MERCIFUL SEVERITY

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO’S EARLY THOUGHT
ON THE REDEMPTIVE FUNCTION OF DIVINE JUDGMENT

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La conversion de St. Paul by Luca Giordano (1690), Musée des Beaux-Arts de Nancy

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1 Introduction

1.1 God’s judgment and his mercy – why study Augustine on this topic today?

This thesis investigates how the fourth-century bishop Augustine of Hippo (354-430) conceived of the function of divine judgment in the process of salvation. By divine judgment I mean God’s revelation of his law to man, and the sanctions that follow upon transgression of this law in the form of punishment. How does this judgment relate to God’s grace? As I will briefly argue below, modern Christianity experiences increasing difficulty in perceiving God as judge, and this has influenced the Christian understanding of salvation. This observation led me to study the theology of a pre-modern theologian whose thought on this issue shaped Western theological thinking until the Reformation.

Charles Taylor has argued that since the time of the Reformation, European culture has moved away from what he calls the ‘juridical-penal framework’ to interpret God’s relation to the world. The Augustinian-Anselmian tradition regarded humanity as created good, but as presently suffering under the penal consequences of sin, both original and actual. Humanity was guilty, and God proved to be a righteous judge by punishing sin both in time and in eternity. However, it was believed that this God had also revealed himself as merciful. He had shown his love in history by sending his Son into the world in order to pay the penalty of sin and thus to save his people from eternal damnation. In this framework, the fear of God, the pain of suffering as chastisement of sin, but also the joy in forgiveness and God-given satisfaction for human debt, paving the way to a life hereafter, were part and parcel of how the Christian’s relation to God was perceived.¹

The rise of deism and humanism altered this understanding of God’s relationship to the world. The influence of these philosophies led to the idea that the present world is to be seen as a harmonious order, which contains all the resources needed to attain human flourishing. Moreover, humanity was less and less regarded as radically fallen; it rather stood in need of improvement. Through the gift of the light of reason, God had indeed endowed humanity with the tool to improve itself. In this picture, God is perceived not primarily as humanity’s judge, but rather as its educator or helper. It is not without reason that the Enlightenment thinkers fiercely attacked the doctrines of original sin, penal atonement, and predestination.² These doctrines did not fit in the new worldview in which God and man were perceived as co-workers towards a better future for mankind, rather than as judge and condemned sinners, respectively.

In postmodern times, after the eclipse of the grand narratives and the enlightened optimism about history, this perception of the relationship between God and man has not essentially changed. It has rather received a Gnostic twist.³ Humans are no longer perceived as rational agents, capable of moving themselves and the world towards a better future, but they are rather seen as the battleground

¹ Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 78. It goes without saying that this tradition itself was full of tensions, especially with regard to the question to what extent humans could make themselves worthy of the reception of divine grace.
² Taylor, A Secular Age, 262.
³ On the return of Gnosticism in postmodernity, see Luca Di Blasi, Der Geist in der Revolte. Der Gnostizismus und seine Wiederkehr in der Postmoderne, (München: W. Fink, 2002).
of innumerable social forces. At the same time, there is a widespread, romantic belief in the goodness of our spontaneous aspirations. Evil is perceived as alienation from a pure self, caused by external influences, not as an internal, intrinsic rebellion against God. Thus, the mission of the late modern person is to discover this inner core and express it in an authentic way of life. In this framework, God is perceived as the one who reminds us of our true identity, and helps us to recover it.

These modern and late-modern understandings of the relationship between God and mankind have made it difficult to understand the juridical-penal interpretation of this relationship, which has dominated the West for such a long time. God is rather perceived as opposing the evil that we suffer, or as suffering with us, than as somehow acting through it as our judge. If humans are essentially good, and God intends human flourishing, why would he allow us to suffer, or even demand the death of his Son for human redemption? This picture of God also explains the modern difficulty with God’s exercise of revenge in the Old Testament. How can a God of love command genocide? It further comes to the fore in how the death of Christ is interpreted. Is God only present in him as the one who suffers evil, or as the one who teaches us something about ourselves and our inclination to violence, or did he himself act through this violence for human salvation?

The modern and late-modern difficulty with the juridical-penal framework in understanding God’s relation to the world, resembles movements of thought which defined the world in which Augustine of Hippo lived. Notwithstanding the differences, the enlightened optimism about human nature and its capacity to be educated resembles classical pedagogical ideas about human reason and its capacity to emancipate humanity from irrational behavior. The Gnostic (Manichaean) argument that humans have a divine core, which God awakens through gnosis, and that evil in all its forms is to be ascribed to another nature, has striking similarities to the late-modern experience of God and the self, as well as its difficulty to connect the God of love to the God of justice.

Augustine developed his theology under the influence of and in conversation with these traditions. This observation led me to study Augustine’s early thought on the relationship between God’s judgment and his salvific action towards humans. Augustine’s return to Christianity must be perceived as a way of overcoming Gnostic dualism, in the form of Manichaeism, with the help of classical philosophical thought. He therefore seems to be a helpful voice to facilitate the contemporary conversation about how Christians can perceive God as both merciful and just.

4 For the postmodern turn to the ‘victimization of the agent’, see Adonis Vidu, Atonement, Law and Justice. The Cross in Historical and Cultural Contexts (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 183.
5 Taylor, A Secular Age, 618.
6 Taylor, A Secular Age, 651ff.
7 There is an extensive amount of literature on this subject. For an overview, see Eric Peels, God en geweld in het Oude Testament, (Apeldoornse Studies, nr. 49; Apeldoorn, 2007).
8 For the return of this dualism in modern Christian consciousness, see A. van de Beek, Een lichtkring om het kruis. Scheppingsleer in christologisch perspectief (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2014), 337-40. Van de Beek argues that present-day dualism is rather Marcionite than Gnostic, as Gnosticism was much more defined by a dualism between matter and spirit. In response to this claim, one could argue, however, that postmodern romanticism with regard to man’s ‘true identity’ is rather Gnostic than Marcionite. On Marcion’s relation to Gnosticism, see Kurt Rudolph, Die Gnosis. Wesen und Geschichte einer spätantiken Religion (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 337-40.
1.2 Contextualizing the research question

The following sections contextualize the research question from three different perspectives. Firstly, I will sketch the anti-Gnostic theological tradition that Augustine received as a young Christian and in which he developed his thought on the relationship between God’s judgment and his salvific action. Secondly, I will describe the relevant aspects of the classical pedagogical tradition with which Augustine was acquainted, both through his own education, and through his study of Cicero and other philosophical schools. Finally, I will sketch the discussion in Augustinian studies about the function of divine judgment in the process of salvation.

1.2.1 The (Alexandrian) anti-dualist tradition

The great obstacle that held Augustine back from returning to the religion of his youth was a Gnostic form of Christianity: Manichaeism. After Cicero had enkindled in him a desire for the immortality of wisdom, he had turned to the Manichees. Both their criticism of orthodox Christianity, their explanation of evil, and their promise of offering a purely rational religion had attracted Augustine.

He describes his return to Catholic Christianity as a struggle to overcome Manichaeism and to find a credible alternative that would satisfy his desire for wisdom. The problem that tormented Augustine the most was the origin of evil. In the Milanese circle, represented by Ambrose, Simplicianus, and Mallius Theodorus, he discovered a concept of evil that enabled him to recover the religion of his youth in a new way. Building upon a Platonist ontology, they taught him that evil is to be understood as the soul’s voluntary aversion from the highest good towards lower things (peccatum), and as the penalty that follows upon this choice (poena peccati). This explanation enabled Augustine to understand his soul’s entanglement in carnal habit as God’s penalty for his own sins, rather than as the assault of another nature on the divine element within him. He further came to know Christ as the Wisdom of God, who had assumed a human body to free the soul from its entanglement in carnal habit and permit it to achieve its spiritual destiny.

In Milan Augustine adopted a form of Christianity that was both anti-dualist and philosophical. It is very likely that the Alexandrian apologetic tradition, represented by Clement and especially Origen, was somehow mediated to Augustine. Their anti-Gnostic theology, which they...
presented as a form of Christian pedagogy of the human soul, bears much resemblance to Augustine’s early theological preoccupations.

In the wake of predecessors such as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus of Lyon, Clement and Origen fought against a Gnostic understanding of reality, which attributed the creation of the material world to a lower deity (the Demiurug) that was opposed to the highest god, or had originated from a fall in the constellation of divine beings. Gnosticism conceived of the true god as purely transcendental, absolutely surpassing the sphere of heimarmenê, the sublunar reality where dark powers rule over our bodies. The highest god does not intervene in this world by force, as the demiurug does, but by revealing secret knowledge (gnosis) to remind fallen souls of their divine identities. According to the heresiological tradition, Gnosticism connected this view of the world to a soteriological determinism. The Gnostics believed they were saved by nature, because of the identity of their souls with the highest god. As long as they were in this world, they only had to resist the power of evil that intended to harm them through the body. God was on their side, but they had to suffer the onslaughts of the demiurug until its final defeat. This dualism also affected their view of the relationship between the Old and the New Testaments. The Gnostics as it were ‘reversed’ salvation history as it is presented in the Hebrew Scriptures. The Creator and Lord of Israel, whom the Old Testament presents as the one and only ruler of the world, they presented as the evil persecutor of the Gnostics, the allies of the true transcendental god. This Old Testament dissembler continuously tried to destroy the Gnostics by persecuting and punishing them. Adam’s exclusion from paradise, the flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah – all such judgments were seen as evil attempts of the demiurug to exercise his dominion over those who belonged to the true god. Jesus inaugurated something entirely new. He was regarded as one of the mediators through whom the transcendent god revealed gnosis to fallen souls, to remind them of their homeland above the heavens, and by doing so to liberate them from the power of the darkness.

Given this perceived unity between the divine and the soul of the Gnostic, it is not surprising that Gnostic Christians were regarded as relativizing external authority. This is identifiable, for example, in Clement’s Paedagogos, where the author depicts his Gnostic opponents as people who regard themselves as already perfect after their enlightenment and therefore as no longer in need of teaching by others whom they regarded as lower then themselves. In the eyes of their opponents, therefore, Gnostic anthropology was dangerously liable to forms of anti-nomianism, a charge that Augustine will repeat against the Manichees.

Clement and Origen used their pedagogical interpretation of Christianity to battle the Gnostic worldview. They emphasized that the Creator of this world and the Father of Jesus Christ are one and the same God. They further strongly defended the doctrine of providence. They believed that God the

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14 Rudolph, Die Gnosis, 146-8; Schottroff, “Animae naturaliter salvandae”, 70.
15 Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogos 1.52.
16 Albrecht Dihle, “Gerechtigkeit”, Reallexiken für antikes Christentum, Bnd. 10, 245-360 (318-9).
Creator cares for this world and governs it in a righteous way, rewarding everyone according to the merits of his free will. Not nature, but rather merit, is what counts for salvation. It is from this context that their discourse on divine punishment is to be understood. Against the Gnostic opposition between the good, transcendent god and the severe or just god, they argued that the one God expresses his goodness exactly by showing his justice and punishing sin. In doing so, God acts as a pedagogue who intends to educate his pupils to become wise adults. In his Paedagogos, Clement states that God as a good educator adapts himself to the capabilities of his students. He prefers to teach by words, but for those who are not eager to learn, he uses the method of disciplinary punishment. In this regard, the incarnate Word does not differ from the God of the Old Testament. Both in the Old Testament and in the New, the Word teaches through words, appealing to human reason and his free will, but threatens the unwilling with the rod of correction, because he wants to save them from ultimate damnation.

By thus presenting salvation history as a pedagogical process, biblical language about God’s discipline of his people (LXX: paideia) and the Greek educational tradition come together. This connection is also evident from Clement’s use of medical imagery to characterize God’s disciplinary treatment of his people. As we shall see, the comparison between medicine and education was widespread among philosophical schools in Antiquity. Thus, Clement’s presentation of Christianity as the fulfillment of Greek paideia not only served apologetic purposes towards his pagan contemporaries, but also functioned as a means to counter Gnosticism.

Clement’s successor Origen further developed this pedagogical understanding of Christianity. Against the Gnostic question of why the situations of souls in this world are so different – if they are created by a good and just God – Origen argued that God created all souls equal, as disembodied entities, but sent them into bodies as a punishment for their voluntary aversion to God. The distinct situations in which they presently find themselves should be explained by the differences of their merits. This does not mean that material creation as such is evil. It is rather a secondary order, springing from God’s goodness, by which God intends to restrain the effects of sin, and lead fallen souls back to himself. He gave them a bodily existence that suited the measure of their sin, in order to educate each soul through the suffering allotted to it. Each soul receives the education that it needs. Some need to be constrained like children and slaves, because they lack an understanding of their need of salvation; others can be taught by words and reason. But the doctor of all souls makes sure that all

17 Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogos, 1,53-74.
18 Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogos, 1,60-61: “Scripture seems to be suggesting that those whom the Word does not heal through persuasion He will heal with threats; and those whom threats do not heal the rod will; and those whom the rod does not heal, fire will consume” (translation: FC, 55); Judith L. Kovacs, “Divine Pedagogy and the Gnostic Teacher according to Clement of Alexandria”, Journal of Early Christian Studies 9/1 (2001), 3-25 (7, 16)
19 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paidagogos, 1,81 where Clement says that the physician adapts his treatment to the illness of the patient, sometimes administering mild, sometimes stringent medicines.
21 Origen, De principiis, 2,9,5-8 (ANF 4, 291-2).
receive the treatment that they need, so that God will eventually become all in all.\textsuperscript{22} In this educational process, the incarnate Logos is the teacher \textit{par excellence}.\textsuperscript{23}

In his account of divine pedagogy Origen reserved a significant place for human free will. Only because souls retain free will (\textit{prohairesis})\textsuperscript{24} and continue to participate in the divine Logos, can they cooperate with God’s teaching, and eventually be restored to their original condition.\textsuperscript{25} As God does not coerce anyone, but makes use of the free will of his rational creatures, the process of purification might take several \textit{aions} (thus Origen adapts the Platonic idea of \textit{metempsychosis}), but it will eventually result in the \textit{apokatastasis pantoon}, the restoration of all rational creatures to their original situation of contemplation.\textsuperscript{26} It should be noted at this point that Origen is very reluctant to teach the doctrine of \textit{apokatastasis} to everyone, because it might provoke moral laxity. It should not be taught to those to whom the threat of eternal punishment is still useful, just as children profit from the threat of punishment, even if the parent eventually refrains from executing it.\textsuperscript{27} Origen sees the Church as a pedagogical institute that accommodates to each individual soul, teaching some, threatening others as still-irrational children, and applying remedial punishments for their sins.\textsuperscript{28}

What is important for the present investigation is that Clement and Origen attempted to reconcile God’s goodness and his justice over against the Gnostics by interpreting divine punishment in time exclusively from a pedagogical perspective. In their system, God is just in treating us according to the merits of our free will, and good in that his punishments for sin are never merely retributive, but rather constructive. By punishing us, God appeals to our mind and will so that we turn back to him. For Origen this connection of divine goodness and justice even leads to the idea of the restoration of all things. Eventually, there is no retributive justice from God’s side, but rather only remedial justice, even for the devil and his angels.

Ekkehard Mühlenberg has argued that Origen’s account of evil resembles the understanding of evil in Neoplatonism, in that he does not regard it as radically opposed to the good, as an anti-power, but rather as an alienation from the good, which is always encompassed by the self-communication of the good.\textsuperscript{29} This idea finds expression in Origen’s doctrine of creation. When the soul turns away from God, bodily creation is the means through which God arrests souls in their fall and draws them back to himself, denying evil the opportunity to take radical possession of man. God’s justice and his mercy

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{22} Origen, \textit{De principiis} 3.5.8.
\textsuperscript{24} On Origen’s anti-Gnostic interest to preserve the freedom of the will, see Michael Frede, \textit{A Free Will. Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 102-24.
\textsuperscript{25} Koch, \textit{Pronoia und Paideusis}, 24-7.
\textsuperscript{26} Koch, \textit{Pronoia und Paideusis}, 26; Ramelli, “Christian Soteriology and Christian Platonism: Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Biblical and Philosophical Basis of the Doctrine of Apokatastasis”, \textit{Vigiliae Christianae} 61 (2007), 313-56 (esp. 314-22). Ramelli points out that Origen’s Platonic presupposition that God is the good who must communicate itself, and his view of evil as privation, underpins Origen’s speculation about the universal restoration of creation. Mark S.M. Scott (“Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation. The Pastoral Pedagogy of Origen’s Universalism”, \textit{Journal of Early Christian Studies} 18/3 (2010), 347-70) has argued, however, that this doctrine has an experimental character and is counterbalanced by many texts in which Origen argues for the existence of eternal punishment.
\textsuperscript{27} Mark S.M. Scott, “Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation”, 365.
\textsuperscript{28} Koch, \textit{Pronoia und Paideusis}, 82.
\end{flushleft}
thus always work together. In this regard, Origen’s account of evil differs from that of Athanasius, Mühlenberg argues. Athanasius regarded the first sin of humanity as unleashing a dynamic power that takes possession of humans and makes them radically opposed to God. The experience of suffering and death makes them put their hope in self-invented idols, rather than fostering their return from non-being to being. Only the divine choice to cancel the power of death through the death of the Word itself could liberate humanity from the power of death. In this vision, divine justice and mercy are much more differentiated. God’s punishment of sin does not necessarily have a pedagogical function.

Although it remains a matter of discussion whether Augustine adopted Origen’s metaphysical framework (the fall of the soul and the apokatastasis pannoton), his early writings testify that he did share Clement and Origen’s pedagogical understanding of salvation history and the function of divine punishment within it. This raises the first question of our investigation: how does Augustine relate to this pedagogical understanding of punishment in his early writings and how does his thought develop up until the Confessions? I will argue that Augustine initially adopted a pedagogical approach, in which God’s punishment of sin is by nature instructive (presupposing the freedom of the will), but gradually comes to disconnect this combination of punishment and mercy. Only for the predestined, who have been liberated from the law of death in the body of Christ, does God’s punishment have pedagogical effects. In this regard, Augustine departed from the Origenist tradition by upholding its theodicy without upholding its belief in human free will.

1.2.2 Philosophical psychagogy

As observed in the previous section, Christian apologists presented Christianity in close connection to the Hellenistic culture of education. Augustine shared in this culture. He received a classical literary education, and after his reading of Cicero, he acquainted himself with important philosophical schools, among which he found Neoplatonism the most illuminating for his understanding of Christianity. In order to understand Augustine’s view of how God’s judgment relates to his mercy, it might be helpful to briefly sketch some pedagogical ideas with which Augustine must have been acquainted.

Before I address the tradition of philosophical psychagogy that Augustine inherited via Cicero and other sources, I will make a few remarks about the use of (corporeal) punishment within the context of education. In the education of children corporeal punishment was not uncommon.

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31 Robert O’Connell has argued that the early Augustine did teach the fall of the soul theory to explain the present existence of humanity in the body. Others scholars such as Goulven Madec, Frederick van Fleteren, and Gerard O’Daly have contradicted him. The discussion continues up to the present day and is well summarized by Ronny Rombs, Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul. Beyond O’Connell and His Critics, (Washington DC: University of America Press, 2006). Recently, Iliari Ramelli (“Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception”, Numen 60 (2013), 280-307) has argued that Augustine taught the doctrine of apokatastasis pannoton in his early years, probably without knowing that it derived from Origen. She bases her argument mainly on mor. 2,7,9, CSEL 90,95: “Dei bonitas... omnia deficientia sic ordinat, ut ibi sint ubi congruentissime possint esse, donec ordinatis motibus ad id recurrant unde defecerunt.”


Augustine himself experienced this custom at school. The same applied to the custom of beating children at home. Philosophically, the use of the whip against children was justified on the basis of the assumption that they lacked reason. Greek and Roman writers regularly compare children to animals and postulate that because they are incapable of controlling their passions, they cannot be expected to act on the basis of reason. Thus, they have to be domesticated by fear of punishment. In theory, therefore, children did not differ from slaves. Both were held in check through fear of punishment. However, children had a different status than slaves; they were their parent’s own flesh and blood, and represented the family’s hope for the future. Furthermore, corporeal punishment was generally regarded as violating someone’s dignity. To flog or whip someone was to degrade him to the status of a slave or a low-class person. Therefore, in the case of freeborn children, whipping represented a paradox to the aristocratic mind. An aristocratic Roman father regarded his son as someone who should be educated to become an honorable and respected citizen. As such, he desired to avoid making him into a fearful and subservient person by treating him as a slave. So the goal of chastisement was to advance filial loyalty, rather than merely to instil fear and confirm hierarchy.

Mere retributive punishments characterized the relationship between slaves and their owners and rulers and subjects. Slaves were simply punished in order to affirm and preserve the hierarchical relationship. In legal cases, punishment was applied for the sake of restoring justice. If a person did not possess Roman citizenship, a magistrate could even flog him without a legal case, just for the sake of preserving order. Outside of the classroom and the family, corporeal punishment thus only had a retributive, repressive function (coercitio).

Augustine also became acquainted with the tradition of philosophical psychagogy, the cure of the soul by training the mind in rational thinking. Cicero mediated to him a Platonic-Socratic understanding of philosophy as a way of healing the soul from its irrational passions. Plato taught that the human soul presently suffers under the passions, caused by wrong judgments that it had contracted through custom and upbringing. Accordingly, the soul had to be converted from the world of common opinion (doxa) to the world of the ideas, where plain truth (alètheia) was to be found. By remembering its knowledge of the ideas (anamnesis), the soul could heal itself from irrationality and act according to the truth. Plato compared philosophy to medicine and the philosophical teacher to a doctor, who needed to know the state of his patient’s soul in order to apply the right treatment. Over against the sophists, he stated that rhetoric should serve this medical purpose. Words should not be

34 conf. 1,13-14.
35 Laes, Children in the Roman Empire, 143-4.
36 The Biblical image of a father flogging his son (Hbr. 12:6) must therefore have been offensive to the Roman aristocratic mind. See Th. de Bruyn, “Flogging a Son: The Emergence of the pater flagellans in Latin Christian Discourse”, Journal of Early Christian Studies 7/2 (1999), 249-90 (259).
37 Laes, Children in the Roman Empire, 144.
39 Roman citizens had the right of prouocatio, the appeal to the court in order to receive a fair hearing. See Saller, “Corporeal Punishment”, 155-6.
40 Flogging was feared by everyone, because it had a symbolic connection to slavery, the loss of Roman dignitas.
41 Paul Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls. Revising a Classical Ideal (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 69. For Cicero’s understanding of philosophy as medicina animi, see Tusc. Disp. 3,3; 3,10-11.
42 Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls, 23.
used to win the crowds for oneself, but to liberate the crowds from their errors. This could imply painful surgery, as the philosophical rhetor deprived his patients of their most cherished opinions about the good. Nonetheless, this severe discipline served their ultimate interest: the return of the soul from the external world, to itself, in order to delight in the truth alone.

In his reflections on the state and on citizenship, Plato also reserved a place for (corporeal) punishment in the process of philosophical education. Starting from the Socratic principle that all sin results from ignorance, he wonders on what basis punishment could be justified. A retributive understanding of punishment is to be rejected, as this presupposes that the sin is done voluntarily, and this is exactly what Plato denies. Therefore, for Plato, punishment can only be justified as a cure of the disease of ignorance. If someone does something wrong, the rational mind is to be regarded as suffering atrophy through the swelling of the lower parts of the soul. Punishment is a chirurgical measure to release the mind from the suppressing power of the passions. At the same time, this punishment has a deterrent character for the body politic at large.\textsuperscript{44} In Plato, as in other philosophers, education and restraint are not in opposition to each other. The former rather serves the latter.

Plato’s therapeutic understanding of philosophy as medicine of the mind had become mainstream among philosophical schools in the Hellenistic world, even if their respective views of happiness differed.\textsuperscript{45} Seneca, for example, depicted himself in his letters to Lucilius as a medical doctor trying to heal his pupil’s soul from irrational passions, implanted in him by his pupil’s upbringing.\textsuperscript{46} By disciplining his mind in Stoic doctrine, the student can heal his soul and acquire a stable place in the world.\textsuperscript{47} Cicero applied this understanding of philosophy to the bond of friendship in general. In classical thought friendship was based on mutual respect for each other’s character and was aimed at perfecting this character in virtue. Therefore, “friends frequently must be not only advised (monendi), but also rebuked (obiurgandi sunt), and both advice and rebuke should be kindly received when given in a spirit of goodwill.”\textsuperscript{48} Because the love of truth binds friends together, a good friend does not remain silent to his companion if the latter violates the truth. Therefore, Cicero says, sometimes bitter-tongued enemies can be better than sweet-smiling friends\textsuperscript{49} – a judgment that Augustine himself repeats in \textit{Confessions} 9,18.\textsuperscript{50} With regard to authorities applying punishment, Cicero emphasizes that an office bearer should exterminate any feeling of vengeance in his mind, and

\textsuperscript{44} On this twofold function of punishment, see \textit{Gorgias} 525B. Cf. E. Barker, \textit{The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle} (New York: Dover, 1959), 204. Plato’s project was to ascribe to the state itself an educating function. He observed that lawyers usually acted as slave doctors who merely prescribed a medicine for a particular illness (i.e. punishment) without examining the actual health situation of the patient. Plato proposed that lawyers needed to be true doctors who examined the health situation of the patient, not only to cure, but also to prevent further illness. In other words, lawyers needed to be educators. For this reason, he thought that the ideal state had to be governed by philosophers. Punishment and restraint needed to have a pedagogical, rather than a mere retributive purpose (Jaeger, \textit{Paideia}, Bnd. III, 291-93). Simultaneously, he denied that virtue could be attained by mere ‘character formation’, because it depended on a direct vision of the good. Nonetheless, good example and restraint of the lower soul could have an ancillary function in gaining this vision of the good. Cf. R.F. Stalley, “Punishment in the Protagoras”, \textit{Phronèsis} 40/1 (1995), 1-19 (17-9).

\textsuperscript{45} Kolbet, \textit{Augustine and the Cure of Souls}, 41.

\textsuperscript{46} Kolbet, \textit{Augustine and the Cure of Souls}, 46-50.

\textsuperscript{47} Kolbet, \textit{Augustine and the Cure of Souls}, 56.

\textsuperscript{48} Cicero, \textit{Laelius De Amicitia} 24,88: “...et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.” (Loeb, 197).

\textsuperscript{49} Cicero, \textit{Laelius De Amicitia} 24,90, 199.

\textsuperscript{50} conf. 9,17: “Even as friends by their flattery pervert, so do enemies by their taunts often correct us” (NPNF 1, 136).
be motivated by the correction of the other person, and the good of the community.51 Both Augustine’s practice of education at Cassiciacum and his understanding of fraternal correction and monastic discipline would prove to be influenced by these kind of ideas, but we will also see how Augustine reworks them in a Christian context.52 In this regard, especially his use of medical imagery will be addressed.53

Painful pedagogy was not merely perceived as something that took place between humans. Among both Stoic and Neoplatonist philosophers it was common to perceive the entire universe as pedagogical in nature. They believed that the world was governed by providence, a spiritual power that imposed order on matter, either understood as the divine spirit that pervades the material world (Stoics), or as a lower hypostasis flowing from the one (Plotinus). Man is a composite of reason and matter, and must mirror the ordering power of providence by ruling over the passions of the body. In order to do so, the wise man must resist the inclination to become dependent upon the things that change, but rather move along with nature (Stoics), and, in the case of Plotinian Neoplatonism, attempt to achieve contact with the undescended part of the soul in the contemplation of the One.54 Whenever the soul suffers from passions, this is the result of irrational attachments to the external world. By giving himself over to the interests of the body, the soul errs and experiences universal justice (dikè) in the sufferings that result from it.55 Simultaneously, however, this suffering admonishes the soul to return to itself and heal itself from its lapse into irrational behavior. Furthermore, it makes the soul vigilant not to lapse again into the same mistakes, and it exercises the soul in virtue. In response to the question why the good so often suffer, Seneca responds: “Those whom the deity supports and loves, he hardens, he examines, he proves.”56 Providence chastises (uerberare), afflicts (lacerare), and probes (probare) in order to train the power of the virtuous man.57 The same idea is expressed by Plotinus when he speaks about the use of evil in Enn. 3.2.5.58 The soul comes to suffer when it transgresses the order of its nature, when it inclines towards that what is worse than itself. This is its righteous punishment (dikè), imposed on it by universal law. Good souls profit from this experience, “for it makes men awake and wakes up the intelligence and understanding of those who are opposed to the ways of wickedness, and makes us learn what a good virtue is by

51 De officiis 1,33; 88-89 (Loeb, 35-37; 89-91).
53 Already Von Harnack observed that, from the very beginning, Christian theologians used medical imagery to characterise salvation, over against the cult of Asclepius and the self-understanding of Greek philosophy as cure of the soul (cf. A. von Harnack, Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1924) in which he incorporated an earlier essay ‘Medizinisches aus der älteren Kirchengeschichte’). Augustine’s use of medical imagery to describe the work of God, Christ and the discipline of the Church belongs to this tradition. For medical imagery in early Christianity, see Michael Dörnemann, Krankheit und Heilung in der frühen Theologie der Kirchenväter (Studien und Texte zur Antiken Christentum 20; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), For Augustine’s position within the wider context of early Christian use of medical imagery for the work of Christ, see Rudolph Arbesmann, “The Concept of ‘Christus Medicus’ in St. Augustine”, Traditio 10 (1954), 1-28.
56 Seneca, De prouidentia 4,7: “Hos itaque deus quos probat, quos amat indurat recognoscit exercet” (Loeb, 28-29).
57 Seneca, De prouidentia 4,12 (Loeb, 30-31).
58 Norbert Scholl, Providentia, 100-1.
comparison with the evils of which the wicked have a share.” The idea of a chastising providence, which we might associate with Christianity, was thus not at all uncommon among classical philosophers.

Augustine received this classical philosophical thought on the disciplinary nature of providence, but he did so as a Christian. The classical notion of the pedagogical nature of providence was based upon the idea that evil can never be radical, because it is part of a greater whole, in which it receives its useful function. The real evil is man’s misperception of universal order and the suffering that results from it. But as the human soul is by nature rational, connected to the divine, it is able to let itself be educated by this experience in the attempt to mirror the order of the cosmos. Furthermore, classical notions of providence and cosmic justice were part of a cyclical worldview. History does not have an eschatological purpose, but is rather an eternal return of the same things. At this point, the Christian tradition differed from philosophical accounts of providence, as it argued that God had created this world with an historical purpose, that evil had become part of this good creation through human sin, and that God providentially used this evil to act out his purposes with creation. In this narrative, providence is not an impersonal law of the universe, but the government of a personal God over the work of his hands. Moreover, Christianity perceived humanity as standing in need of redemption through Christ. The educating power of providence did not suffice for human redemption. This poses the question of how Augustine, who started out as a Christian philosopher, in his discourse on the pedagogical function of divine providence, relates to the aforementioned philosophical ideas.

1.2.3 Law and punishment in Augustine’s thought on salvation

1.2.3.1 Law and grace

Finally, the context of Augustine research itself raises questions with regard to the relationship between divine judgment and mercy. Since Augustine’s own time interpreters of his work have disagreed on the question whether Augustine taught a consistent doctrine of grace throughout the course of his career. Augustine made a plea for his own consistency in the Retractationes, but not all have found his apology convincing, from the Pelagians of his own days to present day Augustine scholars. In the second half of the 20th century, Peter Brown’s reconstruction of Augustine’s early development became influential in Augustinian scholarship. He argued that Augustine started out as a Christian Platonist, espousing an ideal of Christian perfection, based upon a synergism between grace and the power of free will, but gradually discovered, both through his polemics with the

59 Plotinus, Ennead 3.2.5 (translation: Loeb, 61).
61 For different positions, see Anthony Dupont, “Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine? Is There an Early Augustine and What is His View of Grace?”, Ars Disputandi 8 (2008), 67-79 (esp. 67-69).
62 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography (New Edition with An Epilogue; Berkeley - Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 139-50. This is not to deny that before Brown this topic had not been discussed by Augustine scholars. I limit myself here to a brief sketch of developments in the second half of the 20th century and the first decades of the 21 century. For older works on Augustine’s doctrine of grace, see for example K. Janssen, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Rostock, 1936); A. Niebergall, Augustins Anschauung von der Gnade. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung vor dem Pelgianischen Streit (bis zum Abschluss der Confessiones) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1951).
Manichees (who espoused a rather negative view of the human condition and supported their views by appealing to the writings of Paul) and his congregational experiences as a young presbyter, that the bright future he had envisioned for himself remained unattainable on this earth. Humanity lied down as a wounded man at the side of the road to eternity, and was completely dependent upon God’s electing mercy to reach the fatherland. Brown regarded Augustine’s rereading of Paul in the 390s and his congregational experiences as having caused a rupture both in his anthropology and in his understanding of grace. Brown’s reconstruction of the development of Augustine’s doctrine of sin and grace was adopted by other scholars, such as Paula Frederiksen in her dissertation on Augustine’s early reception of Paul and Kurt Flasch in his edition of and commentary on Ad Simplicianum.

There were also other voices, however. For example, in 1996 Pierre-Marie Hombert published a study in which he argued that Augustine’s theology, from its beginnings until its end, can be characterised as to glorify God in his grace, and excluding all boasting in human merit. This feature, Hombert argued, is present in Augustine’s writings from the very beginnnig, and finds its mature expression in Augustine’s reading of Paul in the 390ties, especially in Ad Simplicianum. In a study published around the same time, Volker Henning Drecoll argued that Augustine’s understanding of grace is derived from his view of God as all defining, and unchangeable Creator. This idea can be traced back even to the Cassiciacum Dialogues, and is fully developed by Augustine in De uera religione (390), long before he begins to comment on Romans and Galatians. It was Carol Harrison, who explicitly took Brown’s thesis as her ‘target’ in her 2006 book Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology. She can be seen as the most outspoken proponent of the continuity-thesis. With Drecoll she thinks that the distinction between God as Creator and man as creature forms the basis of Augustine’s theology of sin and grace. Humanity falls away from God, almost by nature, as it was created ex nihilo. God the Creator is the only one who can save us from our fall into nothingness, as he is the only one who creates out of nothing. According to Harisson, Augustine found these ideas affirmed by Paul when he started to the apostle in the 390s. Paul did not change his views on sin and grace, but rather affirmed them, although Augustine struggled for a while with the problem of free will, and for a moment solved this problem by defending the idea that God’s predestination is based upon his foreknowledge of faith. Recent books by Lenka Karfikova and Jarzinho Lopez Pereira have returned to a more ‘Brownian’ approach of the early Augustine’s doctrine of grace.

This study intends to contribute to this discussion by asking the question how God’s law and his punishment feature in Augustine’s understanding of the operation of grace. Thus far, this question has received little attention in the above mentioned discussions. My contention in this study will be that Augustine’s understanding of the operation of grace undergoes development in that he comes to

63 K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens: De diversi quaestionibus ad Simplicianum 1,2 [Lateinisch-Deutsch] (Excerpta Classica 8; Mainz: Dieterich, 1990); Paula Frederiksen, Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis Princeton University, 1979).
65 Volker Henning Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 109; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 355.
66 Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology. An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 74-114 (‘creation from nothing’).
67 Lenka Karfikova, Grace and the Will according to Augustine (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 9-82; Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner (Refo500 Academic Studies, vol. 15; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 81-121.
regard Christ’s death as a representative bearing of God’s punishment over sin. This development went along with a deepening of his teachings on the penal consequences of the first sin for the human predicament.

1.2.3.2 Augustine’s view of ‘temporal punishment’ as a means to conversion

Another discussion related to the previous one, concerns the origin of Augustine’s justification of state-sponsored coercion of the Donatists. In the Donatist controversy Augustine presented a theological justification of the penalties that were issued by the Edict of Unity of 405 against those who remained in the Donatist party. Against the Donatist objection that adherence to a religion is based upon the free choice of the will, Augustine argued that God could use violence and the threat of punishment to restrain the power of habit and effect reflection and eventually conversion. Although he had feared that the use of force would yield faint conversions, when he had seen its effects on the Donatists in Hippo, he became convinced that God had indeed used this means to inspire genuine conversions (cf. Ep. 93).

In the discussion on the evolution of Augustine’s thought on this matter, scholars such as Peter Brown, Sandra Lee-Dixon, and Kurt Flasch, have argued that Augustine first rejected coercion, because he still had high expectations of human rationality and free will. In the course of his development as a Christian theologian, however, he became more and more convinced of the power of habit (uis consuetudinis) over the human mind. Along with this development, he increasingly perceived conversion as a process (rather than as matter of immediate self-determination), in which external inconveniences have a preparatory function. As Peter Brown has it: “In his thought, the final, spontaneous act of the will could be preceded by a long process – of eruditio and admonitio – in which elements of fear, of constraint, of external inconvenience are never, at any time, excluded.”

Augustine did not perceive the use of external force and the fear it induced as opposed to rational teaching and free choice, but rather as enabling the mind to become teachable (docilis), and reflect upon its habits in the light of the truth.

At the same time, Augustine stressed, particularly after he had written Ad Simplicianum, that only God decided in whom these external means led to conversion, and who were merely hardened in their unbelief. Brown argues that this doctrine of predestination provided Augustine with a new argument to justify the use of external force against the Donatists. Whereas he had formerly feared that the use of external force would foster half-hearted conversions, the doctrine of predestination would have relieved Augustine’s conscience. He could leave the fictit to God. Likewise, Sandra Lee-Dixon has defended this view of the early Augustine. Following Brown, she argues that the early Augustine

68 Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 270.
69 A similar but less nuanced case has been made by Kurt Flasch. He argues that the doctrine of predestination caused Augustine to justify coercion in the name of God. His argument runs as follows. Predestination meant for Augustine that God disregarded human free will in the process of salvation. This justified his human servants to follow God by violating the freedom of their fellow men. As God had ordained the use of fear to save the predestined, his human servants were allowed to foster this process by coercion. Thus, the image of God as arbitrary, ‘coercive’ ruler was transferred to humans. This would explain the history of intolerance in Western Europe. A characteristic quote: “Je mehr Augustin die natürliche Sittlichkeit und den römischen Staat entwertete, je armeseliger ihm der freie Wille der Unbegnadeten erschien, um so mehr verlegte er jeden wertvollen Inhalt, alle wirkliche Erfüllung in die Gnade. Ihr zu Hilfe zu kommen, und sei es mit rabiatten Massnahmen, war allemal legitimiert.” See K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens, 119. For his argument, see pp. 114-20.
still believed that (the threat of) temporal punishment was not conducive to conversion, because it would draw people only to outward obedience, whereas inwardly they would continue to cling to their inferior loves. Therefore, only teaching of the good could be an effective means to conversion (with reference to Ep. 22 and 35). When Augustine started writing the Confessions, he would have come to stress the idea that habit can be so strong in human beings that they are not even ‘teachable’. They find themselves ante legem, and the question is how they can be influenced in such a way that they are brought sub lege? Dixon’s answer is that Augustine came to regard (the threat of) suffering as an effective means to this end. Only when sin is curbed through external threats, can one facilitate the possibility of reflection and an openness to teaching.

Brown and others have observed, however, that the idea of external force as somehow conducive to human salvation is present in Augustine before the 390s. Brown writes: “From his earliest works, morally neutral impingements, such as the fear of death or the inconveniences of the life of the senses, are accepted as part of the ‘pulchritudo justitiae’ of a universe in which this force of habit may be broken in men.” This has also been observed by Carol Harrison, who has placed the ‘remedial’ impact of external inconveniences in the context of Augustine’s doctrine of providence. This idea, which she calls ‘the assault of grace’, is already discernible in the Cassicacium Dialogues, and comes to full maturity in the Confessions.

Furthermore, Augustine regarded his later justification of state-sponsored coercion of the Donatists as a form of Church discipline. This is illustrated, for example, by Augustine’s use of the word correptio rather than coercitio to describe the function of the imperial laws. This also explains why he admonished state officials to exercise Christian mildness (mansuetudo) in their execution of the laws. They should intend to attain the cure of the sinner, rather than his repression. These insights have brought Frederick Russell to argue that Augustine’s justification of the coercion of the Donatists should be viewed as part of a broader theology of persuasion by the Church. The Church intends to carve pathways to the human soul, and for that purpose uses different ‘modalities of coercion’, from teaching to threatening, to actual punishment, in order to foster a process of reflection in the mind of the sinner. These insights show that Augustine’s thought on the usefulness of temporal punishment

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70 Lee-Dixon, The Many Layers, 401, with reference to mor. 1,64, CSEL 90, 68: “Merito apud te [= ecclesia catholica] uisum est, quam sit sub lege operatio uana, cum libido animum uastat et cohibetur poenae metu, non amore virtutis obruitur.”
72 Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 271. Brown also points to Augustine’s use of the word disciplina. Augustine used this word to refer to God’s chastisement over Israel, and also used it to characterize God’s pedagogical intentions with the imperial laws issued against the Donatists.
73 See Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 250-2. See also Carol Harrison, “The Assault of Grace in Augustine’s Early Works”, in: F. Young, M. Edwards, S. Parvis (ed.), Studia Patristica 43 (2006), 113-7; Rief, Ordobegriff, 255ff.
76 Frederick H. Russell, “Persuading the Donatists: Augustine’s Coercion by Words”, in: William E Klingshirn & Mark Vessey (ed.), The Limits of Ancient Christianity. Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R.A. Markus (University of Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 116. Russell argues that Augustine regards thinking (cogitare) as the result of forcible action of the mind on memory (cogo). At this point, Augustine’s theory of signs plays an important role. External signs intend to make the person who receives the sign turn inside in order to seek a reality that already exists in his memory. Cf. R.A. Markus, “Augustine on
belongs to a broader network of ideas on methods of persuasion. This study aims to describe what place and function Augustine attributes to temporal punishment, both as part of divine providence and as part of ecclesiastical discipline, and thus to take a position in the aforementioned discussion.

1.2.3.3 Punishment as pedagogical instrument in the Old and the New Testament

It has further been argued that the development of Augustine’s thought on the usefulness of temporal punishment can be explained by a change in his view on the relationship between the Old and the New Testaments. Brown remarks that mere physical fear, which Augustine defended in his anti-Donatist polemics, seems to be void of religious implications. Augustine’s usual appreciation of ‘fear and trembling’ as religious motive has to do with a fear of God himself, whereas the fear of temporal punishment seems not to have any religious benefits. Brown suggests that Augustine’s position can only be understood if we understand his attitude towards the Old Testament. “The attitude which they [Augustine and his contemporaries] adopted to the present was, in large part, moulded and defined by their attitude to this distant past.” In his anti-Donatist polemic, Augustine uses examples from the Old Testament – such as Moses, Elijah, and Nebuchadnezzar – and argues that the severity that they exercised, although more prominent in the time of the Old Testament, is not principally limited to that time. This position of Augustine had deeper roots in his anti-Manichaean polemics. Already in his polemics against the Manichees, he had defended the idea that the severity of the Old Testament was not principally limited to that dispensation. Although the coercive quality of the Old Testament pedagogue needed the grace of Christ, it remained useful also after the coming of Christ. “And so,” Brown concludes, “the concrete example of the people of Israel, with their enforced laws, could come very close indeed to the ecclesiastical realities of Augustine’s North Africa.” However, according to Brown, Augustine had not always held this position. In his works before 394, Augustine would have regarded the Old Testament as a distinct ‘stage’ in the moral development of the human race, which had now been transcended after the coming of Christ. “The perspective of the later Augustine, however, ‘did not admit such an irreversible moral ascent. Because of this, perhaps, Augustine could see the utilitas timoris of the Old Law, not as a remote ‘period’, reflecting an alien ‘gradus morum’, so much as a continuous and necessary complement of the grace of the New dispensation.” Following this line of thought, Augustine also increasingly connected the Church and the State, after the example of the Old Testament, now picturing Christ as the King of kings, rather than the humble teacher “who


77 Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 272.

78 Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 274.

79 A similar opposition between Old and New Testament is suggested by Hübner, “Disciplina”, 461. See also Ebbeler, Disciplining Christians, 44, where she writes on the difference between divine rebuke in the Old and the New Testament: “Among New Testament writers, it was Paul who was most manifestly concerned with the function and practice of rebuke and correction in the Christian community. Whereas the God of the Old Testament was a palpable presence in the lives of his children, prone to rage and regularly swooping in to rebuke them for their sins, the God the New Testament is an invisible but transcendent presence. For the most part, the responsibility for correcting sin in the Christian community falls on scripture (that is, the textual incarnation of the transcendent God) and on one’s Christian brothers.”

80 Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 273.
did nothing by force”. Christ used the rulers of this age to serve the discipline of the Church, just as the kings of old had done. This brings us to the question: to what extent is this development in Augustine’s thought discernible in his early writings? How does his thought on temporal punishment as pedagogical instrument in the history of salvation, and God’s use of human authorities develop in the course of his writings?

1.3 Outline of the dissertation

The previous sections addressed the most important questions that arise out of Augustine’s own context and the context of Augustinian scholarship. This leads to the following research-question and respective sub-subquestions.

Research question
How does Augustine conceive of the function of judgment (the revelation of God’s law and its sanctions) in the process of salvation between Cassiciacum and the Confessions?

Subquestions
1. How does Augustine relate to the anti-Gnostic tradition, which, out of a desire to reconcile God’s goodness and his justice, presented the divine punishment of sin as part of a pedagogical project, in which human free will cooperates with the divine teaching?
2. How does Augustine use elements from the tradition of philosophical pedagogy? Which elements does he use and where does he take a specifically Christian path?
3. What is the place and function of punishment in Augustine’s understanding of the operation of grace? And is it true that Augustine develops from initially being a defender of free will and rational persuasion to being a proponent of external coercion? Does he indeed change his view on the relationship between the Old and the New Testament with regard to the use of temporal punishment?

The method that is followed in this study is chronological-systematic. First, I have divided Augustine’s life in different chronological stages. The second chapter addresses Augustine’s thought on the topic of this dissertation at Cassiciacum, the third chapter describes his thought during the period between his baptism and his ordination (387-391), the fourth chapter reviews the development of his thought during the period of his priesthood until his ordination as bishop (391-397). The fifth addresses the Confessions and has a different character than the previous ones. It does not so much follow the development of Augustine’s thought, but rather asks how his thought up to this point in his life (at the start of his episcopate) is reflected in his theological autobiography. How do the insights that Augustine gained on the redemptive meaning of divine judgment function in the narrative of God’s dealings with him before and after his conversion? The systematic character of the study is reflected in the set-up of the chapters. In each chapter I have assembled the themes that play a role in that particular period of Augustine’s life. This method enables me to both answer the main question of this thesis (and the sub-questions), and identify the development in Augustine’s thinking against the background of the different contexts in which he worked during the first ten years after his conversion.

\[\textit{uera rel. 31. The humble, rational Christ of De vera religione and the ‘violent’ Christ of Augustine’s later works (who, for example, strikes Paul from his horse) are often put in contrast with each other.}\]
The choice to limit my research to writings from Cassiciacum to the *Confessions* is prompted by the limitations inherent to a doctoral dissertation, but also by the consideration that this is one of the most transformative periods in Augustine’s life as a Christian thinker. This makes it a very appropriate period to study the development of his thought on a particular subject. Furthermore, during this stage of his life he was most engaged in the controversy with the Manichees; it was their dualism that challenged him to contemplate God’s judgment over sin and how this judgment relates to the way God effects human salvation.
2 Cassiciacum: The discipline of fortune and dialogue

2.1 The retreat to Cassiciacum

Some time after his conversion in the garden of Milan, Augustine took a time of leisure at the estate of his friend Verecundus in Cassiciacum. This retreat was caused by violent divine intervention. This is at least how Augustine himself presents it in the Cassiciacum Dialogues. Although he had already decided to leave his position as rhetor in Milan after reading the books of the Platonists and Paul,¹ he was withheld by the judgment of certain people (nonnulorum hominum existimatio);² probably important men from the court, or the parents of his pupils. However, a “chest pain” (pectoris dolor),³ which he regards as sent by divine providence, forced him to abandon his position and take a time of otium at the villa of his friend Verecundus in Cassiciacum.⁴ Taking periods of leisure to dedicate oneself to philosophy was not uncommon amongst noblemen in Late Antiquity,⁵ but for Augustine it inaugurated a complete abandonment of life in the world. He wanted to leave behind all the cupiditates that had burdened him during his life in the world, both sexual and political, in order to seek the truth that transcends this mortal life and to find happiness in its enjoyment.⁶

In Cassiciacum he dedicated himself, with his mother Monnica, his son Adeodatus, his brother Navigius, and his pupils Licentius and Trygetius, to the study of philosophy. His understanding of philosophy in the Cassiciacum Dialogues reflects the Christian nature of his conversion.⁷ Although

¹In conf. 7,26-27 Augustine relates that he first read the libri Platonicorum and then Paul. The early Dialogues confirm this. In beata u. 4 he says that he first read “a few books (of Plotinus)” (Plotini paucissimi libri) and then compared them to the “authority of them who have handed over the divine mysteries” (illorum auctoritate, qui diuina mysteria tradiderunt). In Acad. 2,5 he mentions “certain books full of good things from Arabia” (libri quidam pleni... bonus res arabicas), which brought him back to the religion that was planted in him from his youth, in the very marrow of his bones. Consequently, he took up Paul and read him carefully. Both passages indicate that Augustine understood Platonism as standing in the service of his return to Christianity.

²beata u. 4, CCL 29,67: “Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris, cuius te esse studiosissimum accepi, conlataque cum eis, quantum potui, etiam illorum auctoritate, qui diuina mysteria tradiderunt, sic exarsi, ut omnes illas vellem ancoras rumpere, nisi me nonnullorum hominum existimatio commoueret.”

³Acad. 1,3; beata u. 4; ord. 1,5 (where Augustine calls his illness a stomachi dolor). I will discuss the meaning of Augustine’s pectoris dolor below.


⁶Acad. 2,4, CCL 29,20: “Postremo quidquid de otio meo modo gaudeo, quod a superfluarum cupiditatum uinculis euolauit, quod depositis oneribus mortuaram curaram respiro resipisco redeo ad me, quod quero intentissimus aetatem, quod inuentire iam ingredior.”

⁷During the 20th century, there has been a vehement discussion on the question what Augustine’s conversion of 386 actually consisted of. Harnack, Alfaric, and others argued that Augustine in fact converted to Neoplatonism. Others, like Gercchen, took the opposite position, emphasizing the Christian character of Augustine’s Cassiciacum writings. A middle position was adopted by Jens Nørregaard, who argued for a Neoplatonic and a Christian line of thought, creatively combined by Augustine himself. PierreCourcelle criticized these approaches for the fact that they all regarded Neoplatonism and Christianity as clearly distinguished entities. He argued that Augustine encountered in Milan a form of Christianity that had integrated important aspects of Neoplatonic thought, which helped him to overcome his intellectual problems with Christianity (Pierre Courcelle, Rêcherches sur les confessions d’Augustin (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1950), 252). It should, however, be noted that the Milanese circle to which Augustine was introduced was not a unitary whole (Cf. Goulven Madec, Petite études
Augustine borrows much from Neoplatonic and Stoic traditions in his Dialogues, he explicitly presents himself as a Christian thinker. This becomes clear from the fact that prayer and Scripture reading have an important place in Cassiciacum, alongside readings of classical authors and philosophical disputations. Moreover, Augustine writes that, although he holds Neoplatonic philosophy in high esteem and uses its methods for spiritual purification, the authority of Christ is of primary importance to him. These data justify a reading of the Cassiciacum Dialogues as Augustine’s first attempt to present himself as a student and teacher of Christianity to the diverse network of his Christian, Manichaean and Pagan friends and acquaintances in Milan.

In the following I will attempt to demonstrate how Augustine speaks of the salvific function of God’s disciplinary response to human sin in the Cassiciacum Dialogues. I will first address Augustine’s discourse on the disciplinary force of divine providence. I will argue that Augustine, although he regularly refers to God’s providence under the pagan name fortuna (perhaps motivated by his pagan readers from Milan), proves to have a Christian understanding of it. He wants to make clear that through the buffettings of fortune, the personal God of Christianity himself awakens fallen souls and urges them to call upon him as he has made himself accessible in Christ. A second context in which Augustine exemplifies the redemptive meaning of corrective judgment is in the dialogues that he organizes for his pupils. A third context in which I will investigate the salvific meaning of divine discipline is in his descriptions of ascomet."
(2.2.3). As the idea of mishap as divine pedagogy was widespread among philosophical schools in Antiquity, I will subsequently review some philosophical understandings of the help of fortune (2.2.4), in order to finally show how Augustine christianizes this philosophical tradition in the Dialogues (2.2.5 and 2.2.6).

2.2.1 Augustine’s philosophical ideal

In De beata vita Augustine defines the happy life as the perpetual possession of an object that cannot be taken from us against our will. This object should be independent of fortune, the power that gives and takes temporal goods. If man remains attached to what can be taken from him, he will suffer the passions of fear and grief, need and anger. Only if the soul is nourished by a good that cannot be taken from it by the power of fortune, will it enjoy tranquility. Augustine concludes that only God himself, who is detached from the flux of time, can be the true nourishment of the soul. The soul is impoverished when it turns to “that which flows, dissolves, melts and as it were always perishes.” It becomes saturated when it is nourished by supreme being and truth, which is God himself. At the end of the dialogue, he concludes that we will possess the happy life when we will fully enjoy God. This is a stage in which man is free from attachment to bodily passions. He takes care of the body, but his happiness is not dependent upon it.

In De ordine Augustine defines happiness in similar terms as he did in De beata uita, but now from the perspective of providence and evil. When people see evil in the universe, they either conclude from this that God does not govern the universe or that God is not good. The real problem, however, is the sickness of the soul itself. The irrational soul, occupied with the particulars of temporal life, cannot perceive order – and instead of blaming itself for this mistake, it blames God. We will only reach the happy life if the law according to which God governs everything – including evil – is written in our mind. In order to reach this state, the soul should withdraw itself from its occupation with particulars and train itself to discover that everything, good or bad, fits in the bigger whole of a divinely established order. Along this way man acquires a mind that is “with God” (esse cum Deo). The wise man is the one who has “the divine law fixed and unshaken in his soul”, so that he is always “with God”. The lower part of his soul that is occupied with action in the external world is completely governed by his contemplative knowledge of order, so that nothing that happens can upset him. This steadfast knowledge provides him with tranquillity of mind when evil strikes in his life or the lives of others.

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11 beata u. 11, CCL 29,71: “Id ergo, inquam, semper manens nec ex fortuna pendulum nec ullis subiectum casibus esse debet. Nam quidquid mortale et caducum est, non potest a nobis, quando volumus et quandiu volumus, haberi.”
12 beata u. 8, CCL 29, 70: “Nihil est enim omne, quod fluit, quod soluitur, quod liquescit et quasi semper perit.”
13 beata u. 34, CCL 29, 84: “Quisquis igitur ad summum modum per ueritatem uenerit, beatus est. Hoc est animis Deum habere, id est Deo perfrei. Cetera enim quamuis a Deo habeantur, non habent Deum.”
14 ord. 1.2.
15 ord. 2,1-7. On the law written in the souls of the wise, see ord. 2,25, CSEL 63,164: “Haec autem disciplina ipsa Dei lex est, quae apud eum fixa et inconcussa semper manens in sapientes animas quasi transcibitur.”
16 Augustine does not say that sages are indifferent to evil, or deny the existence of evil. The wise man will exercise love towards his neighbor and teach others to reach the same state as he enjoys (ord. 2,5), but will not let his own tranquillity be disturbed by the suffering of others. Cf. mor. 1, 48-51. Augustine also knows of pious men who did not doubt God’s providence and goodness, but nevertheless lament in their poems the dark situations in which they find themselves. He might refer here to the authors of the Psalms, which he intensively
2.2.2 The fallen situation of the soul

Augustine perceives the soul in its present situation as deeply fallen. Humanity has lost the sight of wisdom, and has become unable to return to it by its own knowledge and strength. Augustine remains as yet uncertain about the causes of man’s alienation from wisdom. Is it due to God, nature, necessity, or our own will – to a combination of these factors or to all of them at once? In other words, Augustine hesitates over the interplay between the different causes of human misery, but he is certain about the universality of human fallenness.

The miserable life can be characterized as a life that is not lived according to reason, the highest faculty of the human soul. Vice originates when the mind hands itself over to sense-experiences, as if these can lead him to truth and beatitude. Instead of seeking the blessed life in the highest good that cannot be lost against one’s will, the soul tends to seek beatitude in the things that fade away (de beata vita). Instead of seeking its stability in the knowledge of the divine law that governs the whole of the universe, the soul becomes obsessed with its parts, so that it disables itself to discern how everything, good and evil, fits within the greater whole (de ordine). Man no longer judges his sense-experiences in the light of transcendental truth, but instead is enslaved by them in his search for truth and happiness. As a consequence, he becomes vulnerable to the loss of temporal goods and loses steadfastness in the face of evil, as he lacks the ability to see how evil fits into the greater whole of divine order. Augustine calls this lack of wisdom egestas. Wisdom makes the soul rich and fruitful, whereas a lack of wisdom renders the soul poor and in want. A fool might well consider himself happy as long as fortune smiles upon him, but in fact he is miserable, as he has turned his back on the good that cannot be lost against his will.

Augustine uses several images and examples to describe this common foolishness of mankind. Imitating his examplar Cicero, he compares men to sailors on a sea. Only very few men manage to arrive at the harbour of wisdom by the powers of their own reason and will (ratione institutus cursus et uoluntas ipsa). Most people are deceived by erroneous opinions about the happy life. They are caught by seemingly fair winds that seem to bring them to a quiet sea, but which deceive them by the “fallacious serenity of pleasures and honours” (fallacissima serenitas uoluptatum honorumque). They consider themselves happy with their good fortune, but close their eyes to its instability. The rich man Sergius Orata, the prototype of the fool described by Augustine in De beata uita 26, belongs to this category of people. Augustine’s patron Romanianus, the addressee of Contra Academicos, also used to number among them. In his youth he had become enslaved to his possessions and to the

read during his stay at Cassiciacum (conf. 9,8). Augustine does not condemn these lamentations, but sees them as lower stages on the way to spiritual perfection (ord. 2,15).

17 beata u. 1, CCL 29,65: “Cum enim in hunc mundum siue deus siue natura siue necessitas siue uoluntas nostra siue coniuncta horum aliqua siue simul omnia - res enim multum obscura est, sed tamen a te iam inlustranda suscepta - quelit in quoddam procellosum salum nos quasi temere pasimkugie proicercit, quotusquisque cognosceret, quo sibi nitendum esset quaue redeundum?” Acad. 1, CCL 29,3: “Sed quoniam ita comparatum est siue pro meritis nostris siue pro necessitate naturae, ut diuinum animum mortalibus inhaerentem nequiquam sapientiae portus accipiat...”

18 TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, 72.

19 beata u. 8. In this passage Augustine calls vice nequitia, derived from nequiquam (nothing). Vice is the habit of loving that what is nothing in itself. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3,8,18.

20 ord. 2,7.

21 beata u. 29.

22 beata u. 1, CCL 29,65.

23 beata u. 1.
honour he received from the people whom he supported with his money. He had considered himself happy and would never have believed those who told him that he was in fact miserable. This shows that most people are miserable without knowing it. Their minds have become darkened by fallacious ideas about happiness, so that they have become unable to discern where real happiness is to be found. Although these ideas of happiness are challenged by the vicissitudes of life or the precepts of a teacher, the mind is so deeply attached to the memory of sense-experiences that only a few wise people manage to subject their memory to reason.

Augustine interprets the foolishness of the soul as a form of divine retribution. As man’s soul is governed by God, his moral action is either rewarded with the increase of virtue, or punished with moral degradation. In De beata uita, Augustine expresses this idea (suggested by his mother Monnica) when he contends that everyone possesses God, but does so in different ways. Those who seek God, possess Him as a loving God (propitius deus), but are not yet happy. Those who have found God, also possess Him as a loving God, but are already happy. Those, however, who alienate themselves from Him by their vices, are neither happy, nor do they possess God as loving, but instead as hostile and adverse (infestus/adversus deus). In De ordine Augustine refers to the same phenomenon when he describes the wise man as the one who is “with God”. His soul understands, contemplates and loves the law of God by which everything in the universe is rightly ordered. Consequently, the fool is the one who is not “with God” and his law.

These passages indicate that the human choice to seek truth in the realm of space and time is followed by an immediate deprivation of wisdom. This mechanism is described as God’s punishment, God’s preservation of order over against the sinner. As Augustine puts it in De ordine: the soul can act against order, but according to God’s righteousness it immediately receives the place that it deserves within the order of the universe. The soul can choose against the finality of its own nature,
but cannot break loose from it. Augustine’s definition of the life of vice as *non esse cum deo habere deum aduersum* pre-alludes to his later distinction between *esse sub lege* and *esse cum lege.* Both kinds of expressions indicate that one can oppose God and the law he established for man (*lex aeterna*), but cannot break loose from him as the One who preserves that law over against its transgressors.

### 2.2.3 The coercive force of adverse winds

In order to be cured from the miserable state of his soul, man needs a classical ailment: philosophical therapy. As already mentioned, for Augustine, only a few reach the tranquil harbour of philosophy by the power of their own reflection (it seems that Augustine in *De beata uita* has his addresssee Manlius Theodorus in mind). Augustine considers himself, his patron Romanianus, and most other people as standing in need of the violent admonition of providence.

The soul that has left the contemplation of order and has fallen into the external world, receives various kinds of admonitions to return. It seems that Augustine distinguishes general admonitions from more personal admonition. In a sense, everything in reality functions as an admonition to search for order, like the sound of trickling water or a cock fight. These things urge us to look beyond physical particulars to the manifest order of the natural world and thus to train our minds to ascend from the material to the spiritual. Augustine shares this idea of order with, for example, Neoplatonism. Augustine, however, bases his view on different presuppositions. For him, the world-order is not immanent to the world as in the Neoplatonist ontology of emanation, or the Stoic identification of god with the universal law, but it is based upon the divine will. There is a personal

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33 Cf. uera. rel. 58, CCL 32.225: “Spiritalis homo iudicat omnia, ipse autem a nemine iudicatur (1 Cor. 2:15)... Omnia ergo iudicat, quia super omnia est, quando cum Deo est.”

34 For Augustine’s concept of *lex aeterna* in his early writings, see Rief, *Der Ordobegriff des Jungen Augustinus*, 184-9; Alois. Schubert, “Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen”, in: Clemens Baeumker e.a. (hrsg), *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen*, Band 24, Heft 2, (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung), 1924, 1-63. The concept is originally Stoic. It is connected to a pantheist understanding of providence, in which God and the eternal law coincide. Augustine uses the concept of *lex aeterna* in a theist understanding of God, which identifies the *lex aeterna* with the divine wisdom or reason. God’s action towards his creation is governed by this law. Only humans are able to transgress this law and be punished accordingly, because they possess free will. For the difference between the Stoic understanding of *lex aeterna* and Augustine’s appropriation of it, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, “The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine’s Philosophy of Law”, *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 18 (1973), 59.

35 On this theme see Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*, passim and section 1.2.2.

36 Manlius Theodorus was a Roman prefect and (almost Christian) Neoplatonist who belonged to the Milanese circle and to whom Augustine dedicated his *De beata uita*.

37 *ord.* 1,6.

38 *ord.* 1,25.


40 In *ord.* 1,2 Augustine contends that the order of the animal world is based upon the “will of the divine majesty” (*arbitrium maiestatis diuinae*). From this observation he concludes that human life can neither be subject to “the instability of innumerable perturbations” (*innumerabilium perturbationum inconstantia*), but must be governed by the same order. This implies that Augustine also perceives of human lives as governed by a divine will, which orders the evil that arises in the universe. Against Neoplatonic understandings of providence, in which evil is inseparably connected to the ontology of the universe, Augustine denies that evil is a necessary part of the divine order. It arises against order (*inordinatus*), but God’s justice compels it to its deserved place within order (*in sibi meritum ordinem redegit et compulit*). This means that Augustine already in *De ordine* perceives cosmic justice within a theist rather than an emanationist framework. I derive this interpretation from V. Pacioni, “La Provvidenza Divina e il male nella storia: A proposito di un testo controverso, *De ordine* 1,1, 2.” In: Luigi Alici e.a., *Il mistero del male e la libertà possibile: lettura dei Dialoghi di Agostino* [Atti del V
God, ontologically distinguished from the world,\textsuperscript{41} who establishes the created order and addresses man through it. On the basis of this creational concept of order, Augustine develops the concept of ‘secret providence’ (\textit{secreta prouidentia}) in his Cassiciacum writings (often under the name of ‘fortune’).\textsuperscript{42} He interprets seemingly random events in life as means through which God is personally urging people to turn from their improper love for sensible reality and move towards Him. What happens in life is not part of a blind, necessary process, but is sent by a personal God to address man, who has alienated himself from him.\textsuperscript{43} In the prefaces to \textit{De beata uita} and \textit{Contra Academicos} Augustine compares this providence to winds that seem adverse,\textsuperscript{44} because they take away the quietness of the sea (like certain disasters in life), but eventually bring their victims to the harbour of philosophy where they find “real and abiding joys”.\textsuperscript{45}

However, the blows of fortune do not bring a person automatically to rational insight and behaviour. The \textit{aduersa} can cause people to reconsider their own ideas about the meaning of their lives. They initiate a process of “\textit{Erkenntnisgewinnung}”.\textsuperscript{46} But in order to be led in the right direction, people need proper instruction that effects a change of mind and will, in order to reach the harbour of philosophy. As an example of this, Augustine notes in the preface of \textit{De beata uita} that people find the harbour of philosophy, because they come across ‘certain books’ that help them to take the right course. This also applies to Augustine himself, who was helped by the books of the Platonists and Paul to convert both intellectually and morally. The \textit{pectoris dolor} from which he suffered seemed adverse to him as long as he was bound by the desire for glory. After all, it was depriving him of the instrument with which he strove for glory in this world.\textsuperscript{47} Only through his conversion, however, he

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\textsuperscript{41} For arguments in favor of the thesis that Augustine teaches an ontological distinction between God and creation in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, see Gerber, \textit{The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology. Contextualizing Augustine’s Pneumatology}, (Farnham-Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 72-9; J.P. Kenney, \textit{Contemplation and Classical Christianity. A Study in Augustine} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 35-83. One very convincing passage can be found in \textit{sol. 1,4} where Augustine addresses God as the one who created us out of nothing.


\textsuperscript{43} Rief, \textit{Ordobegriff}, 40; 88-9.

\textsuperscript{44} The image adverse winds that compell one towards the harbour of philosophy is also used by Cicero in his \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, 5,2,5. Cf. E.B.J. Postma, \textit{Augustinus’ De Beata Vita}, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1946), 147.

\textsuperscript{45} Augustine uses the language of coercion in the following passages: \textit{beata} u. 1, CCL 29,66: “... aliquidum et \textit{inuitos contraque} obnitiens aliqua tempestas, quae stultis uidetur aduersa, in optatissimam terram nescientes errantesque compingeret”; \textit{beata} u. 2, CCL 29,65: “... aduersa tempestas, in optatissimam uiam quietamque compellit”; \textit{Acad.} 1,3; CCL 29,4 with regard to Romanianus: “... nunc uero quam te breuiter \textit{admonendum} tot et tanta quae pertulisti aduersa fecerunt.”

\textsuperscript{46} Rief, \textit{Ordobegriff}, 255.

\textsuperscript{47} I interpret Augustine’s chest pain (\textit{pectoris dolor}) or gullet pain (\textit{stomachi dolor}) as a psychosomatic illness. It expresses the physical effects of a psychological disease, namely pride. When Augustine becomes angry with Licentius and Trygetius for their competitive behaviour, he feels pain in his \textit{stomachus}. Their behaviour physically reminds him of his own ‘strive for glory’, and its penal effects. I derive this idea from Catherine
came to experience this illness as a blessing in disguise. Only grace made him experience God’s ‘violence’ as something that helped move him forward. We do not know how long Augustine had already suffered from pain in the chest, but it is possible that his reading of the Neoplatonists and Paul helped him to gradually interpret his *pectoris dolor* as a hidden grace.

This example shows that external force itself is not enough to bring people to the harbour of philosophy. Further guidance is needed. It is not guaranteed, however, that one will receive the correct guidance. On the contrary, many people respond to the loss of temporal goods by manipulating the gods, or by taking recourse to prognosticators. Augustine criticizes the latter practices in *ord. 2, 27*. He observes that many people are impressed by the power that demons are allowed to exercise over nature; therefore they try to win their favour. But this does not free them from their entanglement in the material world. One can also seek strength in erroneous philosophies or heresies that fail to provide a cure for the soul. Thus Augustine himself had acted. After his reading of Cicero, he knew that he had to return to a destiny from which he had alienated himself (‘the immortality of wisdom’). Nevertheless, although he set course to the fatherland, Manichaeism and Scepticism kept him from reaching the harbour that gives access to it. Although Augustine gives both of these movements a place in God’s providential plan for his life, in themselves these could not ultimately heal him from the power of concupiscence and worldly ambition.

Augustine expresses the same fear of erroneous direction to Romanianus in the preface to book 2 of *Contra Academicos*. Fortune had awakened Romanianus from his worldly sloth. But this same fortune also allows the “tides and tempests” of “despair of knowing the truth” or “the premature certainty of knowing the truth” to tempt him. It seems that Augustine has Scepticism and Manichaeism in mind here. They do not have the power to redeem man from his boundedness to the senses. Scepticism is unable to do this, as it despair of gaining any stable knowledge of the truth at all. Manichaeism cannot do it, because it is a materialist heresy, according to which God is dispersed in the realm of space and time. Augustine therefore warns Romanianus that, having been awakened to the search for truth, he should not succumb to the temptations of false wisdom.

These remaining threats of misdirection illustrate that the experience of mishap and the subsequent search for wisdom are not sufficient for true conversion. The ‘signs’ of nature need to be...
interpreted by teachers who show the right way to respond to these signs.\textsuperscript{53} As people take many wrong tracks in response to the voice of God in nature, not very many arrive at the harbour of philosophy.\textsuperscript{54} We all experience the admonitions of providence, but we do not all receive the subsequent teaching that is needed to respond to these signs in the right way. In \textit{De ordine} 1,28 Augustine explicitly uses language that sounds ‘predestinarian’, saying that all people live in darkness, but that wisdom (\textit{sapientia}, which is the Son of God himself) only calls some upwards and permits others to fall in the deeps.\textsuperscript{55} Many are called, few are chosen.

Augustine sees himself as the one who has received the providential grace to have arrived at the harbour of philosophy and in gratitude now plays the role of ‘navigator’ for his readers. This in itself is not something uniquely Christian. As I will show below, philosophers like Seneca and Cicero also regarded themselves as interpreters of fortune’s admonitions. What I would like to argue, however, is that Augustine, unlike his pagan colleagues, tries to convince his readers that the buffetings of fortune in fact come from the God of Christianity who admonishes mankind to surrender to him in his grace. This will prove to be the main difference between Augustine’s harbour of philosophy and that of the philosophers. Whereas the philosophers direct man to his own inner strength to regain internal tranquillity, Augustine directs his readers to the clemency of the Creator, revealed in Power and Wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24) who assumed a mortal body, in order to lead his followers upwards.\textsuperscript{56}

\subsection*{2.2.4 Cicero and Seneca on the relationship between suffering and philosophy}

Fortune’s admonition to philosophy also features as a theme in the writings of pagan philosophers.\textsuperscript{57} In this section I will illustrate this on the basis of Cicero and Seneca, in order to clarify how Augustine christianizes the traditions they represent.

One of the philosophers who influenced Augustine profoundly was Marcus Tullius Cicero. In his largely Stoic thought-world, human rational self-discipline (\textit{virtus}) was believed to be the power by which man remains standing in this world and overcomes the challenges that cross his path. \textit{Virtus} provides the way to human freedom. In the fifth book of the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, however, Cicero asks himself whether this is really true. Because of the destabilizing effect of recent mishap in his life (the death of his daughter Tullia and Caesar’s victory over him), he had begun to fear that his spirit was inseparably bound to the vulnerability of the body. This would mean that the mind, like the body, cannot be redeemed from the realm where fortune reigns. However, he corrects himself, by remembering that his doubts about human nature were based upon common opinion, rather than on the truth about human nature. Although nature has furnished us only with some feeble rays of light and seeds of virtue, these are nevertheless enough to conduct us to the happy life, if we let them mature in us. However, from our birth onward we tend to extinguish them by evil habits and wrong opinions.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Jean Doignon, “La ‘praxis’ de l’\textit{admonitio} dans les Dialogues de Cassiciacum de Saint Augustin”, \textit{Vetra Christianorum} 23 (1986), 21-37 (22-4).
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{beata} u. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{ord.} 1,29, CSEL 63,141: “Demersos quidem esse animos omnium stultorum indoctorumque commune est, sed non uno atque eodem modo demersis operm sapientia et manum porrigit. Alii sunt, credite, alii sunt, qui sursum vocantur, alii, qui in profunda laxantur.” Cf. Carol Harrison, \textit{Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology}, 241, 279-80.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Acad. 3,16; 3,43. Holte, \textit{Béatitude et Sagesse}, 92-3.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Doignon, “La ‘praxis’ de l’\textit{admonitio}”, 21.
\end{itemize}
about ourselves. Thus, our self-perception is misdirected. Instead of believing in our own ability to free ourselves from slavery to fortune, we make ourselves believe that we are its pitiable victims and need the help of the gods to secure our lives from mishap. Instead, Cicero argues, we should take responsibility for ourselves by seeking a cure for our souls in philosophy. For Cicero, philosophy, the medicine of the soul, paves the path for man’s emancipation from fortune’s power. Philosophy teaches us to scorn everything that affects us from outside ourselves and to find happiness in virtue alone. As such, “philosophy [is] a kind of self-therapy to strengthen one’s mind after Fortuna’s assaults have seriously undermined and cast doubt on one of the fundamental principles of traditional ideology: that one’s virtus ought to be strong enough to render the happy life.” Cicero says that he already dedicated himself to philosophy in his youth, but the recent blows of Fortuna drove him again into her arms. To describe his situation, Cicero uses the imagery of the sea on which a heavy tempest caught him and forced him to take refuge in the harbour of philosophy. There he seeks shelter in order to heal the wounds caused by fortune and to strengthen himself against her to resist her in the future (when he is able to return to the political life again). Cicero considers fortune as an adverse force, which, however, simultaneously enables him to become aware of his moral weaknesses. He will strike back through the weapons of philosophy. Through the cure of philosophy he will show the power of human nature to reach the happy life by self-generated virtue.

The second example is Seneca. In his little tractate De prouidentia Seneca focuses on the question of why the gods often strike good men with mishap and seem to spare those who lead immoral lives. According to him, the gods do this in order to give good men the opportunity to exercise themselves in virtue. The strikes of fortune help them to get to know their steadfastness of character. Just like a soldier only becomes a better fighter through confrontation with adversaries, and a seaman proves his helmsmanship in storms, man only comes to know his weakness and strength through adversity. If virtue is never challenged, it withers away. Therefore, we should not be afraid for the adversities the gods send us, but regard them as incentives for our mind to exercise our strength of character. The gods are like fathers who give their children a hard education in order to make them strong and independent. Those who seem to prosper, because fortune smiles upon them, are in fact more miserable than those who receive the opportunity to gain inner strength through the experience of mishap. Our confrontation with fortune should be regarded as a hard conquest that will eventually enable us to despise her:

No proof of virtue is ever mild. If we are lashed and torn by fortune, let us bear it; it is not cruelty but a struggle, and the oftener we engage in it, the stronger we shall be. The staunchest member of the body is the one that is kept in constant use. We should offer ourselves to Fortune in order that,

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58 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 3,1 (Loeb, 225).
59 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 5,2 (Loeb, 427-8).
62 Seneca, De Prouidentia 4,5 (Loeb, 26-7).
struggling with her, we may be hardened by her. Gradually she will make us a match for herself. Familiarity with exposure to danger will give contempt for danger.\(^{63}\)

In the end the wise man will be able to say: “I am under no compulsion, I suffer nothing against my will, and I am not God’s slave but his follower, and the more so, indeed, because I know that everything proceeds according to law that is fixed and enacted for all time.”\(^{64}\) For Seneca, God – who is identical to the necessary order of the universe – trains the mind through mishap to make it a worthy partner of himself. As such he proves to be the father of virtuous men.

Cicero and Seneca both conceive of *fortuna* as a force that enables us to become aware of our self-alienation and to improve our virtue by the exercise of reason. The goal of the battle with fortune is to conquer her in the end, so that we will posses our happiness totally within ourselves and can be free from anything external to us.\(^{65}\) Mishap functions as a counterforce that compels us again and again to restrain our desires for things that are not within our power. We can control these desires through rational self-control.

### 2.2.5 Divine providence coerces towards humility

In the previous section we observed how two pagan philosophers interpreted fortune’s blows as an admonition to strengthen the soul by rational self-control and thus prove the self-sufficiency of human nature. The following segment demonstrates how Augustine christianizes this pedagogical interpretation of fortune’s violence. I will illustrate this from the prefaces to books 1 and 2 of *Contra Academicos*, where Augustine teaches his patron Romanianus how to interpret and respond to the blows of fortune.

In Augustine’s description of Romanianus’s misfortune, he depicts Romanianus having lost a court case and risking a confrontation with heavy financial losses and the corresponding decrease in social standing. In traditional terms, he has been severely hit by fortune. Furthermore, Romanianus’ adherence to Manichaeism might have disabled him to interpret his experiences in a positive way, as it lacks a doctrine of providence. What happens in the world, according to Manichaeism, is the outcome of two opposing forces and therefore is random and accidental.\(^{66}\) This is why Augustine wants Romanianus to know who stands behind fortune. As observed before, Augustine understands *fortuna* not as an independent goddess, or as an expression of a necessary and blind world order (as in Stoicism and Neoplatonic thought). It is the providence of a personal God, who is interested in the lives of individual people. Augustine, for example, supposes that the rich Romanianus himself is an instrument of God to grant Augustine the financial support to dedicate himself to philosophy.\(^{67}\) This same God is at work in the troubles that Romanianus is now experiencing.

Another way in which Augustine’s understanding of providence proves specifically Christian is the way in which he relates *fortuna* to *virtus*. In classical Roman ideology, as we have seen in the case of Cicero and Seneca, *fortuna* can be experienced as a force that admonishes us to seek the cure

\(^{63}\) Seneca, *De prouidentia* 4,12 (Loeb, 30-1).
\(^{64}\) Seneca, *De prouidentia* 5,6 (Loeb, 36-7).
\(^{65}\) Busch, “Fortunae resistere in der Moral des Seneca”, 140-4.
\(^{67}\) *Acad*. 2.4.
of philosophy to strengthen us against her. We ourselves have to exercise our minds through the cure of philosophy in order to restrain our desires for things external to us. Although it is not denied that fortune can offer some help in this regard, the emphasis is on self-generated virtue as the way to the happy life. There is no personal God who cares about the weakness of his creatures. Augustine, however, not only conceives of fortune as the force that has power over things external to us and that should be resisted and overcome by virtue; it is also a power that helps us to attain virtue itself. It is the personal God of Christianity who has revealed himself as a helper and upon whom humans can call. In the preface to book 1 of Contra Academicos, Augustine argues along traditional lines that those who belong to virtue cannot be snatched away from virtue by fortune. But the question is: how do we attain virtue? Augustine’s nontraditional answer is that fortune herself brings us there. “The fact is that... the divine spirit that is united to our mortal bodies can never reach the harbour of wisdom, where the wind of fortune, favourable or unfavourable, cannot reach it, unless fortune herself... brings it there.”

In his analysis of Romanianus’ situation, Augustine emphasizes that in his seeming misfortunes God himself is at work to draw Romanianus back into order. As a Roman aristocrat, Romanianus might experience fortune as a malevolent force, aimed at his destruction. Fortune robs him of his public standing and honour for which he has worked so hard. From a traditional perspective this could be a reason to despise oneself, but Augustine admonishes Romanianus to resist that inclination (ne contemnas te). He should acknowledge that his soul is made for a destiny higher than the enjoyment of temporal goods and honours. By depriving him of temporal goods, God makes him experience “how fleeting, unreliable and full of misery is all that which mortals think to be good.” He would never have acknowledged this if he had continued to prosper. Through these difficulties “that divine element (his mind) [...] which has somehow been lulled to sleep [...] by the drowsy lethargy of this life, providence, working in secret, has decided to rouse by means of the several harsh buffetttings you have suffered.” Using his own pectoris dolor as an example, Augustine tries to convince Romanianus that God uses his sufferings to reveal to him the deceitfulness of the “flattering gifts of this world” (dona blandita huius mundi), to make him stop singing their praises

68 Seneca, De beata uita, 16.3.
70 Acad. 1,1, CCL 29.3: “Diuinum animum mortalibus inhaerentem nequaquam sapientiae portus accipiat, ubi neque aduersante fortunae flatu neque secundante moueatur, nisi eo illum ipsa uel secunda uel quasi aduersa perducat.” For this observation I draw on Van Reyn, Fortuna Caeca, vol. 2, 175-6. Of course, this expression is only revolutionary if one interprets it against the background of Augustine’s Christian view of God.
71 Augustine depicts Romanianus as a noble aristocrat who supported the people around him with his money and received due honor in return. This was the public dignitas of a Roman aristocrat, which he merited by his services to the community (Acad. 1,2).
72 Acad. 1,2.
73 When Augustine calls the mind divinus, this does not necessarily mean that he conceives of the soul as divine in the Plotinian or Stoic sense of the word (as somehow ontologically one with the divine). If it is true, as I assume, that Augustine already in the Cassiciacum Dialogues regarded the soul as a creature (cf. Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology, 72-9; Rief, Ordobegriff, 82), divinus means something like ‘apt to know God’.
75 Acad. 1,3, CCL 29.4: “Euigila, euigila, oro te; multum, mihi crede, gratulaberis, quod paene nullis prosperitatibus, quibus tenentur incauti, mundi huius tibi dona blandita sunt, quae me ipsum capere moliebantur
and to compel him to seek the cure of philosophy, through which the soul is brought back to its proper place in the order of the universe. Philosophy is a means to heal the soul from its irrational orientation, i.e., from the ambition to establish its beatitude within the realm of space and time. This is in fact what Romanianus was doing as a Roman aristocrat (although Augustine emphasizes that Romanianus was led by an admirable philanthropic motivation). Christian philosophy provides the way out of this, as it leads the soul from worship of the temporal towards worship of eternal things, from creation towards the Creator.\textsuperscript{76}

But how will Romanianus reach the harbour of philosophy? On the one hand Augustine points to the nobility of Romanianus’ soul, but on the other hand to its weakness. Just like many other people, he can easily be distracted from his desire for philosophy because of a weakness of the will (\textit{a quaerendi uoluntate avertentur}).\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, he cannot reach his goal without the help of divine providence. Accordingly, Augustine prays for Romanianus and admonishes him to join him in prayer. On the one hand he should employ the oars of all available virtues in rowing against the waves and buffetings of fortune (all the things that can distract him from his course towards true philosophy), but first of all (\textit{in primis}) he has to implore with full devotion and piety the divine help (\textit{diuinum auxilium}) so that he may hold course towards the harbour of philosophy.\textsuperscript{78} He needs divine help in order not to be distracted from his goal. Here, Augustine presupposes the weakness of the human will to reach the happy life on its own power.

But how can Romanianus be sure of God’s benevolence? The fortune that is said to be aimed at Romanianus’ wellbeing also allows him to be confronted with the weapons of the New Academy. Does this providence have a specific intention towards us? And if so, how can we know this intention? Here, Augustine’s admonition to prayer proves to be specifically Christian. Prayer as such is not a specifically Christian phenomenon. It is found both in ancient religions and philosophy. In ancient religions, however, prayer is a way of influencing the gods in order to persuade them to grant certain benefits; philosophical prayer, as it is for example regarded by Plato and Plotinus, is a form of magic, a way to make use of the spiritual sympathy of the universe for the purification of the soul.\textsuperscript{79}
Augustine’s idea of prayer here is specifically Christian, as he considers it as a response to the salvific will of God himself, revealed in Jesus Christ. Augustine identifies the addressee of his prayer as the “Power and Wisdom of the highest God (summi Dei virtutem atque sapientiam, cf. 1 Cor. 1:24), who is no other than the Son of God whom the mysteries present to us.” The kind of prayer that Augustine has in mind is not a means to appease the gods or to mould one’s own soul, but the answer to God’s salvific self-revelation in Christ. God the Son is the virtus et sapientia Dei – the powers that we need to become wise – who has assumed a human body and thus revealed God’s salvific will for fallen mankind. He is revealed to us in the mysteries, i.e. (the doctrine of) the Scriptures. Fortune’s admonition to Romanianus to seek the cure of wisdom in philosophy thus becomes the admonition to seek help from Christ, who is the virtus that we need in order to be freed from fortuna. Thus, in his teaching to Romanianus, Augustine already makes an important point against both Manichees and pagan philosophers: the God of providence is the same God as the one who is presented to us in the mysteries of the Church. The ‘violent’ God of providence hits earth-bound people exactly where they are, in order to make them reflect upon their entanglement in the sensible world and subject themselves to him in order to be healed.

### 2.2.6 Divine teaching: power and example

In the preceding section I argued that, according to Augustine, the force of divine providence urges Romanianus first of all to put his hope in the care of the God of Christianity. This brings us to Augustine’s more theoretical reflections on the place of divine authority as the cure for the soul. In his discussion of the nature of divine authority in the Dialogues, Augustine already alludes to a theme that he will develop after his baptism: the descent of God in history in order to heal the human mind from its obsession with the senses.

In the Cassiciacum Dialogues Augustine already emphasizes that the Christian religion teaches the historical authority of Christ, in contrast to the pride of the Neoplatonist philosophers, who presume that they can attain the fatherland by their own rational powers. According to Augustine, souls have attached themselves so deeply to their senses that they cannot return to the world of the according to Stoic principles, as a kind of magic. There are powers in the universe that can be affected by prayer (cause-effect), but the sage does not make use of these kinds of prayers. Plotinus speaks about prayers of the sage to the One, but means by that a meditative passivity that is observed after one’s purification of multiplicity and before the revelation of the One to the soul (which cannot be forced through human action). The, however, does not intentionally respond to our prayers. For Plato and Plotinus, see John Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 201 (Plato); 202-12 (Plotinus). On the importance of prayer in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, see further P.J. Couvé, *Vita Beata en Vita Aeterna*: een onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van het begrip “Vita Beata” naast en tegenover “Vita Aeterna”, bij Lactantius. Ambrosius en Augustinus, onder invloed der Romeinsche Stoa (Baarn: Hollandia, 1947), 209.

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80 Acad. 2,1, CCL 29,18: “Oro autem ipsam summi Dei uirtutem atque sapientiam. Quid est enim aliud, quem mysteria nobis tradunt Dei filium.”


82 It is not clear how Augustine exactly conceives of this help from Christ. He seems to think of a strengthening of the will, but also of prosperous circumstances (‘good winds’) through which Romanianus can join Augustine in his life of leisure.
intellect, the intelligible world, by themselves.\textsuperscript{83} The \textit{proprium} of the Christian religion is that the divine intellect has come down to help humans to ascend to God.

In \textit{Contra Academicos} 3, 42 Augustine says that the only true philosophy is not the philosophy of this world, but of that ‘other intelligible world’ (\textit{philosophia alterius intelligibilis mundi}).\textsuperscript{84} In this regard, Christianity shares its interest in transcendence with Platonism (and agrees with Platonism in distinguishing itself from the materialist philosophies of this world).\textsuperscript{85} It differs from Platonism, however, in that it not only aspires to attain the world of the intellect, but actually \textit{comes from} that ‘other intelligible’ world. The divine mind has graciously come down to lift humans upward to itself, and bring them back to the destiny for which they were made. Augustine expresses this concept of the Incarnation in the following quote:

\begin{quote}
“the most subtle reasoning would never recall souls blinded by the manifold darkness of error and stained deeply by the slime of the body, had not the most high God, because of a particular compassion for all people (\textit{quadam clementia populari}), bent and submitted the authority of the divine intellect even to the human body itself. By the precepts (\textit{praeepta}) as well as the deeds (\textit{facta}) of that intellect souls have awakened, and are able, without the strife of disputation, to return to themselves and see once again their fatherland.”\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

This quotation offers a clear reference to the incarnation as the event that distinguishes Christianity from Platonism. What is of most interest for my present argument is that Augustine refers to Christ’s \textit{facta} and \textit{praeepta}. Through these he admonished people to turn from their sensory fixations back to the intelligible world.

In \textit{de ordine} 2,27\textsuperscript{87} Augustine situates these \textit{facta} and \textit{praeepta} in a broader scheme of what he calls ‘divine authority’. First, the divine authority manifests itself in ‘sensible signs’ (\textit{sensibilia signa; miranda}). Christ’s miraculous deeds forces those who are still bound to the senses to acknowledge him as the one who has all power over temporal creation.\textsuperscript{88} Demons, however, are also allowed to exercise power over nature. By this power they seduce people to subjection to demonic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[83] To what extent Augustine holds a fall-of-the-soul-theory, as has been extensively argued by Robert O’Connell is discussed in our treatment of Augustine’s view of creation in the next chapter.
\item[84] This is a reference to \textit{Col.} 2:8.
\item[85] When Augustine refers to the philosophy of Plato, he has Plotinus’s system in mind, which he regards as the resurgence of Plato’s philosophy in his own times (\textit{Acad.} 3,43).
\item[86] \textit{Acad.} 3,42, CCL 29,60: “...\textit{cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitus numquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus populari quadam clementia divini intellectus auctoritatatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret, cuius non solum praeeptis sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semet ipsas et resipiscere patriam etiam sine disputationum concertatione potissent” (translation: O’Meara, slightly adapted (I translated \textit{populaire} instead of ‘for the masses’ by the more neutral ‘for all people’). Cf. \textit{ord.} 2,16 where Augustine says that the mysteries liberate the nations (\textit{populi}) through a sincere and firm faith).
\item[87] The part of \textit{ord.} 2,27, CSEL 63,166 that is discussed here, reads as follows: “\textit{Illa ergo auctoritas divina dicenda est, quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transscendit omnem humanam facultatem sed et ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei, quousque se propter ipsum depresserit, et non teneri sensibus, quibus uidentur illa miranda, sed ad intellectum iubebat uelat eum simul demonstrans, et quanta hic posit et cur haec faciat et quam parui pendat. Doceat enim oportet et facits potestatem suam et humilitate clementiam et praeepectione naturam, quae omnia sacris, quibus initiamur, secretius firmiusque traduntur, in quibus honorum uita facillime non disputationum ambagibus sed mysteriorum auctoritate purgatur.”
\item[88] The power of God to work miracles is the same as the power of fortune of which Augustine so often speaks in his dialogues. It is the power that the Creator exercises over his creation. Cf. \textit{Acad.} 3,4, CCL 29,36: “\textit{Ipsa uita nostra, cum hic uiuimus, sit in potestate fortunae}.”
\end{footnotes}
authority. This is what takes place in pagan religion: People subject themselves to demons in order to benefit from their temporal power. The second characteristic of divine authority, therefore, by which it distinguishes itself from demonic authority, is that it leads man from the sensible to the intelligible world. It “leads man onwards, shows him to what extent it has debased itself for his sake and bids him not to be confined to the senses, to which indeed those things seem wondrous, but to soar upwards to the intellect.”

By thus depicting the Incarnation as a twofold manifestation of divine authority, Augustine summarizes the life of Christ as narrated in the gospels. The gospels depict Christ as one who impressed the people because he taught with authority (exousia). It could well be that Augustine refers to this element of the gospels when he characterizes Christ’s teaching as consisting of power (potentia) and precept (praecptio). Through miracles Christ showed the people that he was in charge of temporal life. Thus, Christ sought his people on their own spiritual level, bounded as they were to the senses, and made them attentive to himself. These miracles, however, served a higher purpose. Christ intended to lead his people from the sensible to the intelligible world. For that reason He laid off his divine power and taught the people, by word and deed, to spurn temporal things and to seek intelligible things. “He showed man… to fly to the intellect, showing him at once what he was able to do, why he did it and how little he depended on it.” In other words, Christ as God teaches his people that he is in charge of the temporal world, which they love. Christ as man, in his humility, teaches them to despise this temporal world, and to ascend from the temporal to the intelligible world. God is not to be worshipped for the sake of temporal benefits, but as an end in itself.

In the Dialogues, Augustine does not explicate what this teaching of Christ exactly consists of. He will do this in his Thagastan writings, when he develops the theme of God’s temporal dispensation further. In the Dialogues, however, Augustine is already clear on one point: in the history of salvation God accommodates himself to his people in two ways. Firstly, by showing his sovereign power over the temporal world. Secondly, by teaching them through the example of Christ that they should value the intelligible world – which is the kingdom of Christ – more than the world that can be seen with the eyes.

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89 Frederick van Fleteren, “Demons”, in: Augustine Through the Ages, 266-8.
91 Holte, Beatitude et Sagesse, 307. The gospels associate the power of Christ to heal the sick with his authority over demons. Augustine himself refers a few times to demons who manifest their power over nature (future telling: Acad. 1,20; manifestation of powers: ord. 2,27), thus seducing man to worship them in exchange for temporal benefits. Christ saves the human soul from the dominion of demons, first by showing his superiority over them with regard to his potestas and second by teaching humans to prefer God to temporal creation, by laying off this potestas (Cf. Jn. 10:18: nemo tollit eam [uitam] a me sed ego pono eam a me ipso potestatem habeo ponendi eam et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam hoc mandatum accepi a Patre meo). That Augustine was already aware of Christ’s victory over demons is illustrated in beata u. 3,18 where Augustine refers to the rite of exorcism.
92 This is a recurring theme in Augustine, which he also applies to the Incarnation of Christ: man was misled by external persuasion and is led back to God through external persuasion. Cf. Patout Burns, “Providence as Grace in Augustine”, in: Pierre Yves Fux (e.a.), Saint Augustin: africantité et universalité. Actes du colloque international Alger-Annaba, 1-7 avril 2001. Augustinus Afer, vol. 1 (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2003), 211-8 (213).
94 In ord. 1,32 Augustine characterizes the kingdom of Christ as belonging to the other world that is far removed from the senses. That is why Christ said: Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo.
Augustine moreover considers this divine authority to be at work through the teaching of the Church. “Therein the life of good men is most easily purified, not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the authority of the mysteries.”96 In *De ordine* 2,15 Augustine makes it even clearer when he says that “he [God] who allows no one to perish who rightly believes in Him through the mysteries, may by this bond [of faith] draw them to Himself and free them from these dreadful, entangling evils.”97 Again, Augustine is not yet clear about how the two aspects of the divine authority are mediated through the teaching of the Church, as this is a theme that he will develop later in his Thagastan writings.

### 2.3 The disciplinary power of dialogue

As we already observed, subjection to the authority of Christ did not exclude philosophical disputation as a means to understand the truth. For everyone the way of salvation starts with the authority of Christ, but some are able to reach understanding of the mysteries of Christianity through the exercise of philosophy. Augustine thus regards philosophical disputation as a way to attain the truth within the boundaries of Christianity, not separated from it.98

By organizing disputations in his school at Cassiciacum, Augustine puts himself in the tradition of Plato’s Socrates.99 Socrates used his mayeuttic method to make his dialogue partner aware of his erroneous opinions, in order to assist him in acquiring true knowledge. In the course of the disputations, however, Augustine discovers the limited effect of these exercises on his pupils, driven as they are by lower impulses.

In the following, I will show how dialogue functions for Augustine as a means through which man is confronted not merely with the validity of his intellectual opinions, but also with the moral state of his soul. It makes the disputant aware of his need of wisdom, of his fear of losing face and his desire to gain glory by conquering his dialogue partner. In other words, it shows man to himself as not yet “with God”, and standing in need of moral progress. As such these dialogues have a similar function as the coercive power of fortune. They intend to effect a new openness for truth and learning.100 To illustrate my point, I will make use of the dialogues Augustine organizes for his pupils Licentius and Trygetius.

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97 *ord.* 2,15, CSEL 63,157: “*Quo illos uinculo [fidei] ad sese trahat atque ab his horrendis et inuolutissimis malis liberet ille, qui neminem sibi per mysteria bene credentem perire permittit.*”
99 For the continuity and discontinuity between the Socratic tradition and Augustine, see Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*, 34-9 (on Socratic elenchtic dialogue); 89-116 (on Augustine’s appropriation of this tradition in Cassiciacum). For a broader treatment of the ‘irrational’ aspects of the early Dialogues, see Catherine Conybeare, *The Irrational Augustine* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
2.3.1 Augustine’s disputations with his pupils: purpose and rules

The Cassiciacum Dialogues all have to do with the question of how to attain happiness. Through rational dialogues the interlocutors are trained to clear their minds from error in order to increasingly acquire true knowledge, which is the requirement for attaining the happy life.

Philosophical disputation is frequently compared to a contest (certamen\textsuperscript{101}), or a legal case (causa\textsuperscript{102}) between the dialogue partners.\textsuperscript{103} In the disputation Augustine’s interlocutors try to conquer one another by the force of logical argumentation. The goal of the contest, however, is not personal victory by showing one’s argumentative power over against the rival interlocutor, but instead the common discovery of truth. This, Augustine argues, is the difference between the rhetorical school he has left (schola illa) and the school of Cassiciacum (schola nostra). In the school of Cassiciacum, disputation does not stand in the service of gaining honour for one’s argumentative or rhetorical skills, nor is it a mere game, but it serves the purification of the mind in its search for the truth. Through disputation the truth itself should conquer the disputants and bind them together. Therefore, they should be willing to be overcome by the arguments of the others. Licentius even says that if he will be defeated by the other disputants, he considers this as part of the divine order,\textsuperscript{104} which is aimed at his wellbeing.\textsuperscript{105}

In dialogue, the disputants continually compel one another to think. In this way they acquire knowledge of their rational abilities. The 	extit{egestas} of the soul, the extent to which it lacks wisdom, is revealed. As Augustine puts it: one comes to know ‘how much strength’ one has still to acquire in order to know and defend the truth.\textsuperscript{106} Therefore, if one of the interlocutors is defeated or becomes aware of having made a mistake in his argumentation, his partner should not close the discussion by claiming personal victory. He should give his colleague room for a second chance. This is one of the major rules that Augustine establishes for the discussions.\textsuperscript{107} In his turn, the other discussion partner should not be ashamed of his mistake, but is obliged to take this second chance in order to continue the discussion. After all, his own lack of arguments does not necessarily imply that his partner has provided good arguments or true propositions. Thus the dialogue partners mutually help each other to find the truth, precisely by forcing each other to make mistakes.

\textsuperscript{101} Acad. 1,16.
\textsuperscript{102} Acad. 2,22.
\textsuperscript{103} For the comparison between dialogue and battle, see Plato’s Gorgias, 447a; 505d.
\textsuperscript{104} ord. 1,9, CSEL 63,127: “\textit{Tantum enim eum animo imbibet etaque hausi, ut etiamsi me quisquam in hac disputatione superaret, etiam hoc nulli temeritati, sed rerum ordini tribuam. Neque enim res ipsa, sed Licentius superabitur}.”
\textsuperscript{105} ord. 1,23.
\textsuperscript{106} ord. 1,20, CSEL 63,134. In this passage, Augustine says to Licentius that he will challenge the latter’s thesis (‘nothing happens outside of order’) by defending a counterposition (‘there are things that happen outside of order’ – which Augustine of course regards as an error). He hopes that he will be defeated by Licentius, as this would prove how much Licentius has already progressed in philosophy. If Licentius were defeated by Augustine, however, Licentius would experience how much strength he still had to acquire to return to God (\textit{res te ipsa commonebit quanta e tibi aires, ut in eum firmior redeas parandae sint}).
\textsuperscript{107} Acad. 1,8, CCL 29,7: “\textit{Illi hoc non solent concedere, inquam, quos ad disputandum non inueniendi ueri cupiditas sed ingenti iactantia puerilis impellit. itaque apud me, praeertim cum adhuc nutriendi educandique sitis, non solam concediur sed etiam in praeceptis habeatis uolo ad ea uos discutienda redire oportere, quae concesseritis incautius}.”
2.3.2 The practice of dialectics

Let us now turn to the dialogues between Augustine as moderator and Licentius and Trygetius as his pupils. In the preface to book 1 of *Contra Academicos*, Augustine presents Licentius and Trygetius as both converted from the lower pleasures of youth to the pursuit of philosophy. Their disputations, however, will prove that below this initial “desire for finding the true and right” (cupiditas inueniendi ueri et recti), lower desires are still present. In the following I will show how Augustine’s admonitions to dialogue bring these lower desires to the fore and how Augustine uses the fear of punishment to restrain his pupils from yielding to these inclinations.

*De ordine* starts with a nightly discussion between Augustine, Licentius, and Trygetius about order, occasioned by the sound of dripping water. Augustine is surprised at Licentius’ ability to engage in philosophical disputation, especially because he was not well versed in the discipline. After a period in which Licentius seems to have been silent, Augustine wants to continue the discussion with him, but Licentius appears to have lost himself in his love for poetry. Augustine then bursts out against Licentius, reproving him for his blindness: “With your poetry you are building a wall between yourself and the truth!” This outburst results in Licentius’ temporary conversion. He regards Augustine’s reprimand as a divine sign. Just as Licentius himself, some moments earlier, had by his clamour exhorted a mouse into his hole, so Augustine’s clamour converted Licentius to turn back from poetry to the true and unshaken dwelling-place of philosophy (philosophari... uera et inconcussa nostra habitatio). Augustine’s deterrence thus seems to effect a conversion, but in fact it only effects a temporary suppression of Licentius’ love for poetry. When we meet him the following day, his wisdom has gone and again he turns out to be afraid to engage in dialogue with Augustine. His preference for poetry and fear of losing face have displaced his love for truth.

During the night, Augustine had promised Licentius to challenge his pupil’s thesis that everything happens within order. Now Augustine sets out to fulfil his promise. In order to engage with his pupils in dialogue, he first admonishes them to concentrate (hic esto – ‘be here with your mind’) and to be aware of the importance of the subject for their lives. When Augustine observes from their body language that they are eager to listen to what he is going to say, he changes his pedagogical strategy. Instead of delivering a monologue on *ordo*, he challenges Licentius to give a definition of it. Licentius is shocked about this sudden change of pedagogical strategy.

“When he heard that he was compelled to give a definition, he was shocked as if cold water was sprinkled over him, and he looked at me with a very confused face and said to me, as people do in these kind of situations, with a nervous smile: What is this? What do you think I am? Do you think that I am inspired by a spirit from outside myself? But immediately he animated himself and said: maybe there is some power at my side.”

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108 Acad. 1,4, CCL 29,5: “In hac mecum studiosissime uiiuit noster Licentius; ad eam totum a iuuenalibus inlecebris uoluptatibusque conuersus est ita, ut eum non temere patri audeam imitandum […] Illum enim quoque adulescentem quasi ad detergendum fastidium disciplinarum aliquid quantum sibi usurpasset militia, ita nobis magnarum honestarumque artium ardentissimum edacissimunqae restituit.”

109 Acad. 1,8.

110 ord. 1,9, CSEL 63,127.

Augustine’s admonition to give a definition (which requires cogitation, instead of a passive attitude of listening) confronts Licentius again with his limited abilities and, as his nervous reaction suggests, with his fear of losing face. His first reaction is to avoid discussion. It is easier to listen to the master, than to battle with him. In Acad. 1.17 Licentius betrays a similar attitude. When Augustine is going to attack his academic position, Licentius interrupts him: ‘Wait a moment, please.’ Then, with a smile, he said: ‘Tell me, are you already certain that you will win the argument?’ ‘Suppose that I am’, I replied. ‘You ought not, all the same, on that account abandon your cause, especially since this discussion between us has been undertaken to train you and to incite you to cultivate your mind’.

Augustine’s announced attack on Licentius’ position causes Licentius to retreat, as he fears his inability to resist Augustine. Augustine, however, reminds him of the fact that this fear should not make him retreat, for thus he will deny himself the privilege of learning. It seems as if Licentius is still led by a fear of being defeated himself.

This brings me to the major underlying moral weakness that is exposed by the corrective operation of disputation at Cassiciacum: pride. After all, the fear of losing face is a form of pride: the desire to present oneself as self-sufficient before others. In the Soliloquia, Augustine observes that there is no better way to find the truth than through questions and answers, but at the same time there is almost nobody who is not ashamed to suffer defeat in a disputation. As a consequence, the learning process is frustrated by human competitiveness.

A famous example of such a situation can be found in De ordine 1.29-30. Licentius and Trygetius are engaged in a discussion about the divinity of Christ. During the discussion, Augustine corrects Trygetius when he argues that we call the Father God in the proper sense of the word and not Christ. Trygetius is ashamed of having made this doctrinal mistake and therefore does not want his words to be written down. Licentius, however, insists that Trygetius’ words must be recorded. Augustine interprets this response as a clear token of Licentius’ desire for personal glory. According to Augustine, Licentius had responded “after the custom of boys, or rather after the custom of men – oh what a crime! – of nearly all men [...] as though the question were being debated among us for the purpose of winning glory.” Augustine rebukes Licentius for this behaviour, but Trygetius, in his turn, laughs at Licentius because he is being rebuked. Augustine then rebukes both of them for their neglect of the seriousness of the undertaking. They both seem to be engaged in dialogue for the sake of personal glory, rather than out of love for the truth itself and the desire to find it. Augustine emphasizes that their eternal destiny is concerned here: “Believe me, there are some who are called upwards; others are let loose into the depths.”

112 Similar situations occur in ord. 1.13 and Acad. 1.6.
113 Acad. 2.17, CCL 29.27: “Cui ego cum respondere coepissem: expecta, inquit, quaeo paululum. Ac post arridens: dic mihi, ait, oro te, iamne certus es de uictoria tua? - tum ego: fac me, inquam, certum esse; non ideo tamen tu causam tuam debes deserere, praesertim cum haec inter nos disputatio suscet sit exercendi tui causa et ad elimidandum animum prouocandi” (translation: John. J. O’Meara, Against the Academics, 82).
115 ord. 1,29, CSEL 63,141: “Puerorum scilicet more uel potius hominum - pro nefas! - paene omnium, quasi uero gloriandi causa inter nos illud agetur.”
116 ord. 1,29, CSEL 63,141: “Alii sunt, credite, aliui sunt qui sursum vocantur, aliui qui in profunda laxantur.”
disposition of the soul is decisive for one’s eternal destiny. Therefore, they should help each other on the path towards wisdom, instead of laughing at each other’s mistakes. Augustine asks his pupils to pay him as their tutor with mutual friendship rather than with money. In other words, they would do him, who is concerned for the wellbeing of their souls, the greatest favour if they do not use each other in dialogue for the sake of personal victory, but rather help each other to find the truth together.

Despite this clear rebuke, Li centius seems not to have grasped Augustine’s point and asks what they have done wrong. Augustine then explains that they try to introduce into philosophy the “pest of enfeebling jealousy and empty boasting” (aemulationis tabificae atque inanis iactantiae [...] pestem), which flourished in the school of rhetoric that Augustine had just left. He says that he had already been suffering there from pupils who did not study for the beauty of the subjects themselves, but in order to gain praise. Augustine is afraid that, now that he deters Licentius and Trygetius from this vanity and illness (uanitate morboque deterrere), no motivation to continue in philosophy will remain. Licentius promises that he will do better, but nevertheless asks that their mistake can be erased from the tablet. Trygetius proposes that it remains there as a punishment that deters them from relapsing into the same mistake. Their desire for fame is restrained by the threat of publically losing face on record. Thus, the threat of punishment (losing face in front of others) is a means to suppress their evil passion for glory, until their will is changed for the better. The threat of punishment is made part of their process of education.

The aforementioned examples show how Augustine uses dialectics to expose his pupils to the sinful motivations that lurk below the surface of their philosophical endeavours: they prove either reluctant because they prefer other things to seeking truth, or are hesitant to engage in dialogue, as they fear to lose face. It is easier to listen to the teacher, than to risk losing face in front of the class, and ‘on record’. Augustine uses ‘shock’ therapy in one instance, which, however, only has a superficial effect. This also accounts for the recording of the dialogues. The recording of mistakes functions as a poena peccati, which deters Trygetius and Licentius from competitiveness in public. It is a means to restrain the evil will, hoping that it will be changed inwardly. All in all, the dialogues show that mere rational discipline is not enough to convert the soul from its evil habits.

At this point it should be noted that neither Augustine’s project, nor the discovery of its limited effects, are particularly Christian in nature. One also encounters it in the tradition of Platonic pedagogy. Against the Sophists, Plato had already argued that truth deserves priority over power. The true human community should be ruled by the truth, rather than by the power of rhetoric. In the pedagogical process that leads to the knowledge of the truth, the philosopher (who rules the state as an educator of his people) can make use of punishment in the name of justice, in order to liberate the...

117 The fact that Christian philosophy turns around the (eternal) destiny of the soul makes Augustine so serious about doing philosophy and explains his anger about his pupils’ childish behaviour. See Michael Payne Steppat, Die Schola von Cassiciacum. Augustins ‘De ordine’ (Bad Honnef: Bock & Herchen, 1980), 80-7. Cf. also Acad. 2,9,22.

118 ord. 1,30, CSEL 63,142: “Prorsus, inquit Trygetius, maneat nostra poena, ut ea ipsa quae nos inlicit fama flagello propio a suo amore deterreat.” On the purpose of writing the disputations down, Augustine says in beata u. 15, CCL 29,74: “Ego semel praeceperam, ut nullum uerbum praeter litteras funderet. Ita adolescentem inter uerecundiam atque constantiam exagitatum tenebam” (“I had once and for all ordered that no word should escape record. In this way I held the adolescent in suspense between hesitance and constancy”).

119 Jaeger, Paideia III, 292ff. Jaeger also points to the medical influence on Plato’s understanding of the office of ruler. The ruler-philosopher needs to be a doctor for his subjects.
better part in the human soul from the dominion of the baser part.\textsuperscript{120} Plato uses the imagery of surgery to illustrate his point. Augustine adopts this pedagogical model, and develops it over the course of his career.

\section*{2.4 The discipline of the soul in the process of ascent}

\subsection*{2.4.1 The discipline of inner dialogue: the humbling assault of habit in the \textit{Soliloquia}}

In the previous section we have seen how Augustine used dialogue to exercise his pupils in seeking the truth and to bring them to self-knowledge. But what about himself? Is he in need of some form of discipline after his conversion? On the one hand he depicts himself as free from the burdens of worldly loves. A new life has begun. He knows that there is a long way to go yet, but he is full of hope. He seems to believe that there are men who have already reached the happy life here on earth and seems to hope to become one of them through the exercise of Christian philosophy.\textsuperscript{121} Over against the Academics, he emphasizes that the truth can be found. And to Romanianus he joyfully exclaims that the God whom Christian philosophy promises to reveal is already revealing himself to him, albeit through shining clouds (\textit{lucidas nubes}).\textsuperscript{122} On the other hand, Augustine is aware of the danger of self-delusion. One can regard oneself as quite healthy, if one compares oneself to other persons who are even more ill, but this does not make the judgment true. It can be a means to construct a deceptive self-image, which covers the remaining presence of the old self. This is the pride of the converted self.

Augustine already warns of the danger of self-deception in \textit{De beata uita}. He draws the attention of his readers to a great mountain that is located in front of the harbour of philosophy. This mountain stands for the “proud passion for empty glory” (\textit{superbum studium inanissimae gloriae}). Both people from within the harbour and those who are still approaching it are tempted to ascend this mountain and assume the role of a teacher. On the one hand, they teach those who are approaching the

\textsuperscript{120} Plato, \textit{Republic}, 590e-591b; Plato, \textit{Gorgias}, 478b-e. For a Christian appeal to Plato on this matter, see Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Paedagogos}, 1.8.67; 1.9.75.

\textsuperscript{121} Cf. \textit{Acad}, 3,43: “Whatever be the position of human wisdom, I know that I as yet have not attained it. Though I am in my thirty-third year, I do not think that I should give up hope of reaching it some day. I have renounced everything else that men regard as good, and have proposed to dedicate myself to the search for wisdom.” (translation: O’Meara, \textit{Against the Academics}, 150).

harbour the difficulties and dangers of entering it. On the other hand, they regard themselves as if they have already reached the fatherland. Their position as teachers seduces them to look down upon their ‘pupils’ and to think of themselves as already possessing the happy life. Augustine seems to say: people can use their progression in the life of philosophy, in relation to others, as a basis of being content with themselves, ignoring the infirmity that still inheres in them. Thus, such people deceive themselves with a self-image that has no substance (uanissima gloria). They put their trust in it, thinking that it supports them. But eventually it collapses and they are absorbed in the darkness beneath them; they are snatched away from the ‘splendid dwelling’ that they had almost contemplated. Augustine’s words sound like the judgment upon the foolish builder who built his house on the sand, instead of on a rock (Mt. 7:24-29; Lk. 6:47-49). His house seemed stable until the storms put its foundation on trial and made it fall “with a great crash”. Many scholars think that Augustine refers here to the Neoplatonists, especially because Augustine’s description has much in common with his description of the Neoplatonists in Confessions 7.27. We should not forget, however, that Augustine also sees the danger of pride tempting those who are already in the harbour of Christian philosophy. In other words, he himself is in danger of self-delusion (and he might also implicitly warn Manlius Theodorus here). This interpretation of the passage is confirmed by what Augustine himself says about himself in the Soliloquia: we often think of ourselves as healthy when we compare our illness to that of others. As Augustine is a teacher who is spiritually more mature than his pupils, he is himself tempted to underestimate the remnants of his past self when he compares himself to others.

This is particularly attested in the inner dialogue, which Augustine wrote down in the first book of the Soliloquia. As Augustine says later in his Confessions, this dialogue expresses “the most intimate feeling of my mind with myself and to myself before Thee”. This inner dialogue can be interpreted as Augustine’s inner battle with his conscience, before God. One part of Augustine emphasizes the progress he has already made. The other part of Augustine, however, his ratio, challenges Augustine’s pretences and wants to bring him to the awareness that below his admirable resolutions concerning his new life, the remnants of the old life are still present and make themselves felt. Finally, when confronted with his reaction to a lustful dream, he surrenders his pride and admits his inability to diagnose his own spiritual condition, falling again on God’s grace as the only true judge and cure for his soul.

In the beginning of the dialogue, in Sol. 1,16 Augustine expresses his desire to know nothing more than God and the soul, but has to concede that he is not sure whether this love is really undivided:

123 beata u. I,3, CCL 29,66: “… Inflatos sibi superambulantes succrepante fragili solo demergat ac sorbeat, eisque in tenebras revolutis, eripiat luculentam domum, quam pene iam viderant.”
124 I owe this suggestion to Van Reyn, Fortuna Caeca, Vol. 2, 185.
126 sol. 1,25. In ep. 3,1 (386) Augustine confesses that he feels flattered to be called happy or almost happy by his friend Nebridius, but that his conscience objected to this qualification. He refers to the Soliloquia for substantiation of this self-evaluation.
127 conf. 9,8.
128 Stephan. A. Cooper (“Scripture at Cassiciacum: I Cor. 13:13 in the Soliloquies”, Augustinian Studies 27/2 (1996), 21-47) rightly argues that this theme indicates that Augustine had already grasped more of the Pauline duality between flesh and spirit than is sometimes assumed.
I might answer that, in my present frame of mind, I love nothing else, but it would be more cautious to say I do not know. For it has often happened to me that, when I thought that nothing else could disturb me, something nevertheless came into my mind which affected me much differently than I had expected. Similarly, although something may not have bothered me at all when it merely came into my thought, yet when it did actually happen, it annoyed me more than I had anticipated.\textsuperscript{129}

Here, Augustine confesses that there can be a difference between the actual and the imagined state of one’s soul. One can have decided to want to know God and the soul, but subconsciously the soul can still be bound by the love for sensible things. Augustine must indeed admit that his soul still suffers from three kinds of fear: the fear of losing friends, the fear of physical pain, and the fear of death. Therefore, \textit{ratio} concludes that Augustine is still “perturbed by all the ills and disorders of the soul” and is therefore not yet able to know God. His eyes still love darkness to a great extent and are therefore still ill equipped to see the sun.\textsuperscript{130} Augustine, however, defends himself, pointing to the extent to which his health has already improved. In response, \textit{ratio} sets out to challenge Augustine’s claims, first by asking him whether he still desires riches, a wife, and food. Augustine honestly answers that he has ceased to desire riches after reading the \textit{Hortensius}; that he recently stopped desiring women; and that he only desires food for the sustenance of his body. With regard to his desire for a wife, however, Augustine’s answer betrays the said uncertainty about his own inner life. He says: “I have commanded myself (\textit{mihi imperavi}) – with due justice and good reason, I believe – for the liberation of my soul not to desire, not to seek, not to marry a wife.”\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ratio}, the other part of Augustine’s self, responds that it is not interested in what Augustine has decided, but whether he is still struggling with \textit{libido} or not. Augustine responds that his desire for a wife has ceased and that he recalls this desire with dread and distaste. But he seems to feel that he is on instable ground here, for he asks \textit{ratio}: “What more do you want?” Augustine tries to prove his victory over \textit{libido} before the tribunal of conscience, but he feels that the evidence he gives does not provide full certainty.

\textit{Ratio} continues to challenge Augustine’s claims, now confronting him with certain attractive goods, in order to test whether the desire for them is really extinguished from his soul, or merely inactive for a time, because the objects of the desire are absent and presently do not titillate the mind. Augustine responds that he only loves these goods (friends, honour, a wife, bodily wellbeing), not in order to enjoy them as such, but merely to the extent that they help him to embrace wisdom and truth. He would use them in order to enjoy God. All of Augustine’s answers express his presumed readiness to see God. \textit{Ratio}, however, warns him that the beauty of wisdom only shows herself to lovers who are completely chaste.

Augustine now becomes impatient. \textit{Ratio} promised him to show God, but constantly reminds him of the impediments to seeing God. Augustine claims to have met the requirements: he only loves

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Possem respondere nihil me amare amplius, pro eo sensu qui mihi nunc est, sed tutius respondeo nescire me. Nam saepe mihi usus euenit ut, cum alia nulla re me crederem com moueri, uniret tamen aliquid in mentem, quod me multo aliter atque praesumpseram pungeret. Item saepe, quamuis in cogitationem res aliquia incidens non me persuellerit, re uera tamen eueniens perturbauit plus quam putabam.”}\textsuperscript{129}
  \item \textit{Omnibus igitur adhuc morbis animi et perturbationibus agitari. Quaesum ergo talium oculorum impudentia est, velle illum solem videre?”}\textsuperscript{130}
  \item “...satis, credo, iuste atque utiliter pro libertate animae meae mihi imperauit non cupere, non quaerere, non ducere uxorem.”\textsuperscript{131}
\end{itemize}
wisdom for its own sake and loves or fears other things propter ipsam. So, what are we waiting for? Why does his reason continue torturing him by questioning his readiness for the vision of God?\footnote{sol. 1,22, CSEL 89, 34: “Quid ergo adhuc suspendor infelix et cruciatus miserabili differor?”} Reason then advises Augustine to make himself free of the glue of senses, in order to be able to flee from darkness to light. Augustine, however, deems this impossible as long as the light does not reveal itself to him. Of course, he will love the light above everything else if it reveals itself to him. At this point ratio rebukes Augustine for this way of reasoning. Augustine switches roles with God. First he declares himself healthy and then blames God for the fact that he does not see God. As if the bodily eye will no longer love darkness, when it sees the sun. Only an eye that is healed from its love for darkness can see the sun; otherwise it will turn back to darkness, when the sun reveals itself to it.\footnote{sol. 1,24. Cf. conf. 7, 16, CCL 27, 103: where Augustine reveals that upon gazing at the light above his mind, he was immediately struck back by it and experienced that he was not yet able to see it: “Et reuerberasti infirmitatem aspectus mei radians in me uelutem, et contremui amore et horrore: et inueni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis.”} Augustine is struggling here with his fractured self. He knows that truth can only be contemplated through virtue, and rather than concluding from his present situation that he is apparently not yet ready for contemplation, he blames God for not showing himself to him. In this behaviour Augustine’s prides comes to the fore.

Ratio responds by giving a diagnosis of Augustine’s spiritual state:

In this the mind is often at fault, that it thinks itself and boasts itself sound; and because it does not yet see, it complains as if it is within its rights. But that Beauty knows when she should show herself. For she herself administers the office of physician, and better understands who are healthy than the very ones who are healed. But we, as far as we have emerged (from darkness), seem to ourselves to see; but how far we were immersed (in darkness), and how far we had made progress, we are not permitted either to think or feel, and in comparison with a more severe disease we believe ourselves to be healthy.\footnote{sol. 1,25, CSEL 89, 37-38: “Et in eo saepe fallitur animus ut sanum se putet et sese iactet; et quia nondum uidet, ueluti iure conqueritur. Noui autem illa pulchritudo, quando se ostendat. Ipsa enim etiam medici fungitur munere meliusque intellegit, qui sint sani, quam idem ipsi qui sanantur. Nos autem, quantum emerserimus, uidemur nobis uideret; quantum autem mersi eramus et quo progressi fueramus, nec cogitare nec sentire permittimur et in comparatione grauioris morbi sanos esse nos credimus.”} Augustine is heavily affected by this experience. His pride has been challenged by it. He summons his mind to be silent and not to dig deeper into the abysses of his soul. Augustine decides to no longer judge himself with regard to his health, but to entrust himself completely to the Physician.

In his later works, Augustine says that sexual dreams are the consequence of concupiscence, which in its turn is the punishment of original sin. See Martine Dulaey, Le rêve dans la vie et la pensée de saint Augustin (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967), 138.

\footnote{sol. 1,25, CSEL 89,38: “Secretissimus ille medicus utrumque monstraret, et unde cura eius euaseris et quid curandum remaneat.”}
who knows him better than he knows himself and who promises him to heal him from his sickness.\textsuperscript{137} “You are right in saying, that he whom I burn to see, himself knows when I am in health; let him do what pleases him: when it pleases him, let him show himself; I now commit myself completely to his clemency and care. Once for all do I believe that he does not fail to lift up those who are so disposed towards him.”\textsuperscript{138} In his ‘battle’ with his own mind Augustine has been conquered. The divine Physician himself used a dream, an involuntary movement of memory, to confront Augustine with the remaining stains of his past loves.\textsuperscript{139} The law of God, present in his conscience, exposes him to this reality. Thus God uses the punishment of sin (consuetudo) and the law of the mind to execute his healing work in Augustine. He compels Augustine to be honest regarding his sinful state and to forego his attempt to construct a deceptive self-image. The genuineness of Augustine’s conversion expresses itself in the fact that he does not stick to his pride, but surrenders himself to the help of God. Although in his early years Augustine remains rather positive about the possibilities of attaining the contemplation of God in this life, the experience of failed contemplation at Cassiciacum remains with him as a reminder of his fractured self.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{2.4.2 Punishment within the process of ascent}

In \textit{De quantitate animae}, a work written shortly after his baptism, Augustine gives a similar reflection on the limits of contemplation for the converted person. Although strictly speaking, this work does not belong to the period under discussion in this chapter, it is helpful to illustrate the trajectory that Augustine has taken in his understanding of Christian progress. It illustrates the abiding function of corrective discipline in the Christian life.

From section 70 Augustine sketches a trajectory of ascent via the levels of the soul. The fourth level is the moment of genuine Christian conversion.\textsuperscript{141} He writes:

\begin{quote}
From this point the soul dares to rank itself not only before its own body… but even before the whole material world itself, and it dares to think that the good of the world is not its good… The more it becomes the cause of its own delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser things and
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137] For the medicus-theme in Cassiciacum, see D. Doucet, “Le thème du médecin dans les premiers dialogues philosophiques de Saint Augustin”, \textit{Augustiniana} 39 (1989), 447-64. On the application of this idea within Augustine’s Christology (\textit{Christus medicus}), see P. Eijkenboom, \textit{Het Christus-Medicusmotief in de preken van Sint Augustinus} (Assen, 1960); T. F. Martin, “Paul the Patient. \textit{Christus Medicus} and \textit{Stimulus Carnis} (2 Cor. 12:7): A consideration of Augustine’s Medicinal Christology”, \textit{Augustinian Studies} 32/2 (2001), 219-56 (which also treats the ‘violent’ aspect of Christ’s medicinal work). Augustine might have derived this theme both from the gospels (Lk. 5:31-32) and from Cicero who described philosophy as \textit{medicina animi} (\textit{Tusc. Disp.} 3). This connection between medicine and philosophy was widespread among all philosophical schools in Antiquity.
\item[138] \textit{sol.} 1,26 CSEL 89,39: “Certe dicis, quod ille ipse, quem uidere ardeo, nouerit quando sim sanus. Faciat quod placet; quando placet, sese ostendat; iam me totum eius clementiae curaeque conmitto. Semel de illo credidi, quod sic erga se adefectos subleuare non cesser.”
\item[139] This passage shows that Augustine was already aware of the force of habit within the converted person, immediately after his conversion. At this point I agree with Harrison, \textit{Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology}, 55-63 and disagree with Lenka Karfíkova (\textit{Grace and the Will according to Augustine} (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 29), who argues that this strain of thought emerges for the first time in \textit{Diu. quest.} 83,40. Harrison highlights the similarities between \textit{sol.} 1 and \textit{conf.} 10 with regard to Augustine’s analysis of the inability of the mind to ascent to God and its need of divine grace.
\item[140] For an analysis of Augustine’s Christianization of Neoplatonic contemplation at Cassiciacum, see Kenny, \textit{Contemplation and Classical Christianity}, 61-92.
\item[141] Kenny, \textit{Contemplation and Classical Christianity}, 98.
\end{footnotes}
wholly to cleanse itself and to make itself spotless and stainless. It dares to be strong against every enticement that tries to move it from its resolution and purpose, to esteem human society, to desire for another nothing that it would not wish for itself; to obey authority and the laws of wise men, and to believe that through these God speaks to it.\textsuperscript{142}

However, Augustine continues,

in this noble task of the soul there is still toil, and against the vexations and allurements of the world a hard and bitter fight; in this work of purification there is underneath a fear of death, often not strong but sometimes overpowering – not strong when its faith is most firm […] that all things are so governed by the providence and justice of God that death cannot possibly come unjustly to anyone, even though the person who inflicts death be unjust. But, death is greatly feared on this plane now, when the providence of God is so much the less firmly trusted as it is the more anxiously looked for, and it is the less seen as tranquility grows less through fear – tranquility so requisite for pursuing the study of these most puzzling matters.\textsuperscript{143}

The soul that has decided to live the life of virtue and to free itself from worldly enticements, experiences on a deeper level the fear of death. Exactly when the converted person has set his will on ascending to God through virtue, he is inwardly confronted with the power of ‘the old self’, which still delights more in its own temporal life than in the justice of divine providence through which all things, good and evil, are well ordered. This awareness leads to an even greater fear in man, a fear for divine judgment after death. He starts to consider that if his new self condemns his old self, how much more God will condemn him, when the body has been put off.\textsuperscript{144} In other words, after conversion the fear of hell increases, because through conversion the human person grows in the knowledge of his disordered self. This confrontation with his abiding moral impurity and divine judgment persuades the converted person that he stands in need of divine justice to be inwardly purified. This realisation leads the soul to entrust itself to God’s justifying help: “To [the justice of the supreme and true God] in the difficult task of purifying itself, the soul entrusts itself with complete filial devotion and trust to be helped and made perfect.”\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142} an. quant. 73, CSEL 89,120-21: “Hinc enim anima se non solum suo ... sed ipsi etiam uniuaero corpori audet praeponebna bona eius bona. ... quo magis se delectat, eo magis sese abstrahere a sordibus totamque emaculare ac mundissimam et comptissimam reddere, roborare se aduersus omnia, quae de proposito ac sententia demouere moltiuntur, societatem humanam magni pendere nihilque uelle alteri, quod sibi nolit accidere, sequi auctoritatem ac praecepta sapientium et per haec loqui sibi deum credere” (translation: FC 2, 140).

\textsuperscript{143} an. quant. 73, CSEL 89,221: “In hoc tam praeclaro actu animae inest adhuc labor et contra huius mundi molestias atque blanditia magnus acerrimusque conflictus. In ipso enim pargationis negotio subest metus mortis saepae non magnus, saepe uero uheumenitissimus; non magnus tum, cum robustissime creditur [...] tanta dei prouidentia iuistitiae gubernari omnia, ut nulli mors inique accidere possit, etiamsi eam forte iniquus intulerit. Vehementer autem formidatur mors in hoc iam gradu, cum et illud eo creditur infirmius, quo sollicitius quauritet, et eo ipso minus uidetur, quo tranquillitas propter metum minor est inuestigandis obscurissimis rebus pernecessaria” (translation: FC 2, 140).

\textsuperscript{144} an. quant. 73, CSEL 89,221: “Deinde quo magis sentit anima eo ipso, quo proficit, quantum interis inter puram et contaminatam, eo magis timet, ne deposito isto corpore minus eam deus possit quam se ipsam ferre pollutam.”

\textsuperscript{145} an. quant. 73, CSEL 89,222: “Cui [justitia summi et ueri dei] sese in opere tam difficili mundationis suae adiuuandam et perfeicendam piissime tatissimeque committit” (translation: FC 2, 140).
However, the soul aspires to grow further. By God’s help it reaches a state of moral self-possession (**tranquillitas**), and begins to seek the contemplation of God himself in what Augustine calls ‘the state of entrance’ (**ingressio**). At this point, however, Augustine again warns his readers. It is dangerous to direct the eye of the soul to the truth when it has not yet been completely purified. The effect of this attempt could be that the soul is so blinded by the vision of truth, that it considers the truth to be evil and turns back to a life in the flesh:

> Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed are so driven back by the light of truth that they may think there is in it not only nothing good, but much of evil. They deny it the name of truth and, by reason of pitiable yielding to carnal indulgence, they draw back into the caverns of their own darkness, enduring it because they are ill and cursing the only remedy of their distemper. Whence, divinely inspired, the prophet most fittingly prays: “Create a clean heart in me, O Lord, and renew a right spirit in my breast.” The spirit is right, I believe, if it keeps the soul in its quest for truth from losing the way and going wrong.\(^\text{146}\)

This experience resembles the one Augustine describes in the **Soliloquiae**. If one proudly presumes that one is ready to see God and is struck down (**reuerberatur**) by God’s light, one is in danger of holding to one’s own presumed purity. In doing so, one in fact returns to one’s own carnality. Instead, the soul should respond with humble conversion upon its experience of divine discipline, its being ‘beaten down’. Rather than holding on to its alleged goodness, it should turn back to the way (**cursus**) that God has commanded it to follow, the way of healing authority. If the soul humbly holds on to the path of authority, it is promised to see God in the end.\(^\text{147}\) More explicitly than in the **Soliloquiae**, Augustine affirms in **De quantitate animae** that this process can be completed in this life in a stable beatific vision. Great and incomparable souls have attained this, albeit not without the help of divine grace.\(^\text{148}\)

My conclusion is that **Soliloquiae** book 1 and **De quantitate animae** 73 show that from the beginning Augustine was convinced that even after conversion, forms of divine judgment of sin are still needed in order to make the converted soul realize its inner weakness. In one sense darkness has been left, but in another sense darkness is still present within the soul: the memory of past loves still titillates the mind.\(^\text{149}\) When the providence of God confronts the mind with the things it loves or fears to lose, it discovers the presence of the loves it believed had left behind. Thus it obtains a useful fear of the judgement of God (who fathoms the human heart more profoundly and honestly than it can fathom itself). The converted person uses this fear to flee into the embrace of Christ’s authority for help, in order to be cleansed inwardly. This is what Augustine did when he registered for the catechumenate and was baptized in 387.

\(^{146}\) *an. quant.* 75, CSEL 89,223: “*Quod qui prius uolunt facere quam mundati et sanati fuerint, ita illa luce reuerberatur ueritatis, ut non solum nihil boni, sed etiam mali plurimum in ea patent esse atque ab ea nomen ueritatis abuidicent et cum quadam libidine et uoluptate miserabili in suas tenebras, quas eorum morbus pati potest, medicinae maledicentes refugiant. Unde diuino a difatu et prorsus ordinatisse illud a propheta dicitur: cor mundum crea in me, deus, et spiritum rectum innoua in uisceribus meis [Ps 50:12]. Spiritus enim rectus est, credo, quo fit, ut anima in ueritate quacerenda deuiare atque erreare non possit*” (translation: FC 4, 142).

\(^{147}\) *an. quant.* 76, Cfr. mor. 1.11.


\(^{149}\) *sol.* 1.26.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter investigated Augustine’s thought on the redemptive meaning of divine judgment in the Cassiciacum Dialogues. This conclusion sums up and connects the most important findings of this chapter.

The first context in which Augustine discusses a form of divine judgment is where he speaks about the coercive force of *fortuna* (especially *De beata uita* and *Contra Academicos*). Although he uses a pagan term, he intends to develop a Christian concept of divine providence, aimed against the Manichees whom he left, but also distinguished from Stoic and Neoplatonic understandings of it. With Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy, Augustine affirms that everything that happens is encapsulated in an all-encompassing order or law, but unlike them he perceives this order as the personal involvement of the Creator God in human life.

This God is at work in Augustine’s life and in the life of Romanianus as the one who gives temporal goods, but also takes them away. Augustine interprets his and his patron’s experience of suffering as a form of divine discipline. Through the mishaps that Augustine and Romanianus experienced in their lives, God is forcing them to lay down the pride of establishing their own beatitude, which they had expected to find in their secular careers. Their lives function as examples of God’s way of dealing with the human soul, which has lost itself in the love for perishable things. He awakens it through the violent strikes of fortune. In his fear and pain man experiences the unhappiness of his soul, his *non esse cum deo*, his being under the law. Augustine regards these experiences as wake-up calls for the soul, admonitions to ascend to the intelligible world. In his disciplinary understanding of suffering, Augustine echoes familiar Stoic and Neoplatonic ideas, but recontextualizes them within a Christian framework.

Augustine observes that suffering does not automatically lead to conversion. The human soul is naturally inclined to hold on to its love for temporal things and to use religion and philosophy to strengthen itself against God. Pagan religion is a means to serve carnal desires by establishing an alliance with evil spirits. Stoic philosophy strives to attain independence of the external world, and to establish internal tranquillity in order to be happy in this world. Scepticism (as popularly understood) does not even believe that we can transcend the world of sense-perception. The Christian heresy of Manichaeism, in Augustine’s eyes, likewise cannot help the soul to find the beatitude that it was made for, because it understands God and the soul in terms of matter. The only philosophy that leads man in the right direction is Platonism (resurrected in the philosophy of Plotinus), because it teaches that the soul finds its true home beyond the world of space and time. However, the path to ascend to the goal of Platonic philosophy is the authority of Christ, in whom the Logos has come down to lead the soul to God.

The *proprium* of Christian philosophy is that it teaches that the God whom we encounter in the buffetings of fortune, has come down in order to lead us to him. The coercion of God is aimed at making us submit to his healing authority. This is why Augustine advises Romanianus to pray to Christ in order to hold course towards the harbor of philosophy. He moreover depicts Christ as the one who descended to our level of understanding by first catching our attention through his power (*potestas in factis*) and then leading us onward, through his precepts, from a love for the sensible things.

150 This is why Augustine calls Stoicism a philosophy of this world, which is rejected by Paul in *Col. 2:8*.
151 At several places, Augustine emphasizes the consubstantiality of the Logos with God, thus opposing the subordination of the Logos to the One in Plotinus.
world to a love for himself as God (*praecceptione naturam*). The dual character of the divine pedagogy in the Old and New Testaments (coercion and rational teaching) already announces itself here.

A second context in which Augustine thematizes the disciplining value of judgment, is in the philosophical disputation he organizes for his pupils. Through rational disputation — argument and counter-argument — the dialogue partners correct each other’s opinions about the truth and thus help each other to clear their minds for the truth. The practice of dialogue in Augustine’s school at Cassiciacum challenges this ideal of the rational purgation of the mind. In the first instance, Augustine presents his pupils as eager to philosophize, as if they love the truth above everything else. However, through the ‘violence’ of disputation it becomes clear that there is a difference between their perceived or pretended self and their real self. They are confronted with their fear of losing face and with their desire for praise. Augustine hopes that his rebuke of their pride will lead to conversion. But it does not come to pass. Licentius only experiences a temporary conversion, but is eventually caught again by his past loves for poetry and honor. Trygetius and Licentius get caught up in a fight about the recording of their mistakes, out of fear of losing face. Eventually their quarrel remains recorded in order to restrain them from further inclinations to fight for their own praise. As such, the disputation of Augustine’s pupils show first that the compulsion inherent in philosophical dialogue reveals the abiding presence of the old self (which loves himself more than God/truth) and second that the threat of punishment can be a means of restraining this old self until the love for the truth is born in the process of *eruditio*. The threat of punishment thus facilitates the moral growth of the man. This idea also existed in classical educational theories. Augustine will later use it in his reflections on the function of punishment in the history of salvation.

Augustine himself looks very much like his pupils in the first book of the *Soliloquia*. We witness a man who wants to be more than he is. When one part of himself pretends to desire only God and the soul and nothing else, the other part challenges this claim. Is his pretended self really congruent with his real self? Through a dream, which stirred carnal passions more than he expected, Augustine is convinced of the remaining stains of his former habits. This experience provides his conscience with the decisive argument for the deceptive nature of his self-perception, allowing him to lay down his pride and entrust himself totally to God the Physician. God is the one who can adequately adjudge the impurity of his soul and who is able to cure him from it. This experience is accompanied both by an increasing fear for the divine judgment and an increasing trust upon Christ as the doctor of the soul.

At this point Augustine shows himself to have progressed further on the spiritual path than his pupils. They were confronted with their old selves through the force of disputation, but tried to preserve its interests. Even their self-restraint was motivated by a fear of losing their carnal interests (namely honor). They have not yet progressed towards a love of truth by which they condemn the strivings of their old self. Augustine has. He has acquired a fear of the divine judgment about his inner self and affirms this judgment about himself. He later describes this kind of fear as *timor castus*, as opposed to a *timor carnalis*. This fear leads him to seek help from God as the doctor of his soul. This imagery shows how Augustine applies the tradition of philosophical pedagogy to the process of spiritual maturation as a Christian: the transcendent God leads one through the process of renewal as the one who both teaches the soul its shortcomings and offers himself to it as its healer.
3 God’s pedagogy of the embodied soul: Augustine before his ordination (387-391)

3.1 From Rome to Thagaste

After his baptism in Milan, Augustine traveled to Rome, stayed there for a year because of turmoil in Africa, and crossed the sea at the end of 388 in order to continue his life of Christian leisure in Thagaste, in a community of like-minded brothers, closely associated to the Catholic Church.1

Furthermore, he put his literary production more explicitly in the service of the Church, especially by refuting the theology of the Manichees, his former co-religionists. In Rome he started writing two books on the morals of the Catholic Church and the morals of the Manichees (de moribus ecclesiae et Manichaeorum), and in Thagaste he undertook his first attempt to offer an exegesis of Genesis, mainly to help fellow Catholics to defend themselves against Manichaean attacks on the Old Testament. Augustine also finished his anti-Manichaean masterpiece, De uera religione, before he entered the priesthood in 391. Around this time he also wrote the sixth book of De Musica, the only work on the liberal arts that he managed to complete.

In this period, Augustine started to develop a distinctive Christian theology in which creation, fall, and the history of salvation feature prominently. Simultaneously, particular aspects of Platonism, such as its negative view of embodiment, time, and history, continue to influence his articulation of the Christian faith. At this point, Augustine seems to have encountered difficulties with the essentially historical character of the Christian religion. Although he affirms, against the Manichees, the goodness of human embodiment, and the historical character of salvation, his Platonism nonetheless impedes him from giving these aspects of the Christian faith their full weight (ironically, as the books of the Platonists had also helped him to solve the problem that Manichaeism had foisted upon him). With regard to the subject of this thesis, this will prove to be especially relevant in Augustine’s understanding of the function of the law in the history of salvation, and his interpretation of the work of Christ (with its remarkable neglect of the cross).

In this chapter I will treat three themes which are important for the central question of this thesis. The first part of the chapter discusses Augustine’s understanding of the fall and its consequences. How does Augustine’s understanding of sin and God’s reaction to it develop in this period? I will pay special attention to discussions on Augustine’s early understanding of the nature of sin and the consequences of Adam’s fall for his progeny. This is important to obtain a right understanding of the pedagogical function of punishment. The second part of the chapter addresses Augustine’s understanding of salvation history. In the previous chapter we already encountered this theme in the context of the Incarnation. In Rome and Thagaste, Augustine further develops this theme in his discussions with the Manichees on the relationship between the Old and the New Testaments. I will particularly focus on Augustine’s concept of law and punishment as pedagogical instruments in

the history of salvation. This chapter then closes with an account of Augustine’s forced ordination. Augustine experienced this ordination as a divine chastisement of his proud self-image. This section takes up the line of the *Soliloquia* with regard to Augustine’s personal experience of divine discipline. At the end of the chapter, I will answer the research question: How does Augustine conceive of the redemptive function of divine judgment?

3.2 Augustine’s anti-Manichaean theology of the fall and its consequences

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Augustine develops a specifically Christian view of providence in his early works. This enables him to regard experiences of suffering as means through which God personally addresses individuals, encouraging them to face the miserable state of their souls and to seek for salvation with him. Augustine develops this theme in his Thagastan writings by putting it in the context of man’s creation, his fall, and the curse that followed upon it. He develops the view that God, in response to Adam’s sin, inaugurated the history of mankind, in which man suffers under the resistance of bodily creation. Thus God reminds him of the original obligation with which man was created, namely to subject himself to God in contemplation and to rule over his body. Augustine develops this view in direct opposition to Manichaean accounts of suffering. Therefore, I will first give an account of Augustine’s representation of the Manichaean theology of suffering. Subsequently, I will describe Augustine’s understanding of creation, man’s fall, and its penal consequences.

3.2.1 The Manichaean theology of suffering according to *De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos*

Manichaeism regards the visible world as the result of a cosmological battle between two opposing principles: the realm of light (God) and the realm of darkness (Satan). The realm of light represents peace, rest, and the intellectual aspect of reality; the realm of darkness stands for matter, temporality, and unrest. According to Manichaeism, the creation of this world can be explained from the fact that the realm of darkness began to desire the kingdom of light and invaded it. The kingdom of light defended itself and thus a cosmic battle began. The outcome of the battle was that some light particles were captured by the realm of darkness. This mixture of good and evil constituted the material for our present world. Every living being in reality (whether plant, animal, or human) contains these particles of light. The aim of the Manichaean religion is to redeem them from matter in order to allow them to return to their origin. The sun and the moon are regarded as receptacles of redeemed light particles; these transfer them to the kingdom of light.

According to the Manichaean creation story, Adam and Eve were made by the prince of darkness as a microcosm, a miniature representation of reality itself, consisting of both light and darkness, that is of soul and body. The aim of their existence was to wrap as much light as possible in matter by procreation. According to Manichaeism, the God of Genesis represents the prince of darkness as a microcosm, a miniature representation of reality itself, consisting of both light and darkness, that is of soul and body. The aim of their existence was to wrap as much light as possible in matter by procreation.

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2 For a summary of Augustine’s representation of the Manichaean creation story, see *uera rel* 9,16.
darkness. When it is told that ‘God fashioned man from the mud of the earth and blew into him the spirit of life so that he was made a living soul’ (Gen. 2:7), this text is explained as saying that a part of God himself was turned into man’s soul and wrapped in the fragile and suffering body which we now possess. Moreover, the prince of darkness was eager to deny Adam and Eve the knowledge of who they really were: divine souls wrapped in mortal bodies. Therefore, he gave them the commandment not to eat from the tree of the knowledge good and evil. In this way he would keep them under his control. In other words, the creator of matter used the first humans to fight his own battle against the God of light.

The kingdom of light, however, came to the help of Adam and Eve by sending Jesus to them in paradise. He revealed himself in the form of the serpent and promised them that they would be like gods if they transgressed the commandment they had received. Thus it happened: they discovered that their souls were in fact divine and their bodies the evil invention of the prince of darkness. This is the knowledge of good and evil. As a consequence of this discovery, their eyes were opened and they became displeased with their naked bodies. This means: as soon as they discovered the divine nature of their souls, they became displeased with their own bodies and with the rest of temporal creation. After all, if one belongs to the divine realm, how can it be explained that one is attached to a body that is so fragile and even destined to death? How is it possible that we suffer under creation’s subjection to temporality and decay? Material creation, therefore, cannot be made by a good God, because it causes so much suffering.

In his commentary De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos, Augustine interprets the sin of Adam and Eve as a prophecy of Manichaeism. According to his interpretation, the logic of the first sin repeats itself in Manichaean dualism. The analogy runs as follows. The root of sin is pride (superbia). Pride means that the human soul is no longer content with the place it received in the order of creation, namely under God and above the body. It begins to imagine itself as autonomous and self-sufficient, as if it does not need to be controlled by a being that is higher than the soul. In other words, the soul starts to love itself, as if it were God. Simultaneously, man discovers his own nakedness and is displeased with it. This means that he is no longer content with the middle position of the soul under God and above the body, for this position entails that man is dependent upon God. The order of reality denies man what he aspires and this displeases him. Augustine writes: “Having turned away from this [the divine light] and turned to himself, which is the meaning of taking a bite from that tree, he saw his own nakedness, and was displeased with himself as not having anything to call his very own.”

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5 The Manichees regarded the religion of the Jews also as an invention of this morally repugnant being. He desires animal offerings, commanded to slaughter innocent people, and permitted or even commanded immoral behavior of his most dedicated adherents (the patriarchs and the prophets). Cf. c. Faust. 22.
7 Gn. adu. Man. 2,38.
consequence, the human dependence upon God has to be suppressed or covered. Here pride proves itself as a form of lying. The soul falls away from what it inwardly knows about its own being ('it leaves the inner room of conscience') and desires to present itself to itself and others as what it is not, namely self-sufficient. Augustine writes: “When anybody falls away from that innermost, hidden light of truth, there is nothing that pride is ready to be pleased with except fraudulent pretenses.” This deceitful self-presentation is signified by the fig leaves with which the first humans covered their own nakedness. These represent the delight of the human spirit in telling lies (delectatio or libido mentiendi).

A typical example of the human attempt to cover his own weakness is Adam’s response to God’s accusation after the transgression of the commandment. He blames ‘the woman whom you gave me’ (Gen. 3:12). In other words, Adam accuses God in order to excuse himself. If he cannot become God’s equal in majesty and greatness, he tries to make God his equal and even his inferior by claiming that God is to be blamed for his sin, as he had given him the woman who seduced him.

According to Augustine, Manichaean dualism is a means to this end. Their anthropology functions as a means to self-justification. If the soul is of the same nature as God, it cannot be responsible for evil actions (it can only suffer evil from a nature alien to it). Therefore, these actions must have another origin: the mortal body. This body does not belong to our proper selves, but is the workmanship of an evil nature that is alien to us. Therefore, if we are said to sin, in fact an evil nature is at work in us. Our entanglement in the flesh is not so much due to our own choices (and the habits that proceed from them), but to the power of darkness, which affects our souls through our bodies. Thus Manichaean dualism is a strategy to cover up human sinfulness, using the mortal body and the

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11 Conscientia is the place where God is present to the human mind. See mus. 6,13,14.
12 Gn. adu. Man. 1,23, CSEL 91,144: “Cum enim quisque ceciderit ab illa intima et secretissima luce ueritatis, nihil est unde uelit placere superbia nisi fraudulentis simulationibus.”
14 Gn. adu. Man. 2,25, CSEL 91,147: “Nihil est autem tam familiare peccantibus quam tribuere Deo uelle undecumque accusantur; et hoc de illa uena superfiae est, quoniam sic homo peccavit, cum ualit esse par Deo, id est liber esse ab eius dominio sicut ille ab omni dominio liber est, quia ipse est Dominus omnium. Quoniam ergo in maiestate par illi esse non potuit, iam lapsus etiacens in peccato suo parem sibi eum facere conatur uel poitus illum ualt ostendere peccasse, se autem esse innocentem.”
16 In uera rel. 16, Augustine attributes a doctrine of the two souls to Manicheism (dua genera animarum). This is an interpretation of the Manichean dualism between body and soul, in which the body is seen as an active evil principle through which the gens tenebrarum threathens the good soul. Because of this autonomous dynamic of caro, also designated as mens or spiritus, Augustine argues that the Manichaens in fact viewed man as consisting of two souls with different orientations. Although the Manichees did not express their anthropology in this way, conceptually Augustine’s description seems to be right. Cf. J. Kevin Coyle, “De duabus animabus”, Augustine through the Ages, 287-88; Volker Henning Drecoll & Mirjam Kudella, Augustin und der Manichäismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 148-9; Drecoll, Entstehung, 190-1. For a more elaborate description of the Manichean doctrine of the soul and Augustine’s, see: Concetta Giuffre Scibona, “The Doctrine of the Soul in Manicheism and Augustine”, in: J.A. van den Berg, A. Kotzé, T. Nicklas and M. Scopello, In Search of Truth, Augustine, Manicheism and other Gnosticism. Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty (Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 74; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 377-418.
rest of temporal creation as a ‘shield’. The soul cherishes its pride by declaring itself the victim of evil forces from outside itself. In this way, Manichaeism keeps the soul bound to the ‘delights’ of temporal creation. It gives free reign to those who want to live in the desires of the flesh, because it allows them to see their souls as mere victims of the kingdom of darkness. Augustine also applies this judgment to more ascetic versions of Manichaeism. As Manichaeism is not able to understand God and the soul as immaterial substances, it remains bound to the senses. Manichees might curse the flesh, but do not curse the carnal mind. They imagine the divine as an endless light, in which they will participate after death. This is still a carnal image of God, however, shaped after the concupiscence of the eyes (concupiscentiam oculorum). As Manichaean asceticism identifies flesh (caro) as evil, rather than the mind that thinks fleshly (carnaliter), it might develop a rigorist ethics of abstention, but cannot free the mind from carnal concupiscence itself.

3.2.2 Man’s creation

The preceding section depicted Augustine’s representation of the Manichaean view of bodily suffering as a means of self-justification. Over against this account, Augustine develops his own view of suffering as the punishment of sin. He emphasizes that human suffering is the consequence of a primal choice, by which man opted to leave God, in order to establish his beatitude through action in the body. Man’s mortality reminds him of his rebellion against God as a responsible agent, rather than of the dominion of an evil substance. Evil is not so much a substance as a changed relationship between God, the soul, and the rest of creation, due to a free choice of man. The following section summarizes Augustine’s early account of man’s creation and fall, in order to illustrate how Augustine explains the origins of human suffering.

As the Genesis account reads, “God fashioned the man from the mud of the earth and he blew into him the spirit of life and he was made a living soul” (Gen. 2:7). According to Augustine, this text says that God made man as a unity of soul and body. Against the Manichees he holds that man’s soul

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18 Augustine derives his strongest argument against the Manichaean idea of the soul’s equality with God from their depiction of the soul as suffering under the assaults of the realm of darkness. This would render God himself capable of suffering and would lock him up in time and space. He is no longer the one who stands sovereign over against creation. For an elaborate account of Augustine’s critique of Manichaeism with regard to its doctrine of God, see J. Kevin Coyle, “God’s Place in Augustine’s Anti-Manichaean Polemic”, Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007), 87–102.
20 uera rel. 40, CCL 32,212. Augustine concludes: “Facillimum est exsecrari carnem, difficillimum autem non carnaliter sapere.” This is also one of the core elements of Augustine’s critique of Manichaean ethics in de moribus manichaeorum.
21 Rief, Ordobegriff, 252.
22 There is discussion over how the early Augustine conceived of the pre-lapsarian state of man with regard to the body. Especially De Genesi adu. Man. is an object of this debate. Robert O’Connell has argued that, according to Augustine, the pre-lapsarian human being was a spiritual and not-yet individualized entity, comparable to the Plotinian World-soul from which all individual and embodied souls have their origin and to which they should return. According to O’Connell’s reading of Gen. adu. Man., before the fall there is only one soulish entity, which becomes individualized and wrapped up in a mortal body when it leaves the contemplation of God and starts to concentrate on the material world. Cf. R. O’Connell, “De Genesi contra Manichaeos and the Origin of the Soul”, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 39 (1993), 129-41 (esp. 133-6). According to O’Connell, Augustine does not regard Adam and Eve in Gen. adu. Man as historical individuals, but respectively as a higher
is not a part of God and that his body is not the work of an evil creator. The entire man is created by God from nothing and is therefore liable to change and corruption. Man’s soul consists of two parts, a rational part (ratio), which is symbolized by Adam, and an emotional part (anima), which is symbolized by Eve. The rational part of the soul is made after the image of God. It is designed to lift itself upwards from the earth (as opposed to animals, which are directed towards the earth) and to contemplate intelligible realities. The emotional part of the soul is made to obey reason, so that the body is ruled properly.

Augustine calls the composite of soul (ratio and anima) and body homo animalis, the man who is made to contemplate God, but who still has to be elevated to this stage of contemplation by God. Thus Augustine intends to express the ontological distinction between God and the human soul in opposition to concepts that identify the soul with the divine. The soul stands in need of divine illumination in order to be able to contemplate God. Without the converting activity of God’s Word and Spirit, man can only live according to his animal part, and loses the likeness to God in which he

and a lower principle in the undivided worldsoul (creatura inuisibilis). The major difficulty of this interpretation is that O’Connell conflates the storyline of the soul as creatura inuisibilis, which becomes ‘man laboring on the earth’, with another storyline that says that God created man as a composite of an animal body and soul. At this point I side with Rombs (Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul. Beyond O’Connell and his critics (Washington DC: University of America Press, 2006), 119-30), who has pointed out that the former image of prelapsarian humanity suggests that embodiment and individuation are the result of the fall, whereas the latter image suggests that individuated and embodied existence come from God. These storylines should not be conflated. Cf. Daniel Austin Napier, En Route to the Confessions. The Roots and Development of Augustine’s Philosophical Anthropology (Late Antique History and Religion 6; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 39-45.

It can even be argued that Augustine regarded Adam and Eve as historical individuals, although he treats them in his allegorical exegesis as two parts of the human soul. Cf. the sentence: “Quapropter etsi iuisibilis femina secundum historiam de corpore viri primo facta est a Domino Deo, non utsique sine causa ita facta est, nisi ut aliquod secretum intimaret” (Gen. adu. Man. 2,17). O’Connell regards the word ‘etsi’ as a ‘concesso non dato’ with regard to the historicity of Eve’s creation, but it could also be interpreted as saying that Eve’s creation is historical, but not without allegorical meaning. This is confirmed by Gn. adu. Man. 1,30 where Augustine says of Adam and Eve: “They were not yet children of this age before they had sinned.”

O’Connell also supports his thesis by appealing to the fact that Augustine identifies the first man with the creatura inuisibilis. This identification not necessarily contradicts the idea of an individuated and embodied existence, however. Augustine says that the soul (anima) belonged to the inuisibilis creatura and was interiorly nourished by the divine wisdom. Through sin man came to labor upon the earth and needed outward signs in order to know God. In other texts Augustine uses creatura inuisibilis once to refer to the world-soul (Gn. litt. Imp. 7,14), but in other passages the word refers to the angels (Gn. litt. imp. 3,9; Simpl. 2,1,5). Hence, I suggest that Augustine conceives of the pre-lapsarian soul as sharing the angelic contemplation. As such the soul belonged to the creatura inuisibilis, the heavenly world, but it is possible that it already lived an individuated and embodied life in terra. An argument for this interpretation can be derived from 2,6 where the pre-lapsarian soul says to God: spes mea est tu, portio mea in terra uiuement. In 2,30 terra is equated with corpus corruptibilis. The pre-lapsarian soul seems to have been embodied and individuated in some sense, but it was not yet laboring upon the earth (in the corrupted body). This only began when the human soul left the inner contemplation of God in order to rule the body autonomously. This interpretation of the creatura inuisibilis is broadly confirmed by A. Parvan, “Genesis 1-3: Augustine and Origen on the coats of skins”, Vigiliae Christianae 66/1 (2012), 56-92. Parvan also considers the pre-lapsarian human being as individually embodied, although this embodiment is highly spiritual. The fall’s effect is not embodiment itself, but the body becoming mortal and opaque (84-6).

25 Augustine corrects this interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:46 in the Retractationes 1,10,3 saying that this term of Paul only refers to the body.
26 Harrison, Rethinking, 91.
was created. The Word as the perfect image of the Father grants man the knowledge of intelligible realities, whereas the Spirit connects the mind to these realities through love.  

Man effectively becomes homo spiritualis when he receives the Spirit of God who enables the soul to inwardly contemplate “immortal and intelligible delights” through the Wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24), who is the head of the rational soul (1 Cor. 11:3). This inner illumination is referred to by the words “God placed man in paradise” (Gen. 2:8). In this state man received the commandment to guard paradise, that is to hold his middle position between God and the body, subjecting to the former and ruling the latter. In this way the soul obeys the eternal law (lex aeterna), which commands that it should love eternal things above temporal things and that reason should rule over the body and the lower soul. Augustine calls this position of the soul ordinatus.

Augustine conceives of man’s relation to God as one that is arranged according to the principal of merit and reward. Man merits eternal beatitude if he preserves his middle position, and merits misery if he refuses to do so. God is the one who upholds and executes this law. If Adam kept the commandment of God, the Word of God would have led him to perfection. He would have been stabilized in the state of contemplation. The flipside of the promise of reward, however, was the threat of punishment. If man transgressed God’s commandment he would suffer the penalty for his disobedience in the loss of tranquility of mind and slavery to the body. Thus he would experience the difference between the good that he left and the evil for which he had opted. This punishment should not be conceived as a kind of ‘irrational’ vengeance, but rather as the rational and just consequence of disobeying the commandment that guarantees life. If man starts to love lower goods, instead of the higher ones he was made for, he deprives himself of his destiny and suffers the miserable consequences. As Augustine has it in de quantitate animae: “The highest and true God, through the inviolable and incorruptible law, by which he governs everything that he has made, subjects the body to the soul, the soul to himself and thus everything to himself, and he does not leave her in any act, ...
either through punishment, or through reward.”  

Finally, I note that Augustine does not yet ascribe a positive function to embodiment, sense-experience and time in his view of man in his prelapsarian state. I do not agree with Robert O’Connell that Augustine sees individuation and embodiment as a consequence of the fall. Augustine does conceive of the first couple as individualized and embodied, but their bodies had an angelic nature. This means that, before the fall, man did not need his body to communicate his thoughts. Moreover, Augustine believes that procreation is an effect of man’s turn to the body, a phenomenon that originates after the fall. In other words, Augustine conceives of man’s prelapsarian state as a condition of continuous contemplation. Man disposes of a (highly spiritual) body, but does not act through it. Bodily action seems to be a result of the fall.

3.2.3 The fall

In the state of paradise, the mind and the body were in complete harmony, according to Augustine. The mind did not yet have to labor in order to subject the desires of the flesh to reason. As long as man remained in the contemplation of God, his mind and body functioned in perfect harmony, the one ruling and the other complying. However, through the suggestion of the devil, man fell away from God by pride (superbia). As already discussed in 3.2.1, pride means that the human soul is no longer content with its middle-state in the order of creation, namely under God and above the body. It begins to imagine itself as autonomous and self-sufficient, just like God who is free from all dominion and Lord over everything. Man is displeased with what he is: a nature that cannot be happy when left to its own powers. Man’s discontent with his creaturely position leads to his disobedience to the eternal

36 an. quant. 80, CSEL 89,229: “Deus igitur summus et uerus lege inuiolabili et incorrupta, qua omne quod condidit regit, subicit animae corpus, animam sibi et sic omnia sibi neque in ullo actu eam deserit siue poena siue praemio.”


38 Gn. adu. Man. is the first treatise in which Augustine extensively reflects upon pride (superbia) as the root of sin. The keypassage from Eccl. 10:6: “Initium omnis peccati superbia est”, occurs here for the first time. For the biblical meaning and Augustine’s use of it, see J.F. Procopé, “Initium omnis peccati superbia est”, in: Elizabeth E. Livingstone (ed), Studia Patristica 22 (Peeters: Leuven 1989), 315-20 (319). This concept has a Neo-Platonic background. In Neoplatonic cosmogony, the soul is said to fall because of its tolma (pride), its desire to possess itself separately from the One. Cf. N.J. Torchia, Plotinian ‘Tolma’ and the Fall of the Soul in the Early Philosophy of Augustine (Doctoral Thesis, Fordham University, Fordham, 1987). Augustine uses this concept in a Christian context, presupposing the distinction between man’s creation and his fall (which in Plotinus are inseparably connected).

39 Gn. adu. Man. 2,25, CSEL 91,143: “… sic homo peccavit, cum uult esse par Deo, id est liber esse ab eius dominio sicut ille ab omni dominio liber est, quia ipse est Dominus omnium.”

40 Gn. adu. Man. 1,22, CSEL 91,144: “Non enim accepit hominis natura, ut per suam potestatem Deo non regente beata sit, quia nullo regente per suam potestatem beatus esse solus Deus potest.”
law. He leaves “the inner room of conscience” where this law is present. He no longer obeys the order of creation. He turns his *intention* from contemplation of God to action in the body.\(^{41}\)

These actions are driven by what Augustine calls “the desire to lie” (*libido mentiendi*). Through action in the body, man denies that he can only enjoy real beatitude when he subjects himself to God in contemplation. His actions are led by the desire to provide himself with the stability and constancy that he formerly received from God. A key text for Augustine in this regard is *Ecli.* 10, 9: “*Quid superbit terra et cinis, quoniam in uita sua proiecit intimam sua?*” This text says that man of himself is only earth and ashes. God vivified man through his internal presence to the soul. Thus man had his good within himself (*bonum habet intimum*). By pride, however, man located this inner (but externally originating) goodness in his own life (*in uita sua*), his own self-possession.

Pride as the cause of sin is inseparably connected to *cupiditas* or *concupiscence.*\(^{42}\) These notions indicate man’s desire to possess and rule realities that are equal to him (other souls) or that are below him (bodies), in order to act out the lie of self-sufficiency. Pride and the desire to possess temporal creation are thus inseparably connected.\(^{43}\) This connection is illustrated in a passage in which Augustine defines the sinful orientation of the postlapsarian man as *diligere quod in mundo est,* through *concupiscientia carnis,* *concupiscientia oculorum /curiositas,* and *ambitio mundi* (after 1 Jn. 2:15-16).\(^{44}\) This triple concupiscence specifies what it means for man to imitate God. *Concupiscientia oculorum /curiositas* is aimed at gaining infallible knowledge; *ambitio* aims at gaining power over the external world (including other humans\(^{45}\)), which consists in ease of action; *concupiscientia carnis /voluptas corporis* aims at having ultimate rest (*quies*), without lack or loss.\(^{46}\) Man’s desire for

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\(^{42}\) *Mala concupiscientia, cupiditas, desiderium carnale, auaritia,* and *libido* are often synonymous in Augustine. They represent man’s desire to exchange God for creation. Cf. Gerald Bonner, “*Concupiscientia*”, A-L, 1113; A. Schindler, “*Auaritia*”, AL, 495-6.

\(^{43}\) *In mor.* 1,35, CSEL 90,40 Augustine argues that Adam transgressed the law through *cupiditas,* referring to 1 Tim. 6:10: “*Radix est omnium malorum cupiditas*,” whereas in *Gn. adu. Man.* he characterizes the root of Adam’s sin as *superbia* (*initium omnis peccati superbia*). These causes of sin are connected. Man wants to have absolute beatitude, which only God possesses (*superbia*) and desires to attain this ideal by making himself dependent upon the things that are below him (*cupiditas*). Thus, man leaves his middle place (*medietas*) under God and above the body. Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2,26, CSEL 91,148: “*Dicitur ergo huic: pectore et uentre repes [Gn. 3,14]. Quod quidem in colubro animaduerat, et ex illo animante uisibili ad hunc inuisibilem inimicum nostrum.*”

\(^{44}\) *In mor.* 18-19, 21: 37 (on the sin of Adam as both self-worship and improper love for the body). In *mor.* 1,35, CSEL 90,40 Augustine argues that Adam transgressed the law through *cupiditas,* referring to 1 Tim. 6:10: “*Radix est omnium malorum cupiditas*,” whereas in *Gn. adu. Man.* he characterizes the root of Adam’s sin as *superbia* (*initium omnis peccati superbia*). These causes of sin are connected. Man wants to have absolute beatitude, which only God possesses (*superbia*) and desires to attain this ideal by making himself dependent upon the things that are below him (*cupiditas*). Thus, man leaves his middle place (*medietas*) under God and above the body. Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2,26, CSEL 91,148: “*Dicitur ergo huic: pectore et uentre repes [Gn. 3,14]. Quod quidem in colubro animaduerat, et ex illo animante uisibili ad hunc inuisibilem inimicum nostrum locutio figuratur.* Nomine enim pectoris significatur superbia, quia ibi dominatur impetus animae, nomine autem uentris significatur carnale desiderium, quia haec pars mollior sentitur in corpore. Et quia his rebus ille serpit ad eos quos uali decipere, propertia dictum est: pectore et uentre repes [Gn. 3,14].” The devil deceives man through *superbia* and *carnale desiderium.* Cf. also *lib. arb.* 3,48 where Augustine characterizes *cupiditas /auaritia* (again with reference to 1 Tim. 6:10) as desiring more than what is enough to preserve a nature in its own kind. Similarly, *superbia* is that desire by which we aspire to be more than we are. Cf. B. Bruning, “Augustinus over hoogmoed e.…” *Augustiniana Neerlandica.* *Aspecten van Augustinus’ spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking* (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 309-22 (esp. 316-8).

\(^{45}\) *In mor.* 4; 70; *mus.* 6,44.

\(^{46}\) *mus.* 6, 41, PL 32,1185: “*Iste autem animae appetitus est sub se habere alias animas non pecorum, quas diuino iure concessum est, sed rationales, id est, proximas suas, et sub eadem lege socias atque consortes.*”

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created goods is thus ultimately aimed at acquiring a pretended godlike self-sufficiency. As we will see, however, the very movement of the soul by which man strives after autonomous dominion, produces slavery and suffering.\footnote{I therefore agree with Couenhoven ("Not every wrong is done with pride", \textit{Scottish Journal of Theology}, 32-50 (38ff)), that not every sin is done with pride. The beginning of sin is pride, but the sins that are done as a punishment of this sin are not necessarily motivated by pride.}

Upon Adam’s transgression, God punishes Adam for his disobedience. He becomes conformed to the things he loves. He becomes a “son of this age” (\textit{filius saeculi huius}),\footnote{\textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 1.30, CSEL 91,98; \textit{uera rel.} 38. See also \textit{uera rel.} 43-44 where Augustine says that because we refused to prefer the artist to his art, we were condemned to become part of the ‘poem of the ages’, laboring under its ‘recitation’.
\textit{Rief, Ordobegriff}, 254; Bouton-Touboulic, \textit{L’ordre caché}, 336.} defined by the change and restlessness proper to temporal creation. This punishment is not to be understood as a distinct act of God, but rather as the logical consequence of the transgression of God’s law.\footnote{\textit{Rief}, \textit{Ordobegriff}, \textit{254}; \textit{Bouton-Touboulic}, \textit{L’ordre caché}, \textit{336}.} Being created out of nothing, Adam had been elevated above the temporal creation through the illumination of the Spirit and the Word. As long as he inwardly contemplated God, neither his mind nor his body suffered from time and change, but ruled over temporal creation, enjoying stability and rest. Through pride and cupidity, however, Adam turned away from God in order to possess himself apart from God. Hence, he lost the grace through which he was elevated above the realm of time and change. As a consequence, he fell from “plenty to poverty, from firmness and strength to weakness… from eternal good to temporal good, from spiritual to carnal good… from the highest to the lowest good.”\footnote{\textit{Rief}, \textit{Ordobegriff}, \textit{254}: “Die Ordnung bewirkt, dass das gegen die Ordnung sich verfehlende Geschöpf von dem Objekt seines Strebens nich das erfährt, was es intendiert, sondern nur das, was das intendierte Objekt gemäss dem ihm eignen Ordo zu geben vermag.”}\footnote{\textit{mor.} 1,39-40. Augustine’s uses \textit{Eccl.} 1,2 \textit{uanitas uanitantium} (\textit{mor. eccl.} 1,22; \textit{uera rel.41}; \textit{an. q.} 76) to express the idea that man becomes empty (\textit{uan}), both in mind (foolishness) and body (mortality) by treating creation as if it is the Creator. For the theme of \textit{uanitas} in Augustine, see L. Chevallier and H. Rondet, “L’idée de la vanité dans l’œuvre de St. Augustin”, \textit{Revue des Études Augustiniennes} \textit{3/3} (1957), 222-34.} Both soul and body are affected by this fall.\footnote{\textit{mus.} 6,6; 13. Notice that Augustine holds a holistic view of man as soul and body. As God is the life of the soul and the soul is the life of the body, the body becomes mortal when the soul leaves God. Cf. Zum Brunn, \textit{St. Augustine: Being and Nothingness} (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 55-6. An extensive analysis of Augustine’s view on corporeal death in his anti-Manichaean writings offers Jean-Michel Girard, \textit{La mort chez saint Augustin. Grandes lignes de l’évolution de sa pensée, tell qu’elle apparaît dans ses traités} (Paradosis 34; Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1992), 34-54.} The soul lost its stability and rest, as it started seeking absolute being and truth in the sphere of lower, changeable goods. As a result of the soul’s diversion from God, the body started to leave the soul. It became mortal.\footnote{\textit{uera rel.} 23-24; 83. These passages, in which Augustine argues that Adam became mortal because he made a wrong use of the body, provides support for the thesis defended in footnote 22 that Augustine conceived of Adam in paradise as an embodied individual.} Instead of obeying the soul’s commands, it began to oppose the soul. And what is more, the entire temporal creation started making man suffer, as he constantly experiences that it cannot be to him what he desires it to be. This is the logic of the punishment of sin: if man aspires to have absolute dominion over himself and the surrounding world, he receives the opposite of his strivings. He becomes enslaved to the things over which he was supposed to rule.\footnote{\textit{Rief}, \textit{Ordobegriff}, 254: “Die Ordnung bewirkt, dass das gegen die Ordnung sich verfehlende Geschöpf von dem Objekt seines Strebens nich das erfährt, was es intendiert, sondern nur das, was das intendierte Objekt gemäss dem ihm eignen Ordo zu geben vermag.”}
3.2.4 The relationship between Adam and his offspring

Before I turn to a discussion of the pedagogical meaning of the punishment of the first sin, I need to address the question of to what extent Adam’s progeny participates in Adam’s fall. To what extent has Adam’s fall into sin compromised our ability to know and to will the good? Augustine often speaks about free will, sin, and its punishment in more general terms, which seems to suggest that we find ourselves in the same situation as Adam before the fall. Moreover, it is often argued that Augustine’s polemic against the Manichees is dependent upon the presupposition that we still have a freedom of our own to conquer sin. Moreover, this positive anthropology is often connected with Augustine’s early pedagogical Christology, the absence of a theology of atonement through the work of Christ on the cross, and a Christian perfectionism in which divine judgment over sin gradually ceases to play a role in the Christian life. This brings us to the question of how Augustine conceives of the relationship between Adam and his offspring.

3.2.4.1 The scholarly debate

Athanase Sage has argued that Augustine’s thought on this subject underwent a development consisting of three periods. From 387 to 396 Augustine would have espoused the traditional Christian idea that we inherit from Adam a mortal body, which burdens the soul, but not an inherent tendency to sin. Sin remains a free choice of the will that can be avoided. From 397 Augustine would have begun to defend the view that we not only inherit Adam’s penalty in our body, but also in our souls, consisting of concupiscence. Only from 411 does Augustine start to defend the idea that every person is guilty of the original sin (the sin of Adam) from his birth and therefore liable to condemnation, merely on the basis of his contraction of this sin. This is why Augustine came to defend the necessity of infant baptism for salvation against the Pelagians.

Julius Gross has argued that before 391 Augustine was inclined to the idea that the soul suffered difficulty in this world because of a fall from pre-existent beatitude, which theory was transformed from 391 into the idea of “Erbbübel”, the effects of Adam’s fall under which his descendents suffer, such as death, ignorance and weakness of will. Although children suffer from the same effects, they are not counted as guilty for them by nature. If they die, they do not suffer punishment for any guilt, nor do they receive beatitude on the basis of merit. Having come to the age of reason, man is perfectly capable of willing the good with God’s help. He only becomes guilty of punishment, if he refuses to use his free will. According to Gross, only from 396 does Augustine develop the idea that the sin of Adam is a sin of our nature (‘Natursünde’), which makes us liable to eternal damnation, incapable of having merit of our own.

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55 E.g. M. Verschoren, “The Appearance of the Concept of Concupiscencia in Augustine’s Early Anti-Manichaean Writings (388-391)”, *Augustiniana* 52 (2002), 199-240 (219), argues at this point: “It seems as if Augustine balances between on the one hand the idea that we are able to freely resist sin and on the other hand the admission that Adam and Eve’s sin also compromises our capability to discover truth. Augustine does not go so far as to pretend that we inherit sin, nor does he say that our situation has turned to the worst by Adam and Eve’s sin. Augustine rather describes our situation as similar to that of Adam and Eve.”


Nello Cipriani has argued for a completely opposite position. According to him, the early Augustine regards us as responsible for Adam’s sin, which was punished with both spiritual and corporeal death. Augustine only went from a more traducianist understanding of the relationship between Adam and his offspring to a position which leaves room for other theories about the way in which the sin of Adam is transferred to his descendents. Cipriani argued that Augustine’s problem in understanding infant baptism has not so much to do with his initial hesitance with regard to original guilt, but with the problem of how this outward sacrament affects infants inwardly, as it is their soul that primarily needs to be reconciled to God. Augustine’s judgment on the fate of unbaptized infants in De libero arbitrio 3,66 should be explained from its polemical context. As Augustine himself explains in his Retractiones, this was an apologetic argument against the Manichees, who do not believe in original sin. Carol Harrison, although not directly engaging with Cipriani’s article in her book Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, also strongly argues against Sage that the early Augustine considers us responsible for Adam’s sin and implicated in its penal consequences with regard to body, mind, and will. She argues that Augustine’s theology of sin is primarily based upon his theology of creatio ex nihilo, according to which man has the inherent tendency to fall away from God towards nothingness. This tendency was unleashed by Adam’s free choice to leave God; his offspring suffers from its devastating effects in ignorance, difficulty, and death. Harrison further argues that Augustine only once put this idea between brackets, against the Manichees in De libero arbitrio 3 (considering that ignorance and difficulty belong to our created nature), but even then emphasized that man does not possess the inherent abilities to know and perform the good, but only to ask for help.

Another aspect of the discussion on the relationship between Adam and his descendents concerns the idea of ‘involuntary sin’, introduced by Malcolm Alflatt. He has argued that Augustine starts with the view that sin is a voluntary and avoidable choice of the will, which only becomes necessary through repetitive evil choices. According to Alflatt, this view is particularly attested in the first book of De libero arbitrio. Augustine would only gradually have developed the idea of ‘involuntary sin’, which then occurs for the first time in De fide et symbolo 10,21 and De libero arbitrio 3,51. According to this idea, our will is fettered to a necessity to develop carnal habit, because we suffer from the punishment of the first sin, which consists of ignorance and difficulty. What was voluntary in Adam, has become our nature. Although Babcock has pointed out that

64 Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 167-97.
65 Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 199-226.
66 See M. Alflatt, “The Development of the Idea of Involuntary Sin in St. Augustine”, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 20 (1974), 114-34. In his article “‘Involuntary sin’ in de libero arbitrio”, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 37 (1991), 23-36, Robert O’Connell criticized the idea of ‘involuntary sin’, arguing that Augustine does not so much extend his definition of sin to involuntary evildoings, but rather contends that if we apply the term peccatum to involuntary sinful actions, this use needs justification, as peccatum normally refers to a free act of the human will. He does so by appealing to humanity’s solidarity with Adam and Eve when they sinned. Our involuntary evildoings are both sins and the punishment for the voluntary sin that we committed in them. Only thus, if the evildoer and the bearer of punishment are the same, is Augustine’s account of fallen agency saved from Manichaean necessitarianism. In his article O’Connell forgot to pay attention to Alflatt’s own elaboration of this idea in Malcolm Alflatt, “The Responsibility for Involuntary Sin in Saint Augustine”, Recherches Augustiniennes 19 (1975), 171-86. See for a helpful summary of the debate Wu TianYue, “Augustine on Involuntary Sin: A Philosophical Defense”, Augustiniana 55/1-2 (2009), 45-78 (45-53).
Augustine already developed a synthesis between voluntary sin and compulsion in *De duabus animabus*,\textsuperscript{67} several scholars defend the view that the change in Augustine’s understanding of sin was particularly caused by the debate with the Manichaean priest Fortunatus, who challenged Augustine with the question of how his view on sin as voluntary related to Pauline passages such as *Rom.* 7:23; 8:7 and *Gal.* 5:17, which suggest that we do evil against our will (and hence seem to favor Manichaean dualism).\textsuperscript{68} These passages would have caused Augustine to rethink his earlier position. This eventually resulted in the idea that we sin by necessity, but that this necessity is rooted in a voluntary choice, namely the sin of Adam for which we are somehow responsible. By thus limiting the freedom of the will to the first agent, and declaring us identical with that agent, Augustine was able to combine his anti-Manichaean argument that sin is by nature voluntary with the idea that we cannot avoid developing sinful habits, because our free will suffers from ignorance and difficulty.

The following section addresses the question as to how Augustine in his works until 391 conceives of the relationship between Adam and his descendents and what the consequences of his sin are for their present condition. As *De libero arbitrio* 1 often features as providing arguments for Augustine’s optimistic anthropology, I will first review other passages, and then come back to *De libero arbitrio* 1.

### 3.2.4.2 The fall and its consequences

In the Cassiciacum Dialogues, Augustine had already mentioned the fallen condition of the soul and its bondage to mortal things, but remained in doubt about the metaphysical cause of this situation. In *De animae quantitate* Augustine provides the reader with a first explicit reflection on this point. In section 81 Augustine discusses three questions: why the soul has been assigned with the task to rule the body, how the soul was formed in a frail and mortal body, and what its future will be after its life in the body. Augustine intends to answer these questions within the boundaries of faith.\textsuperscript{69} This means, among other things, that the goodness and justice of God are the incontestable axioms of the inquiry. Against Manichaeism, Augustine intends to safeguard the goodness and justice of the connection between soul and body.\textsuperscript{70}

Augustine concedes that he does not know why the soul was given to the body to rule it, but he does emphasize that it happened according to a divine design. Nor does Augustine know how the soul was joined to a mortal body, but he argues that this is understandable as a punishment that accompanies the soul that sinned. “Who would think of inquiring how the soul is formed in this corruptible and frail body, when he considers that the soul itself has also (i.e. just like the body) been

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\textsuperscript{69} *an. quant.* 80, CSEL 89,230: “Inueniet hoc ratio... si duce pietate requirantur.”

\textsuperscript{70} Cf. *lib. arb.* 1,4, CSEL 74,6. In this passage Augustine says that the question *unde malum faciamus* must be solved by taking faith as the starting point of the inquiry (*Is.* 7:9). This faith entails that God is the Creator of everything, but not responsible for sin. This axiom is needed to avoid the conclusion that if God is the maker of souls and souls sin, God is the author of sin.
justly thrust into death because of sin, and can excel through virtue even in the body.”

This passage reveals two things. First, that Augustine regards humanity as implicated in the sin of Adam. It was a sin of the soul through which the connection between soul and body has been disorganized. Second, Augustine regards this sin of the soul as affecting both the soul itself and the body. The soul is now united to a mortal body, because it was itself thrust into death because of its sin (\textit{anima} \textit{in mortem iure contrusa propter peccatum}).

This passage thus implies that Augustine regards humanity as implicated in the consequences of Adam’s sin, consisting of both the death of the soul and of the body. This means that we necessarily enter this life in the ongoing existence of the old man, “because of the neglect of God’s law.” It is this situation of \textit{uetustas} that accounts for the subsequent formation of compulsive habits in our lives.

\textit{De moribus ecclesiae} (388-89) and \textit{De Genesi adversus Manichaeos} (389) confirm the findings from \textit{De animae quantitate}. Augustine regards all humanity as guilty of the sin that Adam committed in paradise: “We have merited mortality by sinning.” Furthermore, Augustine regards the consequences of that sin as affecting both soul and body. On the one hand one encounters passages that suggest that it is the mortality of the body that seduces the soul to sin. On the other hand one encounters passages that indicate that the soul itself is corrupted through the fall of Adam, so that it is inherent within the soul to give in to the desires of the body.

Augustine describes the punishment of Adam in terms of the body’s oppression of the mind. The mind has difficulty in finding the truth (\textit{difficultas inueniendae ueritatis}), because “the perishing body weighs down the soul and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that thinks many things”.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{an. quant.} 81, CSEL 89,230: “\textit{Quis... quaerendum putet, qualis [anima] in hoc mortali et fragili corpore efficiatur, cum et in mortem propter peccatum iure contrusa sit et uirtute hic etiam possit excellere.}” Cf. \textit{lib. arb.} 3,27-28 where Augustine says that it is a matter of righteousness that the soul that sins is united to a mortal body.

The soul that does not want to exist in the highest degree, is ordered in a lower stage of being, where it nevertheless contributes to the beauty of the universe by adorning the body (like a slave working in the sewer).

\textsuperscript{72} What is most important to Augustine is not how the soul is being united to a mortal body, but that this union is just. In this passage (\textit{An quant.} 80-81), he already alludes to his discussion of the origin of the soul in \textit{De libero arbitrio} 3,56-59. There he also refuses to opt for a particular theory on the origin of the soul’s connection to the body, but stresses that whatever theory one opts for, the justice and goodness of God should be held beyond discussion, so that our inquiries do not violate true religion.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{an. quant.} 55, CSEL 90,201: “[\textit{uetus homo}]... a quo incipere propter neglectam dei legem certa est necessitas.”

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{mor.} 1,12, CSEL 90,14: “… a legibus suis hominem lapsum et propter cupiditatem rerum mortalium iure ac merito mortalem sobolem propagantem”; \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,38, CSEL 91,164: “… poenalem mortalitatem, quam peccando meruimus...”; \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,8, CSEL 91,128: “… mortalitatem, quam damnatione meruimus...”; \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,32, CSEL 91,154: “Nam illa mors, quam omnes qui ex Adam nati sumus, coepimus debere naturae...”; \textit{uera rel.} 51, CCL 32, p. 221: “…peccato nostro, quod in homine peccatore ipsa natura nostra commissit...”

At this point, I would like to nuance Lamberigts’ argument that Augustine’s early anti-Manichaean writings lack an explicit mention of our guilt in Adam (M. Lamberigts, “Peccatum Originale”, \textit{A-L}, forthcoming: “A. nowhere explicitly speaks of our guilt in Adam, suggesting that we are only involved in the punishment...”). Augustine does explicitly say that we or our nature sinned in Adam, which implies that we are guilty of our present penal condition.
The mortal body burdens the mind with “the pricks and scratches of tortuous, intractable problems, or else the anxious thoughts about providing for this life, which frequently choke the word and stop it bearing fruit in man.”

Moreover, the mind has difficulty to distinguish *phantasmata* – images that enter the mind through the senses – from the truth. These passages suggest that both knowing the truth and the ease of maintaining the truth have become difficult for the mind because of the body’s mortality.

One misinterprets Augustine, however, if one perceives the relationship between body and soul too dualistically, as if a pure soul dwells in a corrupt mortal body. In Augustine’s eyes the soul participates in the body’s mortality through its animal part (*pars animalis*). This part of the soul should primarily be fed by the mind’s knowledge of God, so that it delights in God together with the mind. Due to the fall, however, the lower soul has emancipated itself from the mind. It takes its delight from sense-experiences and drags the mind downwards.

Therefore, after sin, the mind is called to control its rebellious counterpart. If the mind refuses to do so, it sins, and the repetition of these sins leads to the formation of habit. *De moribus ecclesiae* 1,40 confirms this argument. In this passage, Augustine observes that the body, by divine law, has become a heavy chain for man (*grauissimum uinculum*), on account of the “the old sin” (*antiquum peccatum*). “This chain, in order not to be shaken and disturbed itself, afflicts the soul with a fear of labor and pain; and in order not to be destroyed and taken away it afflicts the soul through a fear of death.”

If the mind repetitively gives in to the lower soul’s desire for self-preservation, it becomes enthralled by the desires of the body. The very passion of self-mastery brings them “into bondage, so that they become the slaves of mortal things, while seeking ignorantly to master them.” Augustine concedes that the mind’s enslavement to the body is a matter of consent, but this does not prove that such captivity can be avoided.

Other passages in *De moribus* and *De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos* confirm the necessity of this process. The formation of habit seems an unavoidable process, an inevitability rooted in a covetousness that humanity inherits from Adam. In *De moribus* Augustine states that Adam transgressed God’s commandment by *cupiditas*, the desire to master the things below him. As a result

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77 Gn. adu. Man. 2,30, CSEL 91,152: “...punctiones tortuosarum quaestionum aut cogitationes de prouisione huius uitaec; quae plerumque, nisi exstirpentur et de agro dei proiciantur, suffocant uerbum, ne fructificet in homine” (translation: WSA 1/13, 91).


80 mor. 1,40, CSEL 90,46: “Hoc ergo uinculum ne concutiatur atque uextetur, laboris et doloris, ne auferatur autem atque perimatur, mortis terre rore animam quatit.”

81 mor. 1,42, CSEL 90,47: “Quae cum uolunt homines per dominationem tenere, ab his ipsis potius per cupiditatem tenentur, et rerum mortalium serui fiant, cum imperite domini esse desideranti.” Cf. mor. 1,40, CSEL 90,46 where Augustine refers to the *uis consuetudinis* through which the mind loves the body and does not see that the subjection of the body to the mind can only be effected by intelligently using the body for a higher purpose, rather than by serving its immediate demands: “Amat enim illud ui consuetudinis, non intellegens, si co bene atque scienter utatur, resurrectionem reformationemque eius ope ac lege divina sine uilla molestia iuri suo subditam fore; sed cum hoc amore totum in deum conu enerit, his cognitis mortem non modo contentnet, uerum etiam desiderabit.”
of this sin, we all die in Adam (1 Cor. 15:22). This death does not only refer to corporeal death, but also to the death of the soul. In this regard, Augustine refers to Adam as the old man who sinned by cupiditas and whom we are called to put off through temperance. He also quotes I Cor. 15:47-49 where Paul says that we bear the image of the earthly man Adam. This suggests that we not only inherit mortality, but also cupiditas from Adam, which drags the soul into the formation of habit.\(^2\)

In *De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos* 2,10 Augustine builds a similar argument, when he says that Adam lost the Spirit of God when he transgressed God’s commandment. As a result Adam started to live according his animal part. Augustine then adds, “we all who are born after [this] sin, act out the animal man until we gain the spiritual Adam, that is the Lord Jesus Christ, who committed no sin.”\(^8\)

Just as in *De moribus* Augustine contrasts humanity born from Adam, living according to the desires of the lower soul (*pars animalis*), with humanity recreated in Christ, the second Adam, the life-giving Spirit (1 Cor. 15:46). Slavery to cupiditas seems to be inevitable, because of the fractured soul that we inherited from Adam.

Augustine’s depiction of the fall and its punishment in *De vera religione* supports this spiritual aspect of the punishment of the first sin. In section 21-23 Augustine describes the relationship between sin and death. If the soul turns away from God and wishes against God’s law to enjoy bodies, it leaves ‘being’ and tends to nothingness (*uergit ad nihilim*). This does not mean that the body itself is nothing, but since the body receives being from the soul, the soul tends to non-being when it turns away from its own source of being to the body. As long as the soul lives according to this orientation it is carnal (*carnalis*) and earthly (*terrena*); therefore it will not possess the kingdom of God and will even lose the object of its love.

From this general observation about the soul’s sin and its punishment, Augustine suddenly turns to Adam. “Because of sin itself, what is loved becomes perishable, and thus by trickling away it forsakes its lover, because he in turn by loving it has forsaken God. For he neglected his commands: ‘Eat this, don’t eat that.’ Hence, he is dragged off to punishment, because by loving lower things he is assigned his place among the lowest, in the poverty of his pleasures and his pains.”\(^8\) A few lines later Augustine circles back from speaking about Adam’s penal state to the soul in general: “If the soul, however, while engaged in the stadium of human life, beats those desires with which he has fed himself against himself… it will turn back from the many things that change to the one unchanging good.”\(^8\)

The structure of this argument suggests that Augustine regards our souls and Adam’s soul as

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\(^2\) Sage, “Péché Original”, 215 argues that Augustine in this passage conceives of the relationship between Adam and his descendents as example and imitator respectively. The text itself suggests something else. The expression, “*O alta mysteria*”, which follows the quotation of 1 Cor. 15:22, suggests that Adam’s cupiditas comes to us in another way than by mere imitation, for if our sinning were only a matter of imitation, it would be unlikely to speak of deep mysteries. Augustine also expresses the mysterious nature of our solidarity with Adam in *mor.* 1,40: “*antiquum peccatum quo nihil est ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius.*” Cf. Cipriani, “La Dottrina del Peccato Originale”, 31-3.

\(^8\) Gn. *adu. Man.* 2,10, CSEL 91,129-30: “*Animalem hominem prius agimus omnes, qui de illo post peccatum nati sumus, donec assequamur spiritalem Adam, id est dominum nostrum Christum, qui peccatum non fecit [1 Pt. 2,22].”

\(^84\) *uera rel.* 23, CCL 32,201-02: “*Et propter ipsum peccatum, quod amatur, fit corruptibile, ut fluendo deserat amatorem suum, quia et ille hoc amando deseruit deum. Praecepta enim eius neglexit dicentis: hoc manduca et hoc noli. Trahitur ergo ad poenas, quia diligendo inferiorea in egestate uoluptatum suarum et in doloribus apud inferos ordinatur.*”

\(^85\) *uera rel.* 24, CCL 32,201-02: “*Si autem dum in hoc stadio uitaee humanae anima degit, uincat eas, quas aduersum se nutriuit… a multis mutabilibus ad unum incommutabile reuertetur.*”

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a unity. He first explains the consequences of sin for the soul in general, then turns to Adam and eventually turns back to the soul in general. Adam’s soul and our soul are one. Through his sin, our souls have become *carnalis et terrena*, unfit to possess the kingdom of God, and our bodies are destined to die.  

In *De uera religione* 83-84 Augustine affirms this idea. In this passage he first mentions mortality as the consequence of Adam’s eating of the forbidden fruit in paradise. Additionally, he refers to the carnal quality of the soul that we draw from the first transgression of man, saying that as a result of our giving in to the words of the woman, we are now “toiling away at the earth and are most shamefully being overcome by all the things that have been able to shake and disturb us.” At the same time, Augustine stresses that man remains responsible for his deeds. Humanity itself aggravates the soul’s fallenness by its own evil choices. Augustine indicates, for instance, that neither our eyes, nor the things that present themselves to our eyes, lie to us about their nature. Only man himself lies about them when he judges them as if they are the highest goods. If these objects of his love are snatched away from him, man is still not healed from his desire for them, for he still loves his own wrong judgment, so that his greed for them remains. “In this way the spirit is made restless and wretched, as it longs to lay hold of the things it is held by.” Both of these passages suggest that Augustine sees man’s implication in sin as a necessity rooted in Adam’s fall, and aggravated by our own sinful choices. Our soul, from the very beginning, tends towards nothingness and acts out this tendency during its life in a mortal body. We act out the old man, from the beginning of our lives.

In *De Musica* Augustine describes the relationship between choice and the formation of habit. According to what process does man become implicated in habit? Augustine observes that the soul has been created as the ruling principle of the body. It is meant to give life and unity to the body and to govern it according to its knowledge of the truth. This also implies that the soul, in its original integrity, did not undergo any passions from the body. The body could not “make” anything in the

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86 This language, derived from 1 *Cor.* 15:50, shows the importance of 1 *Cor.* 15 for the early Augustine. The opposition between Adam in whom we all die (1 *Cor.* 15:22) and Christ in whom we are all raised to life is already present and will become more important in the course of Augustine’s career. Augustine has become famous for his use of *Rm.* 5:12ff to express original sin and its effects, but this text occurs rather late in his works. In *Ad Simplicianum*, for example, he uses 1 *Cor.* 15:22 to express that all have become *massa damnata* in Adam. Cf. S. Lyonnet, “Augustin et *Rom.* 5,12 avant la controverse pélagienne”, *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 89 (1967), 842-9.

87 *uera rel.* 85, CCL 32,243: “Et nos in terra laboramus et cum magno dedecore superamur ab omnibus, quae nos commouere ac perturbare potuerint” (translation: WSA 1/8, 87).

88 *uera rel.* 65, CCL 32,230: “Ita fit inquietus et aerumnosus animus frustra tenere a quibus tenetur exoptans” (translation: WSA 1/8, 73). In his discussion of *De vera religione*, Prendiville has argued that the *consuetudo corporum* is a result of man’s inordinate attention to the body. In order to find God, man has to use his senses, but runs the risk of paying attention to them in a wrong way, interchanging the goodness of higher intelligible realities with the goodness of lower sensible things. Prendiville argues that this misdirection of the soul is primarily caused by erroneous thinking, rather than by rebellious willing. My interpretation of this passage suggests that the will is deeper involved in Augustine’s understanding of the *consuetudo corporum* than Prendiville wants to be true. Moreover, the development of *consuetudo* is also connected to the effect of the first sin, not merely to our present erroneous thinking. Prendiville reserves this development for the 390s. See John G. Prendiville, “The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine”, *Traditio* 28 (1972), 29-99.

89 *uera rel.* 50.

90 *mus.* 6,9, PL 32,1167: “Ego enim ab anima animari hoc non puto corpus nisi intentione facientis. Nec ab iso quidquam illam pati arbitror sed facere de illo et in illo tamquam subjecto diuinitas dominationis sueae.”
The first sin, however, changed this relationship between body and soul. In her rule of the body, the soul now undergoes passions. Augustine describes this as follows: the things that come to the body or are brought into it are either in harmony with or in opposition to its health. When they are in opposition to it, the soul resists these influences, so that the body’s integrity is preserved. In this action it experiences difficulty and when this difficulty does not pass unobserved, the soul is said to feel pain or labor. If the external object that confronts the body agrees with it, the soul joins it to the body. If the soul pays attention to this, she experiences pleasure. This action of the soul, through which it pays attention to the things that either oppose or agree with the integrity of the body, is called ‘sensation’. This continuous attention to the body implies for the soul that it becomes less, because it is less with itself. Augustine describes this new kind of sensation as a consequence of the aversion of the soul from God. He writes: “However, if the soul neglects the master and is focused on the servant, it feels, with a desire that is called carnal, its own motions which it gives over to the body and is less… But through this fault of its master the body is much less than it used to be, since the soul was more before the fault.” As a consequence, “the soul dominates the now mortal and frail body with great difficulty and attention. Because of this, it makes the mistake of valuing the pleasure of the body more highly – since matter gives way to its attention – than the health itself, which has no need for attention.” The post-lapsarian soul, already focused on the preservation of the body, becomes even more attached to it through the experience of bodily satisfaction, when the body yields to the soul’s attention. According to Augustine, this experience exercises a lasting effect upon the soul. The soul voluntarily chooses to take delight in carnal pleasure (voluptas), but by doing so it decreases its freedom to abstain from this delight. Augustine writes: “Although [the soul] starts those movements as

91 mus. 6,7, PL 32,1166. However, Augustine adds the word fortasse, which indicates that he leaves room for the possibility that the soul in some sense did affect the body before the fall. But Augustine’s general idea seems to be, as we already observed in our treatment of De Genesis adversus Manichaeos, that feelings before the fall were only informed by the mind’s knowledge and love of intelligible reality. Miles argues that the early Augustine opted for an active theory of sensation (according to which the soul is only affected by the body if it gives itself to the body), because he wanted to stress against the Manichees that the soul itself is responsible for its sufferings in the body. See Margaret Miles, Augustine on the Body (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), 17.


93 mus. 6,9: “Ideoque cum renititur adversarii, et materiam sibi subiectam in operis sui uias difficulter impingit, fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficilias propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur, et hoc uocatur dolor aut labor.”

94 mus. 6,8-11.

95 mus. 6,10. Augustine distinguishes between sensus and sensation. The sensus is the instrument of the body (instrumentum corporis) that is activated by the soul. Through sensus alterity is perceived and evaluated by the soul itself as either in agreement or in opposition to the body. This evaluation results in sensation.

96 mus. 6,12: “Cum autem ab eisdem suis operationibus aliquid pattitur, a seipsa pattitur, non a corpore; sed plane cum se accommodat corpori: et ideo apud seipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est.”


98 mus. 6,13: “Quocirca mortali iam et fragili cum magna difficulitate atque attentione dominatur. Hinc illi error incurrit, ut uoluptatem corporis, quia eius attentione cedit materies, pluris aestimet quam sanitatem ipsam, cui attentione nulla opus est.”
it wishes, it does not stop them as he wishes. For, again, the reward of sin is not in his own power as sin itself is. For, indeed, this soul is a thing of great worth, and yet it doesn’t remain apt to suppressing its own lascivious movements. For it sins in its strength and by divine law made weaker after sin it is less able to undo what it has done." Augustine explains this process of habit formation as follows: the *impetus* or *motus animi* by which the sin was freely perpetrated, is stored up in memory and will present itself as the primary motivation to act upon if the soul finds itself in a similar situation. If the soul repetitively gives in to this carnal delight, it becomes increasingly fixed in the mind, so that the mind acquires a ‘carnal way of thinking’. Augustine puts it as follows: “Such a delight [of the soul given over to temporal things] strongly fixes in the memory what it brings from the slippery senses. And this habit of the soul made with flesh, through carnal affection, in the Holy Scriptures is called the flesh. And it is struggling with such a mind in that apostolic sentence: ‘In my mind I serve the law of God, but in flesh the law of sin’ (Rom. 7:25).” If the mind then tries to return to God, it experiences the resistance of its own previously formed disposition. Augustine believes that when the mind concentrates again on spiritual realities, it is able to resist the impetus of *consuetudo* and even to extinguish its promptings. Augustine does not say, however, whether human free will plays any independent role in this process.

3.2.4.3 De libero arbitrio 1

How then should we read *de libero arbitrio* 1? Augustine’s depiction of the will in this book is often invoked as evidence for his optimistic early anthropology. On this issue I side with scholars who have argued that Book 1 should be read in connection with the other two books with which it forms a unity. The main question that is to be answered in this section is how Augustine values the freedom of the human will.

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99 *mus.* 6,14, PL 32,1170: “Non enim sicut peccatum in eius potestate est, ita etiam poena peccati. Magna quippe res est ipsa anima, nec ad opprimendos lasciuos motus suos idonea sibi remanet. Valentior enim peccat, et post peccatum duiuna lega facta imbecillior, minus potens est auferre quod fecit” (translation: FC 2, 339). Augustine then quotes Rom. 7:24 as the cry of man under the dominion of *consuetudo*.

100 *mus.* 6,33, PL 32,1181: “Talis enim delectatio uehementer infigit memoriae quod trahit a lubricis sensibus. Haec autem animae consuetudo facta cum carne, propter carnalem affectionem, in scripturis diuinis caro nominatur. Haec menti obluc tatur, cum iam dici potest apostolicum illud: mente seruo legi dei, carne autem legi peccati [Rom 7,25].” (FC 2, 338). Cf. William S. Babcock, “Augustine’s interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396)”, *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979), 55-74 (58). Babcock regards this passage in *De Musica* as the first instance where Augustine describes the inner struggle of the self against the self, which prevents a person from doing what he wants to do. This is true to the extent that Augustine connects Rom. 7:24-25 to this phenomenon. However, Augustine expresses the experience of this inner division already in the *Soliloquia*.

Isabelle Bochet, *Le firmament de l’écriture. L’hermeneutique augustinienne* (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 190-1, observes that Augustine does not yet divide Rom. 7:24 and 7:25 over the stages *sub lege* and *sub gratia*. The text still functions within a scheme of successive progression in man’s ascent from the sensible to the intelligible.

101 *mus.* 6,33.


De libero arbitrio starts with a question, posed by Augustine’s dialogue partner Evodius: Is God the author of evil? Augustine responds that we should distinguish between evil as sin and evil as the punishment of sin. Man is the author of the first kind of evil. He was created with free will and therefore able to sin. God is the righteous Creator, who rewards the good and punishes evil deeds. But if God created man with free will, is he not at least mediatelly the author of sin? This is the question that initially drove Augustine into the hands of the Manichees, and which now challenges him to start a discussion with his pupil Evodius on the question of why we do evil (unde malum faciamus). In order to answer this question, Augustine first addresses another question: “What is doing evil” (quid est malum facere)? He arrives at the conclusion that evil consists in passion (libido) for the things that can be lost against one’s will. This is the same as disobedience to the eternal law, which commands us to love eternal goods and rule over the passions of the body. Subsequently, Augustine answers the question what the source of evil is, namely the free choice of the will. Neither something higher than the soul, nor something lower is able to compel it. “Nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its own will and free choice (propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium).” As God rules rational creatures according to the eternal law, he punishes them if they disobey this law.

In 1,22 Augustine describes the punishment that follows upon a misuse of this free will. He depicts this punishment as the situation in which “the soul” presently finds itself. “Is it to be regarded as in itself not a small penalty that passion rules the soul, and draws it hither and thither, spoiled of its abundance of virtue, weak and needy… Can we think, in the end, that a condition like that is not penal, when we see that it must be undergone by all who do not cleave to wisdom?” In response, Evodius poses two questions. First, why would someone who is wise opt for sin and become foolish (causa peccati)? Second, why do we who never were wise, suffer the punishment for sin that Augustine just described? Augustine ignores the first question (which he will discuss in book 2 and 3), but responds to the second question, saying that we might have had an anterior life in which we were wise and sinned. Augustine touches here upon the problem of the origin of the soul. He deems this a very difficult question, which is to be discussed in its proper place. Augustine will indeed do so in book 3 of De libero arbitrio, when he reviews the different theories on the origin of the soul, and elaborates the idea that we suffer the punishment for Adam’s sin. At this point in the discussion, however, Augustine does not continue on this issue, probably because the main purpose of this book was to discuss the nature and cause of doing evil as such. Up to this point Augustine has observed what evil is, that its source is to be sought in the free choice of the will, that humans presently find themselves in a condition which is a punishment for the abuse of free will, and that this abuse did not

104 lib. arb. 1,22, CSEL 74,23: “Num ista ipsa poena parua existimanda est, quod ei libido dominatur expollatamque uirutis opulentia per duerua inopem atque indigentem trahit... possuimus ne tandem nullam istam poenam putare quam, ut cernis, omnes qui non inhaerent sapientiae necesse est perpeti?”


106 lib. arb. 1,24. Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 60, has pointed out the cross-references between book 1 and book 3 on this issue. Augustine’s argument that there is no cause of the soul’s loss of wisdom (1,21) returns in 3,47-50. The punitive condition that resulted from the first evil use of the will (1,22) returns in 3,51-70 (ignorantia et difficultas). Evodius’ first question ‘How is it possible to will the first sin?’ (1,23) returns in Book 2,54. Evodius’ second question ‘Why are we punished, if we never were wise?’ returns in 3,53-63 (why are we punished for the sin of Adam and Eve?). Augustine’s answer to this question returns in 3,56-63, where he reviews three theories on the origin of soul, which are compatible with the idea that we are punished for the sin of Adam.
take place in their proper lives on earth. Augustine thus clearly distinguishes between human free will in the state of creation, and its abilities or limitations in the present life.

In the second part of the book, Augustine continues to explore the central problems of the preceding discussion, namely the nature of sin (misdirected willing) and its cause (free will). Now, however, he starts from the presupposition that our present state is natural, rather than the effect of a fall from wisdom. His purpose is to argue that even if we never were wise, we are justly punished if we voluntarily choose to affirm our present moral situation. It is therefore in the power of our will to say “no” to our present penal situation. When Augustine says “nothing is so completely within the power of the will as the will itself” (1,12,26), or that “to attain a good will we have to do nothing but to will it” (1,13,29), he intends to express this ability to cease willing our present state of ignorance and difficulty. Augustine does not mean that we are able to overcome our penal state by our own willpower. He merely points the fact that if we voluntarily affirm a moral situation that we acknowledge is evil, we are justly punished. We therefore experience the freedom to say no to our own evil actions. Furthermore, when Augustine says that the good will can be possessed with the greatest ease (tanta facilitate) and that this is the happy life (beata uita), he does not mean that we possess, with the greatest ease, the free will to do the good (libera voluntas recte faciendi), which Augustine later refers to as exclusively possessed by the first man. He means rather the will by which we want to live rightly (recte et honeste uelle uiuere). This will is easy to have. To qualify the possession of this good will as happiness is intended as a comparative judgment. Compared to a life that turns around the possession of temporal goods – in other words: a life dominated by lust – the will to live rightly is the best thing one can have in this life, as it makes us reject the life of vice. And as this will is so easy to have, one is justly punished if one nonetheless refuses to have it.

Thus Augustine has defended the thesis that, even if we never were wise, doing evil is a free choice of the will in the sense that it is a voluntary affirmation of our present state of ignorance and difficulty. What Augustine does not do in this passage is contend that we easily have the willpower to perform the good. This line of argumentation recurs in De libero arbitrio 3,64-70, where Augustine says that the only freedom that remains for man after sin is the freedom to cry for help, rather than the freedom to perform the good.

3.2.4.4 Conclusion
From the discussion above I conclude that Augustine sees us as implicated in the first sin. The penal consequences of this sin both affect the body and the soul. The soul suffers from cupiditas, from the desire to rule the body and enjoy temporal creation through the body, without reference to God. The mortal body affects the soul exactly because the soul is turned towards it. The human soul itself is wounded and therefore in its weakened condition necessarily becomes the body’s slave.

107 lib. arb. 1,25-26. The counterpart of this paragraph can be found in 3,64-70.
109 Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 126.
110 lib. arb. 3,52.
111 lib. arb. 1,29.
112 Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 121-2.
113 Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 124-5.
114 Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 126: “The will on which his argument turns is not that recte faciendi, it is a will prior to and independent of the actual execution of good deeds.”
Simultaneously, Augustine describes the soul as making itself carnal by its own choices (which enables him to regard us as being in the same situation as Adam when we sin: evil thought, delight, consent, formation of habit\(^{115}\)). The mind’s yielding to the passions causes it to become more and more carnal in its thinking, so that irreversible habits are formed. This stress upon the action of human free will in the formation of habit seems not to be intended as an argument for the human power to abstain from it, but rather argues for the fact that man after the fall remains a rational and willing creature. He necessarily starts life with a soul that drags him down (the punishment for the first sin), but his yielding to this movement results in an even deeper implication in sin (the punishment for his own sins). Augustine describes this as an inevitable process. However, this does not imply that man has been deprived of all freedom to return to God. As I observed in the analysis of *De libero arbitrio* 1, Augustine holds the view that man has at least retained the freedom not to will his fallen situation. This important argument against the Manichees will resurface in Augustine’s work in the 390s, but is finally eliminated from his anti-Manichaean discourse in *Ad Simplicianum* (397).

### 3.2.5 Creation’s rebellion against man: God’s gracious judgment

The preceding section addressed the punishment of the first sin insofar as it leads to a degradation of the soul. I concluded that Adam’s descendents, in Augustine’s mind, tend to give in to the desires of the flesh and thus develop a mind that subjects itself to the interests of the body. This section describes the pedagogical meaning of human suffering, which Augustine sees a divine instrument to lead man back to God. God seeks man where he is, bound to the sensible world. Through suffering, fear and grief from the mortal body, the soul is reminded of its improper love for the body, in which it is entangled since the fall of Adam.\(^{116}\)

Man suffers the punishment for his rebellion against God by suffering the rebellion of his own body and of the rest of corporeal creation. In a prelapsarian state, the soul mediated life to the body and the body obeyed the soul, as long as the soul obeyed God. When the soul, however, rebelled against God by turning towards itself, the body started to rebel against the soul by becoming mortal. The body no longer subjects itself to the soul’s desires, but oppresses it through its vulnerability.\(^{117}\) The soul wants to enjoy sensible creation through the body, but because the body has become mortal, it cannot but fail to fulfill the desires of the soul. Furthermore, sensible creation itself ‘punishes’ man for his improper love of it. When he experiences its failure to be what he wants it to be, he in fact suffers God’s judgment on his evil will. By simply governing material creation according to the laws of time and change, God punishes the soul that loves creation in an evil way. In this situation, man experiences his subjection to the divine law. We already encountered this idea in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, and it recurs in Augustine’s Thagastan writings.\(^{118}\)


\(^{116}\) mor. 1,40, CSEL 90,46: “Sed inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini gravissimum est vinculum iustissimis Dei legibus proper antiquum peccatum, quo nihil est ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Hoc ergo vinculum ne concutiatur atque vexetur, laboris et doloris, ne auferatur autque perimatur, mortis terrore animam quaetemitui consuetudinis.”


\(^{118}\) mus. 6,30, PL 82,1180: “Ita peccantem hominem ordinavit deus turpem, non turpiter. turpis enim factus est voluntate, uniuersum amittendo quod dei praeceptis obtemperans possidebat, et ordinatus in parte est, ut qui
According to Augustine, these divine judgments stand in an eternal perspective. Man’s suffering in this life is not absolute and final. Although man became mortal through sin, he still enjoys something of God’s truth and beauty in his enjoyment of food and drinks, knowledge, health, and ease of action. But when he must leave the body, the soul receives that for which it principally opted by sin: nothingness, the total absence of the truth and beauty for which the soul has been made. This is the final judgment of those who do not live according to the law that God established for man. Hence, the suffering of this life is intended as a sign pointing to the eternal and final suffering that awaits in hell, “where there is no memory of God… where no one will praise him.” It announces the final judgment. As such, suffering in this life is not merely retributive, but also corrective. It is an expression of God’s will to grant humanity the opportunity of salvation. Augustine expresses this idea as follows in De uera religione 15,29:

That the human body, while before sin it was the best of its kind, has become feeble after sin and destined to die is indeed a just punishment for sin; all the same it is a greater manifestation of the Lord’s clemency than of his severity. This, you see, is the way to convince us how right it is to turn our love away from the pleasures of the body to the eternal reality of Truth. And the beauty of justice proves to be in harmony with the grace of benevolence when, after we have been deceived by the sweetness of lesser goods, we are taught a lesson by the bitterness of the penalties. In this way, you see, divine providence has so tempered our penalties that we are allowed to tend towards justice even in this perishable body and also, putting down our load of pride, to submit our necks to the one true God, to put no confidence in ourselves, and to commit the task of ruling and directing our lives to him alone.

The penalty that follows upon the first sin turns out to be an expression of God’s love towards humanity. The penalty of sin is tempered by grace, in that God grants man the opportunity to be educated by his sufferings and regain justice in the midst of suffering. Through the ‘rebellion’ of creation against man, he is granted the opportunity to lay off his own rebellion against God and to

letem agere noluit, a lege agatur.” Augustine also uses the image of the carmen saeculorum. He depicts creation in its temporality as a song uttered by God. Man was created to contemplate the art of the poem, instead of being obsessed with its syllables. As he preferred the syllables to the unity of the whole and the divine art expressed therein, he has become part of the poem of the ages, seeking constancy in it, but never finding it. See mus. 6,14, 44; uera rel. 42-43; dia. qu. 29; lib. arb. 3,42.

Augustine contrasts the carnal man living under the law with the spiritual man (1 Cor. 1:15) who judges everything according to God’s law and is therefore judged by no one (uera rel. 58). For a more elaborate description of this theme in Augustine’s works, see Bouton-Touboulc, L’Ordre Caché, 285-9.

119 Cf. uera rel. 101, CCL 32,253: “Cauendi sunt ergo inferiores inferi, id est post hanc utiam poenae grauiiores, ubi nulla potest esse commemoratione ueritatis… Quare festinemus, et ambulemus cum dies praeesto est, ne nos tenebrae comprehendant. Festinemus a secunda morte liberari, ubi nemo est qui memor Dei sit, et ab inferno, ubi nemo confitebitur Deo.” Cf. also uera rel. 51 for Augustine’s belief in hell and the final judgment.

120 uera rel. 29, CCL 32,205: “Quod uero corpus hominis cum ante peccatum esset in suo genere optimum, post peccatum factum est imbcellulosum et morti destinatum, quamquam iusta uindicata peccati sit, plus tamen clementiae Domini quam severitatis ostendit. Ita enim nobis suadetur a corporis uolupitatibus ad aeternam essentiam ueritatis amorem nostrum oportere concerti. Et est iustitiae pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans, ut, quoniam honorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur. Nam ita etiam nostra supplicia diuina prouidentia moderata est, ut et in hoc corpore tam corruptibili ad iustitiam tendere liceret et deposita omni superbia uni Deo uero collum subedere, nihil de se ipso fidere, illi uni se regendum tuendumque committere” (translation: WSA 1/8, 47). Cf. Couenhoven, Stricken by Sin, 41: “At this point, Augustine’s conceptions of punishment and grace begin to blur together…. Our fractured selves and weakened bodies and minds make it difficult to accomplish all we might wish, but since what we wish is not altogether pure, this limitation is actually a blessing in disguise.”
subject himself again to the divine rule. This interpretation of corporeal ‘oppression’ as a corrective punishment of the human will is well attested in De Genesi contra Manichaeos in the context of man’s exclusion from the paradise and God’s curses over Adam and Eve.

Commenting on the verse ‘God sent (dimisit) him [Adam] away from Paradise’ (Gen. 3:22-23) Augustine argues that man’s exclusion from paradise - corporeal death - can be compared to the ‘exclusion’ of a bad person from a group of good people. When he starts to live among good people and does not change his habits, he is driven out from the group by the weight of his own habit (ex illa bona congregatione pondere malae suae consuetudinis pellitur). If they shut him out they do not exclude him against his will, but according to his will. The exclusion is the affirmation of an already existing desire not to live in communion with this group of people. In the same way, mortality can be regarded as God’s affirmation of the human desire not to live in obedient communion with him. As such, this punishment has a pedagogical function. It is intended as an external sign that confronts man with an invisible reality: his broken relationship with God. Just as excommunication explicates the broken relationship between the sinner and the community, man’s exclusion from paradise explicates the broken relationship with God. This external measure is meant to correct the sinner and to enable him to reflect upon his behaviour, to convert and to be rehabilitated.

In his commentary on Genesis, Augustine gives several examples of how God addresses the human will through the external discipline of bodily oppression. When Augustine discusses the sentence of Eve (‘you shall bring forth children with pain’), he first interprets it in a literal sense. After the fall, women give birth to their children with great pain. Animals suffer from childbirth by nature, but women suffer from childbirth as a punishment of the first sin, by which they became mortal. The suffering of women is, however, a ‘great sign’ (magnum sacramentum). It points us to our inward female part (the lower soul that should subject itself to the male higher soul) and the suffering that it undergoes in producing virtue. Just as women experience severe bodily pain in order to give birth to a child, the lower part of the soul has to suffer the pain of abstaining from its carnal desires in order to give birth to a good habit. In other words, when we see a woman suffering from childbirth, we are confronted with the divine commandment to put to death our bad habits. As Augustine puts it: “What seem to be curses here are in fact commandments, if we take care not to read what is spiritual in a carnal manner; for the law, you see, is spiritual.” This text clearly reveals that Augustine conceives of the mortal body as a sign or sacrament through which the divine law addresses us. Augustine’s message is that through the outward sign of the body God admonishes our souls to return by changing our habits into good ones.

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121 Girard, La mort chez Augustin, 47: “La désobéissance des choses rappelle à l’homme qu’il a à obéir à Dieu.”
122 Gn. adu. Man. 2,34, CSEL 91,157: “Potest ergo uideri propterea homo in labores huius uitae esse dimissus, ut aliquando manum porrigat ad arborem uitae et uiuat in aeternum” Augustine interprets this punishment as a prophecy of the cross of Christ. Through Christ’s suffering man would again stretch out his hand to the tree of life. When he compares the exclusion of man to ecclesiastical discipline, Augustine refers to 2 Tim. 2:25.
124 Gn. adu. Man. 2,29, CSEL 91,150-51: “… nulla abstinentia fit a uoluptate carnali, quae non habeat in exordio dolorem, donec in meliore partem consuetudo flectatur... quae consuetudo ut nasceretur, cum dolore reluctatum est consuetudini malae.”
A second example of Augustine’s sacramental interpretation of creation’s rebellion against man is his allegorical exegesis of the curse that God laid upon Adam. Adam was sentenced to labor upon the earth, which would yield ‘thorns and thistles’, so that he had to win his bread in the sweat of his brow. On the one hand, Augustine interprets this sentence literally. After sin the earth produces dangerous and poisonous plants and pests that make agricultural work difficult. It also has a deeper meaning, however. Augustine writes:

What should be said is that it was through man’s sin that the earth was cursed, so as to bring forth thorns, not so that the earth itself should feel the punishment, since it lacks sensation, but that it might always be setting the criminal nature of human sin before people’s very eyes, and thus admonishing them to turn away at some time or other from their sins and turn back to God’s commandments.

The literal thorns and thistles that impede man’s mastery of the earth are in fact divine admonitions to him to return to his own soul and excise the tares that suffocate the Word of God. In the same way Augustine explains the existence of unfruitful trees and wild animals (which the Manichees considered a good proof of the evil nature of the creator).

“By unfruitful trees… human beings are being mocked and taunted, to make them understand how they should blush for shame at lacking the fruit of good works in the field of God, that is, in the Church, and to make them afraid, because they themselves neglect unfruitful trees in their fields and do nothing by way of cultivating them, of being neglected in their turn by God and left uncultivated.”

Here, Augustine compares the unfruitfulness of trees to the spiritual unfruitfulness of man. The sterility of trees admonishes us to turn inward and to face our own spiritual sterility. Moreover, these trees should make us fear that God will leave us unto decay, just as we ourselves abandon unfruitful trees and cease to cultivate them. On the harmfulness of wild animals Augustine says the same things. Wild animals belong to the good creation; it is unreasonable to say that they should not feed themselves with other animals. However, that wild animals have become harmful to man is due to

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126 Gn. adu. Man. 1,19 CSEL 91,85: “Herbae autem uenenosae ad poenam uel ad exercitationem mortalium creatae sunt, et hoc totum propter peccatum, quia mortales post peccatum facti sumus.” The thorns and thistles are not bad in themselves and therefore not a punishment that is experienced by the earth itself. They have been created after sin, in order to set the ‘crime of human sin’ always before our eyes. In Gen. ad Litt. 3 Augustine will emphasize that these plants existed already before sin, but became harmfull for man, after sin.

127 Gn. adu. Man. 1,19, CSEL 91,85: “Ergo dicendum est, quod per peccatum hominis terra maledicta sit, ut spinas pareret, non ut ipsa poenas sentiret, quae sine sensu est, sed ut peccati humani crimen semper hominibus ante oculos ponere, quo admonerentur aliquando auerti a peccatis et ad Dei praecepta conuerti” (translation: WSA 1/13, 51).


129 Gn. adu. Man. 1,19, CSEL 91,85: “Per infructuosas vero arbores insultatur hominibus, ut intellegant quam sit erubescendum sine fructu bonus operum esse in agro Dei, hoc est in Ecclesia: et timeant ne deserat eos Deus, quia et ipsi in agris suis infructuosas arbores deserunt, nec aliquam culturam eis adhibent” (translation: WSA 1/13, 51).

130 Gn. adu. Man. 1,31. Cf. the example of the cock fight in ord. 1,25-26, which Augustine considers an illustration of the beauty of the order of lower creation. For how Augustine’s view on this theme developed, see Wanda Cizewski, “The Meaning and Purpose of Animals according to Augustine’s Genesis Commentary”, in: Joseph T. Lienhard e.a. (ed.), Augustine. Presbyter Factus Sum (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 363-74.
his mortality. And mortality was caused by sin. Thus, the harmfulness of animals exhocts him not to seek happiness in the life of the flesh, but to devote himself to God and to the life to come.\textsuperscript{131}

In short, corporeal creation after sin functions as a sign of the divine law that compels man to face the soul’s antipathy toward God. Although we want to prove our mastery of ourselves and our environment, contrary to our subordination to God, bodily creation itself coerces us to admit that we act against God’s law.\textsuperscript{132} Through it we meet God himself as our judge. However, God’s accusation as such does not cause humanity to return to its original position in paradise. The tree of life, Augustine argues, can only be reached if we have passed the Cherubim with the flaming, whirling sword that guards it. The flaming sword stands for the temporal tribulation that humanity must undergo for its sins. The Cherubim represent the fullness of knowledge (\textit{plenitudo scientiae}), the love of God and the neighbor through which the law is fulfilled (\textit{Rom. 13:10; Mat. 22: 37,39-40}).\textsuperscript{133} Only by these two, suffering and love, do people return to the tree of life, their middle position under God and above creation. It is the way of remorse and penitence, over against the way of pride and self-justification.\textsuperscript{134} However, as Augustine observes, whereas all must pay the penalty of sin by suffering under the flaming sword, only a few receive the gift of love.\textsuperscript{135} Most are consumed by the fire of judgment, as it strips away their identity, leaving them searching for a replacement; others are purified by the firey trial, because the love of God humbles them and makes them receptive for correction.\textsuperscript{136}

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\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 1,26, CSEL 91,93: “\textit{De perniciosis [bestiis] autem uel punimur uel exercemur uel terremur, ut non istam uiam multis periculis et laboribus subditam, sed aliam meliorem ubi summa est securitas diligentem usque ad desideremus et eam nobis pietaitis meritis compareamus.”

\textsuperscript{132} Augustine persistently denies that non-rational creation shares in the punishment of human sin. Non-rational creation does not suffer punishment, but makes humanity suffer, because of man’s mortality. Cf. Thomas E. Clarke S.J., “\textit{Augustine and Cosmic Redemption}, The Journal of Theological Studies 19 (1956), 133-64. Thus Augustine opposes the Manichean idea of the evil character of creation. Our suffering tells us something about how we have distorted the \textit{conueniencia} between us and our environment through sin (mor. 2,14-17). The incongruent relationship between us and the rest of bodily creation signifies the incongruent relation between us and the divine law. Karla Pollman has shown that this Augustinian idea implies a reversal of the view of the relation between man and his environment in Greek and Roman religion. According to these classical traditions, man’s environment has become imperfect or was made imperfect and man has to master this imperfection in order to give himself a good life. Augustine increasingly stresses that man’s environment is good in its own right, but has become harmful for man because of a change in man himself (mortality through sin). Therefore, with regard to his salvation man should not focus on manipulating his environment, but on conversion of the soul. Cf. Karla Pollmann, “\textit{Human Sin and Natural Environment: Augustine’s Two Positions on Genesis 3:18}, Augustinian Studies 41/1 (2010), 69–85.

\textsuperscript{133} In \textit{en. Ps.} 79,2 Augustine calls the Cherubim, the highest heavenly spirits, the throne of God (\textit{sedes dei}). Believers can only become \textit{sedes dei} through love, the fulness of the law. Through love God dwells in them. Augustine shares the etymology of Cherubim with Origen. See György Heidl, \textit{Origen’s Influence on the Young Augustine. A Chapter of the History of Origenism} (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2003), 145.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,42, CSEL 91,168: “\textit{Qui si ali quando se ad deum conuerterit per flam meam frameam, id est per temporales tribulationes, sua peccata cognoscendo et gemendo et non iam extraneam naturam, quae nulla est, sed seipsum accusando, ut ipse ueniam mereatur, et per plenitudinem scientiae, quod est caritas, diligendo deum, qui supra omnia est incommutabilis, ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente, et diligendo proximum tamquam seipsum [Mt. 22,37], perueniet ad arbo rem uiae et uiuet in ac ternum.”

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,35-36, CSEL 91,159: “\textit{Arborem uiae plenitudine scientiae et flammea framea custodiri. nemo ergo potest peruenire ad arbo rem uiae nisi per has duas, id est toleriantiam molestiarum et scientiae plenitudinem. sed toleriantia molestiarum omnibus fere in hac uita subeunda est tendentibus ad arbo rem uiae, plenitudo autem scientiae uidetur paucioribus proueniere, ut quasi non omnes, qui perueniunt ad arbo rem uiae, scientiae plenitudinem ueniant, quamuis omnes toleriantiam molestiarum, id est flammeam frameam uersatiem sentiant.”

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 2,36, CSEL 91,151: “\textit{Sed aliu est uiri ad consumptionem, aliud est uiri ad purgationem. Nam et apostolus dicit: quis scandalizatur, et ego non uoror? [2 Cor. 11,29] Sed iste affectus purgabat eum magis, quia de caritate ueniebat. Et illae tribulationes quas iusti patiuntur, ad ipsam pertinente flammeam frameam,
3.2.6 Conclusion

In this section I have discussed Augustine’s anti-Manichaean interpretation of suffering as the means through which God teaches man that his project of autonomy is destined to fail. Through the rebellion of bodily creation against the soul, God reminds man of his law. As such, it is an expression of God’s love through which he warns mankind of eternal damnation. Augustine sets this interpretation of suffering against that of Manichaeism. By declaring the soul divine and its attachment to material reality the effect of external forces, Manichaeism is a means of self-justification before God. It re-enacts the first sin and fails to listen to the divine admonition present in the evil that man suffers. Thus it deprives itself from the opportunity to be saved from final damnation. Divine love, however, enables a person to be corrected by the penal effects of his sins.

3.2.7 Excursus: Augustine’s anti-Manichaean argument on God’s relation to evil

In this context, it is important to make a remark on Augustine’s response to Manichaean critique with regard to his explanation of suffering in the world. Is God not evil if he created angels and humans that he knew beforehand were going to sin? Augustine’s answer runs as follows. First, God is not responsible for sin. Angels and humans sinned by their own free will. Yet, God created them, because he knew beforehand that he would use their sins for good and righteous purposes. Why did God permit Adam to sin? Augustine’s answer is: because mortals would be corrected by the thought of their approaching death, which resulted from Adam’s sin. “Nothing, after all, is so effective in deterring people from sin as the thought of their imminent death.” Why did God create the angel that would become the devil? So that, through his malice, God would set many people right (ut multos corrigat). Both in their power over nature and in their seduction of the human mind, they express their malicious schemes for humanity. However, God uses their wills in order to reach his good and just purposes. Augustine illustrates this by using the example of Paul (2 Cor. 12:7), who received a stimulus carnis in his body, an angel of Satan buffeting him, so that he would not become swollen on account of the greatness of his revelations. In De uera religione Augustine makes this function of the devil and his angels even clearer:

Divine providence is present to show us both that this [lowest kind of beauty] is not bad, because of so many manifest traces of the primal numbers... and yet to show us that it is the lowest [beauty] by mixing in with it pains and diseases and distortions of limbs and dark coloring and rivalries and quarrels of souls, so that we might be admonished to seek something unchanging. And God does...
this through the lowest of his ministers, to whom carrying it out is a pleasure. The divine Scriptures call them destroyers and angels of wrath, although they themselves are ignorant of the good that is being achieved through them.139

Bodily sufferings, inflicted by the devil and his angels, are used by God to humble the sinner (Paul) or to redirect his love from the creation to the Creator.

3.3 Punishment as a pedagogical tool throughout salvation history

In the previous section, we discussed the fall of Adam, the way in which his descendants participate in his punishment, and how their sufferings are expressions of God’s temporary judgment, intended to lead rebellious souls back to their Creator. We also paid attention to Augustine’s polemic with the Manichaean explanation of human suffering.

In this section we turn to the meaning of law and punishment as pedagogical tools within salvation history. After the fall, God reached out to save man from his fallen condition through progressive stages of education (dispensatio temporalis). This education process culminated in the coming of the divine Wisdom from heaven, through whom man is recreated. This section addresses the specific question as to how Augustine conceives of the place of punishment within the divine process of salvation. It starts with a short overview of the scholarly discussion on this topic. This overview yields two issues to which two other sections are dedicated: the relationship between the Old and the New Testament and the way in which the character of divine punishment changes throughout salvation history.

3.3.1 The question of punishment in the Old and New Testament in scholarly debate

In scholarly literature, the question as to how God uses punishment as a pedagogical instrument in salvation history is especially discussed in the context of Augustine’s justification of coercion against the Donatists. Whereas he had previously rejected the use of legal and military force to draw the Donatists back into the Catholic communion, from around 403 he began to justify these measures, partly because he witnessed their results and partly for theological reasons.140

139 uera. rel. 75, CCL 32,236: “Sed adest diuina prouidentia, quae hanc ostendat et non malam propter tam manifesta vestigia primorum numerorum... et extremam tamen esse miscens et dolores et morbos et distortiones membrorum et tenebras coloris et animorum simulatas ac dissensiones, ut ex his admonemur incommodabile aliquid esse quarerendum. Et hoc facit per infima ministeria, quibus id agere uoluptatis est, quos exterminatores et angelos iracundiae diuinae scripturae nominant, quamuis ipsi nesciant, quid de se agat boni.”

The pioneering scholar in this field, Peter Brown, has argued that the early Augustine “had thought that the ages before the coming of Christianity had belonged to a more primitive ‘stage of moral evolution’; and that, in his own days, Christianity was a purely spiritual religion. It had risen entirely above the physical sanctions and the enforced observances of that ‘shadowy past’. Brown thus argues that according to Augustine, the good no longer needed to be enforced with physical sanctions, because of a moral evolution within the Christian religion. His ideas reflect an influential article by Edward Cranz who argued that the early Augustine conceptualized the course of history in terms of universal progress, combining a Greco-Roman theory of ascent from the material to the spiritual with the salvation-historical transition from the Old to the New Testament. According to Cranz, Augustine identifies the distinction between lovers of temporal goods and lovers of eternal goods (De libero arbitrio 1) with the distinction between the Jews and the Christians. The lovers of temporal goods need the restraint of the temporal law, so that earthly peace is preserved. The lovers of eternal goods do not need the restraint of temporal laws, as they live according to God’s eternal law. Although Augustine regards Jews and Christians as two distinct groups, he sees the former as an image of the latter. Just as the temporal law is an image of the eternal law, the people of the Old Testament were an image of the people of the New Testament.

Cranz argues that Augustine before the 390s regarded the difference between two classes of people as an historical development within humanity. God gradually educates humanity to a higher state of moral consciousness and behavior. From carnal they gradually become spiritual. His periodisation of history in six stages, parallel to the six stages of man’s ascent to God, would express this progressive idea of history. Cranz furthermore argues that Augustine abandons this view of history in the course of the 390s and eventually arrives at a position that equates the people of the Old Testament and the people of the New, in which the distinction between carnal and spiritual runs through both. Spiritual people were already present in the Old Testament, and those who belonged to the New Testament Church turned out to be much more like the carnal Israelites than Augustine had thought before. This growing equation between the people of the Old and the New Testament therefore caused Augustine to exchange his sixfold scheme of history with a fourfold scheme. Whereas the view of history as six developing stages had supported Augustine’s ideal of moral progress, the fourfold scheme (ante legem – sub lege – sub gratia – in pace) stressed the abiding dominion of sin over man, which could only be broken by the rupture of grace. Augustine had come to discover that the “history of mankind... showed no obvious sign of an irreversible ascent, by


144 Cranz, “Development”, 275-76.

145 Markus, Saeculum, 78, argues that the progressive idea of God’s education throughout salvation history represents the Graeco-Roman ideal of politics as aimed at human perfection. A wise ruler, who understands divine order, teaches his people by laws adapted to their understanding to reach perfection in virtue. He thus shares Cranz’ view.

This view of Augustine’s early development is used by Brown to explain why Augustine increasingly came to value the fear of punishment as a means to foster conversion. Augustine became more and more impressed by the power of sin, and less and less convinced of his previous ideas that conversion was a matter of rational insight brought about by teaching. His flock appeared to be not that different from the obstinate Israelites of the Old Testament. Both groups of people were heavily bound by the force of habit and could not be educated by teaching and moral example alone. Temporal rulers were called to restrain these habits by instilling fear of temporal punishment; only God’s own intervention in their hearts could genuinely release them from the “bond of habit” \((uinculum consuetudinis)\). In his anti-Manichaean defense of Old Testament violence in \(de\) 390s Augustine already argued that physical sanctions, inflicted by God’s ministers, were not by principal limited to the Old Testament dispensation. He pointed to the fact that also the apostles received the authority to inflict physical punishments upon unbelievers. In other words, in the time of the New Testament God could still use physical sanctions, inflicted by those he granted authority, in the service of the gospel. The idea that kings of the earth could serve Christ by putting their political authority to the service of Christ and his Church, eventually led to Augustine’s justification of the legal coercion of the Donatists. Those entangled in the habit of schism could be awakened by the fear of punishment, and thus be led back to the Catholic Church.

In what follows we primarily have to answer two questions. First, how does Augustine conceive of the relationship between the Old and the New Testament? Does he regard the development of salvation history as a gradual moral ascent of the human race, according to which humanity becomes more and more rational and less and less in need of the constraint? Second, what does Augustine’s view on the progression from the Old to the New Testament imply for God’s use of law and punishment as a pedagogical tool? Is it true that Augustine, before the 390s, opts against constraint, because the Christian religion has brought the people of God to a higher moral level?

### 3.3.2 The shape of Augustine’s early soteriology until 391

Before addressing the two questions mentioned above, I will first situate them in the broader context of Augustine’s early thought on salvation. Augustine’s early soteriology is very much expressed in Platonic categories, although he is already transforming them in a biblical way. As observed before, the core problem of man is that he has exchanged God (being) for temporal creation (non-being). He has been disobedient to the eternal law. As a consequence of this fall, man suffers the poena peccati in his slavery to the senses and the death of the body. This punishment eventually leads to eternal damnation.

How can man after the fall be saved from final condemnation? The answer to this question is: by the true – that is, the Christian – religion. As Augustine points out at the beginning of \(De\ vera religione\): “The way to the good and blessed life is to be found entirely in the true religion wherein one

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147 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 234.
149 For a further description of how Augustine’s thought developed after 396, see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 235ff; Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude”, 264-78. More on this issue is to be found in the next chapter.
God is worshipped and acknowledged with the purest piety to be the beginning of all existing things, by whom the universe has begun, is perfected and sustained.”

Through the Christian religion, the human soul regains its capacity for righteousness (iustitia), which Augustine defines as “the ordering of the soul through which it serves no one but God, desires to be equal to no one than to pure souls, and to rule over no one than bestial and corporeal natures.” The effect of this reordering of the soul is peace with God and peace between body and soul; in other words, it is the undoing of sin and its punishment. Through the Christian religion, the triune God comes to the help of humanity to fulfill this righteousness, helping sinful men to merit the promised reward of eternal beatitude.

In line with Platonic thought, the early Augustine understands salvation primarily in terms of the restoration of the soul’s spiritual eyes. The mind that has fallen in love with itself and the ever-fading world of matter must be gradually reaccustomed to the immaterial reality of God, in order to eventually attain the vision of God. The mind cannot do this on its own, but stands in need of a guiding authority. This rule is found in the Christian religion. Augustine’s early stress on the mind’s dependence upon a particular authority to reach the happy life is not in itself a specifically Christian idea. It can also be found in the Platonic tradition, in which the master-philosopher leads the pupil through the course of the liberal arts to the vision of intelligible reality and eventually to the vision of the good. This is, for example, the core message of Plato’s parable of the cave. Those who are tied up in the cave, forced to believe that the shadows on the wall are the real things themselves, need the guidance of a philosopher in order to be gradually led to the vision of the intelligible world of ideas.

One of the distinct Christian features of Augustine’s early theology, however, is that it is not a human authority that paves humanity’s way to heaven, but God himself who descends to humanity. Christ, the Power and Wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24) descended to us in order to teach us how to attain happiness through a life of virtue. Augustine connects this philosophical depiction of Christ with the Pauline image of the second Adam. The Wisdom of God, whom Adam left in pride, appeared visibly before

150 uera rel. 1,1, CCL 32,187: “…omnis uitae bonae ac beatae uia in uera religione sit constituta, qua unus deus colitur et purgatissima pietate cognoscitur principium naturarum omnium, a quo uniuerstitas et incohatur et perficitur et continetur.” Cf. an. quant. 4, CSEL 89, 135: “Ideoque bene praecipitur etiam in mysteriis, ut omnia corporea contentam unityueroque huic mundo renuient - qui, ut uidemus, corporeus est - quiaquis se talem redderat, qualis a deo factus est, id est similem deo; non enim alia salus animae est aut renouatio aut reconciliatio auctori suo.”

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154 For Augustine’s use of 1 Cor. 1:24 see c. Acad. 2,1; mor. 1,21-22,27; an. quant. 76; lib. arb. 1,5; mag. 38.45; uera ref. 3.110. Cf. the judgment of Brian Dobell (Augustine’s Journey from Neoplatonism to Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)), who argues that Augustine sees the early Christ as a “Plato for the masses” (43) and as the true Stoic sapiens (52). He further argues that Augustine held a Photinian Christology until somewhere in the 390s. For the philosophical ideal of paideia/eruditio as it functioned in the Christian tradition before Augustine, see Hoffmann, Anflinge, 33.
our eyes, in order to teach us as a human being how to return to the original contemplation of his divinity.\textsuperscript{155} He lived the life that Adam and humanity after him refused to live. Through his precepts he taught what righteousness is, and through his example he demonstrated this in his life. This life led to suffering and death, but his resurrection proved that a life of virtue eventually leads to the reward of happiness.\textsuperscript{156} As such, Christ transcends all the philosophers that preceded him. They were neither able to live according to their own doctrine, nor could they convert the masses from their entanglement to the senses.\textsuperscript{157} Christ, however, lived a life that was consistent with his doctrine. Moreover, he was able to convert the masses, as can be observed in the Christian Church, where ordinary men and women chose to forsake this world as martyrs or ascetics.\textsuperscript{158} Those who are converted to Christ are transformed from old to new and will eventually reign with Christ over creation, instead of being judged by Him together with those who refused to obey the eternal law.\textsuperscript{159} For this reason, Augustine sees the Christian religion as the fulfillment of pagan philosophy. All pagan philosophy longed to attain the knowledge of the truth. Platonism has been able to find the Creator, but has not been able to put this knowledge into practice by breaking with traditional idolatry. Only Christ was able to effectively release humanity from its idolatry with temporal reality and reunite men to the truth itself.\textsuperscript{160}

What is the secret of Christ’s victory? If he is only a teacher and an example, how then could he effect a change that other teachers had never been able to? This brings us to an often-neglected feature in Augustine’s early soteriology: grace. Although the early Augustine mainly depicts Christ as a teacher (an image that will remain dominant in his work), he clearly confirms at several places that God himself enables humans to follow Christ. For example, Augustine sees God as the one who leads the Church to eternal rest by performing in us the works that he commands us to do.\textsuperscript{161} Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is able to transform humanity, because he is not only an outward teacher, but the Truth and Wisdom of God itself through whom soul and body were created and are recreated.\textsuperscript{162} Christ is the second Adam, who has become a life-giving Spirit.\textsuperscript{163} It is through the

\textsuperscript{155} Cf. \textit{lib. arb.} 3.30.
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{uera rel.} 32-33; \textit{ep.} 11.4. In these passages, Augustine calls the life of Christ a teaching of morals (\textit{disciplina morum/uiuendi}). In \textit{uera rel.} 30 Augustine says that the incarnation demonstrated ‘what an exalted place is held by human nature among creatures’. Christ revealed the divine intention for human nature in his life. Cf. Geerlings, \textit{Christus Exemplum}, 90 (‘In Jesus Christus ist das Urbild des Menschen abgedeckt’).
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{uera rel.} 1-5.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{uera rel.} 5-6.
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{uera rel.} 58.
\textsuperscript{160} On Christianity as the true philosophy, see Ragnar Holte, \textit{Béatitude et sagesse}, 73-177; G. Madec, \textit{Petites études augustiniennes} (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1994), 168.
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 1,43, CSEL 91,114: “Requieuit deus septima die ab omnibus operibus suis [Gn. 2,2], quia et ipse in nobis haec bona operatur, qui ut operemur iubet et recte ipse requiescere dicitur, quia post haec omnia opera requiem nobis ipse praestabit.” Cf. \textit{Quant. an.} 55, CSEL 89,202: “Hac autem actione [the reformation of the soul] nihil mihi uidetur operosius et nihil est cessationi similius neque tamam eam suscipere aut implere animus potest nisi eo ipso adiuuante cui redditur. Unde fit, ut homo eius elementia reformandus sit, cuius bonitate ac potestate formatus est.”
\textsuperscript{162} \textit{uera rel.} 24, CCL 32,22: “Sine dubitatione reparabitur [anima] et a multís mutabilibus ad unum incommutabile reuertetur reformata per sapientiam non formatam, sed per quam formatur uniuersa, frueturque deo per spirítium sanctum, quod est donum dei.” \textit{uera rel.} 25, CCL 32, 22: “Corpus enim per ipsam [anima] uigebit et ipsa per incommutabilem ueritatem, qui filius dei unicus est, atque ita et corpus per ipsum filium dei uigebit, quia omnia per ipsum. Dono etiam eius, quod animae datur, id est sancto spirítu, non solum anima cui datur salua et pacata et sancta fit, sed ipsum etiam corpus uiuificabitur erique in natura sua mundissimum.” On Christ as sapientia et virtus dei who mediates these properties to the soul, see \textit{mor.} 1.22 and 27. In \textit{mor.} 1.27 Augustine argues that God created and enlightens all his creatures through his wisdom and power, i.e. through
indwelling of this Spirit of Christ that both our souls and bodies are redeemed from death. In short, God’s redeeming work through Christ cannot be reduced to a matter of teaching and moral example, but is a matter of recreation of the entire person. This recreation starts inwardly in the soul and is brought to perfection in the resurrection of the body. By saying this, I do not deny that Augustine’s early Christology has an intellectualist emphasis, embedded as it is within the philosophical model of paideia. This approach to Christ – Christus magister – remains present throughout Augustine’s writings until the end of his life. It is enriched, rather than superseded, by other Christological emphases that we will review in the next chapter.

This enrichment consists mainly of Augustine’s increasing emphasis on the redemptive meaning of Christ’s death and resurrection, as mediating the righteousness of God to human nature.

the Son (connecting 1 Cor. 1:24 to Jn. 1:3-4), implying that the Son assumes the same role in humanity’s recreation. For Augustine’s early view of Christ as more than an exemplary teacher, see Pierre-Marie Hombert, “La christologie des trente-deux premières Enarrationes in Psalms de saint Augustin”, in: Isabelle Bochet (ed.), Augustin philosophe et prédicateur. Hommage à Gouven Madec. Actes du colloque international organisé à Paris les 8 et 9 septembre 2011 (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 432-63 (433, footnote 5). Gouven Madec (Le Christ de saint Augustin: La Patrie et la Voie (Paris: Desclée, 2001), 67) notes that we should not expect from the early Augustine to explicitly write down everything he believed about Christ, so that later ‘developments’ are in fact no real developments, but only later expressions of what had already been in his mind. This might be true, but, as we cannot penetrate into Augustine’s mind, we can only observe that his understanding of the work of Christ, especially with regard to the meaning of the cross, was enriched in the course of his writings.

On the sanctifying and vivifying work of the Holy Spirit, see mor. 1.23, CSEL 90,27-28: “Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur deo et ex eo conformati atque figurati et circumcisi ab hoc mundo non confundamur cum his quae nobis debent esse subjecta. Fit autem hoc per spiritum sanctum... neque nos potest a vanitate separare ueritatisque connectere, quod subiectum est uanitatis. Et hoc nobis spiritus sanctus praestat; creatura igitur non est, quia omne quod est, aut deus, aut creatura est”; mor. 1.64 where Augustine connects the text “I am a consuming fire” (Dtr. 4:24) to Christ’s saying “I have come to throw fire on the earth (Lk. 12:45) and applies both texts to the sanctification of the soul through the Holy Spirit; uera rel. 25, CCL 32,203 and mus. 6,49, PL 32,88 where Augustine expresses the Spirit’s work in the vivification of our bodies on the basis of Rom. 8:11 (uiuificabit et mortalia corpora uestra propter spiritum manentem in nobis) and 1 Cor. 15:53-55 (corrup提示e induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem ...mors absorbetur in uictoriam). For further discussion, see Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology, 128-36.


Augustine’s thought on the resurrection of the body has undergone development. In an. quant. 76 (387/88) he acknowledges the resurrection as an article of faith, but argues that a real understanding and assurance of it belongs to the highest degree of spiritual growth. In mor. 1.40 (388/90), he more clearly affirms his belief in the resurrection, although some interpret ‘resurrection’ in this passage as referring to the subjection of the body to the soul in this life (Van Fleteren, “Augustine and Corpus Spiritale”, 337). In uera rel., a clear belief in the bodily resurrection, as a restoration and perfection of the body according to its own nature, is clearly present (uera rel. 25; 83). See on this development Hermann Josef Sieben, “Augustins Entwicklung in der Frage der Identität des irdischen Leibes mit dem auferstandenen”, in: Idem, Augustinus. Studien zu Werk und Wirkgeschichte (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2013), 132-71.


In this regard, I think Geerlings’ judgment needs sophistication. He has argued that Augustine stopped using the word disciplina for Christ’s life and teaching, because of his developing understanding of the need of divine grace in order to learn from Christus magister (Geerlings, Christus Exemplum, 91). Niebergal’s suggestion might be helpful here. According to him Augustine already has an idea of grace as recreation (endowment of forma, species, ordo), flowing from his understanding of creatio ex nihilo, but it is not yet clearly connected to the historical work of Christ. See Niebergal, Augustins Anschauung von der Gnade, 74; Drecoll, Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins, 356.
His reading of Paul and the Psalms, his further immersion into the tradition of the Church, and his ongoing confrontation with the Christology of the Manichaeans would fuel a deeper appreciation of history as the means through which God enacts humanity’s salvation from sin, rather than as a mere means of epistemological accommodation required for humanity’s education in wisdom. 

### 3.3.3 The relationship between the Old and the New Testament

Having discussed the broad lines of Augustine’s early soteriology, we now turn to the major questions that were raised by our discussion of Cranz and Brown. First, how does Augustine conceive of the relationship between the Old and the New Testament? How does the coming of Christ relate to the history of God’s people before him?

Augustine’s theology of the relationship between Christ and the Old Testament is shaped by his polemics with Manichaeism. Manichaeism regarded the Old Testament dispensation as an invention of the kingdom of darkness, which attempted to hide the original religion of reason from the people of Israel. It regarded the god of the Old Testament and the religion that he imposed upon his people as primitive and unacceptable to the educated mind. The God of the Old Testament had impeded the people of Israel from coming to a rational understanding of religion. He had taught them that religion is all about observing rituals and material rewards, such as a long life on this earth, many children and political stability. Moreover, this god permitted his people to commit immoral acts such as polygamy (the patriarchs), adultery (letter of divorce conceded by Moses), and genocide (the conquest of Canaan). The Manichees went on to argue that the carnal character of Israel’s religion is to be explained from the very character of the Old Testament god himself. After all, he himself is presented in the Old Testament with the characteristics of a human being, who is jealous, desires to be fed by his subjects, and punishes them outrageously when they do not give him what he wants.

Manichaeism regarded Jesus as the divine Savior who redeemed humanity from the power of the Old Testament god by preaching a religion that was spiritual and rational. Adimantus, for example, wrote a book in which he paralleled Old Testament and New Testament texts and contended that they are often in blatant opposition to each other. Whereas Moses taught the people of God the lex talionis, Christ taught the commandment of love and forgiveness. While the God of the Old Testament promised his people earthly prosperity if they obeyed his commandments, Christ asks his followers to give up their life in this world in order to save their souls. While the Old Testament God commanded his servants to slay the Canaanites and the priests of Baal, Jesus taught his disciples

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169 Augustine’s neglect of the salvific nature of Christ’s bodily death and his resurrection (although they are not denied) explains why BeDuhn sees so much similarity between Augustine’s and Manichaean Christology. See BeDuhn, Augustine’s anti-Manichaean Dilemma, volume 1, 249-50.

170 c. Faust, 22.1-3 on the Jewish religion as a deformation of the original law.

171 c. Faust, 22. This critique of the Old Testament had been one of the reasons for Augustine himself to join the Manichees in his search for truth and wisdom.


173 c. Adim, 4. Although Augustine does not yet address these questions explicitly before his book Contra Adimantium (394), he must have had knowledge of this Manichaean critique from the time he was a Manichaean auditor himself.

174 c. Adim, 18.
to turn the other cheek and forgive one’s enemies. Manichaeism thus posed a radical opposition between the religion of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament.

Over against the Manichean opposition of the Old and the New Testament, Augustine had to show on the one hand the continuity between both dispensations, and on the other hand explain in what respect the New Testament was New in relation to the Old. He does so by using the pedagogical idea of accommodation. A teacher has to accommodate himself to the situation of the pupil in order to lead him to knowledge. “For, in the spot where a person has fallen, there one has to bend down, so that he may rise again.” Augustine applies this idea to God’s way of teaching humanity throughout time. Humanity is presented as a single human being whose mind has become darkened through sin. In his historical project of redemption (dispensatio temporalis), God now uses material images and temporal rules to eventually lead his people to the understanding of and love for eternal realities. By thus perceiving God’s revelation in the Old and the New Testament as a matter of accommodation, Augustine is able to do justice to both unity and diversity between the Testaments.

In his explanation of the temporalis dispensatio Augustine goes about as follows. Throughout salvation history, God has one teaching project for the mind (rationalis disciplina), but it is presented in two ways, namely partly in a straightforward manner, and partly by comparisons in words, deeds and sacraments, which are accommodated to the carnal mind and intend to rouse the soul to seek for the realities that they signify. Augustine divides these two ways of teaching between the

175 c. Adim. 17.
176 uera rel. 45, CCL 32,215: “Nam in quem locum quisque ceciderit, ibi debet incumbere, ut surgat.”
177 uera rel. 50, CCL 32,219: “…Uniuersum genus humanum, cuius tamquam unius hominis uita est ab Adam usque ad finem huuius saeculi, ita sub diuinae prouidentiae legibus administratur.” Cf. uera rel. 46; diu. qu. 49; cit. 10, 14.
178 For the background of this term, see Hoffmann, Anfänge, 22: “Die dispensatio temporalis ist also das Werk der göttlichen Providenz, d.h. die göttliche Providenz teilt das Leben der Menschheit und des Einzelmenschen ein in Stufen einer zeitlichen Entwicklung, die zur vita aeterna führt. Der Sinn dieser dispensatio ist eine ‘reformatio’ und ‘reparatio’.” The term is closely connected to the concept of authority.
179 Cranz, “Development”, 275; Markus, Saeculum, 80; Hofmann, Anfänge, 144, who gives references to other patristic testimonies to this idea.
180 diu. qu. 49, CCL 4A,76: “[Quare filii Israel sacrificabant usibiliter pecorum uictimas] Quia sunt etiam sacra spiritaula, quorum imaginies carnalem populum celebrare oportebat, ut praefiguratio noui populi seruitute ueteris fieret. Quorum duorum popularum differencialit etiam in uno quoque nostrum licet aduertere, cum quisque ab uetero matris ueterem hominem necesse est agat, donec ueniat ad iuuenilem aetatem, ubi iam non est necesse carnaliter sapere, sed potest ad spiritua1 volu1tate conveneri et intrinsicus registrare. Quod ergo in uno homine recte educato ordine naturae disciplinaque contingit, hoc proportione in uniuerso genere humano fieri per diuinam prouidentiam peragique pulcherrimum est.”
181 In uera rel. 33, CCL 32,208, Augustine uses the image of a doctor who adapts his medicines to the different diseases of his patients, and to a pater familias who gives slaves a more severe treatment than sons, although he intends the benefit of both.
182 Marrou has observed that disciplina, as distinct from doctrina, in Augustine and other writers often refers to knowledge in its practical consequences for life. In the Vulgate it is used as a translation of paideia, the wisdom of the law of God, on which the life according to his commandments is based. See H.I. Marrou, “Doctrina et Disciplina dans la langue des Pères de l’Église”, 5-25 (esp. 11-12, 16). Cf. mor. 1,27 (where Augustine connects disciplina to sapientia and uirtus to action that is based on this wisdom). Clearly, philosophical and biblical wisdom traditions merge in the early Augustine.
183 uera rel. 33, CCL 32, 207: “iam uero ipse totius doctrinae modus partim apertissimus partim similitudinibus in dictis, in factis, in sacramentis ad omnem animae instructionem exercitationemque accommodatus, quid aliud quam rationalis disciplinae regulam impuleit? Nam et mysteriorum expositio ad ea dirigitur, quae apertissime
Old and the New Testament. God started his covenant with Israel by separating them from the nations and their idols and dedicating them to himself. In the Old Testament God commands his people to observe all kinds of rituals and less far reaching moral laws, to which he attached the promise of prosperity in an earthly kingdom. Both these observances and their rewards signified in a hidden way the teaching of Christ and the reward for following Him in the New Testament. The hidden meaning of the Old Testament religion is revealed in the teaching of Christ and the moral life of the Church. The meaning of its earthly reward will be revealed after the second coming of Christ, when God will give Himself to his people as their everlasting rest. The relationship between Old and New Testament then, can be described as *occultatio* and *revelatio*.

The relationship between God’s revelation in both Testaments can be further illuminated by the distinction between the eternal and the temporal law. The eternal law applies to the entire person, to all men at all times. It commands that we abandon the lust for temporal things (*temporalia*) and set our hearts purely on eternal things (*aeterna*). The reward for its obedience is eternal beatitude, whereas the penalty that follows upon disobedience is slavery to lust (*libido*). The temporal law somehow mirrors the requirements of the eternal law, but is only concerned with the actions of people, not with the disposition of the human heart. The reward for obedience to this law is temporal peace, whereas disobedience is punished with temporal affliction. Applied to our subject, one might say that God gave his people in the Old Testament a temporal law that pointed to the eternal law, but was accommodated to carnal people who were not able to fulfill the commands of the eternal law. It constrained sinful behavior through fear of temporal punishment. In the New Testament, however, God sets his people free from the slavery to lust through the love of the Holy Spirit, so that they become receptive to the teaching and example of Christ, and are enabled to live according to the eternal law. This reformation of man is eventually fulfilled in the eternal Sabbath.

The difference between the people to whom God gave the religion of the Old Testament and those of the New is therefore often characterized by Augustine as a difference between fear (*timor*) and love (*caritas*), or between slavery (*servitus*) and freedom (*libertas*). He describes God’s pedagogy in the Old Testament as ‘coercion’ (*coercitio*) through fear, which led to a servile righteousness, whereas he characterizes God’s pedagogy in the New Testament as teaching (*instructio*) through love, *dicta sunt, et si ea tantum essent, quae facillime intelleguntur, nec studiose quaereretur nec suaviter inueniretur ueritas.*

Augustine argues that God used a double form of teaching, namely by speaking to the mind and by letting his people perform particular sacraments, in order to guarantee that knowledge and action would be in agreement with each other (*satis cum cognitione actio conueniret*). This Old Testament form of teaching is fulfilled in Christ’s *praecepta*, which have to be acknowledged by the mind and in his *exemplum*, which has to be imitated in our actions.


lib. arb. 1.13; 1.22.

leading to the highest form of righteousness. However, this does not mean that there is an absolute spiritual progress on the side of God’s people throughout salvation history, as Cranz suggested in his article. Augustine acknowledges that the Spirit of Christ was already at work among the Old Testament people of God and that the New Testament people of God, as long as they live on this earth, form a corpus permixtum, in which many are as carnal as the Israelites, and all are struggling with the old man and stand in need of ongoing purification. In other words, the equation between the Old and the New Testament people of God is already present before the 390s.

Augustine explicitly affirms that God’s covenant with Israel intended to bring forth a real people for God. For this purpose he separated them from the nations and gave them the Law and the prophecies as rain from heaven that enabled the dry land to bring forth beneficial crops. As previously indicated, most people under the Old Testament dispensation did not make a right use of God’s revelation, but Augustine notes that others, particularly the Old Testament office bearers like the prophets and the patriarchs, were effectively regenerated through it. “Whoever deserved in the times of the earthly people to attain to the illumination of the inward man helped the human race at that time by presenting it with what that age required and by prophetically hinting at what was not opportune to exhibit.” Thus, they helped those who were entrusted to them to “long for the grace of God, about whose future coming the prophets used to sing.” Contrary to what Cranz suggests in his article, Augustine already states here that the grace of Christ was present in the Old Testament. Two groups of people where helped by it. First, the spiritales, who were already able to understand the eternal law, accommodated themselves in their teaching and practice to those who were not yet able to understand. The second group, the carnales, longed for the grace of Christ, but did not yet understand it. The others in Israel were completely blind to higher wisdom and only longed for temporal goods.

With regard to the people of the New Testament, Augustine emphasizes that, although they received the full revelation of God’s will in Christ and the Spirit who renews them accordingly, the promise of the New Testament is yet to be fulfilled for them. They are striving towards the full contemplation of God in a life of good works, but will only inherit it after the final resurrection. The new life is described as a gradual decline of the old man and a gradual growth of the new man. During this life, one can only live the life of the new man together with the old one. This is why the

192 Gn. adu. Man. 1,37.
193 uera rel. 51, CCL 32,220: “Quisquis autem populi terreni temporibus usque ad illuminationem interioris hominis meruit peruenire, genus humanum pro tempore adiuvuit exhibens ei, quod aetas illa poscebat, et per prophetiam intimans id, quod exhibere opportunum non erat.”
194 uera rel. 33. In mor. 1,40-45 Augustine also refers to several Old Testament saints who display the New Testament virtues, thus indicating that true love for God was already present in the Old Testament.
195 The difference between carnales and spiritales is derived from 1 Cor. 3:1-3. Augustine had used this distinction in earlier writings such as De ordine, where he distinguished between Christians who are able to surpass authority with reason, and those who remain dependent upon faith during this life in the body. This distinction between two classes of Christians goes back to Clement of Alexandria and Origen.
196 Gn. adu. Man. 1,41; 1,43.
197 2 Cor. 4:16.
198 uera rel. 49; 51.
external signs of the sacraments (although these are fewer in number than the sacraments of the Old Testament), the teachings and example of Christ, and the correction by ministers still have an important role to play in the Church. For this purpose, Christians also still profit from the interpretation of the Old Testament sacraments and prophecies.

At the same time, Augustine distinguishes different spiritual groups within the Church. The *spiritales* have a very deep insight in the truths to which the external signs refer. The *carnales* are those who are much more dependent upon the “milk of authority”. They still have an unbecoming understanding of God’s nature and of the happy life. They are nourished at the breasts of the Church, each according to his own capacities, in order to grow to wisdom and virtue. The *spiritales* are called to exercise love towards them, by accommodating their teaching to the spiritual capabilities of these little ones in Christ. Although the *spiritales* have progressed much further than the *carnales*, they nonetheless run the risk of sinning, namely by pride and self-elevation. The third category that is present within the Church is the chaff amongst the wheat. These are the people who stick with the old man and either remain in the Church until the final judgment, or leave the Church beforehand through excommunication, schism or heresy. In short, the Church is depicted as a mixed body, whose ‘sons’ are constantly in need of admonition and correction, because they have not yet reached final beatitude.

This short overview of the relationship between the Old and the New Testament in Augustine’s thought before 391 shows that although he does indeed see progress within salvation-history, this progress primarily consists in God’s salvific acts. God moved from prophecy to fulfilment, from carnal promises to spiritual promises. There is no spiritual ascent as such within the people of God. Throughout time, there is one spiritual people of God, consisting of degrees of spiritual maturity, living in the midst of the godless. Together, they form God’s Church in time, until the final separation. This is important with regard to the question of what function the threat of punishment serves throughout salvation history. This question is treated in the next section.

199 Explicit references to the sacraments before 391: *mor.* 1,80, CSEL 90,86: “Et illo sacrosancto lauacro inchoatur innovatio noui hominis”; *Gn. adu. Man.* 2,37, CSEL 91,161: “Formata est ergo ei [Christo] coniunx ecclesia de latere eius, id est de fide passionis et baptismi. Nam percussum latus eius lancea sanguinem et aquam profudit”; *quant. an.* 80 (on the baptism of children).

200 *uera rel.* 33, CCL 32,208: “Ita nec seruiliter alligant et exercent liberaliter animum.”

201 *uera rel.* 51.

202 *mor.* 1,17.

203 On this categorie of people in the Church, see Teske, “A Decisive admonition to Augustine?”, *Augustinian Studies* 19 (1988), 87: “The parvuli, then, are those in the Church who are unable to understand invisible or spiritual realities and think of God as having a bodily shape and even a human form. They are contrasted with the adults in Christ who can take solid food; they are called ‘carnal’ or ‘animal men’ as opposed to ‘spiritual men’. Once Augustine calls the carnal man ‘a little one in Christ, like God’s cattle (*pecus dei*).’ Such *pecudes*, he later explains, are ‘those who live simply in the Church, useful [members], not very learned, but full of faith.’ Such men of simple faith are not limited to the laity, but include bishops and priests as well.”

204 *Diu. qu.* 83,36.

205 On separation from the Church in this time through schism and heresy, see *uera rel.* 9-10. On the living together of wheat and chaff, saints and sinners, see *uera rel.* 9, CCL 32,194 (ad tempus ultimae uentilationis uelut paleas sustinere). In *mor.* 1,76, CSEL 90,81 Augustine says that the Church corrects *malos filios* by condemning their sins. With God’s help and good will they are corrected. Others, however, who persevere in their sins, are permitted to grow together with the wheat, until the final separation takes place (*qui autem voluntate mala in pristinis uitis perseverant aut etiam addunt graviora prioribus, in agro quidem domini sinuntur esse et cum bonis seminibus crescere, sed ueniet tempus quo zizania separat*). Augustine further emphasizes that God uses the wicked to exercise the good in vigilance and love (*uera rel.* 50).

3.3.4 Divine judgment in the Old and the New Testament

According to Cranz and Brown, the early Augustine taught that God in the time of the New Testament ceased to use a pedagogy of fear by temporal punishment, because his people had reached a higher level of moral consciousness. They could now be instructed by words, instead of constrained by force. We observed, however, that salvation-historical progress is not so much a moral evolution within the Church, but rather a progression of divine revelation, from sign to reality. The law to which God bound his people in the Old Testament was a temporal one. Obedience to it granted the individual or the nation temporal peace. Disobedience was followed by temporal punishment. But these realities were images. The temporal law pointed beyond itself to the eternal law, the temporal peace within the borders of an earthly kingdom pointed to the eternal peace of the contemplation of God. Temporal punishment, inflicted by temporal rulers, pointed to eternal punishment, based upon the eternal law, inflicted by the Son to whom the Father has entrusted the judgment of the world. It is therefore misleading to suggest that God’s New Testament Church no longer needs temporal punishment, because it has reached a higher level of moral consciousness. On the contrary, many people in the Church still benefit from temporal afflictions. The reason that God no longer rules the Church as a political entity is because the time of fulfillment has arrived. The last period of history is the time in which the Church lives between the typological and the eschatological kingdom (Israel and eternal life), and awaits final judgment.

Augustine develops this understanding of salvation-history in De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos (the scheme of six ages mentioned by Cranz). He compares the different stages of God’s history with his people both to the stages of a person’s life (infantia, pueritia, adolescentia, iuuentus, senectus) and to the days of creation. Just as the days of creation, each phase starts with a morning and ends with an evening. Augustine interprets the mornings as God’s salvific initiative, such as the salvation of Noah in the ark, the covenant with Abraham, the kingdom of David, the preservation of Jewish communities in the time of exile, and finally and decisively the sending of Christ (as the reality to which the earlier salvific events pointed). The evenings represent the sins of the people and God’s judgment over them. Every time Israel turns away from the God who bound them to himself, he punishes them in order to convert them and to further the process of their recreation. Until the coming of Christ, however, the history of Israel is nothing more than a hopeless chastisement of the old man, under the Law. There is no progress until Christ, in whom the old man is put to death and the new man raised to life. In him, humanity is finally recreated. Those who reject

207 uera rel. 58.
208 Old Testament believers always already understood that temporal judgments pointed to this reality. Unbelievers in the time of the New Testament will never be touched by the threat of future judgment, as they are inclined to make themselves believe that God does not punish sins (cf. diu. qu. 36,1).
209 Augustine also uses this scheme in diu. q. 40; 64,2; cat. rud. 22,39; trin. 4,7; ciu. 22,30.
210 On this periodisation of history see Hoffmann, Anfänge, 202-14; Auguste Luneau, L’histoire du salut chez les pères de l’eglise. La doctrine des ages du monde (Paris: Beauchesne, 1964); Karl Heinz Schwarte, Die Vorgeschichte der augustinischen Zeitallerlehre (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1966). The comparison between the days of creation and the stages of salvation-history are intended to stress against the Manichees that the Father of Jesus Christ, the God of Israel, and the Creator are one and the same God. Cf. Cari Kloos, “History as Witness: Augustine’s Interpretation of the History of Israel in Contra Faustum and De Trinitate”, in: Christopher T. Daly, John Doody and Kim Paffenroth (eds.), Augustine and History (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 31-51 (34-6).
him as the fulfillment of Israel’s history remain old and have to undergo final damnation, which is prefigured in the final destruction of the temple. The New Testament Church reads the history of Israel as a prophetic announcement of the dispensation in which she herself lives. Christ brings the eternal salvation that was prophetically announced by God’s temporal acts of salvation in the Old Testament. The punishments of Israel, with the destruction of the nation as its apex, function as an image of the punishment that will meet those who reject Christ. Just as in the other stages of the Church’s life on earth, the last phase of her existence in history will end with apostasy and God’s consequent judgment. This will be the final separation between the old and the new man.

As the world approaches this decisive moment, the Church has the task to instill the fear of God in those to whom she is send. As a general rule of teaching Augustine states that piety starts with fear of punishment and then proceeds to love of justice. Therefore, the Church should first instill the fear of God’s punishment in those who are not yet converted, hoping that this fear will evolve into a genuine love of God. In this regard, the order of conversion resembles the order of salvation history. Just like God started the conversion of the human race through fear of punishment and proceeded to teach them the love of justice through the grace of Christ, he starts the conversion of the individual with the instilment of fear, which evolves into genuine love through conversion.

This does not mean, however, that the converted person no longer stands in need of discipline. As long as the old man exercises his influence upon the new man, Christians remain in need of discipline. Influenced by a widespread philosophical commonplace, Augustine compares the Church’s discipline to the art of medicine. Just as remedies must be adapted to the situation of the patient, disciplinary measures should be accommodated to the nature of a person’s sins. For those who are baptized, one starts from the assumption that admonition is enough, because they have been set free by Christ to be taught through love, rather than coerced by fear. However, as we observed, just like the Israelites of old, Christians can also become entangled in sin and need a more severe treatment to be

211 uera rel. 10, CCL 32,194: “Rudimenta noui populi ab humilitate surgentia in ipsis suis scripturis nimia securitate noluerunt aduertere atque ita in utere homine remanserunt.”
212 Gn. adu. Man. 1,40.
213 Thus Augustine seems to express the teaching of Rom. 11:20-21 where Paul says God’s cutting off of the natural branches (unbelieving Israel) is a warning to the branches that have been inserted later (the Christians from the Gentiles). This suggestion is also made by Karl Heinz Schwarte, Die Vorgeschichte der augustinischen Zeitalterlehre, 42. See also util. cred. 8 (392); in this text Augustine quotes 1 Cor. 10:11 where Paul says that God’s temporal judgments over Israel are intended as correptiones for us ‘over whom the end of the ages has come’.
214 mor. 1,56, CSEL 90,60: “Agit ergo his gradibus, quod ad animum pertinet, ut primo timeat deinde diligat Deum. Hi mores sunt optimi, per quos nobis etiam ipsa proueni, ad quam omni studio rapimur, agnitione ueritatis.” uera rel. 33, CCL 32,207: “Pietas timore inchoatur, caritate perficitur.”
215 diu. qu. 49, CCL 44A,76: “Quod ergo in uno homine recte educato ordine naturae disciplinaque contingit, hoc proportione in unuero genere humano fieri per diuinam prouidentiam peragrique pulcherrimum est.”
216 Cf. mor. 1,62, CSEL 90,66: “…etiam proximi dilectionem atque caritatem ita complecteris, ut uariorum morborum, quibus pro peccatis suis animae aegrotant, omnis apud te medicina praepolleat.” In mor. 1,64 Augustine also expresses this sensibility, saying that to instill the fear of punishment is useless if it is not complemented with the love of virtue. On the need for discernment in applying ecclesiastical penalties for sin, see diu. qu. 83,26, CCL 44A,32: “Alia sunt peccata infirmitatis, alia imperitiae, alia malitiae. Infirmitas contraria est uirtuti, imperitia contraria est sapientiae, malitia contraria est bonitati. Quisquis igitur nouit quid sit irtas et sapientia dei, potest existimare quae sint peccata uenialia. Et quisquis nouit quid sit bonitas dei, potest existimare quibus peccatis certa poena debeatur et hic et in futuro saeculo. Quibus bene tractatis probabiliter indicari potest, qui non sint cogendi ad penitentiam laetuosam et lacrimabilem, quamuis peccata fateantur, et quibus nulla omnino salus speranda sit, nisi sacrificium obulatorint deo spiritum contribulatum per penitentiam.”
brought back on the right track. At this point, the instillment of the fear of divine judgment is needed to convince the sinner that God rules all humans, and that no sin remains unpunished.

In this period of his career, Augustine does not yet address the question of whether temporal rulers have the task of applying their temporal authority in the service of Church discipline. He does subscribe, however, to the Platonic notion that temporal rulers should derive the content of their laws from the eternal law. In a Christian empire this could come to mean that the laws of Christian emperors should reflect the interests of the Christian religion, which had indeed come to pass, for example, in the anti-heretical laws promulgated by emperor Theodocius. In the works that Augustine wrote before his ordination, however, he does not express himself on the question whether temporal rulers should somehow serve the Church’s disciplinary practice.

3.3.5 Conclusion
Cranz and Brown argued that the early Augustine regarded salvation history as a gradual process of moral and spiritual ascent in which the need for constraint by temporal laws decreased. We have observed that Augustine does indeed see progress in salvation history, from shadow to reality, from temporal to eternal, but he does not claim that humanity or the Church as such have undergone a spiritual ascent. In the time of the Old Testament and in the time of the New Testament, the Church is a mixed body, although real believers are more numerous in the time of the New than in the time of the Old Testament. The eschatological change with regard to God’s use of corporeal punishment has to do with the fact that God’s earthly kingdom will imminently be fulfilled in the heavenly kingdom of eternal life. This implies that God’s temporal exclusion from his earthly kingdom will be realized in people’s eternal exclusion from the eternal kingdom. The time between the destruction of Israel as a nation and the final judgment by Christ is the time of warning for this coming judgment. Conversion then starts with fear of God’s judgment and proceeds to love of God himself, from timor seruils to timor castus. However, as the old man continues to exercise his influence on the new man, the Christian remains in need of discipline. The severity with which this is to be applied depends on the ‘medical’ situation of the sinner. Augustine does not yet address the question of whether the temporal rulers of the present age can assist the Church in her calling. This element starts to emerge in the 390s and comes to fruition in his polemics with the Donatists. Augustine’s early theology of salvation history does not exclude this possibility, however.

3.4 Law and fear in Augustine’s understanding of Christian progress
This section further addresses the meaning of divine judgment in the Christian life. In the previous chapter I discussed the function of divine judgment in Augustine’s understanding of ascent through the levels of the soul. In his Thagastan writings, Augustine continues to use models of ascent, but now he increasingly concentrates on the importance of virtue and the exercise of love for the neighbor, rather than on the levels of the soul. This section gives an example of such a model of ascent and

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217 *lib. arb.* 1,12.
218 Already in 372 Theodocius had issued a law against the Manichees, which prescribed heavy punishments on those who attended Manichaean gatherings. See *Codex Theodosianus*, 16,5,3 (ed. Mommsen, Sources Chretiennes, nr. 497, 229-30).
219 Harrison, *Rethinking*, ch. 3; Kenney, *Contemplation*, 94.
thematizes the function of divine judgment within it. Augustine still espouses a progressive view of sanctification, in which the soul, helped by grace works itself upwards to perfection. In this process, Augustine understands the fear of divine judgment as the means through which the virtues are progressively purified.

In his treatise on the fostering of love (de nutrienda caritate), Augustine argues that the fear of the Lord is both the beginning and the completion of wisdom (cf. Ps. 111:10). With regard to the beginning of wisdom, Augustine first observes that the unregenerate, although they know by reason that their sins deserve punishment, use this same reason to make themselves believe that they can hide their sins and avoid punishment. They suppress the eternal law which is stamped upon their minds, in order to continue sinning. In order to foster the beginning of love and wisdom, therefore, the innate knowledge of God’s law must be invigorated in them, which produces a sense of guilt and fear. In order to achieve this, the unbeliever must be confronted with the reality of God’s providence. Augustine explains:

So that God may be feared, it must be made clear that divine providence governs all things, [but this must be made clear] not so much by reasons [...] as by recent examples, however they may occur, or by history, especially by that which, through the administration of divine providence itself, whether in the Old or in the New Testament, has obtained the most excellent authority of religion... Both the punishment for sins and the rewards for good deeds must be discussed.

In other words, through the examples of history, carnal people should be persuaded that God, who governs everything by his providence, does not leave sins unpunished.

Hopefully, the teaching of divine providence inspires a fear of God’s judgment, originating from the unbeliever’s respect for the divine law. If it is accompanied by a decrease of lust, this fear proves to be driven by a certain degree of love for God. The person has made the first step towards true piety. At this point he is ready to receive the sacrament of baptism. In the waters of baptism he is regenerated unto the life of the new man, dedicated to God’s commandments. At this point, the newborn believer is taught the difference between the old and the new man through “the most excellent and singular example of the Lordly Man..., who, when he showed with numerous miracles the great power that he exercised over things, spurned those things which the ignorant consider great goods and endured those things which they consider great evils.”

The example of Christ teaches the newborn believer how to live a life dedicated to God, rather than to the greed for temporal goods. By appropriating the teachings of Christ, the new man overcomes the desire for bodily pleasure.

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200 For the ideal of perfection in this life, see also s. dom. m. 1,2,9, CCL 35,6: “Et haec est lax quae datur in terra hominibus bonae voluntatis, haec uta consummati perfectique sapientis.”

211 diu. qu. 36,1, CCL 44A,55: “Inest homini ratio, quae cum seruit cupiditati perversione miserabilis, ut homines non timeantur, suggerit latere posse commissa…”

212 diu. qu. 36,1, CCL 44A,55: “Ut autem timeatur deus, diuina prouidentia regi uniuersa persuadendum est non tam rationibus, quas qui potest inire potest iam et pulchritudinem sentire iurtitis, quam exemplis uel recentibus, si qua occurring, uel de historia, et ea maxime quae ipsa diuina prouidentia procurante siue in ueteri siue in novo testamento excellentissimam auctoritatem religionis accepit. Simul autem agendum est et de poenis peccatorum et de praemiss recte factorum” (translation: WSA 1/12, 52).

221 diu. qu. 36,1, CCL 44A,55: “… huius [cupiditas] minuendae iniitum est deum timere, qui solus timeri sine amore non potest.”

222 diu. qu. 36,2.
When the Christian has reached this level of self-control, this does not mean that his love of God is not longer accompanied by fear. He is namely still in danger of destroying his virtues by displaying them to others in order to gain their praise. Therefore, Augustine advises, Christians who have progressed on the ladder of virtue, still need the salutary warning of the Lord’s judgment over hypocrites. They need to grow further in their love of God by spurning the praise of men. If this desire for praise has been conquered, there is one final danger left, the sin of pride. This is the last sin, through which all other virtues can be lost.225 “For it is difficult for a person who no longer wishes to please other human beings and who thinks himself full of virtue to deem himself worthy to associate with them.”226 Therefore, even the most perfected Christian needs to fear the possibility that “even that which he seems to possess is taken away from him and that he, with hands and feet tied, is cast into the outer darkness.”227 Boasting in oneself over against others, pretending to be the source of one’s own virtue, thus results in the loss of all virtue and makes one liable to eternal damnation. As a Christian remains vulnerable to the sin of pride, his love of God needs to be accompanied by a fear of divine judgment over this sin until the end of his life in the body. This fear of divine judgment keeps purifying the love of God. This leads Augustine to the conclusion that the fear of God both stands at the beginning of the Christian life, and accompanies the Christian until the end: “This is why the fear of God not only begins but also completes wisdom – that is, in him who loves God most of all and loves his neighbour as himself.”228 The fear of the Lord starts with the fear of temporal punishment for disobedience to the divine law and progresses to the fear of sin itself, the fear of losing God whom the Christian strives to attain through a life of virtue.

3.5 Augustine’s forced ordination229

Before we proceed to the conclusion of this chapter, I need to make a few remarks about Augustine’s ordination. It is well known that Augustine was forced to become a presbyter and to leave the life of philosophical leisure, which he had regarded as the best way to be healed from the desires for temporal comfort and to find rest in God alone. He knew that there were church officials whom God had granted to exercise their office without longing for temporal gain. Although they worked among people who were still full of vices, they themselves preserved the best way of life and had a peaceful and tranquil mind.230 However, Augustine also knew of Church officials who were driven by a desire for honor and a love of engagement in a busy or ‘important’ life.231 The life of action in the world (negotium) seduced them into allowing their tranquility of mind to be disturbed.

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225 Cf. *en. Ps.* 18,1,14.
226 *diu. qu.* 36,4, CCL 44A,57: “Difficile est enim ut dignetur consociari hominibus qui eis placere iam non desiderat et plenum se uirtutis putat.”
227 *diu. qu.* 36,4, CCL 44A,57: “Itaque adhuc necessarius est timor, ne illud etiam quod uidetur habere auferatur ab eo, et manibus ac pedibus ligatis mittatur in tenebras exteriores.”
228 *diu. qu.* 36,4, CCL 44A,57-58: “Quapropter dei timor non solum inchoat, sed etiam perficit sapientiam, id est in illo qui summe diligat deum et proximum tamquam se ipsum” (translation: WSA 1/12, 54).
229 In *ep.* 173,1 Augustine compares the coercion exerted on the Donatist bishop Donatus (the addressee of the letter) to the forced ordination of bishops in general. The bishop is taken captive and during his captivity the will arises in him to accept his office. Similarly, Donatus was forced to join the Catholic Church. The violent restraint of his resistance to the Roman army facilitated the (possible) regeneration of his will.
230 *mor.* 1,69; *ep.* 10,2.
231 *ep.* 10,2.
This is what Augustine wanted to avoid for himself. He regarded the isolated life of carefree leisure (otium) as the best way to free his mind from worldly loves, to strengthen himself in the love for God, and acquire tranquility in the face of death (deificari in otio). Yet, this was not a purely individualistic project. Augustine lived in a monastic community, and served his brothers in that context. Moreover, he wanted to serve the Church as a Christian intellectual, which is already clear from De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos, written for ordinary Catholics. But the best way to be of use for human society, Augustine argues, is by withdrawing oneself “from the tumult of perishable things” (tumultum rerum labentium), without having to bear secular responsibilities. Augustine wanted to serve Church and society as a withdrawn intellectual, surrounded by likeminded friends.

Augustine knew, however, that his fame had made him a likely candidate for the priesthood. As he wanted to preserve his way of life at Thagaste, he avoided visiting churches with vacant bishoprics, but he misjudged the situation of Hippo Regius (which already had a bishop). Bishop Valerius strategically asked his congregation to look out for a helper, and they immediately forced Augustine to take this position. Augustine was shocked and cried. Some of the parishioners thought that he did so because he had hoped for a higher position. They consoled him, saying that his priesthood was at least a step toward the bishopric. Augustine, however, would later contend that he grieved “at the many great dangers which the government and administration of the Church would bring upon him.”

Epistula 21 reveals how Augustine interpreted his forced ordination theologically, acknowledging it as a chastisement by which God had made him aware of the state of his own heart. In this letter he observes that ecclesiastical offices are much desired for self-serving purposes. Exactly because he wanted to avoid this danger, Augustine had preferred his life of leisure to an ecclesiastical position. However, from his place “on the shore” he had come to perceive himself as morally superior to his colleagues in the Church. He had come to believe that avoiding the dangers of the sea, by taking refuge in the harbor of philosophy, had rendered him superior to the sailors on the sea.

232 ep. 10,2. For the expression ‘deificari in otio’, see Roland J. Teske, “Augustine’s Epistula X: Another Look at ‘Deificari in otio’”, in: Idem, Augustine of Hippo: Philosopher, Exegete and Theologian. A Second Collection of Essays (Marquette Studies in Philosophy 66; Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2009), 97-110. Roland Teske argues over against George Folliet (who interpreted the sentence as an expression of Porphyrian, anti-corporeal self-deification) that this phrase should be interpreted in a Christian way. He takes his argument from Augustine’s broader use of deificare and from the contemporary uera rel. 65. According to Teske, deificari in otio means that God frees the human mind from the fear of death through a life of otium, in which the Christian transfers his love for the temporal towards God. In uera rel. 65 Augustine describes this process as ‘receiving the power to become children of God’ (Jn. 1:12) and ‘subjecting oneself to the yoke of Christ’ (Mt. 11:29). Such a child of God is no longer subject to temporal creation (fearing its loss), but subjects it to himself and is totally free of any fear of being separated from it. This person has gained the freedom to love God and the neighbor with all his heart and mind.

233 Alexander, Augustine’s Early Theology of the Church, 332. See also Possidius, Vita Augustini, 3 on Augustine’s orientation on the Church as serus dei: “The truths which God revealed to his mind through meditation and prayer he communicated to present and absent alike, instructing them in sermons and books.” For further discussion on Augustine’s positive connection to the Church during his time in Thagaste, see G. Madee, “Augustin prêtre. Quelques notes pour la célébration d’un 16e centenaire 391-1991”, in: Louis Holtz e.a., De Tertullien aux Mozarabes. Antiquité tardive et Christianisme ancien (IIIe-Vie siècles). Mélanges offerts à Jacques Fontaine (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 132; Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1992), 185-99 (186-7).

234 ep. 10,2.

he had come to learn that his freedom from the cares of the world had been based upon the avoidance of temptation rather than upon inner moral strength. His life of leisure had deceived him about the moral state of his soul. He had been criticizing his colleagues from the mountain of vainglory.\footnote{Augustine’s use of sea imagery in this letter recalls the context of \textit{De beata uita} 1-4 where Augustine also warns for the danger of criticising the sailors on the sea out of a misguided judgment about the inner state of one’s own soul.}

Augustine interprets his forced ordination as God’s punishment for this pride (\textit{uis mihi facta est merito peccatorum meorum}). “I think that my Lord wanted to correct me in that way, precisely because I dared, as if I were more learned and better, to reprimand the mistakes of many sailors before I had experienced what is involved in their work.”\footnote{ep. 21,2, CSEL 34, 1,50: “Arbitror Dominum meum propterea me sic emendare uoluisse, quod multorum peccata nautarum, antequam expertus essem, quid illic agitur, quasi doctior et melior reprehenderem audebam” (translation: WSA 2/1, 55).} Only when he was himself “thrown in the midst of the sea” (cf. the maritime imagery of \textit{De beata uita}), did he come to know the heedlessness of his critique. He had always known the difficulties of the ecclesiastical office (especially the difficulty of living piously among iniquitous men),\footnote{mor. 1,69.} but nevertheless his life of leisure had seduced him into thinking that he was better skilled than those who actually held such a position. But when he was ordained and had to be a “helmsman” himself, he felt how little skilled he actually was. “I have experienced this [the difficulty of his task] much more extensively than I thought, not because I saw some new waves or storms about which I previously had not known, heard, read or thought. Rather, I had not at all known my own skill and strength for avoiding or enduring them, and I thought them [my skills] to be of some value. The Lord, however, laughed at me and chose to reveal me to myself by this experience.”\footnote{ep. 21,2, CSEL 34, 1,51: “Sed multo valde ac multo amplius expertus essem, quam illic agitur, quasi doctior et melior reprehenderem audebam” (translation: WSA 2/1, 55).} These words do no just refer to the moment of Augustine’s ordination (when he actually shed tears, because of the burden that was laid upon him), but especially to the time thereafter, when he came to experience the burden of his task.\footnote{Augustine refers here to what he elsewhere calls the \textit{sarcina} of his office. See Maurice Jourjon, “Sarcina. Une mot cher a l’évèque d’Hippone”, \textit{Recherches de science religieuse} 43/2 (1955), 258-62; George Lawless, “Augustine’s burden of ministry”, \textit{Angelicum} 61 (1984), 295-315.} This time of suffering under this burden (maybe already a few years), finally led to his request for a period of sabbatical in \textit{Epistula} 21. Augustine reveals to Valerius that upon his ordination, he had tried to equip himself for his task as well as possible. He had used all of his scarce free time to seek counsel in the Scriptures, but this had proved inadequate. These experiences eventually compelled Augustine to admit that he needed a time of spiritual therapy through Scriptural mediation and prayer. His problem was not so much that he lacked sufficient knowledge of the doctrine of the Church, but that he was in want of the skills to administer the truth to others, so that it might serve their salvation. Augustine felt the need to study “the medicines of [God’s] Scriptures” (\textit{scripturarum eius medicamenta}) and to pray to God in order to be...
inwardly strengthened by them for his ministry. So he asks Valerius for a time of sabbatical to study the Scriptures and to pray to God.

In order to convince Valerius of the urgency of his request, Augustine refers to the day of judgment, when he will have to give an account to Christ about his care for the Church. He will not be able to excuse himself by saying that he was too much engrossed in the affairs of the Church and therefore could not take recourse to the medicaments of Scripture. Christ will judge him a wicked servant, as the spiritual care for his flock needs priority over the care for temporal concerns. By appealing to Christ’s coming judgment over him, Augustine puts the recently discovered problem of his soul into an eternal perspective. Through his forced ordination and the weight of his task, God has not just made him aware of the spiritual deficiencies of his soul, but also of its damnable state. It is his fear of Christ’s future judgment over his office bearers that makes Augustine’s need for spiritual healing even more pressing. He has to give an account to Christ for how he has acquitted himself of the task his master has given him, and he will not be allowed to excuse himself for his failings if he has refused to make use of the medicaments his master himself provided him.

This is why Augustine beseeches Valerius “by the goodness and severity of Christ”. Christ makes Augustine aware of his shortcomings and his future judgment over Augustine’s care for the Church. This is his severity. This severity aims, however, to compel Augustine to seek the cure for his soul in the soothing medicines of Scripture. This is Christ’s goodness. Along this way, accompanied by the prayers of Valerius, Augustine writes with confidence, “He will give me back to you, perhaps, within a period shorter than I have craved, thoroughly furnished for His service by the profitable counsels of his Scriptures.”

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we followed the thought of Augustine from the time after his baptism until his forced ordination in 391. In this conclusion I will sum up and connect the most important findings of this chapter on the question: what is the soteriological function of God’s judgment of sin?

3.6.1 The pedagogical function of the punishment of the first sin

In the writings that Augustine produced during his time in Rome and Thagaste, he begins to discuss God’s judgment of sin in the context of the fall and its consequences. The theme of divine pedagogy through the fear or suffering of punishment becomes embedded in the biblical story of creation, fall, and redemption. In his polemics with the Manichees, Augustine stresses that humanity’s entanglement in habit and its liability to death are not to be explained as the consequences of the divine soul’s

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241 Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere, 135; Allen D. Fitzgerald (“When Augustine Was Priest,” Augustinian Studies 40/1 (2009), 44) argues that it was especially the turmoil caused by Donatism in Hippo that made his presbyteral responsibilities so burdensome.

242 ep. 21 does not imply that Augustine asked Valerius for a time of study before he was ordained, as is often assumed. He already seems to have experienced the hardships of being a priest (‘living among iniquitous men’) and now requests study time from Valerius in order to cope better with the difficulties of his office. Cf. V.H. Drecoll, “Augustins Bittschreiben an Valerius (Ep. 21)”, Augustiniana 56 (2006), 223-33 (232-3).

243 ep. 21,5, CSEL 34,1,52: “Quid enim responsurus sum Domino iudici: Non poteram ista iam quaerere, cum ecclesiastici negotiis impediri?”

244 ep. 21,6, CSEL 34,1,54: “Fortassis breviore tempore quam postulaui, me saluberrimis consiliisde Scripturis suis reddet instructum.”
entrapment in matter, but rather as punishments for the first sin (and for subsequent sins). In line with other Church Fathers, Augustine opposes Manichaean dualism as a form of self-justification. Manichees exculpate their own souls by declaring them equal to their highest god, and accuse the true God, the maker of bodies, of being the source of their soul’s miserable situation. Augustine argues that the true danger of Manichaean dualism lies in its making the soul deaf to the message of divine punishment.245

In opposition to the Manichaean explanation of suffering, Augustine stresses that man’s suffering is the effect of his Edenic fall, which was a free choice to leave his middle-state between God and corporeal creation, in order to establish his own beatitude through bodily action. Though he was created to merit eternal beatitude by remaining in a state of contemplation, he nonetheless opted to leave the inner light of truth and started to search for truth in the world of time and change. In response, God punishment man for the transgression of his law. Rather than ruling over the animal soul and the physical body, these started to dominate him and denied him from being nourished by the intelligible delights for which his soul was created.

In line with other anti-dualist theologians such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, Augustine stresses that man’s exclusion from paradise had a pedagogical purpose. Through suffering, man should experience his soul’s alienation from God and be admonished to return. Augustine depicts bodily creation as a law that accuses man, commanding him to mortify the desires of the flesh, in order to regain his position of dominion over the body. Augustine also observes that these external admonitions do not suffice to return man to paradise. The fear of death can at most have a deterring effect (cf. Gn. adu. Man. 2,42), but it does not heal man inwardly, entangled as he is in malicious habits. He needs the illumination of an inward teacher and the love of the Holy Spirit to be converted and purified. Augustine does not yet explicitly address the question of to what extent human free will is engaged in this process. On the basis of De libero arbitrio 1 and his general expectations of ascent, it seems likely that Augustine regards the desire to be saved as arising from the human will. In this regard he clearly echoes the traditional anti-Manichaean concern for the freedom of the will in the process of divine paideia.

### 3.6.2 The function and form of divine judgment in salvation history

The pedagogical function of punishment reoccurs in Augustine’s concept of salvation history. He develops two themes that he had already addressed in the Cassiciacum Dialogues: accommodation and coercion. Christ accommodated himself to humans by assuming a mortal body and performing miracles to catch the attention of carnal people, in order to lead them upwards to spiritual realities. That this accommodation could assume the form of coercion became clear from Augustine’s own pedagogical practice: the threat of temporal punishment (through the recording of mistakes) restrained the evil inclinations of his pupils.

245 Although the Manichees did exercise a rite of confession, it was rather a means to return to the self, than a way of confessing guilt to a personal God. Cf. H.C. Puech, Sur le Manichéisme et autres essays (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1979), 169-78, esp. 178: “[Les gnostiques] assimilaient… la métanoia, la ‘repentance’ à une épistrophè, […] une ‘conversion’, d’ordre plus intellectuel que moral, et la concevaient de même à la manière d’un retour sur soi et à soi provoqué, chez qui parvient à se connaître, par le ‘ressouvenir’ de son origine, de sa ‘dignité’, de ses facultés naturelles, et qui, le remenant au bien et ‘lui-même, c’est-à-dire à sa condition de pur noûs, de pur ‘esprit’, établit ‘nécessairement’ entre lui et le mal une ‘séparation.”
Augustine comes to use these categories to explain the difference between the Old and the New Testament. Against the Manichees, he emphasizes that the Testaments are two forms of one divine project of human instruction. In both the Old and New Testament, God aimed at the same goal: the cure of the soul from its ‘irrational love’. The Testaments differ, however, in the way God administers his discipline. As a good doctor he adapts his art of healing to the different diseases of the soul. In the Old Testament, the time in which God’s people were still carnal, God binds his people to himself through a temporal Law with earthly threats and promises. Obedience is rewarded with earthly blessing, disobedience with temporal punishment. Thus he domesticated ‘the old man’ in the people of Israel, coercing them to a certain degree of obedience through fear of punishment. However, this coercion did not free them from their real malady, the desire to sin. The great breakthrough comes via Christ, who is able to set man free from slavery to the senses. Because of this liberating power, he does not coerce them to obedience, but rather can teach them through the example of his life and death. Augustine applies this distinction between the Old and the New Testament also to the life of the individual believer. The transition from the Old to the New Testament signifies what happens in every conversion. If one intends to foster conversion in one’s neighbor, one should seek to inspire first with the fear of God and then with the love of God. A person should be convinced that God punishes sins and develop a carnal fear of God, in order to grow towards a chaste fear (the fear of sinning itself). It is this chaste fear that motivates the new man to mortify his evil desires. He uses his reverence for God’s justice to promote his growth in virtue. With regard to man’s use of the moral law after conversion, we observed that Augustine still works within the paradigm of ascent, in which the Christian soul uses the law to purify itself gradually from the stains of sin.

In this context we tested the hypothesis of Brown and Cranz that coercion through temporal punishment no longer applies in the time of the New Testament, because of the Church’s spiritual ascent through time. I concluded that Augustine indeed characterizes the Old Testament as the time of fear, and the New Testament as the dispensation of love, but that this distinction is not absolute. In both dispensations the Church is a mixed body, consisting of spiritual and carnal people. They continue to stand in need of correction, which is to be adapted to their differing diseases. These observations justify the conclusion that Augustine’s early thought allows room for the idea that God uses corporeal punishment in the service of Church discipline. Just as God inflicts temporal punishments for the healing of sin through his general providence, there is room in Augustine’s thought for the belief that God also makes use of temporal rulers in the service of Church discipline. In this period of his career, however, this is not yet an issue for Augustine, although he does argue in De libero arbitrio that temporal rulers should mould their temporal laws to the eternal law. This Platonic concept could easily be applied in a Christian context in favor of state support of the Christian religion.

3.6.3 Augustine’s personal experience of divine discipline

The final section of this chapter addressed Augustine’s own experience of punishment, when he was ordained a priest against his will. At Cassiciacum we witnessed him being punished in the process of ascent, because he had misjudged the ability of his own soul to contemplate God. Something similar returns in the context of his forced ordination. Again Augustine’s pride is the problem. He had allowed himself to believe that he was more advanced in virtue than the ecclesiastical office bearers whom he
saw struggling with their task of congregational leadership. Through his forced ordination, however, Augustine is confronted with the real state of his soul, as his responsibilities force him to acknowledge his own difficulties in serving the ordinary believers who composed Valerius’ congregation. Through the force of his ecclesiastical responsibilities, God shows Augustine the remaining illness of his soul, thus compelling him to abandon his pride and seek healing in the ‘medicines of Scripture’.
4 Reappropriating Paul and exercising discipline: Augustine during his presbyterate (391-397)

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter we will follow Augustine’s thought on the redemptive meaning of God’s judgment during the period of his priesthood. His thought on this subject developed under the influence of both his ongoing engagement with the text of the Bible, especially with Paul,\(^1\) the polemical challenges that Manichaeism and Donatism posed to him,\(^2\) and the pastoral problems that arose in his congregation and religious community.

After a short note on Augustine’s reappropriation of Paul in this period, the first main section of this chapter addresses Augustine’s understanding of the penal consequences of the first sin in his controversy with Manichaeism. Augustine continues his preceding thought on this matter. He emphasizes the detrimental consequences of sin for both soul and body, but upholds the freedom of will in the process of salvation. His ongoing engagement with Paul finally leads him to deny that sin has left man any freedom to turn to God. Humanity is a massa peccati, bounded to the penalty of eternal death, unless God graciously intervenes.

The second section of this chapter addresses Augustine’s understanding of the law in its relation to grace. It first describes Augustine’s understanding of the soteriological function of the law of nature. Then it addresses Augustine’s developing understanding of the Old Testament Law. It argues that Augustine’s understanding of the function of the Law changes in connection with his doctrine of grace. From a pedagogue who prepares his pupils for the Teacher, it becomes the pedagogue who prepares his pupils for the Mediator of righteousness. This changing function of the law is connected to a development in Augustine’s understanding of the work of Christ. Augustine comes to understand Christ’s death on the cross as a representative bearing of the punishment of sin, which liberates those who believe in him from the curse of the Law. A final section addresses the question of what these changes imply for Augustine’s understanding of the function of divine judgment in the life under grace.

The third section addresses Augustine’s developing understanding of Church discipline. The first subsection addresses Augustine’s thought on fraternal correction. The second focuses on the disciplinary regime in Augustine’s religious community, as attested in the rule that he wrote around 397. The third subsection takes up the question that was posed in the previous chapter, concerning the use of corporeal punishment in the time of the New Testament. We observed that Augustine would not reject coercion by force on the basis of a moral progress inherent to the Church itself. Rejection of the use of political means of Church discipline is solely based upon the fact that the Church finds itself in the salvation-historical situation of living between the temporal, sacramental kingdom of Israel and the

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\(^1\) Frederiksen, *Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul*, 80.
\(^2\) Lancel, *St. Augustine*, 150: “The Manicheans prospered at Hippo under Fortunatus.” On Augustine’s experience with Donatism in Hippo during the time of this priesthood, see Alan Fitzgerald, “When Augustine was Priest”, 37–48. The most important sources that testify to Augustine’s engagement with the Donatists during this period are *Epistula 23*, *Enarratio in Psalmum 10* and *Psalmus contra Partem Donati*.
eternal kingdom of Christ. This subsection seeks to identify to what extent Augustine, in this period of his career, reflects upon the question of whether there is room for an alliance between Church and state in the *saeculum*. The final part of this section addresses Augustine’s own disciplinary activity as a presbyter in his congregation.

### 4.2 Augustine the presbyter and Manicheaism: reclaiming Paul

As a presbyter, Augustine continued his polemics with his former co-religionists. The distinctive feature of his anti-Manichaean polemic as a presbyter was its increasingly Pauline character. As Décret has pointed out, the Manichees amply, though not exclusively, used the letters of Paul to support their substantialist view of evil, and their negative view of the Old Testament. They interpreted the Pauline battle between the flesh and the spirit (*Gal. 5:19*) dualistically as a war between two ontological principles. Further, they identified the law of sin and death, of which Paul speaks in *Romans* 7, with the Law of Moses, through which the power of darkness tried to hold fallen souls bound to their bodies. In order to hold them in captivity to himself, the prince of darkness invented the material observances of the Old Testament, and imposed them on the Jewish people. Christ set his people free from the dominion of this Law by revealing to them that they presently suffer under the onslaught of the contrary nature, and teaching them to separate themselves from their attachment to the body and to live according to their ‘good soul’ (*anima bona*). For the Manichees, the Law of Moses stands in the service of evil, because it comes from the devil himself and can therefore never exercise a positive function in the history of redemption.

In an ecclesial context, in which the Bible was the decisive source of authority, Augustine had to reclaim Paul from the Manichees in order to defend Catholic doctrine in a credible way. This is what we see him doing in his polemic with Fortunatus and in his commentaries on *Romans* (including *Ad Simplicianum*) and *Galatians*. He tries to interpret Paul’s discourse on the battle between flesh and spirit in a non-dualist way, and he seeks to relate the Old Testament Law in a positive way to the work of Christ. Christ is the one who both brought the reality of the shadows of the Law, and bore the curse of the Law on the cross. The liberation that Christ brings is not so much a liberation from, but rather a fulfillment of the law.

In the following sections I will address Augustine’s anti-Manichaean interpretation of Paul concerning the relationship between compulsion and free will (4.3), and with regard to the relationship between the Old Testament Law and Christ (4.4). With regard to the first issue, I will argue that

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3 This does not mean that Augustine had not read Paul before his ordination. Already as a Manichaean auditor he had read him and Paul had been of decisive importance for his conversion. Augustine’s literary activity right after his conversion already shows a thorough engagement with Paul’s writings. His rereading of Paul in the 390s, however, led to a deepening of Pauline influence on his thought, especially with regard to themes such as sin and grace.


5 M.G. Mara, “Agostino e la polemica antimanichea: il ruolo di Paolo e del suo epistolario”, *Augustinianum* 32/1 (1992), 119-44; Frederiksen, *Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul*, 105; BeDuhn, *Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma*, vol. 2, 192-238; Bochet, *Le firmament de l’Écriture*, 206; Drecoll, *Entstehung*, 146, 198 who contends on the basis of particular characteristics of Augustine’s exegesis of *Romans* and *Galatians* (especially his appeal to free will and the positive function of the law) that his turn to Paul was not an accidental by-product of his ordination, but caused by anti-Manichaean polemical concerns.
Augustine remains consistent with his earlier writings both with regard to the pervasive effects of the punishment of the first sin on humanity, and with regard to his understanding of the remaining freedom of the will. The absolute facilitas to know and to do the good was lost in Adam. After the fall, man acts under the penal effects of the first sin and his free choices are irreversibly determined by these effects. Nonetheless, Augustine argues, man remains a rational being, who still has the freedom to know and to will his moral obligations, but he lacks the power to fulfill them. This position, however, changes in Ad Simplicianum. With regard to the second issue (relationship between the Law and Christ), I will focus on Augustine’s interpretation of the law as a pedagogue to Christ.

4.3 The consequences of the first sin

4.3.1 The compulsive power of evil according to the Manichees

Before turning to Augustine’s anti-Manichean polemic on the punishment of the first sin, it is helpful to first describe more precisely the Manichaean account of evil to which Augustine responded. For this purpose I take my starting point in Fortunatus’s theodicy, as expounded in Contra Fortunatum. This dialogue offers the very own words of the Manichaean priest Fortunatus, who was highly influential in Hippo at the time of Augustine. In its account of the origin of evil in the world, Manichaeism contends for the innocence of God. According to the Manichees, the Catholic theodicy cannot avoid making God the author of sin. If one contends, as the Catholics do, that sin comes from a human being or an angel and that these creatures come from God as their maker, then God is in some sense responsible for sin. Manichaeism’s interest, then, is to defend the innocence of God with regard to evil. Evil cannot arise from God and therefore neither from souls that have originated from Him (ex eo sint), for this would imply that God produces evil things. Consequently, Manichaeism has to deny either the existence of evil, or the omnipotence of God. It does the latter. It argues that evil is an autonomous substance, associated with matter, which set out to attack God’s kingdom. In response, God had to defend himself against the rebellion of evil and did so by sacrificing a part of himself – his power (virtus) – to evil’s greed. This world was fashioned from this power’s mingling with evil. Human souls are to be seen as parts of God, which are enslaved to and corrupted by matter, and in need of a deliverer to purify them from error and to release them from the mingling with the evil substance.

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6 Karfikova, Grace and the Will according to Augustine, 63-5.
8 duab. an. 10, CSEL 25,1,63: “Hic fortasse quis dicat: unde ipsa peccata et omnino unde malum? Si ab homine, unde homo? Si ab angelo, unde angelus? Quos ex deo esse cum dictur, quamuis recte uereque dicantur, uidentur tamen inperitis et minus ualentibus intueri quasi per quandam catenam ad deum malae et peccata conecti.” Cf. c. Fort. 20; lib. arb. 1,2,4-5 (where Augustine himself states the question in this way).
9 c. Fort. 20.
10 Cf. c. Fort. 14, CSEL 25,1,91 where Fortunatus explicitly associates the contraria natura with the body: “Duae sunt substantiae in hoc mundo, quae speciebus et nominibus distant: quarum est una corporis, alia uero aeterna, patris omnipotentis quam esse credimus.”
11 c. Fort. 1, CSEL 25,1,83-84: “Dictis enim aliam nescio quam gentem tenebrarum aduersus dei regnum rebellasse; deum autem omnipotentem cum uideret, quanta labes et uastitas immineret regnis suis, nisi aliquid aduersae genti obponeret et ei resisteret, mississe hanc uirtutem, de cuius commixtione cum malo et tenebrarum gente mundus sit fabricatus; hinc esse, quod hic animae bonae laborant, seruunt, errant, corrupuntur, ut
According to Fortunatus, the principles of good and evil, darkness and light, penetrate the entire universe. Over against Augustine’s monist idea that the universe has been created good by the Triune God, Fortunatus argues that all the contrarities in the world suggest a dualist origin. He contends that the world as we now know it was brought into existence through a command (iussio) of the good God, but that this act itself was a reaction to the assault of the kingdom of darkness on the kingdom of light. This resulted in an intermingling of two opposing principles. Fortunatus states:

From the facts themselves it is evident that darkness and light are not at all alike, that the truth and a lie are not at all alike, that death and life are not at all alike, that soul and body are not at all alike... And our Lord was right to say: The tree that my heavenly father has not planted will be uprooted (Mt. 15:13), because it does not bear good fruit (Mt. 3:10), and there is also the tree that he has planted. Hence, it is very clear from the nature of things that there are two substances in this world, which differ in their appearances and names; one of these is that of the body, but the other is eternal, which we believe is the substance of the almighty Father.

The root of all evils (radix omnium malorum), Fortunatus argues, is therefore not a free choice of the will, as Augustine presumes, but the opposing nature (contraria natura), the tree that the Father has not planted. When the apostle Paul defines cupiditas as the root of all evils (1 Tim. 6:10), this should not be read as referring to a vice that only dwells in our hearts, but to the author of evil himself, whose influence extends throughout the whole world. The evil soul at work in us is only a branch of this large tree of evil.

Fortunatus considers his recourse to an active evil nature the best explanation for the evil that we do, because of the fact that we find ourselves doing it against our wills. Contrary to Augustine, who explains this phenomenon as the punishment of a voluntary sin, Fortunatus holds that “if the soul were situated in a body alone without any opposing nature, it would be without sin and would not
make itself subject to sin.”

Therefore, before the enlightenment by Christ the Saviour, who enables the divine soul to separate itself from the opposing nature, all evil that we do is done in us by the opposing nature. To substantiate his conviction from Scripture, Fortunatus appeals to three Pauline texts: Rom. 8:7 (prudentia carnis inimica sit Deo; legi enim Dei non est subiecta, nec enim potest), Gal. 5:17 (caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carmen. Ut non quaecumque uultis, illa faciatis), and Rom. 7:23 (uideo aliam legem in membris meis repugnandem legi mentis meae et captivum me ducentem in legem peccati et mortis). These texts show, according to Fortunatus, that the good soul does not sin of its own accord (sua sponte), but by the action of that power which is not subject to the law of God, the contraria natura.

4.3.2 Compulsion as punishment: the development of Augustine’s thought until 394

In his response to the Manichees, Augustine intends to reconcile human responsibility and the experience of compulsive willing. This subsection discusses how Augustine does this in De duabus animabus and Contra Fortunatum (the two earliest anti-Manichaean texts after his ordination to the priesthood) and passages from other works that Augustine composed after these tractates. We will see that the presence of Paul in Augustine’s thinking becomes more dominant. However, until Ad Simplicianum, this does not lead to substantial changes in his thinking in comparison to the period before his ordination.

Augustine takes his point of departure in the doctrine of creation. According to Augustine’s ontology, God has created everything out of nothing through his Word and Wisdom. However, not everything that has been created has the same level of being. Creation is hierarchically layered, from spiritual to material substances. These substances are all good in their own kind, but have different types of being. Within this hierarchy, the soul is the highest substance under God the Creator. From these presuppositions Augustine argues that the evil soul cannot be completely evil, because it possesses life, movement, and immortality, all of which it owes to God the Creator. Hence, the evil soul also must have been created by God, that is to say, insofar as it is a good substance, not insofar as it is evil. Here Augustine introduces the distinction between a substance and the corruption or defect that exists in a substance. The soul might be corrupted through vice, but nonetheless it remains more excellent than any material substance, like the light of the sun and the moon worshipped by the Manichees, because the soul belongs to the highest layer of created reality.

However, this distinction between substance and the defect in a substance, gives rise to the Manichaean question as to how this defect came to dwell in the soul. Augustine responds to this question by referring to the free choice of the will. The only way in which the soul can fall away from the knowledge of God and die is because it chooses this path on its own accord. Sin should therefore be defined as an act that is done without compulsion: “Sin… is the will to retain and follow after what...”

17 c. Fort. 20, CSEL 25,1,99: “Si sola uersatur anima in corpore constituta, cui deus, ut dicis, liberum arbitrium dedit, sine peccato esset nec peccatis se obnoxium facet.” (translation: WSA 1/19, 155).
18 c. Fort. 21.
19 For the use of these texts by Fortunatus, see further François Decret, “L’utilisation des épîtres de Paul chez les Manichéens d’Afrique”, in: Essais sur l’Église manichéenne, 86-8.
20 duab. an. 12-13; c. Fort. 16.
21 duab. an. 9.
22 duab. an. 4.
23 duab. an. 10.
justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain.” This explanation of sin as a free act of the will is indispensable for Augustine, as only in this way can the judicial relationship between God and the soul be upheld. If the soul’s alienation from God is not the result of the free choice of the will, but is in some sense compulsory, all religion crumbles to dust. This would imply that the soul cannot be held responsible for its deeds, that there is no ground for punishment, reward, or pardon, and that the repentance of sins is senseless. Moreover, it would imply that creation is ruled by change, rather than by divine providence, for in that case the destiny of souls is not dependent upon their merits, but on the uncertain outcome of the battle between good and evil. Augustine therefore regards Manichaeism as a form of fatalism. Over against Manichaeism Augustine argues that the relationship between God and man has a juridical character. God deals with man according to the merits of the human will. Man is obliged to nourish himself with spiritual things and rule over the sensible. He merits eternal life if he obeys this law, but will suffer the punishment of misery if he does not obey it. The disobedient soul becomes subject to the things over which it was set to rule.

But do humans still have the freedom to fulfill the divine law on their own strength? In his *Retractationes* (427) Augustine denies that he ever intended to imply this in *De duabus animabus*. He argues that when he said that sin is an uncompelled choice of the will, he was speaking of Adam and Eve in the situation before the fall. They were completely free to abstain from what justice forbids. They knew the good and had the willpower to act accordingly, but let themselves be persuaded by the devil to act against God’s commandment. After the first sin, the will acts under the compulsion of evil desire (cupiditas/concupiscencia). This means that it does not have the inherent ability to choose the good, either because it does not know the good, or because it does not have the strength to resist the evil desires that dominate it. Nonetheless, one cannot be said to sin without the will, as one consents to the evil desire with the will. Therefore, after the fall, the expression “sin is nowhere but in the will” still applies, although this sin is also the punishment of sin.

Does Augustine explain himself convincingly here? I think that he does. As we observed, Augustine took his point of departure in the doctrine of creation. In the first part of *De duabus animabus*, he discussed the human soul and its free will from the perspective of its originally created

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24 *duab. an.* 15, CSEL 25,1,70: “Ergo peccatum est voluntas retenendi vel consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere.”
25 *duab. an.* 17. Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 90; BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, volume 2, 117.
26 Cf. *uera rel.* 27.
27 *duab. an.* 17, CSEL 25,1,73: “Postremo ut nihil horum laudandorum habeant illae animae, quae illorum rationibus habere coguntur, quaeerem, utrum aliquas an nullas animas deus damnet: si nullas, nullum meritorum iudicium est, nulla prouidentia, et casu potius quam ratione mundus administratur uel potius non administratur; non enim administratio casibus danda est.”
29 *c. Fort.* 21, CSEL 25,1,100: “Ego dico peccatum non esse, si non propria voluntate peccatur; hinc esse et praemium, quia propria voluntate recta facimus. Aut si poenam meretur, qui peccat inuisus, debet et praemium mereri, qui bene facit inuisus. Quis autem, qui dubitet non deferri praemium nisi ei, qui aliquid bona voluntate fecerit? Ex quo intellegimus et poenam inferri ei, qui voluntate mala aliquid fecerit.” Cf. *lib. arb.* 1,30; *c. Fort.* 15 and *duab. an.* 10.
30 *c. Fort.* 15; *c. Fort.* 20; *Gn. litt. imp.* 1,3, CSEL 28,1,460.
31 *retr.* 1,15,4 (*duab. an.* 15).
32 *retr.* 1,15,3.
33 *retr.* 1,15,3.
34 *duab. an.* 14.
35 *retr.* 1,15,2-4.
integrity. In *de duabus animabus* 19, Augustine turns to the soul’s present experience of moral deliberation. In its present situation it suffers from the effects of the fall. Augustine observes that we, as we are presently constituted (*nunc constituti sumus*), can be affected by lust through the flesh and by virtue through the spirit. As a consequence, the soul experiences a fluctuation between good and evil choices. The soul experiences delight in the lust of the flesh (*illud libet*), whereas it knows that it should choose what is fitting (*hoc decet*). This fluctuation is not a struggle between two opposing principles, as the Manichees have it, but a conflict within the human will itself. It experiences internal division. Augustine explains this experience as an effect of the fall:

It has been made difficult for us to abstain from carnal things, whereas our truest bread is spiritual. For with great labor we now eat this bread. For neither without punishment for the sin of transgression have we been changed from immortal into mortal. So it happens, that when we strive after better things, and habits formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to militate against us and put obstacles in our way, some foolish persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another kind of soul which is not from God.

Against the Manichees, Augustine thus explains the experience of internal division and compulsion from the fall and its consequences. The human will now acts under the conditions of mortality, so that it feels attracted by the desires of the flesh, and develops carnal habits (*consuetudo facta cum carne*), which start to draw the will back when it wants to return to God. This description of the present condition of the human will agrees with Augustine’s explanation of his own words in the Retractationes. From the perspective of creation, the will was free to abstain from what justice forbids, but after the fall it only wills under the burden of mortality and thus becomes implicated in habit and comes to experience moral difficulty. As it is the same human being who sinned and presently acts under the penal consequences of this sin, he remains responsible for his actions. Augustine does not explicate in this passage to what extent man is able to cooperate in the process of overcoming *difficultas*. The preceding and following works suggest, however, that Augustine still regards the will as free to a certain extent to will its own salvation.

In *Contra Fortunatum* Augustine develops his understanding of compulsive willing in response to his interlocutor’s use of Pauline texts to support the theory of the opposing nature at work.

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36 *duab. an. 19*, CSEL 25,1,75: “*Ita enim nunc constituti sumus, ut et per carnem voluptate adfici et per spiritum honestate possimus.*” As observed in the previous chapter, Augustine perceives of the pre-lapsarian man as a soul that rules the body, and does not receive any impulses from the body.

37 *duab. an. 19*, CSEL 25,1,75: “*Nam mihi cum accidit, unum me sentio utrumque considerantem alterutrum eligentem; sed plerumque illud libet, hoc decet, quorum nos in medio positi fluctuamus.*”

38 *duab. an. 19*, CSEL 25,1,75: “*Cur non magis hoc signum est unius animae, quae libera illa voluntate huc et hoc ferri, hinc atque hinc referri potest?*” Augustine’s use of *libera uoluntas* in this context does not refer to the religious freedom of the will, but to its capability to move itself. Cf. *diu. qua. 40.*


40 Humanity’s present condition is “*voluntaria in causa*”. See *duab. an. 12*. I derive this term from R.J. O’Connell, “‘Involuntary sin’ in *de libero arbitrio*”, *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 37 (1991), 23-36 (29).
in us (Rom. 8:7; Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:23-25a). These texts clearly suggest that man somehow sins against his will. Augustine harmonizes this idea with human free will by differentiating between man before and after the fall: “I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was first formed. He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God. But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity (praecipitati in necessitatem).” In this sentence, Augustine limits absolute freedom of the will to the first man, and sees his offspring as acting under necessity. But what does Augustine mean by the word necessitas? Does he mean that humanity necessarily sins because of Adam’s sin; or does necessitas, as some scholars suggest, merely refer to the mortality of the body, which makes it difficult not to sin?

In the sentence that follows, Augustine confuses the reader even more. He appeals to everyday experience to illustrate that we have been plunged into the necessity by Adam’s sin: “Each of us can discover after a little reflection that what I say is true. For at present (hodie), before we become entangled in some habit, we have in our actions the free choice of doing or not doing something. But after we have done something with this freedom and the deadly sweetness and pleasure of the action has taken hold of the soul, the soul is so entangled in that same habit of its own making that afterwards it cannot conquer what it fashioned for itself by sinning.” Subsequently, Augustine refers to the Manichaean habit of swearing by the Paraclete. His interlocutor will experience that, if he decides to stop swearing, the “habit made with the flesh” (consuetudo facta cum carne) will start to oppose the good will. This habit is what Paul calls “the wisdom of the flesh that cannot be subject to the law of God” (Rom. 8:7), and the “flesh that lusts against the spirit” (Gal. 5:17). It is not a nature, but a disposition of the soul that is formed by repetitive sinful choices. Malcolm Alflatt has rightly asked how this appeal to our everyday experience of habit explains anything about the relationship between Adam’s sin and his progeny’s necessity to sin. Augustine’s use of the word hodie might provide a clue to the answer. By this word Augustine distinguishes our present situation from that of Adam. Just like him, before we become entangled in some habit, we have liberum arbitrium to choose between good and evil. But unlike him, Augustine suggests, doing something with this freedom inevitably

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41 According to Alflatt, “Development”, 131, Augustine is confronted here for the first time with a Pauline argument for Manichaean dualism. In the previous chapter we have seen that Augustine already addressed Rom. 7:25 in De Musica. In other words, Fortunatus’ appeal to this text did not come as a surprise. For an extensive treatment of the dialogue, see BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, vol. 2, 122-63.

42 c. Fort. 22, CSEL 125.1,103-04: “Liberum voluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est. Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino voluntati eius resistere, si uellet dei praecepta seruare. Postquam autem libera ipse voluntate peccauit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus” (translation: WSA 1/19, 157).

43 The first interpretation is defended by Alflatt, “Development”, 129. For the second interpretation, see Frederiksens, Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul, 78; Gross, Entstehungsgeschichte, 268. Necessitas does not need to refer to a necessity that is inherent to the will itself, but can also refer to something external that exercises influence upon the will, but does not have the power to move it. Cf. s. 112,8, RB 76,54: “Foris inueniatur necessitas, nascetur intus voluntas.”

44 c. Fort. 22, CSEL 125.1,104: “Potest autem unusquisque nostrum mediocri consideratione inuenire uerum esse, quod dico. Hodie namque in actionibus nostris antequam consuetudine aliqua inpecicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid uel non faciendi. Cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosa dulcedo et uoluptas, eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic implicatur, ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipso peccando fabricata est” (translation: WSA 1/19, 157).

leads to sinful acts and the consequent development of habit. Somehow, free will is so predisposed that it inevitably falls into sin and develops compulsive habits.

In the following part of the debate, Augustine confirms that he understands the human soul in its present situation as by nature enslaved to the passions of the flesh. He supports this conviction by using several quotations from Paul, which will later become the central texts of his doctrine of original sin. He argues against Fortunatus that sin and the habit of the soul (consuetudo animi) have their origin in a free choice of the will of a nature created by God (1 Tim. 4:4). This nature appears to be the first man. In him humanity was created good, but through his choice they were made sinners. Augustine quotes Paul: “Just as through the disobedience of the one many were made sinners, so through the obedience of the one many were made righteous (Rom. 5:19). For just as death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead also came through a man (1 Cor. 15:21). As long as we bear the image of the earthly man (1 Cor. 15:49), then, that is, as long as we live according to the flesh (Rom. 6:6), which is also called our old self, we experience the necessity of our habit so that we do not do what we will.” Augustine suggests in this passage that humanity not only dies physically because of Adam, but also inherits a carnal soul from him. By nature we bear the image of the earthly man and live according to the flesh. When Adam sinned, he spiritually became earth and was therefore destined to return to the earth (Gen. 3:19). Those who are born from him suffer under the same sentence: “We are born from him in this way [namely destined to die], because we are earth and we will return to the earth because of what the first man merited by his sin.”

Our being born mortal presupposes the fallen nature of the soul, inherited from Adam. When it comes to man’s return to God, Augustine only mentions the working of divine grace through which the soul is freed from the lex peccati and comes to serve righteousness. Augustine does not express himself on the extent to which human free will is engaged in this process.

Paula Frederiksen (Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul, 78) argues that Augustine’s idea of necessitas does not imply that we sin necessarily, but only that mortality has made it difficult for us to do the good. It is true that necessity does not imply here that we no longer enjoy free will, by which we choose to give in to the compulsion that the mortal body exercises upon the mind. The question, however, is whether Augustine thinks that this liberum arbitrium still has the power to resist sin and implication in habit. Although he asserts that we still possess the freedom to choose, he does not even consider the possibility that we can still make use of it by which we avoid implication in habit. Augustine writes:

“When we have done something with this freedom (fecerimus aliquid ista libertate) and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of the act itself has taken hold upon the mind (et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosa dulcedo et uoluptas), by its own habit the mind is so implicated that afterwards it cannot conquer what by sinning it has fashioned for itself (eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic implicatur, ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est)” (c. Fort. 22, CSEL 25,1,104).

However, we should not expect Augustine to be explicit here about the moral possibilities of free will, as he is only discussing the way in which habit is formed, not the extent to which it can be avoided.


c. Fort. 22, CSEL 25,1,105: “Sicuti per unius inobaudientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, sic et per unius dicto audientiam iusti constituantur multi [Rm. 5,19], quoniam per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum [1 Cor. 15,21]. Quamdiu ergo portamus imaginem terreni hominis, id est quamdiu secundum carnem uiuimus, qui uietus etiam homo nominatur, habemus necessitate consuetudinis nostrae, ut non quod volumus faciamus.”

c. Fort. 22, CSEL 125,1,106: “Ex ipso enim omnes sic nascimur, quia terra sumus, et in terram ibimus propter meritum peccati primi hominis.”

For Augustine’s use of the word terra for the fallen soul, see uera. rel. 23.
After *Contra Fortunatum*, Augustine continues to emphasize that we inherit a soul from Adam that drags man towards a life after the flesh. In *De Genesis ad litteram liber imperfectus* (393-94) Augustine repeats his definition of sin from *De duabus animabus*: “Sin is the evil consent of free will, when we move towards the things that justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain.”

But he limits this freedom to Adam before the fall and describes our sinning before the intervention of grace as natural and necessary: “Sins are called natural, which are necessarily committed before God has compassion [with us], after we have been plunged into this life by a sin of free choice.” This understanding of the punishment for the sin of Adam also becomes clear from Augustine’s use of Ephesians 2:3: “At one time, we also, by nature were children of wrath”. In *Contra Adimantum* 21 (394), Augustine applies this text to “the old life that we draw from Adam, so that what was voluntary in him, became natural in us.” We presently act with our free will, but this will is predisposed by a fallen nature, which necessarily subjects the will to the law of sin. In this way Augustine reconciles compulsion and responsibility in his incipient appropriation of Paul against the Manichees. In these texts he does not pronounce himself on the question of to what extent the will has any freedom of its own to turn to God.

4.3.3 *De libero arbitrio* (395/96)

In *De libero arbitrio* 3 Augustine systematizes his thought on human responsibility and the penal consequences of the first sin for Adam’s offspring. Although Augustine emphasizes the detrimental consequences of the first sin on human knowledge and action, he upholds the present freedom of the will to call for divine help as an argument against the Manichees to uphold human responsibility.

At the end of book 3 of *De libero arbitrio* Augustine asks in what state man was first created. If man was created wise, how could he be seduced to sin? And if he was created foolish, how is God not the creator of vices, as foolishness is the greatest vice? In response to these questions, Augustine argues that man was not created in a state of wisdom or folly, but rather in a middle state: he was not yet wise, but was able to acquire wisdom. Man’s goodness, Augustine argues against his opponents, consisted not so much in his possession of wisdom, but in his capacity to acquire it. He received reason so that he could understand God’s commandments, and the ability (posse) to act according to

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51 Gn. litt. inp. 1,3: “Nec esse peccatum nisi prauum liberae uoluntatis adsensum, cum inclinamur ad ea quae iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstiner.”

52 Gn. litt. inp. 1,3: “Dicit autem peccata naturalia, quae necesse est committi ante misericordiam dei, postquam in hanc utiam per peccatum liberi arbitrii lapsi sumus.”

53 c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,180: “Tali enim cruce uetus homo, id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit voluntarium, in nobis fieret naturale. quod ostendit apostolus dicens: fuitmus et nos alicuaq natura filii irae sicat et ceteri [Eph. 2,3].” Cf. C. Adim. 12, CSEL 25,1,141: “Primus homo de terra terrenus; secundus homo de caelo caelestis. Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Et quomodo induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius, qui de caelo est. Hoc autem dico, fratres, quia caro et sanguis regnum dei hereditate possidere non possunt neque corruptio incorruptionem hereditate possidebit [1 Cor. 15,39-50].”

54 On the dating of the work, see S. Harrison, *Augustine’s Way into the Will*, 16-21. Harrison remarks that although Augustine composed the work in different stages – “laicus coepi, presbyter terminau” (perseu. 12,30) – it is not clear how exactly the composition of the work took place. One should therefore be reluctant to regard *De libero arbitrio* as a book of three stages, which reflects a clear intellectual development. Augustine intended the work as a unitary composition. See footnote 106, ch. 3.

55 *Lib. arb.* 3,71.

56 Augustine adds that even if man was created with wisdom, it was still possible that he would choose against it, when confronted with an attractive enough alternative.
his knowledge. From that moment man was a morally responsible being. He has the obligation to listen to God and to obey him and can rightly be charged if he refuses to do so. By fulfilling this obligation man would merit the bestowal of wisdom, a fuller and eventually fulfilled union with God. But if he refused to fulfill what he was able and obliged to do, man would justly be punished with the loss of the goods he received. If he did not pay his debt to God by doing what he ought to do, he would pay the penalty for disobedience by suffering.

As Adam chose to listen to the suggestion of the devil in paradise and rebel against God’s commandment, he had to pay the debt owed to divine justice. He lost the knowledge of the truth and the power to act according to this knowledge, so that he would err against his will and act against his own interests. As Augustine has it in 3,52:

It is a perfectly just penalty for sin that man should forfeit what he would not put to good use when he could easily do so, if he were willing. That is to say, a man who fails to do what he knows is right, and a man who was unwilling to do what was right when he could, forfeits the power to do so when he wants to have it. These two punishments, ignorance and difficulty, are truly present in every soul that sins. Through ignorance, the soul is tainted with error; through difficulty, it suffers anguish. But to accept falsity for truth, so as to err unwillingly, and to be unable to refrain from lustful acts through the resistance of carnal habits, these are not of man’s nature as he originally existed, but are a punishment of man inflicted after his condemnation.

As a consequence of his pride, Adam lost the knowledge of the good and the power to act according to the divine law. Man thus has become divided against himself. He longs to know the truth and act accordingly, but as a punishment of his rebellion against God he has forfeited both of these goods.

This loss of the power to do the good and the knowledge of the good have become part and parcel of the souls of Adam’s descendents. Augustine notices this when he observes that people do moral wrongs out of ignorance (ignorantia), or out of an inability to do what they want to do (difficultas). For sins done out of ignorance, Augustine quotes 1 Tim. 1:13 and Ps. 25:7. For sins that arise from difficulty in acting according to one’s knowledge of the good, Augustin quotes Rm. 7:18-19 and Gal. 5:17, texts that we already encountered in Contra Fortunatum. These are moral wrongs,

57 lib. arb. 3,42. Augustine argues that a nature owes to God what it has received from him (this is implied in the sentence: nemo autem debet quod non acceptit).
58 lib. arb. 3,72; 3,74. In lib. arb. 3, 44 Augustine describes this reward as an increase of being (esse). If man uses his will rightly, he will increase in being, but if he refuses to do so, he decreases in being. This decrease of being is called corruptio or defectus. It is proper to the nature of non-rational beings, but in the case of man it is the result of a free choice of the will.
59 lib. arb. 3,44, CSEL 74,126: “Quia enim nemo superat leges omnipotentis creatoris, non sinitur anima non reddere debitum. Aut enim reddit bene utendo quod acceptit aut reddit amittendo quod uti noluit bene. Itaque si non reddit faciendo iustitiam, reddet patiendo miseriam, quia in utroque uerbum illud sonat hoc enim etiam modo dici potuit quod dictum est: si non reddet faciendo quod debet, reddet patiendo quod debet” (translation: FC 59,206).
60 lib. arb. 3,52.74.
62 lib. arb. 3,51, CSEL 74,131: “Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam improbanter et corrugenda iudicantur… sunt etiam necesitate facta improbanda, uti uult homo recte facere et non potest.”
but they cannot be counted as sins in the proper sense of the word, because we commit them against our wills. Neither can they be said to arise from our nature, for if that were the case, we would not disapprove of them (for moral evil is against nature). Augustine comes up with the solution that they are a punishment for the sin of Adam, in which we are implicated. “It remains, then, that this is a just punishment springing from man’s condemnation.”

The evil things that we do out of ignorance or difficulty are not so much sins in the proper sense of the word (committed by liberum arbitrium without compulsion), but the necessary effects of the first sin that was done voluntarily. We call them sins in the sense of ‘causa pro effectu’, just like we refer to a language with the word ‘tongue’ (lingua), indicating both the cause of the spoken word and its effect, the spoken word itself.

The punishment of sin receives the name of its cause. Augustine does not attempt to prove the logic of why it is just that Adam’s progeny is punished for his sin. The only answer he gives is that “equity would not allow Adam to beget offspring better than himself.” As we have observed in his previous writings, Augustine always accepted humanity’s solidarity with Adam. They sinned in Adam. Although he distinguishes Adam from his descendents, he understands humanity as a collective entity. This seems to me the reason why he so often refers to the sin of Adam and its consequences as respectively man’s sin and man’s condemnation. When Adam chose to listen to the devil’s suggestions, his offspring did so with him and justly inherited the punishments that he merited by his choice: mortality, ignorance of the good, and carnal concupiscence that impedes the will from bringing its knowledge of the good to action.

In several places, however, Augustine argues that God does not charge us for what we have become through the first sin, but for how we respond to our penal situation. If we come to the knowledge of our ignorance and difficulty, we have the duty to seek a way out of it through confession and prayer. In De libero arbitrio 3 Augustine explicitly emphasizes that God has left us the freedom to seek, ask and knock (Mt. 7:7). In response, God gives us aid. If we do not use this freedom, we are

64 lib. arb. 3,54.
66 See, lib. arb. 3,51-52. De libero arbitrio 3 distinguishes itself from other writings in that Augustine makes more effort to justify the assumption of our identity with Adam. O’Connell has argued that Augustine as a Neoplatonist assumes that our souls were somehow present in Adam’s soul. Consequently, when Adam fell, we fell in him, because we were part of his soul (R.J. O’Connell, “Involuntary sin”, 30). Although Augustine considers this possibility in his review of the different theories on the origin of the soul, he does not adopt the traducianist theory as his personal position. It seems to me that his major argument for our identity with Adam comes from his theodicy. If we commit moral wrongs against our will (out of ignorance and difficulty), these must be punishments, as all evil suffered is a punishment that comes from God. As God is just and almighty, this punishment must be God’s own and must be just. Therefore, it must be a punishment for a sin freely committed. This presupposes that we were once good and merited God’s punishment by sinning (3,51). Cf S. Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will. The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 128-9. It is therefore of secondary importance to Augustine how our souls relate to Adam’s soul. He reviews different theories on the origin of the soul, but does not make any definite choice between them. Cf. G. Madec, Dialogues philosophiques III. Bibliothèque augustiniennne 6. Troisième édition (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1976), note complémentaire 18, 582. Augustine himself also explicitly says that it is more important to know how the first man was created than to know how his offspring originated from him (lib. arb. 3, 71). Cf. Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 182.
rightfully condemned. Augustine even argues that if we never were wise, if ignorance and difficulty belonged to our natural state, we would still be accountable for our sins on the basis of the fact that we, at a certain age, are able to acknowledge our state of ignorance, are admonished to seek help by divine providence, and are able to respond to this admonition in faith. Augustine already suggested this idea in *De libero arbitrio* 1 and then goes on to restate it in the third book of this work.

### 4.3.4 The punishment of sin in Augustine’s Pauline commentaries

This subsection addresses Augustine’s treatment of the punishment of Adam’s sin and of our subsequent sins in his commentaries and comments upon Romans and Galatians. In these commentaries Augustine introduces his fourfold scheme of salvation-history and the order of salvation in the individual life. Whereas previously he had only used the sixfold division of history and the individual life, based on the days of creation, he now introduces a fourfold scheme, based on Paul’s theology of salvation history, in which there is a time before the law (*ante legem*), a time under the law (*sub lege*), a time under grace (*sub gratia*), and a time in peace (*in pace*). In the first stage we follow our carnal desires (*sequirur*); in the second phase, when we are confronted with the knowledge of the good, we are dragged by our desires (*trahimur*). Under grace, we are able to resist concupiscence (*non consentimur*). And in peace, after our resurrection, we no longer suffer from desires that oppose the law of God. This section addresses the question of how Augustine describes the punishment of sin in its activity before the law (*ante legem*).

As indicated before, when Augustine speaks of the punishment of the first sin, he connects corporeal death (*mors*) to the soul’s misdirected desire (*concupiscientia/desideria prava*). In Augustine’s commentaries on Romans and Galatians we see this interrelatedness recur in his interpretation of specific Pauline terms. For example when Augustine comments on the meaning of the term *lex peccati* (*Rom. 7:25*) he writes: “[Paul] namely calls the law of sin the mortal condition which comes from the transgression of Adam, through which we have become mortal. Because of this defect of the flesh, carnal desire disturbs us, and according to this he also says at another place: ‘We also

67 *lib. arb.* 3,53, CSEL 74,133: “Non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod neglegis quaerere quod ignoras, neque illud quod ulerat in membra non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contentis; ista tua propria pecatta sunt. Nulli enim homini ablata est scire utile quaerere quod inutiliter ignoratur, et humiliter confitendam esse ineccibilitatem, ut quaerenti et confiteni ille subueniat qui nec errat dum subuenit nec laborat.” *lib. arb.* 3,58, CSEL 74,137-38: “Nullo modo creatorem hinc esse culpandum, quandoquidem, etiamsi eas ipse misisset, quibus etiam in ipsa ignorantia et difficultate liberam voluntatem petendi et quaerendi et conandi non abstulit daturus petentibus demonstratus quae rentibus pulsantibus aperturus, omnino extra culpam essest. Hanc enim ignorantiam et difficultatem studiosis et benevolis eunxit ad coronam gloriae ualere praestaret, neglegentibus autem et peccata sua de infirmitate defendere uolentibus non ipsam ignorantiam difficultatemque pro criminis obiceret, sed, quia in eis potius permanere quam studio quaerendi atque descendi et humilitate confitendi atque orandi ad veritatem ac facilitatem pertenire soluerunt, inuto supplicio uindicaret.”

68 Augustine uses the example of a child, which is not guilty if the ignorance of language and the inability to speak when it is born, but becomes guilty if it refuses to learn.

69 On this scheme, see A.F.N. Lekkerkerker, *Römer 7 und Römer 9 bei Augustin* (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1942), 15-40; Drecoll, *Entstehung*, 147-64; Frederiksen, *Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul*, 129-73. Frederiksen (*Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul*, 127-27) points to the continuity between both schemes. They both reflect high expectations of man’s spiritual progress in this life, and presuppose a natural inclination of man to will the good. The fourfold scheme differs from the ascentional scheme in that it sees conversion more in terms of a radical transition from *non posse* to *posse*, rather than as a gradual process of spiritual purification.

were by nature sons of wrath like the others’ (Eph. 2:3).”

Augustine applies the same interpretation to Pauline terms such as corpus/caro peccati (Rom. 6:6; 8:3) and corpus huius mortis (Rom. 7:24). Both of these terms refer to man’s mortality and to the carnal desires that tempt the mind to serve the interests of the body.

However, the desires that arise from the mortal body should be distinguished from actual sin. Man sins by giving in to these desires. Through repeated acquiescence, the mind habituates itself to the desires of the body, so that it becomes enslaved to sinning. It develops the prudentia carnis that cannot be subject to the law of God. When Paul says that sin (peccatum) – in the sense of concupiscientia, the penal effect of the first sin – has come to rule (regnare) in our mortal bodies, he stresses that this rule has been realized through human consent to the desires of the flesh. Our soul bears mortal offspring, because it has married itself to the sinful passions of the body (Rom. 7:1-2). This does not mean that this process of habituation is avoidable, but rather that humanity bears responsibility for it. Habituation is a penal consequence of our own choices. We ourselves are responsible for the first sin and for the dominion of sin over us. Here we again encounter Augustine’s anti-Manichaean motif of rooting involuntary sinning in man’s own responsibility. Just as in De libero arbitrio, however, Augustine defends the notion that man retains the freedom to ask God for help when he becomes aware of his penal situation. In order to defend the justice of the distribution of divine grace,

71 exp. prop. Rm. 48, CSEL 84,20: “Legem autem peccati dicit ex transgressione Adae conditionem mortalem, qua mortales facti sumus. Ex hac enim labae carnis concupiscientia carnalis sollicitet et secundum hanc dicit alio loco: fuitus est nos naturaliter filii iaei sicut et ceteri [Eph. 2,3].” Cf. exp. prop. Rm. 13-18, CSEL 84,8: “Ista desideria de carnis mortalitae nascentur, quae trahimus ex primo peccato primit hominis, unde carnaliter nascimur.” exp. prop. Rm. 50, CSEL 84,23: “Quod autem ait: corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem utia est propter iustitiam [Rm. 8,10], corpus mortuum dictur mortale. Ex ipsius enim mortalitate indigentia rerum terrenarum sollicitat animam et quaedam desideria excitat.”

72 exp. prop. Rm. 48; diu. qu. 66,6 (caro peccati – Rom. 8,3); exp. prop. Rm. 32-34; exp. Gal. 22 (corpus peccati – Rom. 6,6).

73 exp. prop. Rm. 29; exp. prop. Rm. 13-18; 35; exp. Gal. 46.

74 exp. prop. Rm. 13-18; 36; 47; 52; exp. Gal. 46-48.


Augustine upholds the freedom of man to either put his faith in the liberator and to be enabled to fulfill the law through his grace, or to reject the way of faith and thus remain subject to condemnation. This freedom of the will continues to play a role in Augustine’s understanding of perseverance. It is the human person who must choose grace and keep choosing it.

Let us finally turn to Ad Simplicianum. Augustine’s view of the effects of the first sin in Ad Simplicianum is consistent with his preceding writings. It is often suggested that Augustine makes a major turn in this work. I am of the opinion that he merely draws conclusions from his earlier thinking. Although he uses new terms such as *peccatum originale* and *originalis reatus* to refer to the first sin, he expresses ideas that were already present in his earlier writings. Humanity shares the responsibility for the first sin and therefore owes a penal debt. Augustine writes:

All human beings – since, as the Apostle says, *all die in Adam* (1 Cor. 15:22), from whom the origin of the offense against God (*origo offensionis dei*) was brought to the whole human race – are a kind of single mass of sin owing a debt of punishment to the divine and loftiest justice, and whether [the punishment that is owed] be exacted or forgiven, there is no injustice.

When Augustine famously refers to humanity as a *massa peccati*, he means that this first sin is transmitted to all subsequent generations (*tradux peccati*), that they are therefore bound by an original guilt (*originalis reatus*), and that this guilt accounts for the fact that they suffer under *concupiscentia carnalis* and death as its punishment. Augustine had already made this clear in an earlier text, where he says: “From the fact then that nature sinned in paradise, we are formed by mortal generation by the same divine providence not in line with heaven but in line with the earth (that is, not in accordance with the spirit but in accordance with the flesh), and we have all been made one mass of clay, which is
a mass of sin. Since then by sinning we have lost merit and God’s mercy is far off, there is nothing else that sinners deserve than eternal damnation.”

What changes in this work is that Augustine starts to deny that election is based upon God’s foreknowledge of human faith. He still affirms the freedom of the will to choose for faith in *Ad Simplicianum* 1,1,14. He denies it, however, in the second part of the first book. Whereas he had formerly defended that the power to ‘seek, ask, and knock’ (Mt. 7:7) are in the power of the will, so that God’s grace is distributed according to the merit of faith, he now exclaims: “The free choice of the will counts for a great deal, to be sure. But what does it count for in those who have been sold under sin?” With no less rigor, however, Augustine upholds humanity’s culpability and God’s justice. Augustine continues to emphasize that human sin alone is the ground for condemnation. For instance, when Paul comes to speak about God’s wrath against the vessels of unbelief, Augustine emphasizes that this wrath is not directed against them as creatures, but as sinners. God created human beings good, and they made themselves into sinners. When *Romans* 9:13 reads that God hated Esau, this does not mean that God’s hatred is directed against Esau as such, for God hates nothing that he has made (Sap. 11:25). God only hated Esau’s sin. Likewise, when God is said to make (*facere*) vessels of reproach, this does not mean that God causes humans to sin, but rather that he exacts a righteous judgment over them. And when *Romans* 9:18 reads that God hardens whom he will, this does not mean that he makes people worse, but rather that he righteously refuses to show his mercy. God permitted Pharaoh to harden himself against God’s admonitions, in order to punish him on the basis of his own merits and thus to show his power as a judge of sinners.

What changes in *Ad Simplicianum* is that Augustine now denies that there are certain hidden merits by which some among the mass of perdition make themselves worthy of the reception of grace. God’s *misericordia* is no longer based upon the good will, but does itself call the good will into existence through a *uocatio congrua*, which works as *effectrix bonae uoluntatis*. All are equally incapable of turning to God, and nonetheless worthy of damnation, because they are fully responsible for their situation. That some receive justifying faith and not others is solely based upon God’s inscrutable decree. Augustine will therefore no longer appeal to the presence of our free will to ask for help in order to battle Manichaean fatalism. His thinking shows continuity, however, in his defense of the justice of God in his judgment over humanity. Man has made himself a sinner, but he now lacks all

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83 *diu. qu.* 68, CCL 44A,177: “*Ex quo ergo in paradiso natura nostra peccauit, ab eadem diuina prouidentia non secundum caelum sed secundum terram, id est non secundum spiritum sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una massa luti facti sumus, quod est massa peccati. cum ergo meritum peccando amiserimus, et misericordia dei remota nihil aliud peccantibus nisi aeterna damnatio debeatur.*”

84 *Simpl.* 1,2,21, CCL 44,53: “*Liberum uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato quid ualet?*”

85 *Simpl.* 1,2,18.

86 *Simpl.* 1,2,18.

87 *Simpl.* 1,2,15.

88 *Simpl.* 1,2,18; *diu. qu.* 68,4.


90 *Simpl.* 1,2,13. Cf. *Simpl.* 1,2,21: “Who can believe without being touched by some call, that is, by the evidence of things? Who has it in his power for his mind to be touched by such a manifestation as would move his will to faith? Who embraces in his heart something that does not attract him? Who has it in his power either to come into contact with what can attract him or to be attracted once he has come into contact? When, therefore, things attract us whereby we may advance towards God, this is inspired and furnished by the grace of God; it is not obtained by our own assent or effort or by the merits of our works, whether it be the assent of our will or our intense effort or our works aglow of charity, it is he who gives, he who bestows it” (translation: WSA 1/12, 205).
resources to take the initiative to return to God.\textsuperscript{91} Augustine himself confirms this change in his thinking in the \textit{Retractationes}, where he says that he battled for the free will of man, but that the grace of God conquered him.\textsuperscript{92}

\subsection*{4.3.5 Conclusion}
Over against the Manichaean theory that we sin by compulsion and therefore cannot be held responsible for our actions (prior to our enlightenment by Christ), Augustine argues that this compulsion is a just retribution for the sin of Adam. If we become implicated in sin, we cannot help ourselves to get out of this situation, but are still responsible for it, because it is not unrighteous that we suffer the state of punishment. The misdirection of our wills is our full responsibility. Thus, Augustine upholds the forensic character of the Christian religion, in which God deals with individuals according to the merits of their wills. An important development takes place, however, with regard to Augustine’s appeal to free will. He ceases to teach that God’s decision to save or condemn man is based upon any merit of the human will.

\section*{4.4 The function of the law in the process of salvation}
This section investigates how Augustine perceives of the function of the law in the process of salvation. First, I will pay attention to Augustine’s understanding of the law’s pedagogical function in the life of the individual (4.4.1). Second, I will address Augustine’s understanding of the law’s function in the history of salvation. This treatment is divided in two part. First, I will address the salvation-historical function of the law according to \textit{De utilitate credendi}, where Augustine explains Gal. 4:22-26 and 2 Cor. 3:6 (4.4.2). This is the first text in which Augustine gives an extensive explanation of the Pauline image of the law as pedagogue that leads to Christ. In this text, he still interprets this relationship within the framework of \textit{paideia}: The law leads to Christ the teacher. In the second section on the salvation-historical function of the law, I will investigate the change in Augustine’s thinking on the law as pedagogue to Christ from 394 onward (4.4.3).

\subsection*{4.4.1 The elenctic function of the law in the life of man}
In our penal situation, God introduces a law that teaches us the difference between good and evil. This law is intended to make its hearer suffer under his present condition, so that he is compelled to ask for help. Augustine distinguishes between the law of nature, and the moral law that was revealed in the form of the decalogue.

At several places, Augustine contends that all humans know the difference between good and evil by nature. As we already observed in \textit{De libero arbitrio}, he argues time and again that our

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{91} Cf. Drecoll, \textit{Entstehung}, 246-7 (contra Flasch’ \textit{Logik des Schreckens}): “Augustin opfert mit \textit{Simpl.} 1,2 nicht den Gedanken des \textit{liberum arbitrium}. Est is ihm vielmehr gerade ein zentrales Anliegen, (gegen die Manichäer gerichtet) am \textit{liberum arbitrium} festzuhalten, und zwar vor allem im Zusammenhang des Sündenverständniss. Wie in der Paulusauslegung vor \textit{Simpl.} 1,2 werden aber die Möglichkeiten des freien Willens im Hinblick auf die Erlösung stark eingeschränkt, in \textit{Simpl.} 1,2 gerade auch hinsichtlich des Glaubensbegriffes.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{retr.} 2,1,1. In \textit{perseu.} 52 Augustine characterizes the nature of his discovery more modestly. He says that when he started writing \textit{Ad Simplicianum} he came to see more plainly (\textit{plenius sapere coepit}) that God’s grace is not dependent upon our preceding merits.
\end{quote}
condition of ignorance and difficulty does not deprive us of the moral responsibility with which we were created. God still endows souls with the faculties by which they know that they have to acquire truth and should act according to it (naturale iudicium; facultas bene faciendi). In De sermone domini in monte he even says that there is no human being, however blinded by lust, who is incapable of using his intellect, and perceiving a little light of truth. This truth is the law of nature that God has written in the hearts of men (Rom. 2:14-16).

Augustine believes that among those people who were not blessed with God’s special revelation, philosophers such as Plato and Socrates have perceived the law of nature in the best possible way. They knew that creation pointed to its Creator, and that this Creator should be the sole object of worship. However, Augustine argues, only Christ could enable them to live according to what the law of nature commanded them to do. Without Christ, they possessed knowledge of the truth, but it could not lead them to right action. On the contrary, they tended to act contrary to what they knew to be true, as they continued to participate in the cult of demons, out of fear of rejection from the side of the people. This shows that true philosophy can lead man to the knowledge of the truth, but does not set him free from the dominion of the flesh. It should lead its practitioner to cry for help to the God of Christianity.

Augustine addresses the elenctic function of the decalogue in his reading of Romans 7. This revealed law basically exercises the same function as the law of the nature: it intends to make us experience our present situation as something that we suffer against our will, but from which we cannot redeem ourselves. Augustine argues that the law, when it is introduced in our lives, cannot lead us to life, but rather makes us conscious of the rule of sin over us. Augustine explains Rom. 7:9 (ego autem uiuebam aliquando sine lege, adueniente autem mandato peccatum reuiuixit, ego autem mortuus sum) as saying that Paul under the law once thought that he lived, namely before he got to know the law. But through the law, which says, “you shall not covet” (non concupisces), he came to know what sin is, namely concupiscence, the impulse he was always inclined to follow. This made him realize that he is in fact spiritually dead.

The awareness of sin, however, does not imply that man is able to conquer its dominion. When man hears the law of God and starts to delight in it, concupiscence begins to resist that delight with a much stronger counter-delight. Sin uses the commandment to give rise to all kinds of disobedient desires (Rom. 7:8). Without the grace of the liberator who strengthens the mind against these desires, man’s initial delight in the law of God is necessarily overcome by the much stronger.

93 lib. arb. 3,57.
94 s. dom. m. 2,32.
95 Augustine already argued this in uera rel. 1-6. He also makes this point in ep. 118.
96 exp. prop. Rm. 38, CSEL 84,17: “Quod autem ait: ego autem uiuebam aliquando sine lege [Rm. 7,9], intellegendum est, uiuer e mihi uidebar, quia ante mandatum latebat peccatum. Et quod ait: adueniente autem mandato peccatum reuiuixit, ego autem mortuus sum [Rm. 7,9sq.], intellegendum est, peccatum apparere coeptit, ego autem mortuum me esse cognoui.” Cf. Simpl. 1,1,4, where Augustine points out that the words peccatum reuiuixit mean that sin was once known as sin, namely by Adam who received God’s commandment. After him the knowledge of sin was lost, but when the law was re-introduced this knowledge was revived.
97 In this stage Augustine applies Rom. 7:22 (condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem) still to man sub lege, but will later contend that man sub lege cannot delight in the law of God in any way. He can have fear of punishment and therefore desire to do the law, but this is not a true delight in what the law requires. See F. van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23 in its Pauline Context”, Augustinian Studies 32/1 (2007), 89-114 (95ff); M.-F. Berrouard, “L’exegese augustinienne de Rom. 7,7-25 entre 396 et 418, avec des remarques sur les deux periodes de la crise pelagienne”, in Recherches Augustiniennes 16 (1981), 101-96.
delight in sinning. Hence, man is dragged towards transgression of the law against his will. Commenting on Rom. 7:8, Augustine writes:

As through the prohibition, concupiscence is increased, when the grace of the liberator is absent, therefore it has not yet reached its full measure before it is prohibited. When, however, it is prohibited, when grace, as we mentioned, is absent, concupiscence grows to such a degree that it becomes complete in its nature, so that it even opposes the law and adds to the offence by transgression.98

The introduction of the law thus shows sin to us in its true nature and in its true power over us. Man under the law might want the good, but is unable to do it, because the habituated delight of sin overrules the mind’s consent to the law of God. In this way, sin deceives man and in doing so kills him (Rom. 7:11). It makes him believe that its sweetness is preferable to the demands of God’s law, but shows its true nature in the bitterness of punishment.99

It is exactly this experience of suffering under the law through which God compels man to humble himself and seek the grace of Christ. Only when he refuses to do so through pride (and tries to redeem himself from this suffering by either denying his guilt or appeasing his conscience with his own merits), does he lock himself up in his penal condition, in which he will ultimately suffer final damnation. As we have seen, Augustine abandons this latter position in Ad Simplianum. God’s condemnation or salvation of man is no longer based upon God’s foreseen refusal or acceptance of his help. Humbling faith in the face of the law’s accusation is a gift, rather than an accomplishment of man’s free will.100

### 4.4.2 The salvation-historical function of the law: de utilitate credendi (391/92)

In the previous chapter I demonstrated how Augustine developed an understanding of the Old Testament law in opposition to Manichaeism. According to Augustine, God accommodated his method of teaching to the fallen situation of his chosen people. By giving them a temporal law, and by threatening with temporal punishments, he both restrained their inclination to worship the idols of the nations and prefigured the future teaching and life of Christ and his Church.

During the 390s Augustine developed this understanding of the law through his rereading of Paul. The Pauline texts that fuel the development of his understanding of the Old Testament law are Galatians 3-4 (on the law as paedagogos) and 1 Corinthians 3:6 (“littera occidit, spiritus vivificat”).

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98 exp. prop. Rm. 37, CSEL 84,16: “Augetur enim prohibitione concupiscentia, quando deest gratia liberantis, ideo nondum est omnis, antequam prohibeatur. Cum autem prohibita fuerit desistente ut diximus, gratia, tantum crescit concupiscentia, ut ita in suo genere omnis, id est, consummata fiat, ut etiam contra legem fiat et praeaericatione crimine accumulet.”

99 exp. prop. Rm. 39, CSEL 84,17: “Quod autem ait: peccatum enim occasione accepta per mandatum fefellit me et per illud occidit [Rm. 7,11], ideo dictum est, quia desiderii prohibit fructus dulcior est... Ista dulcedo est occasio per mandatum inuenta peccati, quae cum appetitur, utique fallit et in maiores amaritudines uertit.” Cf. exp. prop. Rm. 42, CSEL 84,18 where Augustine speaks of the sin as ‘selling one’s soul to the devil for the sweet prise of temporal pleasure’ (unasquisque peccando animam suam diabolo vendit accepta tamquam pretio dulcedine temporalis uoluptatis); Simpl. 1,1,5, CCL 44,5: “Peccatum non legitime usens lege ex propositione aucto desiderio dulcium factum est et ideo fefellit. Fallax enim dulcedo est, quam plures atque maiores poenarum amaritudines consequuntur.”

Augustine first interpreted these texts primarily from a hermeneutical perspective. In this perspective, the law primarily functions as accommodated teaching of what would be revealed in the instruction and life of Jesus. We already encountered this approach in the previous chapter. Gradually, however, Augustine integrated this approach to the law of the Old Testament with a more Pauline understanding of sin and salvation through Christ. God gave the law to the people of Israel to convince them of their slavery to sin, so that they would be convinced of their helplessness in the face of divine judgment, and seek refuge through faith in the grace of the mediator. In this context the law intends not just to teach, but also to humble the sinner. Furthermore, its hermeneutical meaning not only refers to Christ’s teaching and example, but also to his death on the cross as the means through which he becomes the mediator of righteousness for those who were under the law.\footnote{Bochet, \textit{Le firmament de l’Écriture}, 54-7 distinguishes between a hermeneutical and a soteriological meaning of 2 Cor. 3:16 in Augustine. Although I agree with this distinction, one should not forget that for Augustine the hermeneutical approach to this text has a soteriological dimension.}

The first passage in which Augustine explains the function of the Old Testament law, using the aforementioned Pauline texts, comes from \textit{De utilitate credendi} (391-92). This tractate starts with a discussion of four hermeneutical rules that characterize a Catholic reading of the Old Testament over against a Manichaean interpretation (the historical, analogical, aetiological, and allegorical senses).\footnote{Util. cred. 5.} According to Augustine, all of these rules have been used by Jesus and the writers of the New Testament to interpret the Old. In \textit{De utilitate credendi} 8-9 Augustine discusses Paul’s use of allegory, the reading of Old Testament passages as signs of New Testament realities. As an example of such an allegorical reading of Old Testament history, Augustine takes Galatians 4:22-26.\footnote{Util. cred. 9, CSEL 25,1,12: “Idem enim Paulus dicit ad Galatas: scriptum est enim quod Abraham duos filios habuit unum de ancilla et unum de libera. Sed is quidem qui de ancilla secundum carnem natus est. Qui autem de libera per promissionem quae sunt per allegoriam dicta. Nam haec sunt duo testamenta. Unum quidem de monte Sina in servitutem generans quod est Agar [Gal. 4,22-24]. Sina enim mons est in Arabia quae confinis est et quae nunc est Hierusalem et seruit cum filitis suis. Quae autem sursum est Hierusalem libera est quae est mater omnium nostrum.”} Manichees use this text to argue that the Catholics, who acknowledge the Old Testament law as part of Scripture, are still slaves, sons of Hagar, the signifier of the Sinaitic covenant. Christ has revealed the oppressive character of the Sinaitic covenant and thus freed his followers from it by radically abolishing it. Therefore, they argue, those who still hold the Old Testament law as in some sense authoritative have fallen from grace (Gal. 5:4). According to Augustine, the Manichees understand the grace of Christ as the revelation of the law’s oppressive character, which had always already been an evil intrusion of the Hebrew God upon free people. In opposing this interpretation of Galatians 4, Augustine argues:

We say that the law was necessary only for those for whom servitude was still useful and that it was therefore useful that [the grace of Christ] was hidden, because people who could not be called back from sins through reason, were to be coerced through such law, that is to say by the threat and dread of such punishments, which can be apprehended by the foolish. When Christ’s grace sets us free from this, it does not condemn that law, but at a certain moment he invites us to submit to his love and not to serve the law of fear. This is the grace or benefit that those who still yearn to be under the chains the law fail to perceive as coming from God for them. Paul rightly rebukes them as unbelievers, because they do not believe that through our Lord Jesus Christ they have now been set free from the slavery in which, by God’s most just plan, they were held subject for a set time. This explains that other text of the apostle: \textit{The law was our tutor in Christ} (Gal. 3:24). So
the one who gave to humans a pedagogue, which they would fear, is the same as the one who afterwards gave them a teacher, whom they would love.\textsuperscript{104}

In this passage Augustine argues that God imposed the law upon a people who were enslaved to their passions and could not be motivated to refrain from sinning by reason. Only the fear of temporal punishment, which even the foolish understand, held them back from sin. Simultaneously, this law had a deeper figurative meaning. Its pedagogical function was not only to restrain sin, but also to signify grace. It signified the grace of Christ, which would enable them to understand the eternal realities that the law had always pointed to. Thus, Christ the teacher did not abolish the Old Testament law, but took away the veil that covered its meaning (2 Cor. 3:14). Through the Spirit of Christ the precepts and mandates of the Old Testament law disclose their mysterious meaning. Those who receive this Spirit, the Christians, are the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem, signified by Sarah. They are free, not from the law itself, but from a carnal interpretation of the law that made them obey externally, hoping for temporal rewards and fearing temporal punishments. The Jews, however, who did not believe in Christ, remained captive to this carnal interpretation. They are the sons of the mountain Sinai, signified by Hagar, who lives in slavery with her people. For those who reject Christ the letter kills; for those who love him as their teacher, the Spirit vivifies (2 Cor. 3:6).\textsuperscript{105} This understanding of the opposition between the law as pedagogue and Christ as teacher to whom the pedagogue leads is derived from the context of classical pedagogy, and was adopted in Christian exegesis from very early on.\textsuperscript{106} Augustine initially adopts this interpretative tradition, but will abandon it in his commentaries on Paul.

4.4.3 The salvation-historical function of the law: Romans and Galatians (394-96)

Augustine’s understanding of the function of Old Testament law in \textit{De utilitate credendi} continues the hermeneutical approach of the previous chapter, albeit with a more explicit use of Pauline texts: the pedagogue foreshadows the teaching of Christ, and accommodates the demands of the divine law to carnal people. When Augustine starts to write his commentaries on Romans and Galatians (394-95),

\textsuperscript{104} Util. cred. 9, CSEL 25,1,12: “Legem necessarium esse dicimus nisi eis, quibus est adhuc utilis seruitus, ideoque utiler esse latam, quod homines, qui renuocari a peccatis ratione non poterant, tali lege cohercendi erant, poenarum scilicet istarum, quae uidiebant ab stibis possunt, minis atque terroribus. A quibus gratia Christi cum liberat, non legem illam damnat, sed aliquando nos obtemperare suae caritati, non seruire timore legis inuitat. Ipsa est gratia, id est beneficium, quod non intellegent sibi uenisse diuinitus, qui adhuc esse cupiant sub uinculis legis. Quos merito Paulus obiuergat tamquam infideles, quia a seruitute, cui certo tempore iustissima dei dispositione subiecti erant, iam per dominum nostrum Iesum se liberatos esse non credunt. Hinc est illud eiusdem apostoli. Lex enim paedagogus noster erat in Christo [Gal. 3,24]. Ille igitur paedagogum dedit hominibus, quem timenter, qui magistrum postea, quem diligerent.”

\textsuperscript{105} Util. cred. 9, CSEL 25,1,12: “…in quibus tamen legis praeceptis atque mandatis, quibus nunc christianos uti fas non est, quale uel sabbatum est uel circumcisio uel sacrificia et si quid huiusmodi est, tanta mysteria continentur, ut omnis pius intellegat nihil esse pernicias quam quicquid ibi est accipi ad litteram id est ad uerbum. Nihil autem salubrius quam spiritu reuelari. Inde est: littera occidit spiritus autem uiuificat [2 Cor. 3,6]. Inde est: id ipsum uelamen in lectione ueteris testamenti manet quam spiritui reuelari. Inde est: littera occidit spiritus autem uiuificat [2 Cor. 3,14]. Euacuatur namque in Christo non uetus testamentum, sed uelamen eius.”

\textsuperscript{106} Werner Jentsch, \textit{Urchristliches Erziehungsdenken. Die Paideia Kyriu im Rahmen der hellenistisch-jüdischen Umwelt} (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie 45/3; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmannverlag, 1951), 276. Paul refers to the Old Testament law with the word ‘pedagogue’ to denote its temporal and its sin-curbing function for the people of Israel before the coming of Christ. The assumption that Paul implicitly regards Christ as the teacher to whom this pedagogue leads stretches the comparison too far. See David J. Lull, “‘The Law was our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25”, \textit{Journal of Biblical Literature} 105/3 (1986), 481-98 (esp. 496-8).
however, a new aspect occurs in his understanding of the function of the law. It was not just given to constrain sin and to foreshadow Christ’s future teaching, but also to bring its hearers to the knowledge and confession of sin and to faith in the mediator of righteousness. Especially his exegesis of *Galatians* 3 on the relationship between God’s covenant with Abraham and the giving of the law to Israel proves to be relevant in this regard. In the following section, I will point out how Augustine treats the function of the law and its sanctions in his exegesis of this chapter.

God’s relationship with Israel begins with the establishment of a covenant between himself and Abraham and his offspring. In Abraham, God separated his people from the nations and dedicated it to himself. God promised Abraham to be the God of his offspring forever, to give them an everlasting resting place in Canaan, and to bless the entire world through them. This promise to Abraham signified the blessings of the New Testament, veiled in the shadows of the Old. In promising an earthly kingdom to Abraham and his seed, God in fact promised them eternal life with God himself in his everlasting kingdom.107

Furthermore, Augustine observes that the fulfilment of God’s promise to Abraham was solely based upon God’s unchangeable will.108 The actual inheritance of the promised future did not depend upon obedience to God’s law, but solely upon God’s own promise. Hence, the later imposition of the law upon Abraham’s descendents could not invalidate this promise to Abraham and his offspring, as Paul says in *Galatians* 3:17. “Yet no one, he says, annuls or adds to the will of an ordinary human being once it has been ratified... Just as the testator’s death serves to ratify his will because he is no longer able to change his decision, so the unchangeability of God’s promise serves to ratify the inheritance of Abraham.”109

However, as we have previously noted, Augustine simultaneously upholds that communion with God requires human obedience to the divine law. This is how God’s relationship with humanity works: obedience to his law leads to life, whereas disobedience leads to death. The inheritance of the Promised Land required that God’s people be righteous in his sight. Only righteous people pass through divine judgment without being consumed by it.110 This demand of righteousness on the one hand and the unconditional nature of God’s promise to Abraham on the other, seems to lead to a collision between God’s justice and his mercy, for when Abraham received the promise he was still unrighteous. How is this tension resolved? The well-known Pauline answer, followed and explained by Augustine, is that Abraham was justified by faith. In his *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola apostoli ad Romanos* Augustine points out that Abraham “was justified not by his own merit as through works, but by the grace of God through faith.”111 The circumcision that followed – a work of the law – was a *signaculum iustitiae fidei*, a typological affirmation of God’s justifying work in his people. It was a sacrament that signified the cleansing of our conscience through Christ, in whom the old man was put to death and the new man came to life.112 By circumcision God ratified his own

107 In *Contra Adimantium* 18-20, Augustine states at several places that the Old Testament promise of an abundant life in Canaan signified the restored and fulfilled communion of God’s people with God himself. He moreover emphasizes against the Manichees that this idea is already present in the Old Testament itself (c. *Adim.* 19, referring to Ps. 144:11-15; Ps. 37:16; Ps. 119:72; Ps. 19:9-10; Prov. 3:13-15; Wis. 7:7-9).


109 exp. Gal. 23; *dii qu.* 75.

110 exp. prop. Rm. 9; c. *Adim.* 26-27.


112 exp. Gal. 20 (*signaculum fidei*); c. *Adim.* 16 (*signaculum iustitiae fidei*); ep. 23,3 (*signaculum iustitiae fidei*).
promise to Abraham that he would make him and his seed inherit the earth on the basis of a righteousness that he would bestow upon him through faith in Christ. In the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, God’s justice and mercy would come together unto salvation for all who believe. In God’s covenant with Abraham, one is justified by faith in Christ, the mediator of righteousness, rather than by one’s own merits.\textsuperscript{113}

But if Abraham and his offspring were justified before God through faith, why was the law still given? The law was given in order to compel God’s people to actually seek salvation through faith in God’s mercy. After all, they too belonged to humanity after the fall, which had lost the knowledge of sin and simply followed their own concupiscence.\textsuperscript{114} They did not think of themselves as unrighteous in the sight of God, deserving of damnation and standing in need of God’s mercy. In order to seek salvation through faith, they needed to be brought to the knowledge of their own condemned state and of God as their saviour. As Augustine puts it in his commentary on Galatians:

The law was ordained, therefore, for a proud people so that they might be humbled by their transgressions… so that they might seek grace and not assume they could be saved by their own merits (which is pride), and so that they might be righteous not by their own power and strength, but by the hand of a mediator who justifies the impious.\textsuperscript{115}

The law was meant to convince those who naturally thought of themselves as righteous people, that they were in fact imprisoned on death row (\textit{Gal. 3:23: sub peccato conclusus}), awaiting their condemnation, if they did not take refuge in the mediator.\textsuperscript{116}

In this context, the Pauline phrase, “the letter kills,” assumes a new meaning. It not only refers to the effect of the law on those who do not understand its allegorical and prophetic meaning, but also comes to indicate the juridical function of the law as the prosecutor of guilty sinners. It condemns them to death.\textsuperscript{117} From his commentaries on \textit{Romans} and \textit{Galatians}, Augustine starts to connect this hermeneutical interpretation of the law as pedagogue to Christ with a juridical interpretation. In what follows I will first point out how Augustine elaborates the law’s hermeneutical function and then will show how he connects it with its juridical function.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] exp. prop. \textit{Rm. 25}.
\item[114] \textit{exp. Gal. 46}; exp. prop. \textit{Rm. 13-18}.
\item[115] \textit{exp. Gal. 24}, CSEL 84,88: “Superbienti ergo populo lex posita est, ut, quoniam gratiam caritatis nisi humilitatis accipere non posset et sine hac gratia nullo modo praecipita legis impleret, transgressione humiliaretur, ut quaereret gratiam nec se suis meritis saluum fieri, quod superbum est, opinaretur, ut esset non in sua potentate et auresibus justus, sed in manu mediatoris iustificantis impium” (translation: Plumer, \textit{Augustine’s Commentary on Galatians}, 168).
\item[116] \textit{exp. Gal. 25}, CSEL 84,90: “Non ergo lex data est, ut peccatum auferret sed ut sub peccato omnia concluderet. lex enim ostendebat esse peccatum, quod illi per consuetudinem caecati possent putare iustitiam, ut hoc modo humiliati cognoscérent non in sua manu esse salutem suam, sed in manu mediatoris.” Cf. \textit{exp. Gal. 26}: “... in adventum eius fidei, quae postea revelata est, conclusio enim eorum erat timor unius dei.” Augustine’s exegesis might have been influenced by the Donatist exegete Tyconius. In his \textit{Liber regularum}, 3,10, Tyconius gives an extensive allegory of faith as the guard who is the only one able to open the door of the death row. On Tyconius’ possible influence on Augustine in this period, see Babcock, “Augustine’s interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396)”, \textit{Augustinian Studies} 10 (1979), 67-74.
\item[117] Simpl. 1,1,17, CCL 44,23. In this text Augustine combines both of his exegeses of Paul’s expression ‘littera occidit’. It kills when it is read but not understood in its signifying function, and it kills when it is not fulfilled (\textit{lex enim tantummodo lecta et non intellecta uel non inpleta utique occidit; tunc enim appellatur littera}).
\end{footnotes}
As Augustine had done from the beginning of his career as a Christian intellectual, he defended the Old Testament law against Manichaeism as a form of divine accommodation. For him, the Old Testament represents the time of the Church’s infancy. When God established his covenant with Israel, he accommodated himself to the carnal minds of his people. He gave them a temporal law, with temporal threats and promises to bind them to himself as his people. This law signified both the higher righteousness that would be revealed in the New Testament and the redemptive work that Christ would perform through his death and resurrection. Through these images he intended to lead carnal minds to the understanding of other realities. Simultaneously, however, Augustine emphasizes against the Manichees that both the New Testament law and its gospel are already present in the Old Testament, because God always had a people who spiritually belonged to Christ, and therefore longed for his grace, and loved the righteousness that he would reveal.

God thus started with an external righteousness and external ritual observances. He did so, however, to lead the chosen seed to a spiritual understanding of the law, both with regard to its demands and its promises. In *Contra Adimantum* 8, Augustine argues that God first gave the *lex talionis* in order to restrain his people’s desire for vengeance, in order to prepare them for the real virtue of forgiveness, which Jesus commands in the New Testament. Simultaneously, God already begins this pedagogical process in the time of the Old Testament, as is illustrated in texts such as *Lamentations* 3:30 (“[the righteous] will offer his cheek to the one who strikes him; he will be covered with insults”) and *Psalm* 7:4-5 (“O Lord, my God, if I did this, if there is injustice on my hands, if I repaid those who were causing me evil”). Likewise, the laws about clean and unclean food were imposed upon Israel in order to signify the deeper truth that not what enters the mouth makes man unclean, but what proceeds from it (*Mt.* 15:11, 17-20). Again, this idea is also already present in the Old Testament. Ceremonial laws such as these intended to lead God’s people to the awareness that God requires from them a purity of heart. As Augustine puts it: “Foods that were forbidden signify certain forms of uncleanness on the part of human beings, which are not admitted into the society of the body of Christ, that is, into the solid and everlasting Church.”

As indicated, the Old Testament moral and civil laws and ceremonial institutions not only referred to a higher moral law, but also signified the future life and death of Christ and its sanctifying effect for the life of the Church. Whereas this idea had not been absent from Augustine’s earlier works, it almost coincided with the moral meaning of the law, because of Augustine’s focus on Christ as a teacher. Now, Augustine comes to emphasize that the Old Testament ceremonial institutions not only signify Christ’s teachings, but also his death and resurrection. Circumcision signified Christ’s...

118 *c. Adim.* 16,3.
119 In *c. Adim.* 17,6 Augustine refers to David’s love for Saul. According to Augustine, God gave David the right to kill Saul, so that he would not have done anything contrary to God’s revealed justice if he had killed Saul. David’s choice to spare Saul’s life then, was solely motivated by love of the neighbour, rather than by fear of punishment. Thus David fulfilled the commandments of Christ. In *exp. Gal.* 19, Augustine refers to Moses and the prophets as belonging to the New Testament, because they understood that the *sacramenta* of the Old Testament signified the commandment to love God and the neighbor.
120 *dii. qu. 53,1; c. Adim.* 12; 20,2.
121 *c. Adim.* 8.
122 *c. Adim.* 14, CSEL 25,1,153: “*Illa, quae prohibita sunt, quasdam hominum inmunditias significant, quae in societatem corporis Christi, id est in ecclesiam stabilem et sempiternam non recipiuntur*” (translation: WSA 1/19, 200). In *A-L* s.v. “Lex”, 937-8, it is contended that the sin-revealing nature of the law only refers to the Decalogue. In an allegorical way, however, it also refers to ceremonial laws.
death on the cross, through which our conscience would be cleansed. The burnt offering \((\text{holocaustus})\) of the Levitic priesthood foreshadowed Christ’s passion, through which he would cleanse his people forever from their sins. The Sabbath signified the rest in which Christ brings his people through his resurrection from the dead. The Old Testament law thus not only contained moral precepts \((\text{praeccepta uitae})\), but also visible signs of the gospel \((\text{umbra futurae/ praeccepta significandae futurae})\).

Having discussed the hermeneutical meaning of the Old Testament law, I will now move to an examination of its juridical function. By that I mean that the law was given to convince the seed of Abraham of their sins and to direct their faith to Christ, the future mediator of righteousness. The following quotations illustrate the way Augustine perceived this particular function of the law:

The fact that they were found to be transgressors of this law served not to harm but to benefit those who believed, for recognition of the greater illness made them both desire the physician more urgently and love him more ardently. For the one whom much is forgiven, loves much.

“The seed was placed by angels [who administrated the law, BvE] in the hand of a mediator so that he might liberate from their sins those now forced through transgression of the law to confess that they need the grace and mercy of the Lord, so that their sins might be forgiven and they might be reconciled to God in a new life through him who had poured out his blood for them.”

Augustine argues that also the punishments of the law were meant to effect this humility in the seed of Abraham. In the time of the Old Testament these punishments assumed an external form, because they were adapted to carnal people. Just as God promised the reward of temporal prosperity in an earthly kingdom, he threatened individuals with exclusion from the community, and the community itself with exclusion from the land, if they did not obey his commandments. However, these external punishments were intended to instill in God’s people a genuine reverence for God as judge of their sins. This spiritual meaning of corporeal punishment in the Old Testament is well illustrated in Augustine’s explanation of the command to extinguish the peoples of Canaan. In Contra Adimantum 17 Augustine writes:

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123 ep. 23.3. See also s. dom. m. 1,12 where Augustine explains the circumcision on the eighth day as a reference to the resurrection of Christ (the first day of the week) and to the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost (the first day after 7x7 days) through whom we receive the promised inheritance and are brought into God’s everlasting rest.

124 diu. qu. 61.2; en. Ps. 19:10; exp. Rm. inch. 18-19.


126 exp. Gal. 26, CSEL 84,92: “Et quod praevaricatorus ipsius legis inuenti sunt, non ad pernicem sed ad utilitatem ualuit eis, qui crediderunt, cognitio enim maioris aegritudinis et desiderari medicum uehementius fecit et diligi ardentius. Cui enim plurimum dimittitur, plurimum diligi.”

127 exp. Gal. 24, CSEL 84,88: “Dispositum est per angelos semen in manu mediatoris [Gal 3,19], ut ipse liberaret a peccatis iam per transgressionem legis coactos confiteri opus sibi esse gratiam et misericordiam domini, ut sibi peccata dimitterentur et in noua uita per eum, qui pro se sanguinem judisset, reconciliarentur deo” (translation: Plumer, Augustine’s Commentary on Galatians, 169).

128 As to the command itself, Augustine assumes that God had the right to command his own people to execute his judgment upon the inhabitants of Canaan. Moreover, Augustine regards this judgment as a form of grace in the sense that it impeded the Canaanites from continuing their idolatry and from eventually suffering an even more severe judgment (s. dom. m. 63). This does not mean that the intention with which the carnal Israelites
The people – for whom fear was useful – were subdued by a very severe command in order that, just as they saw that their wicked enemies and the worshippers of idols were given into their hands to be killed, they themselves might also fear that they would be given into the hands of their enemies if they scorned the commandments of the true God and fell into worship of idols and the impieties of the nations. For, when they sinned in a similar manner, they were punished in a similar manner. But all this temporal punishment strikes terror into weak souls in order to educate those nourished under discipline and to turn them away from everlasting and indescribable punishments, because carnal human beings have more fear of the punishment that God imposes in the present time, than of that which he threatens for the future.\(^{129}\)

This passage illustrates how God intended to lead his people to a spiritual understanding of physical realities. It was not enough that they would be inspired to restrain their own inclination to idol worship out of fear of being excluded from the land. They had to be ‘nourished under discipline’ so that they came to understand that this punishment only prefigured everlasting judgment. External and temporal punishment intended to generate a genuine reverence for God as the judge of sinners. This reverence should lead to the confession of sins and a return to God in his grace. It is this attitude that characterizes the elect when they witness the present punishments of the wicked. They do not boast in themselves, as if they deserved God’s grace, but rather “wash their hands in the blood of the sinner (\textit{Ps. 58:11}), that is, when they see the punishment of sinners, they are cleansed from evil works through the fear of God.”\(^{130}\) The punishments of others makes them acknowledge God as their judge, but also inspires them to call upon his saving name.\(^{131}\)

In Christ, God comes to his people both as judge and as a saviour. Before Christ bore the curse of the law for sinners, he exposed Israel to its alleged self-righteousness. Augustine argues that Israel’s leaders, had come to use the sacramental law to justify themselves before God and to ascertain themselves of God’s temporal blessings. They tried to attain a ‘righteousness that is by the law’ (\textit{Phil. 3:6: iustitia quae in lege est}).\(^{132}\) Augustine emphasizes that there was nothing wrong with this law-righteousness itself. It had its temporary function as a sign of the righteousness that Christ would bring. But in and of itself it was nothing more than a kind of civil obedience. It did not justify the sinner before God.\(^{133}\) Israel’s problem was the tendency to use this law-righteousness as their righteousness before God. “Glorying about their father Abraham, [they] boasted that they had a kind of natural righteousness (\textit{iustitia naturalis}) and the more arrogantly they preferred their merits in themselves executed God’s judgment was correct. Only the spiritual Israelites, who were solely motivated by the love of God and of his justice, acted rightly in executing God’s commandment.

\(^{129}\) c. Adim. 17,2, CSEL 25,1,167: “…\textit{populus, cui terror utilis erat, severissimo imperio domaretur. Ut quemadmodum uidebant dari in manus suas interficiendo inimicos inpios cultoresque simulacrorum, sic ipsi formidarent in manus inimicorum suorum dari, si dei iussa contenmerent et ad cultum idolorum atque inpietates gentium laberentur. Nam et in ipsos similiter peccantes non dissimiliter uindicatum est. Sed omnis haec temporalis uindicata infirmos animos terret, ut enatritos sub disciplina erudit et a sempiternis atque ineffabiliis subpliciis possit auetere, quia plus timent carnales homines, quod in praesenti deus uindicat, quam illud, quod futurum minatur}” (translation: WSA 1/19, 208, slightly adapted). Cf. for a similar but less elaborated argument, the case of Elijah’s execution of the priests of Baal in \textit{s. dom. mon.} 1,63.

\(^{130}\) Simpl. 2,18, CCL 44,47: “…\textit{iustus manus lauet in sanguine peccatoris, id est mundetur ab operibus malis per timorem dei, cum uident supplicia peccatorum}.”

\(^{131}\) \textit{En. Ps.} 24,14.


\(^{133}\) \textit{exp. Gal.} 43.
circumcision above the Gentiles the more dangerously (they boasted in them).”

In his ministry, Christ criticizes this way of using the law. He shows that the sacramental law was always already about the love of God and the neighbour. He does not reject the law itself, but shows that he has come to fulfill it as the Word of God who had instituted this law for a time, in order to supersede it at the end of time by revealing and embodying the righteousness that it demanded. This is why Christ started to relativize and ‘transgress’ the sacramental commandments of the law in order to show its true moral meaning. In this way, he showed the Jewish idolatry with the law and called them to faith in himself as the one who had come to fulfill the law. The Jews, however, regarded Jesus as a transgressor of the law, who should be excluded from the community of Israel, according to the law’s stipulations. As a consequence of their rejection, Christ, the just one, suffered the curse of the law (maledictum legis). The punishment that was intended for sinful Israel was now executed over the one and only just Israelite.

In this way God’s grace and judgment came together in the death of Christ. He died the death that all deserved, and to which the sacraments of the law, and God’s temporary judgments over Israel, had always pointed. Thus he took upon himself Israel’s curse, so that they could be liberated from their bondage to sin and death, and become heirs of the heavenly life that God had promised to Abraham. In this way, Christ became the righteousness of God for all who believe (Rom. 10:3), but a stumbling block for those who boasted in the works of the law, and refused to put their faith in him as the mediator of righteousness. In this way the separation between the sons of Hagar, who live after the flesh, and the sons of Sarah, who live according to the Spirit, continues in the time of the New Testament. The former continue to live sub lege and await final condemnation, whether the latter are justified sub gratia, and await the final peace at the resurrection.

134 exp. Gal. 25, CSEL 84,89: “In istis enim erat per transgressionem legis conflingenda superbia, qui gloriantes de patre Abraham quasi naturalem se habere iactabant iustitiam et merita sua in circumcissione ceteris gentibus tanto perniciosius quanto arrogantius praeferebant.”


136 exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,81: “Propterea dominus Iesus Christus iam libertatem daturus credentibus, quaedam earum observationem non seruauit ad litteram. Unde etiam cum sabbato esurientes discipuli spicas euulsissent, respondit indignantibus dominum esse filium hominis etiam sabbati. Itaque illa carnaliter non observando carnalium conflagravit inuidiam et suscepit qudem poenam propositam illis, qui ea non obseruassent, sed ut credentes in se tali poenae timor liberaret, quo pertinet, quo adiungit: Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis factus pro nobis maledictum...”

137 En Ps. 19,9, CCL 38,11: “Ipsi obligati sunt, et ceciderunt [Ps. 19,9]. Et ideo ipsi temporalium rerum cupiditate obligati sunt, timentes parere domino, ne a Romanis pererent locum; et irruentes in lapidem offensionis et petram scandalii, de spe caelesti ceciderunt; quaibus caecitas ex parte Israel facta est, ignorantibus dei iustitiam, et suam uolentibus constituere. Nos uero surreximus, et erecti sumus [Ps. 19,9]; de lapidibus excitati filii Abraham qui non sectabantur iustitiam, adprehendimus eam, et surreximus; nec uiribus nostris, sed per fidem iustificati erecti sumus.” For Augustine’s use of Rom. 10:3, see further en. Ps. 17,28; 27,8; 28,6.

138 Augustine’s exegesis of Gal. 4:21-31, the allegory of the sons of Hagar and Sarah, plays an important role in his polemics against the Donatists. Augustine comes to apply the distinction between Jews and Christians, signified by Hagar and Sarah, to the opposition between Donatists and Catholics. Just as Sarah persecuted Hagar in order to discipline her pride and bring her to humility and confession, the Catholic Church persecuted the Donatists, Augustine argues in ep. 185. An extensive overview of Augustine’s exegesis of this passage is given by Wendy Elgersma Helleman, “‘Abraham had two sons’: Augustine and the Allegory of Sarah and Hagar (Galatians 4:21-31)”, Calvin Theological Journal 48 (2013), 35-64.
4.5 Christ’s redemptive bearing of the punishment of sin

This section investigates how Augustine understands the death of Christ and its salvific meaning. In the previous chapter, we concluded that, although Augustine regards Christ as a real human being, who assumed our mortal body for the sake of our redemption, he did not yet have a clear view of how Christ’s death (and resurrection) constituted human salvation historically. Augustine interpreted Christ’s death on the cross primarily as a consequence of his exemplary life, in which his love for God made him shun the things humanity strives for and bear the things that humanity tries to avoid. Grace consisted of Christ’s liberating influence on our minds, mediated through the Spirit. In the early 390s Augustine continued this pedagogical Christology. In this model, the primary redemptive significance of Christ is not what he accomplished historically, but rather the subjective influence of his example on our minds. Augustine viewed Christ’s death in this exemplarist perspective.

Gradually, however, Augustine came to reflect upon the uniquely redemptive significance of Christ’s death on the cross. Michael Cameron has argued that this development might be explained by the fact that his polemics with the Manichees compelled Augustine to further reflect upon the significance of Christ’s real humanity. Hitherto Augustine had explained the necessity of the Incarnation primarily from the idea of accommodation. Christ assumed a mortal body in order be visible for flesh-bound people and to give them a model of how to live a virtuous life. The Manichees, however, had a quite similar understanding of Christ. They regarded the historical human Jesus as the instrument through which the heavenly Christ admonished his followers to separate themselves from matter and return to the kingdom of light. They denied, however, the Incarnation itself, the unique personal assumption of human flesh and spirit by the Son of God. For them the historical Jesus was one of the many human persons through whom the “Jesus of Splendor” had taught humanity to return to the Father of light. Also Jesus’ death on the cross was seen as an illustration of a general and

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139 See, for example c. Fort. 17, CCL 38,15: “Peccando enim auersi eramus a deo, tenendo autem praecepta Christ reconciliarium a deo, ut qui in peccatis mortui eramus, seruantes praecepta eius uiaificemur et pacem habeamus cum illo in uno spiritu.” For the changes that appear between 392-394, see Joanne McWilliam Dewart, “Augustine’s Developing Use of the Cross: 387-400”, Augustinian Studies 15 (1984), 15-33. She distinguishes between Augustine’s use of the cross as an example of self-mortification, as an example of courage inspired by the hope of the resurrection, and as a ransom for sin, although this latter notion is rather undeveloped before 394.

140 Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere, 159.

141 Lam, Die Heilsbedeutung, 83-91. On the basis of recent research, Lam stresses that the Manichees did not teach docetism in the sense that the man who died on the cross was not a real human being. Rather, they made a strong separation between two Christs, the Jesus of Splendor and Jesus of Nazareth. Cf. Kurt Rudolph, Die Gnosis, 160-71 (esp. 171). The historical person of Jesus is one of the figures through whom the heavenly Christ reveals to the soul that it suffers under the powers of darkness. Jesus’ historical suffering functions as an allegory of the universal suffering of the divine world-soul. See. c. Faust. 33,7: “... credimus etere, praeterea crucis eius mysticam fixationem, qua nostrae animae passionis monstrantur vulnera.” It is for this reason that Faustus could contend that Jesus, as the spiritualisprofusio of the Father, suffers on every tree (c. Faust. 20,2), but did not die on the cross (c. Faust. 26,2). Manichaeism denies the Incarnation and therefore ends up interpreting the story of the cross as an example of a universal truth about the suffering soul. Through this revelation the Manichee receives an understanding of the knowledge that helps him to become aware of his animabona, and to separate himself from the body of death, by which the prince of darkness held him captive.

timeless truth, namely the universal suffering of the soul in the realm of darkness.\textsuperscript{142} When Augustine, through his rereading of Paul, came to reflect upon the meaning of the death of Christ, he had to respond to this Manichaean interpretation. Did the Son of God illustrate a universal truth by dying on the cross, or did he do more than that? Augustine is challenged to think through the soteriological implications of his belief in the personal union of the Son of God with human nature. From around 394, Augustine began to argue that Christ assumed a body not only for the purpose of revelation and inspiration, but also in order to enact the Church’s salvation in that very body. The Son of God assumed a human soul and a mortal body, in order to bear the penalty for sin in his body, to take it away through his death, and to restore human nature to integrity through his resurrection.

Thus, Augustine came to stress against the Manichees the unique redemptive significance of Christ’s death on the cross. It does not illustrate the universal suffering of the divine soul in the realm of matter, but rather enacts the condemnation of the old man in the body of Christ on behalf of humanity, so that man’s soul and body are liberated from sin and its penal consequences. The following subsections address Christ’s bearing of humanity’s punishment from three different texts: Augustine’s commentaries on the Pauline letters, \textit{De libero arbitrio} 3, and Enarratio in Psalmum 21,1. Each text approaches the theme from a different angle.

\subsection{4.5.1 The commentaries on the letters of Paul}

The following provides an overview of Augustine’s developing exegesis of Pauline texts that address the meaning of Christ’s death. I will show that Augustine, in his appropriation of Pauline texts that mention Christ’s crucifixion, moves from a more subjective to an objective approach. From an example of self-mortification, Christ’s death becomes the representative bearing of the curse of the law for the sake of those who suffered under its condemnation.

In \textit{Exp. prop. Rm.} 32-34 Augustine discusses Rom. 6:6: “We know that our old man has been crucified together (with him), so that the body of sin would be emptied.” Augustine immediately connects this text to \textit{Dtr.} 21:23 where Moses says that everyone is cursed who hangs on a tree.\textsuperscript{143} Why does Augustine connect these texts? Probably, this is part of one of his discussions with the Manichees, who used this text to prove that Moses is opposed to Christ.\textsuperscript{144} According to the Manichees, if Moses really cursed Christ, he is opposed to the New Testament and cannot be a real prophet.\textsuperscript{145} Instead, Augustine argues that Christ on the cross signified (\textit{significata est}) the crucifixion of the old man, just as his resurrection signified the renewal of the new man. Hence, Moses did not curse the Lord, but only prophesied what his crucifixion displayed (\textit{ostenderet}), namely the doing away of the old man. Michael Cameron has argued that this indicates that Augustine in this passage regards Christ’s death as only an imitable image of the Christian’s self-mortification. Figure and
reality are juxtaposed, rather than conjoined. Augustine would have used this idea in order to avoid bringing grist to the mill of the Manichees by associating Christ too closely with sin.\footnote{Cameron, \textit{Christ Meets Me Everywhere}, 154.}

According to my reading, Augustine at this point is simply not entirely clear about the exact relationship between Christ and the death of the old man. On the one hand he wants to keep Christ free from sin (which he will also argue for later), but on the other hand he wants to do justice to texts in which Christ is identified with the old man, such as 1 \textit{Ptr.} 2:24 (“he bore our sins”), 2 \textit{Cor.} 5:21 (“he committed sin for us” or “he was made sin for us”\footnote{In the original Greek text, God is the subject of \textit{epoièsen (fecit)} and Christ is identified with \textit{hamartia (peccatum)}, which refers to the sin offering or scapegoat ritual in Lev. 16:21 (Cameron, \textit{Christ Meets Me Everywhere}, 145).}), and \textit{Rom.} 8:3 (“from sin he condemned sin”\footnote{exp. prop. \textit{Rm.} 32-34, CSEL 84,14: “Manifestum est autem secundum eum nos agere ueterem hominem, qui maledictus est, propter quem peccatum et de domino dictum esse nemo ambigit.”}). On the basis of these texts, Augustine concludes: “It is clear that we act according to that old man, which is cursed. No one doubts that because of this man (\textit{propter quem}), sin can be applied to the Lord.”\footnote{exp. prop. \textit{Rm.} 47-48, CSEL 84,21: “Nulla ergo condemnatio est nunc in his, qui sunt in Christo Iesu... Quod enim impossibile erat legi, in quo infirmatur per carnem, deus filium suum misit in similitudine carnis peccati et de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne, ut iustitia legis impleturur in nobis, qui non secundum carnem ambulamus sed secundum spiritum [\textit{Rm.} 8,3sq.; diu. qu. 66,6, CCL 44A,158-59: “... lex enim spiritus uitae in Christo Iesu liberarit me a lege peccati et mortis.”}. This text seems to suggest that Augustine sees Christ as playing the role of, or as acting on behalf of the old man (\textit{ueterem hominem agere}). Christ’s ‘\textit{agere veterem hominem}’ assured that the body of sin was emptied out (\textit{ut euacuetur corpus peccati}). In order to explain this further, Augustine refers to Pauline texts which connect the death of believers in Christ to the mortification of sinful desires by the Spirit (\textit{Rom.} 6:8; Gal. 5:24). But whether Christ’s death on the cross is only a \textit{similitudo} of our self-mortification, or that his death also counts as its constitutive ground, is not yet clarified in this passage. The following texts, however, suggest that the former interpretation is more likely.

In \textit{De diuersis quaestionibus 83} and the \textit{Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos} Augustine comments on \textit{Rom.} 8:1-4: “There is, then, no condemnation now for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has liberated me from the law of sin and death. For what was impossible to the law, because it was weakened by the flesh, [for that purpose] God sent his Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin and from sin he condemned sin in the flesh, so that the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit.”\footnote{exp. prop. \textit{Cor.} 5:21.} Augustine’s comments on this verse in the works mentioned are almost identical, but differ in their treatment of the verse \textit{de peccato condemnauit peccatum in carne}. In \textit{De diuersis quaestionibus 83} Augustine first explains that “the flesh” (\textit{caro}) impeded the fulfilment of the law in us. The flesh stands for our delight in temporal things. Without grace this delight draws man towards sin, because there is no love of justice, which strengthens the mind to resist the delights of the flesh. God’s salvific action is expressed in the sentence that follows. Being sent by God the Father, Christ comes “in the likeness of sinful flesh” (\textit{in similitudine carnis peccati}\footnote{Against the Manichees who give a docetic interpretation to this phrase, Augustine affirms that the Son of God assumed a real human body and soul (on the real human soul of Christ, see \textit{diu. qu.} 80,3). He differs from other humans, however, in two respects. First, he was not born from \textit{delectatio carnalis} and therefore did not suffer from \textit{concupiscentia}. Second, Christ did not bear a mortal body against his will, but subjected himself to mortality voluntarily (cf. \textit{Gn. adu. Man.} 1,8,14; \textit{diu. qu.} 80,3). See Mayer, \textit{Die Zeichenlehre}, 216-25.}), and by sin he condemned sin in the flesh (\textit{et de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne}). Augustine argues that Christ’s
assuming the “likeness of sinful flesh” refers to his partial taking up of the punishment of sin. His flesh was not the flesh of sin in the sense that Christ is himself not a sinner, as he had not been born from carnal delight.\footnote{Dominic Keech (The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 83) observes that this is the first place where Augustine explains Christ’s non-implication in sinful desire from the fact that he was born from a virgin.} Therefore, he does not share the punishment of concupiscence with other humans. Nonetheless, his flesh resembled the flesh of the sin, as he assumed a mortal body, which is the punishment for Adam’s sin.\footnote{diu. qu. 66,6, CCL 44A,159: “Non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat, sed tamen inerat in ea similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat. Mortem autem non meruit Adam nisi peccato.”} In this body Christ performed his work of redemption, which is indicated in the words “by sin he condemned sin in the flesh”. Cameron has observed that the original subject of the sentence in Greek has changed in Augustine’s Latin translation from God the Father to Christ.\footnote{Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere, 145.} In the Greek text, Christ is the object of God’s condemnation of sin in the flesh, whereas in Augustine’s translation, Christ is the one who condemns sin in the flesh: “But what did the Lord do? By sin he condemned sin in the flesh, that is by taking on the flesh of man the sinner and teaching how we should live, he condemned sin in the flesh itself.”\footnote{diu. qu. 66,6, CCL 44A,159: “Sed quid fecit dominus? De peccato damnauit peccatum in carne [Rm. 8,3], id est suscipiendo carnem hominis peccatoris, et docendo quemadmodum uiueremis, peccatum in ipsa carne damnauit, ut aeternorum caritate spiritus flagrans non duceretur captius in consensionem libidinis.”} Cameron argues that, whereas the Greek text identifies Christ and sin as the object of God’s punishment (implying that Christ somehow bears the sin of man in the flesh), Augustine’s Latin translation separates Christ from sin by saying that Christ is the one who condemns sin by assuming a mortal body (which Paul indicates with the word “sin”, using the cause pro effectu trope), and by showing us how we should live. Cameron concludes that Augustine still regards the work of Christ on the cross as a moral example, rather than as a redemptive suffering in which he takes away the punishment that humanity deserved.\footnote{Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere, 146-7.} I think this is correct to the extent that Augustine emphasizes at this point the psychological effect of Christ’s life and death upon his followers. By assuming a mortal body and living a righteous life in that body until he died, he taught his followers not to be driven by carnal desires and the fear of death. This depiction of Christ’s death still echoes the exemplary approach that characterized Augustine’s understanding of the life and death of Christ up to this point in his theological development.\footnote{McWilliam Dewart, “Augustine’s Developing Use of the Cross”, 23-5.}

This interpretation is confirmed by Augustine’s exegesis of Rom. 8:1-4 in Exp. prop. Rm. 48. In this passage, Augustine’s explanation of Christ’s redemptive act, expressed by the words de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne, reads the following:

"Our Liberator the Lord Jesus Christ, by taking up mortal flesh, came in the likeness of the flesh of sin. For death is the wages of the flesh of sin. But surely the Lord’s death was an act of good will, not the payment of a debt. Yet nonetheless here too the Apostle calls Christ’s assumption of mortal flesh ‘sin’, even though he was without sin, because the immortal one as it were commits sin (tamquam peccatum facit), when he dies. But ‘by sin’, Paul says, ‘he condemned sin in the flesh’. For this is what the death of the Lord accomplished, that death might not be feared and as a result of
this, temporary goods might no longer be sought for, nor temporal evils shunned, in which things the wisdom of the flesh was at work, through which the precepts of the law could not be fulfilled.  

Although it is not entirely clear what Augustine means when he says that Christ the immortal one “as it were committed sin when he died”, he clearly communicates the following logic of redemption: Death is the wages of our sin. Christ, through his death, paid these wages without owing them. The effect of this should be that those who believe in Christ are no longer led by the desires of the mortal flesh (the prudentia carnis). Augustine does not clarify, however, how this effect is accomplished. He still seems to interpret the tranquil death of Christ as somehow inspiring us to temper the desires of our mortal flesh.

In Contra Adimantum 21 Augustine addresses the text: “Cursed is everyone who has been hanged upon a tree (Dt. 21:23)”, as he had done before in Prop. Rm. 32-34, but now in relation to Christ’s saying that everyone who wants to be perfect must take up his cross and follow him (Mt. 16:24, 19:21). Adimantus used this text to prove the opposition between the Old and the New Testament. In the Dt. 21:23 someone who hangs on the tree is cursed, whereas in Mt. 16:24 the person who takes up his cross to follow Jesus is blessed. Augustine answers that Moses’ curse is announced against the old man (uetus homo) whom the Lord hanged upon the tree. This old man is the old life (uetus uita) which we contracted from Adam, “the flesh with its passions and desires” (Gal. 5:24).

Augustine also refers to this old life in Adam with the word “death”. By this word he seems to refer to the entire reality of man’s salvation from God, as he says that this death came to man from the devil through the woman. The word, therefore, seems to apply to both spiritual and corporeal death, with which Adam and Eve were punished after giving in to the temptation of the devil. It is to this death, Augustine continues, that Moses’ curse applies. Repeating his earlier statement in Prop. Rm. 32-34, Augustine argues that Moses’ curse did not apply to Christ himself, but to the death of the old man

158 exp. prop. Rm. 48, CSEL 84,21-22: “Ideo liberator noster dominus Jesus Christus suscipiendo mortalem carmem uenit in similitudine carnis peccati. Carni enim peccati mors debita est. At uero illa mors domini dignationis fuit, non debiti, et tamen hoc quoque apostolus peccatum uocat susceptionem mortalis carnis quamuis non peccattricis, ideo quia immortalis tamquam peccatum facit, cum moritur. Sed de peccato inquit, damnuat peccatum in carne [Rm. 8,3]. Id enim egit mors domini, ne mors timeretur et ex eo iam non appearentur temporalia bona nec metuerunt temporalia mala, in quibus carnalis erat prudentia illa, in qua impleri legis praecepta non poterant” (translation: Frederiksen, Augustine on Romans, 19).

159 Augustine takes this expression from his mistranslated version of 2 Cor. 5:21 where, according to the Greek text, Christ is said to have been made sin by God for us. Instead, Augustine reads that Christ himself committed sin (fecit peccatum). Augustine interprets Christ’s committing of sin as a way of speaking about Christ’s death. His death can be called ‘sin’, as it goes against the nature of the immortal one to die. Another interpretation that Augustine gives of the text is that death itself might be called sin, because it resulted from sin (it is a metonymy of the type causa pro effectu). Later, Augustine identifies ‘de peccato’ with the sin of those who put Christ to death (see e.g. s. 152,10). He also corrected his reading of 2 Cor. 5:21, making God the Father the subject of fecisset peccatum and Christ the object. Christ was made sin in the sense of the Old Testament sin-offering, in which the sins of the people were transferred to the animal victim (e.g. s. 134,4,5; 152,11; ep. 140,30,73). Cf. G. Partoens & A. Dupont, “‘De quo peccato?’ Augustine’s exegesis of Rom. 8:3c in sermo 159, 9-11”, Vigiliae Christianae 66(2) (2012), 190-212 (esp. 193-94, 209); J. Patout Burns, “How Christ saves”, in: Ronnie J. Rombs & Alexander Y. Hwang (ed.), Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church. Essays in Honor of Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 193-210 (199-200).

160 c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,180: “Qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carmem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus concupiscentis [Gal. 5,24]. Tali enim cruce uetus homo, id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit voluntarium, in nobis fieret naturale. Quod ostendit apostolus dicens: fuimus et nos aliando natura filii irae sicut et ceteri [Eph. 2,3]... Si ergo uetus uita de Adam, unde et nomine ueteris hominis uetus uita signatur.”
that Christ took upon himself when he hang on the cross.\textsuperscript{161} By doing so as the sinless one, Christ annulled this death (\textit{quam mortem} dominus noster suscipiend\textit{u} corpus peccati)\. Augustine substantiates this thesis by referring to Rom. 6:6: “Our old man was nailed to the cross along with him in order that the body of sin might be canceled out (\textit{euacuauit}).” And a few lines further down he quotes Gal. 3:13: “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having been made a curse for us. As it is written: cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree.”\textsuperscript{162} These texts clearly illustrate that Augustine sees Christ in his death as representatively assuming the punishment that sinful humanity deserved. In Christ our entire old self has been destroyed on our behalf. Thus, Christ becomes the mediator of life, as the serpent was the mediator of death.\textsuperscript{163} In order to illustrate how Christ’s death benefits Christians, Augustine refers to the serpent that Moses elevated in the desert to signify the death of Christ. Just as those who were poisoned by the serpents were immediately healed by looking to the serpent on the tree, we are healed from “deadly desires” through faith (\textit{per fidem}) in the cross of Christ.\textsuperscript{164} The destruction of the “old life from Adam” in us is not simply a matter of imitation, but of appropriation of what is already a reality in Christ. And this appropriation takes place through faith in Christ and love for him.\textsuperscript{165} According to Augustine, this is what Christ referred to when he described the way to perfection as a taking up of our cross after him: it is the personal appropriation of what has happened to human nature in Christ on the cross. The result of this is that we crucify the flesh with its passions and desires in ourselves (Gal. 5:24).

The \textit{Expositio Episulae ad Galatas} provides us with a second clear passage on Christ’s representative bearing of the curse of the law.\textsuperscript{166} In paragraph 21, Augustine had commented on Gal. 3:10-12 where Paul contrasts the righteousness that is through the law and the righteousness that comes through faith in Christ. The former consists of an outward obedience based on the fear of temporal punishment, whereas the righteousness that is received through faith consists of real love for

\textsuperscript{161} c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,180: “Non ergo dominus per linguam Moysi famuli dei, sed mors ipsa meruit maledictum quam dominus noster suscipiend\textit{u} corpus peccati. Mors itaque illa pependit in ligno, quae per mulierem ad hominem serpentina persuasione peruenit.”

\textsuperscript{162} c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,181: “Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. scriptum est enim: maledictus omnis, qui pendet in ligno [Gal. 3,13].”

\textsuperscript{163} The opposition between Christ as mediator of life (by his humility) and the devil as mediator of death (by his pride) is a theme that often recurs in Augustine. See Gerard Remy, \textit{Le Christ Mediateur dans l’oeuvre de Saint Augustin} (Paris: Atelier Reproduction des theses université de Lille, 1977), 46-52; 371-98.

\textsuperscript{164} c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,181: “unde etiam serpemtem ad significationem ipsius mortis Moyses in heremo exaltuuit in ligno. Et quoniam a mortiferis cupiditatibus per fidem sanaur crucis domini qua crucem mors ligno suspensa est, propertia qui serpentum morsibus uenienabantur, conspecto serpente, qui fixus erat atque exaltatus in ligno, continuo sanabuntur.”

\textsuperscript{165} c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,181: “Suscipiendo autem ignominiosissimum apud homines mortus genus dominus noster Iesu Christus, hoc est mortem crucis commendauit nobis dilectionem suam, ut meritio apostolus diceret ascendens nos ad eius caritatem: Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Scriptum est enim: maledictus omnis, qui pendet in ligno [Gal. 3,13], ut non solum nullam mortem, sed etiam nullum mortis genus christianam libertas sicat Iudaica seruitus formidaret.”

\textsuperscript{166} c. Adim. 21, CSEL 25,1,180: “Illa [crucem] tollitur, cum sequimur domum, de qua dicit apostolus: qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carmen suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus concupiscentissi [Gal. 5,24].”

Cameron, \textit{Christ Meets Me Everywhere}, 151ff. Cameron argues that Augustine discovered a new approach to soteriology through his reading of Galatians. He writes on p. 151: “Augustine’s take-away insight from reading Galatians was that salvation not only accommodated to historical events, but salvation itself was essentially historical.” Cameron is of the opinion that Augustine’s reading of Galatians precedes \textit{Contra Adimantum} 21 (\textit{Christ Meets Me Everywhere}, 322-3 note 65), so that his views in \textit{Contra Adimantum} 21 depend upon those in the \textit{Expositio Episulae ad Galatas}. I leave this matter unresolved here, as it is of minor importance to my project, and I stick to the order of the \textit{Retractiones} in which \textit{Contra Adimantum} precedes Augustine’s commentaries on the letters of Paul.
God (God is enjoyed instead of used for temporal rewards). How did Christ’s work on the cross enable believers to acquire this kind of righteousness? Augustine argues that Christ, in order to give freedom to those who believe, did not observe the commandments of the Law of Moses according to the letter (ad litteram), but according their spiritual meaning.\textsuperscript{168} Thus he incited the hatred of carnal people, who executed him as a transgressor of the law. In this way he took upon himself the punishment (suscepit poenam)\textsuperscript{169}, which was laid down for those who did not observe the commandments of the law. He did so, Augustine explains, to liberate those who believe in him from the fear of punishment.\textsuperscript{170}

But does this mean that those who believe in Christ may just continue sinning, because the threat of punishment has been taken away? This is clearly not what Augustine means. As in \textit{Contra Adimantum}, it is the entire old man who has been condemned in Christ. Augustine continues his discussion by commenting on Gal. 3:13: “Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, as it is written: cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree.”\textsuperscript{171} Augustine argues that there are two aspects to Christ’s having been made a curse for us. First of all, Christ took upon himself our death, the punishment of the sin of the first man. Consequently, in the death of the Lord, death itself was cursed and conquered. Secondly, the cause of death, namely sin itself, was cursed in Christ. Augustine relies on several biblical texts to substantiate this thesis. Of Christ it is said that “he bore our sins in his body upon the cross” (1Ptr. 2:24) and “what else hung on the tree than the sin of the old man, which the Lord received for us in the very mortality of his flesh?”\textsuperscript{172} Augustine then cites 2 Cor. 5:21 in combination with Rom. 8:3: “God made him to be sin for us, adding: that by sin he might condemn sin.”\textsuperscript{173} Christ thus assumes the identity of the old man and this old man is put to death in him, so that all who believe in Him can be healed from the dominion of sin. Augustine summarizes this idea in the following sentence: “For our old man was not crucified at the same time, as the same apostle says elsewhere, unless in this death of the Lord hangs a figure of our sin, so that the body of sin would be emptied out, so that we would no longer serve sin.”\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{168} Augustine refers to story in which Christ plucked heads of grain with his disciples and responded to those who objected to this that the Son of Man is Lord of the Sabbath (exp. Gal. 22). See on this also the previous paragraph.

\textsuperscript{169} Cameron, \textit{Christ Meets Me Everywhere}, 154 notes that Augustine uses the word suscipere with poena as its object for the first time in the \textit{Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas}. In earlier writings he only used it in relation to the Incarnation (suscipere hominem; naturam humanam; humanam carnem). For an overview of the different uses of suscipere with regard to the Incarnation, see Pierre-Marie Hombert, “La christologie des trente-deux premières \textit{Enarrationes in Psalmos} de saint Augustin”, in: Isabelle Bochet (ed.), \textit{Augustin philosophe et prédicateur. Hommage à Goulven Madec. Actes du colloque international organisé à Paris les 8 et 9 septembre 2011} (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 432-63 (438).

\textsuperscript{170} exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,81: “Unde etiam cum sabbato esurientes discipuli spicas euulsissent, respondit indignantis dominum esse filium hominis etiam sabbati. Itaque illa carnali non observando carnalium conflagrarit inuidiam et suscepit quidem poenam propositam illis, qui ea non obseruassent, sed ut credentes in se talis poenae timore liberaret, quo pertinet, quod adiungit: Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis factus pro nobis maledictum, quia scriptum est: maledictus omnis qui pendet in ligno [Gal. 3,13].”

\textsuperscript{171} exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,82: “Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis factus pro nobis maledictum quia scriptum est: maledictus omnis, qui pendet in ligno [Gal. 3,13].”

\textsuperscript{172} exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,83: “Quid autem pependit in ligno nisi peccatum ueteris hominis, quod dominus pro nobis in ipsa carnis mortalitate suscepi?”

\textsuperscript{173} exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,83: “Unde nec erubuit nec timuit apostolus dicere peccatum eum fecisse pro nobis addens: ut de peccato condemnaret peccatum.”

\textsuperscript{174} exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84,83: “Non enim et uetus homo noster simul crucifigetur, sicit idem apostolus alibi dicit, nisi in illa morte domini peccati nostri figura penderet, ut euacuaretur corpus peccati, ut ultra non seruiamus peccato.”
This passage poses a new question, however. Does Augustine mean that Christ really procured salvation for us, or is his death merely an outward image (figura) of an inner reality, which has no intrinsic connection to the believer’s salvation (as was also the question in the case of Exp. prop. Rm. 32-34)? This has been argued by Philip Cary with regard to Augustine’s understanding of Christ’s death as a sacrament of man’s inner transformation. He argues that “for Augustine Christ is a sacrament that does not effect what it signifies”. However, there are clear indications in the text that suggest that Augustine indeed regards the death of Christ as a sign that effects what it signifies in those who believe. This becomes clear from the comparison that Augustine makes between the serpent that Moses elevated in the desert and the cross of the Christ. Immediately after the sentence on Christ’s crucifixion as a figure of our sin, Augustine writes: “It was also in a figure of this sin and death that Moses in the desert lifted up the serpent on a tree. For it was by a serpent’s persuasion that humanity fell into the condemnation of death. And so it was fitting for a serpent to be lifted up on a tree as a sign of that death, for in that figure the death of the Lord was hanging on a tree.”

By elevating this serpent on a tree, Moses, as it were, condemned the evil that the serpent represented. By looking to this serpent, all those who were bitten and were going to die (morituri erant) participated in this ‘condemnation’ and consequently were healed. Christ has brought the reality of what the serpent on the tree only signified (the condemnation of Satan, sin, and death): “Death is cursed, sin is cursed, the serpent is cursed, and all these things are triumphed over in the cross.” Therefore, all who look to Christ in faith are justified (ex fide iustificat Christus credentes in se) and consequently set free from the fear of death, through which sin exercised its power. This justification effects the believer’s liberation from the curse of the law. He no longer needs to be held back from sin by the threat of punishment, but is open to the teachings of the Spirit. As Cameron has observed, Augustine’s understanding of Christ’s death is both a real performance of the conquering of death and sin and a sign or sacrament of what happens within believers through the work of the Spirit.

The last passage from Augustine’s commentaries on Paul that illuminates his understanding of the death of Christ is Ad Simplicianum 1,17. In this passage, Augustine comments on Romans 7:4: “You are dead to the law through the body of Christ.” This text seems to depict the law as something negative, whereas Paul says that the law is good (Rom. 7:16). Augustine argues, however, that Paul intends to say here that we are redeemed from the punishment of the law (supplicium legis). Without Christ the law could only administer death to those to which it was given, because they could...
not but transgress its requirements and therefore deserved condemnation. However, through the death of Christ we have been redeemed from the disposition (affectus) that the law punishes and condemns.\(^{181}\) We are dead to the punishment of the law through the body of Christ, “through which the debts that bound people to a righteous punishment have been forgiven.”\(^{182}\) In other words, in Christ the old man, which could only merit condemnation because of the “the body of sin”, has been done away with, and through Christ’s resurrection, the new man has come to life who is enabled to fulfill the law through the Spirit of Christ, who pours the love of God into our hearts (Rom. 5:5).\(^{183}\)

4.5.2 Enarratio 1 in Psalmum 21

In the Enarrationes in Psalmos Augustine also expands upon his view of Christ as the one who takes up our humanity in order to transform it through his death and resurrection. He does so by reading the Psalms according to the rhetorical device of prosopopeia.\(^{184}\) Prosopopeia means that the speaker or writer plays the role of another person. According to Augustine, Christ is the speaker of the Psalms, but he plays different roles. Sometimes he speaks in the person of the Church, sometimes he speaks in his own person. Fundamental to this idea is the marital union between Christ and the Church.\(^{185}\) By assuming human nature, the Son of God united himself to Church, so that what is his can become hers. Christ lets the sins of his bride be credited to him and takes upon himself the punishment that she deserved, but endows her with his perfection through his life and resurrection. En. 1 in Ps. 21 gives a good, albeit incipient, illustration of how this works in Augustine’s exegesis of the Psalms.\(^{186}\) First, we encounter Christ speaking in the person of the old man; then we encounter him as speaking in his own person, as sinless man and head of the Church.\(^{187}\)

Augustine argues that “the words of this psalm are spoken in the person of the crucified one, for at the beginning of this psalm we hear the cry he uttered while he hung upon the cross, yet redeeming (servuans) the person of the old man, whose mortality he bore. For our old man was nailed

\(^{181}\) Simpl. 1,17, CCL 44,22: “Quia mortui sumus legi dominanti, liberati ab eo affectu quem lex punit et damnat.”

\(^{182}\) Simpl. 1,17, CCL 44,22: “Mortui estis supplicio legis, per corpus Christi, per quod sunt delicta donata, quae legitimo supplicio constringebant.”

\(^{183}\) Simpl. 1,17.

\(^{184}\) Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere, 179-85.


\(^{187}\) Wellmann, Von David, 206-7.
with him on the cross.”

In this passage Augustine says that Christ in his person identifies himself with the person of the old man. He then continues to explain the first words of the psalm as the sinful words of the old Adam with whom Christ identifies himself. In the person of Adam, Christ says: “O God, my God, look to me; why have you forsaken me, being far from my salvation? The words of my sins.” Augustine explains these words as follows: “Our old self, nailed to the cross with Christ, is speaking here, ignorant even of the reason why God has abandoned it…” Subsequently, Augustine explains what the words of this old man sound like. The psalm reads: “O my God, I will cry to you all day, and you will not listen to me.” According to Augustine this means: “My God, I will cry to you when things are going well in this life, to ask that my prosperity may not change; but you will not listen to me, because these cries are part of the words of my sins.” The psalm continues: “…and [I will cry to you] in the night, but you will not collude with my foolishness.” Augustine comments:

...for in this life’s misfortunes I will cry to you to make things prosper for me, and likewise you will not listen. You refuse, not to drive me to further folly, but that I may have wisdom to know what you truly want me to pray for: not to ask in sinful words prompted by longing for temporal life, but in the words of one converted to you and tending to eternal life.

In these words, Christ assumes the identity of the old man on our behalf, and as it were confesses our sins on our behalf.

Simultaneously, Christ speaks out of his own person (non ex persona Adam loquens, sed ego proprie Jesus Christus), as the sinless man and head of the Church. The Psalm depicts him as the righteous and humble Israelite, whom God “drew out of the womb of his mother” (vs. 10), that is from the Jewish synagogue. The Jewish synagogue stands for the people of Israel who “trusted for their salvation in the material observance of the Sabbath and circumcision and the like.” In contrast to them, Christ is depicted as the humble one who expects his salvation only from the Lord. Augustine sees Christ as the new man (ego proprie), who assumed the person of the old man (in persona ueteris hominis), among a people that lived the life of the old man. They rejected him, but in this rejection...
God himself brought Christ “down among the ungodly condemned to die”, and exercised his judgment over the old man whom he represented. But as Christ himself was the new man, death did not consume him, but brought him to perfection, like a vessel in the furnace. The old man was done away with, and the new man was raised to life.

4.5.3 De libero arbitrio 3

In De libero arbitrio Augustine uses both the exemplum-approach to the work of Christ and the early Christian Christus victor motif, according to which Christ through his innocent death deprives the devil of his juridical power over mankind.

In De libero arbitrio 3,30 Augustine takes the exemplum-approach to the work of Christ. In this paragraph he discusses the fall of man through the persuasion of the devil. Through this fall man has lost the nourishment of the Word, which he shared with the angels, and has been made captive to death, so that he must toil to receive the nourishment that he needs. Therefore, the Word has made itself visible to us, so that it might recall (reuocaret) us from the pursuit of visible things (which is the same as being captive to the bonds of death) to its divine nature, which is the true nourishment of rational creatures. “In this way the soul discovers him outwardly as humble whom it had inwardly abandoned in its pride, and by imitating his visible humility, the soul will return to his invisible majesty.” This approach to the work of Christ recalls similar accounts from De Musica and other writings and will extensively reoccur in the Confessions.

In the next paragraph (3,31), however, Augustine takes another approach to the work of Christ. He depicts Christ as the one who lays the juridical basis needed to set man free from the rule of the devil and to give him eternal life. At the beginning of history the devil became the ruler of humanity. He acquired this position not by force, but through persuasion. Man consented to the suggestion of the devil to rebel against God and thus became a servant of the devil, subject to evil demands and desires. Augustine emphasizes that the devil’s rule over humanity is a consequence of man’s free choice, as otherwise man would have been the victim of the devil’s violence and be unaccountable for his sins. It is precisely man’s voluntary choice to side with the devil that gives the devil its power over him. On this basis, the devil is entitled to accuse man before God and to demand from God that man be condemned together with him and his angels. “When the woman was deceived and the man had fallen through the women, [the devil] claimed the entire offspring of the first man as a sinner guilty of death, certainly with a malicious desire to kill, but nonetheless according

ad deum (en. Ps. 21,1,25)). This verse recalls Augustine’s characterization of the old man in 21,1,2-3 as the one who cries to God with sinful words (uerba delictorum). Augustine thus identifies the Jewish people with Adamic humanity in its rebellion against God. Christ is the one who is rejected by this old man, but at the same time assumes the role of this old man in his death on the cross, so that the old life is done away with for the sake of those who put their hope in the name of the Lord (en. Ps. 21,1,24).

en. Ps. 21,1,16.

en. Ps. 21,1,16.

en. Ps. 21,1,16.

For the theme of intellectual nourishment, see duab. an. 19.

lib. arb. 3,30, CSEL 74,116: “Sic eum anima quem superbiens intus reliquerat foris humilem inuenit, imitaturae eius humilitatem visibilem et ad inuisibilem altitudinem rediturum.”


lib. arb. 3,31.

lib. arb. 3,29.

lib. arb. 3,28; lib. arb. 3,31.
to the most fair justice.”

The power that the devil exercises over humanity, then, is primarily the legal power of a prosecutor. Moreover, he is the one who received the task to execute God’s punishment over human sin, namely temporal death. By inspiring man with the fear of this death, the devil holds him captive to his earth-bound desires and thus to eternal death, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.

God could not simply set humanity free from their alignment with the devil, because they had made the choice themselves and therefore deserved to be given over to the devil and be sent to hell eventually with him. If God deprived the devil of his power by violent intervention (violentia dominatu), he would violate the rules of his own justice (according to which the devil could claim rights over humanity). The devil had the right to demand man’s punishment from God on the basis of the fact that man had chosen his side. Therefore, in order to deprive the devil of his power, God had to proceed according the law of justice (lex iustitiae), and he did so in Jesus Christ. Christ assumed a human nature, free, however, from the evil desires with which the rest of humanity is born. Nor did he commit any sin during his life. Therefore, the devil had no ground to accuse Christ of guilt and to demand his death. Nonetheless, he executed Christ as if he were a sinner. Christ thus paid a debt (death), which he did not owe, and because of this sacrifice, the devil loses his rights over those who believe in Christ. Christ has acquired the right to renew those who believe in Him, to release them from sin and from the fear of death. Although they still have to pay the punishment of temporal death, they do so as people who have been reconciled to God, so that temporal death becomes the way to eternal life. “It is then, a matter of strict justice that the devil is forced to release all those who believe in Him whom he put to death so unjustly, so that these believers, in that they die temporally, pay their debt, and in that they live for all eternity, they live in Him who paid a debt for them, which He himself did not owe. Those, however, whom the devil persuaded to persevere in unbelief, he has as his companions in eternal damnation.”

4.5.4 Conclusion
What does Augustine’s emphasis on the redemptive character of Christ’s death add to his Christology thus far? Until around 394 Augustine understood redemption primarily as a cleansing of the effects of redemptive ransom theory, which is often regarded as teaching that Christ paid a price to the devil in order to receive humanity back from him, as if they made an agreement. The theory rather expresses the legal dimension of the opposition between Christ and the devil. The devil exercised his rights of possession over humanity, because of human sin. Christ’s regained the rights of possession not because he payed the devil a price that he demanded, but because the devil abused his power by putting the righteous one to death. Thus he deprived himself of the rights of possession over those who are in Christ.
sin in the soul through the teaching of Christ and the inner work of the Holy Spirit. Through his ongoing polemic with the Manichees, Augustine had to reflect deeper upon the meaning of Christ’s bodily death and resurrection. He had always held to this dogma, but had not yet thought through its soteriological implications. Especially in his exegesis of Paul the development of his thought on this matter is tangible. With regard to our theme – the soteriological dimension of divine judgment – this involves a major development. Augustine comes to understand the death of Christ as the constitutive ground for man’s redemption. From an example of fortitude, and an inspiration to kill the desires of the flesh, Christ’s death becomes the representative payment of the punishment of sin, which constitutes the juridical ground for the forgiveness of sins and the renewal of the will. He takes upon himself the penal state to which humanity was bound and from which it could not liberate itself, in order to communicate his own righteousness, without violating the laws of divine justice. In Christ, penal justice and restorative justice come together for the sake of the restoration of human nature. It is this fundamental idea that Augustine both expresses in his exegesis of Paul’s theology of the cross, and in his understanding of Christ’s work as a victory over Satan, as expounded in De libero arbitrio 3. By identifying himself with the guilty, and by sharing their punishment, namely death, he levels the juridical claim of sin and Satan over them. Thus the way is opened for them to fulfill the law through the Spirit and merit eternal salvation.

Systematically speaking Augustine thus espouses a form of penal substitution. What Augustine does not teach, however, is that Christ bore the final punishment of sin on the cross, the punishment of hell, in the place of sinners. This is a later development in the doctrine of penal atonement, which originated in the time of the Reformation, especially through Calvin’s reinterpretation of Christ’s descent into hell as his suffering of the eternal wrath of God on the cross in our stead. In Augustine’s view, Christ identified with humanity’s present penal situation, consisting of the dominion of sin, death, and devil, and thus broke the juridical power of evil over us, so that we can be forgiven and receive the Spirit of God to fulfill the law in the present and merit eternal life. God indeed exacted a penalty from Christ in order to redeem human nature from his wrath, but this was not a penalty that superseded the already existing penal situation of mankind itself. Christ took our temporal penalty upon himself, in order to gain the right to save the Church from eternal punishment at the end of time. In this regard, Augustine’s understanding of penal substitution differs from later expressions of the doctrine in the Reformed tradition.205

205 I make this point here in order to clarify the difference between Augustine and my own confessional position as a scholar standing in the Reformed tradition. This distinction is not sufficiently taken into account in the discussion of penal atonement in Augustine by Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, Andrew Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton: Crossway, 2007), 179ff. For further criticism of this book, see Derek Flood, “Substitutionary Atonement and the Church Fathers: A Reply to the Authors of Pierced for Our Transgressions”, Evangelical Quarterly 82/2 (2010), 142-59. For the position that I defend here, see also Pierre-Marie Hombert, “‘Le Christ s’est fait pour nous malédiction’. L’interprétation patristique de Galates 3,13”, in: I. Bochet (ed.), L’exégèse patristique de l’épître aux Galates (Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes, 2014), 181-248 (241ff). Hombert distinguishes Augustine’s ‘ontological’ interpretation of Christ’s bearing of the curse of the law from substitutionary interpretations. The former says that Christ redeemed humanity by sharing in humanity’s present penal condition, thus conquering sin and death through his righteousness and life, whereas substitutionary interpretations adopt a more forensic framework, in which Christ pays a penalty that differs from our present penal condition, in order to compensate for our debts. This interpretation is rare in patristic literature. We should not forget, however, that the ‘ontological’ interpretation also functions within a forensic framework.
One final observation with regard to the level of Augustine’s development should be made here. McWilliam Dewart has argued that the changing emphasis in Augustine’s Christology has to do with the development of his hamartology.²⁰⁶ Augustine has arrived at the view that sin is deeply rooted in human nature (as a punishment for the first sin) and binds man unavoidably to divine punishment. This required a Christology in which Christ is more than a teacher, but needs to represent humanity before God, and suffer his curse over man’s corrupted nature, in order to liberate humanity from its penal condition. Thus far my contention has been that Augustine’s doctrine of sin does not change as much as McWilliam Dewart suggests. Nonetheless, through Augustine’s rereading of Paul, the theme of humanity’s bondage to sin and the devil moves to the foreground up to the point that Augustine comes to deny all synergism in the process of salvation (Ad Simplicianum). This changing emphasis largely coincides with the changing emphasis in Christology. Man’s incorporation into Christ’s body, through which he dies to the law and receives the Spirit of life, becomes the sole source of man’s regeneration and perseverance.²⁰⁷ The liberation of the will from its bondage to sin (its penal situation) is solely based upon the work of Christ on the cross.

4.6 The form and function of divine judgment in the Christian life

In our treatment of the function of the law in the time of the Old Testament, we already touched upon its soteriological function. The law as a whole intended to humble its hearers through transgression and compel them to take refuge in the promised mediator, whose work was foreshadowed in the law’s ceremonial institutions. This type of humility and faith was only engendered, however, in the chosen seed, the children of the heavenly Jerusalem. In the time of the New Testament, this family of believers is supplemented by the Christians from the Gentiles, who are incorporated into the Church through faith in the preaching of the apostles and subsequent baptism. This section addresses the ongoing function of divine judgment in the life of the baptized. It takes up the theme of ascent and progressive sanctification that was also addressed in the previous chapters (2.4 and 3.4). How does Augustine conceive of the function of divine judgment in the context of his changing understanding of Christian sanctification? In previous chapters I argued that Augustine held an ideal of sanctification which was genuinely Christian in that it presupposed a distinction between Creator and creature, the influence of sin, and the need for grace, but it was still understood as a progressive process towards perfection. The divine law exercised its disciplinary function within this framework. It helped man to acknowledge both the level of his progress and the extent to which he still had to grow in virtue. However, this model of sanctification was challenged from the earliest stage of Augustine’s life as a Christian. His self-experience in the Soliloquia had made him aware of the unfathomability of his own subjectivity and of the effects of the sin that indwelled him. He had felt his own incapability to measure the extent of his own sanctification, and recognized his absolute need to entrust his sanctification to an omniscient and gracious Physician.

It is this aspect of Augustine’s earlier reflections on Christian sanctification that moves to the foreground in his reflections on the Christian life from around 393. Christian sanctification becomes

²⁰⁷ McWilliam, “Augustine’s Developing Use of the Cross”, 31. The connection between Augustine’s developing views on the work of Christ and his changing doctrine of grace in Ad Simplicianum is not explicitly drawn by Augustine himself, but can be inferred from his reasoning.
the desire for the fulfillment of God’s promises, based upon the work of Christ. Not just the example of Christ, but Christ himself becomes the source of Christian sanctification. This becomes clear from how Augustine comes to speak about baptism. Baptism is the foundation of the Christian life, because through it the Christian is incorporated into Christ and receives the forgiveness of sins that Christ purchased on the cross. In Christ, evil has lost its binding power over man. Therefore, baptism forms the stable guarantee that sin has no abiding power in the Christian life. Whenever the building of the Christian life collapses through sin, it can be rebuilt upon the foundation that Christ has laid, through a broken spirit and a humble calling upon the name of the Lord. Christ is the high priest who is always heard by his Father in heaven, where he prays and offers his sacrifice on our behalf. Our strength then is to be found in the salvation that he graciously confers on us in our weakness. It is because the Church is perfectly grounded in Christ that she can say: “Judge me, O Lord, for I have walked in my innocence” (Ps. 25:1). Only because she is in him, she shall not be moved. In short, the Church’s being in Christ constitutes the firm juridical ground for her justification and resurrection unto life. The beginning of this process has already started through the Spirit, by whom the Church adheres to God in faith.

It is in this framework that divine judgment exercises its disciplinary function. Augustine emphasizes that the forgiveness of sins does not imply that all penal justice has been abolished in the Christian life. On the contrary, the forgiveness of sins liberates man from the dominion of sin and death, and hence from eternal punishment, but does not abolish God’s justice in the present time. God grants his peace to his children by upholding the demands of his justice, rather than by abolishing them, as wordly judges do when they acquit criminals without exacting a penalty or requiring compensation for their misdeeds. This idea shows the structural continuity between Augustine’s Christology and his understanding of sanctification. Just as in Christ God saves human nature from damnation by fulfilling the demands of his justice (both penal and restorative), he sanctifies the Christian by fulfilling the demands of his justice. God does not abolish the law for those who are in Christ, but fulfills its righteousness in them through the grace of the Spirit. Neither does he remove the temporal penalties that his children deserve as descendents of Adam. Rather, he uses these penalties to discipline them in righteousness (disciplina iustitiae).

Augustine uses three different images to express God’s use of punishment in the process of sanctification. On the basis of Hbr. 12:6 and Prv. 3:12, he uses the image of God as a Father who chastizes the sons he receives (s. dom. m. 1,63; ep. Rm. inch. 10; diu. qu. 82). Furthermore, he depicts God as a doctor who uses painful surgery in order to heal his patients (diu. qu. 82). Third, he depicts him as the Lord of his slaves, who punishes those who know his will more severely than those who do not know his will. Christians deserve to be punished more severely when they sin, because they know the will of the Lord, as opposed to those who are estranged from God (Lk. 12:47) (s. dom. m. 1,63 and ep. Rm. inch. 18).
judgment over sin; they have become the instruments of his fatherly love for his children, by which he prepares them for the inheritance (Hbr. 12:6).

The two following sections address two forms of God’s fatherly chastizement in the lives of his children. The first section addresses the disciplinary function of concupiscence in the Christian life. God abandons his children temporarily to the assaults of concupiscence in order to exercise them in humility and dependence upon his grace. This section proves that Augustine increasingly abandons his understanding of sanctification as a progressive purification of virtue. The second section addresses Augustine’s discourse on the disciplinary function of temporal death and other kinds of temporal, bodily suffering.

4.6.1 The disciplinary function of concupiscence

According to Augustine’s fourfold scheme of the order of salvation (ante legem – sub lege – sub gratia – in pacem), believers sub gratia still suffer from concupiscence, but do not give in to it. Although sin still dwells in them, and they still have to fight against it, they seem to be continuously victorious. This scheme suggests that a sinless life after conversion is possible. It still espouses an ideal of perfection in this life. Simultaneously, however, we encounter texts in which Augustine understands concupiscence as a much more influential power in the Christian life. These texts indicate that Augustine understands Christians as still struggling with weakness of will, so that they are regularly overcome by concupiscence.

As indicated, the abiding power of concupiscence and habit in the Christian life assumes a pedagogical function. Its influence and entangling power deepens the Christian’s awareness of his

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215 For Augustine’s use of the image of the pater flagellans, see De Bruyn, “Pater Flagellans”, 264-72.
216 exp. prop. Rm. 35, CSEL 84,14: “Quod autem ait: peccatum enim in uobis non dominabitur, non enim estis sub lege, sed sub gratia [Rm. 6,14], utique ad tertia illum gradum iam pertinet, ubi homo iam mente seruit legi dei, quamuis carme seruiat legi peccati. Non enim obaudit desiderio peccati quamuis adhuc sollicitent concupiscentiae et prouocent ad consensionem, donec unaificent etiam corpus et absorbantur mors in victoriam.” div. qu. 66,6: “Quibus tamen quamuis existentibus mens ad inlicita facienda non consentit, quae iam seruiat legi dei et sub gratia constituta est.”
217 See diu. qu. 67,6; s. dom. m. 2,38. The tension between Augustine’s ideal of perfection and his acknowledgment of the abiding influence of concupiscence becomes clear, for example, from inconsistencies in his exegesis of Rom. 7:23-24 (ideo aliam legem in membris meis repugnanti legi mentis meae et captiantem me sub lege peccati, quae est in membris meis. Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?) Usually, Augustine understands this cry as uttered by man sub lege, but sometimes he applies it to man sub gratia, indicating that this man still struggles with the discrepancy between willing and performing. Although Augustine has not yet arrived at his new exegesis of Rom. 7:22-25, according to which Paul is speaking about himself after his conversion, these inconsistencies hint at this future change. This observation is made by Martin, Rhetoric and Exegesis, 68; Harrison, Rethinking, 132; Bochet, Le firmament de l’Écriture, 195-6. For the development of Augustine’s exegesis of these verses up until the Confessiones, see Bochet, Le firmament de l’Écriture, 186-225. On the change in Augustine’s exegesis of Romans 7 during the Pelagian controversy, see M.-F. Berrouard, “L’exegese augustinienne de Rom. 7,7-25 entre 396 et 418”, 101-96; Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23”, 89-114; R. Dodaro, “Ego miser homo sum: Augustine, the Pelagian Controversy and the Paul of Rom. 7:2-25”, Augustinianum 44 (2004), 135-44.

The continuing need for forgiveness of sins in the life of man sub gratia is further attested by the following texts from this period: en. Ps. 24,11, CCL 38,139: “Propter nomen tuum, domine, propitiaberis peccato meo; multum est enim [Ps. 24,11]. Non solum peccata mea donasti, quae ante quam crederem admisit; sed et peccato meo, quod multum est, quia et in uia non deest offensio, sacrificio contribuisti spiritus propitiaberis.” en. Ps. 24,18, CCL 38,140: “His sacrificiis propitiatus remitte peccata mea, non illa tantum iuuentutis et ignorantiae meae ante quam crederem, sed etiam ista quae iam ex fide uiuens per infirmitatem uel uitae huius caliginem admitto.” Cf. also f. et symb. 10,21; ep. Rm. inch. Exp. 18.
need for the grace of Christ. It challenges self-reliance and fosters humility and faith that boasts in the Lord only.\textsuperscript{218} *Enarratio in Psalmum* 6 exemplifies this pedagogical understanding of concupiscence. It depicts the Christian who falls into sin and is refused a redemptive answer by God when he prays for help and renewal. He is left to the penal consequences of his own choice. However, this divine silence aims to convince the sinner of his utter dependence upon God’s grace and to increase gratitude for divine forgiveness. In other words, God hides his face for a time, in order to test the Christian’s love for God as his redeemer.

In *Enarratio* 6 Augustine first says that the fear of judgment still plays a role in the Christian life. Having mentioned the condemnation of the ungodly at the day of judgment, Augustine says that the Church itself, in this Psalm, stands in fear of this condemnation (*quam damnationem metuens*). Therefore she prays to God: “Lord do not accuse me in your anger... Do not reprove me in your fury.”\textsuperscript{219} In these words the Church ponders its own merits and fears either to be condemned by God on the day of judgment, or to be purified from remaining weaknesses.\textsuperscript{220} Therefore, the Church prays to God that he will heal her from sin in this life, so that she neither has to fear death, nor the hand of the doctor after death.\textsuperscript{221} The author goes on to pray: “Have mercy on me, Lord, because I am weak; heal me, Lord, because my bones are troubled and my soul is greatly perturbed.”\textsuperscript{222} The writer prays to God to save him from the weakness (*infirmitas*) which he has inflicted upon himself through his sins.

However, God apparently refuses to fulfill the supplicant’s prayer. Instead of coming to his help, he delivers the supplicant to the consequences of his sins. This leads the supplicant to the desperate exclamation: “And you, Lord, how long [will you be angry]?”\textsuperscript{223} Augustine goes on to argue, however, that this divine silence serves the pedagogy of salvation. He writes: “Here, obviously, is a soul wrestling with its own diseases, but its treatment by the doctor is delayed, in order that it may be convinced how great are the evils into which it has launched itself by sinning... Therefore, God, to whom it is said, *And you Lord, how long?* is not to be reckoned as cruel but as a good persuader of the soul with regard to the evil it has occasioned for itself.”\textsuperscript{224} The reason why God does not hear the supplicant is to convince him of the severity of his evil. The supplicant needs to know the deadly nature of his illness in order to beware the danger of falling back after he is cured.

\textsuperscript{219} *en. Ps. 6,3, CCL 38,29: “Domine, ne in ira tua arguas me... nec in furore tuo corripias me.”*  
\textsuperscript{221} *en. Ps. 6,3, CCL 38,29: “Quid ergo iste orat, qui non uult in ira domini uel argui uel emendari? Quid, nisi ut sanetur? Ubi enim sanitas est, nec mors metuenda est, nec urentis aut secantis medici manus.”*  
\textsuperscript{222} *en. Ps. 6,3, CCL 38,29: “Miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus sum; sana me, domine, quoniam conturbata sunt ossa mea”* (translation: WSA 3/15, 105).  
\textsuperscript{223} Augustine also quotes this text in his struggle with *consuetudo* in *conf*. 8,28. Cf. Bochet, *Le firmament de l’Ecriture*, 162.
\textsuperscript{224} *en. Ps. 6,4, CCL 39,30: “Quis non intellegat significari animam lactantium cum morbis suis, diu autem dilatam a medico, ut ei persuaderetur in quae mala se peccando praecipitauerit? Quod enim facile sanatur, non multum cautetur; ex difficiultate autem sanationis, erit diligendor custodia receptae saniatis. Non ergo tamquam crudelis deus aestimandus est, cui dicitur: et tu, domine, usquequo [*Ps. 6,4*], sed tamquam bonus persuasor animae, quid mali sibi ipsa pepererit”* (translation: WSA 3/15, 106).
Moreover, Augustine continues, God intends to persuade him of the fact that he does not *deserve* to be heard. Literally, Augustine says that the supplicant’s prayer is not perfect enough as to hear the promise “While you are still speaking I will say, ‘Behold, here I am’” (Is. 65:24). In other words, through God’s silence the supplicant learns that in and of himself he is as worthy of damnation as the ungodly who do not want to turn to God.  

In this way, God brings him to despair. Left to himself, he will fall back into “the blindness of the mind which captures and envelops the person who is sinning.” This is the antechamber of hell, the irreversible “outer darkness”, which follows after the day of judgment. The supplicant knows that only God can save him from this situation, but he also knows that he does not deserve God’s help. If God dealt with him according to his merits, he would be without hope.

However, he also knows God as the one who has revealed himself as the redeemer of his people. The deepened awareness of his unworthy position before God therefore leads him to a deepened faith in God’s mercy. It is this hope in God’s mercy that he subsequently appeals to in his prayer: “Save me, because of your mercy.” Augustine comments: “He understands that it is not on his own merits that he is being healed, because a righteous condemnation is most certainly due to the sinner who transgresses the commandment as laid down. Heal me, therefore, says the psalmist, not in proportion to what I deserve, but in proportion to your mercy.”

God’s temporary judgment, his temporarily giving over of a Christian to the power of sin and the fear of judgment, thus served to convince him of his own unworthiness before God, and to make him more fervently seek God in his mercy.

### 4.6.2 The disciplinary function of corporeal suffering

For Augustine, another way in which God puts the punishment of sin in the service of the Christian’s sanctification, is by holding him subject to death and other corporeal evils resulting from the fall. Augustine uses the example of the martyrs to exemplify this theological idea. A rather new element in Augustine’s reflections on the disciplinary effect of corporeal evils is his attention to the integrity of the body itself. Bodily suffering does not just direct our love to higher spiritual joys, but also to the hope of the resurrection, through which God restores the body itself to integrity.

With regard to death Augustine writes: “Furthermore, the divine justice is of such a constancy that although the spiritual and eternal punishment will have been relaxed for the one who repents, nevertheless corporeal pressures and afflictions, by which (as we know) even the martyrs where exercised, and eventually death itself, which our nature merited by sinning, will not be relaxed for anyone.” Although the grace of God through Christ liberates from eternal death, it does not relax temporal corporeal afflictions and death. Augustine refers to the martyrs as the examples of this truth.

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225 *en. Ps.* 6,4.
226 *en. Ps.* 6,6, with reference to *Rom.* 1: 28: “Because they did not see fit to acknowledge God, he gave them over to their own depraved way of thinking.”
227 *en. Ps.* 6,8.
228 *en. Ps.* 6,5, CCL 38,30: “Intellegit non suorum meritorum esse quod sanatur, quandoquidem peccanti et datum praeceptum praetereunti, iusta damnatio deebatur. Sana me ergo, inquit, non propter merium meum, sed propter misericordiam tuam.”
229 *ep. Rm.* inch. 10, CSEL 84,157: “Porro iustitiae diuinae tanta constantia est, ut cum poena spiritualis et semperna paenitentis fuerit relaxata, pressurae tamen cruciatusque corporales, quibus etiam martyres exercitatos nouimus, postremo mors ipsa, quam peccando meruit nostra natura, nulli relaxetur.”
Even they, the most righteous of all believers, had to undergo the corporeal afflictions that humans are subject to after the fall, either naturally or through the sinful deeds of others.

However, these troubles were used by God to discipline the martyrs in righteousness, to test whether their love of God would be stronger than their love of the body. God taught them to value their peace with God through faith over the peace of the body, in order to receive the peace of the body at the end of time. Augustine writes:

Tribulations and troubles, when given through God’s justice as retribution of sin, do not turn good and just men to sin. Their sins displease them more than any bodily pain, and these trials and tribulations purge them completely of every stain. For the peace of the body will be confirmed in due time, if now our spirit holds unshakably and unchangingly to the peace which the Lord has deigned to give us through faith.  

In his Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas 64 Augustine gives another illuminating example of the disciplinary meaning of God’s retributive justice in a martyriological context. In Galatians 6:17 Paul writes that he bears the marks of the Lord Jesus Christ in his body. Augustine argues that these marks (stigmata) refer to the brands that slaves received in their body as a punishment for misbehavior. According to Augustine, Paul applies this term to the marks of punishment that came from the persecutions that he suffered as retribution for the offense of persecuting the churches of Christ. Paul had sinned against Christ by persecuting his people, and for these wrongs he received the punishment of persecution himself. However, his sins had been forgiven in baptism, and on that basis he had received the Spirit of adoption. This entailed that the temporal punishments he still deserved for his persecution of the churches of Christ would not destroy him, but rather would lead him to the crown of victory. Christ used them to put the old Paul to death and lead the new Paul to eternal life, and thus to glorify himself through Paul. How then did these persecutions foster the mortification of Paul’s old nature and the furthering of his identity in Christ? As Augustine indicates in several passages, before his conversion Paul was a carnal Jew who obeyed the law out of a desire for temporal reward. He persecuted Jewish Christians, transgressors of the Mosaic Law, to prove his own faithfulness to the law and to receive a place of honor among his people. As a Christian apostle, it is precisely these earthly rewards that are denied to him. Rather than being honored by the world through the preaching of Christ and the making of disciples, he is rejected and persecuted, just like his master. In this way God disciplined Paul to love Christ for his own sake, and to dedicate himself to the Church for Christ’s sake, rather than for any temporal reward.

This does not mean, however, that Christ sustains his people merely with spiritual delights. On the contrary, it is to those who first seek the kingdom of God, that everything else will be given. Christ provides his people with all the temporal necessities that they need to seek the kingdom of God. Just

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230 ep. Rm. inch. 10, CSEL 84,157: “Sed tribulationes et molestiae cum per iustitiam dei redduntur peccatis, bonos et iustos, et quibus iam plus peccata ipsa displicent quam ulla corporis poena, non reflectant ad peccandum, sed ab omni labae penitus purgant. Pax enim perfecta etiam corporis suo tempore roborabitur, si nunc pacem quam dominus per fidei dare dignatus est, inconcusse spiritus noster atque incommutabiliter teneat” (translation: Frederiksen, Augustine on Romans, 65).

231 exp. Gal. 56.

232 Augustine refers to Acts 9:6: “I will show him how much suffering he must undergo for my name’s sake.”

233 exp. Gal. 62 (on honor among compatriots as the motive for proselitizing).

234 exp. Gal. 5.
like the Jews in the Old Testament, Christians receive temporal rewards for serving God. Paul also received honor from the people for whom he did his work as an apostle. However, because God’s children are still inclined to shift their trust from God to the God’s gifts, he regularly withholds these rewards, in order to exercise their love for him and to purify it from stains. As Augustine puts it in De sermone domini in monte:

When this apostle mentions his tribulations and labors... let us not think that God has wavered in His promises, when the apostle suffered hunger and thirst and nakedness while seeking the kingdom of God and His justice... That Physician to whom we have entirely entrusted ourselves and from whom we have the promise of the present life and of the life to come – that Physician intends to help us through these things. He places them before us or takes them away according as He judges it expedient for us, for He governs us and guides us so that we may be consoled and exercised in this life, and so that in the life to come we may be established and confirmed in eternal rest.

4.7 The discipline of the Church: serving God’s pedagogy

4.7.1 Correctio fraterna

In the second chapter of this thesis we investigated the practice of dialectics at the ‘school’ of Cassiciacum. This practice could be regarded as a form of mutual correction, aimed to bring each other to a deeper understanding of the truth. Augustine believed that the truth made use of this dialectic process to draw its lovers upwards to itself. We observed, however, that underneath the love of truth lingered a desire for praise and domination. Serving the truth through mutual correction proved to be a difficult task for Augustine’s pupils. After his ordination as a priest, Augustine’s reflections on brotherly correction recur in the context of his congregational and monastic responsibilities and his engagement with biblical texts. As I will illustrate, in his treatment of brotherly correction Augustine repeatedly warns of the danger of abusing justice for selfish purposes. When sinful humans judge each other, the abuse of justice always looms.

Augustine develops his view of brotherly correction by embedding it deeper in a Christological framework. Christians should regard each other as one in Christ, and imitate Christ in

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235 s. dom. m. 2,57-58; c. Adim. 12.
236 exp. Gal. 5.
237 s. dom. mon. 2,58, CCL 35,154: “In commemoratione autem tribulationum ac laborum suorum idem apostolus... non aestimemus domini promissa titubasse, ut famem ac sitim et nuditatem patetur apostolus quaerens regnum et iustitiam dei... quando quidem ista sicut adiutoria nout ille medicus, cui semel nos totos commissimus, et a quo habemus promissionem utae praesentis et futurae, quando adponat quando detrahat, sicut nobis iudicat expedire; quos et consolandos et exercendos in hac uita et post hanc uiam in perpetua reque stabilendos atque firmandos gubernat et dirigit.”
238 Thus far this theme has received little attention in Augustinian scholarship, as is observed by Ebbeler in her recent book on Augustine’s disciplinary activity in his letters: Jennifer Ebbeler, Disciplining Christians, 42. Agostino Clerici, La correzione fraterna in S. Agostino (Palermo: Edizioni Augustini, 1989) gives a concise overview of this theme in Augustine’s works. Further, Van Bavel wrote the entry ‘Correction’ in Augustine Through the Ages, 242-44 and “Correptio”, in A-L. More particular attention as been paid to the theme in Augustine’s monastic rule by L. Verheijen, see infra. The only dissertations that exist on this topic are G. Keating, The Moral Problems of Fraternal, Paternal and Judicial Correction. According to Saint Augustine (Unpublished Dissertation, Gregoriana; Rome, 1958) and Daniel Edward Doyle, The Bishop as Disciplinarian in the Letters of St. Augustine (New York: Peter Lang, 2002).
their mutual love for each other. This means that love and patience with the brother should rule the exercise of judgment. Just as God put his justice in the service of his love in that Christ bore the sins of others, Christians should patiently bear the sins and infirmities of their brothers, in order to foster their healing. 239 Just as Jesus came into the world not to judge, but to give his life for sinners, Christians refrain from passing final judgment upon their brothers, but regard their vices as their own and see it as their responsibility to facilitate the process of healing. 240 If they find it difficult to love the brother, because the brother’s vices obscure his good qualities, they must quell their frustration and consider that Christ has died on the brother’s behalf. It is not the love of the brother’s good character that drives the Christian’s patience with his infirmities, but rather the love of Christ who has died for the brother and promised to be the physician of sinners. 241 Augustine writes:

This then, is the law of Christ, that we should bear one another’s burdens (Gal. 6:2). For by loving Christ we easily endure another’s weakness, even if we do not yet love him on account of his own good qualities. For we realize that the Lord whom we love died for him. The apostle Paul brought this love to our attention when he said: ‘And the weak brother will perish by your knowledge, a brother for whom Christ died’ (1 Cor. 8:11). [Paul said this] so that if we love the weak brother less because of the fault that made him weak, we should see him in him (illum in eo consideremus) who died for him. Not to love Christ, however, is not weakness but death. Hence, we should be on our guard, with great care and having implored God’s mercy, that we do not neglect Christ because of the weak brother, when we should love him because of Christ. 242

Moreover, Augustine adds, a Christian should bear in mind that he is as liable to sin as the brother who tries one’s patience. Hence, not only the love of Christ, but also the knowledge of a common weakness should motivate care for and patience with the other. 243 With this approach to brotherly love as the context of mutual correction, Augustine decisively departs from the classical ideal of “Zweckfreundschaft”, which bases love between friends upon mutual respect for each other’s moral capacities. 244

These considerations on Christian love and humility lead Augustine to emphasize that all mutual correction should be preceded by self-scrutiny. Christians must correct each other (Gal. 6:1), but before they do so, they must consider whether they intend this in a spirit of gentleness, motivated

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239 diu. qu. 71,3. Augustine refers to Phil. 2:5-8.
240 diu. qu. 71,4.
241 diu. qu. 71,6.
242 diu. qu. 71,7, CCL 44A,207: “Ipsa est ergo lex Christi, ut inuicem onera nostra portemus. Christum autem diligendo facile sustinemus infirmitatem alterius, etiam quem nondum propter sua bona diligimus. Cogitamus enim quia ille quem diligimus dominus propter eum mortuus est. quam caritatem nobis Paulus ingessit cum dicere: et peribit infirmus in tua scientia, frater propter quem Christus mortuus est [1 Cor. 8,11], ut si illum infirmum propter utitum quo infirmus est minus diligimus, illum in eo consideremus, qui mortuus est propter ipsum. Christum autem non diligere non infirmitas sed mors est. quapropter ingenti cura et implorata dei misericordia cogitandum est, ne Christum neglegamus propter infirmum, cum infirmum debeamus diligere propter Christum.”
by love for the sinner, rather than by the lust for vengeance or the desire to dominate. Augustine is well aware that if sinful humans exercise justice (in whatever form), they are inclined to misuse it in the service of self-interest. “We should never undertake the task of rebuking another’s sin without first examining our own conscience by inner questioning and then responding – unequivocally with God – that we are acting out of love.”\footnote{exp. Gal. 57, CSEL 84,133: “Numquam itaque alieni peccati obiurgandi suscipiendum est negotium, nisi cum internis interrogotionibus examinantibus nostram conscientiam liquido nobis coram deo responderimus dilectione nos facere” (translation: Plumer, 225).} If one is obsessed with a desire for vengeance (e.g., because his feelings are hurt), one does not have a mind that is healthy enough to heal the mind of the other person. Just like a doctor needs clean hands to treat his patient, the Christian needs a clean mind to treat the patient under his hands. If he discovers that his mind is troubled by affections of anger or vengeance, these should first be washed away through repentance. Until that moment one should refrain from rebuking the brother,\footnote{exp. Gal. 57.} and rather invite him to common repentance.\footnote{s. dom. m. 2,64, CCL 35,161: “Si autem cogitantes nosmet ipsos inuenerimus in eo esse uitio in quo est ille quem reprehendere parabamus, non reprehendamus neque obiurgamus, sed tamen congemiscamus; et non illum ad obtemperandum nobis sed ad pariter conandum insitemus.”} In this way, one simultaneously promotes the correction of the neighbor, but avoids hypocrisy about one’s own moral status.\footnote{Keating, The Moral Problems of Fraternal, Paternal and Judicial Correction, 43. Augustine also warns against too rash a judgment on someone’s behaviour. Some acts are unambiguously wrong, but the moral status of other actions is dependent upon the intention of the actor. Until we know this intention, we should not pass judgment on such actions (s. dom. m. 1,61).} The anger about the sin of the brother (which can in itself be justifiable) easily becomes a means to avenge oneself, or to cover up one’s own unrighteousness. Obsession with the straw in the eye of the brother easily blinds one to the beam in one’s own eye (Mt. 7:4).\footnote{s. dom. m. 1,63. On Augustine’s exegesis of Mt. 7:4 see L. Verheijen, “The Straw, the Beam, the Tusculan Disputations and the Rule of St. Augustine: on a Surprising Augustinian Exegesis”, Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), 17-36. Augustine identifies the beam (trabes) with ira inueterata, anger that has grown old. Augustine’s understanding of the danger of anger is comparable to that of Cicero. Anger obfuscates the mind and impedes it to service justice in the correction of the other person. A spirit of vindictiveness hinders one to act with patience towards the other and to help him convert from his vices. Cf. De officiis 1,33; 88-89 (Loeb, 35-37; 89-91).}

Augustine applies these insights into the psychology of fraternal correction to the attitude of the Donatists towards the Catholic Church in Hippo. According to Augustine, the Donatists had isolated the sin of traditio to the community of the Catholics, and thus used the alleged unrighteousness of the Catholic community to boast in their own justice. Their righteousness seemed to consist in not belonging to the impure community of the Caecilianists. Augustine contends that this obsession with the sins of others had blinded the Donatists to their own iniquities. Their community also hid traditores. But in order to uphold their own innocence, Augustine argues, they “transferred the sin that they themselves committed to others”.\footnote{Ps. c. Don. 21-24, ed. Anastasi 46: “Homines multum superbi, qui se iustos dicunt esse... Diabolo se tradiderunt, cum pugnant de traditione et crimen quod commiserunt in alios volunt transferre.” Augustine makes this point even clearer in c. ep. Parm. 3,5. In that passage he compares the Donatists to the Pharisee who boasted in his own righteousness over against the tax collector, instead of confessing the sins that he shared with his brother (Lk. 18:14).} In Augustine’s view, the Donatist schism was an act of judgment that functioned in the service of self-justification. The Donatists did not put themselves under the demands of justice, which would have led them to confession and reconciliation with their brothers in the name of Christ, but used the law to condemn their brothers and to hide their own sins. Rather than serving unity, their anger enacted separation.

246 exp. Gal. 57.
247 s. dom. m. 2,64, CCL 35,161: “Si autem cogitantes nosmet ipsos inuenerimus in eo esse uitio in quo est ille quem reprehendere parabamus, non reprehendamus neque obiurgamus, sed tamen congemiscamus; et non illum ad obtemperandum nobis sed ad pariter conandum insitemus.”
248 Keating, The Moral Problems of Fraternal, Paternal and Judicial Correction, 43.
249 s. dom. m. 1,63. On Augustine’s exegesis of Mt. 7:4 see L. Verheijen, “The Straw, the Beam, the Tusculan Disputations and the Rule of St. Augustine: on a Surprising Augustinian Exegesis”, Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), 17-36. Augustine identifies the beam (trabes) with ira inueterata, anger that has grown old. Augustine’s understanding of the danger of anger is comparable to that of Cicero. Anger obfuscates the mind and impedes it to service justice in the correction of the other person. A spirit of vindictiveness hinders one to act with patience towards the other and to help him convert from his vices. Cf. De officiis 1,33; 88-89 (Loeb, 35-37; 89-91).
250 Ps. c. Don. 21-24, ed. Anastasi 46: “Homines multum superbi, qui se iustos dicunt esse... Diabolo se tradiderunt, cum pugnant de traditione et crimen quod commiserunt in alios volunt transferre.” Augustine makes this point even clearer in c. ep. Parm. 3,5. In that passage he compares the Donatists to the Pharisee who boasted in his own righteousness over against the tax collector, instead of confessing the sins that he shared with his brother (Lk. 18:14).
The fact that judgment can be abused does not lead Augustine to refrain from judgment altogether. The condemnation of sin belongs to a genuine expression of brotherly love. Christians should let themselves be used as instruments of the divine discipline, in which God puts his penal justice in the service of his children’s sanctification. But exactly because of the transformative purpose of discipline the Christian should always reflect upon how to correct his brother in such a way that it fosters his improvement. His rebuke should not just be retributive, but pedagogical. First of all, this requires a willingness to explain why the brother’s behavior is wrong, and a readiness to suffer his anger without becoming angry oneself (2 Tim. 4:2). This does not mean that all rebuke should be done in a gentle manner. What kind of treatment is applied to the person in question depends on what seems most effective for his ultimate healing. “Whether to use more severity or more charm in speaking should be determined by what seems necessary for the salvation of the person being corrected.”

Neither does attentiveness to the brother’s situation always imply that one should wait until the brother seems receptive for reproach. Paul advises his pupil Timothy to rebuke in season or out of season (2 Tim. 4:2). Rebuking one’s brother against his will, when he seems completely un receptive, can still be a loving act. Augustine compares this way of correction with the practice of doctors who tie a patient down against his will, while he screams that he would rather die than be treated in this way. The doctor, however, continues patiently, and focusses on the necessary surgery, because he knows that this is what the patient needs. Likewise, Christians should sometimes choose to apply surgery on a brother against his will and suffer his anger, because they are convinced that the brother’s situation requires this kind of remedy. God often uses such fierce and apparently unfruitful surgery to heal the person in question. Augustine writes: “For many, reflecting afterwards on what they were told and how they deserved it, have in fact criticized themselves even more sternly and severely, and though they appeared to go away from the ‘physician’ quite upset, they were gradually healed as the force of the word penetrated in their hearts. This would not happen if we always waited for the patient with gangrene to ask for treatment, when cautery or surgery would save him.” Augustine summarizes his exposition of brotherly correction with the words: “Love, and say what you like: in no way will what sounds like a curse (maledictum) really be an insult if you keep clearly in mind that your intention in using the sword of God’s word is to liberate the person from the siege of vices.”

This injunction would return in the context of the Donatist controversy and would form the ethical

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251 exp. Gal. 56. God also uses the angry response of the brother to test one’s love for Christ and brother. God not only exercises his discipline through the righteous will of the one who rebukes, but also through the unrighteous response of the one who is rebuked. This is why Christ congratulates those who are persecuted for the sake of his name (s. dom. m. 1.13).

252 Keating, Fraternal, Paternal and Judicial Correction, 20-1.


254 exp. Gal. 56, CSEL 84,132: “Multi enim postea cogitantes, quae audierint et quam iuste audierint, ipsi se grauius et seuerius arguerunt et, quamuis perturbationes a medico uiderentur abscedere, paulatim uerbi uigore in medullas penetrante sanati sunt. Quod non fieret, si semper expectarentur periclitantem patrescentibus membris, quando eum liberet aut uri aut secari” (translation: Plumer, 225).

255 exp. Gal. 57, CSEL 84,134: “Dilige et dic quod uoles. Nullo modo maledictum erit, quod specie maledicti sonuerit, si memineris senserisque te in gladio uerbi dei liberatorem hominis esse uelle ab obsidione uitorum.” From the perspective of the one rebuked, Augustine emphasizes that one should not pay attention to the harshness of the rebuke, but to the truth thereby uttered. For in the truth of another’s rebuke, however harsh, Christ, the Truth itself, is addressing us. Cf. ep. 33, 3.
directive that Augustine gave to state officials who persecuted the Donatists.\textsuperscript{256} Also the metaphor of the doctor who ties his patients down against their will, in order to foster their healing, will return later in Augustine’s justification of state penalties against the Donatists.\textsuperscript{257}

4.7.2 The practice of discipline in Augustine’s religious community

A more specific context in which Augustine addressed the topic of brotherly correction is in the rule that he composed for his religious community. Although there is still discussion concerning the date of the rule’s composition, most scholars hold the view that Augustine wrote it around 397, shortly after his ordination as a bishop and the establishment of a monastery for clerics in the episcopal house of Hippo.\textsuperscript{258} As has been observed in the previous chapters, from the moment of his conversion Augustine had lived the Christian life as a member of a community of friends who had devoted themselves to a life of mutual help on the way to God. This communal life became increasingly embedded within the life of the Church and lost its initial philosophical outlook.\textsuperscript{259}

This section illustrates Augustine’s understanding of discipline as he expounds it in his monastic rule. I will first illustrate the general disciplinary function of the rule for the community and then describe the disciplinary procedure that it prescribes in the case of a particular sin. This disciplinary procedure for the first time illustrates Augustine’s use of corporeal punishment in the context of ecclesiastical discipline: the rejection of a monk from the religious community.

4.7.2.1 Communal correction

The purpose of communal life according to Augustine’s rule is “to live harmoniously in the house (Ps. 67:7) and to have one heart and one soul seeking God (Acts 4:23a)”\textsuperscript{260} With these words Augustine in fact declares the double commandment of love, the love of God and the neighbor in God, as the core of the monastic life. As such, Augustine’s religious community merely tries to live out what should characterize all Christians.\textsuperscript{261} In order to express and exercise this love, the monks engage in a life of continence (continentia) by giving up private possessions, social status, and marriage. Furthermore, they promise to support each other in leading this life of continence. The prescriptions of the rule are

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{257} ep. 89,6; ep. 93,2-4; ep. 185,7.
\bibitem{260} reg. 1.2.
\bibitem{261} W. Brockwell, “Augustine’s Ideal of Monastic Community: a Paradigm for his Doctrine of the Church”, \textit{Augustinian Studies} 8 (1977), 96-7.
\end{thebibliography}
intended to help the community to remain focused on their common purpose. The superior (praepositus) is there to supervise the monks’ common obedience to the rule.

Augustine depicts the monks as living sub gratia, but simultaneously as struggling with sinful desires. On the one hand, the monks are said to have been called to live as free people sub gratia, as lovers of spiritual beauty, spreading the good odor of Christ by their way of life. On the other hand, their desire for personal honor, private possession, and carnal pleasure (suae quaerere rather than quaerere quae Iesu Christi sunt), continues to tempt them and they regularly capitulate to it. This is why they continuously stand in need of correction. They receive this correction primarily through the weekly reading of the precepts of the rule. Upon hearing these precepts one is either confirmed in one’s obedience to God, or confronted with one’s disobedience and thus called to repentance and confession of sins. Augustine writes:

“This little book is to be read to you once a week. As in a mirror, you will be able to see in it whether there is anything you are neglecting or forgetting (cf. Jam. 1:23-25). If you find that your actions match what is written here, thank the Lord who is the giver of every good (Jam. 1:17). If, however, a person sees that he has failed in some way, then let him be sorry for what has occurred in the past and be on his guard for what the future will bring. Let him pray that his sin be forgiven and that he not be led into temptation (Mt. 6:12-13).”

Besides helping the monk to recognize the fruits of grace, the reading of the rule confronts him with his shortcomings, and helps him to confess his sins before God, to ask for forgiveness and for future help from God.

4.7.2.2 The disciplinary process in case of individual sins

Chapter 4 of the rule addresses the personal application of this public form of correction. In this chapter Augustine describes the disciplinary procedure that should be followed if one witnesses a brother committing a sin. He uses the example of lustful glancing at women.

Before discussing the details of this social-juridical process, Augustine emphasizes that discipline by the community is much more than an interpersonal affair. It serves God’s own discipline in the lives of the monks. His judgment of sin is mediated through the discipline of the community. One should not avoid sin because one fears rejection from the community, but rather because one fears God, even if one’s glancing escapes the notice of the brother. Augustine writes: “The holy man should fear to displease God, lest he desire to please a women sinfully. Let him bear in mind (illum cogitetur)
that God sees everything, so that he will not glance at a women in an evil way.”

It is the fear of God that should motivate the monk to control himself. Monastic discipline aims to foster this fear of God, rather than of fellow humans.

Having clarified the transcendental dimension of discipline, Augustine continues to discuss the first phase of the disciplinary process: mutual correction. Augustine argues that God uses mutual vigilance to preserve the purity of his children: “Mutually safeguard your purity, when you are together in church and wherever women are present. God, who dwells in you, will protect you in this way too by your mutual vigilance.” If one of the brothers observes another brother looking at a woman in a forbidden way, he is called to reprove the culprit immediately (statim admonete), so that the sin might not progress (ne coepta progrediatur) and might as soon as possible be corrected (sed de proximo corrigatur). If one observes the same person, after the admonition, doing the same thing again, one should report him (indicare) to the praepositus as a “wounded person in need of healing” (uulneratum sanandum).

Augustine is very well aware that the monks are reluctant to do this, either from fear of being discovered by the offender, or from the desire not to be disloyal to the brother. He argues, however, that it would be cruel to remain silent about the infection of a brother’s heart, just as it would be cruel to ignore a corporeal wound, which the patient prefers to conceal out of fear for surgery. To denounce the illness of the brother to the praepositus should be seen as merciful, for only by revealing the offense one creates the opportunity for the brother to be helped by others (indicando corrigere potestis frates uestros), even if this happens against his will. Furthermore, the fact that one has to report the brother to the praepositus rather than continue to rebuke him personally, should probably be explained both due to the danger of false accusation, and because of the power of a higher authority. The authority of the praepositus could convince the accused to confess his sin, but also safeguarded the impartiality of the process. The praepositus had the authority to start a judicial process.

The praepositus confronts the sinner with the accusation in private (secretius corripere). Only if the brother continues to deny the accusation, “others are to be summoned without his knowledge so that he can be accused in the presence of all, not by a single witness but by two or three.” Here, Augustine is using an element from the Matthean account of church discipline (Mt. 18:15-17). Ghislain Lafont has argued that Augustine turns the “two or three others” into witnesses in a public trial, whereas in Matthew they function as private correctors. However, the Matthean account also seems to emphasize the judicial function of these other brothers, as it refers to Dtr. 19:15, which deals with the legal grounds for the credibility of an accusation: at least two or three witnesses are needed for a
charge to be valid (in ore duorum uel trium testium stabit omnem uerbum). The reason why one should to take two or three other brothers along after the sinner has refused to listen (si autem non te audierit adhibe tecum adhuc unum vel duos), is to collect legal grounds for a public accusation. Augustine thus interpreted Mt. 18:16 from this judicial perspective. Only if two or three witnesses testify to the accusation, the delinquent can be publicly convicted (conuinci) and punished (coherecri). This procedure sounds severe, but intends to preserve the impartiality of the process.

If the accused is convicted, he must submit to a punishment (auidicta) that is determined by either the praepositus or the priest. Just like the verbal correptiones, this punishment aims to heal the sinner (emendatoria). It is not primarily vindictive, but therapeutic. Augustine does not explicate what kind of punishments he has in mind. He might have thought of public penance. Through public penance the Christian disciplines himself in a righteousness that he had lost and actively restores the relationship with God and the community. In the ordo monasterii 10, however, Augustine also speaks of corporeal punishment when it concerns younger people, such as children. If the convicted brother refuses to submit to the punishment, he is to be expelled (proicitur) from the community. Also this exclusion from the community is to be regarded as an act of mercy towards the sinner. First, exclusion prevents him from increasing his guilt by making more brothers perish (plurimos perdat) through the deadly contagion (pestifera contagio) of his life. Second, it confronts the sinner with an already-existing reality, which had remained hidden until now: his alienation from the inner life of the community. If the community allowed the sinner to exercise his membership without impediments, this would help him to feel invulnerable to divine judgment, despite his way of life. By excommunicating him, the community opposes this self-deception, in order to instill the sinner with the fear of God, and to foster his conversion and return. This recalls the way in which Augustine describes Adam’s exclusion from paradise in De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos 2,34.

The mortality to which the first humans became subject was nothing more than God’s

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271 This text is echoed in reg. 4,8, ed. Verheijen, 426: “Prius tamen et alteri uel tertio demonstratum, ut duorum uel trium possit ore conuinci et competenti severitate coherceri.”
272 For the function of Mt. 18:15-17 in the rule, see Verheijen, Nouvelle Approche, 324; Van Bavel, The Rule of St. Augustine, 78. Another text that might have inspired Augustine in this regard is 1 Tim. 5:19-20 (“Do not admit a charge against an elder except on the evidence of two or three witnesses. As for those who persist in sin, rebuke them in the presence of all, so that the rest may stand in fear” - translation: ESV). Van Bavel remarks that Augustine basically follows the Matthean procedure, but adds the step of the correptio secreta by the praepositus between the fraternal correction and the public accusation.
274 On the term auidicta/poena emendatoria, see Verheijen, Nouvelle Approche, 315-21. He shows the linguistic and theological connection between ecclesiastical punishment and other kinds of punishments that God uses to amend our lives, in order to avoid the final vindictive punishment (poena interfectoria).
275 H.B. Weijland, Augustinus en de kerkelijke tucht (Kampen: Kok, 1965), 150-1. In works composed before his ordination as a bishop, Augustine does not address the practice of penance. Diu. qu. 26 indicates, however, that Augustine already knew of the difference between public penance for great offenses and penance for daily sins.
277 reg. 5,9, ed. Verheijen, 426: “Non enim et hoc fit crudeler, sed misericorditer, ne contagione pestifera plurimos perdat.” Obviously, Augustine understands the contagiousness of the sinner in a moral sense, rather than in a ritual sense, as did the Donatists.
278 Gn. adu. Man. 2,34.
affirmation of Adam’s inward alienation from God. It was a *dimittere*, a ‘letting go’, in order to persuade Adam of the self-deception of sin by external means, so that he eventually might turn back to the tree of life.

The exclusion of the sinner also protects the health (*sanitas*) of the community against the brother’s infectious illness. Exclusion is a public disapproval of the sinner’s persistence in sin and thus affirms the religious identity of the community.

4.7.2.3 The role of the praepositus

As we have observed already, the *praepositus* receives great authority. He represents God himself and therefore deserves due respect from the brothers. He has the task of ensuring that the precepts of the rule are observed, and that infractions are corrected (*emendandum corrigendumque*). Matters that exceed his competence and power, however, are to be referred to the priest, who has greater authority over the community. Augustine is well aware, however, that the *praepositus* himself is also a sinner, just like those over whom he presides. Augustine even says that the higher one’s position is, the more dangerous it becomes. The primal moral danger for the *praepositus* is the abuse of power for personal gain. Therefore, he is urged to see himself as one who does not dominate through power (*potestate dominantem*), but serves through love (*caritate seruientem*). This does not mean that he refrains from using his power to correct and even punish, but that he does so with the intention to instill the fear of God in those who he has under his authority, and to foster their obedience to God’s commandments. He should know that his position of honor is only an instrument to help others fear God. He should always bear in mind that he himself has to give an account of his ministry to God (*semper cogitans deo se pro uobis redditurum esse rationem*). This awareness should help him to serve in love, even when he exercises discipline, rather than to take the place of God by dominating others. The use of power (*potestas*) is to be led by the love of justice and the love of the neighbor.

4.7.3 Church discipline and civil authorities

A third question that is to be addressed in our discussion of Church discipline concerns the involvement of civil authorities in this process. During the Donatist controversy Augustine came to justify state intervention as a means of Church discipline. Witnessing the return of many Donatist families, he came to believe that the state laws promulgated by Honorius inspired them with a useful

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279 Verheijen, *Nouvelle Approche* I, 345. Verheijen also points to *reg.* 6,2 where Augustine writes that someone who refuses to ask forgiveness is “entirely out of place in the monastery, even if he is not excluded” (*sine causa est in monasterio, etiam si inde non proiciatur*).

280 *reg.* 7,3, ed. Verheijen, 435: “…ad presbyterum, cuius est apud uos maior auctoritas, referat, quod modum uel uires eius excedit.” According to Verheijen this could have to do with knowledge of doctrine in which the presbyter was better versed than the *praepositus*. See Verheijen, *Nouvelle Approche* I 394-96.

281 *reg.* 7,4, ed. Verheijen, 436: “Quia inter uos, quanto in loco superiore, tanto in periculo maiore uersatur.”

fear of temporal punishment that evolved into a genuine fear of God, which eventually led them to reconciliation with the Catholic Church.

In the previous chapter we concluded that Augustine’s early theology does not offer grounds to think that he would have rejected this idea earlier in his career because of any principal discontinuity between the Old and the New Testament. We concluded that the Christian religion is not inherently less violent, or more rational, than its Old Testament foreshadowing. The difference between the two dispensations is one of shadow and reality: the temporal punishments and rewards of the Old Testament foreshadow the eternal punishments and rewards of the New Testament, which Christ will distribute when he comes in judgment. This difference explains why the Church itself does not dispose of civil means to impose the commandments of God. However, this does not mean that the Church, in the time between its political existence in Israel and the second coming of Christ, cannot arrive in a situation in which the kings of the earth become members of the Church and somehow subject their political authority to the Church’s mission. Augustine’s reflections on this theme in his works before the high point of the Donatist controversy are rather scarce, however. Nonetheless, in the 390s he developed some ideas which proved to be foundational for the argument he would develop from around 400 in favor of the coercive measures issued against the Donatists.

The first issue concerns the question of whether corporeal punishment can be inflicted by Christians. The Manichaean missionary Adimantus had confronted him with this question in his book Antithesis, to which Augustine responds in his 394 work Contra Adimantium. Adimantus had argued that the God of the Old Testament and Jesus are opposed to each other, as the God of the Old Testament endowed his office bearers to execute judgment upon God’s enemies, whereas Jesus commanded his apostles to love their enemies unto death. In other words, the New Testament leaves no place for retributive punishment, inflicted by humans in the name of God. Augustine opposes this idea in De sermone Domini in monte 1,63 and Contra Adimantium 17. In short, Augustine’s response to the Manichees is that retributive punishment can stand in the service of righteousness and love for the neighbor. Therefore, it is perfectly reconcilable with Christ’s commandment to love God and one’s enemy. The interest that underlies Augustine’s argument is that if the Manichaean position were true, any retributive act inflicted by humans would be evil. This would lead to a revolutionary rejection of all civil authority. Over against the Manichaean way of thinking, Augustine wants to uphold the idea that retributive justice can be reconciled with the commandments of Christ.

Augustine supports his proposition by referring to the example of the apostles as the successors of the Old Testament prophets. Before Pentecost they were still unable to inflict punishments, as they had not yet received the Spirit of love. At Pentecost, however, the Spirit descended upon them and enabled them to exercise authority with love. From that time on God gave the apostles the authority to inflict punishment, sometimes even corporeal in nature. Augustine gives the example of Peter through whom God put Ananias and Sapphira to death, because they had lied against the Holy Spirit. He also points to Paul who commands the Corinthians to hand the brother who lives with his mother over to Satan “unto the destruction of his flesh”, in order that his spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord Jesus (1 Cor. 5:3-5).

Augustine derives his strongest argument, however, from the apocryphal Acts of Thomas, which were held in high esteem among his

283 Augustine admits to his Manichaean opponents that Paul’s expression ‘destruction of the flesh’ might not refer to corporeal death, but to repentence. Nonetheless, they have to admit that Paul inflicted a certain kind of punishment on this sinner by handing him over to Satan. See s. dom. m. 1,65; c. Adim. 17,2.
Manichaean opponents. The acts relate that the apostle Thomas was struck by a cupbearer while he attended a feast of the king of India. In response, Thomas cursed the cupbearer, but at the same time prayed for his ultimate salvation. When the cupbearer went to the well to draw water, he was devoured by a lion. Dogs brought one of his hands into the room where Thomas was dining, and all the people were filled with great fear of the apostle and paid him honor. From this moment on he began to teach the gospel.\(^{284}\)

These examples show, according to Augustine, that all of these apostles where authorized by God to inflict punishments for the sins of those over whom God had given them authority. And they did so out of love, as they inflicted temporal punishment in order to pursue their subject’s eternal salvation. Moreover, to those who witnessed these punishments, they functioned as a call to conversion, so that they would “not be condemned with the world” (1 Cor. 11:32). By saying this Augustine does not deny that Old and New Testament differ with regard to the way in which the Church is ruled. Bishops, the present rulers of the Church, are not endowed with the same authority to punish as was, for example, Moses, in whom spiritual and civil authority were united. Bishops can rebuke people, and have the authority to impose penances, to depose clerics from their charges, and ultimately to excommunicate persistent sinners, but of themselves they do not have the means to impose such measures with violence, unless this power is given to them by the state.\(^{285}\)

What Augustine’s argument does achieve, however, is that it makes room for the infliction of corporeal punishment by Christians in the service of the Church. The only thing is that one needs to posses the authority (potestas) that is needed to inflict such punishments. Augustine states that in the present time the authority over our life in the body has been given to the powers of this age (potestates huius mundi).\(^{286}\) At first hearing, this phrase has a negative connotation in Augustine’s thought. The phrase potestates huius mundi primarily refers to the devil and his angels, who exercise the power that they received from God to make humanity subject to them through the fear of death. This subjection of humanity to the fallen angels finds its expression in traditional pagan religion. In their sacrifices to the gods, human beings express their obedience to evil spirits, for the sake of their temporal wellbeing.\(^{287}\) When Augustine applies the phrase potestates huius mundi to human rulers, the reference to the rule of the devil and his angels is still present. Traditionally, the cult of the gods and reverence for the emperor where closely intertwined. The emperor used his power over the temporal lives of his subjects to bind them to himself, challenging the sovereign rule of God by requiring religious allegiance to

\(^{284}\) s. dom. m. 1,65; c. Adim. 17,2. See The Acts of the Holy Apostle Thomas 6-9 (ANF 8,536-37).


\(^{287}\) In exp. Gal. 32 explains the procuratores actoresque huius mundi (Gal. 4:8) as the fallen angels who let themselves be served as gods through pagan idol worship. They had held the ancestors of the Galatians subject to themselves through the fear of death. For Augustine’s use of principatus et potestates [huius mundi] (derived from Col. 2:8 and Eph. 6:2), see further exp. prop. Rm. 58; dieu. qu. 61,2; 67,5. For Augustine’s theory on angelic power over temporal creation, see dieu. qu. 79,1: “Unaquaque res usibilis in hoc mundo habet potestatem angelicum sibi praeposuit.”
him. Thus the devil used the temporal power of kings to exercise his rule over humanity.\textsuperscript{288} The African Church had suffered from this in her many martyrs, a memory that was kept alive in liturgy and folk piety.\textsuperscript{289} The power of emperors (as all human power) thus had an ambiguous connotation in Augustine’s mind. God used temporal power to preserve order in the world, but the persons who possessed this power were inclined to use it in the service of God’s enemy.

Again this does not imply that Augustine rejected the validity of secular power altogether. All power comes from God. It can be misused, but it can also be sanctified by God’s grace. This is what Christians had seen happening in the recent history of the Church in the conversion of Constantine. Augustine inherited this tradition. Through his Ascension, Christ had been annointed as the only rightful king of the earth. In his cross he had triumphed over the principalities and powers of this world.\textsuperscript{290} Although the full impact of this triumph would only be revealed after his second coming, when every man will confess that all power comes from God,\textsuperscript{291} his triumph already creates the possibility that the kings of this world are released from their bondage to the devil and come to acknowledge Christ as the only rightful authority in heaven and on earth.\textsuperscript{292} The nations that once persecuted the Church in the name of their idols had converted to Christ.\textsuperscript{293} The Church had prayed for the kings of this world and God had heard her prayers. They had turned to Christ, and had placed themselves at service of his Church.\textsuperscript{294}

This conversion implied for Augustine that the emperors would now use their power – the power to promulgate laws – to promote the true Christian religion and the cause of the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{295} In his \textit{Psalmus contra Partem Donati} Augustine examplifies this when he refers to emperor Constans’ sending of money to Africa, in order to restore peace between the Donatists and the Catholics. Augustine believed that this history illustrated the present fulfillment of the Old Testament

\textsuperscript{288} In \textit{exp. prop. Rm. 72} Augustine refers to the history of persecution by pagan emperors as illustrating this.


\textsuperscript{291} \textit{dia. qu.} 69.4; \textit{en. Ps.} 9.8.

\textsuperscript{292} \textit{dia. qu.} 69.4 where Augustine refers to Christ’s present reign in the faithful, through which they “no longer seek rest in the power of a creature, nor in their own power”.

\textsuperscript{293} \textit{en. Ps.} 6.13. Cf. Brown, “Augustine Attitude”, 267; Markus, \textit{Saeculum}, 133. Markus’ quotes texts that date from the end of the 390s, but the initial idea seems already present in the \textit{Psalmus}.

\textsuperscript{294} \textit{Ps. c. Don.} 279-84.

\textsuperscript{295} John R. Bowlin, “Augustine on Justifying Coercion”, in: Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy, \textit{Augustine and Modern Law} (Series: Philosophers and Law; Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 413-34 (420-1) argues against R.A. Markus that Augustine sees grace as reforming the state unto service to God, rather than making it ‘neutral’, that is, merely engaged with matters that pertain to this mortal life.
prophecies about the kings of the nations offering their gifts to Christ and his people. He moreover affirms that the battle that followed after Donatist resistance to the imperial delegates was a legitimate battle for unity, supported by the laws of the emperor. He condemns the excessive violence used by Macarius and his army, but does not pass any negative judgment on his military intervention as such. These data confirm that according to Augustine, temporal rulers could use their power to legislate and to enforce legislation in the service of the Christian religion and the Catholic Church. He would elaborate on this issue further in early anti-Donatist works such as Contra Epistolam Parmeniani, but he seems to espouse his basic ideas already in the early 390s. His reading of Optatus of Milevus’ Contra Parmenianum de Schismata Donatistarum might have influenced him at this point. Theologically his position was rooted in two arguments: first, in the anti-Manichaean argument that the infliction of physical punishment and the command to love the neighbor were not opposed to each other; second, in the argument that God continued to rule human society through the rulers of this world. These powers are inclined to oppose God (as by nature they serve the devil), but can be converted unto service to Christ and the Church.

In this period, however, Augustine does not yet want to make use of these means, because he hopes that the schismatics are receptive to the words of correction. As I have pointed out, this approach was deeply rooted in Augustine’s view of brotherly correction. The primary approach of the brother is one of mildness. “A servant of the Lord must not strive, but be mild towards all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness correcting those that think otherwise” (2 Tim. 2:24-25). Brotherly correction should aim to persuade the brother of his mistakes, so that internal conversion can take place. Although Augustine was not principally opposed to state-sponsored coercion, he regarded it as ancillary to teaching by words. Temporal punishments can assume an ancillary function in the process of teaching, in order to “shock” the unwilling recipient and facilitate the possibility of reflection.

4.7.4 Augustine’s ministerial exercise of discipline

4.7.4.1 Augustine’s discipline and the laetitiae

In a number of letters from the period of his priesthood Augustine makes us part of the pastoral problems with which his congregation confronted him. One of these concerned the exuberant

297 Ps. c. Don. 151-54, ed. Anastasi, 858,166: “Modum si excessit Macharius conscriptum in christianae lege, uel legem regis ferebat cum pugnaret pro unitate.”
298 On this interpretation of the Psalmus, see Grasmück, Coercitio, 170-6.
299 Chadwick, “Augustine and State Authority”, 56. Optatus and Augustine differ, however, with regard to their evaluation of the death penalty in religious matters. Optatus justified the massacre by Macarius and Paulus with an appeal to Old Testament precedents. Augustine argued that in the New Testament the death penalty had been abolished as a legal punishment for idolatry (ep. 43). Augustine justified temporal punishment by the state in religiosis, but emphasized its medicinal character. See Lamirande, Church, State and Toleration, 61-3.
301 Text quoted in exp. Gal. 56.
302 Simpl. 1,2,22. Augustine gives the example of Saul whose will was first ‘thrown back through severity’ (saeuitia retroqueretur) and then ‘corrected unto faith’ (et corrigetur ad fidem). Christ violently struck Saul down, in order to repress his raging, furious and blind will (quam rabida voluntas, quam furiosa, quam caeca). This action created the circumstances in which Paul could receive the effective call of grace by which he was converted.
celebration of the feasts of the martyrs, the so-called laetitiae or refrigeria.\textsuperscript{303} The licentious way in which these feasts were celebrated seems to have been generally accepted among African Christians.

In \textit{Epistulae} 22, written to Bishop Aurelius of Carthage, Augustine criticizes the duplicity within the disciplinary practice of the African Church. Some sins are severely sanctioned, such as sexual impurity. Those who make themselves culpable of sexual sins are banned from ecclesiastical offices and even from the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{304} Other sins, however, such as strife and drunkenness, are tolerated and almost no longer regarded as vices at all.\textsuperscript{305} The habit of celebrating the laetitiae testifies to the general acceptance of drunkenness. African Christians are used to extravagant eating and drinking in honour of the martyrs, not only at home, but even at the martyr’s shrines and in the churches. It had become part and parcel of their experience of Christianity as such. In \textit{Epistula} 29 Augustine argues that this is to be explained from the time that crowds of pagans entered the Church at the beginning of the third century. As many of them were held back from becoming Christian because this obliged them to stop celebrating the feast days of their idols, the bishops of that time had decided to have patience with the weakness of the crowds by allowing them to celebrate their feasts, but now in honour of the Christian martyrs. The bishops hoped that once these people subjected themselves to the authority of Christ, they would gradually learn to obey the commandments of sobriety out of respect for their Lord.\textsuperscript{306} Despite these resolutions, however, the extravagant feasting had been tolerated until now and had become an integral part of African Christianity.

In response to this practice, Augustine proposes a reform program to Aurelius, starting with the exclusion of these practices from public worship places: the tombs of the martyrs and the churches. Celebrations at home are to be tolerated, but the faithful are admonished not to join those who organize such feasts in their private festivities. The body of the Lord is to be received together with such people, but one should not eat with them in private, in order to teach such brothers and sisters that they alienate themselves from the Christian community by such behaviour (cf. 1 Cor. 5:11). In this way, Augustine hopes that “the wound inflicted by this custom” can be healed. Augustine believes, however, that such measures can only be effective if the African bishops decide to promote them together. If only some bishops prohibit the practices, people might cross over to another diocese and continue their practice there.\textsuperscript{307} Therefore, Augustine proposes that either the Church of Carthage starts to impose these measures as an example to the other churches, or that Aurelius organizes a council where the African bishops decide together.

Furthermore, Augustine proposes the education of the people. Only through education can the habit be eradicated from their hearts. He writes to Aurelius:


\textsuperscript{304} ep. 22,3, CSEL 34,1,56: “Horum ergo trium cubilia et inpudicitiae ita magnum crimine putatur, ut nemo dignus non modo ecclesiastico ministerio, sed ipsa etiam sacramentorum communione uideatur, qui se isto peccato maculauerit. et recte omnino.”

\textsuperscript{305} ep. 22,2, CSEL 34,1,56: “Duo autem reliqua, id est primum et ultimum, tolerabilia uidentur hominibus atque ita paulatin fieri potest, ut nec uilia iam potentur.”

\textsuperscript{306} ep. 29,9.

\textsuperscript{307} On the phenomenon of ‘cross-overs’ to flee local Church discipline, see Brent Shaw, \textit{Sacred Violence. African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 2.
Augustine thus proposes to first approach the crowd with gentle admonitions. He probably does so because he is dealing with a habit that is hardly considered a vice. The people have to be educated first as to why this habit does not fit with the Christian life. Augustine expects that the *spiritales* in the Church will be moved first. By their authority they might then persuade the multitude. Only the few should be rebuked severely, with reference to God’s future judgment. Augustine does not explain why and when this should happen to these few. I assume that the threat of divine punishment functions as a second step in the disciplinary process. Augustine approaches Christians from the assumption that the new man prevails in them over the old. Therefore, the disciplinary process starts with gentle instruction. If they, however, then persist in the practices of the old man, resisting the will of God, they need a severer admonition, namely the announcement of divine judgment upon those who intentionally hold on to the life of the old man.

The general council to which Augustine alluded in *Epistula 22* was organized by Aurelius of Carthage in 393 in Hippo Regius. The canons of this council show that it intended a complete reform of the African Church, especially with regard to the clergy. Canon 29 deals with the *laetitiae*. It

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308 ep. 22,5, CSEL 34,1,58: “Sed quod erat tunc dolendum, nunc auferendum est non aspere, sed, sicut scriptum est, in spiritu lenitatis et mansuetudinis [Gal. 6,1; 1 Cor. 4,21]... non ergo aspere, quantum existimo, non duriter, non modo imperioso ista tolluntur, magis docendo quam iubendo, magis monendo quam minando. Sic enim agendum est cum multitudine, seueritas autem exercenda est in peccata paucorum, et si quid minamur, cum dolore fiat de scripturis comminando uindictam futuram, ne nos ipsi in nostra potestate, sed deus in nostro sermone timeatur. ita prius mouebuntur spiritales uel spiritalibus proximi, quorum auctoritate et lenissimis quidem sed instantissimis admonitionibus cetera multitudo frangatur” (WSA 2/1, 60, slightly adapted).

309 In his early writings, the *homines spiritales* form a group of learned believers, who enjoy either charismatic or ministerial authority, are characterized by a love of God and the neighbor (*uera rel. 24 and 58*), and are engaged in serving their fellow believers with admonition, teaching, and refutation of heresy. Cf. also Gal. 6:1, the text to which Augustine alludes in ep. 22,5: “fratres, etsi praeoccupatus fuerit homo in aliquo delicto, vos, qui spiritales estis, instruite huiusmodi in spiritu lenitatis, intendens teipsum, ne et tu temteris.” On the *homo spiritalis* theme in Augustine work, see: Cornelius Mayer, “Augustins Lehre vom ’homo spiritalis’”, in: Cornelius Mayer & Karl Heinz Chelius, *Homo Spiritalis. Festgabe für Luc Verheijen OSA zu seinem 70. Geburtstag* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1987), 3-60.

310 Recall the rule of discipline that Augustine formulated in mor. 1,56, CSEL 90,60: “Agit ergo his gradibus, quod ad animum pertinet, ut primo timeat deinde diligat Deum. Hi mores sunt optimi, per quos nobis etiam ipsa prouenit, ad quam omni studio rapimur, agnito ueritatis”; and uera rel. 33, CCL 32,207: “Pietas timore incoatur, caritate perficitur.”

stipulates “that no bishops or clerics will have banquets in the Church, unless perhaps to refresh those who pass by, if necessity requires that they receive hospitality there; the people, however, should be prohibited to have these kind of meals, as far as possible.”  

After 393 Augustine called on the authority of a council to put the proposed prohibitions into practice: the laetitiae should be banned from holy places. *Epistula* 29, however, written around 395 to Alypius, shows that this law met with fierce resistance from the side of the congregation. Augustine writes that on Ascension Eve, a few days before the laetitia in honour of Hippo’s martyr-bishop Leontius, the people caused uproar, saying that they could not bear the prohibition to celebrate the “solemnity” together in the Church. During the following days, Augustine preaches a series of sermons in which he addresses the issue again. What strikes the reader in these sermons, in contrast to *Letter* 22, is that Augustine does not choose a mild, educative approach. He no longer considers his flock as ignorant, but as obstinate and proud. Although they know better now, they desire to live out their carnal appetites under the cover of religion. Commenting on Mt. 7:6 (“Do not give what is holy to dogs, and do not cast your pearls before swine”), Augustine announces that they will be put to shame (cogerentur erubescere) if they continue to oppose the commandments of God. At the end of the sermon he adds that “if they continued to do it in their homes, it would be necessary to exclude them (eos arceri oporteret) from what is holy and from the pearls in the Church.” It might well be that Augustine refers here to exclusion from the Lord’s Supper. Whereas he had first tolerated the domestic celebration of the martyr feasts, education and conciliar authority have increased the congregants’ responsibility. The level of discipline becomes severer now. Not just brotherly rebuke through the refusal of table fellowship at home, but exclusion from the Eucharist awaits those who persevere in their sins.

Although Augustine’s first sermon was received favourably, it had a minor effect, as only a small group of people were present in the church. Outside the walls of the church, however, the sermon met with critique from those who were not present, but who heard of it from others. Therefore, Augustine prepared a sermon for Ascension Day, in which he would address the problem again, this time for a larger crowd. In this sermon, Augustine compares his congregants, people from the New Testament, with the Jews, the people of the Old Testament. He first draws their attention to Christ’s cleansing of the temple. If Christ already drove those out of God’s house who were selling necessary goods for the prescribed sacrifices, how much more furious would Christ enter this Church in judgment? Subsequently, Augustine turns to the history of the golden calf (Ex. 32). He emphasizes that the Jews were never found drunk in the name of true religion (as Augustine’s own congregants are), except when they celebrated a feast after they fashioned the golden calf. Augustine then adds: “After I said this, I also took up the book and read out the whole passage.”

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312 Breviarium Hipponense 29, CCSL 149,41: “Ut nulli episcopi uel clerici in ecclesia conuiuentur, nisi forte transeuntes hospitiorum necessitate illic reficiant; populi etiam ab huiusmodi conuiuis, quantum potest, prohibeantur.”


314 ep. 29,3, CSEL 34,1,115: “… sancto et margaritis ecclesiasticis eo arceri…” Cf. s. 60A where Augustine describes the barking dogs and the pigs as those people who enjoy their carnal pleasures and do not see the need to repent and receive forgiveness.

315 ep. 29,3.

316 ep. 29,4.
unimportant addition, for it suggests what Augustine aimed at in addressing his flock. The narrative ends with a massacre among the Israelites as a punishment for their idolatry. By relating this Old Testament story, Augustine tacitly suggests that his congregants awaits an even severer punishment, as they, people of the New Testament, commit the same sins, yet not once, but frequently, and, moreover, in the name of true religion.

Augustine does not only announce a more sever punishment on his flock, because their sins are more serious than those of Israel, but also because the grace they received is greater. Paul distinguishes the Christians from the hardhearted Jews by describing them as “his letter, written not on tablets of stone, but on tablets of hearts of flesh” (2 Cor. 3:3). Christians are indwelled by the Spirit, who makes them receptive to the law of God. This implies, Augustine further explains, that he is entitled to expect from his congregants that his preaching breaks their heart, just as Moses broke the tablets of stone, when he was confronted with the sins of the people. If they are people of the New Testament, cleansed from sin, justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God (1 Cor. 6:9-11), “how can you still tolerate in your heart, that is the temple of God, such filth of concupiscence against which the kingdom of the heavens is closed?” Quoting Paul from Gal. 5:19-21 and 1 Cor. 6:9, Augustine warns them that if they hold on to these works of the flesh, and do not display the fruits of the Spirit, they will not inherit the kingdom of God. He also warns those who associate with people who have these banquets in their homes. By associating with persistent sinners they demonstrate their approval of their wicked deeds and are therefore guilty of the same sins (cf. 1 Cor. 5:11).

Augustine considers his responsibility as a preacher to be a heavy burden. He identifies himself with the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel, who characterizes himself as a watchman, who is called to warn his people for approaching danger (Ez. 33:9). Christ has endowed him with this responsibility and he will have to render an account of it. However, Augustine does not consider his own responsibility to be ultimate. At the end of the sermon he assures his flock that he trusts in him “who cannot lie and who promised through the mouth of his prophet concerning Jesus Christ, If his children abandon my law and do not walk in my commandments, if they profane my ordinances, I shall visit their crimes with the rod and their sins with scourges, but I shall not allow them to be condemned along with this world (allusion to 1 Cor. 11:32).” Augustine thus believes that God

317 ep. 29,4. CSEL 34,1,115: “Addidi etiam cum dolore, quo potui, quoniam apostolus ait ad discernendum populum christianum a duritia Iudaeorum epistulam suam non in tabulis lapideis scriptam sed in tabulis cordis carnalibus [2 Cor. 3,3], cum Moyses famulus dei propter illos principes binas lapideas tabulas confringisset, quo modo non possemus istorum corda confringere, qui homines noui testamenti sanctorum diebus celebrandis ea uellent sollemniter exhibere, quae populus ueteris testamenti et semel et idolo celebravit.”
318 ep. 29,5.
319 ep. 29,5.
320 ep. 29,7.
321 ep. 29,7. Augustine also uses Ps. 89:31-34 to interpret the sack of Rome in ciu. 1,10, CCL 47,11: “It is fitting that even the discipline of experience is added to them, who for a long time neglected the discipline of words”(opertebat enim ut eis adderetur etiam experimentorum disciplina, a quibus tam diu fuerat neglecta uerborum). In Contra Epistulam Parmeniani 3,14 Augustine quotes a passage from Cyprian’s De lapsis 6, in which the latter also uses Ps. 89:31-34 to interpret persecutions as God’s corrective punishment of a Church that leads a worldly life. Also Cyprian stresses that God warns through the words of Scripture and if the Church does not listen, the harder medicine of actual punishment is inflicted, as Cyprian’s flock is presently experiencing. See
himself will somehow intervene with corrective punishment, to convert those for whom the discipline of words was not enough. Augustine might have had Paul in mind here, who mourned to the Lord about the unrepentant attitude of the Corinthians, asking God “to obtain a rod... by which they would be corrected” 322 If the human minister of the flock has acquitted himself of his job and does not see any effect, he may put his hope in the personal intervention of the Lord. This trust in God’s own intervention illustrates Augustine’s theology of predestination in practice. 323

Although this second sermon moved the people to tears and filled Augustine with hope of their correction, the next day it was reported to him that there were still many people who complained about the prohibition of the laetitiae. When Augustine heard this, he resolved to read the passage from Ezekiel: The lookout is acquitted if he reported the danger, even if those to whom it is reported refuse to beware (Ez. 33:9) “and to shake the dust from his clothes and leave” (Mt. 10:14). But “then the Lord showed that he does not abandon us and showed how he exhorts us to place our trust in him.” 324 An hour before Augustine was about to start his sermon, the complainers came to him and he was able to bring them to a right opinion with a few words. These words show how Augustine experienced in practice what he will later express in the anti-Donatist formula: “Foris inveniatur necessitas, nascitur intus voluntas.” 325 Augustine is called to report the danger, but God gives repentance. In response to the complainers’ sudden change of attitude, Augustine abandoned his first resolve and devotes his sermon to explaining how the habit of extravagant laetitiae had arisen and why it should be prohibited now (see above) and that the Africans should be imitators of the Italian Churches, “in which these practices had never been accepted and in part corrected by good pastors with the obedience of the people.” 326 At the end of the sermon, Augustine “saw that all were with singleness of heart beginning to have a good will and had rejected their bad habit.” 327

We do not know, of course, how strong this good will would prove to be in the future. In any case, Augustine’s account of his disciplinary activities regarding the laetitiae illustrates both his view on discipline in general and the relationship between human correction and divine grace. As we have observed before, Augustine prefers the method of gentle teaching before threatening with divine judgment, especially when it concerns a sin that arises from ignorance among Christians. If they, however, persist in their habit and do not want to repent, Augustine threatens the people with the final judgment (emphasizing their greater responsibility compared to the people of the Old Testament). He

 laps. 7, CCL 3,224: “Praenuntiata sunt ista nobis et ante praedicta. Sed nos, datae legis et observationis inmemores, id egimus per nostra peccata ut, dum domini mandata contemnimus, ad correctionem delicti et probacionem fidei remedis seuerioribus ueniremus.”

322 C. ep. Parm. 3,14, CSEL 51,117: “Quid aliud hic dixit: non parcam [2 Cor. 13,2] nisi quod superius ait: et lugeam [2 Cor. 12,21], ut luctus eius imperetaret flagellum a domino, quo illi corriperentur...”

323 It also testifies to Augustine’s view on the relationship between Church unity and discipline. If it is impossible to expel evildoers from the congregation, because there are too many of them, one should not abandon them, thus causing a schism, but sigh to God for their improvement, and bear with them until they convert, or until the final separation at the end of time. Augustine expresses this idea already in Ps. c. Don. 288-89, ed. Anastasi 70: “Expello malos quos possum, quos non possum cogor ferre, fero illos donec sanentur, aut separantur in fine.” Cf. H.B. Weijland, Augustinus en de kerkelijke tucht, 60.

324 ep. 29,8.

325 s. 112,8.

326 ep. 29,10. It is interesting to notice that Augustine gets the objection that in the ‘basilica of the blessed Peter’ daily drunkeness does take place. Augustine has to admit that the bishops do not have the power in that big city to completely control the great multitude of carnal people. But he admonishes his people saying that if they want to honor Peter they should better listen to his epistle, and then reads 1 Petr. 4:1-3.

327 ep. 29,10.
also admonishes his flock to expose sinners publicly by not eating with them, thus showing the borders of the community and making them ashamed. A further way to effect this change of habit is exclusion from the Eucharist. If these efforts do not have the desired outcomes, Augustine takes recourse to God’s own disciplinary intervention in the life of his people, so that they will not be condemned along with the world. This trust again illustrates one of the fundamental ideas in Augustine’s understanding of ecclesiastical discipline, namely that it serves God’s own pedagogy in the lives of his people. Augustine himself witnesses the surprising way in which God gives repentance at the point where human teachers have abandoned hope.

4.7.4.2 Augustine’s discipline in the service of Church unity

A second widespread sin that Augustine addresses in his letters is strife and jealousy (contentio and dolus) among the clergy, the other vice to which he referred in Epistula 22 as unjustifiably tolerated in the African Church. Augustine observes that ecclesiastical office bearers are easily driven by the desire for praise. They find the honour of their own name among men more important than the purity of their conscience before God. This desire results in jealousy, strife, and hypocrisy.328

In his letters Augustine emphasizes that what should count for a bishop or priest is not his personal honour, but rather a good conscience before God. Only if a bishop is independent from the praise of men, and strives to please God alone, he is able to act with right judgment in relation to the people over whom he has received authority.329 In Epistula 22, Augustine confesses to Aurelius that he himself daily struggles with this vice: “For only one who has declared war on this enemy feels its strength, because, even if it is easy for someone to do without praise when it is denied, it is difficult not to take delight in it when it is offered.”330

Augustine’s rebuke of this vice plays a role in his early correspondence with a Donatist colleague, Maximinus of Sitium (Epistula 23).331 Augustine tries to win his colleague over by appealing to God’s judgment over those who prefer the praise of men to a good conscience before God. He attempts to persuade the Donatist bishop to return to the Catholic Church by putting him before the judgment seat of Christ.332 People had told Augustine that Maximinus was an exceptional Donatist, because he refused to rebaptize Catholics. Although Augustine did not believe this at first, he considered “that it is possible that the fear of God entered the human soul reflecting on the future life.

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328 ep. 22,7. The canons of the council of Carthage (390) illustrate that this vice led to schisms between clergy and to the usurpation of another’s ecclesial territory. Cf. Shaw, Sacred Violence, 359, 378-79. For the text of the canons that mention these abuses, see CCSL 149,16-18.
329 ep. 22,8. Cf. en. Ps. 7,4: “The apostle Paul says, Let anyone who boasts, boast in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31). This integrity, however, is dragged down into the dust if through bragging (superbia) someone despises the secret testimony of his conscience, where God alone tests a person and yet wants to be a somebody among his fellows. This is what lies behind what the psalmist says elsewhere, God will grind to pieces the bones of those who curry favor with their fellows (Ps. 53:5)” (translation: WSA 3/15, 117).
330 ep. 22,8.
331 On this letter, see also Ebeler, Disciplining Christians, 69-75.
332 Epistula 23 is often cited to show that the early Augustine rejected military force to compel schismatics to unity, and opted for peaceful dialogue. See Paul van Geest and Vincent Hunink, Met zachte hand. Augustinus over dwang in kerk en maatschappij (Budel: Damon, 2012), 32-3; Frend, “Augustine and State Authority”, 56-7. This is correct, but one should not forget that Augustine already makes use of spiritual coercion by referring to Christ’s future judgment. His early attitude to the Donatists should not be misperceived as a form of dialogue in a modern, ecumenical fashion.
so that it held itself back from a most evident crime.” 333 This consideration filled Augustine with hope of reunion with his schismatic colleague, for if Maximinus acknowledges the validity of Catholic baptism, he in fact rejects the legitimacy of the Donatist schism. Unfortunately, Augustine had heard that Maximinus had rebaptized the Catholic deacon Muttugenna. In his letter to Maximinus, he asks him for clarification of this matter, but until Maximinus himself confirms this rumour, Augustine continues to believe the best of him.

Augustine continues his letter by appealing to Maximinus’ alleged fear of God. Augustine believes that although Maximinus holds the right beliefs, and therefore fears to rebaptize a Catholic, his belief is not yet bold enough to publicly confess the truth and risk the rejection of his Donatist colleagues. He fears the loss of his honourable position more than God’s judgment over him. In response, Augustine tries to convince Maximinus to act according to his beliefs by appealing to Christ’s future judgment:

In the sight of Christ do not fear the reproach or do not be terrified at the power of a human being. The honour of the world is passing; its pride is passing. In Christ’s future judgment neither pulpits furnished with steps nor thrones with canopies, nor flocks of processing and chanting nuns will be called to our defence when our consciences begin to accuse us and the judge of our conscience begins to pass judgment. Those things which here are honours will then be burdens; those things which here raise us up will then pull us down. These honours which are shown to us for a time on account of the good of the Church will perhaps be defended by a good conscience, but they will not be able to defend a bad conscience.334

If Maximinus believes that rebaptism is a crime against Christ in heaven, whose sign (of baptism) must be approved of wherever it is found, he presently lives in sin before God.335 The honour he receives as a Donatist bishop obfuscates this reality. But when the praise of men has passed, only the testimony of a bad conscience remains.336 Then Maximinus will have to bear the consequences of his preference for human praise over the praise of Christ. Augustine hopes that this announcement of future judgment will persuade Maximinus to bear the suffering that a bold confession of his faith will bring along. Augustine admonishes him: “Why do you not go out... and say:... I do not destroy what I recognize as the Lord’s; I do not subject to exsufflation the standard of my king.”337 If Maximinus fears Christ more than his peers, unity is only a matter of time.

Augustine not only attempts to inspire Maximinus with the fear of Christ as a counterbalance to his fear of his peers. He also instills this fear with regard to Maximinus’ responsibility for his flock.

333 ep. 23,2, CSEL 34,1,68: “[Fateor, primo non credidi.] Deinde considerans posse fieri, ut animam humanam de futura uita cogitantem dei timor inuaderet, ut se ab scelere apertissimo temperaret...” (WSA, 1/2, 64).
335 ep. 23,4, CSEL 34,1,67: “Cur non discissis...et dicis: non destruo, quod dominicum agnosco, non exsufflo uexillum regis mei?” (WSA 1/2, 65).
336 Augustine calls the praise of men ‘the old skins of timid servitude’ (veterae pelles timidae seruitatis), which calls to mind the tunics of skins that Adam and Eve received after they had sinned: the body and its actions used to conceal our inner world for others. Cf. Gn. adu. Man. 2,32.
337 ep. 23,4.
We both have to give an account to Christ of how we cared for his flock and laboured for their salvation, Augustine argues. Augustine writes about himself: “I cannot be silent about our deacon who was rebaptized, for I know how dangerous for me such silence is. After all, I do not plan to pass my time in the vanity of ecclesiastical honours; rather, I bear in mind that I will give an account to the prince of all pastors about the sheep entrusted to me.”

The thought of having to give an account to the prince of all pastors stimulates Augustine to save people from the destruction (pernicioses) that is to come, not only those who are still in the Catholic Church, but also those who belong to her but are presently cut off from the vine of the Lord through schism.

Augustine thus tries to compel his colleague to unity by invoking the future judgment of Christ both for his way of seeking praise (from man rather than from Christ) and for the way he takes care of his flock.

4.8 Conclusion
This chapter investigated Augustine’s thought on the salvific function of divine judgment in the works that he composed during the period of his priesthood until his ordination as a bishop. Particularly Augustine’s engagement with Paul (against the Manichees) and his new responsibilities as an ecclesiastical office bearer accounted for developments in his thought.

4.8.1 The punishment of sin and free will
The first part of this chapter addressed Augustine’s polemic with the Manichees concerning the effects of the first sin on the human will. His Manichean opponents interpreted Paul’s discourse on the battle between flesh and spirit as confirming their dualist understanding of the human person. Augustine attempted to reclaim Paul from the Manichees in order to uphold the forensic understanding of the relationship between God and man, which he had adopted via Ambrose and had defended in his early writings. God deals with humans according to their merits, and in order to have merit, one needs to possess liberum arbitrium. The experience of compulsion and division of the will must therefore be interpreted as a divine punishment for human sin. Augustine increasingly emphasizes man’s inability to return to God, up to the point that he even comes to deny that a humble response to the divine call has any meritorious value (Ad Simplicianum).

Although I argued in the previous chapter that Augustine had always held a strong view of human fallenness, he continued to ascribe an independent role to the human will in the process of Christian transformation. We encountered this idea in De libero arbitrio 1 and in his progressivist view of sanctification. This explicit appeal to the place of free will will further surfaces in Augustine’s discussion of grace in his commentaries on Romans and Galatians and in De libero arbitrio 3. In these works, it serves an anti-Manichean purpose. God’s goodness is reconciled with his judgment over sin in that man, although he suffers the punishment of sin in his members, has retained the possibility of humbling himself upon the call of the divine law, which he encounters through general revelation or through the special care of God (in an ecclesiastical context). By appealing to free will, Augustine

338 ep. 23,6, CSEL 34,1,70: “Ego rebaptizato diacono nostro silere non possum; scio enim, quam mihi silentium perniciosum sit, non enim cogito in ecclesiasticis honoribus tempora uentosa transigere, sed cogito me principi pastorum omnium rationem de commissis ouibus redditurum.” (translation: WSA 1/2, 67).

339 ep. 23,6.
clearly represents the anti-dualist tradition as expounded by Clement and Origin. They interpreted God’s punishment of sin as merely pedagogical: it confronted man with his own sins and granted him an opportunity to entrust himself to God’s grace.

Augustine abandons this idea in *Ad Simplicianum* 1.2. He comes to deny that human *librum arbitrium* has retained any freedom to respond with conversion to the divine call. God’s condemnation of humanity in Adam is primarily retributive. Only those whom God singles out to be justified of the penal consequences of the first sin (and subsequent sin) benefit from the evil they still suffer. In those who remain part of the *massa damnata*, the divine call only meets resistance and confirms the non-elect in their condemned position. It seems that Augustine’s reappropriation of Paul against the Manichees has led him to a paradox that the tradition before him had avoided. On the one hand, he confirms man’s full moral responsibility before God, but on the other hand he denies that man is able to use this responsibility in the right way; he has lost this freedom completely in Adam.

### 4.8.2 The function of the law in relation to Christ

This development went along with Augustine’s appropriation of Paul’s theology of law and grace. Previously, Augustine had understood the relationship between Christ and the law within a pedagogical framework. The Old Testament law foreshadowed the teaching of Christ and coerced its carnal subjects into obedience through fear of punishment. This pedagogical framework defines Augustine’s interpretation of the Pauline duality between law and grace in the early 390s. In *De utilitate credendi* Augustine defends the goodness of the law against the Manichees, arguing that Paul’s characterization of the law as a killing letter refers to its effect upon those who do not understand it. The law as a pedagogue taught in an obscure and coercive way what Christ would teach his pupils in a plain and convincing manner. Augustine understands the Pauline statement that the grace of Christ has freed us from servitude to the law epistemologically: Christ the teacher liberates reason from the dominion of the passions, so that the mind no longer experiences the law as coercive, but as convincing; it wants to be educated by it.

When Augustine begins to comment on *Romans* and *Galatians* in 394, he expands this pedagogical understanding of the relationship between Christ and the law. In Augustine’s new interpretation, the letter that kills not only refers to its not being understood, but also to its not being fulfilled. It is there to bring its hearers to the knowledge of their guilt before God and of their liability to condemnation. The pedagogue assumes the function of plaintiff who brings its hearers to despair about their juridical position before God. They need a new juridical position before God. Although both soteriological frameworks ascribe to Christ a uniquely mediating role, the latter emphasizes that the renewal of man requires the forgiveness of an objective guilt. Sin’s effects can only be undone if the juridical ground on which sin rules over humanity have been removed. This had been an underestimated aspect in Augustine’s pedagogical understanding of Christianity.

### 4.8.3 The development of Augustine’s understanding of Christ’s death

The change in Augustine’s understanding of the law went along with an evolution in his understanding of the death of Christ. His polemical appropriation of Paul forces Augustine to think about the historical uniqueness of Christ’s incarnation and death. Augustine’s pedagogical Christology shared an
important characteristic of Manichaean Christology, namely that it focused on Christ as a teacher. Furthermore, it interpreted Paul’s expressions about Christ as having been made sin for us, or as bearing our sins, or as being made a curse for us, as referring to the suffering of the soul under the powers of evil, which Jesus on the cross exemplified. In his sufferings, Christ exposed the cruelty of the God of the Old Testament. Augustine’s struggle with Paul in conversation with the Manichees helped him to achieve a deeper understanding of the salvific meaning of Christ’s death as more than exemplary teaching, and as part of the one divine economy of salvation (and thus in continuity with the Old Testament). In *Contra Adiutantium*, his commentary on *Galatians*, and *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine comes to argue that God executed the curse of the law on Christ, in order to set those who believe in him free from the power of sin, death, and devil. In *De libero arbitrio* Augustine argues the same idea from another perspective. The devil, who had received the right to exercise power over humanity through the fear of death, was deprived of this right by putting the righteous one to death, so that all who are in Christ can be released from sin without violating the law of righteousness. In *En. in Ps. 21* Augustine makes his case within the context of his *totus Christus* idea. Christ thus identifies with the person of the old man on the cross, suffers its punishment, and communicates the righteousness that is proper to his own person to the Church. In Christ, believers have been released from the debt of condemnation, which they owed because of their sins, and receive the rights of being fully released from the *poena peccati*.

Although Augustine does not explicitly connect his Christology to his doctrine of predestination, nonetheless, the connection is logically there. If man deserves condemnation, and the only way to be released from this condition is through the death of the old man in the body of Christ, then the appeal to free will as the merit that grounds the reception of his grace (as Augustine still has it in the *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos*) becomes a “Fremdkörper” in the concept of salvation.

### 4.8.4 The function of temporal punishment and the fear of God in the Christian life

This juridical move in Augustine’s Christology also appears in his way of conceptualizing the Christian life. Through faith in Christ, sins are forgiven. This implies that man is no longer bound to suffer final punishment. His will is liberated to fulfill the law, rather than to suffer its condemnation. However, God does not remove the temporal punishments for sin. This would contradict his righteousness. God rather uses them towards the end of the Christian’s education in righteousness (*disciplina iustitiae*). Augustine applies these ideas both to corporeal suffering, and to the assault of concueto. Both of these punishments have a pedagogical function in the life of Christians.

Further, Augustine ceases to conceptualize the Christian life in terms of gradual ascent. He comes to speak of the Christian life in a rather undifferentiated way as life *sub gratia*. The life under grace can be described as a continuous exercise to return to the grace of Christ. At this point, an element that occurred earlier in the *Soliloquia* reoccurs: God allows the believer to become entangled in the sin, in order to deepen his awareness that sanctification is a gift of God in Christ, rather than something of which he himself disposes. This element had been present in Augustine’s thought from very early on, but now becomes increasingly embedded in a non-progressivist view of the Christian life. The law of God no longer merely functions as a means to purify the will towards virtue, but rather as an incentive to continuously confess one’s sins and plead for God’s promise of forgiveness and healing. Augustine will further develop this idea in the *Confessions*. 
4.8.5 Church discipline

Having been forced into the priesthood, Augustine had to assume responsibility for a congregation which consisted of different kinds of Christians, many of which were still largely pagan. Furthermore, he was confronted with the drawing force of a Donatist counter-Church, and the influence of Manichaeism. Simultaneously, he continued to reflect upon the organization of the life in his own religious community (and the communities that were established under its inspiration).

First, I described Augustine’s discourse on fraternal correction. Just as in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, Augustine emphasizes that the one who rebukes might himself be driven by baser desires than the love of truth itself. Therefore, Augustine contends that reflection upon one’s motives needs to precede the decision to rebuke the brother. In this respect, Augustine’s thought reflects the ancient pedagogical notion that one who intends to cure another’s mind must first possess soundness of mind himself; his medical imagery recalls that ancient context. At the same time, Augustine’s view of mutual correction became more distinctly Christian. This comes to the fore in his understanding of the love that should motivate Christian rebuke. The brother is loved not on the basis of his own moral capacities, but as one for whom Christ has died. It is the grace of Christ that should motivate the believer to bear with the sins of the other, to apply corrective words with good hope of conversion, and to do this with humility.

In Augustine’s reflections on discipline in his religious community, we received more insight into his understanding of the different levels of discipline: from mutual rebuke, to corrective punishment, to exclusion from the community. In the description of discipline in his religious community, Augustine first repeats the need for mutual rebuke. Through mutual vigilance God himself protects the community against sin. If the brother does not want to listen, however, he is to be confronted with the weightier authority of the praepositus, who represents God to the community. It is hoped that his words will inspire the sinner with the fear of God himself. The praepositus is also endowed with the right to apply corrective punishments to the sinner. However, before these can be applied, the alleged sinner deserves a fair juridical process, in order to prevent the accused from becoming the victim of the evil intentions of others. If the sinner is convicted, he must undergo punishments. Even if he repents at that moment, he needs to undergo them, not as satisfaction for sin, but rather as cure of his soul. The praepositus should reflect upon which penal measures would be the most effective for the healing of the sinner. If he does not want to subject himself to this ‘surgery’, the last remedial measure consists of proiectio, the expulsion of the sinner from the community. This is done both to restrain the negative effects of sin on the congregation, but also to restrain the sinner in seducing others. Furthermore, this excommunication is a sign of a spiritual reality: the sinner’s alienation from the kingdom of God and his grace. As such it is meant as a final admonition to return.

In the 390s Augustine thus proves to develop his thought on the place of temporal punishment in the context of communal discipline. This confirms our findings in the previous chapter, where we concluded that the Church in the time of the New Testament does not differ from Israel with regard to its need of temporal restraint. The Church starts with teaching, but can be called to apply severer medicines if the state of the patient requires it. The development of Augustine’s thought on this matter also appears in his justification of corporeal punishment administered in the time of the New Testament.

He applies this insight to the Donatists who, according to Augustine, raged against the Catholics, and because of that did not see the speck in their own eye.
Testament. Against the Manichees who oppose the violence of the Old Testament to the love commanded by Jesus in New Testament, Augustine argues that severity and love can go together in the application of punishment. However, one needs to possess the God-given position to apply these punishments. In this regard, the Church of the New Testament differs from the Church in the Old Testament, as it is no longer ruled by king who possesses coercive power. The New Testament Church lives under the physical authority of the rulers of this age (*potestates huius mundi*). Augustine approaches worldly rulership with suspicion, because it is exercised by fallen humans. As Robert Markus has observed, Augustine breaks with the optimistic Platonic ideal of a state that educates its citizen. However, he simultaneously shares in the post-Constantinian experience that the rulers of this world can be converted and can use their coercive power in the service of the Church.

Augustine’s own ministry also testifies to the different levels at which he exercised discipline over his flock. In his complaints about the *laetitiae*, he writes to Bishop Aurelius of Carthage that discipline should start with teaching (from the presupposition that their congregants do not err willingly and are teachable). Only when they prove obstinate, the bishop should remind them of God’s judgment, in order to reinvigorate the fear of God in them. This is exactly what Augustine does. He starts his campaign by explaining the origin of the habit, calls for repentance, and admonishes his congregation to exercise mutual rebuke by not eating with those who organize *laetitiae* at their homes, according to Paul’s injunction in 1 Corinthians 5. Furthermore, Augustine expects a lot from the disciplinary authority of a council, which could issue a general decree to ban the feasts from public worship places. This was done by the council of Hippo in 393, but Augustine’s correspondence with Alypius testifies that there was still significant resistance to this measure. In this situation, Augustine takes recourse to God’s own (violent) intervention to correct his children.

This shows that Augustine’s exercise of discipline in his congregation differed from the exercise of discipline in his religious communities. Widespread sinful habits could not be eradicated through severe disciplinary measures (such as excommunication), without breaking the unity of the congregation. In this case, the disciplinarian followed the example of Paul, by invoking God’s own disciplinary intervention. Augustine believes that all discipline by humans eventually serves God’s own discipline of his people. Therefore, it may be expected that if God’s people do not listen to the words of his human servants, they must expect for God to use other means to correct them, so that they are not condemned with the world. It might be that Augustine used a similar way of reasoning in the case of the Donatists. He initially accepted the appeal to the state for no other purpose than to restrain Donatist violence, but when he witnessed the effects of the state laws on the Donatist congregation in Hippo, he perceived it as divine intervention. God himself had done through his providence, what human words had not been able to accomplish.
5 Confessions: God’s lawsuit with Augustine between the deferral and the reception of baptism

5.1 Introduction

This chapter on the Confessions investigates how Augustine perceived the relationship between God’s grace and his judgment in his own life. The present chapter differs from the previous ones in that it does not so much investigate a new period in Augustine’s thinking, but rather asks how the insights gained in the previous chapters feature in the autobiography that he wrote at the beginning of his episcopate. What does Augustine say about God’s pedagogical use of evil in his life, the function of the law in relation to grace, the disciplinary presence of the Church, Christ as the mediator of righteousness, and the function of judgment after conversion?

The main argument of this chapter is that Augustine describes the course of his life as a lawsuit of God with him, which begins after the deferral of his baptism and Augustine’s subsequent alienation from God and the Church, and was brought to a resolution when Augustine received baptism at the hands of Ambrose. As a child of Adam, Augustine was born as a man liable to condemnation. Although he could have been reborn to a life in the spirit through baptism, his mother deferred it, so that he was delivered to the dominion of his old nature and headed towards final condemnation. In retrospect, however, Augustine sees that God was always present to chastise him from without, and to illuminate him from within with the knowledge of his law, so that he would gradually come to see himself as a man under law, and confess his need for Christ the mediator of

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1 It is generally assumed that Augustine composed the Confessions between 397 and 401. P.-M. Hombert, however, holds that the work was interrupted early after 397, and presumes that the books 1-9 were written in 400 and the books 10-13 not before 403. See P.-M. Hombert, Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennne, (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série d’Antiquité, 163; Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2000), 9-23.

Augustine did not write the Confessions as an autobiography in the modern sense of the word. Rather, he relates his life from the perspective of God’s providence in order to praise him in his justice and goodness, and to raise up the human mind and heart towards God. Cf. retr. 2,6,1, CCL 57,94: “Confessionum mearum libri tredecim et de malis et de bonis meis deum laudant iustum et bonum, atque in eum excitant humanum intellectum et affectum.” On the protreptic genre of the Confessions, see Annemaré Kotzé, Augustine’s Confessions. Communicative Purpose and Audience (Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2004).

Another peculiar aspect of the Confessions is the unity between the first ten books, which are autobiographical, and the last three, which present an exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis. Many proposals concerning its unity have been given. For a time it was thought that the Confessions were simply badly composed. This judgment was expressed (but later revoked) by Henry Irenéé Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: Éditions E, de Boccard, 1982), 75 (“Augustin compose mal”), and recently repeated by Serge Lancel, St. Augustine, 209 (“the error in this ‘architectural’ view (or any other similar inspiration) lies in the striving at all costs to recognize in the Confessions a literary unity which they do not possess – and which Augustine did not try to impose on them”). However, many interesting proposals have been made as to the compositional unity of the work. For a survey of recent scholarship, see e.g. Annemaré Kotzé, Augustine’s Confessions, 7-43. Two interesting recent proposals, which both give a prominent place to the hexaemeron-structure, are given by Jared Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions (Unpublished PhD-thesis Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., 2012), 273-328, and Daniel Austin Napier, En Route to the Confessions, ch.6.

I refrain from contributing to this discussion, as the research question of my thesis does not require this. I will use the material from Books 11-13 as theological background information to the story of Augustine’s conversion and his postbaptismal life as related in Book 10.
righteousness. I will argue that it is not Augustine’s decision in the garden, but rather his reception of baptism that marks the decisive moment in his life, because it granted him a new juridical position before God. Formerly he deserved condemnation, because of the load of his sins. Now he deserves redemption from condemnation on account of Christ. Although after baptism, the penal effects of sin continue to battle against him, and render the final victory uncertain, the law no longer condemns him, because in Christ the power of sin and death have been made void. This leads to a confessional use of the law. It helps Augustine to confess his sins, and thus to exercise himself in dependence on the grace of Christ. Moreover, grace has liberated him to present his own life in the light of God’s law, in order to foster the conversion of others.

5.2 Creation, sin, and punishment: the mind made captive to the law of the flesh

Augustine’s autobiography unfolds against the background of a primordial fall of humanity in Adam. Man was created to know and to love God through the things God had made. Augustine compares temporal creation to the recital of a poem, by which God admonishes man to ascend to the wisdom of the divine artist expressed therein. Temporal creation is not a goal itself, but rather functions as a vehicle by which God exhorts man to turn inward and ascend to the beauty and wisdom of the Creator that can be discerned by the mind. This is what it means to live according to the Spirit. If man lives according to the Spirit (obeys the law that God imposed on his mind), he will eventually inherit a place in the “heaven of heaven” (caelum caeli), the community of spiritual beings that is elevated above time, and contemplates God without change and variation.

However, man opted to seek his fulfillment in the realm of the senses. He refused to use creation as a path towards God, but came to treat it as God’s very substitute. He began to seek eternal

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2 conf. 4,17. In conf. 11,13 Augustine speaks of God’s Word and Wisdom who, being himself ever present (stans.. nec futura nec praeterita aeternitas), pronounces future and past times (dictet futura et praeterita tempora).

3 The status of time is a contested issue in Augustinian studies. O’Connell and Teske, for example, have argued that Augustine treats time in the Confessions as a result of the fall. For their views, see R.J. O’Connell, Augustine’s Confessions. The Odyssey of the Soul, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 135-44; Roland Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 138-58. However, Augustine speaks of time as a creature of God, and as the condition in which man is allowed to grow towards likeness to God. It seems to me that Augustine regards temporal existence as a condition of the good, but not yet consummated, creation. Human existence in time is good, but participation in God’s eternity is better. When Augustine speaks negatively of man’s existence in time (as he does, for example in conf. 11,39-40, a text to which O’Connell and Teske also refer), he does so on account of human sin. As a consequence of man’s disordered love for temporal things, his identity has lost its unity and has become dispersed in time (Cf. O’Daly, “Time as Distentio and Temporality in Augustine’s Confessions”, in: Idem, To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of St. Augustine (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 259-74; Jean Pépin, “Recherches sur le sens et les origines de l'expression 'Caelum caeli' dans le livre XII des 'Confessions' de saint Augustin”, Archivum latinitatis Medii Aevi 23/1953, 185-274.


5 conf. 6,1, CCL 27,73: “Et ambulabam per tenebras et lubricum et quaerabam te foris a me et non inueniebam deum cordis mei.” conf. 7,11, CCL 27,100: “… ante te erat desiderium meum et lumen oculorum meorum non erat mecum [Ps. 37,9-11]. Intus enim erat, ego autem foris, nec in loco illud.” conf. 10,38, CCL 27,175: “Et ecce
This sinful choice brought its own punishment along. Man lost his knowledge of the truth and his power to act in accordance with the truth. The wisdom of the flesh came to dominate his soul.

Augustine uses a variety of images to express the reality of sin and its penal consequences on the human soul. One of these images is the dark abyss (Gen. 1:2). As a consequence of Adam’s disobedience, the soul as it were returned to its unformed state, before God enlightened it with his Word and ordered its love through his Spirit. Darkness symbolizes human ignorance of the truth, and the waters of the abyss symbolize the restlessness of the human will, which has attached itself to unstable goods. Sin has made Adamic humanity into a dark and restless sea.

Another image that Augustine uses to describe the penal consequence of (the first) sin is that of exile. This image is inextricably connected to the parable of the prodigal son. When Adam sinned, the heavenly Jerusalem remained standing by God’s grace, but man left the house of the Father to journey to a far-off country (terra longinqua). Since then, man misses the joys and comforts of the Father’s house. Instead of being nourished by the Word of God, he suffers spiritual hunger (egestas). Instead of being clothed with the divine light, he walks around naked and in darkness.

This is the cosmic background against which Augustine’s life unfolds. To put it in the Pauline terminology that so often recurs in the Confessions: by refusing to live according to the Spirit, humanity has become subject to the prudence of the flesh.

intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram.”

6 John Cavadini (“Time and Ascent in Confessions XI” in: Joseph T. Lienhard, Earl C. Muller and Roland J. Teske, Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993), 174) has argued that Augustine’s account of time in Book 11 of the Confessions can be read as a critique of man’s inclination to temporalize God and eternalize himself. On the one hand, Augustine critiques those who ask what God did before he created the world. This question subjects God to time and makes him into a creature. Simultaneously, Augustine critiques an idea of time according to which past, present, and future are regarded as having real existence. Man tends to represent past and future as existing ‘somewhere’, because he does not want to admit that his own being continuously tends to nothingness.

7 conf. 13,13.


10 conf. 12,13. Augustine describes himself and his friends before his conversion as ‘banished from God’s house’ (2,4) “walking along the streets of Babylon” (2,8).

11 Leo Ferrari, “The Theme of the Prodigal Son in Augustine’s Confessions”, Recherches Augustiniennes 12 (1977), 105-18; Georg Nicolaus Knauer, “Peregrinatio Animae. Zur Frage der Einheit der augustinischen Konfessionen”, Hermes 85/2 (1957), 216-48. Knauer highlights the importance of Ps. 139 in combination with Lk. 15:12-24 for the unity of the Confessions. He seeks the unity of the Confessions in the pilgrimage of the soul that leaves God, is chased by God, both in judgment and grace, and returns to God.

12 Cf. conf. 1,28; 4,30; 7,16.


14 conf. 13,9.
The young Augustine: life in the flesh and God’s chastisements

The following sections describe how Augustine depicts himself in his youth. He was born under the curse of Adam. He suffered under the penal effects of Adam’s sin (5.3.1). At the same time, however, he was familiarized with the Scriptures and the Church, the places where God recreates man into his image (5.3.2). Yet, because his mother deferred baptism, Augustine was delivered to his Adamic nature and to the waves of temptation in the world. Rather than being led back to God, he further alienated himself from God by following the inclinations of his fallen nature: the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the ambition of the world (5.3.3). In hindsight, Augustine sees God at work in the evils that he suffered on account of his sinful behaviour. However, as he was dominated by the desires of the flesh, he lacked all receptiveness for God’s accusing voice (5.4) Although his reading of the *Hortensius* awakened in him the struggle between flesh and spirit, the materialist and dualist misconstruction of this battle by Manichaeism impeded him from becoming receptive to the message of divine chastisement (5.5.). Only his reading of the books of the Platonists, and the metaphysic he gained through them, would effect a change in this situation.

Augustine’s adamic nature

Augustine begins the description of his childhood with the praise of God the Creator. God gave him being and form, the desire for self-preservation, an intelligent mind, a desire for truth, and a heart that sought human community.\(^\text{15}\) Furthermore, God fulfilled Augustine’s created desires by sustaining him with food via his nurses, by teaching him language so that he could understand other humans, and by surrounding him with a community of teachers and friends with whom he could learn and share the truth.\(^\text{16}\) “Indeed, all good things come from you, O God, and ‘from my God is all my salvation.”\(^\text{17}\) At the same time, however, Augustine confesses that he suffered under God’s condemnation. He was born as a child of Adam. He suffered the penal consequences of Adam’s sin in his own nature. He belonged to the “salty water that flows from Adam’s limbs – deeply inquisitive, like a sea in a stormy swell, restlessly unstable”.\(^\text{18}\)

In the *Confessions*, Augustine for the first time elaborates how the consequences of the first sin can be discerned from the earliest moments of human life. Taking his point of departure in *Job* 14:4-5 (*nemo mundus a peccato coram te, nec infans, cuius est unius diei uita super terram*), Augustine states that human concupiscence is already present in little infants.\(^\text{19}\) He argues that the eagerness of a baby’s cry for its mother’s breast hides an already-existing obsession with bodily self-preservation (*concupiscentia carnis*). And under the cries, tears, and limb movements by which infants express their desire for nourishment, already lurks a desire to subdue their parents to their own wills (*ambitio mundi*). Augustine even claims to have seen a baby that could not stand his brother sharing the milk of his mother’s breast. He wanted to have his mother for himself alone. Augustine concedes

\(^{15}\text{conf. 1,31.}\)
\(^{16}\text{conf. 1,7; 1,12.}\)
\(^{17}\text{conf. 1,7.}\)
\(^{18}\text{conf. 13,28, CCL 27,257: “… ex utero eius (Adam) salsugo maris, genus humanum profunde curiosum, et procellose tumidum et instabiliter fluidum.”}\)
\(^{19}\text{Augustine often uses *Job* 14:4-5 to support his doctrine of original sin throughout the rest of his writings often with the variation ‘sorde’ instead of ‘peccato’. See for example *c. litt. Pet.* 2,232; *pecc. mer.* 3,13; *ciu.* 20,26; *c. ep. Pel.* 4,4; *c. Iul.* 2,3; *c. Iul.* 4,49; *ep.* 166,6.}\)
that these evils are tolerated in children, because they are unable to understand their censurability. But this does not mean that the children themselves are innocent. “The infant’s limbs might be innocent, but not its mind”, Augustine argues. The desires that will later move the child to transgress the law already prove to be present in it.

This does not mean that Augustine believes that God credits the movements of the infant’s will to it as personal sins. Rather, these movements must be understood as evidence of its solidarity with Adam. Infants share responsibility for Adam’s sin, and the present movements of their souls are the penal effects of this sin, which indeed disposes them to commit personal sins in the future. This seems to me the meaning of expressions such as peccatum infantiae meae and conceptus in peccatis. It is the sin of Adam inherited by all and at work in all of us that Augustine confesses in the account his infancy. Children do not only share in Adam’s transgression, but also suffer its penal consequences in the soul, which are themselves the causes of new sins. As Augustine has it in En. in Ps. 132,10: “From Adam is Adam, and on top of Adam’s sin many sins originate. Whoever is born, is born as Adam, a damned from a damned, and by living in an evil way he adds to Adam.” In the subsequent narration of his own actions and those of his environment Augustine expresses how the penal consequences of the first sin engender new sins in Adam’s offspring.

5.3.2 Missing salvation: the deferral of baptism

That Augustine was born as a child of Adam, suffering under God’s anger, is not the only thing he has to say about his infant identity. He was also introduced to the Christian faith from the earliest moment of his life on earth. He tells his readers that he was signed with Christ’s cross and seasoned with his salt from the moment he left his mother’s womb. He learned that God is great and powerful, and able to hear our prayers and come to our help, even though we do not see him. Augustine also heard about the humility of Christ, who had descended to us because of our pride and promised us eternal life. Despite the influence of his father who was still a pagan during Augustine’s youth, the teachings of his mother and other Christians exerted great influence on him: He had started to pray to God, and when a sudden illness struck him, he asked for the baptism of Christ “with fervour of mind” (motu animi) and

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20 conf. 1,11, CCL 27,6: “Ita imbecillitas membrorum infantilium innocens est, non animus infantium.” He adds that the same thing that we bear with in a child, we condemn in an adult.
21 Paul Rigby (Original Sin in Augustine’s Confessions (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987), 34) argues: “Augustine does not distinguish between an evil act and guilt for that act, but between guilt and the infant’s comprehension of that guilt. The fact that an infant cannot understand its guilt does not mean that the infant is innocent.” This does not mean, however, that an infant has personal sins. Augustine denies this, for example, in Gn. ad. litt. 10,23; Pecc. mer. 1,40,30. It seems to me that Augustine’s denial of the infant’s innocence refers to its solidarity in the sin of Adam, of which it now suffers the penal consequences.
22 On our solidarity in the sin of Adam, see conf. 1,14; 5,16; 8,21-22.
23 conf. 1,12, CCL 27,7: “Quod si et in iniquitate conceptus sum et in peccatis mater mea me in utero aluit, ubi, oro te, deus meus, ubi, domine, ego, seruus tuus, ubi aut quando innocens fui?” In this sentence, peccatum must be understood as a metonymy of the type ‘causa pro effectu’.
25 conf. 1,17.
26 conf. 1,14.
27 conf. 1,17.
“with faith” (*fide*). This is why Augustine can say of himself: “So I already believed”, and “You were already my guardian.”

However, Augustine’s mother refrained from further introducing Augustine into the Church and its healing discipline by deferring his baptism (when it turned out that Augustine would not die). In line with a widespread custom, she deemed it better to reserve the medicine of baptism for a later moment in Augustine’s life, so that it could wash away as many sins as possible. Augustine deplores his mother’s decision and asks God if this has been the cause for his relapse into the ‘waters’ of sin. Would it not have been better to be baptized and to have guarded his regained health under God’s care? It remains an enigma to Augustine why God allowed Monnica to defer his baptism and unleash the entire story of Augustine’s fall. It reminds the reader of the enigma of the fall of Adam, with which the Manichees confronted Augustine. He does not know why God allowed the fall to happen. He does confess, however, that God uses its penal consequences in his providence over humanity. And this is also what Augustine confesses with regard to his own life.

Although Augustine’s adamic nature was allowed to receive free play over him, the authority of the Christian faith would always remain engraved in his mind. Augustine never explicitly turned his back to the religion of his youth. He should rather been seen as a wandering catechumen. I will argue, therefore, that the story of the *Confessions* unfolds between a baptism deferred and a baptism received. The story of Augustine the sinner, and of God as the chastising Father, can be interpreted as one long disciplinary process, one long catechumenate, in which God acts as the one who restraints Augustine’s sins, but also gradually instills in him a fear of God himself, which leads him to the conviction that he needs a mediator who takes away his guilt before God and thus liberates him from the dominion of sin over him. It is this mediator with whom Augustine is finally united through baptism.

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28 conf. 1,17.  
29 conf. 1,17.  
30 The delay of baptism had become common in fourth-century Christianity, because of the belief that if one underwent baptism later, more sins could be washed away. In line with the tradition, baptism was seen as remitting past sins, and obliging the baptized to live a perfect life after baptism. There was only one possibility of penitence and forgiveness after baptism, namely in the case of *peccata mortalia*, such as adultery, murder, or idolatry. Monnica’s deferral of baptism can therefore be seen as motivated by a desire for Augustine’s salvation. Throughout the *Confessions*, Augustine seems to break with this view of baptism. In his view, the Christian life after baptism remains a struggle with sin. For this interpretation, see Michael Schramm, “Taufe und Bekenntnis. Zur literarischen Form und Einheit von Augustinus’ *Confessiones*”, *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 51 (2008), 82-96 (esp. 86-8). Augustine’s doctrine of original sin as espoused in the *Confessions* announces the normativity of infant baptism, which he would defend against the Pelagians. On this matter, see D.F. Wright, “Augustine and the Transformation of Baptism”, in: Alan Kreider (ed.), *The Origins of Christendom in the West* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 287-310. On the catechumenate before and in Augustine’s time, see William Harmless, *Augustine and the Catechumenate* (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1995).  
31 conf. 1,18. For Augustine’s understanding of ecclesial formation, see *conf.* 13,15ff. In book 1 of the *Confessions* Augustine opposes the authority of the pagan educational system to the formation program of the Church (*conf.* 1,27). The former deforms the human person, while the latter reforms him in the image of God (*conf.* 13,18ff). Augustine sees the postponement of his baptism as impeding his reformation and as keeping him unformed earth (*terra informis*). On the opposition between ecclesial and secular formation, see Napier, *En Route to the Confessions*, ch 6.; Gerald P. Boersema, “‘Exquisite and precious vessels’: doctrina in Book 1 of Augustine’s Confessions”, *Augustiniana* 61/3-4 (2011), 187-205.  
32 Thomas M. Finn, *From Death to Rebirth. Ritual and Conversion in Antiquity* (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), 230; Michael Foley, “The Sacramental Topography of the *Confessions, Antiphon* 9/1 (2005), 30-64 argues convincingly that the whole of the *Confessions* is structured around the high points of the liturgy, among which baptism takes a central place.
5.3.3 Augustine delivered to his adamic nature: curiosity, lust, and pride

This section describes Augustine’s alienation from God with the categories that Augustine himself uses to describe his life in sin: concupiscencia carnis, concupiscencia oculorum, and ambitio mundi (1 Jn. 2:16). These are created inclinations of human nature – the desire for self-preservation, knowledge, and human community – which sin has distorted into lust, curiosity, and pride respectively. Moreover, they mutually reinforce each other; they work together in a unified operation. The following sections analyze how Augustine acted out this threefold concupiscence. Further, it will pay attention to the social mediation of concupiscence. Augustine depicts himself not just as an individual that abandoned God, but as someone who, after the deferral of baptism, was gradually introduced into another community, the city that is ruled by the devil and his angels.

5.3.3.1 Concupiscencia oculorum

The distortion of the desire for temporal knowledge, concupiscencia oculorum, primarily revealed itself in Augustine’s love of the theatre. Augustine depicts the theatres as an organized liturgy for demons. Gladiator fights and the stories of gods and heroes narrated or enacted there mediate a morality that conforms the minds and wills of the spectators to the mind and will of the devil. Augustine contrasts this deforming knowledge to the reforming knowledge of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, mediated through the Scriptures and the liturgy of the Church. He came to ignore the latter, while embracing the former.

Already as a young boy Augustine preferred the vain knowledge of the spectacula to the useful knowledge taught in grammar school. During his literary education in Madaura, his curiosity found further nourishment. He was required to read the writings of Homer, Virgil, and Terence, which made him “drunk with the wine of error”. He enjoyed reading the stories, and delighted in sympathizing with its characters, but did not judge what he read in the light of God’s revealed truth. As a consequence, his curiosity induced in him the vice of lust. As an example of this, Augustine describes how he identified with the grief of Dido the adulteress, and how he enjoyed the declamation of a

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33 For the importance of this text in Augustine’s description of sin in the Confessions, see J.J. O’Donnell, Confessions. Introduction, Text, Commentary, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 204; N. J. Torchia, “St. Augustine’s Triadic Interpretation of Iniquity in the Confessions”, in: Joseph C. Schnaubelt and Frederick Van Fleteren, Augustine: “Second Founder of the Faith” (Collectanea Augustiniana 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1990),159-73.
34 Napier (En Route to the Confessions, ch. 6) points out the Stoic background of Augustine’s understanding of human nature as created with a threefold natural desire, the so-called commendationes.
35 Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions, 80 speaks of the resemblences between Augustine’s understanding of sin as a unitary operation of threefold concupiscence and his understanding of the Trinity. Sin is a perverse imitation of the triune God.
36 See conf. 3,5. Cf. 6,11-13 on the madness that the theaters could induce in the spectators.
37 For the reforming drama of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, see conf. 4,19. Cf. also s. 301/A (ca. 400) where Augustine opposes the drama of the theater to the drama of the liturgy.
38 conf. 1,15, CCL 27,9: “Non enim meliora eligens inoboediens eram, sed amore ludendi, amans…scalpi aures meas falsis fabellis, quo prurirent ardentius, eadem curiositate magis magisque per oculos emicante in spectacula, ludos maiorem.”
39 conf. 1,26, CCL 27,18: “Non omnino per hanc turpitudinem uerba ista commodius discuntur, sed per haec uerba turpitudiva ista confidentius perpetratur. Non accuso uerba quasi uasa electa atque pretiosa, sed unium erroris, quod in eis nobis propinabatur ab ebris doctoribus, et nisi biberemus, caedebamur nec appellare ad aliquem iudicem sobrium licebat.”
40 conf. 1,20-21.
poem about the adultery of a Jupiter. Curiosity did not only engender other vices. Augustine also used the vice of curiosity to cure the negative effects of his sins. By attending the theaters and witnessing the suffering of its actors, he consoled himself in his own sufferings. He used the suffering of others to scratch his own sores. Thus he sought to heal the pain resulting from his sins, without having to repent of the sins themselves.

5.3.3.2 Concupiscentia carnis

The vice of lust is a distortion of the created inclination to self-preservation. Rather than using temporal creation according to the measure (modus) that God has ordained, it becomes the supreme object of enjoyment, in which man seeks to find his rest (esse et requiescere).

We already observed the presence of this sin in Augustine as a baby. It developed in his youth and connected itself to the vice of pride. In the account of his boyhood, Augustine relates that he stole food from his parents, not just out of gluttony, but also in order to please his peers. In his adolescence, lust became the defining theme of his life. Self-preservation became his driving motive in his interactions with other people, when he should have loved them as fellow creatures with whom he shared temporal and eternal goods. This attitude found its primary expression in Augustine’s sexual licentiousness: he loved to love and to be loved, not according to proper mode of friendship, but as a means to fulfill his desire for self-preservation in the enjoyment of other bodies. This desire for sexual satisfaction moreover functioned within the economy of worldly ambition. Augustine felt that he must desire love, in order to stir the curiosity of his peers by his stories and to prove that his sexual achievements met their standards.

The most profound description of the sin of lust is not found, however, in passages that deal with Augustine’s sexual licentiousness, but rather in the endearing narrative of his relationship with an unnamed friend. Augustine describes the relationship between him and his friend as extremely close. They formed one soul in two bodies. However, Augustine did not love his friend in God, so that their bond would receive stability in God’s eternal being. Rather, he loved his friend in the way he should have loved God, namely as an eternally constant companion, as one who would never die. When his friend indeed died, Augustine was so devastated that the whole world became death to him:

Grief darkened my heart. Everything on which I set my gaze was death. My home town became a torture to me, my father’s house a strange world of unhappiness; all that I had shared with him was without him transformed into a cruel torment. My eyes looked for him everywhere, and he was not

41 conf. 1,26.
42 conf. 3,4.
43 conf. 4,15, CCL 27,48: “…ipsa [anima mea] esse uult et requiescere amat in eis, quae amat.”
44 conf. 1,30.
45 conf. 2,2, CCL 27,18: “Et quid erat, quod me delectabat, nisi amare et amari? Sed non tenebatur modus ab animo usque ad animum, quatenus est luminosus limes amicitiae, sed exhalabantur nebulae de limosa concupiscentia carnis et scatebra pubertatis et obnubilabant atque obscurabant cor meum, ut non discerneretur serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis.”
46 conf. 2,7.
47 conf. 4,11.
48 Augustine does not say this explicitly, but it can be inferred from the whole of his argument. Man is made to seek being and rest (esse and requies – conf. 4,15) outside of himself in God. The friend had replaced God, so that Augustine can be said to have sought immortality in his friend. This explains why Augustine was surprised that death did not also take him away when his friend had died (conf. 4,11).
there. I hated everything because they did not have him, nor could they now tell me ‘look, he is on the way’, as used to be the case when he was alive and absent from me. I had become a vast question to myself. 49

Reflecting on this experience, Augustine concludes he had loved his friend as if the latter could secure his very being. The friend had become the one in whom Augustine had sought to be and to rest. And when man seeks his being in things that are perishable, he must necessarily be torn asunder (dilaniatur) when the things he loves leave him. 50 According to Augustine, friendship can only be sustainable (and therefore truly enjoyable) when friends are bound together in God. God is the eternal being that stabilizes the bond of love between the two friends. This love preserves one from disordered grief over the loss of a friend. 51

The above mentioned reflection of Augustine also shows that lust deforms one’s way of knowing the world. Because Augustine’s friend had become the god of his universe, the whole world lost its goodness and attraction for him after his friend’s death. The inordinate love for his friend disabled Augustine to know the world in its objective goodness. This shows the truth of what Augustine argues elsewhere, that when creation is worshipped instead of the Creator, man loses the ability to perceive the world in its own integrity. 52

5.3.3.3 Ambitio mundi

Worldly ambition is the third vice that indwelled the young Augustine’s heart. It is the distortion of the created inclination to obey God together with one’s fellow men into the desire to exchange God’s authority with self-rule and to impose this rule on others. In Augustine’s youth this sin showed itself primarily in his disobedience to human authorities. He writes: “O God, I sinned by going contrary to the precepts of my parents and my teachers.” 53 Although his parents and teachers could be blamed in many respects, he still regards them as legitimate authorities through whom God exercised his rule over the young Augustine. This is why Augustine says that when he disobeyed his parents and teachers – not in order to avoid doing evil, but to do his own will – he sinned against God and despised him in them. 54 Augustine describes himself as involved in an ongoing rebellion against the rule that

49 conf. 4,8, CCL 27,44-45: “Quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum, et quidquid aspiciebam mors erat. et erat mihi patria supplicium et paterna domus mira infelicitas, et quidquid cum illo communicauieram, sine illo in cruciatum immanem umerat. expectabant eum undique oculi mei, et non dabatur; et oderam omnia, quod non haberent eum, nec mihi iam dicere poterant: ecce ueniet, sicut cum uiueret, quando absens erat. Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio...” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 57).

50 conf. 4,15.

51 This way of loving the neighbour has been critized by Philip Cary, “Love and Tears: Augustine’s Project of Loving without Losing”, in: Craig J.N. de Paulo e.a. (ed.), Confessions of Love. The Ambiguities of Greek Eros and Latin Cartus (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 39-54, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love”, in: T.V. Morris, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). According to these writers, Augustine condemns all grief over the loss of an earthly companion. Paul Helm (“Augustine’s Griefs”, Faith and Philosophy 20/4 (2003), 448-59) has argued, however, that Augustine does not condemn grief as long as it is felt for the right reasons, namely for the loss of the experience of Christian friendship. This is why Augustine does condemn the tears he shed for the death of his mother, as far as they were caused by the loss of his temporal connection to her. He does not condemn, however, his grief for her death as a fellow-believer, which temporarily deprived him of the possibility of sharing with her the love of God.

52 c. Adim. 12.

53 conf. 1,16.

54 conf. 2,7.
God imposed on his life. He disobeyed his teachers at secondary school in order to play games and celebrate his victories over others. He rejected the precepts of Scripture with regard to sexuality, in order to follow his own rules. He violated the law by stealing pears from an old man’s garden, not in order to gain something good, but merely to enjoy evil: the bare freedom of disobeying the law and going unpunished. Augustine wanted to be an “overturner” (euersor) of God’s order and to wallow in his self-rule.

The irony of this attempt, however, is that Augustine never attained absolute self-rule, both because of his creaturely limitations and because he remained bound to the norms mediated to him by his social environment. This irony becomes especially apparent from Augustine’s career ambitions. His educators taught Augustine that rhetorical excellence, and the consequent reward of public honour, was the highest good to attain in life. It is this imposed normativity that fueled Augustine’s desire to excel, and it defined his way of treating others. Augustine did not really attain self-rule, but was rather ruled by an ideal imposed on him from without. Rather than ruling himself, he was ruled by the devil.

5.4 God’s disciplinary response to a deaf Augustine

The previous section addressed the young Augustine’s indulgence to the law of sin present in his members as a child of Adam. The following paragraphs address God’s punishment of Augustine’s sins. By punishing sin, God takes care that the sinner does not find satisfaction in sin, but instead suffers from the choice he has made and is thus confronted with its vanity. In the introduction to this thesis, we observed that this idea echoes the Neoplatonic notion of cosmic justice. Robert O’Connell has argued for the importance of this idea in Augustine’s early works (especially for his refutation of the Manichees), and has shown that it belongs to the overarching themes of the Confessions. The following quotation from the Confessions illustrates this idea:

The unjust stumble over you and are justly chastised. Endeavouring to withdraw themselves from your gentleness, they stumble on your equity and fall into your anger. They evidently do not know that you are everywhere. No space circumscribes you. You alone are present even to those who

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55 conf. 1,16.  
56 conf. 2,3-7. Augustine notes that although God’s own voice sounded through the admonitions of his mother, his mother herself did not ask more of him than not to commit adultery with married women (thus risking a legal case). The fear of the punishment rather than the love of justice motivated her admonitions.  
57 conf. 2,14-16.  
58 conf. 3,6. In Carthage, Augustine depicts himself as sympathizing with a youth gang, called eversores, who went around the streets in search for fight and riot. For more historical details on this phenomenon, see Shaw, Sacred Violence, 18-26.  
59 conf. 1,14.  
60 In his worldly ambition, Augustine uses his Manichaean friends to gain the position of court rethor in Milan, and rather than trying to correct his rebellious pupils, he flees from them in order to save his own career perspectives.  
Augustine, however, places this Neoplatonic notion in a theistic and creational framework. Augustine believes that in his sufferings he is not so much confronted with an impersonal, necessary order, but rather with a personal God, who is involved in his life and is driven by loving intentions towards him. Moreover, Augustine seems to have broken with the optimistic idea that we are able to positively respond to our sufferings. Indeed, he did experience the divine admonition to return, but Augustine also emphasizes that he no longer possessed the ability to perceive this divine call and respond to it properly. Only because God had predestined him to be incorporated into Christ, in whom Augustine’s soul would be liberated from the claim of sin, was he finally enabled to perceive his sufferings as divine chastisements and to properly respond to them, namely by confessing his sins. This affirms the conclusions of the previous chapter.

The following sections describe how Augustine related to God’s chastising activity in his life before and while he was a Manichaeans. Augustine describes himself as completely deaf to God’s voice sounding through his sufferings. “And I did not know it” (et nesciebam), he often comments. Only when Augustine gained his new Christian-Platonic metaphysics was he enabled to discern his sufferings as coming from the God who was chasing him as his wayward child.

5.4.1 The punishment of curiosity

In book 1 of the Confessions, Augustine highlights how God used his educators to chastise him for his curiosity. In order to force Augustine to attend grammar school classes and to deter him from truancy, he was corporally punished by his teachers (uapulabam). Although Augustine criticizes the motivations of his teachers, and concedes that true learning requires free curiosity (rather than coercion), he approves of the restraint that his teachers exercised on him. If the flux of the child’s own curiosity (fluxus liberae curiositatis) is given free play, the child will not acquire useful knowledge, but rather will deliver itself to pernicious delights (iucunditas pestifera).

Augustine’s own behaviour confirmed this anthropological conviction. He committed truancy to attend the theatres and to let his ears be titillated by false stories. God used the punishments of
Augustine’s educators to restrain this behaviour, and to call Augustine back to a good use of his desire for knowledge. In their beatings, Augustine believes, he was confronted with God’s own discipline:

> The free-ranging flux of curiosity is channelled by discipline under your laws, God. By your laws we are disciplined, from the canes of the schoolmasters to the ordeals of martyrs. Your laws have the power to temper bitter experiences in a constructive way, recalling us to yourself from the pestilential life of easy comforts which have taken us away from you.⁶⁷

This does not mean that Augustine justifies the behaviour of his educators as such. He rather criticizes them. He argues that they only restrained their pupils’ sins, in order to foster these same sins. They punished their pupils for attending the theatres, in order to make them pursue a career that would enable them to organize theatre shows themselves.⁶⁸ Moreover, Augustine accuses his educators of hypocrisy. They flogged their pupils, because these preferred competitive games to the classroom, whereas they themselves played the same kind of games in their adult lives.⁶⁹

Nonetheless, Augustine speaks positively about God’s use of the penalties he suffered.⁷⁰ “But you, by whom ‘the hairs of our head are numbered’ (Mt. 10:30), used the error of all who pressed me to learn to turn out to my advantage.”⁷¹ By coercing Augustine to learn good things, namely to read and write, God gave him knowledge that would later prove to be useful in God’s service.⁷² By punishing Augustine’s curiosity, God thus both restrained Augustine’s misuse of his intelligence and prepared it for its future service to God.

At that time, however, Augustine did not discern God’s presence in the scourging of his educators. It is Augustine’s converted self who evaluates his boyhood sufferings as useful restraint and as preparation for his future life as a converted Christian and bishop. As a boy he could only imagine God as being opposed to his sufferings (rather than as rebuking him through them), because he did not see his own folly and his need for correction.⁷³ The fact that God did not grant his request for

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⁶⁷ conf. 1,23, CCL 27,13: “Sed illius fluxum haec restringit legibus tuis, deus, legibus tuis a magistrorum ferulis usque ad temptatones martyrum, ualentibus legibus tuis miscere salubres amaritudines reuocantes nos ad te a iucunditate pestifera, qua recessimus a te.” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 17).

⁶⁸ conf. 1,23.

⁶⁹ conf. 1,15.

⁷⁰ Leo Ferrari (“The Boyhood Beatings of Augustine”, Augustinian Studies 3 (1974), 1-14) has suggested that Augustine’s image of God as scourger and of himself as guilty creature is based upon his classroom experiences. He would have projected the relationship he had with his teachers onto God, as a ‘similar’ source of authority. I do not think that this psychological interpretation of Augustine’s image of God does justice to the text. If Augustine’s image of God were the product of his traumatic experiences in the classroom, one would expect either of the following options. Out of anger and self-pity, he would depict God as exclusively opposed to what his educators did to him. God would be the loving, affirming father. Or, out of loyalty with his educators, still fearing their rejection, he would not have the courage to imagine God as disapproving their actions, and would therefore identify God’s action with theirs. But Augustine does neither of these two things. He condemns his teachers for their misuse of power (namely in the service of evil rather than righteousness – conf. 1,26) and for their hypocrisy (they punished him for playing games which they also played – conf. 1,15). Simultaneously, he confesses that God used their actions to restrain Augustine’s curiosity. The image of God is thus neither based upon anger against, nor on loyalty to, his teachers. It rather seems that Augustine’s image of God transformed his feelings about himself and about his teachers. This text testifies to the therapeutical value of Augustine’s Christian faith.

⁷¹ conf. 1,19, CCL 27,11: “Tu vero, cui numerati sunt capilli nostri [Mt. 10,30], errore omnium, qui mihi instabant ut discerem, utebaris ad utilitatem meam.” (Chadwick, Confessions, 15).

⁷² conf. 1,24.

⁷³ conf. 1,14.
redemption might have even given him a sense of abandonment. In retrospect, though, he sees that God was in fact graciously present with him, precisely by holding him subject to the chastisements of his educators.

5.4.2 Punishment of lust
Especially in Books 2 through 4 of the Confessions, Augustine describes how God punished him for his indulgence in carnal concupiscence. As a young student in Carthage he sought for love and affection, but did so outside of the bonds of marriage and fidelity. Augustine fell in love and his love was returned, but he simultaneously suffered God’s chastisement for despising the bond of marriage. The instability of the relationship, the possibility (or actuality) of losing his partner to another, made him suffer under all kinds of painful emotions.

I rushed headlong into love, by which I was longing to be captured. ‘My God, my mercy’, in your goodness you mixed in much vinegar with that sweetness. My love was returned and in secret I attained the joy that enchains. I was glad to be in bondage, tied with troublesome chains, with the result that I was flogged with the red-hot iron rods of jealousy, suspicion, fear, anger and contention.  

Augustine further reflects on God’s punishment of his carnal concupiscence in the story about the death of his friend. Augustine loved this friend as if he could guarantee the continuity of Augustine’s existence. By allowing this friend to die, God exposed Augustine to the idolatrous nature of his friendship and to his enmity against God. His disgust for life showed that he had loved his friend as if his friend were God. His hatred against death was in fact a hatred against God who deprived him of his friend. And his fear of death was a fear of the one who could ultimately deprive him of his imagined immortality; for if Augustine died, his friend would die completely, which would mean that Augustine would lose his own identity altogether. Furthermore, the fact that only his tears could give him a sense of consolation proved that his friend still was the one who gave ultimate meaning to his life. Through all of these emotions God confronted Augustine with the idolatrous nature of his friendship.

God thus confronted Augustine with his law, which taught him that true immortality can only be found when we transfer our love from temporal creation to the immortal God, “where love is not deserted if it does not depart”. However, as Augustine did not yet see that his sufferings should be interpreted as punishments for his own sins, he did not have a reason to convert. He tried to cure his

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74 conf. 3,1 (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 35).
75 conf. 4,11, CCL 27,45-46: “Nam ego sensi animam meam et animam illius unam fuisse animam in duobus corporibus, et ideo mihi horribi erat uta, quia nolebam dimidius uiuere, et ideo forte mori metuebam, ne totus ille moreretur, quem multum amaueram.”
77 conf. 4,18 and conf. 4,16, CCL 27,48.
78 Augustine is already converted to Manichaeism when his friend dies (whom he had seduced to become a Manichee). As I will argue below, Manichaeism prevented Augustine from understanding his sufferings as a punishment for his own sins. Furthermore, Augustine ironically remarks, Manichaeism deprived him of a God
wound by fleeing from Thagaste to Carthage, so that he would not continuously be reminded of his friend. Time and new contacts tempered his pain, but did not remove the causes for similar grief in the future.\textsuperscript{79} He remained bound to temporal creation.

5.4.3 Punishment of the ambitio mundi
It seems that for a time Augustine’s worldly ambition was not challenged at all. The first books of the \textit{Confessions} highlight his success as a student and rhetor, especially with regard to his achievements in rhetorical competitions.\textsuperscript{80} The blinding pride that resulted from his success even became one of the reasons why he rejected the Bible as the path to Wisdom (as it did not meet the standards of rhetorical sophistication) and embraced Manichaeism. This version of Christianity presented itself as the religion of the elite, in contrast to the Catholic Christianity of North Africa. As such it sustained Augustine’s elitist self-image.\textsuperscript{81} However, Augustine does not relate any divine scourging with regard to his worldly ambition until the moment he decided to leave Africa for Milan, due to the unruliness of his pupils in Thagaste.

5.5 Augustine’s philosophical awakening and the resistance of the flesh
Hitherto I described how Augustine as a boy and young man was delivered to his adamic nature, and suffered divine chastisement for his sins, but neither understood his sufferings, nor had the will to convert to God in response to them. He remained deaf to the divine plaintiff.

It was Augustine’s reading of Cicero’s \textit{Hortensius} that effected the first change in this carnal way of life. This experience awakened him to the life of the spirit. Augustine expresses his reading experience as follows: “The book changed my feelings. It changed my prayers towards you, Lord. It made different my wishes and desires. Suddenly every vain hope became empty to me, and I longed for the immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardour in my heart and I began to rise up and return to you.”\textsuperscript{82} Augustine thus interprets his reading of Cicero’s \textit{Hortensius} as a true experience of conversion. God himself changed his feelings and awoke a desire in him to return to his father’s house, just like the prodigal son. Augustine’s conscience was awakened to a transcendental reality that presented itself to him as normative in an absolute sense. He had to find this truth and subject himself to it. This discovery put Augustine’s present way of life in the flesh radically in doubt; it destabilized his inner self.\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[79] conf. 4,12-13.
\item[80] conf. 4,1.
\item[81] Manichaeism presented itself as a religion for critical and educated people. As such it provided the young adolescent Augustine with a sense of self-esteem (\textit{duab. an.} 11; \textit{util. cred.} 1-2). In disputing uneducated Catholics on the problem of evil, he considered himself a great teacher, elevated above the masses (\textit{duab. an.} 10). But his success made him negligent of examining the truth of Manichaean teaching itself. He rather wanted it to be true, in order to uphold the basis of his elitism.
\item[82] conf. 3,7, CCL 27,30: “Ille uero liber mutauit affectum meum et ad te ipsum, domine, mutauit preces meas et uota ac desideria mea fecit alia. Viluit mihi repente omnis uana spes et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aequo cordis incredibili et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem.” Cf. Lk. 15:20: ‘surgam, et ibo ad patrem meum, et dicam ei: pater, pecavi in caelum, et coram te . . . (20) et surgens venit ad patrem suum.’
\end{footnotes}
In *Confessions* 10,33 Augustine identifies this philosophical desire with the Pauline struggle between the desire of the spirit and the desire of the flesh. When reading the *Hortensius*, Augustine was about to pass from the stage *ante legem* to the stage *sub lege*. However – as Augustine observes in *Conf.* 10,33 – when the spirit attempts to subject the flesh, the flesh fights back, and without grace man yields to its power. This is exactly what happened to Augustine after his first philosophical awakening. Cicero’s admonition to search for a wisdom that surpasses all philosophical sects immediately reminded Augustine of the name of Christ. Therefore, he turned to the Bible. However, the Scriptures offended his literary taste. They lacked the elevated style of Cicero. It was his pride that held Augustine back from subjecting himself to the liberating discipline of Scripture. He deprived himself of the possibility to arrive *sub lege* and then *sub gratia* through the authority of Scripture. He explains that “my inflated conceit shunned its mode of teaching (*modus eius*) and my gaze never penetrated to the things that were to be found inside. She, however, was of such nature that she grew with the little ones, but I disdained to be a little one, and puffed up with pride, I considered myself a mature adult.”

Augustine sees this pride as symptomatic of his spiritual state at this moment in his life. He desired beatitude and truth, but he himself wanted to determine where to find it. He did what is typical for the sinner: rather than subjecting his carnal desires to the truth, he subjected the truth to his carnal desires. As a penal consequence of this indulgence to the flesh, Augustine fell into Manichaeism. It was Manichaeism that would hold him back from discovering himself in the light of God’s transcendence. Only through his reading of the books of the Platonists, he gained the knowledge of God’s transcendence and was enabled to evaluate his own life in light of it. In other words, through his reading of the books of the Platonists, Augustine passed to the stage *sub lege*. His return to the Scriptures, in particular to Paul, then opened for him the way towards a life under grace.

The following sections describe first how Manichaeism impeded Augustine from perceiving himself *sub lege*, because of its materialist understanding of God and the soul, and its ‘victimization’ of the sinner (5.5.1). Second, I will illustrate how Augustine sees his adherence to Manichaeism has having obstructed his search for transcendence (5.5.2). Third, I will show how Augustine gradually abandoned Manichaeism, regaining confidence in finding the truth in orthodox Christianity, but still continued to combine the search for truth with a life in the flesh, because he lacked a vision of the truth that fully convinced him (5.6). Fourth, I will describe how Augustine experienced God’s punishments of his threefold concupiscence during this period. God continued to put him to unrest.

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84 *conf.* 10,33.

85 Augustine opposes the Bible to the schools of rhetoric. The latter is ‘covered with mysteries’ which lead its humble readers to the truth, while the former are covered with the veils of mystery that hide error (*conf.* 1,22).

86 *conf.* 3,5, CCL 27,31: “*Tumor enim meus refugiebat modum eius et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius. Uerum autem illa erat, quae cresceret cum paruulis, sed ego dedignabar esse paruulus et turgidus fastu mihi grandis uidebatur.*” Cf. how Augustine describes his way of approaching the Scriptures, ‘*uidere quales essent*. He approached the Scriptures with the method of a proud retorician, rather than with the attitude of a humble exegete. This attitude he will learn from Ambrose. Cf. Fischer & Mayer, *Die Confessiones*, 146.

87 *conf.* 10,34.

88 Cf. *mor.* 1,32, CSEL 90,37: “…*et ego latraui et canis fui, quando mecum iure non docendi cibo sed refellendi fustibus agebatur* (I too barked and was a dog; and then, as was right, instead of the food of teaching, I got the rot of correction”). In retrospect, Augustine sees his fall into Manichaeism as a corrective punishment for his ‘barking’ against the Christian Scriptures, his unwillingness to receive *disciplina* from Wisdom itself. Wisdom, however, refuses to give what is holy to dogs (*Mt.* 7,7). Augustine makes the point that Scripture cannot be understood if the reader lacks the love of God, which entails obedience to his authority.
about his present life, but because the truth had not yet appeared to him, he remained in a state of suspense (5.7).

5.5.1 Manichaeism: a materialist understanding of the battle between flesh and spirit

Besides its critique of the Bible⁸⁹ and its promise of a rational religion, both of which affirmed Augustine’s elitist self-image, Manichaeism⁹⁰ attracted Augustine, because it offered him an explanation of the nature of evil. Augustine’s philosophical awakening had opened his eyes to the battle between flesh and spirit within himself and his need for redemption. He sought this redemption in Christianity, but because he had been disappointed by Catholic Christianity in Africa, especially in her Bible, he turned to Manichaean Christianity in his quest for answers. Augustine saw the Manicheans as offering him an understanding of the battle between flesh and spirit and a way of dealing with it that both enabled him to continue his present way of life and simultaneously receive a sense of liberation.

In his reflections on Manichaeism, Augustine first blames the Manichees for their materialist understanding of God and the soul. He argues that God and the soul have a spiritual nature. God is an unchangeable, incorruptible, and incorporeal being, elevated above space and time. The human soul is made to contemplate God by ascending from corporeal reality to the incorporeal reality of God. The soul sins when it ceases to make this upward movement towards God and turns to itself and the sensible world, in order to find truth in the realm of creation. This movement away from God towards temporal creation makes the soul carnal.

Augustine also criticizes the Manichees for having taught him to understand God and the soul in corporeal terms. They taught that God can be compared to the substance of light, and that a part of him is spread out through material creation. Augustine’s critique of this understanding of God is that it immerses the soul even deeper into the life of the senses, rather than helping it to ascend from material to spiritual reality. As Augustine himself comments: “Not according to the intelligence of the mind, by which you willed me to surpass the beasts, but according to the sense of the flesh I sought...

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⁸⁹ See conf. 3.12-13.

⁹¹ conf. 3.10.
you.” Rather than liberating the mind from its carnality, Manichaeism affirms the carnality of the mind. The Manichees promised Augustine the light of truth, but made him gradually descend to the darkness of the underworld.

Furthermore, Augustine argues that Manichaeism denies the entire concept of moral responsibility, due to its identification of God and the soul and its understanding of evil as a physical substance. For the Manichees, the soul is a part of God that presently suffers under the dominion of an external principle that has entrapped it in matter. According to Augustine this makes it impossible to evaluate human action from a moral perspective. In Manichaeism, the carnal movements of the human soul do not result from the soul’s voluntary aversion from God towards creation, but are to be attributed to a contrary nature that has entrapped a part of God in matter. As Augustine has it:

> It seemed to me not us who sin, but I do not know what other nature that sins in us, and I liked it that my pride was without blame, and when I did something wrong, not to confess to you, so that you could heal my soul, that sinned against you. But I loved to excuse myself and to accuse something else that I do not know, which was with me and yet not I… My execrable iniquity referred that in me you, almighty God, were defeated to my destruction, rather than that I was defeated by you unto salvation.

In other words, not only does Manichaeism’s image of God fix the soul in its obsession with the senses, but its ontological dualism also denies man’s responsibility for this obsession.

Augustine contends that this understanding of God, the soul, and evil influences Manichaean soteriology. As a Manichaean, Augustine understood Christ as an extension of the divine light that had appeared in the world of matter to remind the soul of its origin in the kingdom of light. In response to this divine call, the soul had to separate itself from the world of matter. The salvation brought by Christ is thus not understood as a renewal of the mind in its relation to the world, but as a separation of a good and an evil substance. For the Manichaean elect, this implied a rigorous life of abstention. For Augustine the auditor, however, it primarily involved participation in the rituals of liberation executed by the elect. As such, Manichaean soteriology perfectly matched with Augustine’s desire for salvation from evil, without actually having to change his way of life. By participating in the Manichaean

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93 For Augustine, this is a matter of high ethical relevance. In his view, this materialist understanding of reality wipes out the ontological difference between rational and non-rational creatures. This could lead to the situation that a Manichaean denied fruit to a hungry man, because the latter’s consumption of it would encapsulate the divine particles of light in an unclean body (conf. 3,18).

94 conf. 3,11.

95 Burnaby, Amor Dei, 200 summarizes Augustine on this issue as follows: “The ethics of naturalism are always at bottom Manichaean. The existence of evil is admitted, but only as an external fact of nature: moral evil is not more than a ‘physical’ phenomenon... Responsibility and accountability are empty terms, for they do not mean that a man ought to ‘answer’ for his actions, ought to ‘render account’ of them.” BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma II, 108 calls for caution, however, in taking Augustine’s ethical conclusions from Manichaean dualism as adequately representing Manichaean doctrine.

96 conf. 5,18, CCL 27,67: “… mihi uidebatur non esse nos, qui peccamus, sed nescio quam alliam in nobis peccar naturam et delectabat superbiam meam extra culpam esse et, cum aliquid mali fecisset, non confiteri me fecisse, ut sanare animam meam, quoniam peccabat tibi, sed excusare me amabam et accusare nescio quid aliud, quod mecum esset et ego non esset... execrabilis iniquitas, te, deus omnipotens, te in me ad pernicieam meam, quam me a te ad salutem male superari.”

97 See conf. 5.20 on the docetic view of Christ that Augustine held in this period.
liturgy, he received a sense of contact with the divine and a hope of liberation. Augustine expresses this soteriological dualism in book 4 as follows:

We were seduced and seducing, deceived and deceiving through various cupidities, publicly in teaching of the arts which they call liberal; privately through a falsely so called religion – in the former role arrogant, in the latter superstitious, in everything vain. In the one we pursued the empty glory of popularity… in the other we sought to purge ourselves of that filth (the filth of pursuing the empty glory of popularity) by bringing food to those who were called the Elect and Holy, from which they manufactured for us angels and gods in the workshop of their stomach, to bring us liberation.98

Augustine enjoyed an illusion of purgation, without really being purged of what made him miserable, because Manichaeism misconstrued the battle between flesh and spirit as a battle between two material substances within Augustine: the part of God and the contrary nature.99

5.5.2 Failed ascent: pride keeps Augustine bound to the flesh

Augustine illustrates how Manichaeism held him bound to the senses by relating his attempt to ascend from corporeal to spiritual reality. He tried to undertake this ascent when he reflected on the topic of beauty and fittingness. His thoughts on this matter he published in a lost book called De pulchro et apto. He relates, however, that his ascent failed, because his Manichaean materialism hindered him from imagining anything incorporeal. Although the power of truth rushed into his eyes (inruebat in oculos ipsa uis ueri), he turned his mind away to lines and colours and physical magnitudes. And because he was unable to perceive the immaterial ideas present in corporeal things, he also lacked the ability to perceive the incorporeal nature of his own soul.100

Augustine connected this materialism to the dualism between God and matter. Virtue he attributed to a substance called the Monad and evil to a substance called Dyad, Pythagorean terms for the two opposing substances in Manichaeism. He associated God and the soul with the Monad. This Monad is at work in acts that we experience as coming from the rational mind. Whenever we behave

98 conf. 4,1, CCL 27,40: “… seducebamur et seducebamus, falsi atque fallentes in uariis cupiditatibus, palam per doctrinas, quas liberales uocant, occulte autem falso nomine religionis, hic superbi, ibi superstiosi, ubique uant, hac popularis gloriae sectantes inanitatem… illac autem purgari nos ab istis sordibus expetentes, cum eis qui appellarentur electi et sancti, afferemus escas, de quibus nobis in officina aqualiciuli sui fabricarent angelos et deos, per quos liberaremur.”

99 During his time as a Manichaean, Augustine also believed in astrology and consulted astrologers (although his adherence to them gradually faded, until he finally abandons it in Book 7). Pagan astrology taught that the universe was determined by the movements of the stars. This determinism gave reason to deny personal responsibility, and thus gave further support to Augustine’s Manichaean idea that he was the victim of external forces, rather than a responsible agent before a transcendent God. At the same time, astrology’s suggestion that our knowledge of the movement of the starts enables us to predict the future, might have given a sense of control to Augustine the Manichaean, who believed that evil is an external and uncontrollable force. For this observation, see Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions, 102. For Augustine’s criticism of astrology, see L. de Vreese, Augustinus en de astrologie (Maastricht: Veltman, 1933); B. Bruning, “De l’astrologie à la grâce”, Augustiniana 41/1-4 (1991), 575-643; Thomas O’Loughlin, “The Development of Augustine the Bishop’s Critique of Astrology”, Augustinian Studies 30/1 (1999), 83-103.

100 conf. 4,24, CCL 27,52: “Et inruebat in oculos ipsa uis ueri et auertebam palpitantem mentem ab incorporeae re ad liniamenta et colores et tumentes magnitudines et, quia non poteram ea uidere in animo, putabam me non posse uidere animum.”
‘irrationally’ he believed this Monad was repressed by the evil counter-substance, the Dyad. Augustine identified himself with the former, and dissociated himself from the latter.

Augustine argues that his ascent failed because he attributed his inability to see immaterial reality to a counter-substance, and refused to take responsibility for it himself. If he had known God as being itself, his soul as created by him, and his obsession with the senses as resulting from his own sins, this could have led him to confession and renewal. The proud identification of his own soul with God, however, impeded him from doing so. This pride was punished with a fixation of the mind in its carnality. The flesh drew the mind back towards carnal images – or, which is the same, it suffered God’s punishment within itself.

I tried to approach you, but you pushed me away so that I should know death, for you resist the proud. What could be worse arrogance than the amazing madness with which I asserted myself to be by nature what you are? I was changeable and this was evident to be from the fact that I wanted to be wise and to pass from worse to better. Yet I preferred to think you mutable rather than hold that I was not what you are. That is why I was pushed away, and why you resisted my inflated pride, and I imagined corporeal forms, I being flesh accused flesh… [I lent the ears of my heart], o sweet truth, to hear your interior melody, when I was meditating on the beautiful and the fitting, and I desired to stand still and to hear you and to rejoice with joy at the voice of the bridegroom, but I could not (et non poteram), because I was snatched away by the sounds of my error and the weight of my pride plunged me into the deep. For you did not give my ears joy and gladness, nor did my bones exult (Ps. 51:10), because I had not yet been humbled.

In response to this experience, Augustine turned to the Categories of Aristotle to find deeper insight into the nature of things, but this did not change his understanding of God and the soul. He applied Aristoteles’ categories to God’s being and produced a figment, which was again the penal result of his corporeal thinking. “You had commanded and it so came about in me, that the soil would bring forth thorns and brambles for me, and that with toil I should gain my bread.” (Gen. 3:18).

Neither did Augustine’s reading of the books of the liberal arts liberate him from his bondage to corporeal creation. “I enjoyed reading them, though I did not know the source of what was true and certain in them. I had my back to the light and my face towards the things that are illuminated. So my

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101 *conf.* 4,24, CCL 27,52. Augustine also distinguishes virtue and vice as expressions of peace vs. discord and unity vs. division (*et cum in uirtute pacem amarem, in uitiositate autem odissem discordium, in illa unitatem, in ista quandam divisionem notabam, inque illa unitate mens rationalis et natura uritatis ac summni boni mihi esseuidebatur, in ista aero divisione irrationalis iuitae nescio quam substantiam et naturam summ mali*).

102 *conf.* 4,26-27, CCL 27,53-54: “Sed ego conabar ad te et repellebar abs te, ut aperem mortem, quoniam superbis resistis [Iac. 4,6; 1 Pt. 5,5]. Quid autem superbius, quam ut adsererem mira dementia me id esse naturaliter, quod tu es? cum enim ego essum mutabiliis et eo mihi manifestum esset, quod utique ideo sapiens esse capiebam, ut ex deteriore melior fierem, malebam tamen etiam te opinari mutabilem quam me non hoc esse, quod tu es. Itaque repellebar, et resistebas uentosae ceruici meae et imaginabur formas corporeas et caro carnem accusabam ... dulcis uritas, in interiorem melodium tuam, cogitans de pulcherho et apto et stare cupiens et audire te et gaudio gaudere propter uocem sponsi [Jo 3,29], et non poteram, quia uocibus errores mei rapiebar foras et pondere superbiae meae in ima decicabam. non enim dabas audtuii meo gaudium et laetitiam, aut exultabant ossa [Ps. 50,10], quae humiliata non erant” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 68).

face by which I was enabled to see the things lit up, was not itself illuminated.” And so, Augustine’s pride brought his search for truth to an impasse, because he did not know God as the light of his mind. Although Augustine would abandon Manichaeism, he would keep struggling with his intellectual materialism until he encountered the books of the Platonists.

5.6 Augustine’s gradual return to Christianity and his state of suspense

In Book 5 Augustine narrates the beginnings of his liberation from Manichaeism. The study of the liberal arts, already mentioned at the end of Book 4, had led him to question the Manichaean understanding of the cosmos. Further study of pagan philosophers made these questions even more pressing. But Augustine had heard of the great authority of Faustus of Milev and hoped to pose his questions to him in order to receive satisfying answers. Faustus, however, whom Augustine describes as more eloquent than learned, could not answer Augustine’s questions. This experience affirmed Augustine’s doubts about Manichaean cosmology and formed the decisive step towards his abandonment of the sect. “In consequence, the enthusiasm I had for the writings of Mani was diminished, and I felt even greater despair of learning from their other teachers after having consulted on the many points which disturbed me the man who was particularly distinguished.”

However, although the philosophers whom Augustine studied helped him to leave the Manichees, they did not lead him to the knowledge of God the Creator either. Although he lost confidence in Manichaeism as the way to the truth, he still held to a materialistic understanding of reality, and to a substantialist view of evil. His encounter with Ambrose in Milan changed this situation, however. Augustine explicitly contrasts Ambrose with Faustus. Whereas the latter had become a snare of the devil to all who listened to him, Ambrose taught the doctrine of salvation. His authority began to convince Augustine from the very outset. Although Augustine pretended to be merely interested in Ambrose’s rhetorical skills, along with the bishop’s words their content also entered into his heart, albeit gradually. Ambrose’s preaching increasingly convinced Augustine of the defensibility of Catholic Christianity against the Manichees, but it did not persuade him of its truth.

At a certain moment, he decided to leave the Manichees and to assume a sceptical position. Yet, he did not apply his scepticism in an absolute way, because he still believed that the truth he was searching for could only be found in Christ. Therefore, he did not entrust the healing of his soul to the Academics, but followed the inner voice of his parents and enrolled as a catechumen in the Catholic

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105 conf. 7,1.
106 conf. 5,3.
107 conf. 5,13, CCL 27,63: “Refrecto itaque studio, quod intenderam in Manichaei litteras, magisque desperans de ceteris eorum doctoribus, quando in multis, quae me movebant, ita ille nominatus apparuit.” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 79).
108 conf. 5,18-19.
110 conf. 5,23-24, CCL 27,71: “... longe est a peccatoribus salus [Ps. 118,155], quals ego tunc aderamet tamen propinquabam sensim et nesciens... et dum cor aperirem ad excipiendum, quam diserte diceret, pariter intrabat et quam uere diceret, gradatim quidem.”
111 As he found it intellectually unfaithful to remain a member of a sect to which he preferred certain philosophers.
Church, “until something certain would show itself, by which I could direct my course.”

Under the preaching of Ambrose, Christianity became more and more credible to Augustine. What held him back from final assent, however, was his fear of believing falsehood. His disillusionment with Manichaeism was still fresh, and this made him anxious about entrusting himself to another authority.

The preaching of Ambrose partially conquered the compelling force of scepticism. Although Augustine was reluctant to embrace the Christian faith altogether, he came to prefer it to Manichaeism (praeponens), because it was more modest in its pretensions. It commanded faith in things that could not be demonstrated, rather than promising rational insight and ending up with the demand to believe incredible things. Moreover, Augustine became persuaded that belief in authority as such is not irrational. On the contrary, he argues, unless we believe anything what is told to us, we cannot do anything in this life.

Indeed, most of our basic convictions are based upon belief in what others have told us to be true. This acceptance of authority led Augustine to accept Scripture as divine revelation. The reasoning that led him to this belief was as follows: he believed that God exists and cares for humanity (providence), that humanity lacks the rational power to find the truth on its own, and he observed that Scripture had been accepted among almost all nations. None of the philosophers he had read offered rational arguments that forced him to reject these beliefs (although they differed on the question of providence). On this basis, Augustine concluded that his belief in the authority of Scripture was philosophically acceptable.

This did not mean, however, that he was already fully released from scepticism. His faith still had the character of rational assent. This had to do with the fact that he was still entangled in his materialism. He needed the personal encounter with the transcendent God to prompt him to seek God through the Scriptures. Augustine’s faith needed a form of sight, in order to wholeheartedly subject himself to the authority of Scripture, which he had rationally accepted. As we will see, when he received his encounter with God through his reading of the books of the Platonists, he immediately turned to the Scriptures. His metaphysical discovery as it were formed the hermeneutical key that opened the Scriptures to him as the means through which the God whom he had contemplated for a time offered him the way to salvation.

Until that moment, however, he remained in a state of suspense, because he had not yet encountered a truth that captured his heart and persuaded him of his need to abandon his present way of life. This does not mean that Augustine regards his scepticism about the truth as rendering him inculpable. After all, he sees his adoption of scepticism as a penal consequence of his own sins. Had

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112 conf. 5,25, CCL 27,72: “…donec aliquid certi eluceret, quo cursum dirigerem.”
113 conf. 6,6.
114 conf. 6,7.
115 For the discussion among different philosophical schools, see Fuhrer, “Zwischen Glauben und Gewissheit”, 252-3. Fuhrer argues that Augustine assumes a Stoic position on divine providence at this point. This might have been the case, as Augustine also seems to hold a Stoic view of the divine nature during this period. However, the text itself indicates that Augustine’s belief in divine providence was not so much derived from a philosophical school, but rather not decisively contradicted by any of them (idipsum enim maxime credendum erat, quoniam nulla pugnacitas calumniosarum quaestionum per tam multa quae legeram inter se confligentium philosophorum exterquere mihi potuit, ut aliquando non crederem te esse quidquid esses, quod ego nescirem, aut administrationem rerum humanarum ad te pertinere).
116 conf. 6,8. What convinced Augustine even further of Scripture’s authority was its general accessibility (sermo humilis) combined with a deep profundity. Scripture invites everyone into its bosom, and promises those who let themselves be exercised by its words to reveal deeper mysteries.
117 Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions, 122.
he not left God in Adam, the truth would never have been uncertain to him. Augustine therefore attributes his state of suspense to his own unwillingness to find the truth in the place where it was. “With all my love for the happy life I feared that life at the place where it was, and while I fled it, I kept seeking it.” Rather than bowing to the truth itself, and confessing the wickedness of his life in the flesh, he tried to combine his threefold concupiscence with the search for truth and happiness. In other words, he continued in the course he had taken after his reading of Cicero.

5.7 God’s disciplinary punishments of Augustine the seeker of truth

Meanwhile, God continued to discipline Augustine through corrective punishments. Although he had been awakened to the life of the spirit after his reading of Cicero, he kept combining his search for ‘the immortality of wisdom’ with his indulgence to the flesh. He searched for wisdom, but fled from it at the place where it was to be found. In Books 5 and 6, in which Augustine relates the time between his abandonment of Manichaeism and his discovery of the books of the Platonists, he describes several disciplinary measures by which God confronted him with the vanity of this attempt to combine the search for truth with the indulgence to his threefold concupiscence (curiosity, lust and pride).

His reading of pagan philosophers of nature, for example, confronted him with the untruth of Manichaean cosmology to which his unbridled curiosity had led him. About this experience Augustine confesses to God: “[You were] putting my shameful errors before my face so that I would see and hate them.” Augustine’s encounter with a drunken beggar in Milan was used by God to confront him with the vanity of his worldly ambition. He came to see that he was using all his intellectual and rhetorical power to achieve a temporal felicity that this beggar already possessed. Moreover, the beggar’s felicity had a much purer moral basis than the one Augustine and his friends strove for with their mendacious speeches. This experience made Augustine increasingly aware of the fact that his worldly ambition rather impeded than advanced the discovery of the happy life. “You broke my bones with the rod of your discipline”, he writes in retrospect. In Milan, Augustine was also confronted with the impossibility of combining his carnal concupiscence with the search for wisdom and happiness. Alypius tried to convince Augustine that he needed to abandon his marriage plan for the sake of seeking wisdom in a philosophical community of friends. Augustine, however, could not imagine a life without the delights of sexual lust, and therefore defended a form of seeking the truth that could be combined with marriage. However, when his friends’ wives turned out to disagree with their spouses’ resolutions, the entire plan collapsed and Augustine and his friends turned back to their worldly affairs. Meanwhile, Augustine’s concubine was snatched away from his side, and

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118 conf. 6,20.
119 conf. 5,11 CCL 27,62: “Inhonestos errores meas iam conviertebas ante faciem [Ps. 49,21] meam, ut uiderem et odissem.” Augustine alludes to Psalm 50:21. In this psalm, God gathers his people to have a lawsuit with them, because of their idolatry. Although they take God’s name in their mouths and observe religious rituals, their behaviour betrays them as despisers of God’s commandments. In Augustine’s imagination this is what he had done as a Manichaean. He had taken the name of God in his mouth, but his religion was empty of true obedience.
120 conf. 6,10, CCL 27,80: “Et inueniебam male mihi esse et dolebam et conduplicabam ipsum male, et si quid adrisisset prosperum, taedebat apprehendere, quia paene priusquam teneretur auolabat.”
121 conf. 6,9, CCL 27,80: “Propertia et tu baculo disciplinae tuae confringebas ossa mea.”
122 In conf. 6,22 Augustine states he sought marriage exclusively to satisfy his concupiscentia, rather than to become an honourable husband and a father of children.
Augustine tried to temper the pain of this loss with new sexual relationships. In all of these experiences God taught Augustine that the truth only reveals itself to its chaste lovers, but resists those who want to possess her together with something else.

Through these corrective punishments, God confronted Augustine with the fact that the compromise between flesh and spirit leads to nothing. However, because Augustine was still entangled in his materialist way of thinking, he lacked the resources to truly identify his problem. In order to attain the waters of baptism, he needed to see himself as a creature made to contemplate God, but fallen because of his own sins, and standing in need of grace to bridge the gap. Although Augustine, by this time, had left behind the Manichaean view of God as a corruptible substance, and of evil as a counterforce of which man is merely a victim, he had not yet gained a new vision of God, the world, and his own place within it that enabled him to correctly diagnose the nature of his unhappiness. His mind remained enslaved to his corporeal imagination. His reading of the books of the Platonists would effect a change in this situation. By these books God would bring Augustine under the law.

5.8 Being brought under the law: the effect of reading the Platonists

5.8.1 Augustine’s discovery of the Creator and his creation

During his stay in Milan, Augustine encountered the books of the Platonists, mediated to him through a man “swollen with pride”. Augustine interprets this encounter not as an isolated event, but rather as standing in the service of his return to Christianity. God used these books in order to reveal to him a particular truth of Christianity, namely the transcendence of God and the spiritual nature of the soul. By reading these books, he received an overwhelming experience of what it means that God is his Creator and he God’s creature, who has fallen away from God through sin. Although the way in which Augustine came to this knowledge is comparable to the Plotinian ascent of the soul, the function Augustine ascribes to this ascent differs from its function in Plotinus. As has been argued by several scholars, Augustine does not understand this ascent as aimed at the salvation of the soul, so that his falling back would testify to the failure of the ascent. The

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123 conf. 6,25.
124 conf. 10,66.
125 conf. 7,2. Drecoll, Entstehung, 376 identifies Augustine’s understanding of God right before his reading of the Platonists as Stoic. I think that Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions, offers a less probable suggestion when he says that Augustine held a view of God that resembled the Epicurean understanding of atoms as the underlying source of all reality. Augustine’s believe in divine providence was denied by the Epicureans, but affirmed by the Stoics, albeit in a pantheist manner.
126 conf. 7,13. This might have been Flavius Manlius Theodorus to whom Augustine dedicated De beata vita.
128 John Peter Kenney has pointed out that Plotinian contemplation identified knowledge of transcendence with salvation itself. Through contemplation, the Plotinian philosopher discovered the unfallen part of his soul and thus gained the confidence to purge himself of the exigencies of temporal, bodily existence. Later Neoplatonists rejected the idea that the soul was partly unfallen, and took recourse to theurgical rituals to mediate between the One and the fallen soul. See the observations in John Peter Kenney, “Saint Augustine and the Limits of Contemplation”, M.F. Wiles and E.J. Yarnold (ed.), Studia Patristica 38 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 201-4 and Idem, Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology (Wipf & Stock: Eugene, 2010), 91-149 (on Plotinus).
passage in which Augustine relates his experience of contemplation is not about salvation, but about the revelation of the relationship between God, the soul, and the rest of creation. It is about how Augustine came to know himself as a fallen creature in the light of God’s creatorship and his righteous judgment. In this passage, Augustine is made man sub lege, who comes to delight in the law of God, but feels that he has been sold under the law of sin and is unable to redeem himself from this burden.

In *Confessions* 7,16-23 Augustine describes his vision of God. I take this passage as one description of the same reading event, in which Augustine, by God’s help (duce te), was elevated through observation of creation, into the soul, up towards a momentary vision of God. In that event he saw an unchangeable light (lux incommutabilis) above the eye of his soul (super eundem oculum animae meae). Augustine emphasizes that the nature of this light was not derived from anything known to him through the senses. It was not merely above his mind, as particular created realities transcend other created realities because of their differing natures. This light, Augustine confesses, was completely different (ualde, ualde aliud ab istis omnibus), because it had made him (superior quia fecit me). He himself was lower because he was made by this light (ego inferior quia factus ab ea). This light inflamed him with a desire to hold its vision. He immediately knew that his soul was made to contemplate God for all eternity.

From this experience of God as transcendent Creator, Augustine looked down on material creation and saw that everything derives its being from God and is therefore good. Yet, created things are not the highest good. This becomes manifest from the fact that they can be corrupted. Their being can become less. Furthermore, one must distinguish within the realm of creation between a higher and a lower level. For example, the earth is lower than the heavens. It is characterized by things that harm each other’s being (non conueniunt). In comparison with the harmony of the heavens, the realm of the earth is lower and less good. Nonetheless, all the things together are very good. “And for you evil does not exist at all, not only for you, but neither for your creation, because outside of you there is nothing that rushes in and corrupts the order that you imposed on her.” From the highest heavens to the worm – all together they form the choir of creation that sings God’s praises (Ps. 148:1).

Thus, Augustine discovered God as the Creator of everything, the soul as the spiritual substance in us that is made by God and designed to contemplate God, and the material creation as
good in its own way of being. Augustine regards these insights concerning the relationship between God and the world as having provided him with the presuppositions that he needed to acquire a new understanding of the nature of evil. He began to see that evil cannot be a substance, as Manichaeism claimed, because God created everything good. But then, how should evil be conceived? Augustine concluded that evil is to be understood solely as a voluntary movement of the soul and the punishment that follows it (and he is even reticent to call this punishment evil, as it is the expression of God’s justice upon the soul that sins).

5.8.2 Augustine’s discovery of the nature of evil: sin and its punishment

If there is nothing evil in God’s creation, why then do humans experience evil in this world? Augustine’s response to this question is that we have come to experience creation as evil as a result of the soul’s turning away from God towards lower things. It is sin that makes us experience creation as evil. How is this to be explained?

As we have seen in the preceding pages of the Confessions, the soul that seeks its life outside of itself in the realm of space and time comes to suffer from this choice. It experiences that creatures cannot nourish it with the food that it needs. However, as the soul cannot believe that what displeases it in creation should be understood as a divine punishment for its own sins, it invents another substance as the source of evil. This, Augustine argues, explains the origin of his adherence to Manichaeism. He did not want to convert from his own sins, and he neither wanted to acknowledge God’s anger against his sins, and therefore adopted the view that evil comes from another substance under whose dominion the soul suffers. Now Augustine sees, however, that his own entanglement in concupiscence and the suffering that resulted from it, should be understood as his own sin and its punishment.

This discovery determined Augustine’s interpretation of being ‘knocked down’ upon his experience of contemplation. Augustine tells his readers, that during his ascent to God, he could not hold his soul’s eye directed towards the divine light that he saw. He now knew, however, how this was to be explained. As a Manichaean he had attributed the failure of ascent to the influence of the contrary nature, but he now realized that this failure was due to the fact that his soul bore the penal marks of its own iniquity, its veneration of the sensible world instead of God. Augustine’s failure to hold on to the vision of God made him aware of his self-inflicted fallenness.

And you beat back the infirmity of my sight, shining vehemently on me... And I found myself to be far away from you in the land of unlikeness, as if I heard your voice from above: ‘I am the food of the strong men; grow and you shall feed upon me; nor shall you change me, like the food of your flesh, into you, but you shall be changed into me.’ And I learned that you have corrected man for his iniquity and have made my soul shrink like the web of a spider (Ps. 38:12)...

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135 conf. 7,22.
137 conf. 7,16, CCL 27, 104: “Et reuerberasti infirmitatem aspectus mei radians in me uphementer, et contremui amore et horrore: et inueni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis, tamquam audirem uocem tuam de excelso: cibus sum grandium: cresce et manducabis me. nec tu me in te mutabis sicut cibum carnis tuae, sed tu
I was astonished to find that already I loved you, not a phantom instead of you. But I was not stable in the enjoyment of my God. I was caught up to you by your beauty and quickly torn away from you by my weight and rused into those things with groaning; and my weight was my carnal habit.\textsuperscript{138} But with me there was a memory of you, and I did not in any way doubt that the one to whom I should attach myself was (esse), but that I who should attach myself (to him) was not yet (nondum esse), because the decaying body weighs down the soul and the earthly habitation drags down the mind that has many thoughts.\textsuperscript{139}

Augustine had discovered God as his Creator and the nature of evil as the soul’s sin and its punishment. These insights made him conclude that it was his own iniquity that hindered him from holding on to the vision of God. As a consequence of its own iniquity, the soul has lessened in being, and has become unable to be nourished by God. Its mental sight is no longer accommodated to the object it longs to know and love.\textsuperscript{140}

Augustine sees this discovery as setting the stage for his return. He discovered God as the absolutely desirable transcendent Creator, and himself as the one who had alienated himself from God by his own sins. This knowledge nullified all of Augustine’s previous excuses for conversion. Knowing the truth now, Augustine could no longer exculpate himself for not clinging to it. He had become man under the law: he had received the knowledge of what he should desire, and of the self-inflicted nature of his inability to fulfill this obligation. This is exactly the purpose for which God made Augustine read the Platonists: to see the state of his soul in the light of God’s holiness, so that he would be filled with the fear of God’s judgment and the need for conversion.

5.8.3 The deficit of the books of the Platonists

The previous section illustrated what Augustine learned from the Platonists. But he also criticizes them. Platonic monotheism had been right in several respects. It had seen God and his creative Word or Wisdom. It had confessed that the soul is not itself the light, but has to be enlightened by the Word. It had held that the Word is consubstantial to the Father. And finally, it believed that souls are renewed by participation in the Word. These are the major truths of Platonism, which helped Augustine to regain the right vision of God the Creator, and of himself as a creature, made to be enlightened by

\textit{mutaberis in me, et cognoui, quoniam pro iniquitate erudisti hominem et tabescere fecisti sicut araneam animam [Ps. 38,12] meam...}”\textsuperscript{138}

Chadwick translates \textit{consuetudo carnalis} into English as ‘sexual habit’, but the word has a much broader meaning. It refers to the punishment of the mind that seeks God in the sensible world (cf. \textit{conf. 7,23, CCL 27,103}: “\textit{abdaxit cogitationem a consuetudine}”).\textsuperscript{139}

\textit{conf. 7,23, CCL 27,107}: “Et mirabar, quod iam te amabam, non pro pro phantasma, et non stabam frui deo meo, sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo et ruebam in ista cum gemitu; et pondus hoc consuetudo carnalis. Sed mecum erat memoria tui, neque allo modo dubitabam esse, cui cohaererem, sed nondum me esse, qui cohaererem, quoniam corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitante [Sap. 9,15].”\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{138} Chadwick translates \textit{consuetudo carnalis} into English as ‘sexual habit’, but the word has a much broader meaning. It refers to the punishment of the mind that seeks God in the sensible world (cf. \textit{conf. 7,23, CCL 27,103}: “\textit{abdaxit cogitationem a consuetudine}”).

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{conf. 7,23, CCL 27,107}: “Et mirabar, quod iam te amabam, non pro pro phantasma, et non stabam frui deo meo, sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo et ruebam in ista cum gemitu; et pondus hoc consuetudo carnalis. Sed mecum erat memoria tui, neque allo modo dubitabam esse, cui cohaererem, sed nondum me esse, qui cohaererem, quoniam corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitante [Sap. 9,15].”

\textsuperscript{140} In this passage, elements from the parable of the prodigal son return: Augustine discovers that he is in a land of unlikeness (\textit{regio dissimilitudinis}), suffers hunger (implied by God calling Augustine to feed upon him), and hears God shouting from afar (\textit{de longinquo}). Augustine has now clearly perceived the divine call that he heard for the first time when reading the \textit{Hortensius}, but suppressed by turning to the Manichees. Cf. Knauer, “\textit{Peregrinatio}”, 229.
 Augustine criticizes the Platonists, however, because of their pride (praesumptio). This pride shows itself in the refusal to accept the incarnation of the Word and to admit that the soul has impaired itself from being united with God.

According to Neoplatonist thinking, the incarnation of the Word would entail a violation of the hierarchy of being. Lower things participate in higher things and can become better by a higher degree of participation. This upward participation the Neoplatonists could understand. This explains why they could only imagine the salvation of man as a matter of working oneself upwards. The divine is unmovable, and does not actively reach out to bring man upwards. Its omnipresence indeed admonishes man to return, but it does not heal his fractured nature to enable him to obey this call. Although from the perspective of Christianity, the Neoplatonists can be regarded as having understood the truth of creation, from their own perspective they had not. A creational ontology allows the Word to become flesh, because there is no opposition between the Creator and his creation; in Neoplatonism, however, this is unimaginable: the unchangeable cannot assume a changeable nature. Nonetheless, Augustine argues, the Platonists had to acknowledge their lack of power to reconcile themselves to the divine (although they boasted in their ‘knowledge’). Just as the rest of humanity, they suffered under the dominion of sin and the devil. They refused, however, to confess their sins. Instead, they tried to purge themselves through bodiless mediators. They communicated with demons through idol worship, and thus tried to pave a way upwards for themselves towards the divine realm. But because the demons these philosophers worshipped did not solve the problem of sin itself, as they themselves invented sin, the Platonists remained in their power, under the curse of the law, condemned to death.

This critique of the Platonists seems primarily directed against Porphyry, whom Augustine would later criticize in De ciuitate Dei for his rejection of Christ and for his justification of theurgy. While Plotinus thought that the soul could accomplish its own ascent through the discovery of its unfallen part, Porphyry argued for the need of mediators. But rather than seeking mediation through the incarnate Word, he rejected Christ and sought his way upward through the invocation of heavenly spirits. This is what Augustine refers to when he identifies the Platonists in the Confessions with the idol worshippers of Rom. 1:22-23.

142 Contrary to what has been argued by some scholars (such as Harrison, Rethinking, 77), Augustine does see the Platonists as having grasped the truth of creation. This has rightly been noticed by Ortiz, Creation in Augustine’s Confessions, 125-34. However, this does not mean that they themselves knew that they had understood the truth of creation. On the contrary, their disbelief in the Incarnation is partly to be explained from the fact that their metaphysics did not allow participation of the higher in the lower. A creational ontology does allow this.
144 For Augustine’s anti-Porphyrian polemic in ciu., see Bochet, Le firmament de l’Écriture, 415-500.
145 conf. 7,15, CCL 27,102: “Et ideo legebam ibi etiam immutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae in idola et uaria simulacra, in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium [Rm 1,23], uidelicet Aegyptium cibum...” The place that Porphyry reserves for theurgical practices is rather limited. According to him, it only helped the purgation of the lower, irrational part of the soul. In order to purge the entire soul of man, he deemed the path of ascesis and dialectics indispensable. By thus combining Neoplatonic soteriology with popular religion, Porphyry sought a universal way of liberation over against Christianity. His pupil Iamblichus attributed a more extensive function to theurgy for the purgation of the soul. For the function of theurgy in the philosophy of Porphyry, see Pjotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, “Porphyry and Theurgy. Theoplatonic Background to Religious Practice”, in: Journal of Neoplatonic Studies 9/2 (2004), 219-42.
The core problem of Neoplatonist soteriology, as Augustine sees it, is not only its unwillingness to accept the God-sent mediator Christ; rather, it espoused a completely different idea of mediation. Rather than acknowledging that man’s sin, his voluntary disobedience to God, is the root-problem that should be solved, it shifts the problem to the effects of sin, particularly to the soul’s entanglement in the mortal body. Augustine argues that once the Neoplatonists had done this, they could easily be deluded by the devil and his spirits. The devil presented himself to them as free from death, because he does not have a body. This is only presumption, however, Augustine argues. As the devil is a sinner himself, he must suffer the wages of sin, which is death (*stipendium peccati mors est*). Therefore, he is unable to redeem humanity from death.

Against this soteriology Augustine argues that God solves the problem of man by first removing the cause of death, namely human iniquity. The true mediator has come to us to share with us our guilt and punishment, and to give us his righteousness, so that those who trust in him receive the wages of his righteousness, namely peace and life.

### 5.9 Rediscovering Christianity through Paul

This section shows what Augustine’s turn to Paul meant for him. As I observed before, Augustine does not see his philosophical quest in the *Confessions* as a goal in itself. It stood in the service of recovering his “lost” Christian faith. Philosophical schools did not satisfy him if they lacked the name of Christ. Moreover, Ambrose helped him to recover the Bible and to accept its authority. It is not surprising then, that when Augustine received certainty about God through his readings in the books of the Platonists, he immediately returned to the Bible. It is especially Paul who captured his imagination, the apostle with whom he had become acquainted during his time with the Manichees. Would his newly acquired metaphysic help him to understand this apostle afresh?

In Paul, Augustine discovered all true things that he also learned from the Platonists, but now with the recommendation of God’s grace. This short remark about the difference between Paul and the Platonists is often read as if Paul only added Christ to the Platonic story. It seems to me, however, that Augustine discovered two things in Paul that the Platonists ignored: the grace of Christ, but also the irresolvable nature of inner division (the battle between flesh and spirit). I will first treat Augustine’s discovery of man’s inner division, and then address his discovery of the Incarnation of the Word.

#### 5.9.1 The reality of inner division

According to Augustine, Paul taught that the intellectual ability to see God’s eternal power and divinity through creation (*Rom.* 1:20), and the vision of God itself were dependent upon God’s

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146. Cf. Porphyry’s dictum “*omne corpus fugiendum est*”, which Augustine himself approximated in *sol.* 1.24 (*omnia sensibilia fugienda*) and retracts in *retr.* 1.4. For a critique of this dictum in Augustine’s own works *s.* 241,7; *ciu.* 10,29; 12,20; 13,16-18; 22,26.
149. Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 20-34.
grace. These gifts were given to the Platonists. They had received the intellectual capacities to see God’s invisible things and had been granted the vision of his divinity. However, rather than thanking God for their knowledge, and humbling themselves because it convinced them of their falleness, they started to boast in their knowledge. They had been so proud about the sight that God had granted to them, that they collapsed their sight into salvation, as if the fact that they could not hold on to this sight did not prove that their souls were burdened by the consequences of their sins. Augustine sees the Platonists, just as the Manichees, as identifying their real selves with the “knower”, and dissociating themselves from the “sinner”. This judgment still applies in the case of Platonists who conceded that they needed the help of spirits to purge themselves. Exactly because they did not want to confess their iniquity, but were simultaneously unable to purge themselves from its effects, they started to invoke spirits that could help them overcome these effects, without the need for confession.

What Augustine discovered in Paul is that he took seriously the reality of sin, and the experience of inner division. Paul teaches that the ‘natural’ knowledge of God does not give a person any reason for boasting. It rather compels him to confess his sins and their power over them. After all, the person who has received the gift of sight and knows to whom he should be united, nonetheless cannot fulfill his obligation, but falls back towards himself. In Augustine’s view, Paul does justice to the insolvable nature of this inner division. Paul argues that the man who delights in the law of God and the man who is taken captive by the law of sin present in his members are one and the same person. He does not solve this inner tension by reducing a person’s true identity to that of the “knower”. The one who knows God’s law and delights in it is the same person as the sinner who disabled himself to act in accordance to the law:

Eventhough man delights in the law of God according to the inner man, what will he do (faciet), because of the other law in his members that fights against the law of his mind, leading him captive to the law of sin, which is in his members? For you are just, Lord; but we have sinned, and being pressed down by the weight of sin, we have sinned even as sinners, and they who have not the law are judged by the law as though it were binding on them.

151 conf. 7,27, CCL 27,110: “Et coepi et inueni, quidquid illac uerum legeram, hac cum commendatione gratiae tuae dici, ut qui uidet non sic glorietur, quasi non acceperit [1 Cor. 4,7] non solum id quod uidet, sed etiam ut uideat - quid enim habet quod non acceperit? [1 Cor. 4,7].”
152 conf. 10,67.
153 Kenny, “Augustine and the Limits of Contemplation”, 204.
154 Kenny (“Augustine and the Limits of Contemplation”, 203-4) argues that Augustine in the Confessions primarily attacks the Plotinian school that sought unity with the divine by rediscovering the unfallen part of the soul as being one’s higher self. This might be the hidden agenda of his descriptions of ascent (which Kenney insightfully analyzes), but when he attacks the Platonists explicitly, he seems to have in mind the school of Porphyry who denied the existence of an unfallen part of the soul. As I argue above, however, Augustine sees both schools of thought as unwilling to acknowledge themselves as guilty before God and in need of righteousness from above.
155 conf. 7,27.
156 conf. 7,27, CCL 27,111: “... etsi condelectur homo legi dei secundum interiorem hominem [Rm. 7,22], quid faciet de alia lege in membris suis repugnante legi mentis suae et se captivum ducente in lege peccati, quae est in membris [Rm. 7,23] eius? quoniam iustus es, domine [Tb. 3,2; Ps. 118,137]; nos autem peccauimus, inique fecimus [3 Rg. 8,47], impie gessimus, et grauata est super nos manus tua [Ps. 31,4], et iuste traditi sumus antiquo peccatori, praeposito mortis, quia persuasit voluntati nostrae similitudinem voluntatis suae, qua in ueritate tua non stetit [No. 8,44].”
Augustine sees Paul as affirming the experience he had after reading the books of the Platonists; he delighted in God’s transcendence and knew that he had to be united to this God in order to attain happiness, but he suffered under the penal consequences of his own sins, and did not have the power to solve this inner division himself.

5.9.2 Augustine’s approach to the work of Christ

Augustine also discovered in Paul the divine response to the impasse in which man finds himself: the grace of Christ. The Word, who granted some humans sight of his divinity, has assumed a body not only to admonish (admonere) all to see, but also to heal them in order that they can hold fast (tenere) to what is to be seen, even those who were not able to see God from afar.\textsuperscript{157}

As a Manichaean, Augustine held a docetic Christology. After his reading of the books of the Platonists he seems to have understood the person of Christ from an adoptianist perspective, in accordance with the Platonic idea that the lower can participate in the higher, but not vice versa.\textsuperscript{158}

Augustine arrived, however, at an orthodox Christology that confesses that the Word itself has assumed flesh and dwelled among us: the utter violation of Platonic ontology.\textsuperscript{159} The divine Word, consubstantial with the Father, assumed a human body and a human soul in order to mediate righteousness and life to humanity.

How does Augustine understand the work of Christ in the \textit{Confessions}? At this point the two approaches to the work of Christ that we encountered in the previous chapters come together. Augustine presents the work of Christ on the one hand as a sharing of humanity’s punishment and as mediation of righteousness, and on the other hand as the pedagogy of the soul. Both of these approaches will be elaborated in the following sections.

5.9.2.1 Juridical Christology: Christ the mediator of righteousness

The juridical approach to Christology is connected to Augustine’s understanding of the human predicament. We observed that Augustine diagnoses the distance between God and man as caused by human sin. Humanity voluntarily abandoned God in Adam, conforming its will to that of the devil, and each person adds to this primordial aversion by living out his threefold concupiscence. According to his righteous judgment, God delivered man to the movement of his own will, so that there is no possibility of turning back. Man is delivered to the dominion of sin, death, and devil and heads to final condemnation. Christ becomes the mediator between God and man by sharing their penal condition,\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Conf.} 7,27. In this context, Augustine observes that some are not even able to see God from afar (\textit{de longinquo uidere non potest}). He probably refers to those not philosophically schooled. Christ, however, has become the way along which they go (uenire), see (uidere) and hold (tenere). The philosophers might surpass these people in that they have seen God from afar, but as they have refused to seek the way towards him through the mediator, they miss out on what the simple but humble believers will attain.

\textsuperscript{158} Ortiz, \textit{Creation in Augustine’s Confessions}, 154.

\textsuperscript{159} Madec (“Platonisme et Christianisme”, 134) argues that it was probably the Milanese priest Simplicianus who showed Augustine the similarities and the differences between the teachings of the Platonists and the prologue to the gospel of John. That Augustine arrived at an orthodox understanding of the Incarnation before his conversion has convincingly been argued by William Mallard, “The Incarnation in Augustine’s Conversion”, \textit{Recherches Augustiniennes} 15 (1980), 80-98. The claim remains contested, however, as the recent book on Augustine’s conversion by Brian Dobell shows (Dobell, \textit{Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion}, 2009).
and by mediating his righteousness to them. Thus, Christ changed man’s juridical position before God: in Christ man’s guilt is removed and on that basis the penalty of sin – the dominion of death, devil, and consuetudo – has been made void. Augustine expresses this idea in the following texts:

Who will deliver him from the body of this death, unless your grace through our Lord Jesus Christ, whom you have brought forth coeternally with you and created in the beginning of your ways, in whom the ruler of this world did not find anything worthy of death, and he has killed him: and the handwriting that was against us has been made void.¹⁶⁰

He is the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. He appeared among mortal sinners as the immortal one, mortal like humanity, righteous like God. Because the wages of righteousness are life and peace, being united with God by his righteousness he made void the death of justified sinners, a death which it was his will to share in common with them.¹⁶¹

This does not mean that the poena peccati is already removed in this life. It has rather been made void. It has lost its binding power. Although the law of sin is still at work in Christians, and still leads them into temptation and sin, these sins can no longer be held against them, as they share in Christ’s righteousness. Augustine expresses this idea eloquently in Book 9 of the Confessions, when he reflects upon the life of his deceased mother. He observes that his mother undoubtedly sinned after she was baptized. He prays God to forgive the sins that she committed after baptism and expresses the confidence that God has granted him his request, on account of the holy sacrifice, through whom the handwriting that was against us was blotted out, through whom the enemy was triumphed over, who held our sins against us and sought reasons to accuse us, and he found nothing in him, through whom we conquer. Who returns to him his innocent blood? Who pays back the price, with which he bought us, so that we were released from the enemy? Your maid-servant tied her soul to the sacrament of this our price through the bond of faith. No one plucks her from your protection.¹⁶²

This juridical understanding of the work of Christ is both anti-Platonist and anti-Manichaean. As we observed before, Augustine regards both of these groups as unwilling to confess their guilt before God. They both disconnect the human predicament from its root-cause, namely man’s rebellion against God – and this influences their soteriology. Manichaean soteriology circles around the liberation of light substance from its entrapment in the body. Platonist soteriology, particularly in its Porphyrian guise, focuses on the purgation of the soul from the stains of its existence in the body through the invocation of bodiless spirits. Although Augustine might have felt sympathy for this

¹⁶⁰ conf. 7,27, CCL 27,110-111: “… quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis huius nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum [Rm. 7,24sq.], quem genuisti coaeternum et creasti in principio uiarum [Prv. 8,22] tuarum, in quo princeps huius mundi [Io. 14,30] non inuenit quidquam morte dignum, et occidit eum: et euacuatum est chirographum, quod erat contrarium nobis [Col. 2,14]?”

¹⁶¹ conf. 10,68, CCL 27,192: “…mediator ille dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus [1 Tm. 2,5], inter mortales peccatores et immortalem iustum apparuit, mortalis cum hominibus, iustus cum deo, ut, quoniam stipendium iustitiae uita et pax est, per iustitiam coniunctam deo euacuaret mortem iustificatorum impiorum, quam cum illis voluit habere communem.”

¹⁶² conf. 9,36, CCL 27,153: “…auctimam sanctam, qua deletum est chirographum, quod erat contrarium nobis [Col. 2,14], qua triumphatus est hostis computans delicta nostra et quaerens quid obiciat, et nihil inueniens in illo, in quo uincimus. quis ei refundet innocentem sanguinem? Quis ei restituet pretium, quo nos emitt, ut nos auferat ei? Ad cuius pretii nostri sacramentum ligauit ancilla tua animam suam uinculo fidei. nemo a protectione tua dirumpat eam.”
Neoplatonic ideal at the time of writing the *Confessions* (he still has a rather disembodied understanding of the heavenly life), he rejects their soteriology, as it denies that humanity needs to be released from its guilt before God in order to be liberated from sin’s penal consequences.

5.9.2.2 Pedagogical Christology: Christ the milk for infants

In the *Confessions* Augustine connects this Christology to the pedagogical Christology which was more prominent in his early works. The connection between these two approaches becomes clear from the following quotation:

> And our life itself descended to us and bore our death and killed it through the abundance of its life and he thundered, shouting aloud that we should return to him in that secret place, from where he came to us, first in that womb of the virgin, where he married human nature to himself, mortal flesh, which would not be for ever mortal; and from thence as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber he jumped up as giant to run his course. For he did not delay, but ran crying out loud by his words, deeds, death, life, descent, and ascent – calling us to return to him. And he went away from our eyes, so that we would return to our heart and find him. 163

This quotation says that Christ married human nature to himself and conquered its death through his life: righteousness conquers sin and its punishment. Simultaneously, Augustine describes Christ’s life as an admonition of the Word that has appeared externally to our eyes to make us return to his secret presence in our heart. This was the reason of his ascension, that we would not cling to him in the flesh, but would ascend to him as the eternal Word who teaches us inwardly. Augustine does not leave behind his pedagogical Christology, but incorporates it into his juridical understanding of the work of Christ. Christ not only grants those who believe in him a new juridical position, but also presents himself as the humble teacher who has assumed a human nature in order to help sense-bound souls to ascend to the transcendental reality of his divinity. As such, Christ fulfils the aspirations of Platonic philosophy, not just for the few, but for everyone. Whereas the few received a flash of divine transcendence by God’s grace, Christ has descended to grant to everyone a sustainable vision of God, if one is humble enough to confess one’s own inability to ascend, and to bow before the Word who has become flesh. 164 In this regard, Paul’s distinction between milk and food (1 Cor. 3:2-3) plays an important role. Christ the Word mingled the food that Augustine was unable to eat with the flesh, in order to become milk for his infant state. 165

163 *conf.* 4,19, CCL 27,50: “Et descendit huc ipsa uita nostra et tulit mortem nostram et occidit eam de abundantia uitarum suae et tonuit clamans, ut redeamus hinc ad eum in illud secretum, unde processit ad nos in ipsum primum uirginalem uerum, ubi ei nupsit humana creatura, caro mortalis, ne semper mortalis; et inde uelut sponsus procedens de thalamo suo exultauit ut gigans ad currendam uiam [Ps. 18,6]. Non enim tardauit, sed cucurrit clamans dictis, factis, morte, uita, descensu, ascensu, clamans, ut redeamus ad eum. Et discissit ab oculis, ut redeamus ad cor [Is. 46,8] et inueniamus eum” (translation: Chadwick, *Confessions*, 64).

164 See *conf.* 4,19; 7,24.

5.10 Effecting conversion

Augustine’s reading of the Platonists and Paul informed him about his own state under the law and about his need for the grace of Christ. However, this knowledge did not immediately effect Augustine’s conversion. It had to be applied to his personal life.\footnote{At the beginning of Book 8, Augustine observes that he has certainty about God’s transcendence and of Christ as the way to the fatherland, but that concerning his temporal life everything was uncertain. \textit{conf.} 8,1, CCL 27,113: “\textit{De mea uero temporali uita nutabant omnia.”} He doubted about the life he needed to choose, and therefore turned for advice to Simplicianus.} He had to be convinced of what the vision of divine transcendence demanded of him personally, namely to abandon his political ambitions and the desire for marriage. God used two conversion stories, related to Augustine by Simplicianus and Ponticianus, to convince him of these demands.

Simultaneously with the delight in God’s law, however, Augustine was confronted with the inner division of his will. He ardently desired to make himself free for God, but at the same time he felt the drawing force of habit, which held him back from actually making a decision. The captivity of his will to carnal habit, of which the ascent of Book 7 had made him aware, presented itself again, obstructing his efforts to order his temporal life according to the demands of God’s law. This inner division led Augustine into an impasse. He had been deprived of all his excuses for conversion, both his Manichaeans and his sceptic excuses, and was confronted with the bare fact that he simply did not will his conversion strongly enough.

Then, the second aspect of what he learned from Paul became concrete for him: the grace of Christ. He depicts the revelation of God’s grace to his mind as having released him from the attempt to force his own will to conversion. He was driven out of himself to God in prayer. And God responded to this prayer by pointing Augustine to a biblical text (\textit{Rom.} 13:13) that created in him the will to leave behind his secular career and his desire for marriage.

This conversion in the garden of Milan is often regarded as the decisive moment of Augustine’s conversion. I will argue, however, that this is not consonant with Augustine’s view of the remaining influence of the punishment of sin in a Christian. As Augustine argues in Book 10, the struggle between flesh and spirit continues in the Christian life. He even says that the victory of this battle remains uncertain until the end.\footnote{\textit{conf.} 10,39.} The new will does not possess any stability in itself. It seems to me that Augustine, after his conversion-experience in the garden of Milan, needed to learn that he could not build his Christian life upon the experience of certainty he had received in the garden. Underneath his new self, he still dragged along the old self with its iniquities, which would sooner or later strike back. Only faith in Christ, expressed through the reception of baptism, would empty the power of the punishment of sin over Augustine’s new self.

This shows that the evolution of Augustine’s thought on sin and its punishment, and on the work of Christ, affected the way in which he later evaluated his own conversion. Already at Cassiciacum, he was confronted with the remaining stains of habit upon his soul (cf. \textit{Soliloquia}) and his need for ongoing purgation by the divine doctor. In the \textit{Confessions}, Augustine takes up this line of thought, and connects it to his newly won insights on the work of Christ. The new life cannot be built upon anything present in the will itself (even if it is received by divine grace), but it must be rooted in
Christ, in whom man has been redeemed from the claim of sin over him, the influence of which remains present in the life after baptism.\(^{168}\)

### 5.10.1 Augustine sub lege

The first exemplary story that persuaded Augustine about the way of life he had to assume, was the story of the Roman philosopher and rhetor Marius Victorinus. Augustine, confused about the way of life he had to assume after his conversion, turned for advice to Simplicianus and told him about his past errors and his reading of the books of the Platonists, translated by Victorinus. Simplicianus congratulated Augustine with the fact that he had read the right philosophers and not those who have fallen in deceit “according to the elements of this world” (Col. 2:8). What Augustine lacked still, however, in Simplicianus’ view, was the humility of Christ. “Then, to exhort me to the humility of Christ hidden from the wise and revealed to babes, he recalled his memory of Victorinus himself.”\(^{169}\)

Simplicianus related that Victorinus, a pagan Neoplatonist philosopher and rhetor, had started to read the Scriptures and Christian writers later in his life, and at a certain moment called himself a Christian. Simplicianus said to him that he did not believe this until he saw Victorinus in church. He had to proclaim publicly that he belonged to the people of Christ, and had abandoned the city of the devil and his angels. But Victorinus was afraid of the slander he would suffer from his pagan colleagues. However, while he reflected on this and read the Scripture, he was suddenly filled with fear of Christ’s judgment. He felt that if he did not publicly renounce the devil and confess Christ, Christ would neither confess him before his Father in heaven, but rather condemn him with the devil and his angels, whom he had worshipped together with his Neoplatonist colleagues.\(^{170}\)

This fear of Christ’s judgment motivated Victorinus to ask Simplicianus to take him to church in order to be baptized. To this story, Simplicianus added another anecdote from Victorinus’ life about Emperor Julian’s promulgation of a law that forbade Christians to teach literature and rhetoric. This law made Victorinus gladly leave “the school of chatter” (loquacem scholam). These stories “inflamed” (exarsi)\(^{171}\) Augustine with the desire to follow Victorinus’ example, and free himself from his worldly occupations.

Another other story that set Augustine on fire to free himself for God was told to him by Ponticianus. On a certain day, this African court official visited Augustine and to his surprise he discovered a Pauline codex on Augustine’s desk; at his remark, Augustine told him that he studied Paul. In response, Ponticianus seized the occasion to tell Augustine about the life of Anthony and the monastic movement that originated in his vein. In his story, he focused on two particular persons, agentes in rebus (imperial court officials), who were converted to the monastic life by reading Anthony’s life story. They encountered Anthony’s Vita, written by Athanasius, in a certain house; and when one of them read it, his present life as a state official occured to him as vanity, and he was set on

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\(^{168}\) Markus, *Saeculum*, 144, describes Augustine’s theology of postbaptismal life as breaking with an earlier ‘Christianity of discontinuity’ (a term borrowed from Peter Brown, “Pelagius and his supporters: aims and environment”, *Journal of Theological Studies* 19/1 (1968), 93-114), according to which baptism emancipated a Christian from the power of his own past. For a critical evaluation of the contention that this idea represented the mainstream patristic tradition before Augustine, see Peter Burnell, “Concupiscence and Moral Freedom in Augustine and before Augustine”, *Augustinian Studies* (1995), 49-63.

\(^{169}\) conf. 8,3, CCL 27,114: “Deinde, ut me exhortaretur ad humiliatem Christi sapientius abscinditam et reuelatam paruulis, Victorium ipsum recordatus est.” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 135).

\(^{170}\) conf. 8,4.

\(^{171}\) Ortiz, *Creation in Augustine’s Confessions*, 61, has observed that the sentence “exarsi ad imitandum exemplum eius” recalls the the language of creation as *conversio* and *formatio*. The Spirit sets the will on fire to imitate the Word, examplified in the life of Victorinus.
fire (accendere) to sell everything he had (Lk. 14:28) and to convert to the monastic life. He told his friend about his experience and his friend decided to follow him. They agreed with their fiancées that all of them would lead a life of celibacy. And thus it happened. It goes without saying that Augustine relates this story as examplary to him, because at the time it was told to him he was still bound to the desire for marriage.

Both of these stories inflamed in Augustine a delight in the law, but simultaneous with this delight in the law of God, the law of sin in his members imposed itself upon him with irresistible force. After hearing the story about Victorinus, he knew that he had to abandon his worldly occupations, but “the burden of the world weighed me down with a sweet drowsiness such as commonly occurs during sleep.” With regard to the story of Pontitianus, Augustine’s language is even more severe:

You, however, Lord, turned me back to myself while he was speaking, taking me from my back, where I had set myself, as I did not want to see myself, and to set me before my face (Cf. Ps. 49:21), so that I would see how vile I was, how distorted and filthy, covered with sores and ulcers. And I looked and I was horrified, but there was no way of fleeing from myself (Cf. Ps. 138:7). And if I tried to avert my gaze from myself, he continued his story, and you placed me back in front of myself and you threw me before my own eyes, so that I would discover my iniquity and hate it. I had known it, but was repressing it and refusing to admit it and forgetting it.

Augustine was convinced that he needed to abandon his present way of life, but simultaneously felt the inclination to repress this feeling.

Augustine explains that he now experienced what he had read in Paul about the struggle between flesh and spirit, but he no longer interpreted this experience in a Manichaean way. It was not a contrary nature that battled against him; rather, it was his own will that suffered internal division as a consequence of the sin of Adam and of his own subsequent sins:

In my own case, as I deliberated about serving the Lord God which I had long been disposed to do, the self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind. And so it was ‘not I’ that brought this about ‘but sin

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172 conf. 8,15.
173 conf. 8,12, CCL 27,120: “Ita sarcina saeculi, uelut somno assolet, dulciter premebar.” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 141).
174 conf. 8,16, CCL 27,123: “Tu autem, domine, inter uerba eius retorquebas me ad me ipsum, auferens me a dorso meo, ubi me posueram, dum nollem me attendere, et constituebas me ante faciem meam, ut uiderem, quam turpis essem, quam distortus et sordidus, maculosus et ulcerosus. et uidebam et horrebam, et quo a me fugerem non erat. Et si conabar auertere a measpectum, narrabat ille quod narrabat, et tu me rursus opponebas mihi et impingebas me in oculos meos, ut inuenirem iniquitatem meam et odissem, noueram eam, sed dissimulabam et cohiebam et obtiuscebam.”
175 conf. 8,11, CCL 27,120: “Sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem [Gal. 5,17]...” On this text, see Bochet, Le firmament de l’Écriture, 124-28.
which dwelt in me’, sin resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of Adam.  

Even when he had left behind Manichaeism, he had still found a reason to excuse himself by saying that the truth had not dawned on him with certainty. He had not known with certainty what his moral obligation was. However, after the revelation in Book 7, Augustine had no excuses left. He just did not want his conversion strongly enough: “[My soul] held itself back, it refused and did not excuse itself. Exhausted were the arguments; they were all refuted. What had remained was a mute trembling and as if facing death it was afraid of being restrained from the flux of habit, along which it wasted away towards death.”

Augustine had arrived at the root problem that impeded his conversion: the will itself, suffering under the punishment of its own sins, which divided it against itself. It is this experience of complete responsibility before God and the self-inflicted inability to fulfill this responsibility that brought Augustine to a state of madness. God made him feel guilt and fear in the face of the law, but Augustine was unable to fulfill the righteousness that it demanded. And because he had not yet come to surrender himself to the grace of God, but tried to solve the discrepancy by himself, he was kept in a state of suspense.

5.10.2 Grace gives way to the confession of being man sub lege

Augustine tells us that a penultimate solution arose for him when, in the midst of the inner struggle between his old loves and his new love, lady Continence (continentia) presented herself to him not just as law, but as divine gift. Showing Augustine the many examples that went before him, she smiled at him with an exhortative smile and asked:

“Will you not be able to do what those men and women have done? Or do you think that they can do it in themselves and not in the Lord your God? The Lord their God has given me to them. What do you


177 conf. 8,11, CCL 27,120: “Et non erat iam illa excusatio, qua uideri mihi solembam proptera me nondum contempo saeculo seruire tibi, quia incerta mihi esset perceptio seeritatis: iam enim et ipsa certa erat.”

178 conf. 8,18, CCL 27,124-25: “Et renitebatur, recusabat et non se excusabat. Consumpta erant et confusa argumenta omnia: remanserat muta trepidatio et quasi mortem reformidabat restringi a fluxu consuetudinis, quo tabescebat in mortem.”

179 conf. 8,25, CCL 27,129: “Et instabas tu in occultis meis, domine, seuera misericordia flagella ingeminas timoris et pudoris, ne rursus cessarem et non abrumpetur id ipsum exiguum et tenue, quod remanserat, et reualesceret iterum et me robustius alligaret.”

180 conf. 8,25, CCL 27,129: “Sed non recutiebat retro nec auertebat, sed suspendebat.”

181 continentia is often translated as referring to sexual abstinence, but it denotes much more than that. As conf. 10,39ff makes clear, it stands for the unified heart that has God as its sole object of worship, and uses creation to this end. Through continentia the heart is gathered from its dispersion in the many unto a unified love of the Creator (conf. 11,39).
stand in your self, and not remain standing? Throw yourself on him and fear not. He will not withdraw himself so that you fall. Make the leap with confidence. He will receive you and heal you.”

This offer of grace, Augustine believes, provided him a way out of the impasse of internal division. He did not have to liberate himself from his penal condition. God would heal his wounded nature, so that he could fulfill the law.

Augustine sees the call of grace as having released him from his struggle under the law. He felt that he no longer had to suppress the profundity of his misery, because he did not have to liberate himself from it, but could trust in God’s grace. This consideration immediately drew the entirety of his misery before his face, and made him burst out weeping, praying to God to put an end to his anger toward him:

Where then [this] consideration drew from a hidden depth and brought before the sight of my heart the totality of my misery, a big storm occurred bearing a huge downpouring of tears… I threw myself down somehow under a certain fig tree, and let my tears flow freely. Rivers streamed from my eyes, a sacrifice acceptable to you (Ps. 50:19), and (though not in these words, yet in this sense) I repeatedly said to you: “And you Lord, how long? How long, Lord, will you be angry to the uttermost? Do not be mindful of our old iniquities.” For I felt that these held me. I uttered miserable cries: “How long, how long, tomorrow and tomorrow? Why not now? Why not an end to my wretchedness in this very hour?”

The force of the law and the promise of grace had drawn Augustine to confession. By God’s grace working in his conscience, he had given himself to God and asked him to take away his anger. Finally, Augustine had been personally led to the acknowledgment that he was unable to recreate his own fallen soul, but that it had to be recreated by God. First, God had brought him to the acknowledgment of his own responsibility as a sinner under the law; then, God had convinced him of his need for grace. In this way, Augustine suggests, the truths he had discovered in the Platonists and Paul became concrete for his own life.

Augustine tells us that he experienced the divine response to his confession in the words ‘tolle lege’, which he interpreted as a divine admonition to open the Pauline codex that still lay on the table with Alypius. This admonition made him remember the story of Anthony, who also converted after

182 conf. 8,27, CCL 27,130: “... tu non poteris, quod isti, quod istae? An uero isti et istae in se ipsis possant ac non in domino deo suo? Dominus deus eorum me dedit eis. Quid in te stas et non stas? Proice te in eum, noli metuere; non se subtrahet, ut cadas: proice te securus, excipiet et sanabit te.”


having heard a Scripture reading, namely Mt. 19:21: “Go and sell all you have, give it to the poor and you will have a treasure in heaven.” Augustine opened the codex and read Rom. 13:13: “Not in riots and drunken parties, not in licentiousness and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make to provision for the flesh in its lusts.” When considering this text, “all the darkness of doubt fled from [his] heart.” God had called Augustine and had instilled in him a “conquering delight” in the law, so that he been enabled to take the decision to leave his worldly ambition and desire for marriage behind.

5.11 Cassiciacum: ongoing conversion leading to baptism

It seems to me, however, that Augustine’s newly received delight in the garden of Milan is not all he wants to say about his conversion, when he reflects on it in the Confessions. Theologically, baptism should be seen as the central moment of Augustine’s return to God. Although it needs to be conceded that Augustine does not pay much attention to the event of his own baptism, at many points in the Confessions he emphasizes the decisive meaning of this rite for the Christian life.

In baptism, Augustine teaches, God forgives both the original and the personal sins of the baptized and removes the enmity with God, which the sinner had produced through his sins. In other words, through baptism the Christian is granted a new juridical position before God on the basis of which the penal consequences of sin lose their claim upon him. In Book 10 of the Confessions Augustine emphasizes that the struggle between flesh and spirit continues in the life of a Christian. The experience of conversion not at all assures one of one’s victory over the penal consequences of one’s sins. This is why incorporation into Christ is so important. Only in him does the believer have the assurance that the spell of sin has been broken.

This is why I think that theologically, Augustine’s baptism should receive the central place in his conversion. It is not without reason that Rom. 13:13 is a baptismal text, which implicitly seems to

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185 conf. 8,29.
186 conf. 8,29.
187 Augustine’s conversion story affirms the theology of grace as expounded in Ad Simplicianum 1,2,21. God influences Augustine in such a way that the external circumstances effect faith and a conquering delight in him. Augustine believes and wills, but the ability to do so is not to be attributed to the human will. Cf. Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadentlehre Augustins, 323.
188 Frederick J. Crosson has argued that the conversion story in the Garden should not be read as an isolated event of divine intervention, but as one of the many stages (albeit a decisive one) in God’s ongoing providential dealings with Augustine from the moment of his birth (Crosson, “Book Five: The Disclosure of Hidden Providence”, in: Kim Paffenroth, A Reader’s Guide to Augustine’s Confessions (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 71-82 (84). This idea can be extended to the time after Augustine’s conversion in Milan. God continues to ‘convert’ Augustine to grace. This leads to baptism, but also after baptism God continues to deepen Augustine’s awareness of his need for God’s grace.
186 conf. 5,16, CCL 27,64-65: “...ibam iam ad inferos [Job 7,5] portans omnia mala, quae commiseram et in te et in me et in alios, multa et grauia super originalis peccati uinculum, quo omnes in Adam [1 Cor. 15,22] morimur. Non enim quidquam eorum mihi donaueras in Christo, nec soluerat ille in cruce sua inimicitias, quas tecum contraxeram peccatis meis.” In conf. 13,12 Augustine uses the imagery of creation. In baptism, the dark abyss of the soul is illuminated by the Lord. In Him the believer has become a son of the day, although in himself he is still a great abyss.
admonish Augustine to seek baptism.\textsuperscript{191} This implicit admonition to seek baptism was also present in Simplicianus’ story about Victorinus. Simplicianus admonished Augustine to the “humility of Christ” by telling how Victorinus found the way to the Church and was baptized. It has even been argued that Monnica’s vision of Augustine standing with her on the same “wooden rule” (\textit{regula lignea}),\textsuperscript{192} refers to the wooden channel of baptismal water, and thus suggests Augustine’s baptism. This interpretation is made even more credible by Augustine’s later interpretation of the word \textit{regula} as ‘rule of faith’,\textsuperscript{193} the creed which was given to the \textit{competentes} at the moment of their baptism.\textsuperscript{194} It seems therefore that Augustine’s conversion has not yet reached its ‘destiny’ in the garden of Milan. He must still be brought to the waters of baptism, in order to be incorporated into Christ, and to become “light in the Lord” and “a son of the day”.\textsuperscript{195}

Augustine’s stay at Cassiciacum can be interpreted as the period in which he was further convinced of the need to take this final step. This can also be inferred from his own description of this period in the \textit{Confessions}. On the one hand, he depicts his sojourn at Cassiciacum as a time in which he looked back upon the life he had lived and rejoiced in the fact that God had delivered him from his entanglement in vain loves and had “constituted him in hope” of the future contemplation of God.\textsuperscript{196} On the other hand, Augustine relates that God continued to level his pride. “For my remembrance recalls, and it becomes sweet to me to confess to you, Lord, with what internal stings you subdued me and in what ways you levelled me by bringing down the mountains and hills of my thoughts, and made straight my crooked ways, and smoothed my roughness.”\textsuperscript{197} Could it be that this pride consisted in the presumption that he had somehow emancipated himself from the influence of his past, and that he would soon be cured from the stains of his past and be ready for the vision of God? However this may be, it seems that Augustine needed to learn that below his new will still lurked the influence of his past. Our analysis of the \textit{Soliloquia} confirmed this.

In the description of his Cassiciacum sojourn, Augustine relates an experience that supports the argument made above. God chastised him with a sudden toothache.\textsuperscript{198} The toothache even deprived Augustine of his ability to speak. He asked his companions to pray for him, and upon their prayer the pain immediately left him. Augustine interprets this experience as a divine intervention with a deeper meaning. On account of this experience he writes: “And your commands were made known to me in the depths (of my being) and I praised your name, rejoicing in faith, but that faith did not allow me to be saved from my former sins, which were not yet forgiven me in your baptism.”\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{191} Foley, “The Sacramental Topography of the \textit{Confessions}”, 39.
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{conf.} 3,19.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{conf.} 8,30.
\textsuperscript{194} Foley, “The Sacramental Topography of the \textit{Confessions}”, 40.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{conf.} 13,13.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{conf.} 9,11, CCL 27,140: “...sed tu, domine, singulariter in spe constituisti me [Ps. 4,10].”
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{conf.} 9,7, CCL 27,137: “Reuocat enim me recordatio mea, et dulce mihi fit, domine, confiteri tibi, quibus internis me stimulis perdomueris et quemadmodum me complanaueris humilitatis montibus et collibus cogitationum mearum et tortuosa mea direxeris et aspera lenieris.” Not without reason Augustine confesses that the writings composed at Cassiciacum still breathe the “school of pride”, albeit as from a runner who has stopped running.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{conf.} 9,12, CCL 27,140: “Sed nec obitus sum nec silebo flagelli tui asperitatem et misericordiae tuae mirabilem celeritatem, dolore dentium tunc excruciatas me.”
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{conf.} 9,12, CCL 27,140: “Et insinuati sunt mihi in profundo nutus tui et gaudens in fide laudavi nomen tuum, et ea fides me secum esse non sinebat de praeteritis peccatis meis, quae mihi per baptismum tuum remissa nondum erant.”
Augustine seems to interpret his sudden illness as a means through which God convinced him of his need to be released from the burden of his former sins. It might have reminded him of a similar experience he had in his youth, and a second time after his arrival in Rome, when he was suddenly overcome by a disease and faced death. In retrospect, he discerns how urgently he needed baptism, because of the load of sins he carried on his shoulders.²⁰⁰ Only baptism could have set him free from the guilt of his past and its penal consequences. Augustine’s sudden illness at Cassiciacum might have reminded him of these situations. Although he presently felt reborn through his newly gained resolutions, he became (suddenly) aware of the fact that he was still bound to the sins of his past, and to the ontological consequences of these sins on his soul. His future was not at all certain. The fear that this induced in him might have compelled him to ask for baptism from Ambrose. On the liberating effect of baptism he writes: “We were baptized and the anxiety about our past life fled from us.”²⁰¹

5.12 Judgment in the life after baptism
This section addresses the salvific function of divine judgment in the life after baptism. First, I will expound Augustine’s understanding of baptism itself. For Augustine, it is the beginning of new life, the change of man’s forensic position before God, and the sure foundation of its completion. Simultaneously, Augustine regards the Christian after baptism as still suffering under the penal effects of his sins (this is why his new forensic position is so important). Second, I will address the function of God’s law for Augustine in the life after baptism. How does the function of the law differ from the life before conversion and baptism? The difference is that man not only delights in the law according to the inner man, but also starts to do the law. In principle the discrepancy between the inner delight in the law and the doing of the law (delectare – facere), as observed by Paul, is resolved. This does not mean that the Christian now possesses the power to resist the assaults of habit and no longer consents to them (as Augustine had previously taught). Rather, he starts to obey the law by confessing his own disobedience to it. His suffering under the assaults of indwelling sin lead him to confession, and it is exactly by confessing sin that sin is conquered. In the act of confession, God’s judgment and his grace cooperate salvifically in the believer.²⁰²

5.12.1 Light in the Lord and still a great abyss
In the previous section, I argued that baptism must be regarded as the decisive turning point in Augustine’s life. From the deferral of baptism, Augustine is eventually brought to its reception.²⁰³ What exactly is conferred upon the believer in baptism? At several places Augustine states that one receives this sacrament unto the remission of sins.²⁰⁴ Until that moment one stands guilty before God. In baptism one is incorporated into the mediator of righteousness. On that basis the guilt

²⁰⁰ conf. 5,16.
²⁰¹ conf. 9,15, CCL 27,141: “Baptizati sumus et fugit a nobis sollicitudo uitae praeteritae.”
²⁰² I am aware of the fact that the word confessio in Augustine has a broader range of meanings. It refers to the confession of faith (confessio fidei), the confession of praise (confessio laudis) and the confession of sin (confessio peccati). All of these meanings are interconnected. They come together in the fundamental acknowledgement of God as Creator and recreator of man. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, “Originalität und Überlieferung in Augustinus’ Begriff der Confessio”, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 3/4 (1957), 375-92.
²⁰³ See footnote 32.
²⁰⁴ conf. 1,17; 9,15; 10,4.
of one’s past sins is removed. This is why Augustine says that the anxiety about his past evils fled from him only after the moment of his baptism. He was already converted, but mere faith did not allow him to be secure about his past. Only by putting on Christ through baptism are sins forgiven, and the removal of condemnation is assured.  

Furthermore, Augustine describes baptism as having a concrete effect upon the soul of the believer. “Through faith and the sacrament you changed my soul,” he confesses (mutans animam meam fide et sacramento tuo). Regularly, he uses the imagery of creation to describe the effects of baptism. He depicts the competentes as the invisible and unformed earth. Through faith and baptism they are recreated and become “light in the Lord” (Eph. 5:8). This inner renewal forms the counterpart of the forgiveness of sins. On the basis of their new juridical position, believers receive the renewal of their mind and will. Through the discipline of Scripture and the example of the saints, the Spirit starts to recreate the believer in the image of God, so that he becomes the “spiritual man, who judges everything, but is judged by no one” (1 Cor. 2:15-16).  

However, this renewal remains an ongoing process in this life. Its completion stands out as a promise for the future “when death will have been swallowed up unto victory.” As Augustine puts it in Conf. 13,13:14: “And behold, we once were darkness, but now we are light in the Lord. And yet we are so by faith, not yet by sight. For in hope we are saved. Hope, however, which is seen, is no hope.” Augustine emphasizes that baptized believers still struggle with the darkness of their former lives. Even Paul – for Augustine, the most exemplary Christian – testifies to this struggle. He did not consider himself as having grasped the heavenly price, but, forgetting what lies behind, reaches forward, as someone who sighs as one oppressed, and thirsts for the living God as a deer after water springs, saying: “When shall I come? (Ps. 42:1)” With regard to himself, Augustine also emphasizes that he indeed has his moments of exultation in God, but these are like oases in the desert. “I take a breath in you for a short while and pour out my soul above me with a voice of exultation and praise.” Augustine refers here to the short moments of contemplation that God grants him during this life. These are the first fruits of the Spirit, the testimony that in faith and hope he belongs to the

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205 conf. 9,12, CCL 27,140: “Et insinuati sunt mihi in profundo nutus tui et gaudens in fide laudavi nomen tuum, et ea fides me securum esse non sinebat de praeteritis peccatis meis, quae mihi per baptismum tuum remissa nondum erant.”  
206 conf. 10,4. Cf. conf. 4,8 on the transformative effect of baptism on Augustine’s friend. It changed him from a Manichaean into a confessing Christian.  
207 On this process, see conf. 13,15-35.  
208 conf. 10,42, CCL 27,177: “Nunc tamen quid adhuc sim in hoc genere mali mei, dixi bono domino meo exultans cum tremore [Ps. 2,11] in eo, quod donasti mihi, et lugens in eo, quod inconsummatus sum, sperans perfecturum te in me misericordias tuas usque ad pacem plenariam, quam tecum habeunt interioria et exteriora mea, cum absorpta fuerit mors in victoriam [1 Cor. 15,54].”  
209 conf. 13,14, CCL 27,248-49: “[Et ecce fuimus aliudando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino [Eph. 5,8]. It tamen adhuc per fidem, nondum per speciem [2 Cor. 5,7]. Spe enim salutis facti sumus. specie autem, quae uidetur, non est speces [Rm. 8,24].]”  
210 conf. 13,14.  
211 conf. 13,15, CCL 27,250: “Respiro in te paullum [Io. 32,30], cum effundo super me animam meam in uoce exaltationis et confessionis sunt festivitatem celebrantis [Ps. 41,5].”  
212 On several occasions, Augustine testifies to the significance of contemplative experiences in the post-baptismal life. The most famous one is of course the vision he had with his mother at Ostia (conf. 9,23-25). Also in conf. 10,65 and 11,2 he relates his ascensional exercises, and the contemplative experiences God granted through them. However, Augustine no longer regards contemplation as a state that endures. It has become a momentary glimpse of the life to come, which is only received in full, when we are invited to “enter the joy of our Lord” (Mt. 25:21) and when “life is swallowed up in victory” (1 Cor. 15:51). Nonetheless, these experiences
heavenly city. But these moments do not last long. “Still [my soul] is sad, because it falls back and becomes an abyss, or rather feels that it still is an abyss.” In other words, in themselves and left to themselves, believers are still in darkness. They do not even know the outcome of the battle that they have to fight with their old selves. It is for this reason that Augustine says that he does not pass any definitive judgment on himself or on others. A victorious outcome of his ongoing battle with sin can only be granted by the Lord himself, who is both his judge and saviour. Whoever boasts, let him boast “in the Lord”.

However, Augustine does not perceive this existence of the Christian between darkness and future contemplation as an uncertain situation, as if the new life can be lost at any moment when the flesh fights back. On the contrary, through faith the starving deer is assured that he will not die in the desert and will not be consumed by the darkness of the night. As Augustine has it:

Let my faith say to my soul, my faith which you have kindled in the night before my feed: “Why are you so sad, soul, and why do you disturb me? Hope in the Lord; his word is a lamp for your feet. Hope and persevere, until the night has passed, the mother of iniquities, until the wrath of the Lord has passed, whose sons also we have been when we were once darkness, the remnants of which we drag along in the body that is mortal because of sin, until the day dawns and the shadows will be removed.” ‘Hope in the Lord’: you will stand in the morning and contemplate; I will praise you evermore. In the morning I will stand and I will see the salvation of my face, my God, who will vivify our mortal bodies because of the Spirit, who dwells in us, because he mercifully hovers over our interior darkness and fluidity. From him we have received in this pilgrimage the assurance that we are already light in the Lord. While we are still saved in hope we are sons of light and sons of the day, not sons of the night and the darkness, which we yet have been.

function as added assurances that through faith we already enjoy the spiritual life of the caelum caeli. On this function of contemplation in Augustine’s Christian life, see John Peter Kenney, The Mysticism of Saint Augustine. Rereading the Confessions (New York: Routledge, 2005), 89-109 (on the transformation of the function of Neoplatonic contemplation in Augustine); Idem, Contemplation and Classical Christianity, 151-61 (on the vision of Ostia).


On Augustine’s reference to 2 Cor. 4:3.

In this passage, Augustine states that the Spirit assures Christ’s members that they are sons of the day and thus will not be conquered by the remaining darkness that is still in them and by which they are regularly overcome. But on what basis does Augustine know this? How can he be certain that God’s mercy will outweigh his righteous judgment over the sins of his people? In order to understand this we must clarify the connection between Augustine’s understanding of the work of Christ and his pneumatology in the *Confessions*. As we have seen, in baptism believers are incorporated into Christ. In Christ the penal consequences of sin have been broken, because Christ bore the punishment of sin as the righteous one. Christ’s death on the cross thus provides the warrant that the wrath of God that is still present in Christ’s members will pass and that they will contemplate God for all eternity. The Spirit then, in his turn, does two things. First, he gives assurance of the hope believers may have of their future redemption. As Augustine has it in the passage quoted above: “From him [the spirit that hovers over our darkness and fluidity] we have received an assurance in our pilgrimage that we are light… that we are sons of the light and of the day.” Second, this assurance is accompanied by a new delight: the Spirit transforms the weight of cupiditas into the weight of heaven-directed love. He lifts the soul up from darkness and preserves it from the waters of chaos, until it has attained its resting place in the heaven of heavens, the house of God. As Augustine puts it Book 13 of the *Confessions*:

> The impurity of our spirit flows downwards because of our love of cares, and the holiness which is yours draws us upwards in a love of freedom from cares, so that we may have our heart lifted up towards you, where your Spirit is born over the waters, and come to your supereminent rest, when our soul has passed over the waters that are without substance… Love lifts us up and your good spirit elevates our humility from the gate of death… Through your gift we ascend and are carried upwards; we are kindled and we go… to the peace of Jerusalem.

This assurance of and desire for salvation form the basis of Augustine’s prayers in the last books of the *Confessions*. He asks God to give what he commands (Book 10) and to grant him understanding of what he believes from the words of Scripture (Book 11). These prayers breathe boldness in addressing God and confidence that God will not reject Augustine, because Augustine prays in the name of Christ “who intercedes for us”. In Him God has made himself our debtor: he has obliged himself to give us what he commands. Christ’s mediation provides the solid ground for confidence that those who ask will receive, those who seek will find, and to those who knock will be let in (Mt. 7:7-8).
5.12.2 Doing the truth is coming to the light: confessio laudis and confessio peccati

We observed that the new life after baptism consists of a new delight in God as the sole object of worship. The fallen soul has started to live according the spirit. By this new delight man is gradually drawn towards God. He is recreated through the Spirit in the image of God, according to God’s original design. However, this delight is continuously challenged by the remaining influence of habit, that part of the soul that is still “a great abyss”. The battle between the flesh and the spirit still continues after baptism. Nonetheless, it is placed in a new context, namely the context of grace. The Christian uses the law spiritually by not concealing the darkness of his soul, but by confessing it. In this way he “does the truth” and “comes to the light” (Jn. 3:21).

5.12.2.1 Confessio laudis

Man’s delight in God comes to function in the context of confessio. On the one hand, this means that Augustine praises God for the extent to which the law has already been fulfilled in his life. This is the confessio laudis. In Book 10 Augustine praises God for the fact he has converted Augustine from seeking God outside of himself in creation, to an acknowledgment of God as the transcendent Creator. God had been present everywhere, but Augustine had refused to acknowledge him. Finally, however, God had removed his deafness and blindness, and enkindled Augustine’s love for him. As Augustine has it in the famous words of Confessions 10,38:

You were with me, but I was not with you. These things held me far away from you, which would not be if they were not in you. You have called and shouted and shattered my deafness. You were radiant and resplendent and put to flight my blindness. You were fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now pant after you. I tasted you, and I feel but hunger and thirst after you. You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace which is yours.

Augustine sees his conversion as God’s victory over his resistance to God’s law, which had been accusing him in many ways. God had healed both his faculty of judgment and his will. Thus, the knowledge of God’s law and his gift of obedience had come together in Augustine’s conversion, and now constitute his way of life. He has been brought back to the path for which Adam was designed, namely to use creation as a stepping stone to the enjoyment of God. This sometimes even leads to moments of contemplation for Augustine, “extraordinary depths of feeling, marked by a strange sweetness. If it were brought to perfection in me, it would be an experience quite beyond anything in this life”. His incipient fulfilment of God’s law is rewarded with foretastes of the life to come in the caelum caeli.

225 conf. 10,1.
226 conf. 10,38, CCL 27,175: “Mecum eras, et tecum non eram. Ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. Vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam, coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam, flagrasti, et duxi spiritum et anhelo tibi, gustau et esurio et sitio, tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam.” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 201, adapted).
227 conf. 10,40-65.
228 conf. 10,65, CCL 27,191: “[Et aliquando intromittis me in] affectum multum inusitatum introrsus ad nescio quam dulcedinem, quae si perficiatur in me, nescio quid erit, quod uita ista non erit” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 218).
5.12.2.2 Confessio peccati

However, Augustine simultaneously experiences that his love of God remains contested. “But I fall back into my usual ways under my miserable burdens. I am reabsorbed by my habitual practices. I am held in their grip. I weep profusely, but still I am held. Such is the strength of the burden of habit. Here I have the power to be, but do not wish it. There I wish to be, but lack the power.” Augustine’s incipient fulfilment of the law of God and its rewards are continuously challenged by the assaults of consuetudo, so that he cannot maintain a state of contemplative sight. In this regard, there is no difference between his experiences of ascent before and after his conversion. It is exactly the love of God, the desire of the future life, that makes Augustine aware of the levels of his soul that do not yet comply with his new delight. He remains a man suffering under inner division. Augustine’s self-scrutiny in the second half of Book 10 of the Confessions testifies to this deep awareness.

However, Augustine deals with his disobedience to the law in a different fashion after his conversion than before. It leads him to confession. His delight in God and his grace helps him to lay his remaining sins and weaknesses open to God and invoke him as the healer of his soul. In other words, the accusation of the law does not hold Augustine captive to fear (leading to suppression of what he should do), but effects a continuous return to Christ as the one through whom the cracked soul is unified. This return to Christ is what the self-scrutiny of the second half of Confessions 10 leads to:

“So under the three forms of lust I have considered the sicknesses of my sins, and I have invoked your right hand to save me. For I have caught a glimpse of your splendour with a wounded heart, and being rebuked I said ‘Who can attain that?’ I am cast out from the sight of your eyes’. You are the truth presiding over all things. But in my greed I was unwilling to lose you, and wanted to have you at the same time as holding on to a lie, in much the same way as no one wants to become such a liar as to lose all awareness of what the truth is. This is why I lost you: you do not condescend to be possessed together with falsehood.”

With these words Augustine confesses the duplicity of his heart, which he experienced before and after his conversion: longing for God, but still not displaying the continence that is needed to contemplate God. This leads him to the cry that sounds very much like the cry of Paul in Rom. 7:25, with which Augustine characterized his state sub lege. But now this inner division does not lead him to despair, but to a boasting in the grace of Christ:

Who would I find to reconcile me to you?... The true Mediator you showed and sent... in your secret mercy... How you have loved us, good Father, you who did not ‘spare your only Son but delivered him up for us sinners’... With good reason my firm hope is in him. For you will cure all

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230 Cf. Drecoll, Entstehung, 342.


232 conf. 10,66.
my diseases through him who sits at your right and intercedes for us. Otherwise I would be in despair.  

This quotation shows the great difference between the effect of the law’s accusation before Augustine’s conversion and after. Before his conversion, it brought Augustine in a state of despair and madness. In the context of grace, however, it brings him to deepened humility about himself, and exultation in the Lord. The law has come to serve the work of grace in Augustine and the glorification of God as Augustine’s recreator.

5.12.2.3 Contemplating the law of God in the service of Christ’s body

This changed function of the law (from working condemnation into serving grace) also influences Augustine’s self-understanding and confidence as a bishop. As we observed in chapter 3, it was this work that he feared, because of the many temptations of the life among ‘iniquitous men’. Life in the world, especially “the furnace of human tongue,” seduced him to give in to the desire for praise still present in his heart. At the end of Book 10, Augustine refers to a moment at which the despair about his own sins and the “pile of his misery” had made him consider a flight into solitude. This might refer to the period of his life recorded in Epistula 20, where Augustine relates how his congregational responsibilities confronted him with his inability to serve the people well. It might equally well refer to another moment in his ecclesial career, maybe to the moment of his ordination as a bishop. In any case, it illustrates that Augustine as a bishop still had his moments of despair about the power of his old life over him, and felt inclined to ‘solve’ his inner division by focussing on self-transformation, and avoiding the external influences that obstructed this process. Moreover, as the citation below illustrates, Augustine had to do with people who ‘spoke evil of him’, probably because of his generally known past as a Manichaean.

Augustine continues, however, by relating that Christ held him back from putting his considerations into practice. Christ reminded Augustine of the fact that he belonged to the people for whom Christ had died. Therefore, he should not withdraw in isolation to permit his own transformation, but is called to join the community of those for whom Christ has given himself and serve this community in his name. As Christ has liberated Augustine from the claim of sin, he is free to forget himself, and serve others, despite of his past and of the sin that still indwells him. Augustine writes:

But you forbade me and comforted me saying: ‘that is why Christ died for all, so that those who live should not live for themselves, but for him who died for them’ (2 Cor. 5:15). See, Lord, ‘I cast my anxiety on you that I may live and contemplate the wonders of your law. You know my inexperience and weakness: teach me and heal me’ (Ps. 6:3; 142:10). Your only Son in whom are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Col. 2:3) has redeemed me by his blood’ (Rev.

233 conf. 10,68-69, CCL 27,191-92: “Quem inuenirem, qui me reconciliaret tibi?... uerax autem mediator, quem secreta tua misericordia demonstrasti ... misisti... quomodo nos amasti, pater bone, qui filio tuo unico non pepercisti, sed pro nobis impis [Rm. 8,32] tradidisti eum!... merito mihi spes ualida in illo est, quod sanabis omnes languores meos per eum, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis [Rm 8,34]: alioquin desperarem” (translation: Chadwick, Confessions, 218-20, slightly adapted).

234 conf. 10,62-63.

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Augustine’s discovery of grace thus liberated him to serve others. This seems to be one of the explanations why Augustine could write the Confessions at all. He did not have to hide his former life, but could put it in the service of the Church, and of those outside of the Church. He could present his own life in the mirror of the law, because he had been released from fear of condemnation. And thus he could openly present his sins and God’s judgment over them, in order to exhort others to confess their own sins, accept God’s judgment over them, and call upon him in his grace. God thus did not only put the law in the service of the glorification of his grace in the life of Augustine. In doing so, he also liberated Augustine to place the law in the service of God’s grace for others, by telling the story of his own life in the light of both God’s justice and God’s mercy. Just as God had used the life stories of other saints to bring Augustine under the law and show him the liberating power of his grace (Book 8), God makes Augustine into one of the saints through whose life story (and further exposition of Scripture) God convinces others of their sins and brings them to confession and conversion.

5.13 Conclusion

How does God’s justice function in relation to his grace? And how is Augustine’s theological development on this question reflected in his theological autobiography?

In the previous chapter we concluded that Augustine developed a Pauline understanding of the relationship between law and grace. Although Augustine had always held the view that the demands of the law only restrain one who does not possess the love to fulfill them, his view of the relationship between law and grace had been rather intellectualist. He understood grace primarily in terms of persuasive teaching (according the pedagogical model he followed), which enabled the mind to understand the law’s rationality and obey its demands out of love, rather than out of fear. During the 390s Augustine had developed his understanding of the relationship between law and grace under the influence of his reading of Paul. The law exposed man as suffering under the dominion of sin, and as destined to damnation, if he would not be justified through the grace of Christ. Augustine came to connect this grace much more to the death of Christ. His death emptied the power of sin, death, and devil over us, and changed our forensic situation before God. The pedagogy of punishment is now

235 conf. 10,70, CCL 27,193: “Conterritus peccatis meis et mole miseriae meae agitaueram corde meditatusque fueram fugam in solitudinem, sed prohibuisti me et confirmasti me dicens: ideo Christus pro omnibus mortuus est, ut qui uiuamiam non sibi uiuam, sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est [2 Cor. 5,15]. Ecce, domine, iacto in te curam meam, ut uiuam, et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua [Ps. 118,18]. Tu scis imperitiam meam et infirmitatem meam: doce me et sana me [Ps. 142,10]. Ille tuus unicus, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi [Col. 2,3], redemit me sanguine suo. non calumnientur mihi superbi, quoniam cogito pretium meum et manduco et bibo et ergo et pauper cupio saturari ex eo inter illos, qui edunt et saturantur: et laudant dominum qui requirunt eum [Ps. 21,27].”

236 conf. 10,4; cf. retr. 2,1 where Augustine says that his Confessions praise God in his justice and his goodness, and intend to rouse the human mind and affections towards him.

237 conf. 11-13 could be regarded as Augustine’s ongoing service of “meditating upon the law” in the service of God’s people. Through the Bible God disputes with us (disputas nobiscum – conf. 13,22-23), levels the pride of man (conf. 13,17), and brings him to confession.
exercised on this basis, namely to discipline the believer in the righteousness received in Christ and to make the believer grow in the knowledge of grace.

It is this Pauline understanding of the relationship between God’s justice and mercy that defines Augustine’s theological autobiography. It can be understood as a lawsuit that God brought against him from the moment of the deferral of his baptism until the moment he was finally incorporated into Christ through baptism. In the first sections we observed that Augustine depicts himself as suffering under God’s condemnation on account of Adam’s sin. His baptism could have been the beginning of the healing of his nature, but his mother deferred it, so that Augustine was delivered to his own adamic nature. Consequently, he lived out his life in the flesh according to his threefold concupiscence, adding to the guilt he contracted from Adam. We further observed that Augustine sees God as having punished him for his sins, thus accusing him and calling him to return. Augustine went away from him, but he met the omnipresent God everywhere in his anger. As O’Connell has observed, this theme echoes the Plotinian idea of cosmic justice, but in Augustine it loses its pedagogical function. God restrained Augustine’s sins, and continuously reminded him through his sufferings that his life in the flesh only led to unhappiness, but Augustine remained for a time completely deaf to God’s voice, continuing to ‘store up wrath for the day of judgment’. 238

Augustine attributes it to God’s grace that he was reawakened to the life of the spirit by reading of Cicero’s Hortensius. This reading confronted him with the need to break with his present way of life. However, this interior delight in ‘the law of the mind’ could not conquer the power of the flesh over him. Rather, the flesh affirmed its claims over Augustine, which found its expression in his rejection of the Scriptures and his choice for Manichaism. The flesh led his mind captive to the law of sin, so that Augustine was unable to discern the divine law, which commands us to rule over corporeal creation and strive after the contemplation of the incorporeal God. He sees his adherence to Manichaism as a punishment for his pride against God: rather than bringing him to the struggle with the flesh, Manichaean materialism even dragged him deeper into the flesh, and its dualism precluded his awareness and confession of his own sins. Even after his abandonment of the Manichees, his inability to discern spiritual reality kept hindering him from becoming man sub lege. He continued to search for wisdom, but he did so according to the demands of the flesh. Therefore, God continued to chastise him on account of his disobedience, but as Augustine did not have any certainty about the truth or a way to interpret God’s activity in his life, he remained bound to sin.

It is God who finally brought Augustine under the law through his reading of the books of the Platonists. He discovered God as Creator, himself as a creature made to contemplate God, and the rest of creation as created good, although less in being. This new metaphysic enabled Augustine to understand evil as a voluntary turning away from God, and its punishment, the resulting consequences. Thus he came to see himself as man under the law. By God’s grace, Augustine had overcome the misconstruction of the battle between flesh and spirit by the Manichees and had come to delight in the law. The moral implications of his vision of God were subsequently elaborated through his encounters with Simplicianus and Pontitianus. In listening to their stories, Augustine’s resistance to God’s law reached its climax: he was deprived of all his excuses, but he still did not want to obey fully. He feared divine punishment and restrained his sinful inclinations, but he was unable to liberate himself unto obedience to God.

238 Cf. conf. 9,10.
It was the call of grace which set him free to call upon God ‘against God’, to ask him to liberate Augustine’s will from its bondage to sin. He experienced the divine response to this prayer in the immediate certainty that he wanted to abandon his worldly career and desire for marriage. God created in him a *delectatio victrix*, which resolved his inner division. Although God’s grace fulfilled in Augustine the righteousness that the law demands, Augustine, however, had to be subdued further by God’s chastisement. He had indeed made the principal transition from fear to love, from being under the law to being under grace, but it seems that he somehow thought that the struggle with his old self belonged to the past. He had to be convinced that the old life is still present underneath his new resolutions (as we already witnessed in our analysis of the *Soliloquia*). God exposed Augustine to this reality; this induced within Augustine the fear of the punishment he still deserves for his former sins. This led him to desire baptism, as in baptism the believer is united to Christ, in whom he receives a new forensic position: from deserving condemnation because of his sins, he comes to deserve liberation from condemnation on account of the righteousness of Christ. In Christ the divine justice is reversed from penal to restorative. Augustine is very critical of the Neoplatonist way of mediation, because they fail to appropriate their sinful selves as their real selves. They want to liberate themselves from sin’s punishment without confessing its cause, which keeps them in the hands of the mediator of pride, the devil, and ensures their guilt and condemnation under the law.

Augustine thus understands grace in the *Confessions* as laying a new juridical basis for the Christian life. This is why penal divine justice no longer fills Augustine with the fear of condemnation, but rather comes to function in the service of the appropriation of the righteousness received by Christ. He no longer experiences the law of sin, which is present in his members, as leading him to condemnation; it rather functions in the service of confession, and as such in the service of growing in the love of God himself. Augustine’s exercises of ascent feature in this confessional framework. On the one hand, his moments of sight are rewards for his delight in the law of God, first fruits of the Spirit. On the other hand, in his falling back, he is exercised in the dependence upon Christ’s justifying grace. In this regard, Augustine’s understanding of ascent has changed from a method of attaining perfection in this life, into a method of exercising the hope of the future life and the dependence upon God’s grace to arrive there.

The context of grace also helps Augustine to use his own life story in the service of the conversion of others. As he no longer needs to fear condemnation from God or other people, he is released to write down his own experiences in the light of God’s justice (and of his mercy), in order to serve toward the correction and conversion of others.
6 Conclusions

6.1 Introduction
This thesis addressed the question of how Augustine perceived of the function of God’s judgment over sin in the process of salvation. In the introductory chapter, I placed this question in three different, but related contexts: the context of anti-Gnostic polemics, represented by Clement and Origen; the context of classical psychagogy; and the debate on the salvific function of law and punishment in the early Augustine. These contexts yielded three questions:

1. How does Augustine use elements from the tradition of philosophical pedagogy? Which elements does he use and where does he take a specifically Christian path?
2. How does Augustine relate to the anti-Gnostic tradition, which, out of a desire to reconcile God’s goodness and his justice, presented the divine punishment of sin as part of a pedagogical project, in which human free will cooperates with the divine teaching?
3. What is the place and function of punishment in Augustine’s understanding of the operation of grace? Is it true that the Augustine develops from a defender of free will and rational persuasion to a proponent of external coercion? Does he indeed change his view on the relationship between Old and New Testament with regard to the use of temporal punishment?

6.2 Divine judgment and philosophical pedagogy
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the research presented in this thesis is that Augustine placed himself within the tradition of philosophical pedagogy. His positive evaluation of restraint and temporal punishment should primarily be approached from that context, rather than from the development of his doctrine of sin, or an evolution in his view on the relationship between the Old and the New Testament. Furthermore, both his understandings of the relationship between the law and Christ, and of ecclesiastical discipline prove to be influenced by elements from this tradition.

In the Cassiciacum Dialogues, Augustine shows himself an heir to the Stoic and Neoplatonist understanding of providence as a pedagogical force. The fallen soul is admonished by the evils it suffers to return to itself and restrain its attachment to the changeable world. It does so through philosophical exercise, which is understood in medical terms as a cure of the mind (medicina animi). This is what Augustine does, and what he admonishes his patron Romanianus to do, after the violent admonitions of fortune. However, we also concluded that Augustine starts to Christianize this way of thinking. He understands the buffetings of fortune as sent by a personal God, rather than as part of an impersonal order, inherent to the universe. Furthermore, it is the Christian religion that Augustine sees as the true cure of the mind. God’s violent admonition is primarily meant to compel Augustine to bow to the authority of Christ, the divine Logos who has assumed a human body to heal fallen souls by his salvific teaching. The buffetings of fortune in and of themselves do not achieve this in men. Rather,
the human mind needs the right philosophy (i.e. Christianity) to understand who addresses him in his sufferings, namely the personal God of Christianity; and it needs to know that his Wisdom and Power (the second person of the Trinity) has come down to help humans to ascend to God, and can be called upon in prayer.

Another aspect that reveals how Augustine conceptualizes the salvific meaning of judgment within a classical pedagogical framework is in the dialogues he organized at Cassiciacum. In these dialogues, his pupils were called to correct each other by exchanging arguments, in order to train their minds in the discovery of truth. However, they, unfortunately, proved to be more driven by a love of praise and competition, than by the love of truth and the neighbor. This led Augustine to the use of restraint, a pedagogical tool we also encountered in Plato. If the mind finds itself suffering under the passions of the lower soul, it benefits from temporal punishment, in order to subdue the swelling that burdens the mind. Augustine’s recording of the dialogues can be seen as such a restraining measure against the lower passions of his pupils.

In Augustine’s understanding of the function of God’s law and his punishment in the history of salvation, he also proves to have learned from classical pedagogical insights. The *dispensatio temporalis* is understood as *medicina animi*, medicine of the mind. In treating his patients, the doctor adapts his remedies to the severity of their illness. The religion of the Old Testament and the coming of Christ in the New Testament are understood as two distinct but related phases of the condescension of divine authority to heal the human mind from its entanglement in the sensible world, and to lead it upwards to the vision of truth through a life of virtue. Augustine compares this pedagogical project to the education of a human being from childhood to adult maturity. In the period of childhood, in which the mind is not yet able to use reason, God coerces his people to outward obedience to temporal laws through the fear of temporal punishment. These temporal laws were shadows of eternal laws which Christ would reveal through his ministry, and which he would teach to those who believe in him. The people of the New Testament would be set free from the dominion of the passions over reason so that they could be taught freely, without the need of coercion through fear. Augustine does not see this transition from the Old to the New Testament as absolute, however. The New Testament Church threatens with eternal punishment, of which the temporal punishments of the Old Testament (exclusion from the land) were only signs. She still administers to her children the medicines that suit the illness of their souls.

Augustine’s use of the pedagogical framework to understand the relationship between the Old and the New Testament has particular consequences for his understanding of Paul. He understands Paul’s characterization of the Old Testament law as a pedagogue to Christ in *Galatians* 3 from the classical context in which the pedagogue had the task to restrain the child’s irrational inclinations, until he would become rational and could be taught freely. This is the purpose for which Christ came into the world. He is the teacher who illuminates our mind so that we can be taught by words, rather than being coerced through temporal threats. Although Augustine never explicitly abandons this pedagogical hermeneutic when relating the Old Testament law to Christ, he will enrich it with a more forensic hermeneutic. The law as pedagogue does not merely brings us to Christ the teacher, but also to Christ the mediator of righteousness. The problem that Christ solves is not merely the problem of irrationality, but of humanity’s irreversible guilt before God.
In his reflections on Church discipline, Augustine continued to apply philosophical ideas of pedagogy. The medical imagery remains present, for example in the context of fraternal correction and monastic discipline. Just as in Cassiciacum, Augustine remains aware of how the illness of the mind influences the moral purity of mutual correction and therefore emphasizes that all rebuke should be preceded by careful self-scrutiny. Augustine uses Stoic insights on the troubling effect of anger on the human mind. Before we inflict rebuke, we should ask ourselves if we are motivated by the love of justice and the desire to correct the sinner, rather than by the desire to avenge ourselves. Augustine not only applies this idea to the members of his own congregation and religious community, but also to the Donatists (in his Psalmus contra Partem Donati), whom he sees as caught in the chains of inveterate anger against the Catholics. Simultaneously, his use of Stoic ideas on rebuke are ‘coloured’ by his reading of Paul, who emphasizes the need of love and humility in the exercise of judgment. The knowledge of one’s own sinfulness and limited ability to know the heart of the brother should make one hesitant to chastise too easily.

Augustine also Christianizes his use of medical imagery in his reflections on Christian discipline. This has to do with his understanding of grace. In the Platonic tradition, correction and punishment are understood in medical terms, because sin cannot be understood as guilt. Sin arises from ignorance, and must therefore be seen as not culpable. Punishment is therefore never retributive, but rather meant as shock therapy of the mind. Augustine sees sin as culpable, and its effects as the penal consequences of sin. The effects of sin on the mind and the will cannot be cured if its root, namely guilt, is not forgiven, because sin is not just something accidental, but imprisons man in its power. Man has been sold under sin, has become part of the massa damnata, and can only be released from this forensic position through faith in Christ. At this point, Augustine’s theological motivation to apply brotherly correction has become radically Christian. The motivation with which we apply correction is not the fact that the brother has a rational mind (which must and can be released from the dominion of the passions), but the fact that Christ had died for him. This is at least what one should presume. One should regard the brother as being in Christ. For this reason, one may expect that the brother is susceptible to the fear of God and will listen to the correction.

6.3 Judgment and mercy in Augustine’s anti-Manichean polemic
Augustine uses his pedagogical understanding of punishment in the service of his anti-Manichean polemics. Man’s involuntary suffering should not be understood as the assault of a contrary nature, but rather as God’s penalty for human sin. God uses this punishment of sin within his pedagogy of salvation, in order to lead fallen souls back to himself. In his Cassiciacum Dialogues, Augustine already makes this point when he says that the human soul suffers under the effects of its own folly. Divine providence takes care that the soul that attaches itself to changeable reality suffers the effects of its own sins through ontological degradation. In this way it experiences God as its enemy. This same God expresses his goodness, however, when he makes the soul aware of its disease through suffering or teaching.

In the writings that Augustine composes after his baptism, he situates human suffering in the context of creation and fall. We presently suffer under the consequences of the fall of Adam and of our subsequent sins. Augustine understands this fall as a passing from a state of inward contemplation, detached from bodily existence, towards a situation in which the soul seeks truth and beatitude through
action in the body, in the external world. As a consequence of this disobedience to God, the lower soul and the body have become disobedient to man, so that he continuously suffers from lack and want, and has difficulty discerning the truth. I argued against Sage and others that the early Augustine sees man as deeply fallen, not only because he suffers under the mortality of the body, but also because of the carnal nature of his soul, which inevitably entangles itself in carnal habit.

However, we also observed that Augustine combines the idea of divine punishment with the idea of God’s mercy and free will. By condemning man to live in a mortal body and suffer the pains of bodily existence, God has allowed man to lay down the pride through which he fell away from God and regain his original state of contemplation. Augustine even says that the punishment of the first sin expresses God’s clemency more than his severity, as he allows man to be educated (erudiri) by it. In this context, Augustine compares the resistance of the bodily creation to the accusation of the law. In the body’s resistance to human sin, one should hear God’s law, which commands man to love God above anything else. The rebellion of creation against man reminds him of his own rebellion against God, encouraging him once again to rule over the things of which he has become a slave. It is this interpretation of human suffering that Augustine uses against the Manichees, who, in his view, exculpate themselves by attributing their suffering in the body to the assault of a contrary nature.

Although the early Augustine does say that man needs interior illumination and love in order to be able to respond to the divine law that addresses him in his suffering, he nonetheless reserves room for independent human effort. He understands man’s return to God as a gradual process of return, in which divine grace, the human will, and God’s purifying judgment work together. This idea comes to the fore in his description of ascent in De quantitate animae and later in De diuersis quaestionibus 36. At the same time, Augustine has a deep awareness of the remaining stains of habit upon the human soul. This already comes to the fore in the Soliloquia, where the assault of habit compels him to lay down his pretended purity. This awareness is also present in his understanding of ascent in De quantitate animae: the soul, which easily deceives itself about its own purity, must always be receptive to God’s purifying and humbling judgment, if it wants to advance in virtue. Notwithstanding these insights, Augustine continues to think within a pedagogical framework in which man’s salvation is conceived in terms of a process of inward purgation of the soul. As becomes clear from De libero arbitrio and his commentaries on Romans, Augustine is motivated by the desire to combine the idea of divine justice and the help of grace by basing the reception of grace on the merit of man’s will. Carol Harisson has rightly argued that Augustine from the very beginning regards man as deeply dependent upon God’s grace. However, Augustine sees this grace as operating within an ascensional model, in which the human will has a role of its own to play in the work of purification. God’s law and punishment function as corrective means in this process of inner purification.

In the 390s, however, Augustine gradually shifts his understanding of the relationship between God’s justice and his grace. He further develops the forensic framework, according to which man presently suffers under the penal consequences of the first sin, in the light of his appropriation of Paul. In conversation with the Manichees, he attempts to reclaim Paul’s discourse on the battle between the flesh and spirit; and he comes to conclude in Ad Simplicianum that man’s liberum arbitrium, sold as it is under the sin, has lost all power to turn toward God. In De libero arbitrio, Augustine still maintained that our experience of ignorance and difficulty can effect in us the desire to know the good and to want it, and thus provokes us to ask for help. God does not blame us for the penal state in which
we were born, but for how we relate to this state. Augustine abandons this idea, however, in *Ad Simplicianum*. Because of the original sin in the garden, humanity is condemned to death row, and it awaits final damnation.

His battle with the Manichees over the correct interpretation of Paul effects a change in Augustine’s use of the anti-dualist tradition that he inherited. No longer does he reconcile God’s goodness and his severity in a pedagogical model, but he arrives at a radical separation between God’s mercy and his punishment over sin. Against the Manichees, Augustine upholds humanity’s responsibility before God. Ignorance, concupiscence, and mortality are the penal effects of the first sin for which we are all responsible. We are condemned perpetrators rather than victims. But Augustine abandons the anti-Gnostic tradition in that he argues there is no free will remaining that enables man to respond positively to the penal consequences of his sin. The punishment under which he presently suffers is solely understood as God’s retributive response to sin. Man has arrived in a forensic position from which he cannot escape: helpless, but responsible. This shift in Augustine’s reception of the anti-Gnostic theology of his predecessors explains why Julian of Aeclanum would later contend against Augustine that the latter had not yet fully freed himself from his Manichaean past.

This did not mean, however, that punishment ceased to play a role in the economy of salvation. Rather, Augustine transposes the soteriological function of punishment to his Christology. Before the 390s he had understood Christ as the Word who had come in the flesh to teach us through his words and example to live a life of virtue and thus enable humanity to be released from its captivity to the senses. In this framework, Christ’s death on the cross has an exemplary function. Through his death he condemned our sinful way of relating to this temporal life. However, in his reappropriation of Paul, Augustine comes to see that Christ established salvation through his death itself. In his death on the cross he represented humanity *sub lege*. The law exposed humanity as irreversibly bound to condemnation. Christ the righteous one, however, identified with humanity under the law. In him the life of the old Adam was condemned hung on the cross to death and was condemned to death. Through Christ’s death, God triumphed over sin, death, and devil, because the righteous one took upon himself the punishment of sinners. Therefore, these sinners receive the right to be released from condemnation. In Christ their forensic position has changed. They have died to the law and live for God through the Spirit of Christ who enables them to fulfill the law. I also argued that this theology of penal atonement should not be confused with the later development of this doctrine that teaches that Christ suffered the final punishment in our stead. He rather identified with humanity’s present penal situation and deprived it of its binding claim. This does not exclude, but rather includes the idea of post-mortem purification, an idea to which Augustine alludes in some early texts.

In this new forensic framework, Augustine comes to understand the pedagogical function of law and punishment as *disciplina iustitiae*. Sins have been forgiven. In principle man is released from final condemnation, because the claim of sin over him has been broken. However, God’s justice does not compromise with his grace. Therefore, the penal consequences of the first sin and of subsequent sins remain present in the life of a Christian. However, they are now put in the service of the Spirit’s work in the believer. God still allows the believer to fall back into sin, but does so in order to deepen the awareness of his need for the grace of Christ. Augustine even interprets Paul’s sufferings as retribution for his persecution of the Christian Church, but this retribution ultimately serves to purge

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1 *C. Iul. Imp. 4,42.*
his soul from the desires for temporal glory that motivated him before his conversion. As observed, the *Christus medicus* motif also changes in this context. The healing of Christ received a new meaning in the forensic framework. It is not just a gradual process of moral purgation (as it was still understood in, for example, the *Soliloquia*), but it is executed on two levels: Christ takes away the root of humanity’s disease, namely sin, and then cures its effects by the Spirit.

In my interpretation of the *Confessions*, I have attempted to show that this new model of Augustine’s interpretation of the function of judgment in the context of salvation reoccurs in his theological narration of his conversion and post-conversion life. Augustine presents himself as a slave of sin, unreceptive to God’s accusations sounding to him through his sufferings. When the law of the mind was awakened in him through his reading of Cicero, the flesh immediately reasserted its right over him and drew him into Manichaeism. God had to open his eyes to the accusation of the law through his readings of the books of the Platonists. This led Augustine into a crisis of internal division: sin did not let him go. However, grace opened the way to confession and to the victory of the law of the mind over the flesh, but Augustine still had to learn that it is incorporation into Christ that removes the claim of sin over him. Because Christ gives believers a new forensic position before God, they are allowed to ask: “Give what you command, and command what you will.” In this context, Augustine’s ongoing experiences of failure help him to grow in his dependence upon the grace of Christ. Augustine has relinquished his focus on ascent as a gradual process of growth in virtue. Rather, for Augustine, the Christian life is an ongoing exercise of *confession*: the momentary enjoyment of the first fruits of the Spirit (*confessio laudis*), the continual remorse over sin, and the necessary pleading for the mediation of Christ, “who intercedes for us”.

6.4 The debates about grace and Augustine’s justification of coercion

A third context for our research question was offered by a debate within Augustinian scholarship on Augustine’s views on the function of punishment and coercion in the process of salvation. We touched upon two discussions, the grace-debate and the debate on the pre-history of Augustine’s justification of state-sponsored coercion.

6.4.1 Grace and punishment

With regard to the first debate, my contention is that Augustine, before his rereading of Paul, although espousing a quite radical doctrine of sin, and teaching that grace is a matter of recreation of the entire person, still largely thinks within a pedagogical framework, in which grace is primarily understood in terms of corrective punishment and the teaching of Christ; it assumes the cooperation of free will.

Augustine’s rereading of Paul, in conversation with the Manichees in the 390s, enriches the framework in which he conceptualizes sin and grace. His doctrine of sin reaches its climax in *Ad Simplicianum*. He comes to deny that the punishment of the first sin has left any freedom to the human will to respond positively to God’s call. Original sin inextricably binds man to his penal condition. Along with this development in his doctrine of sin, Augustine comes to emphasize the salvific nature of Christ’s death. In Christ the old man has been condemned, so that those who are in Christ are set free from the juridical claim of sin over them. Through faith the believer is granted a new forensic position before God, which assures him that his penal condition will not last forever; rather, it is put in
the service of his renewal. This discovery affirms the interests of the proponents of the continuity-thesis, but also concedes to the proponents of the discontinuity-thesis that Augustine’s rereading of Paul in conversation with the Manichees effected a decisive change in his conceptualisation of the operation of grace.

6.4.2 Augustine’s justification of coercion

In discussions on the background of Augustine’s justification of coercion against the Donatists, Brown, Flasch, and Lee-Dixon argued that the early Augustine was opposed to the use of the threat of (temporal) punishment for conversion. They contended that, as he gradually adopted a negative view of human moral capabilities, he came to acknowledge the usefulness of fear in order to curb or break the bond of habit, and to foster a process of reflection. It could bring a person ‘sub lege’, as Lee-Dixon puts it. The relationship between Augustine’s doctrine of predestination and the issue of coercion has been evaluated in different ways. Whereas Brown argued that a doctrine of predestination relieved Augustine of concern over those who only converted out of fear, Flasch argued that the authoritarian image of God inherent to this doctrine justified the use of violence to ‘bring the predestined in’. We further reviewed the scholarly opinion that the change in Augustine’s attitude towards coercion would have been caused by an evolution in his understanding of the relationship between the Old and the New Testament. He first saw the Old Testament as a stage that was surpassed by the New Testament, but he increasingly came to equate the two.

The conclusion of our research is that Augustine’s belief in the need for coercive measures for conversion is already discernible in the Cassiciacum Dialogues. It is rooted in classical pedagogical thought on the usefulness of punishment in order to liberate the mind from its suffering under irrational impulses. In the Cassiciacum Dialogues, Augustine acknowledges the usefulness of fortune’s assaults to awaken the soul to its egestas. Augustine himself also uses restraint as part of the dialogical exercises of his students. As their soul still suffers under the habit of seeking praise, they need to be restrained by a punishment that fits their desire, namely the fear of losing face.

We further concluded against Brown and Cranz that the early Augustine does not see a radical difference between the Old and the New Testaments with regard to God’s methods of teaching. It is indeed true that coercion by fear prevailed in the Old Testament, and instruction by love in the New, but this is not an absolute opposition. At the beginning of God’s educational program, he used earthly threats and promises to bind a carnal people to himself. In the New Testament, Christ sets his people free from fear of temporal punishment, leading them to the eternal inheritance of the heavenly kingdom through the rational instruction of the mind. However, as the converted person and the Church at large remain mixed bodies, the threat of punishment remains useful for Christians. In the New Testament this threat is primarily the threat of eternal punishment (due to its situation in salvation history ‘between the kingdoms’), but Augustine’s theological model does not exclude the use of temporal punishment when the illness of the patient requires it, and the one who administers the punishment has received authority to do so.

Augustine develops his thoughts on the relationship between Old and New Testament with regard to God’s method of teaching in the 390s. Against the Manichees, he argues that Christ’s command to turn the other cheek is not in contradiction to the divine command to Moses and Elijah to exercise judgment over the inhabitants of Canaan or the priests of Baal. The love of justice, the love of
the sinner, and the possession of authority is what justifies such an act. The example of the apostles illustrates this. Augustine concedes, however, that capital punishment has been abolished in the time of the New Testament (at least as executed by the Church). Augustine’s general reflections on the authority of temporal rulers, and his defense of Constans’ intervention in Africa in order to establish Church unity, further suggest that all theological arguments are there to justify the support of the state to the discipline of the Church. In *Contra Epistulam Parmeniani* (400) he elaborates this understanding of the task of Christian rulers as supporting the Church’s battle against the works of the flesh. During the first half of the 390s, however, the justification of state-sponsored legal action in favor of the Church does not yet play a role in his polemic. He uses it neither against the Manichees, against whom he could have invoked the anti-heretic law of Theodosius (372), nor against the Donatists. He always prefers dialogue on the basis of reason or Scripture to any use of restraint that does not lead to a true fear of the Lord.

The latter approach is also visible in his own practice of Church discipline. Augustine first approaches his people with teaching. As believers of the New Testament they may be expected to possess the Spirit and be receptive to teaching. When they do not listen, he reminds them of their responsibility before God as New Testament believers. If the people of Israel were already so severely punished for a sin which was not even done in the name of true religion, what will happen to God’s people in the time of the New Testament, if they continue to organize licentious banquets in the very name of true religion? Augustine takes recourse to a new ‘mode of coercion’ (Russell) by threatening his congregation with God’s judgment. He moreover admonishes his flock to use the Pauline means of social isolation: true believers should not eat with those who organize *laetitiae* in their homes. Furthermore, he uses the coercive authority of a council to restrain the organization of these feasts. When many of his congregants turn out to be intractable to words and threats, Augustine announces that God himself will come to visit his people with the rod of correction. Just like Paul in 2 Corinthians 2, he sees the Church as possessed with the authority to invoke God’s intervention in order to correct his people, so that they will not be condemned with the world.

My suggestion is that Augustine’s justification of state-sponsored coercion of the Donatists was likely based upon this notion of redemptive correction. He was one of the few bishops of his time who did not actively promote the intervention of the state in the Donatist conflict for other reasons than the preservation of civil order. He only began to justify the state laws as a providential means of discipline after he had witnessed the conversions of Donatists in Hippo. Could it be that he interpreted state intervention as God’s response to the Church’s prayers for conversion of the Donatists, which had as yet yielded little fruit? Because human persuasion had failed, God himself had intervened to redress the sins of his chosen ones and bring them back to the flock.
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Series

CCL  Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, Turnhout: Brepols, 1953-.
CSEL  Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1865-.

Editions


De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, in: Sancti Aurelii Augustini de diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, edidit Almut Mutzenbecher, Aurelii Augustini Opera Pars XII,2,1, CCL 44A, Turnholti: Brepols, 1975, 9-249.


7.2 Translations

Abbreviations of series

FC  The Fathers of the Church Series, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
BA  Bibliothèque Augustinienne, Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1933-.

Single volumes

7.3 Classical works: editions and translations


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*A-L*  Cornelius Peter Mayer et. al. (ed.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, Basel: Schwabe, 1986-

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Samenvatting

De voorliggende studie beschrijft en analyseert het vroege denken van Augustinus van Hippo (354-430) over de soteriologische betekenis van Gods oordeel over de zonde. Hoe verhouden Gods barmhartigheid en zijn oordeel zich tot elkaar? Het onderzoek is chronologisch-systematisch van opzet. Het behandelt in chronologische volgorde deelsaspecten van de genoemde thematiek zoals die aan de orde komen in de geschreven die Augustinus componeerde gedurende de eerste tien jaar van zijn activiteit als christelijk theoloog. Deze periode werd verdeeld in een aantal fasen, die ook de basis vormen voor de hoofdstukindeling van de studie: het verblijf na zijn bekering in Cassiacum (zomer en winter 386), zijn periode als ambteloos schrijver in Rome en Thagaste (387-391) en ten slotte de periode als presbyter in Hippo Regius (391-396). In een laatste hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht op welke manier zijn denken over genade en oordeel terugkomt in de Confessiones, de theologische autobiografie die hij schreef aan het begin van zijn episcopaat.

1. Introductie

In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt de hoofdvraag van het onderzoek op drie manieren gecontextualiseerd. De eerste context die wordt besproken is de antignostische (Alexandrijnse) traditie waar Augustinus naar alle waarschijnlijkheid door is beïnvloed. Deze traditie, met vertegenwoordigers als Clemens van Alexandrië en Origenes, stelden tegenover de gnostici dat het kwaad in de wereld moet worden begrepen als rechtvaardige straf op de zonde van de mens, maar tegelijk als bewijs van Gods goedheid. God gebruikt het kwaad om de mens tot bekering te brengen. Volgens deze visie heeft de mens een vrije wil behouden om op Gods correctieve straf positief te reageren. Hoe verhoudt de vroege Augustinus zich tot deze traditie?

De tweede context waarin het onderzoek geplaatst wordt is die van de filosofische psychagogie. Vanaf Plato werd de filosofie verstaan in medische termen als ‘chirurgie van de ziel’: de ziel moest genezen worden van onjuiste meningen zodat het een zuiver zicht zou krijgen op de waarheid. Ook de orde van het heelal werd gezien als pedagogisch van aard. De ziel lijdt door gebondenheid aan het materiële en voorbijgaande, maar ervaraat juist daarin een aansporing om in te keren tot zichzelf, en via die zelfinkeer zijn geluk te vinden. Deze psychagogische traditie leerde Augustinus kennen via Cicero en de Neoplatonisten. Hoe verhoudt hij zich hiertoe in de manier waarop hij spreekt over correctieve discipline door God of mensen?

Een derde context is die van het Augustinus-onderzoek zelf. Daarin spelen twee discussies een rol. Allereerst de discussie over de ontwikkeling van Augustinus’ genadeleer. Tot nog toe is hierin weinig aandacht geweest voor de betekenis van straf voor Augustinus’ opvatting over hoe Gods genade werkt. Ten tweede speelt de vraag hoe Augustinus’ latere rechtvaardiging van staatsdwang tegen de Donatisten historisch begrijpelijk moet worden gemaakt. Welke vroegere ideeën kwamen hierin tot ontsteking, en in hoeverre is hier sprake van ontwikkeling van een ‘rationele’ Augustinus, die de menselijke keuzevrijheid respecteert, naar een ‘onderdrukkende’ Augustinus, die dwang rechtvaardigt in naam van God?
2. Cassiciacum: de discipline van fortuna en dialoog
Het tweede hoofdstuk behandelt de periode van Augustinus’ verblijf op het landgoed Cassiciacum, waar hij zich een aantal weken na zijn bekering in de tuin van Milaan terugtrok met een aantal verwanten. Drie thema’s staan in dit hoofdstuk centraal. Allereerst Augustinus’ christianisering van de pedagogie van fortuna, de pagane naam voor het noodlot. Augustinus interpreteert fortuna als de verborgen voorzienigheid van de Schepper, die door het lijden dat de mens treft de ziel ontdekt aan zijn ‘spirituele armoede’ en aanspoort om te buigen voor Christus, de ‘kracht en wijsheid van God’ (1 Kor. 1,24) die gevallen zielen door zijn macht en onderwijs terugbrengt naar de intelligibele wereld.

Een tweede thema dat in dit hoofdstuk wordt behandeld is de pedagogische betekenis van de dialogen die Augustinus organiseert voor zijn leerlingen. Net als de ‘slagen van fortuna’ heeft de dialoog tot doel de gesprekspartners te ontdekken aan de armoede van hun ziel, zodat ze zich bewust worden van de mate waarin ze nog geestelijk moeten groeien. Augustinus ontdekt echter bij zijn eigen leerlingen dat zij meer gedreven zijn door competitiedrang en eerzucht, dan door een oprecht verlangen naar waarheid. Hij gebruikt de dreiging van straf als pedagogisch middel om deze competitiedrang te bedwingen.

Een derde thema dat in dit hoofdstuk wordt behandeld is Augustinus’ visie op en ervaring van goddelijke straf op de weg naar de contemplatie van God. Augustinus hoopt dat hij in dit leven een blijvende staat van contemplatie kan bereiken, maar zijn ervaring van ‘terugstoting’ bepaalt hem bij de mate waarin hij nog altijd aan het aardse gebonden is. Deze straf interpreteert hij als een manier waarop de goddelijke arts hem ervan bewust maakt hoezeer hij afhankelijk is van diens helende handen.

Het derde hoofdstuk behandelt Augustinus’ denken over de soteriologische betekenis van Gods oordeel in de periode dat hij verblijft in Rome en Thagaste als ambteloos schrijver.

In deze periode gaat Augustinus voor het eerst expliciet in op de Manichese visie op het kwaad in de wereld. Waar de Manicheërs het kwaad dat wij lijden interpreteren als afkomstig van de prins van de duisternis, daart stelt Augustinus dat we dit moeten interpreteren als een goddelijke straf op de zonde van de mens. Wij zijn geen slachtoffers, maar daders die straf lijden. De positie wordt verdedigd dat reeds de vroege Augustinus de zonde van Adam ziet als de oorzaak van zowel onze sterfelijkheid als van de ‘vleselijkheid’ van de ziel. Dit neemt echter niet weg dat hij de mens blijft zien als verantwoordelijk, en ook in staat om te reageren op de goddelijke aansporing tot bekering die klinkt in zijn lijden. Augustinus bevindt zich hier duidelijk in het paradigma van Origenes die Gods straf op de zonde interpreteert als louter pedagogisch, en daarmee als een vorm van genade.

Een tweede thema is Augustinus’ visie op Gods gebruik van straf in de heilsgeschiedenis. Tegenover Peter Brown en Edward Cranz, die hebben betoogd dat Augustinus de heilsgeschiedenis ziet als een proces van morele progressie, waarin de overgang van het Oude naar het Nieuwe Testament ook zou impliceren dat God geen aardse straffen meer gebruikt om zijn volk op te voeden, wordt betoogd dat Augustinus zo’n progressieve visie op de verhouding van het Oude en het Nieuwe Testament niet kent. Hoewel Augustinus zich in zijn werken voor 394 niet uitlaat over het gebruik van dwangmiddelen in de tijd van het Nieuwe Testament, behoudt zijn vroege theologie een principele openheid hiervoor. In een laatste paragraaf wordt getoond hoe Augustinus zijn eigen ordinatie als
presbyter heeft begrepen als een goddelijke straf op zijn eigen hoogmoed. De goddelijke roeping om
de gemeente van Hippo te dienen, midden in de verleidingen van het alledaagse leven, maakte hem
ervan bewust hoezeer hij daarvoor de gaven miste, terwijl hij zichzelf altijd had gezien als iemand die
vanwege zijn bestaan als christelijk wijsgeer op een hoger moreel niveau verkeerde dan vele van zijn
collega’s die een kerkelijke verantwoordelijkheid hadden.

4. De herlezing van Paulus en de kerkelijke tucht - Augustinus als presbyter (391-397)
Het vierde hoofdstuk onderzoekt Augustinus’ intellectuele productie en praktijk als presbyter van de
katholieke gemeente in Hippo Regius.

In deze periode is het vooral zijn anti-manichese herlezing van Paulus en zijn eigen
tuchtpraktijk die nieuwe perspectieven openen op de vraagstelling van het onderzoek. Eerst wordt
gekeken hoe Augustinus’ denken over de gevolgen van de zonde van Adam zich ontwikkelt. In Ad
Simplicianum komt hij tot de conclusie dat de mens niet meer in staat is uit vrijheid positief te
reageren op Gods corrigerende straffen. Hiermee breekt Augustinus met de origenistische traditie
waarin Gods straffende gerechtigheid en genade juist in harmonie werden gebracht door het postuleren
der de vrije wil. Augustinus behoudt de anti-gnostische theodicee, maar breekt met de gedachte dat
alle straf pedagogisch is. Dit geldt alleen voor de uitverkorenen.

In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook onderzocht hoe Augustinus’ visie op de relatie tussen de wet en
Christus zich ontwikkelt. Waar hij de oudtestamentische wet eerst primair benaderde vanuit een
hermeneutisch perspectief (als geaccomodeerde manier om het onderwijs van Jezus te verbeelden),
daar wordt zijn visie verrijkt met een juridische visie op deze relatie. De wet leert de zonde kennen en
dwingt zijn hoorders hun toevlucht te zoeken tot de middelaar van de gerechtigheid, Jezus Christus.
Hiermee hangt ook samen dat Augustinus’ visie op het kruis van Christus een verandering ondergaat.
Waar Augustinus Christus eerst met name als leraar had gezien, en zijn dood als exemplarisch moment
van zelfverloochening, daar gaat hij nu de dood van Christus interpreteren als een representatieve
strafbetaling. Christus neemt in zijn persoon de strafconditie waarin de mensheid verkeert op zich en
vernietigt die, zodat wie in hem geloven van de straf op de zonde kunnen worden bevrijd.

In deze periode zien we ook een verdere ontwikkeling van Augustinus’ visie op de plaats van
wet en straf in het christelijk leven. Hij lijkt zijn vroegere progressieve ideaal van heiliging op te
geven. Het christelijk leven lijkt nu veel meer een voortdurend heen-en- weer te zijn van zonde, straf
en terugkeer naar de genade van Christus. Op dit punt is er echter geen absolute discontuiniteit. Deze
lijn was ook al aanwezig in de Soliloquía. Augustinus’ forensische perspectief in de soteriologie heeft
het beeld echter verrijkt. In Christus is de rechtsclaim van de zonde teniet gedaan, maar de invloed van
de zonde, de poena peccati, laat zich in het heden nog altijd gelden. Deze wordt echter in dienst
gesteld van het werk van Gods genade in het leven van de gelovigen.

Een laatste serie paragrafen behandelt verschillende aspecten van broederlijk vermaan en
kerkelijke tucht. Dat Augustinus hier aandacht aan geeft, verraadt zijn praktijk als predikant in de
gemeente en de religieuze gemeenschap waar hij leiding aan gaf. Augustinus blijkt klassieke
filosofische noties over ‘corrective friendship’ over te nemen; tegelijk plaats hij die in een christelijk
kader. Vermaan wordt niet gegeven op basis van respect voor iemands morele capaciteit, maar op
basis van de liefde voor Christus, die voor de broeder is gestorven. Verder wordt duidelijk dat
Augustinus de belangrijkste argumenten voor de rechtvaardiging van geweld tegen de Donatisten al in
dit stadium heeft ontwikkeld. Tegenover de Manicheeërs stelt hij namelijk dat het gebruik van geweld niet principieel beperkt is tot het Oude Testament, mits degene die de straf uitoefent daarvoor de autoriteit bezit en het met de juiste attitude uitoefent. Verder zijn er duidelijke aanwijzingen, met name vanuit de in 393 gecomponeerde Psalmus contra Partem Donati, dat Augustinus deelt in de post-Constantijnse idee dat Christus de koningen van de aarde aan zich bindt en inschakelt voor de missie van de kerk.

Ook behandelt dit hoofdstuk Augustinus’ eigen gebruik van kerkelijke tucht. Daarin valt op dat hij gebruik maakt van een graduele intensivering van dwangmiddelen, tot hij uiteindelijk uitkomt bij de Paulijnse bede (2 Kor. 12,21; 13,2) of God zelf wil ingrijpen om ervoor te zorgen dat zijn ontrouwe volk niet met de wereld verloren gaat. De suggestie wordt gedaan om Augustinus’ rechtvaardiging van dwang tegen de Donatisten ook vanuit dit perspectief te bekijken. Na jaren van vruchteloze ‘diaolog’ met de Donatisten, zag hij het staatsingrijpen (en het effect daarvan) als een providentiële ingreep van God, waardoor tot zijn verrassing bewerkt werd wat vele jaren van dialoog niet hadden bewerkt.

5. Confessiones: Gods rechtszaak met Augustinus tussen uitstel en ontvangst van de doop

In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht of Augustinus’ visie op de relatie tussen straf en genade, zoals die zich ontwikkeld had tot 396, ook terugkomt in zijn theologische autobiografie, de Confessiones. De conclusie daarvan luidt bevestigend. Augustinus tekent zijn eigen ‘verstaan’ van Gods straffende activiteit in zijn leven als een vrucht van goddelijke openbaring, en zijn gehoorzaamheid als een vrucht van genade. Verder wordt betoogd dat Augustinus niet het moment in de tuin van Milaan, maar zijn doop ziet als het hoofdmoment van zijn bekering, omdat hij door de doop (inlijving in Christus) verzekerd werd dat de macht van de zonde in zijn leven gebroken was, waarvan hij na zijn bekering nog altijd de invloed onderging. Gesuggereerd wordt dat het dit bewustzijn was dat hij in Cassiciacum moest leren.

6. Conclusie

In een concluderend hoofdstuk wordt antwoord gegeven op de drie deelvragen waarmee het onderzoek werd ingeleid.

Augustinus ontwikkelt zich als een vertegenwoordiger van de anti-gnostische traditie waarin Gods straf en genade harmonisch worden verbonden in een pedagogisch model, waarin de menselijke vrije wil een onmisbare schakel is. Augustinus verlaat dit model echter. Hij houdt vast aan de theodicee van deze traditie (namelijk dat het kwaad dat wij lijden een straf is op de zonde van de mens en niet een anti-goddelijk principe), maar gaat ontkennen dat Gods straf over de zonde altijd een pedagogisch karakter heeft. Ze heeft dit alleen voor de uitverkorenen, voor wie blijvend in Christus zijn, en van gebondenheid aan de straf verlost zijn.

Augustinus plaatst zichzelf ook duidelijk in de klassieke pedagogische traditie. Dit wordt duidelijk in de manier waarop hij in Cassiciacum spreekt over de opvoedende betekenis van fortuna en de pedagogie van de dialoog. Maar als hij al presbyter is, blijven klassieke noties over ‘corrective friendship’ zijn denken bepalen. Tegelijk christianiseert hij deze traditie echter. De fortuna verliest bij hem haar noodzakelijke karakter. Het gaat om de voorzienigheid van een persoonlijke God, die de mensheid door de incarnatie te hulp is gekomen. Ook breekt hij met de idee waarop de klassieke
pedagogische traditie sinds Plato was gebaseerd, namelijk dat de menselijke geest lijdt, niet zozeer onder de gevolgen van de eigen zonde, maar onder de invloed van de passies, die de ratio onderdrukken. Psychagogische vermaning is daarbij gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat de mens kan worden teruggebracht naar zijn oorspronkelijke rationaliteit. Augustinus’ zondebegrip doet hem breken met deze idee. De menselijke geest lijdt onder de strafgevolgen van de zonde, en kan daarom alleen heling ontvangen op basis van het feit dat de schuld waardoor hij aan deze strafgevolgen gebonden is door Christus is weggedaan. Onderling vermaan wordt daarom gegeven ‘in Christus’ en is alleen werkzaam dankzij hem.

Het onderzoek toont ook aan dat het genadedebat onder Augustinus-onderzoekers verrijkt kan worden met het inzicht dat, hoewel de vroege Augustinus duidelijk leert dat Gods genade meer is dan uitwendig onderwijs, hij toch meer oog krijgt voor de unieke betekenis van de dood van Christus voor de verlossing van de mens. Het pedagogische model wordt verrijkt met een forensisch perspectief in het verstaan van de verzoening tussen God en mens. Voor de discussie over de ‘voorgeschiedenis’ van Augustinus’ rechtvaardiging van dwang tegen de Donatisten levert het onderzoek op dat er op dit punt geen radicale breuk in zijn denken is aan te wijzen, maar eerder een vloeiende ontwikkeling.