characterized by hierarchical levels. This relationship also leads to his denial of God's essential attributes of infinity, i.e., an incomprehensible essence, eternity, and immensity, since a composite god would be restricted by other things including created beings, time, and space. Initially, Socinus's concept of the Father's one person and essence no longer requires him to account for an unfathomable way to explain how three distinct persons in one God's essence can coexist. Socinus concedes that only the Father has an essence and is the origin of all, but he attempts to separate the Father's essence from His internal will and qualities in the realm of God, namely, the perpetual third heaven, in order to support the idea of the Father's sole aseity. Thus, his notion of a composite deity must be constrained by His internal decrees and qualities, and in his scheme the Father has aseity but not simplicity or infinity. Socinus believes in a composite god and therefore he dismisses the concept of God's incomprehensible essence. Furthermore, since Socinus denies a simple and self-existent God, he rejects the concept of God's eternity. Socinus's concept of the Father's preordaining Jesus as the eternal Son of God prior to the creation is ultimately reduced to a formulation of the Father's internal decree, rather than an affirmation ofthe Trinity's transcendental and unchangeable decree. Socinus asserts that the Father's preordination of Jesus as Christ before the creation of the world was not established by the eternal decrees of the Trinity but would instead be validated by temporal outcomes. Since Socinus admits that the Father has an essential aseity but not an essential simplicity, his belief narrows to the idea that God is dependent on accidental events and constrained by time and space. As a result, Socinus's definition of the Father's internal wills and qualities is restricted to the temporal and changeable rather than the transcendental and eternal. Likewise, since Socinus denies a simple and self-existent God, he rejects the concept of God's immensity. In Socinus's formulation, a composite and temporal God is ultimately comprehensible through figures such as the glorified Jesus, the incarnate Christ, Elijah, or Paul as referenced in 2 Corinthians 12:4, insofar as such a God must be confined within the limitations of time and space—specifically, within a locatable realm such as the third heaven. Even though we who are on earth cannot access the Father who is in the third heaven, the sanctified or glorified Jesus in the third heaven can access the Father who is in the third heaven. Thus, Socinus's denial of a simple and self-existent God results in his rejection of the concept of God's immensity which should transcend the third heaven. Socinus's view of a composite god leads to the denial of God's incomprehensible and transcendental essence since his view disregards the notions of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son and the aseity of the Son (the *Principium*).

Third, Socinus denies Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son and Calvin's concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son, yet affirms the Father's twofold temporal emanation: namely, the first emanation from the Father's essence to His internal wills and invisible qualities in the third heaven, and the second emanation from the Father's essence to His external wills and temporal qualities on earth. Since Socinus denies Augustine's concept of the Father's natural generation of the Son, his notion of a hierarchy between the Father and His internal decree asserts that the Father possesses aseity but lacks the simplicity of the Trinity. He separates the Father's essence from His internal decree and attributes such as rectitude and equity. Second, since Socinus denies Calvin's idea of the Father's personal generation of the Son, his understanding

of the Father's internal wills and qualities as His monistic and internal wills and qualities is completely contrary to Calvin's idea of the Trinity's eternal decrees and qualities. In the end, Socinus's concept of the Father's internal wills and qualities differs from the notion of the eternal Son proposed by Augustine and Calvin. Socinus regards the Father's internal wills and attributes as subordinate to His essence, whereas Augustine and Calvin maintain that the eternal and natural Son is consubstantial with the Father's essence, either by the Father's natural generation of the Son or by the eternal Son's aseity. Rather, Socinus believes in a composite god rather than a simple and self-existent Trinitarian God. Socinus's belief in a composite and temporal god results in his denial of three essential attributes of God: His immensity, eternity, and incomprehensibility.

In Chapter 4, I explained that Turretin supports the Trinity's eternal decree by reintroducing Augustine's concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and their aseity. This approach counters Socinus's view of a composite deity that posits a hierarchy between the Father's essence and His internal decrees and attributes. Additionally, I demonstrated that Turretin clarifies and strengthens Calvin's concept of the Trinity's eternal decree by emphasizing Calvin's notion of the Father's personal generation of the Son. This serves to refute both Socinus's denial of Christ's incommunicable personality and the Lutheran concept of *in abstracto.*

To begin with, Turretin follows Augustine's interpretation of John 5:26 and Calvin's interpretation of Colossians 2:9 to prove that there is no hierarchy between the eternal Father's aseity and the eternal Son's aseity. In doing so, he opposes Socinus, who denies that God's name Jehovah and His aseity are attributed to the Son (the Immanent Logos). In other words, Turretin asserts that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit all have aseity and yet are consubstantial. Turretin cites both Colossians 2:9, which Calvin uses to support the Son's aseity, and John 5:26, which Augustine uses to support the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, to prove that the Son is *Principium* and to uphold the doctrine of the Father's natural generation of the Son. Like Augustine, Turretin believes that his concepts of the Father's natural generation of the Son and the Son's aseity assist in proving that the eternal Son possesses consubstantiality with the Father. Turretin's Trinitarian framework affirms that the Word is God *as Principium*, as he maintains in his exposition of John 1:1–3 that the eternal Word exists in the *Principium* by virtue of the Father's natural generation of the Son.

Moreover, Turretin attempts to highlight Calvin's concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son in order to refute both the Lutheran and Socinian rejections of Christ's incommunicable personality and the necessity of His vicarious satisfaction. When Turretin refers to John 5:26-27, he not only adopts Augustine's emphasis on the Father's natural generation of the Son (John 5:26) but also expands on Calvin's concept of the Father's personal generation of the Son (John 5:27). In other words, Turretin asserts that the Father grants the eternal Son His aseity through the natural generation of the Son and endows Him with a distinct personality through the Father's volitional generation of the Son. Also, Turretin's concept of the Trinity's eternal decrees reflects his affirmation of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son. He asserts that the eternal decrees of the Trinity are grounded first in natural generation and procession and second in volitional generation and procession. In other words, the eternal decrees of the Trinity are grounded in natural generation and procession and are fulfilled through the volitional generation of the Son and the volitional procession of the Holy Spirit.

Taken together, Turretin's idea of the Trinity's eternal decrees contradicts Socinus's idea that the Father alone decreed Christ in eternity, as Turretin argues that the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) all agreed that the Immanent Logos needed to be Christ in eternity. Turretin understands that the Immanent Logos who was in the form of the Father through the Father's

natural generation of the Son possessed His unique personality by means of His own volitional subjection in order to give eternal life and forgive the sins of all the saints of both the OT and NT eras.

In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how Turretin's concepts of natural and volitional generation and procession can be utilized to elaborate on the relationships between God's singular essence and the three distinct personalities and wills of the Trinity, as well as between God's absolute attributes of rectitude and goodness and Christ's personal attributes of vindictive justice and eternal benevolence.

Primarily, Socinus's concept of the Father's internal wills and qualities, though eternally ordained prior to creation, is applicable only to those who sincerely repent and thereby obey according to the Father's internal wills and qualities. Moreover, a hierarchical structure emerges between the Father's essence and His internal wills and qualities, as these internal wills and qualities are ascribed to the essence of the Father. This framework reflects a monistic conception of God, which ultimately results in Arian subordinationism, as Socinus lacks a holistic idea of natural generation and procession necessary to articulate the Trinity's consubstantial essence and qualities. In contrast to Socinus's inability to make the Father's sole aseity equal with His absolute wills and qualities, Turretin employs a holistic idea of natural and volitional generation and procession to elucidate the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence, the Trinity's sovereign good pleasure (*prothesis*), the Immanent Logos's foreknowledge (*prognosis*)—as manifested in Christ— and the Immanent Holy Spirit's predestination (*proorismos*)—as personally expressed in the third person of the Trinity. In doing so, Turretin constructs a theological foundation that avoids any hierarchical distinction between the aseity of the eternal Father and that of the Son by affirming the eternal Son's aseity—explicitly articulated in Colossians 2:9—in conjunction with the doctrines of natural generation and procession, as set forth in John 5:26. Accordingly, he asserts that the Trinity's mere good pleasure is intrinsically linked to God's essence because this good pleasure is consequent upon the natural and volitional generation of the Son and the natural and volitional procession of the Spirit. In summary, Turretin's holistic understanding of natural and volitional generation and procession provides a coherent framework for articulating the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantiality, the Trinity's sovereign good pleasure (*prothesis*), and the distinct personalities, offices, and decrees of both Christ and the Holy Spirit —namely, foreknowledge (*prognosis*) and predestination (*proorismos*).

Moreover, in contrast to Socinus's separation of God's internal quality of rectitude from His temporal quality of vindictive justice, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective upholds a holistic understanding of natural and volitional generation to explain the relationship among the Trinity's consubstantiality, the Trinity's mere good pleasure (*prothesis*), and the personal wills and qualities of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Due to his holistic idea of the natural and volitional generation and procession, Turretin's Trinitarian formulation can, in a theologically precise way, refute Socinus's claim that God's vindictive justice is one of His temporal qualities, not an eternal or essential one. On the one hand, Turretin's concept of natural generation affirms a communion of the absolute quality of rectitude between the Father and the Immanent Logos. On the other hand, Turretin's idea of the Father's natural and volitional generation of the Son aligns with the idea that the Immanent Logos can possess both God's absolute quality of rectitude and His personal qualities of vindictive justice and eternal benevolence. Turretin can then conclude that while the Immanent Logos remains in the essence of the eternal Father and has the absolute qualities of rectitude, wisdom, goodness, and mercy, He, as the Logos Brought Forth, can also possess the personal qualities of eternal vindictive justice, eternal benevolence, and eternal life.

Considered collectively, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective is not identical to Socinus's concept of a composite deity, which relies on a hierarchical distinction between the Father's essence and His internal, perpetual wills and attributes, as well as a separation between the Father's essence and His external, temporal wills and attributes. By employing a comprehensive formulation of natural and volitional generation and procession, Turretin establishes a robust theological foundation that affirms the relationship between the Trinity's consubstantial essence, the Trinity's sovereign good pleasure (*prothesis*), and the distinct personalities, offices, and decrees of both Christ and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, Turretin's Trinitarian perspective effectively maintains the intrinsic connection between the shared essence of the Trinity, the absolute rectitude inherent in the Father and the Immanent Logos, and the relative and vindicative justice of the Logos Brought Forth.

In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that Calvin and Turretin establish the relationship between hypothetical and consequential necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction by affirming the eternal counsel of the Trinity, grounded in the natural and volitional (or personal) generation and procession within the Godhead for the elect in eternity, upon the condition of Adam's violation of the covenant of works. To establish this relationship, it should be examined whether Calvin's and Turretin's Trinitarian doctrines suggest that the eternal Son of God underwent humiliation in two distinct ways: (1) by lowering Himself from the Immanent Logos to the Logos Brought Forth, and (2) by descending from the Logos Brought Forth to the Incarnate Logos. I have demonstrated that Turretin's and Calvin's concepts of the Immanent Logos's twofold humiliation are intrinsic to their definition of heaven, which encompasses a twofold aspect. Through a comparison of Turretin's definition of the three distinct meanings of heaven with Calvin's, it can be concluded that Calvin's Trinitarian perspective aligns more closely with Turretin's than with Socinus's.

Calvin believes that the Immanent Logos must veil His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth on behalf of the elect. On the one hand, in opposition to the Lombard's idea of Christ's merit for Himself,[1] Calvin argues that Christ, while possessing God's essence in Himself, had no reason to veil His essence to be the Logos Brought Forth in order to possess His eternal life for Himself, except for the sake of the elect. Calvin concludes that the Immanent Logos's self-emptying of His essence is required to possess Christ's mediatorial authority on behalf of others. On the other hand, since Osiander contends that Christ's essential righteousness, rather than His vicarious satisfaction, is necessary for our perfect salvation and glorification, he denies the necessity of the eternal Son's distinct personality from the Father. Because Osiander does not acknowledge Christ's divine personality and authority granted by the Father in eternity, he argues that Christ would have become the Incarnate Logos regardless of whether Adam sinned, in order for His church to have a head to rule over humanity throughout the world. In rebutting Osiander's denials of Christ's divine personality, Calvin first assumes that the Immanent Logos, already possessing Immanent Life for Himself, must undergo humiliation to possess His distinct personality, the Logos Brought Forth, in order to bestow eternal life upon human beings. He then argues that Adam's fall necessitated the incarnation of the Logos Brought Forth, so that the Incarnate Logos could satisfy God's divine wrath and fulfill the eternal decree of the Trinity. In summary, in rebutting Osiander's denial of the hypothetical necessity of Christ's distinct personality and the conditional necessity of His vicarious satisfaction, Calvin argues that, because Adam transgressed God's commandment, it consequently became necessary for the Logos Brought Forth to become the Incarnate Logos. The Logos Brought Forth, in the state of incarnation, fulfills His mediatorial role and, according to the eternal decrees of the Trinity, grants eternal life to the elect.

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[1] Cf. Calvin, "Institutionis Religionis Christianae Editio Ultima," II.xvii.6 (CO. 2, p. 390-92).

Turretin also upholds Calvin's concept of Christ's incommunicable personality to counter the Lutheran notion of *in abstracto* and Socinus's denial of Christ's distinct personality. Turretin highlights the distinction between the Son of God, who shares the same essence as the Father, and Christ, who assumes His role as Mediator for the elect. Furthermore, opposing Socinus's denial of the necessity of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, Turretin argues that unless Adam had sinned, the Logos Brought Forth would not have become the incarnate Logos to secure eternal forgiveness and merit for the elect. After Adam's sin, there is no other means to satisfy God's vindicative justice and impart His eternal benevolence than through Christ's atoning satisfaction of divine justice. As the Mediator between God and humanity, the Son of God must fulfill His mediatorial role through the exercise of His threefold office.

Turretin's and Calvin's conceptions of the Immanent Logos's twofold humiliation are reflected in their respective definitions of the twofold nature of heaven. They draw a clear distinction between the heaven from which the Immanent Logos receives His essence, the heaven in which the Logos Brought Forth resides and permeates, and the third heaven where the human nature of the Logos Brought Forth is exalted. Although Christ's glorified human nature is located in the third heaven, He remains united with both the Logos Brought Forth and the Immanent Logos, thereby retaining His identity as Christ and God. Building on the notion of natural and volitional generation, Turretin seeks to affirm and further clarify Calvin's concept of the three distinct meanings of heaven: 1) the eternal Son's consubstantiality with the Father; 2) Christ's unique personality, characterized by His divine knowledge and will; and 3) the third heaven. Due to Turretin's holistic conception of natural and volitional generation, he is able to effectively refute Socinus's misinterpretation of the meaning of heaven. Considering the alignment between Calvin's view of heaven and Turretin's, Calvin's Trinitarian perspective is consistent with Turretin's, which is grounded in the doctrines of natural and volitional generation and procession. Therefore, Calvin's Trinitarian perspective does not differ significantly from Augustine's or Turretin's Trinitarian perspectives. However, it stands in stark contrast to that of Socinus.

In conclusion, Calvin and Turretin attempt to elaborate on why the Immanent Logos veiled His essence in order to be the Logos Brought Forth and become the mediator between God and man. They believe that the Immanent Logos, who was in the form of the Father, had consubstantiality with the Father, while the Logos Brought Forth had a distinct personality from the Father for the sake of others. According to them, God's essential and personal qualities of vengeful justice and eternal benevolence must be satisfied due to the fall according to the Trinitarian decree. In other words, Adam's sin necessitated the incarnation of the Logos Brought Forth, as God established the Trinitarian decree prior to Adam's fall and the incarnation. If the fulfillment of God's vindictive justice of the Logos Brought Forth is required by the Trinitarian decree, then the only way to satisfy God's essential and personal qualities of vindictive justice is via the accomplishment of Christ, the mediator. Likewise, neither the Logos Brought Forth without His human nature nor His human nature alone can accomplish Christ's mediatorial office. Christ must be both the Immanent Logos as the author of the decree and the Logos Brought Forth as the administrator of the decree. The Logos Brought Forth in eternity must accordingly become Jesus to fulfill God's vengeful justice on behalf of His sinful elect whom he foreknew and predesitned in accordance with the eternal decree of the Trinity.

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