

A HISTORICAL-HERMENEUTICAL STUDY OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERPRETATION OF JOHANNINE LANGUAGE IN ITS ANCIENT RHETORICAL CONTEXT

EEN HISTORISCH-HERMENEUTISCHE STUDIE VAN παροιμία EN παρρησία IN HET JOHANNESVANGELIE

EEN BIJDRAGE AAN DE INTERPRETATIE VAN JOHANNESSE TAAL IN HAAR ANTIEKE RETORISCHE CONTEXT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
TABLE OF CONTENTS	V
ABBREVIATIONS	XV
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I. TRANSFORMING HISTORICAL OBJECTIVISM INTO HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS: FROM “HISTORICAL ILLNESS” TO PROPERLY LIVED HISTORICALITY	7
1. THE TENSION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND MODERN-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGIES	8
2. FROM HISTORICAL OBJECTIVISM TO HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS	10
3. THE RECEPTION-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY	13
3.1 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS A PRELUDE FOR THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY	13
3.2 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS IDENTICAL TO THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY .	16
3.3 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS AN INTEGRATED DISCIPLINE OF THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY	18
4. FROM “HISTORICAL ILLNESS” TO PROPERLY LIVED HISTORICALITY	20
5. FROM HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO <i>WIRKUNGSGESCHICHTLICHES BEWUSSTSEIN</i>	27
6. HERMENEUTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE <i>FRAGEHORIZONT</i> OF THE TEXT	30
7. THE ALTERITY OF THE TEXT	32
8. THE (IN)VALIDITY OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION	37
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	44
CHAPTER II. AN EVALUATIVE <i>STATUS QUAESTIONIS</i> ON παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN	47
1. JOHANNINE παροιμία IN EARLY SCHOLARLY LITERATURE	48
1.1 THE TERMS παροιμία AND παραβολή AS SYNONYMS IN THE LXX	48
1.2 JOHANNINE παροιμία AS INAUTHENTIC	52
1.3 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND SYNOPTIC παραβολή AS EQUIVALENT TRANSLATIONS OF AN ARAMAIC <i>VORLAGE</i>	53
1.4 JOHANNINE παροιμία AS THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION OF THE JOHANNINE GROUP	54

2. THE GENRE-CRITICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE παροιμία AS <i>TERMINUS TECHNICUS</i> FOR A LITERARY GENRE.....	56
2.1 THE LITERARY GENRE OF JOHANNINE παροιμία.....	57
2.2 RELATED STUDIES	59
2.3 INTERMEDIARY STUDIES.....	61
2.4 CRITICAL REACTIONS	62
3. THE HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AS <i>MODI DICENDI</i> AND <i>MODI INTELLIGENDI</i>.....	64
3.1 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AS KEY TERMS OF CHRISTOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY	64
3.2 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AS KEY TERMS OF JOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF LANGUAGE.....	67
3.3 DIALECTICS BETWEEN JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AS <i>RELECTURE</i>	69
4. THE POST-HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE παροιμία AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA OF INEXPRESSIBILITY	70
4.1 STUDIES INSPIRED BY DERRIDA	70
4.2 RELATED STUDIES	73
5. THE READER-RESPONSE APPROACH: JOHANNINE παροιμία AS A LITERARY STRATEGY	74
5.1 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND THE COSMOLOGICAL TALE (A. REINHARTZ).....	75
5.2 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND PARTICIPATION/TRANSFORMATION (G.R. O'DAY AND R. KYSAR)	77
5.3 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND MARK 4:1–20 (C.W. SKINNER)	79
6. STUDIES ON THE SEMANTICS OF JOHANNINE παρρησία	81
6.1 JOHANNINE παρρησία AS SPECIFICALLY CHRISTIAN	81
6.2 AN INITIAL ATTEMPT TO HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION OF JOHANNINE παρρησία (G.L. PARSENIOS)	88
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	93
CHAPTER III. Παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN	97
1. JOHN 10.....	97
2. JOHN 11:11–16.....	109
3. JOHN 16:23–33.....	112
3.1 <i>RELECTURE</i> AND <i>RÉÉCRITURE</i>	114

3.2 THE APORIA OF JOHN 16:5.....	116
3.3 THE FUSION OF PRE-PASCHAL AND POST-PASCHAL TIME IN JOHN 16:23–33...	120
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	127
CHAPTER IV. THE ORIENTATION OF THE TEACHING OF THE POST-PASCHAL PARACLETE IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.....	129
1. JOHN 14:25–26.....	129
1.1 JOHN 14:26E: ANTECEDENT(S) OF RELATIVE PRONOUN?	132
1.2 JOHN 14:26D: EXPLICATIVE OR CUMULATIVE καί?.....	134
2. JOHN 16:12–13.....	136
2.1 JOHN 16:13C, E: Εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει OR ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ + ἀκούει?	139
2.2 JOHN 16:13C: THE MEANING OF πάσῃ/πᾶσαν.....	141
2.3 JOHN 16:12A: THE MEANING OF πολλά	142
2.4 JOHN 16:13F: THE MEANING OF τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ.....	143
3. REPETITION AS A KEY NOTION FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF THE PARACLETE	145
3.1 KIERKEGAARD’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOLLECTION AND REPETITION.....	145
3.2 THE PARACLETE’S REMINDING AND TEACHING AS RECOLLECTION AND REPETITION	148
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	150
CHAPTER V. THE SEMANTICS OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN CONNECTION TO ἐρωτάω AND αἰτέω IN JOHN 16:23–27.....	153
1. Ἐρωτάω AND αἰτέω IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL	153
1.1 PRE-PASCHAL ἐρωτάω VERSUS POST-PASCHAL αἰτέω	154
1.2 POLEMICAL ἐρωτάω VERSUS CONFIDENT αἰτέω	157
2. Αἰτέω AND παρρησία IN JOHN 16:23–27	160
2.1 A PHILOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ἐρωτάω AND αἰτέω IN JOHN 16:23–27	160
2.2 THE DISCIPLES AND JESUS’ παρρησία AT THE HOUR (JOHN 16:25)	162
3. IN JESUS’ NAME	167
3.1 EVALUATIVE <i>STATUS QUAESTIONIS</i>	167
3.2 JOHN 16:26	168
3.3 BEING SENT BY JESUS.....	171
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	173

CHAPTER VI. THE <i>παρρησία</i> OF THE JOHANNINE JESUS AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TEACHING METHOD.....	175
1. PHILODEMUS: <i>παρρησία</i> AS AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD.....	175
2. <i>Παρρησία</i> AS AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD BEYOND EPICUREANISM.....	179
2.1 PLUTARCH	179
2.2 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.....	181
3. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN	182
3.1 JOHN 7:1–44	182
3.2 JOHN 10:1–30.....	185
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF <i>παρρησία</i>.....	186
CHAPTER VII. THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE <i>παρρησία</i> OF JESUS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL	189
1. PHILODEMUS: THE TWO FORMS OF <i>παρρησία</i>.....	189
2. THE TWO FORMS OF <i>παρρησία</i> BEYOND EPICUREANISM.....	192
2.1 PHILO.....	192
2.2 THE CYNIC EPISTLES	194
2.3 PLUTARCH	195
2.3.1 Therapeutic <i>παρρησία</i>	196
2.3.2 Practical <i>παρρησία</i>	199
2.4 DIO CHRYSOSTOM	202
2.5 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.....	202
3. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN	205
3.1 THE MIXED FORM OF <i>παρρησία</i> IN THE FAREWELL DISCOURSE	206
3.1.1 John 13:36–14:10.....	206
3.1.2 John 14:11–24.....	208
3.1.3 John 14:25–28.....	208
3.1.4 John 16:25–32.....	209
3.2 THE MIXED FORM OF <i>παρρησία</i> OUTSIDE THE FAREWELL DISCOURSE.....	210
3.2.1 John 1:46–51.....	210
3.2.2 John 3:9–10.....	212
3.2.3 John 20:24–29.....	212
3.3 THE SIMPLE FORM OF <i>παρρησία</i>	213

3.3.1 John 5:37–38.....	214
3.3.2 John 5:41–42.....	215
3.3.3 John 6:26–27, 36.....	216
3.3.4 John 7:14–31.....	217
3.4 THE GRADUAL INTENSIFICATION OF <i>παρρησία</i>	219
3.4.1 John 8:12–20.....	219
3.4.2 John 8:21–30.....	219
3.4.3 John 8:31–37.....	220
3.4.4 John 8:38–47.....	221
3.5 JOHN 19:19–22.....	223
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF <i>παρρησία</i>	224
CHAPTER VIII. JESUS' <i>παρρησία</i> AND THE SALVATION OF THE κόσμος IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.....	227
1. THE PARACLETE'S ἐλέγχειν IN JOHN 16:9–11.....	227
2. Παρρησία, SHAME, AND REPENTANCE.....	228
2.1 LXX PROVERBS	228
2.2 PHILODEMUS	233
2.3 PHILO.....	234
2.4 PLUTARCH	235
2.5 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.....	237
2.6 JOHN.....	237
3. THE SALVATION OF THE κόσμος IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.....	239
3.1 JOHN 8:28; 19:37	239
3.2 JOHN 12:32	240
3.3 JOHN 12:39–40.....	241
3.4 JOHN 3:16–17; 12:46–47 <i>ET AL.</i>	242
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF <i>παρρησία</i>	244
CHAPTER IX. FRIENDSHIP AND <i>παρρησία</i> IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL	247
1. FRIENDSHIP LANGUAGE IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL	247
1.1 Φίλος.....	247
1.2 Φιλέω, ἀγαπάω	250

1.2.1 Father – Son	250
1.2.2 Jesus – Disciples	251
2. THE GRECO-ROMAN IDEAL OF FRIENDSHIP	251
3. FRIENDSHIP, παρρησία, AND COMMITMENT	254
3.1 LXX WISDOM TRADITION	254
3.2 PHILO.....	255
3.3 JOHN.....	256
4. JESUS' DEATH AS ACT OF FRIENDSHIP	258
4.1 SCHOLARLY LITERATURE	258
4.2 FRIENDSHIP AND παρρησία.....	260
4.2.1 Philodemus.....	260
4.2.2 Plutarch	262
4.3 JOHN	264
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	266
CHAPTER X. JESUS' παρρησία IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL: PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE?	267
1. THE SCHOLARLY DISTINCTION OF PUBLIC/POLITICAL AND PRIVATE/ETHICAL παρρησία	267
2. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE παρρησία IN 1TH CENTURY BCE – 2ND CENTURY CE	269
2.1 PHILODEMUS	269
2.2 PLUTARCH	270
2.3 LUCIAN OF SAMOSATA	272
3. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE παρρησία IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.....	274
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF παρρησία.....	278
CHAPTER XI. Παροιμία AND παρρησία IN LXX PROVERBS, THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH, PLUTARCH, AND THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.....	281
1. LXX PROVERBS AND ITS EARLY RECEPTION.....	281
1.1 LXX PROVERBS 1:1–6.....	281
1.2 EARLY CHURCH FATHERS	283
1.2.1 Clement of Alexandria.....	284
1.2.2 Basil of Caesarea	286

1.2.3 Gregory of Nyssa	288
1.2.4 Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae (Ps.-John Chrysostom/ Ps.-Athanasius)	292
2. RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH.....	293
2.1 DEMETRIUS.....	293
2.2 QUINTILIAN	295
2.3 Ps.-DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS	299
2.4 Ps.-HERMOGENES	300
3. PLUTARCH.....	303
3.1 Παρρησία AND πανουργία.....	303
3.2 Παρρησία AND παροιμία	305
4. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN	309
4.1 JOHN 7:32–36	312
4.2 JOHN 10:1–6	313
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SITUATION OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.....	315
CHAPTER XII. A HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN JOHN TO παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK THROUGH THE LENS OF THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH	319
1. EVALUATIVE STATUS <i>QUAESTIONIS</i> ON παρρησία (MARK 8:32A).....	319
1.1 THE OPPOSITE TERM OF παρρησία?	319
1.2 Παρρησία AS UNIVOCAL LANGUAGE?.....	322
2. Παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK AND THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH.....	323
2.1 MARKAN PARABLE THEORY AND DEMETRIUS' DEFINITION OF FIGURED SPEECH	325
2.2 THE MARKAN παραβολή AND THE MOTIVES/USES OF FIGURED SPEECH IN ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY	328
2.2.1 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 4:1–34	329
2.2.2 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 12:1–9	330
2.2.3 Παρρησία and Safety in Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34.....	331
3. COMPARISON OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN JOHN TO παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK.....	334
3.1 INITIAL ATTEMPTS.....	334

3.2 HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH	336
3.3 THE JOHANNINE παροιμία AND THE MARKAN παραβολή THROUGH THE LENS OF QUINTILIAN	338
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION	341
GENERAL CONCLUSION.....	345
1. HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS AS THE METHODOLOGY OF BIBLICAL STUDIES..	345
2. <i>STATUS QUAESTIONIS</i>	347
3. Παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF THE GOSPEL.....	349
4. THE ORIENTATION OF THE TEACHING OF THE PARACLETE.....	350
5. THE USE OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN CONNECTION TO ἐρωτάω AND αἰτέω IN JOHN 16:23–27	351
6. JESUS' παρρησία AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TEACHING METHOD	352
7. THE ADAPTABILITY OF JESUS' παρρησία	353
8. JESUS' παρρησία AND THE SALVATION OF THE κόσμος	355
9. Παρρησία AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE GOSPEL	356
10. THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF JESUS' παρρησία	357
11. JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AND THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH.....	358
12. A COMPARISON OF THE JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία TO THE MARKAN παραβολή AND παρρησία.....	359
13. IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH	361
APPENDIX ONE	365
APPENDIX TWO	367
APPENDIX THREE.....	379
BIBLIOGRAPHY	383
1. PRIMARY SOURCES	383
1.1. TEXT EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS	383
1.2. LEXICA AND TOOLS	386
1.3. PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE	387
2. SECONDARY SOURCES	388
2.1. COMMENTARIES	388
2.2. STUDIES.....	391
DUTCH SUMMARY	429

CURRICULUM VITAE..... 439

ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations of journals, major reference works, and series used in this dissertation are taken from the SBL Handbook of Style.¹ For the abbreviations of the names of ancient authors and their writings (including biblical) I have used the SBL Handbook of Style, Liddell – Scott – Jones, and Lampe.² In some rare occasions, these reference works did not offer the required abbreviations, or the abbreviations offered were difficult to understand for an uninformed reader. I then used the abbreviations provided by the Franz Joseph Dölger Institut.³

The following abbreviations were used that cannot be found in the above-mentioned reference works:

GW	Gesammelte Werke Gadamer
KNT	Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
KSA	Kritische Studienausgabe Nietzsche
NLLT	Natural Language & Linguistic Theory
NZST	Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie

¹ See Billie J. Collins – Bob Buller – John F. Kutsko (eds.), *The SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines* (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, ²2014), 171–260.

² See Geoffrey W.H. Lampe (ed.), *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), xi–xlv; Henry G. Liddell – Robert Scott – Henry S. Jones (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), xvi–xxxviii; Collins – Buller – Kutsko (eds.), *The SBL Handbook*, 124–171.

³ See Franz Joseph Dölger Institut, https://www.antike-und-christentum.de/rac_tools/abkuerzungen [accessed January 19, 2021].

INTRODUCTION

The Gospel of John is known for its abundance of figurative language, metaphors, and symbols. In the last thirty years, major works have been written on these elements of the Johannine language.⁴ Much attention has been given to the classification of the different types of figurative language and how the imagery is used in earlier biblical traditions or in the world around the New Testament.⁵ These attempts have led to an awareness of the peculiarities of Johannine language and the importance of studying this language in its own right in comparison to the parables of the Synoptic Gospels. The present dissertation has grown out of this awareness and aims to provide the first historical-hermeneutical analysis of the Johannine views on language, as they are expressed by the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. The main research question is how to interpret John's use of these terms in its historical context. As we will see, previous scholarly literature has mainly interpreted these terms in the literary context of the Gospel. My evaluation of the scholarly literature will show that many difficulties of interpretation in John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* have not yet been observed.⁶ I will go beyond the limitations of previous scholarship by providing a broad historical-contextual framework to interpret John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*: Philodemus' *Περὶ παρρησίας*, Plutarch's *Πῶς ἂν τις διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου*, LXX Proverbs, the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, etc. I will provide original analyses of the views on *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* in these writings and will examine whether John is (indirectly) influenced by these views. By reading John against the background of these writings I will open up new paths into "the tangled thicket of John's figurative world".⁷

In Chapter One, I will provide the theoretical framework of the methodology of this study. It is notoriously difficult to interpret John's language because of its incoherent and intricate nature. Our modern love for coherency and clarity is not shared by John, who appears to have different standards and a different understanding of how language operates. Interpreting John's language requires of us to translate his language to ours.

⁴ I mention here Jan G. van der Watt, *Family of the King: Dynamics of Metaphor in the Gospel According to John*, BibInt 47 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000); Ruben Zimmermann, *Christologie der Bilder im Johannesevangelium: Die Christopoetik des vierten Evangeliums unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Joh 10*, WUNT 171 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004); Jörg Frey – Jan G. van der Watt – Ruben Zimmermann (eds.), *Imagery in the Gospel of John*, WUNT 200 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); Ruben Zimmermann (ed.), *Kompendium der Gleichnisse Jesu* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 697–848; Clémence Hélou, *Symbole et langage dans les écrits johanniques*, Pensée religieuse et philosophique arabe (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012). Many more studies could be mentioned. For overviews of the literature, see van der Watt, *Family of the King*, xvii–xviii; Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 77–87; Ruben Zimmermann, "Imagery in John: Opening up Paths into the Tangled Thicket of John's Figurative World," in *Imagery in the Gospel of John*, 1–43, at 2–9.

⁵ See the studies mentioned in the overviews quoted in n. 4.

⁶ See *infra*, Chapter Two.

⁷ The metaphor is derived from Zimmermann, "Imagery in John," who is inspired by Adolf Jülicher's comments on Johannine imagery.

There is always an inevitable historical mediation in the interpretation of language. In this mediation, it is important not to project our own understanding and standards of language onto the Gospel and to take into consideration John's views on Jesus' language. At the same time, mediation can only take place on the basis of our own presuppositions. Biblical interpretation without presuppositions is impossible.⁸ Chapter One will provide a critical reflection on this process of historical mediation. With Gadamer, I will argue for the necessity of elucidating the "prejudices", or presuppositions, that constitute my historical horizon. Only by becoming conscious, as much as possible, of the presuppositions that have guided previous interpretations of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel, I can be addressed by the otherness of John's Gospel. The text can either correct, alter, or confirm these presuppositions. The confrontation with the otherness of the text will generate new questions, which will allow me to identify with the hypothetical first reader of the Gospel. Given this substantial influence of Gadamer's understanding of historical hermeneutics on my methodology, the present study is characterised as historical-hermeneutical.

In Chapter Two, I will provide an overview of previous scholarly literature on *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel. This overview will not only be descriptive, but also evaluative. I will provide an analysis of the shortcomings of the scholarly literature, and an elucidation of the presuppositions that have guided scholarly interpretations. In this endeavour, new research questions will be formulated that will allow me to provide a new perspective on John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. These questions will be addressed by the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two is the backbone of Chapters Three to Twelve.

Chapter Three will pose the question of how *παροιμία* relates to *παρρησία* in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Are they opposite terms, as might be concluded on the basis of John 16:25? Or can they be reconciled with one another? Jesus claims to have spoken *ἐν παροιμίαις* before his death (16:25), yet equally claims to have taught *παρρησίᾳ* in this period (18:20; cf. 7:26; 11:14). Through literary analyses of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John 10; 11:11–16; 16:23–33, I will examine whether Jesus' *παρρησία* is in opposition to his *παροιμία* teaching, or whether his *παρρησία* is expressed through *παροιμίαι*.

In Chapter Four, I will address the question of the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete. Scholarly literature on *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John assumes that the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective (John 14:25–26; 16:12–13). In this interpretation, the Paraclete's teaching provides the disciples with a univocal knowledge of Jesus' words. The authors of this position claim that this *modus intelligendi* of the disciples is characterised by *παρρησία* in opposition to the *modus intelligendi* of misunderstanding, which is depicted by *ἐν παροιμίαις* (16:25). In this dominant

⁸ For instance, the questions that guide Biblical exegesis already presuppose a certain idea of the subject matter with which biblical writings are concerned. Correctly observed by Rudolf K. Bultmann, "Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?," *TZ* 13 (1957) 409–417.

interpretation of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*, they are purely cognitive terms used by John to reflect on the conditions of Christological knowledge. I will examine on the basis of philological criteria whether the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is presented as retrospective or prospective in 14:25–26 and 16:12–13. The formulation that the Paraclete is to teach τὰ ἐρχόμενα (16:13f) suggests that the teaching of the Paraclete is prospective as well.

In Chapter Five, I will analyse John's discourse on the different forms of asking (*αἰτέω*, *ἐρωτάω*) in connection to *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* (John 16:23–27). A strong division between past and future is present in this passage. The pre-paschal *ἐρωτᾶν* is juxtaposed to the post-paschal *αἰτεῖν* (16:23–24, 26). The positioning of 16:25 within this discourse suggests a connection of *παροιμία* to *ἐρωτάω*, and *παρρησία* to *αἰτέω*. I will address the question how to understand these connections. Important primary sources that will be used for interpreting the connection of *παρρησία* to *αἰτέω* in this context are Philo, *Her.* 6–7, 26–27 and Job 27:7–10.

Chapter Six will deal with a paradox in John's depiction of Jesus' *παρρησία*. John repeatedly stresses that Jesus spoke, and even walked, *παρρησίᾳ* during his life time (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54). At the same time, he considers the hour of Jesus' death to be the time of his *παρρησία* (7:6–8; 16:25). As we will see, this ambiguity in the text is difficult to explain from within the literary context of the Gospel. The question I will address is how the hypothetical first reader, who is directly or indirectly influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* probably interpreted this puzzling description of Jesus' *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel. An important idea that I will use for this purpose is Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental (“stochastic”) teaching method of which the outcome is uncertain in advance and dependent on the *καιρός*. Other ancient authors who will be discussed are Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria. Similar to Philodemus, they compare the use of *παρρησία* to the use of medicine.

In Chapter Seven, I will pose the question how Jesus' *παρρησία* adjusts itself to its addressees in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Among others, I will examine whether the intensity of Jesus' *παρρησία* to the disciples differs from his *παρρησία* to the ‘Jews’, and, if so, how. I will provide a historical-contextual reading of this adaptability from the perspective of the conventions of *παρρησία* as attested by Philodemus, Philo, the Cynic Epistles, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Clement of Alexandria.

Chapter Eight will address the question how Jesus' *παρρησία* is connected to the idea of the salvation of the *κόσμος* in the Fourth Gospel. Many passages in the Gospel speak of, or presuppose, the salvation of the *κόσμος* (e.g., John 3:16–17; 8:28; 12:32, 39–40, 46–47). Jesus always taught the *κόσμος* *παρρησίᾳ* (18:20) and the Paraclete will, as the mouthpiece of Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour (16:25), continue this *παρρησία* teaching by means of his *ἐλέγχειν* of the *κόσμος* (16:9–11). I will research how to understand this connection between Jesus' *παρρησία* and the promise of the salvation of the *κόσμος*. The important primary sources and authors that I will discuss for this purpose are LXX Proverbs, Philodemus, Philo, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria.

In Chapter Nine, I will ask the question as to how Jesus' *παρρησία* relates to friendship language in John's Gospel. Jesus' death is presented as both an act of friendship (John 15:13) and an act of *παρρησία* (16:25). I will enquire how to understand this connection between friendship and *παρρησία* in the Gospel from the perspective of the ancient conventions of *παρρησία*. Given that, in antiquity, *παρρησία* is the discerning feature of a friend in distinction to a flatterer, it is to be expected that I will find an application of this criterion of friendship in John's presentation of Jesus' death as both an act of friendship and an act of *παρρησία*. Important ancient authors that I will discuss for this purpose are Philodemus and Plutarch. Another exegetical question I will address is how to understand the combination of the ideas of commitment (John 15:14) and open communication (15:15) in John's understanding of friendship. The formulation of the open communication between Jesus and his disciples reminds us of the idea of *παρρησία* between friends. LXX Wisdom literature and Philo will be my main reference sources to examine these features of the friendship bonds between Jesus and the disciples.

Chapter Ten will deal with the question as to whether Jesus' *παρρησία* is characterised as public and/or private in the Fourth Gospel. Scholarly discussions of *παρρησία* in antiquity often distinguish between a public (or political) use of *παρρησία* and a private (or ethical) use of *παρρησία*. I will, first, examine whether John's readers, who were (indirectly) influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, made such a distinction. For my study of these conventions, I will discuss Philodemus, Plutarch, and Lucian of Samosata. Second, I will enquire whether the information that John provides us about what we – as present-day readers – would call Jesus' private use of *παρρησία* and his public use of *παρρησία*, entails that there is a distinction between both. On the basis of John 18:20, it is to be expected that John considered the totality of Jesus' teaching, including his teaching of the disciples, to be a *παρρησία* teaching performed in public instead of ἐν κρυπτῷ (“in secret”).

In Chapter Eleven, I will pose the question how the first readers of the Gospel probably interpreted John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. This chapter builds on the research results of Chapter Three. The main primary sources for interpreting how *παροιμία* relates to *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel are LXX Prov 1:1–6 and the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech delivered to us through Demetrius, Quintilian, Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Ps.-Hermogenes. Especially Plutarch will be an important reference source for interpreting the relationship between *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel.

Finally, Chapter Twelve will provide a historical-contextual comparison of John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* to Mark's use of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία*. As Mark is the only other canonical Gospel that uses the term *παρρησία* (Mark 8:32), the question arises why John opted for a different term (viz., *παροιμία*) to refer to Jesus' imagery. The historical-contextual framework developed in Chapter Eleven will be used to interpret the relationship between *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* in Mark. This historical-contextual framework will enable me to describe the differences between Mark's use of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* and John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. Finally, the rhetorical theory of

Quintilian will be used to explain why John opted for παροιμία (in combination with παρρησία) instead of παραβολή (in combination with παρρησία).

All twelve chapters will end with an intermediate conclusion. At the end of the study, I will formulate a general conclusion in which I summarise the research results of the entire study.

The reference style of this dissertation follows the guidelines of the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of KU Leuven.⁹ For biblical writings, I make use of Nestle-Aland 28, the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, and the Göttingen edition of the LXX.¹⁰ For the LXX writings of which there is presently no Göttingen edition (e.g., Proverbs), I am obliged to consult Rahlfs' edition.¹¹ Translations of biblical texts are my own, if not indicated otherwise. For ancient non-biblical writings, I have, as a rule, in the first quotation mentioned the edition I quote from. If I provide a translation, I either refer to the translator in footnote or mention that it is my translation, or a translation that is adapted by me. The reader can find the full references of the translations in the bibliography.

⁹ For these guidelines, see Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, *Guidelines for the Composition of Essays, Master's Theses, and Dissertations*, 12th Revised Edition, November 2019, <https://theo.kuleuven.be/en/student-programmes-docs/guidelines.pdf> [accessed January 19, 2021]. I sometimes deviate from these guidelines. These deviations are, however, minor and easy to understand without further clarification.

¹⁰ Karl Elliger *et al.* (eds.), *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1997); Barbara Aland *et al.* (eds.), *Novum Testamentum Graece* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012); Joseph Ziegler *et al.* (eds.), *Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum. Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Göttingensis editum*, 16 Bände (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926–2015).

¹¹ Alfred Rahlfs (ed.), *Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum Graece iuxta LXX interpretes* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006).

CHAPTER I.

TRANSFORMING HISTORICAL OBJECTIVISM INTO HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS: FROM “HISTORICAL ILLNESS” TO PROPERLY LIVED HISTORICALITY

The present chapter aims to provide a critical reflection on the role of modern-historical methodologies in Biblical criticism. The first section will analyse the reservations about modern-historical methodologies coming from recent scholarly literature in the field of Biblical studies and theology. On the basis of this analysis, the second section will argue for the necessity of transforming historical objectivism, or positivism, into historical hermeneutics. The third section will evaluate whether the present practices of reception-historical methodology in Biblical studies are able to perform this transformation by: (i) combining historical criticism with reception-historical methodologies; and (ii) reformulating historical criticism in terms of reception history. I will demonstrate that these attempts, although their intent is to criticise historical objectivism, still operate from the metaphysical subject-object distinction that is fundamental for historical objectivism. Due to this inability of present practices in Biblical studies to dismantle the foundational metaphysical framework of historical objectivism, the fourth section of the present chapter will renew the dialogue between Biblical studies and philosophy. Modern historicism neglects the historical horizon of the historian. Human consciousness is, however, dispersed in time. It is oriented towards the past, the present, and the future. The subject-object distinction of historical objectivism posits the historian outside history. The modern historian operates from a view from nowhere. The limitations of one's own historicity are neglected. Modern historical consciousness seeks to gather the totality of history, but is ultimately overwhelmed by history. By neglecting the limits of historical knowledge set out by the historicity of human consciousness, one is unable to carry history further, and suffers from what Friedrich Nietzsche calls “*historische Krankheit*”. In order to relate authentically to one's own historicity, Nietzsche experiments with the idea of transforming historiography into an art form. I will evaluate Nietzsche's understanding of antiquarian, monumental, and critical historiography in this respect. Nietzsche, however, understands the historical horizon of human life as something that is closed, whereas, even speaking of one's own historical horizon presupposes that one can transcend it. The fifth section of the present chapter will discuss how Hans-Georg Gadamer tackles this problem with his notion of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. After the theoretical discussion of this notion, the sixth section will be more oriented to the practice of Biblical interpretation by addressing Gadamer's understanding of the hermeneutical consciousness of the researcher and the *Fragehorizont* of the text. The seventh and eight sections will continue this focus on the practice of Biblical interpretation by addressing Gadamer's thinking on the alterity of the text, and the (in)validity of textual interpretation. In the intermediate conclusion, I will

explain how Gadamer and historical hermeneutics are fundamental for the approach of the present study on the terms *παρουσία* and *παρρησία* in the Gospel of John.¹²

1. THE TENSION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND MODERN-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGIES

The relationship between theology and modern historicism is one of tension.¹³ The Pontifical Biblical Commission has argued for the necessity of the historical-critical method for the interpretation of the foundational texts of Christianity:

“The Eternal Word became incarnate at a precise period of history, within a clearly defined cultural and social environment. Anyone who desires to understand the word of God should humbly seek it out there where it has made itself visible and accept to this end the necessary help of human knowledge.”¹⁴

Regardless of the indispensability of historical study for the interpretation of the Bible, scholarly literature of the 21st century in the field of Biblical studies and theology has, according to my analysis, three reservations about traditional modern-historical methodologies.

The first reservation is epistemological. According to George Aichele, Peter Miscall, and Richard Walsh, claims to knowledge of an essential or definite meaning of a biblical text are without foundation (anti-foundationalism). They, therefore, do not accept that there is “a final account, an assured and agreed-on interpretation” of any biblical text (anti-essentialism).¹⁵ As historical critics think that they reconstruct the definite meaning of biblical texts, Aichele, Miscall, and Walsh have portrayed the practice of historical criticism as myth making.¹⁶

The second reservation about traditional historical-critical methodologies is theological. According to some critics, historical criticism is anti-theological. Historical

¹² Parts of the present chapter were previously published in Thomas Tops, “Transforming Historical Objectivism into Historical Hermeneutics: From ‘Historical Illness’ to Properly Lived Historicity,” *NZST* 61/4 (2019) 490–515. See, also, Thomas Tops, “The Challenge of Ideological-Critical Interpretation in Biblical Studies: From Modern Historical to Historically Effected Consciousness,” in *Theology in a World of Ideologies: Authorization or Critique?*, ed. Hans-Martin Kirn – Wolter Rose, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 133 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2020), 186–199.

¹³ The present reader will see that the understanding of theology used in the present subsection is very democratic in the sense that theologians and Biblical scholars of different Christian denominations are discussed.

¹⁴ Joannes Paulus II, *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church: Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul II and Document of the Pontifical Biblical Commission*, Vatican Documents (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), 189.

¹⁵ George Aichele – Peter Miscall – Richard Walsh, “An Elephant in the Room: Historical-Critical and Postmodern Interpretations of the Bible,” *JBL* 128/2 (2009) 383–404: at 384.

¹⁶ See Aichele – Miscall – Walsh, “An Elephant”: 389–396.

criticism only leads to more historical questions, whereas theological questions recede.¹⁷ According to Ulrich Luz, the major problem of historical-critical exegesis is that it isolates biblical texts in their original historical context so that they have no contemporary relevance at all.¹⁸ John Millbank observes that historical criticism operates from an anti-theological world view, because it presupposes that the world is ontologically autonomous from God and leaves no room for divine intervention.¹⁹ Jürgen Moltmann claims that modern historicism has factualised history and has, thus, detached the present from the past. As the Gospel cannot be reduced to facts, it cannot be the research object of historical criticism. Moltmann concludes that historical criticism has diverted New Testament studies from its proper research object.²⁰

The third reservation about traditional historical-critical methodologies is cultural-historical. According to Bradley McLean, modern historicism has caused what he calls the present state of nihilism, because it has made people aware of the cultural and historical contingency of all forms of biblical belief, values, and ethics. Modern historicism has discovered that there are no eternal truths, nor is there an absolute point of reference. Everything is subjected to historical decay. Early Christianity is reduced to pure historical knowledge. Therefore, it is a dead religion. It has no contemporary relevance.²¹

In my observation, all three reservations about modern-historical methodologies are ultimately criticisms against historical objectivism or positivism. Historical objectivism is seen as: (i) a myth; (ii) detrimental for the contemporary (theological) relevance of biblical texts; and (iii) one of the causes of the “crisis of nihilism”.²²

In spite of these criticisms there is little awareness of the philosophical tenets of historical criticism among Biblical scholars. This is partly because there is little dialogue between philosophers and historical critics. The aggressive reaction of the historical critic John Van Seters to the postmodernists Aichele, Miscall, and Walsh cannot be considered as a dialogue because Van Seters wrongly compares postmodernists to unhistorical novel

¹⁷ See Karl Möller, “Renewing Historical Criticism,” in *Renewing Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Craig G. Bartholomew – Colin J.D. Greene – Karl Möller, Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 1 (Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 2000), 145–171; Christopher R. Seitz, “Scripture Becomes Religion(s): The Theological Crisis of Serious Biblical Interpretation in the Twentieth Century,” in *Renewing Biblical Interpretation*, 40–65; Johnson T.K. Lim, “Historical Critical Paradigm: The Beginning of an End,” *AsJT* 14 (2000) 252–271.

¹⁸ See Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*, Teil 1, *Mt 1-7*, EKKNT I/1 (Dusseldorf: Benziger, 2002), 109–110.

¹⁹ See Benjamin Sargent, “John Milbank and Biblical Hermeneutics: The End of the Historical-Critical Method?,” *HeyJ* 53 (2012) 253–263: at 254–256.

²⁰ See Jürgen Moltmann, “‘Verstehst Du auch, was Du liest?’ Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die hermeneutische Frage der Theologie. Ein Zwischenruf,” *EvT* 71/6 (2011) 405–414: at 407–409.

²¹ See Bradley H. McLean, *Biblical Interpretation & Philosophical Hermeneutics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 304.

²² McLean, *Biblical Interpretation*, 304.

writers,²³ whereas postmodernists consider history as “a necessary function of consciousness” and a condition of possibility for human understanding.²⁴ Van Seters considers philosophical and historical perceptions as mutually exclusive; a view that is still widely held until today in Biblical studies. Craig Bartholomew, however, remarks that historical criticism also has a philosophical subtext. The founding father of Biblical criticism, Wilhelm de Wette, was conscious of his philosophical subtext as a historical critic, but philosophical reflection on this subtext became less important for Biblical scholarship when Julius Wellhausen articulated Biblical exegesis as a science.²⁵ This has led to a less critical form of historical criticism that is still mainstream in Biblical studies today. According to McLean, modern historicism does not simply provide a historical method, but is also a form of metaphysical thinking. The epistemology of historical criticism is based on the epistemological model of the Enlightenment. According to this model, one needs to distance oneself from the prejudices of one’s historical and cultural context to obtain objective knowledge. The fundamental metaphysical subject-object distinction of the epistemological model of the Enlightenment offers a view from nowhere for an abstract subject. Traditional historical criticism values the historical character of the object of knowledge, e.g., a text, but neglects the historical character of the subject of knowledge, that is, the researcher.²⁶

2. FROM HISTORICAL OBJECTIVISM TO HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS

With Gadamer, I observe that all criticisms against historical objectivism or positivism have a common feature: “die Einsicht, daß das sogenannte Subjekt der Erkenntnis von der Seinsart des Objektes ist, so daß Objekt und Subjekt der gleichen geschichtlichen Bewegtheit angehören” (GW 2.410). In my view, the task of historicism is, therefore, to ground its knowledge claims in the historicity or *Geschichtlichkeit* of the researcher. With ‘historicity’ is not meant the modern-historical thesis that human consciousness is conditioned by its socio-historical context, but that it is limited by an historical horizon. Human consciousness is itself dispersed in time. It is oriented towards

²³ See John Van Seters, “A Response to G. Aichele [sic], P. Miscall and R. Walsh, ‘An Elephant in the Postmodern Interpretations of the Bible’,” *JHebS* 9/26 (2009), http://www.jhsonline.org/Articles/article_128.pdf [accessed January 10, 2021].

²⁴ Aichele – Miscall – Walsh, “An Elephant”: 400.

²⁵ See Craig G. Bartholomew, “Before Babel and After Pentecost. Language, Literature and Biblical Interpretation,” in *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Craig G. Bartholomew – Colin J.D. Greene – Karl Möller, Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), 131–170, at 136 and Craig G. Bartholomew., “Uncharted Waters: Philosophy, Theology and the Crisis in Biblical Interpretation,” in *Renewing Biblical Interpretation*, 1–39, at 20.

²⁶ See McLean, *Biblical Interpretation*, 55–79. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, *Hermeneutik I – Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 177–222 provides a more complete picture of the historical tenets of historical criticism by adding that the psychological understanding of meaning by historical criticism is also influenced by the hermeneutics of Romanticism. Further references to Gadamer’s *Gesammelte Werke* will be abbreviated as GW.

the past, the present, and the future. Unlike other objects in the world, the researcher is not only situated in history, but his or her consciousness of history is also limited by a historical horizon.²⁷ According to Gadamer, this historical horizon is a condition of knowledge, and not a limitation of knowledge.²⁸ He defines horizon as “de[n] Gesichtskreis, der all das umfaßt und umschließt, was von einem Punkt aus sichtbar ist” (GW 1.307). In his view, one denies having a historical horizon, because one does not see far enough, and overvalues what is close by. Conversely, having an historical horizon implies that one is not limited to what is close by, but that one can see further. One can correctly assess the meaning of all the things within this horizon concerning their size and location (see GW 1.307–308). Instead of promoting boundless relativism, Gadamer’s understanding of human consciousness rather calls for an increased attention for how, e.g., biblical texts are received in history. The requirement that knowledge operates from within the limits of the historicity of the researcher calls for a revaluation of the prejudices or presuppositions that implicitly guided previous interpretations of, e.g., biblical texts. Prejudices do not hinder understanding, but make it possible (see GW 1.281–295). The historical horizon of the researcher is constituted by his or her prejudices (see GW 1.311). To ground knowledge in the historicity of the researcher, thus, requires the study of reception history.

The awareness of the task of historicism to operate from within the limits of the historicity of the researcher is only partially and sporadically present in the scholarly literature of Biblical studies. Ronald Hendel remarks that historical critics cannot posit themselves outside history, because they “are in the position of author and character at once”.²⁹ Dobbs-Allsopp exhorts historical critics “to overcome the paradox of making recourse to knowledge about the past while affirming the utter subjectivity of this knowledge as it is inevitably constructed from a present context”.³⁰ As a result of this subjectivity, it is self-evident that the “interpretations and reconstructions of texts from the past” are “relevant” for the historical and cultural context of the researcher.³¹ As

²⁷ For this understanding of human consciousness, see Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1920/1963), § 75. Osman Bilen, *The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I Culture and Values Vol. 27 Series IIA Islam Vol. 11 (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2000), 19 correctly remarks that for Gadamer, the historicity of human understanding implies that “[h]uman understanding is neither in history nor above and beyond history, but moves along with it. The concept of history must be understood here in its peculiar sense. History is not a domain independent of human involvement. In other words, to think of history and human beings separately is possible only on the level of abstraction and theoretical reflection”.

²⁸ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 19: “Gadamer does not take history and the historic[al]ity of human understanding as negative, but rather he recognizes history as a category of human knowledge. Also the historic[al]ity of understanding belongs to the ontological—or in epistemological terms to the *a priori*—structure of ‘understanding as.’”

²⁹ Ronald Hendel, “Mind the Gap: Modern and Postmodern in Biblical Studies,” *JBL* 133/2 (2014) 422–443: at 428.

³⁰ F.W. Dobbs-Allsopp, “Rethinking Historical Criticism,” *BibInt* 7/3 (1999) 235–271: at 252.

³¹ Dobbs-Allsopp, “Rethinking Historical Criticism”: 255.

Gadamer claims, there is no difference between understanding a text in its own historical-cultural context and applying the meaning of the text to our historical-cultural context (see GW 1.312–346).³² According to Jens Schröter, one of the most important tasks of present Biblical scholarship is “[d]ie Entwicklung einer Hermeneutik, die vom mehrfachen Schriftsinn mittelalterlicher Exegese lernt und die Schematische Aufteilung in historische Exegese und nachträgliche Applikation hinter sich lässt”.³³ This hermeneutics has to do full justice to the textual and the historical, as well as the theological dimension of the text. One cannot divide between historical interpretation of biblical texts and theological application. The tasks of Biblical studies and theology are not mutually exclusive.³⁴

Despite this sporadic awareness of the need to replace historical objectivism with historical hermeneutics, there is little philosophical reflection on what such a historical hermeneutics might look like. A philosophical analysis of the shortcomings of modern historicism is, also, lacking. The present chapter takes the tension between theology and modern historicism seriously. As demonstrated above, this implies that historicism should operate from within the limits of the historicity of the researcher.

The growing dissatisfaction with the historical objectivism of modern-historical methodology has generated more attention for reception-historical methodology. Recent scholarship in Biblical studies has sought to bridge the gap between the original historical meaning of biblical texts and their contemporary (theological) relevance by studying the reception history or *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of biblical texts. According to reception theory, the task of Biblical criticism is not to reconstruct a single and constant meaning of a text, but to study how the reception of texts has shaped the pre-understanding of a next generation of readers.³⁵ Thus, the meaning of a text is not situated in the intention of its author(s), but is itself historical because it is generated by the dialectic relationship between text and reader. The methodology of reception history is characterised by historical consciousness. This distinguishes it from many forms of reader-response

³² Gilberto A. Ruiz, “Examining the Role of the Reader: A Necessary Task for Catholic Biblical Interpretation,” *Hor* 44 (2017) 28–55: at 52 correctly remarks that this challenges the view of the Pontifical Biblical Commission in *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church* that there is “a stable ‘message’ that can be ‘actualized’ in different contexts without itself being changed (§IV.A)”.

³³ Jens Schröter, “Gegenwart und Zukunft der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft: Ein autobiographischer Essay,” in *Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft: Autobiographische Essays aus der Evangelischen Theologie*, ed. Eve-Marie Becker, Uni-Taschenbücher 2475 (Tübingen: Francke, 2003), 146–156, at 155–156.

³⁴ See Schröter, “Gegenwart und Zukunft der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft,” 153. Elsewhere, Schröter pleads for the reception of the epistemological views of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Gustav Droysen, and others in New Testament studies: see Jens Schröter, “Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft: Methodologische Aspekte und theologische Perspektive,” *NTS* 46/2 (2000) 262–283: at 267–274 and Jens Schröter, “Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Historiographie und Hermeneutik in der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft,” in *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Exegesis*, ed. Petr Pokorný – Jan Roskovec, WUNT 153 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 191–203.

³⁵ See Anthony C. Thiselton, “‘Behind’ and ‘In Front Of’ the Text. Language, Reference and Indeterminacy,” in *After Pentecost*, 97–120, at 105.

criticism.³⁶ It is influenced by Gadamer, although the origin of its terminology in Gadamer is sometimes barely reflected upon.³⁷ The question I put forth here is whether the current practices of the methodology of reception history operate from within the limits of the historicity of the researcher. The next and third section of the present chapter will, therefore, evaluate whether these practices have transformed the historical objectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneutics.

3. THE RECEPTION-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

In my analysis, there are three distinct understandings of the reception-historical methodology in scholarly literature of the 21st century. They differ from one another concerning their view on the relationship between historical criticism and the study of reception history.

3.1 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS A PRELUDE FOR THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY

The present subsection cannot discuss all the authors of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology individually, but will sketch their main features and afterwards illustrate these features by presenting an author (Ulrich Luz) who functions as a paradigmatic example.

In the first understanding of the methodology of reception history, historical criticism is a necessary prelude for reception history. According to Luz, the task of historical criticism is to reconstruct how texts seek to be understood.³⁸ Jeremy Punt explains that historical criticism provides reception history with guidelines for developing the meaning of the text in history.³⁹ Emmanuel Nathan and Ulrich Luz add that historical criticism at the same time prevents people from projecting their ideologies on texts. Historical criticism tests our prejudices, and criticises us whenever we seek to gain access to the meaning of a text.⁴⁰ Michael Wolter explains that historical criticism guards the autonomy and alterity of the text in relation to its readers.⁴¹ According to the proponents of this

³⁶ See Robert Evans, *Reception History, Tradition and Biblical Interpretation: Gadamer and Jauss in Current Practice*, LNTS 510/STr 4 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 9.

³⁷ See Evans, *Reception History*, 2.

³⁸ See Ulrich Luz, "Theologische Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments als Hilfe zum Reden von Gott," *EvT* 72/3 (2012) 244–259 and Ulrich Luz, *Theologische Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments* (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Theologie, 2014), 22–23. Luz' understanding of historical criticism and reception history as two distinct successive methodological steps is illustrated by Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*, 4 vols., EKKNT I/1–4 (Zürich: Benziger, 1985–2002).

³⁹ See Jeremy Punt, "The Priority of Readers among Meanings and Methods in New Testament Interpretation," *Scriptura* 86 (2004) 271–291: at 280.

⁴⁰ See Emmanuel Nathan, "Truth and Prejudice. A Theological Reflection on Biblical Exegesis," *ETL* 83/4 (2007) 281–318: at 318 and Luz, *Matthäus*, Teil 1, 110.

⁴¹ See Michael Wolter, "Die Autonomie des Textes gegenüber den Lesern als Anliegen der historisch-kritischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments," in *Verstehen, was man liest: Zur Notwendigkeit historisch-*

understanding of the methodology of reception history, historical criticism, thus, has a double function. On the one hand, historical criticism is able to criticise reception history. On the other, historical criticism provides reception history with the interpretation possibilities of a text. The most eminent proponent of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology is Luz.⁴²

According to Luz, the task of historical criticism is to reconstruct the theological horizon of New Testament texts.⁴³ Reception history should afterwards adapt to this theological horizon. This horizon explicates how these texts seek to be understood. Luz calls the task of historical criticism “Erklärung” and the task of reception history “Applikation”. The division between both tasks is required to safeguard the alterity of the text and to avoid subjectivism. One needs to divide between our own questions and the ones that the text sought to answer in the past. The results of the task of “Erklärung” are normative for the task of “Applikation”. Luz considers, for example, both the structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to New Testament texts as inadequate attempts to actualise the meaning of these texts, because these approaches do not agree with the theological horizon of these texts. These texts require other textual models. The textual model of the New Testament is, according to historical criticism, the announcement. A first feature of announcements is that they are more than just information, because they cannot be adequately understood as detached from their speaker. One cannot speak of the death of the author, because the author is present in the text. A second feature is that announcements have concrete addressees. Therefore, one should also take the historical and cultural context of the addressees into consideration. A third feature is that announcements always communicate something extra-textual. This does not necessarily have to be something factual about the world, but can also be, for example, images of hope. The textual models of structuralism and post-structuralism cannot address these features of New Testament texts, because they consider texts as structured webs. Every extra-textual reference has disappeared in these textual models. Luz calls for a theological hermeneutics of the New Testament. This hermeneutics should be a dialogue partner who

kritischer Bibellektüre, ed. Karin Finsterbusch – Michael Tilly (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2010), 88–99, at 98.

⁴² In addition to the already mentioned authors, see, also, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “The Reader in New Testament Interpretation,” in *Hearing the New Testament: Strategies for Interpretation*, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 301–327; Teresa Okure, “‘I Will Open My Mouth in Parables’ (Matt 13.35): A Case for a Gospel-Based Biblical Hermeneutics,” *NTS* 46/3 (2000) 445–463; Martin Meiser, “Gegenwärtige Herausforderungen und bleibende Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft,” in *Herkunft und Zukunft der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft*, ed. Oda Wischmeyer, NET 6 (Tübingen: Francke, 2003), 35–62; Markus Bockmuehl, “New Testament *Wirkungsgeschichte* and the Early Christian Appeal to Living Memory,” in *Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium (Durham, September 2004)*, ed. Stephen C. Barton *et al.*, WUNT 212 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 341–368; Francis Watson, “Hermeneutics and the Doctrine of Scripture: Why They Need Each Other,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 12/2 (2010) 118–143.

⁴³ This discussion of Luz is based on Luz, “Theologische Hermeneutik”: 249, 254–255 and Luz, *Theologische Hermeneutik*, 19–21, 149–203, 311, 366.

elucidates how New Testament texts seek to be understood, and what kind of understanding these texts make possible. At the same time, this theological hermeneutics should make its dialogue partners aware of the interpretation models they derive from their social and cultural context. These dialogue partners should adapt their interpretation models to the textual model that New Testament texts require.

Luz' interest in reception history is not motivated by a philosophical reflection (e.g., Gadamer), but by a reflection on the historical effect that the Bible intended to have on its first readers. This implicit meaning, instead of some modern psychological reading, should, according to Luz, be determinative for the application of the meaning of these texts in our present context. New readings of a text are justified in as far as they realise what the text intended to realise, or in as far as they realise a neglected aspect of the text.⁴⁴

A merit of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology is that it demonstrates that biblical texts do not have a closed and definite meaning, but are filled with possibilities. Luz compares texts to trees that always produce new buds; or to the earth, on which always new flowers grow. These buds and flowers are not only written commentaries, but can also be paintings, poetry, songs, prayers, hope, action, and suffering. One can also understand biblical texts on the basis of these buds and flowers.⁴⁵

Enquiring whether this understanding of reception history is able to transform the historical objectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneutics, I remark that Luz sees a difference between understanding and application. In this understanding of the reception-historical methodology, the task of historical criticism is to discern how a text seeks to be understood, whereas reception history actualises the meaning of this text to different historical and cultural contexts. This understanding of the reception-historical methodology is, therefore, not able to transform the historical objectivism of modern historical criticism into historical hermeneutics. It neglects the historicity of the historical critic. Mark Knight and Robert Evans correctly criticise Luz for interpreting Gadamer wrongly, because Luz divides between historical exegesis and *Wirkungsgeschichte*. Luz considers *Wirkungsgeschichte* as an independent activity, whereas, according to Gadamer, *Wirkungsgeschichte* is integrated into and not divided from the understanding of the text itself.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ For this evaluation of Luz' interest for reception history, see Mark W. Elliott, "Effective-History and the Hermeneutics of Ulrich Luz," *JSNT* 33/2 (2010) 161–173: at 163. More recently, Dale C. Allison, "The History of the Interpretation of Matthew: Lessons Learned," *In die Skriflig* 49/1 (2015), <https://www.indieskriflig.org.za/index.php/skriflig/article/view/1879/3109> [accessed January 10, 2021] has, also, emphasised the importance of the study of reception history for bringing to light credible exegetical and historical interpretations of a text that were once part of the tradition of interpretation of a text, but were forgotten without any reason.

⁴⁵ See Luz, *Matthäus*, Teil 1, 112–113.

⁴⁶ See Mark Knight, "*Wirkungsgeschichte*, Reception History, Reception Theory," *JSNT* 33/2 (2010) 137–146: at 142–143 and Evans, *Reception History*, 50.

3.2 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS IDENTICAL TO THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY

In the second understanding of the reception-historical methodology, Biblical exegesis is a form of “ethology”.⁴⁷ Just as the ethologist observes how animals behave and interact with their environment, the Biblical exegete ought to observe how biblical texts are received and what effect they had on their readers. From an ethological perspective, the identity of an animal is determined by what it does and what it can do, and not by what it ought to do or by how it looked like in the past. When studying a biblical text, one should, therefore, not study an ideal version of this text that did or did not exist at a certain time in its textual tradition, but all the variants and translations of this text. One ought to study what texts have concretely done in history, and what they can do in the future.⁴⁸ According to William Lyons, the understanding of a text in its historical context is, consequently, no longer distinguished from the study of the reception history of a text. There is no distinction between the original meaning of a text and the meaning that a text has obtained in history. The notions of first- and second-stage interpretations are not insisted on anymore.⁴⁹ The proponents of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology propose not to divide between historical criticism and reception history. Everything is reception and also history. One can better not use the phrases ‘reception history’ or ‘historical criticism’, but the more general phrase ‘Biblical studies’.⁵⁰ Another option is to relabel historical-critical methodology in terms of reception history.⁵¹

The authors of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology consider historical-critical methodologies as forms of the study of reception history. Consequently, they do not seek to do away with these methodologies. The study of the response of the original reader(s), hypothetical or not, is inherent to research on the Gospels. Redaction criticism is interested in how redactors reacted to their sources, e.g., Matthew’s reaction to Mark. Research is interested in how certain authors used biblical texts, and how copyists adapted biblical texts. Form criticism does not only search for literary genres and

⁴⁷ Brennan W. Breed, “What Can a Text Do? Reception History as an Ethology of the Biblical Text,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies: Theory and Practice*, ed. Emma England – William J. Lyons, LHBOTS 615 (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 95–109, at 98.

⁴⁸ See Breed, “What Can a Text Do?,” 97–103. For a more extensive elaboration of Brennan’s theoretical views on reception-historical methodology, see Brennan W. Breed, *Nomadic Text: A Theory of Biblical Reception History*, ISBL (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2014).

⁴⁹ See William J. Lyons, “Hope for a Troubled Discipline? Contributions to New Testament Studies from Reception History,” *JSNT* 33/2 (2010) 207–220: at 214–215.

⁵⁰ See James G. Crossley, “The End of Reception History, a Grand Narrative for Biblical Studies and the Neoliberal Bible,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 45–59, at 47–48.

⁵¹ See Lyons, “Hope”: 207–220 and Jonathan Morgan, “Visitors, Gatekeepers and Receptionists: Reflections on the Shape of Biblical Studies and the Role of Reception History,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 61–76, at 63–64.

why these genres are used, but also describes the *Sitz im Leben* of the original audience.⁵² Text and reception are difficult to distinguish. There is no textual basis distinct from its reception.⁵³ Textual criticism is, thus, equally a study of the reception history of a text.⁵⁴

These forms of written exegesis are, however, not privileged. The visual artist, the literary writer, and the musical composer are equally considered as active readers of the Bible.⁵⁵ In principle, the reception-historical methodology can study everything, even politics, and the identity of people.⁵⁶ This methodology can relate many things with one another that at first sight have little in common, e.g., Lenin, Calvin, and Nick Cave.⁵⁷ In my view, this considerable expansion of the research domain of Biblical studies is used as a pragmatic argument. Biblical studies is a threatened discipline at universities. The reception-historical approach expands the research domain of Biblical studies, and connects Biblical studies with other academic disciplines. Given that Biblical exegetes

⁵² See Lyons, “Hope”: 213–214.

⁵³ See Jacques van Ruiten, “Nomadic Angels: Gen 6,1-4 and Reception History,” in *A Pillar of Cloud to Guide Text-Critical, Redactional, and Linguistic Perspectives on the Old Testament in Honour of Marc Vervenne*, ed. Hans Ausloos – Benedict Lemmelijn, BETL 269 (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 247–276 and James E. Harding, “What is Reception History, and What Happens to You if You Do It?,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 31–44, at 38.

⁵⁴ This thesis has recently been illustrated for the Apocalypse, see Garrick V. Allen, “Textual History and Reception History. Exegetical Variation in the Apocalypse,” *NovT* 59 (2017) 279–319.

⁵⁵ For the visual artist, see Martin O’Kane, “*Wirkungsgeschichte* and Visual Exegesis: The Contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer,” *JSNT* 33/2 (2010) 147–159; Barbara Baert, *Interspaces between Word, Gaze and Touch: The Bible and the Visual Medium in the Middle Ages: Collected Essays on Noli Me Tangere, the Woman with the Haemorrhage, the Head of John the Baptist*, ANL 62 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011); Caroline Vander Stichele, “The Head of John and its Reception or How to Conceptualize ‘Reception History’,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 79–93.

For the literary writer and the musical composer, see Harding, “What is Reception History,” 35; Ibrahim Abraham, “High, Low and In-between: Reception History and the Sociology of Religion and Popular Music,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 241–253; Michael J. Gilmour, “‘God’, ‘God Part II’ and ‘God Part III’: Exploring the Anxiety of Influence in John Lennon, U2 and Larry Norman,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 231–239; Helen R. Jacobus, “The Story of Leonard Cohen’s ‘Who by Fire’, a Prayer in the Cairo Genizah, Babylonian Astrology and Related Rabbinical Texts,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 201–217; William J. Lyons, “‘Time To Cut Him Down To Size?’ A Critical Examination of Depeche Mode’s Alternative ‘John of Patmos’,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 219–230; Samuel Tongue, “The End of Biblical Interpretation – the Beginning of Reception History? Reading the Bible in the Spaces of Literature,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 111–124. See, also, Christopher Rowland *et al.* (eds.), *Blackwell Bible Commentaries* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003–...).

⁵⁶ See Masiiwa R. Gunda, “Reception History of the Bible: Prospects of a New Frontier in African Biblical Studies,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 125–138 and Gerald O. West, “Layers of Reception of Jephthah’s Daughter (Judges 11) Among the AmaNazareth: From the Early 1900s to Today,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 185–198. See, also, Rowland *et al.* (eds.), *Blackwell Bible Commentaries*.

⁵⁷ See Roland Boer, “Unlikely Bedfellows: Lenin, Calvin and Nick Cave,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 141–153.

have competences that the practitioners of other academic disciplines do not have, the presence of Biblical exegetes at universities is justified.⁵⁸

Despite this pragmatic argument, this understanding of the reception-historical methodology is not able to transform the historical objectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneutics. The historical-critical method is relabelled in reception-historical terms. Its underlying subject-object epistemology is, however, still implicitly present. The idea of the reception historian as an ethologist posits the reception historian outside history in order that s/he can describe how a text has been interpreted/received in history. This understanding of reception-historical methodology, thus, does not operate from within the limits of the historicity of the reception historian. *Wirkungsgeschichte* can and should, however, be an important building block for the critique of this method's false claims to objectivity and the hermeneutical naïveté of modern historicism. If Gadamer is correct, that all understanding is co-determined by *Wirkungsgeschichte*, the study of the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of a text has an important remedying role for every researcher working with any method. *Wirkungsgeschichte* does not have any methodological-normative function, but offers a phenomenological description of how understanding is always co-determined by the historicity or historical horizon of the researcher.⁵⁹ *Wirkungsgeschichte* is then not simply a description of or a meta-reflection on how people go about interpreting the Bible, but a necessary condition of all critical-historical understanding.⁶⁰ Let us turn to the third understanding of the reception-historical methodology, which arose from the need to more actively engage with Gadamer.

3.3 HISTORICAL CRITICISM AS AN INTEGRATED DISCIPLINE OF THE STUDY OF RECEPTION HISTORY

In the third and last understanding of the reception-historical methodology, historical-critical methodologies play a “*distinctive* and significant role” within the methodology of reception history.⁶¹ Evans observes that Biblical scholarship has only partially integrated Gadamer's thinking into the methodology of reception history. It has only adopted Gadamer's view that the meaning of a text is not restricted to the intention of its author(s) or the historical horizon of the first audience of the text. One of the difficulties in *Wahrheit und Methode* is that Gadamer also claims that identification with

⁵⁸ For this pragmatic argument, see Lyons, “Hope”: 216–217 and Emma England – William J. Lyons, “Explorations in the Reception of the Bible,” in *Reception History and Biblical Studies*, 3–13, at 4.

⁵⁹ For this critical function of *Wirkungsgeschichte*, see Moisés Mayordomo, “Exegese zwischen Geschichte, Text und Rezeption: Literaturwissenschaftliche Zugänge zum Neuen Testament,” *VF* 55/1 (2010) 19–37: at 34–35 and Moisés Mayordomo, “Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Wirkungsgeschichte? Hermeneutische Überlegungen mit einem Seitenblick auf Borges und die Seligpreisungen (Mt 5,3–12),” *SThZ* 72/1 (2016) 42–67.

⁶⁰ *Contra* Richard S. Briggs, “What Does Hermeneutics Have To Do With Biblical Interpretation?,” *HeyJ* 47/1 (2006) 55–74: at 60–61.

⁶¹ Evans, *Reception History*, 43 n. 91. Italics in the original.

the original audience of the text is an essential part of the hermeneutical process. Evans criticises other Biblical scholars for having emphasised the first aspect of Gadamer's thinking at the expense of the second. For Gadamer, however, the original historical horizon of a text is co-constitutive for the meaning of a text, because it is needed for the mediation/fusion with the horizon or historical situation of the researcher (*Horizontverschmelzung*).⁶² According to Evans, this implies that traditional historical-critical methodologies are required to actualise the reception of a text again and again. Thus, there is a dialectic relationship between historical criticism and reception. The task of historical criticism is to transpose the reader into the place of the hypothetical first reader in order to reconstruct the question to which the text gives an answer.⁶³

In my view, especially in the case studies that he provides, Evans does not implement Gadamer in the study of the New Testament, but Gadamer's student Hans Robert Jauss.⁶⁴ Evans uses mainly the Jaussian concept 'Erwartungshorizont' in his methodological work. Each generation of readers interacts with the text on the basis of a framework of expectations. These expectations concern, for example, the semantics of words, the genre of a text, and the socio-historical setting of a text. These expectations are the results of earlier readings of texts. They can be corrected, altered, but also confirmed in succeeding periods of history.⁶⁵ In order to identify the expectations of the first reader of a text, one ought to study contemporary literature of the text, the semantic competences of the first readers, and the specific situation in which a text was read.⁶⁶

Evans pleads for a redefinition of the terms 'synchronic' and 'diachronic'. For Evans, the diachronic history of a text is not the prehistory of how a text came about, but the reception history of a text. All the receptions of a text form a series of synchronic cross sections that constitute the diachronic history of this text. Historical-critical research adds one synchronic cross section to this series. The study of contemporary literature to identify the horizon of expectation of the first reader, is also a form of synchronic research.⁶⁷ Evans does not derive this methodological model for interpreting texts from Gadamer, but from Jauss.

A merit of Evans is that he has demonstrated, with Gadamer, that historical criticism and the identification with the first reader is not a "(temporal) *pre*-condition for understanding, rather than *co*-determinant in the process of understanding an historic text". The task of historical criticism is, thus, not "constructing the possibilities of the first reception", "the primary datum to which later meanings are added".⁶⁸ There is no

⁶² See Evans, *Reception History*, 45.

⁶³ See Evans, *Reception History*, 24.

⁶⁴ For the case studies, see Evans, *Reception History*, 53–113. Jauss has, also, strongly influenced David P. Parris, *Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics*, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 107 (Eugene OR: Pickwick, 2009) and Víctor M. Morales Vásquez, *Contours of a Biblical Reception Theory: Studies in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Romans 13.1–7* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2012).

⁶⁵ See Evans, *Reception History*, XV–XVI, 10.

⁶⁶ See Evans, *Reception History*, 54–55.

⁶⁷ See Evans, *Reception History*, 39.

⁶⁸ *Contra* the understanding of the reception-historical methodology discussed in §3.1.

distinction between “first- and second-stage interpretations”.⁶⁹ Evans agrees on this point with the above-described second understanding of the methodology of reception history.⁷⁰ He also differs from it, because he does not relabel historical criticism in terms of reception history, but places traditional historical-critical methodologies in a dialectic relationship with reception.

A disadvantage of Evans’ understanding of the reception-historical methodology is that its use of historical-critical methodologies is not preceded by a study of how the historical critic is co-determined by the reception history of the text. According to Evans, the task of historical-critical methodologies is to identify the horizon of expectation of the first reader. He recognises that the outcomes of these methodologies are co-determined by the historical contingencies of their practitioners, but he confuses what Gadamer calls the *Geschichtlichkeit* of understanding with the modern-historical thesis that human thinking is conditioned by its social-historical situation.⁷¹ Evans embraces a traditional understanding of modern-historical methodologies and does not deconstruct its underlying subject-object distinction by a preliminary study of how the hermeneutical situation of the researcher is already co-determined by the reception history of his or her object of research. He, thereby, neglects the limits of the historicity of the researcher.

According to Gadamer, such a study is, however, a necessary condition for meeting the alterity of a text: “[e]s gilt, der eigenen Voreingenommenheit innewohnend, damit sich der Text selbst in seiner Andersheit darstellt und damit in die Möglichkeit kommt, seine sachliche Wahrheit gegen die eigene Voremeinung auszuspielen.” (GW 1.274) This self-consciousness that our presuppositions are determined by the text’s history of interpretation, is what Gadamer calls *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. It is a necessary condition for meeting the alterity of the text. Evans correctly points out that this conversation with the text requires identification with the original audience, but forgets that the fusion with the original historical horizon of the text is, according to Gadamer, the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* (see GW 1.312).

This last understanding of the reception-historical methodology is, thus, also not able to transform the historical objectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneutics. The following and fourth section of the present chapter will, therefore, renew the dialogue between Biblical studies and philosophy.

4. FROM “HISTORICAL ILLNESS” TO PROPERLY LIVED HISTORICALITY

Already in 1874, Nietzsche criticised modern historicism in a way that is highly similar to the criticisms formulated by the critics in Biblical studies and theology in the 21st century. However, unlike contemporary critics, Nietzsche provides a philosophical analysis of the shortcomings of modern historicism and, as we will see, a way to remedy them.

⁶⁹ Evans, *Reception History*, 46. Italics in the original.

⁷⁰ See *supra*, §3.2.

⁷¹ See Evans, *Reception History*, 277. For further elaboration of this criticism, see *infra*, §8.

As “Arzt der Cultur” (KSA 7.545) Nietzsche proceeds in a therapeutic way.⁷² In his essay, *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*, Nietzsche diagnosed modern historical consciousness as suffering from “historische Krankheit” (KSA 1.246; 1.329). In its effort to reduce history to objective historical knowledge, modern historicism has posited the historian outside history. The objectivity of modern historicism presupposes that the subject is permanently absent or that the personality of the historian is completely silenced. This implies that the past may have no effect on the historian. Even if a poem, music, or a historical deed is of high quality, the historian may only study the history of its author. Modern historicism does not allow the past to have an effect on the present. Its criticism only leads to more criticism. Modern historians have lost self-control over their writing pens. They are weak personalities. Unable to carry history further, they are buried by it. They are unable to measure themselves with history and are, therefore, completely indifferent to it. They do not know why they prefer, for example, studying a poet instead of a philosopher. They only prefer that knowledge of history is objective. As a result of this indifference, they are overwhelmed by history (see KSA 1.282–285). Historical criticism detaches the present from the past. It reduces religion to historical knowledge and reveals the errors, violence, barbarism, and inhumanity in religions. All pious feelings towards religions disappear and religions cease to live (see KSA 1.296). Modern historians are, therefore, unable to render the past meaningful for the present. Although not explicitly, Nietzsche, thus, prophetically holds modern historicism responsible for the later crisis of nihilism. However, Nietzsche protests, even modern historians are driven by unhistorical needs, although they deny it (see KSA 1.255). This lack of self-knowledge causes their inability to carry history further.

Nietzsche challenges his readers to consider the historical and the unhistorical as equally important (see KSA 1.252). Modernity sees itself as superior to times in which there was no modern historical consciousness. Nietzsche agrees with the necessity of the historical for human life, but disagrees with the view of modern historicism that the historical is superior to the unhistorical and that historical consciousness has overcome the unhistorical. He observes that life is fundamental for historical knowledge, because knowledge that would destroy life, also destroys itself. René Descartes’ *cogito, ergo sum* should be preceded by *vivo, ergo cogito* (see KSA 1.329–331). Life is impossible without the capacity to forget, which Nietzsche defines as “unhistorisch zu empfinden” (KSA 1.250). As the unhistorical is a condition of human life, it is also a condition for the historical perception of reality (see KSA 1.252–253).

According to Nietzsche, the unhistorical, or the capacity to forget, is a necessary condition for human happiness. Humans envy the carelessness of animals and little children. While humans constantly drag the past with them, the consciousness of animals and little children is bound to the present. Animals and little children are not troubled by the past, but simply enjoy the moment. Humans consider this blissful state as a lost

⁷² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli – Mazzino Montinari (Munich: dtv & de Gruyter, 1977). Abbr.: KSA.

paradise. Modern historicism, therefore, wrongly considers human historical consciousness as superior to animal forgetfulness, just as it wrongly considers the historical consciousness of adults as superior to the forgetfulness of little children (see KSA 1.248–250). The historical and the unhistorical are both necessary for the health of human life.

Although both the unhistorical and the historical are required for human life, Nietzsche views the unhistorical as more fundamental than the historical. Forgetfulness is required to perceive reality historically.⁷³

“Denkt euch das äusserste Beispiel, einen Menschen, der die Kraft zu vergessen gar nicht besässe, der verurtheilt wäre, überall ein Werden zu sehen: ein Solcher glaubt nicht mehr an sein eigenes Sein, glaubt nicht mehr an sich, sieht alles in bewegte Punkte auseinander fliessen und verliert sich in diesem Strome des Werdens: er wird wie der rechte Schüler Heraklits zuletzt kaum mehr wagen den Finger zu heben.” (KSA 1.250)

“Das Unhistorische ist einer umhüllenden Atmosphäre ähnlich, in der sich Leben allein erzeugt, um mit der Vernichtung dieser Atmosphäre wieder zu verschwinden. Es ist wahr: erst dadurch, dass der Mensch denkend, überdenkend, vergleichend, trennend, zusammenschliessend jenes unhistorische Element einschränkt, erst dadurch dass innerhalb jener umschliessenden Dunstwolke ein heller, blitzender Lichtschein entsteht, also erst durch die Kraft, das Vergangene zum Leben zu gebrauchen und aus dem Geschehenen wieder Geschichte zu machen, wird der Mensch zum Menschen: aber in einem Uebermaasse von Historie hört der Mensch wieder auf, und ohne jene Hülle des Unhistorischen würde er nie angefangen haben und anzufangen wagen.” (KSA 1.252–253)

It is impossible to perceive reality in a purely historical fashion, that is, in the state of becoming. Therefore, the capacity to forget is required to perceive reality historically. The common sense chronological and logical order between remembering and forgetting is reversed. The ordinary view is that one first has to remember something, before one can forget it. Nietzsche, however, does not understand the historical and the unhistorical

⁷³ In this presentation of Nietzsche's thinking I posit myself among these authors who argue that Nietzsche does not oppose animal forgetfulness, that is, the unhistorical, to human memory, that is, the historical, but that the latter always requires the former: see Catherine Zuckert, “Nature, History and the Self: Fr. Nietzsche's Untimely Considerations,” *Nietzsche Studien* 5 (1976) 55–82 and Vanessa Lemm, “Animality, Creativity and Historicity: a Reading of Friedrich Nietzsche's Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben,” *Nietzsche Studien* 36 (2007) 169–200. Nietzsche does not consider the historical and the unhistorical as psychological activities, but as conditions for the possibility of knowledge. This interpretation of Nietzsche's text is not universal, because others understand the historical and the unhistorical in Nietzsche's text as psychological activities that take place alternatively: see Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 331–374; Robert Doran, “Nietzsche: Utility, Aesthetics, History,” *Comparative Literature Studies* 37/3 (2000) 321–343; Christophe Bourquin, “Die Rhetorik der Antiken Mnemotechnik als Leitfaden von Nietzsches Zweiter Unzeitgemässer Betrachtung,” *Nietzsche Studien* 38 (2009) 93–111.

as psychological abilities, but as necessary conditions of human understanding.⁷⁴ Human consciousness is always dispersed in time, that is, oriented to the past, the present, and the future. Human understanding is, therefore, always conditioned by a historical horizon. At the same time, as I will explain below, this historical horizon cannot arise without the capacity to forget or the unhistorical. According to Nietzsche, the unhistorical does not indicate a psychological activity of human consciousness, but the condition of the possibility of human consciousness.

Nietzsche's writing on forgetting is mainly located in his posthumously published essay *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne* (1872) and other *Nachlaß* fragments of this period. In this period of his life, Nietzsche's reflections on forgetting are related to his reflections on language and truth. This suggests that when Nietzsche articulates the capacity to forget, or the unhistorical as a condition for the historical horizon to arise (see KSA 1.252–253), he understands this historical horizon fundamentally as a language horizon. The historicity of human consciousness is mediated by language.⁷⁵ Whenever one addresses (historical) reality through language, the process of name-giving constantly presupposes one's metaphorical and metonymical activity. All claims to (historical) objectivity require that one forgets this activity (see KSA 1.880–881). As a result of this forgetfulness, one wrongly thinks that one speaks the truth. In reality, however, one has transformed the world in one's own human image (see KSA 1.883). Truth is “[e]in bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen” (KSA 1.880).

Every linguistic expression of reality requires metaphorical activity because one cannot explain the phenomenon of language without presupposing this metaphorical activity. Nietzsche presupposes three causal relations to understand the phenomenon of language. The causal relationship between: (i) objects in reality and our nerve system; (ii) our nerve impulses and our mental images; and (iii) our mental images and our linguistic expressions of them. Nietzsche says that the last two causal relations are metaphors (see KSA 1.879), because he understands causality as a metaphor.⁷⁶ About the first causal relationship he states the following:

“Nur durch Vergesslichkeit kann der Mensch je dazu kommen zu wähnen: er besitze eine Wahrheit in dem eben bezeichneten Grade. Wenn er sich nicht mit der Wahrheit in der Form der Tautologie, das heißt mit leeren Hülsen begnügen will, so wird er ewig Illusionen für Wahrheiten einhandeln. Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines Nervenreizes in Lauten. Von dem Nervenreiz aber Weiterzuschließen auf eine Ursache außer uns, ist bereits das Resultat einer falschen und unberechtigten Anwendung des Satzes vom Grunde.” (KSA 1.878)

⁷⁴ Gadamer, *GW*, vol. 1, 21, also, interprets Nietzsche in this way.

⁷⁵ One can also find the articulation of historicity as mediated by language in Gadamer, *GW*, vol. 1, 442–494.

⁷⁶ See *infra*.

Nietzsche refers here to Arthur Schopenhauer's formulation of the law of sufficient reason in Schopenhauer's dissertation *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* (1813). More specifically, he refers to the first root of sufficient reason; sufficient reason as the physical reason, the cause of all physical change in reality. According to Schopenhauer's representation theory, sense experience only teaches us how appearance is, not how reality *an sich* is. Error occurs when one concludes from sense experiences how reality is, i.e., a logical inference from a consequence to its cause.⁷⁷ Nietzsche points out that understanding truth as correspondence, has some unpleasant metaphysical implications, namely, an aggressive form of scepticism and subjective idealism.⁷⁸

In order to understand the causal relationship between objects in reality and our sense experience of them, Nietzsche reflects on the nature of causality. He observes that one cannot understand causality. We constantly experience smoke as accompanied by fire, but the assertion that there is a necessary causal relationship between both phenomena, is not rationally founded, but is what David Hume calls a natural belief of the human mind. We simply believe it in order to be able to understand nature.⁷⁹ Although we do not understand what causality is, Nietzsche points out that we do have a direct experience of it in our self-consciousness: "[j]edes Leiden ruft ein Tun hervor, jedes Tun ein Leiden" (KSA 7.484). This most general feeling already presupposes our metaphorical activity. The perception of the causal relationship between our will and our actions is fundamental for understanding the metaphorical nature of the category of causality:

"Ein empfundener Reiz und ein Blick auf eine Bewegung, verbunden, ergeben die Kausalität zunächst als Erfahrungssatz: zwei Dinge, nämlich eine bestimmte Empfindung und ein bestimmtes Gesichtsbild erscheinen immer zusammen: daß das eine die Ursache des andern ist, ist eine Metapher, entlehnt aus Wille und Tat: ein Analogieschluß. Die einzige Kausalität, die uns bewußt ist, ist zwischen Wollen und Tun – diese übertragen wir auf alle Dinge und deuten uns das Verhältnis von zwei immer beisammen befindlichen Veränderungen. Die Absicht oder das Wollen ergibt die Nomina, das Tun die Verba." (KSA 7.483)

Thus, Nietzsche explains causality as a metaphor. We have a direct experience of the causality between our will and our actions. We sense how our will urges us to act. We

⁷⁷ See Arthur Schopenhauer, *Sämtliche Werke in fünf Bänden*, Band 1, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Teil 1*, ed. Wolfgang Frhr. Von Löhneysen, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 661 (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1986), 131.

⁷⁸ This interpretation of Nietzsche's reference to Schopenhauer is also defended by Joshua Andresen, "Truth and illusion beyond falsification: Re-reading *On truth and lie in the extra-moral sense*," *Nietzsche Studien* 39 (2010) 255–281: at 275. Others defend that this reference to Schopenhauer demonstrates that Nietzsche understands truth as correspondence: see, e.g., Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 81.

⁷⁹ Hume, however, does not use the example of fire, but his famous example of the billiard balls: see David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 51.

metaphorically transpose this inner experience to the outer world in order to understand how this world affects our consciousness, and how phenomena in the world relate to each other. Our view that one phenomenon is the cause of another is the result of an inference by analogy. We cannot explain the phenomenon of language and our ability to speak truth, without, from our side, presupposing this metaphorical activity.

Our language use is also made possible by our metonymical activity. We categorise things with words. No single leaf is identical to another, yet, we classify them all under the word 'leaf'. We falsely identify one leaf with the other (see KSA 1.880). This requires that we identify one, or a finite set of predicates of a thing, with the essence of the thing as such. This is a form of identifying the essence of a thing as such with some of its consequences.⁸⁰

As a consequence that forgetfulness of our metaphorical and metonymical activity is required to constitute our linguistic or historical horizon, the unhistorical or the capacity to forget is a necessary condition for the historical. It is impossible to divide the course of human life in an unhistorical childhood that is later on defeated by historical maturity. Both the historical and the unhistorical are required for human life. They are equally important for human and cultural health. Modern historicism does not acknowledge this importance of the unhistorical. Therefore, it does not contribute to the health of human life and culture. On the contrary, Nietzsche diagnoses modern historical consciousness as ill. Illness is understood here as a form of inauthenticity. Modern historiography does not relate properly to the historicity of the historian. Its methodology posits the historian outside history, and, therefore, ignores the historical and linguistic horizon of the historian. This leads to its false truth claims and the inability to write history in the advantage of life. The question is: how do we relate properly to our own historicity? Paul van Tongeren observes correctly that, according to Nietzsche, our morality does not consist in an adequacy to nature (Stoics), but in an adequacy to our historical being. This is, however, not a matter of relating to something outside of us, because we *are* this historicity.⁸¹

⁸⁰ KSA 7.495–496 illustrates this thesis with an example: “Das Wesen der Definition: der Bleistift ist ein länglicher u. s. w. Körper. A ist B. Das was länglich ist, ist hier zugleich bunt. Die Eigenschaften enthalten nur Relationen. Ein bestimmter Körper ist gleich so und so viel Relationen. Relationen können nie das Wesen sein, sondern nur Folgen des Wesens. Das synthetische Urtheil beschreibt ein Ding nach seinen Folgen, d. h. *Wesen* und *Folgen* werden *identifiziert*, d. h. eine *Metonymie*.

Also im Wesen des synthetischen Urtheils liegt eine Metonymie, d. h. es ist eine *falsche Gleichung*. D. h. *die synthetischen Schlüsse sind unlogisch*. Wenn wir sie anwenden, setzen wir die populäre Metaphysik voraus d. h. die, welche Wirkungen als Ursachen betrachtet.

Der Begriff ‘Bleistift’ wird verwechselt mit dem ‘Ding’ Bleistift. Das ‘ist’ im synthetischen Urteil ist falsch, es enthält eine Übertragung, zwei verschiedene Sphären werden neben einander gestellt, zwischen denen nie eine Gleichung stattfinden kann.

Wir leben und denken unter lauter Wirkungen des *Unlogischen*, in Nichtwissen und Falschwissen.”

⁸¹ See Paul J.M. van Tongeren, “Nietzsche’s Transfiguration of History: Historicity as Transfiguration,” *Epoché* 2/2 (1994) 23–46: at 27.

Nietzsche claims that in order to heal from historical illness, one needs to know oneself. One needs to arrange the chaos in oneself by discerning real from fake needs (see KSA 1.333–334). This is the first step to writing history in the advantage of life. This, however, cannot be done by scientific modern historical-critical methodologies, because they posit the historian outside history and, thus, cause the historical illness. Historiography needs to be transformed into an art (see KSA 1.296). In order to do this, Nietzsche prescribes three forms of historiography: monumental, antiquarian, and critical historiography.

1. Monumental historiography provides us with excellent examples and teaches us that, because excellence was realised once, it can be realised again. This form of historiography can expose the insignificance of the present and motivate people to fight for a better future. Monumental historiography, thus, orients the historian to the future. It can, therefore, be compared to novel writing. This approach to history also has its deficiencies. It can be misleading, because it always normalises, generalises, and equalises what is different. Monumental historiography will always minimise the diversity of motives and reasons, the *causae*, in order to represent the *effectus* as something monumental, i.e., exemplary and worthy of imitation. Monumental historiography works with false analogies to find a common form of excellence in every great individual. Consequently, in its attempt to romanticise the past, monumental historiography obscures the real historical connection of cause and effect and destroys the essential difference between all great things. When practiced by weak personalities, monumental historiography can be used against the present and the future. It can damage the self-confidence of people by teaching them not to pursue excellence, because all forms of excellence are already realised in the past.
2. Antiquarian historiography diverts the attention from the present to the past, out of reverence for the past. This form of historiography also has its creative and destructive side. Its creative side is that it strengthens people's feelings of piety towards their origin. These feelings can be compared to the feeling that a tree has for its roots, the happy awareness that one's existence is not arbitrary, but an heir, blossom, and fruit of history. This feeling of being justified can be called the true intent of the historical. Antiquarian historiography orients the historian to the past. Its destructive side is that, when practiced excessively, it holds everything as equally important. A dangerous consequence is that everything that does not hold the same esteem for the past is denied and opposed. Other perspectives on the past are suppressed. Antiquarian historiography can, therefore, not produce new life, but only conserve life.
3. Critical historiography is the antidote for the destructive sides of monumental and antiquarian historiography, because it criticises and judges the past from the viewpoint of the needs of the present. It orients the historian to the present. By breaking the past into pieces, critical historiography avoids that monumental historiography leads to an awareness that all forms of excellence are already realised in the past. It also counters excessive antiquarianism that makes other interpretations of history impossible.

However, an excess of critical historiography leads to pessimism and an ironic self-consciousness, because it reveals the violence, falseness, absurdity, and violence in history.⁸²

Nietzsche calls for a synthesis between these three forms of historiography. He prescribes critical-monumental and critical-antiquarian historiography. Only when used in combination we avoid their destructive sides. In this combination of these three forms of historiography, the human way of being is recognised as temporality, in other words, as dispersed in the past, the present, and the future. Nietzsche's transformation of history into a work of art, thus, diverts human consciousness from historical illness to a properly lived historicity.⁸³ Only from within one's historical horizon can one understand the past: "[d]er Spruch der Vergangenheit ist immer ein Orakelspruch: nur als Baumeister der Zukunft, als Wissende der Gegenwart werdet ihr ihn verstehen." (KSA 1.294)

The problem with Nietzsche's understanding of historicity is that, on the one hand, Nietzsche conceives of human life and consciousness as limited by a closed historical horizon. On the other, Nietzsche cannot but admit that humanity has "unavoidable transcendent and totalizing aspirations". We are part of a development that we can "never perceive in a more or less objective way". We can never "completely and definitely know" our historical horizon. Nevertheless, even speaking of our historical horizon as Nietzsche does is "a way of totalizing" our life. In our efforts to totalise our life and our history, we "transcend (or imagine to transcend)" our historical horizon.⁸⁴

The question is, however, whether one can speak, as Nietzsche does, of closed historical horizons (see, e.g., KSA 1.251–252). The next section of the present chapter will present Gadamer's criticism on Nietzsche's view that the historical horizon of the historian is closed, and exists independently of the historical horizon of, for example, the text. Gadamer was aware of the problem with Nietzsche's understanding of historicity, and has provided an interesting solution for it with his notion of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*.

5. FROM HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO *WIRKUNGSGESCHICHTLICHES BEWUSSTSEIN*

Gadamer's concern in *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) is similar to Nietzsche's concern in *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*. According to Gadamer, Nietzsche does not criticise historical study as such, but only the methodology of modern historicism. This methodology causes the self-alienation of historical consciousness because it posits the historian outside history. Modern historicism seeks to understand history without prejudices. Thus, it abstracts from the historical horizon of the historian, because this horizon is constituted by the historian's prejudices (see GW 1.311). This

⁸² The depiction of the three forms of historiography is based on KSA 1.258–270.

⁸³ This interpretation of Nietzsche's transformation of history into a work of art is indebted to van Tongeren, "Nietzsche's Transfiguration": esp. 23–31.

⁸⁴ Van Tongeren, "Nietzsche's Transfiguration": 25.

prejudice against all prejudices (see GW 1.275) prevents modern historicism from addressing the truth claims of what Gadamer calls classical texts (see GW 1.290–295). The meaning of classical texts exceeds what their authors intended, and the original historical horizon of these texts.⁸⁵ According to modern historicism, the original historical horizon of the text exists independently of the historical horizon of the historian. The task of modern historians is to overcome the historical distance between these two horizons by transposing themselves into the historical horizon of the text and abstracting from their own historical horizon. Instead of focusing on what classical texts have to say, modern historians approach them as witnesses. Modern historians are like crime investigators, who do not pay attention to what the witnesses want them to believe, but to what they unintentionally express. They use texts as tools for reconstructing historical facts that are meaningful in their historical consciousness, but have no contemporary relevance (see GW 1.342–344).

According to Gadamer, historical distance, however, does not need to be overcome, but is required for understanding the truth claims of classical texts. Historians do not need to abstract from their historical horizon. The historical horizon of the historian co-determines the meaning of these texts. Prejudices do not hinder understanding, but are required for understanding and allow us to participate in tradition (see GW 1.301–304). The reason why people understand texts differently, is because their reading of texts is guided by different prejudices (see GW 2.442). The only requirement for understanding is that one understands differently than one's predecessors (see GW 1.302). The meaning of classical texts is never exhausted, but requires an infinite process of interpretation (see GW 1.303). These texts are the sources of our culture. Just as water sources constantly provide new and fresh water, the study of classical text enables new readings and meaning, because people's readings are guided by different prejudices (see GW 2.383–384). Not only the "Vormeinung" of our own customary language use, but also content-related prejudices make up our "Vorverständnis" of a text (see GW 1.272–273). Our prejudices, far more than our judgements, constitute the historical reality of our being (see GW 1.281). Due to this linguistic mediation, our historical horizon is a language horizon (see GW 1.442–494). Historical thinking, thus, always requires a mediation between the concepts of the text and our own thinking. It is a matter of translating the concepts of the past when we think by means of them (see GM 1.401). Understanding is, therefore, always a "Mitdenken des Gedachten" (GW 1.397).

Despite the common concern between Nietzsche and Gadamer, Gadamer criticises Nietzsche's understanding of historical horizons. Nietzsche presents historical horizons as closed and existing independently of each other. According to Gadamer, however, there are no closed and distinct historical horizons. The historical horizon of the historian and the historical horizon of, for example, the text, are not closed, and do not exist independently of each other (see GW 1.309–310). Although he constantly speaks about

⁸⁵ The term 'texts' is used here for all entities that contain meaning and are potential objects of interpretation. Thus, for instance, paintings and musical compositions, also, fall under this category.

these two horizons, and even calls the fusion of these two horizons the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* (see GW 1.311–312), Gadamer realises that, in reality, there is only one historical horizon. This one historical horizon is forever in motion and is constituted by the dynamic between the historical horizons of the historian and the text. Historians do not leave their historical horizon at home when they visit the historical horizon of the text. The idea of a closed historical horizon is an abstraction. In reality, human existence is never bound to any one standpoint. Historians walk in their historical horizon, and their historical horizon moves with them whenever they visit the historical horizon of the text. The historical horizon of the text can, thus, only be viewed from within the historical horizon of the historian. On the other hand, the confrontation with the alterity of the text corrects and alters the prejudices of the historian. The historical horizon of the historian is, thus, also effected by the historical horizon of the text. Thus, both the historical horizon of the historian and the historical horizon of the text are in motion. Gadamer calls this dialectic progression between both horizons *Horizontverschmelzung* (see GW 1.309–310). In Hegelian fashion, this dialectic progression consists in “d[er] Erhebung zu einer höheren Allgemeinheit, die nicht nur die eigene Partikularität, sondern auch die des anderen überwindet” (GW 1.310). Hence, both horizons do not exist independently of each other, but participate in a dialectic progression that constitutes the one and only moving historical horizon. Gadamer calls this movement “die Wirklichkeit des geschichtlichen Verstehens” (GW 1.305). He understands this movement as “die Wirklichkeit der Geschichte” (GW 1.305). As a result of this phenomenological reduction, one cannot strictly speak of the historicity of human consciousness. Our historicity does not direct us to a historical object outside of us, but is historical reality itself.⁸⁶ Therefore, understanding history is actually understanding ourselves (see GW 1.265).

The naïveté of modern historicism is that its practitioners forget their own historicity, whereas real historical thinking must operate from within the limits of its own historicity. Real historical thinking does not hunt after an imagined historical object, but understands the reality of history (“die Wirklichkeit der Geschichte”) as the reality of historical understanding (“die Wirklichkeit des geschichtlichen Verstehens”). Gadamer calls the phenomenological description of understanding “*Wirkungsgeschichte*” (GW 1.305). This phenomenological description leads to the consciousness that all understanding is effected by history (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*). Our interpretation of, e.g., a biblical text is necessarily influenced by the presuppositions of previous interpretations of that text, which have attained a certain credibility and authority in history. The self-criticism of historical consciousness leads to Gadamer’s hermeneutics (see GW 1.295). Modern historical consciousness forgets its own historicity and, hence, is the opposite of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. It posits the historian outside

⁸⁶ Gadamer is indebted to Heidegger (*Sein*, 388) for this insight: “[d]ie These von der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins sagt nicht, das weltlose Subjekt sei geschichtlich, sondern das Seiende, das als In-der-Welt-sein existiert.”

history, and is, therefore, self-alienation. In reality, modern historical consciousness is, however, also co-determined by history.⁸⁷ *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* is not something else added onto historical consciousness, but is an awareness that historical consciousness is co-determined by history. *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* is, thus, “das wahre historische Bewußtsein”.⁸⁸

After this theoretical discussion of the notion of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*, the next section of the present chapter will orient itself more to the practical implementation of this notion in the practice of Biblical interpretation. The focus will be on Gadamer’s understanding of the hermeneutical consciousness of the researcher, and the *Fragehorizont* of the text.

6. HERMENEUTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE *FRAGEHORIZONT* OF THE TEXT

Gadamer is only concerned with the question as to how understanding is possible (see GW 2.439). He only describes what always takes place when understanding occurs. His aim is not to prescribe how to obtain understanding, but only to justify how understanding is possible (see GW 2.394). According to Gadamer, all understanding requires *Vorverständnis*. This required pre-understanding is made possible on the basis of the prejudices that one has inherited from tradition. To quote Gadamer: “[i]n Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr.” (GW 1.281) Since modern historians are not conscious of how their understanding is guided by prejudices, they forget their own historicity (see GW 1.304–305). The consciousness of one’s own prejudices is, however, necessary to meet the alterity of the text. Hidden prejudices disable one to hear the *Sache* of the text (see GW 1.274).

The readiness to experience the alterity of the text is what Gadamer calls hermeneutical consciousness. Hermeneutical consciousness is the discerning feature of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. One recognises that an object can be different than one thinks it is. The meaning of, for instance, a text is still indeterminate. In order to obtain this hermeneutical consciousness, one has to ask questions. The structure of experience is the structure of the question, of asking whether the meaning of, for instance, a text is this or that. Gadamer uses Plato’s question-answer dialectic to elucidate this phenomenological structure of experience. The openness of the question consists in the fact that it is not settled. Asking questions implies that what is asked is still “in der Schwebe”. The question is considered as hermeneutically prior to the answers that it has obtained. The openness of the question is not boundless because it is limited by what Gadamer calls the “Fragehorizont” (see GW 1.368–371, 375). The *Fragehorizont* of, for

⁸⁷ Hans-Helmuth Gander, “Between Strangeness and Familiarity: Towards Gadamer’s Conception of Effective History,” *Research in Phenomenology* 34 (2004) 121–136: at 122, therefore, correctly implies that “when we understand history falsely or inadequately, we necessarily also misunderstand ourselves”.

⁸⁸ Etsuro Makita, “Der Begriff des historischen Bewußtseins bei Gadamer,” *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 36 (1993) 317–331: at 330. Italics in the original.

instance, a text does not exist independently of our own historical horizon. In our intent to answer the question that the text asks us, we are involved in a process of questioning. Our own questions, and the question that the text seeks to answer, thus, do not exist independently of each other. The reconstruction of the question, to which the text provides an answer, is subjected to historical mediation, and is, therefore, co-determined by our own questions (see GW 1.379–380).

Gadamer's notion of *Fragehorizont* reminds us of his earlier claim that the meaning of, for instance, a text is always co-determined by the occasion for which it is intended ("Okkasionalität" of the text; see GW 1.149). One, therefore, needs to transpose oneself into the historical horizon from which the text speaks. The hermeneutical demand is to understand the text in terms of the specific situation in which it was written (see GW 1.308). However, this hermeneutical demand does not imply that one has to abstract from one's prejudices/presuppositions. As explained earlier, for Gadamer, the historical horizon of the text does not exist independently from the historical horizon of the researcher. One can only visit the historical horizon of the text from within one's own historical horizon (see GW 1.309).⁸⁹

Gadamer's criticism of the modern understanding of method has led him to retrieve Hegel's understanding of the dialectic method of the Greeks. Instead of positing the historian outside history, the true method is "das Tun der Sache selbst" (GW 1.467–468). Understanding is not an operation external to historical reality, but is the reality of history itself. The task of method is "eine Sache in ihrer eigenen Konsequenz entfalten" (GW 1.468). Understanding is not a method that turns our consciousness towards a chosen research object, and turns history into objective knowledge. Understanding, on the other hand, is itself participating in a tradition of interpretation. It is an event that is, in itself, advanced by historical change (see GW 1.314). Understanding is always dialectic. It is a matter of conceiving possibilities as possibilities. It tests whether opposite answers can be given to a certain question. There is no external method for this. It only requires the Socratic self-knowledge that one does not know (see GW 1.371).

Gadamer, thus, renounces the idea that there is one methodological way to the *Sache* of the text. His phenomenological analysis of experience promotes a dialectical model of textual interpretation in Biblical studies. According to this model, the task of Biblical scholarship is to view different interpretations in the history of interpretation of the biblical text as possibilities. Instead of wanting to know better than other scholars, and to only engage in dialogue to prove oneself right, Biblical scholars ought to strengthen the positions of others. By weighing the pros and cons of each interpretation, the task of hermeneutical consciousness is to see how different presuppositions render different interpretations of the text possible. This constructive and authentic dialogue with other scholars is, moreover, the condition for scholars to participate in the tradition of interpretation of biblical texts. Only by becoming aware of the presuppositions of their historical and cultural tradition, do Biblical scholars open themselves for the ability of the

⁸⁹ See *supra*, §5.

text to either confirm or alter these presuppositions. Hermeneutical consciousness is the readiness to experience the alterity of the text. One can only carry history further from within one's historical horizon. The replacement of historical objectivism by historical hermeneutics does, however, not abandon the necessity of studying the original historical context of biblical texts. On the contrary, Biblical scholars can only participate in the tradition of interpretation of biblical texts by providing different interpretations of the text's meaning than their predecessors have done. This requires that they transpose themselves into the historical and cultural context of the biblical text. The fusion of the historical horizon of the researcher and the historical horizon of the text is the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*.

7. THE ALTERITY OF THE TEXT

The present section will further analyse the role of alterity in Gadamerian hermeneutics. In addition to the historicity of the researcher, the alterity of the text is an important feature of Gadamerian hermeneutics. For Gadamer, founding historicism on the historicity of the researcher is required, so that the researcher can be addressed by the otherness of the text. Yet, as we will see, Gadamer's thinking on otherness has been criticised extensively. I will demonstrate that these criticisms can be easily countered by reference to Gadamer's writings. These countercriticisms will further clarify what Gadamer means by the alterity of the text.

According to his critics, Gadamer instrumentalises the other. By conceiving tradition as unified and homogeneous, the other has no say in Gadamer's traditionalism and conservatism. This reduction of difference, in the name of unity and continuity, does not only apply to the otherness of those that have no voice in society, or members from other traditions, but also to the otherness of the text. Gadamer's understanding of the fusion of horizons seeks to appropriate "whatever is alienating in the text". The aim of this fusion is to achieve "full harmony in understanding".⁹⁰ Gadamer conceives textual interpretation in terms of a dialogue between reader (*ich*) and text (*du*), but in this dialogue there is no equality or reciprocity among the dialogue partners, but only domination and annihilation of otherness governed by the reader's metaphysical will to dominate.⁹¹ Gadamer's error is that he identifies truth with power or success, thereby ignoring "the fundamental Enlightenment insight that tradition is a locus for *untruth*, oppression, and distortion".⁹²

⁹⁰ Marie Fleming, "Gadamer's Conversation: Does the Other Have a Say?," in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, ed. Lorraine Code, Re-reading the Canon (Pennsylvania PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 109–132, at 126.

⁹¹ See Fleming, "Gadamer's Conversation," 111, 121.

⁹² Susan-Judith Hoffman, "Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics and Feminist Projects," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 81–107, at 83. Italics in the original. Elements of these criticisms on Gadamer's thinking on alterity can also be found in Marina Vitkin, "The 'Fusion of Horizons' on Knowledge and Alterity: Is Inter-Traditional Understanding Attainable through Situated Transcendence?," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 21/1 (1995) 57–76: at 57; Linda M. Alcoff, "Gadamer's Feminist Epistemology," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 231–258, at 255; Silja Freudenberger, "The Hermeneutic Conversation as Epistemological

According to Fred Dallmayr, Gadamer's conception of the fusion of horizons in *Wahrheit und Methode* is "attached to a certain kind of idealism" that attenuates difference "in favor of a nearly preestablished harmony between self and other".⁹³ For Veronica Vasterling, Gadamer reduces otherness to sameness, because otherness can only be respected if one allows that "different viewpoints may be incompatible or unfusable".⁹⁴ Sometimes there are no shared evaluative standards and incommensurability prevails. According to Marina Vitkin, Gadamer's thesis that language discloses a world, wrongly presupposes that all languages disclose the same world. "[N]othing in Gadamer's conception can guarantee the sameness of objects, of the world, across traditional boundaries", because this would require an "argument for a more universal (i.e. trans-traditional) ground for the fusibility of horizons (in this full-bodied sense, ground for the sameness of objects)". This argument would have to rise "above the tradition within which it itself is generated in order to demonstrate this inter-traditional universality theoretically". This is made impossible by "Gadamer's insistence on the radical historicity of understanding".⁹⁵ Vitkin argues for a radical incommensurability thesis that allows for "real differences between traditions".⁹⁶ Respecting otherness implies that one does not force others "into a frame of reference alien to them".⁹⁷ The other is beyond any comparison.⁹⁸

Model," trans. Melanie Richter-Bernberg, in *Feminist Interpretations*, 259–283, at 261–262; Grace M. Jantzen, "The Horizon of Natality: Gadamer, Heidegger, and the Limits of Existence," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 285–306, at 290–291; Robin Pappas – William Cowling, "Toward a Critical Hermeneutics," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 203–227, at 217–218; Meili Steele, "Three Problematics of Linguistic Vulnerability: Gadamer, Benhabib, and Butler," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 335–366, at 336; Veronica Vasterling, "Postmodern Hermeneutics? Toward a Critical Hermeneutics," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 149–180, at 150, 178.

These criticisms repeat elements of the critique against Gadamer previously uttered by Jürgen Habermas (*Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*), Jacques Derrida (see Richard J. Bernstein, "The Conversation that Never Happened [Gadamer/Derrida]," *The Review of Metaphysics* 61/3 [2008] 577–603), and John Caputo (*Radical Hermeneutics*, 114–115). For the discussion of this critique, see Lawrence K. Schmidt, "Respecting Others: The Hermeneutic Virtue," *Continental Philosophical Review* 33/3 (2000) 359–379; at 372–373 and Hoffman, "Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics," 83.

⁹³ Fred Dallmayr, "Self and Other: Gadamer and the Hermeneutics of Difference," *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities* 5/2 (1993) 507–524: at 509.

⁹⁴ Vasterling, "Postmodern Hermeneutics?," 163.

⁹⁵ Vitkin, "The 'Fusion of Horizons'": 66–67.

⁹⁶ Vitkin, "The 'Fusion of Horizons'": 69.

⁹⁷ Vitkin, "The 'Fusion of Horizons'": 58.

⁹⁸ The incommensurability thesis is also defended by Robert Bernasconi, "'You Don't Know What I'm Talking About': Alterity and the Hermeneutical Idea," in *The Specter of Relativism: Truth, Dialogue, and Phronesis in Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. Lawrence K. Schmidt, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 178–194 and Robert Bernasconi, "'Y'All Don't Hear Me Now': On Lorenzo Simpson's The Unfinished Project," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 33/3 (2007) 289–299. For discussion of Bernasconi's arguments, see Joseph Gruber, "Hermeneutic Availability and Respect for Alterity," *Philosophy Today* 58/1 (2014) 23–38.

Counter criticism one: in defence of Gadamer, scholars have argued that understanding is not appropriation for Gadamer. In Gadamer's view, the other is always the voice that opposes our prejudices, and remains the dialogue partner that cannot be suspended. Dialogical relations are bound to mis- or non-understandings. Because of our historicity, the other can never be reduced to our own self, and remains an occasion for further growth and self-knowledge.⁹⁹ Gadamer rejects Hegel's claim to absolute knowledge "on the basis of the finitude" of understanding. He adopts Hegel's dialectical understanding of experience, but argues against Hegel that the other needs to be recognised as "being outside the reflectivity of consciousness". By taking into account the historicity of experience, Gadamer draws the boundaries of reflection.¹⁰⁰ For Gadamer, the confrontation with the other allows us to discern between true and false prejudices. This critical questioning of one's own presuppositions is made possible by what Gadamer calls "[d]er Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit" (GW 1.299). The preconception of completeness grants the other the "possibility of saying something both coherent and truthful with respect to the topic under discussion". This means that, e.g., a text, has an immanent unity of meaning and that its reader's understanding is always guided by transcendent expectations of meaning that come from the relationship to the truth of what is meant. The preconception of completeness is "logically necessary in order to critically question one's own prejudices". It grants the other the freedom to disagree.¹⁰¹ Instead of reducing alterity to selfness, Gadamerian hermeneutics has integrated the Derridean insight of 'différance'. For Gadamer, "[d]ifference exists within identity; otherwise identity would not be identity. Thought contains deferral and distance".¹⁰²

Instead of promoting traditionalism and conservatism, Gadamer demonstrates "how to effect change within the existing set of meanings that constitute society". Consequently, "it is precisely the element that has seemed most antifeminist – tradition – that is the most useful tool for feminist analysis".¹⁰³ It is from within tradition that we change it, "not from an Archimedean point of feminist truth".¹⁰⁴ Gadamer provides a

⁹⁹ See Dallmayr, "Self": 524; James Risser, *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-reading Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 181; Gruber, "Hermeneutic Availability": 27–28. Freudenberger, "The Hermeneutic Conversation," 21 correctly observes that, according to Gadamer, "[h]ermeneutic interpretive conversation enables recognition of the other and cognizance of the situatedness of human life and knowledge." As Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 103 points out, this is what makes Gadamer so distinct from Ricoeur: "Gadamer does not privilege sameness—the rendering similar, the reduction of the other to the same, that appropriation seeks—in the way Ricoeur does, and in fact has to for the sake of the correspondence required in any methodological orientation. Gadamer does not see hermeneutics as a subject's struggle against cultural distance, but asks about the possibility of hearing voices that are culturally distanced."

¹⁰⁰ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 82.

¹⁰¹ Schmidt, "Respecting Others": 366.

¹⁰² Dallmayr, "Self": 516.

¹⁰³ Susan Hekman, "The Ontology of Change: Gadamer and Feminism," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 181–201, at 184.

¹⁰⁴ Hekman, "The Ontology of Change," 197.

middle ground between traditionalism/relativism and absolute incommensurability. Cynthia Nielsen uses musical metaphors to explain this:

“I have opted for the analogy of an improvisational attitude in which melodic lines and harmonies are constantly being re-harmonized in order to describe the act of ongoing horizon-fusing. It is not that the other’s melodic fragment or harmonic progression is *completely* foreign or unintelligible to me – otherwise, neither would show up *as* problems or puzzles. Rather, they do not fit well within my present harmonic and melodic schema (i.e., my as of yet, unchanged horizon). However, when a genuine fusion takes place, something has happened allowing me [...] to ‘find a language’ in which my understanding of the other has come about through an infusion of something of the other’s world ‘in’ me. Mixing metaphors, my horizon has been reharmonized by the melodic lines of the other such that the other’s ‘melody’ is heard *exactly* the same in my horizon as in her horizon. It is to say that the other’s voice has been preserved, neither muted nor silenced but continues to sound its melody within the new harmony that we have created together.”¹⁰⁵

Nielsen correctly points out that for Gadamer historical understanding is always a confrontation and critical challenge of tradition.¹⁰⁶ The other is not completely foreign to tradition, but s/he does not fit well into the harmonic and melodic schema of the tradition. Gadamer, thus, avoids the “ethnocentric temptation” that reduces otherness to selfness. The language that results from the fusion of horizons is a language that the dialogue partners have created together. This does not result in an identical understanding that both dialogue partners possess. Each dialogue partner comes to understand the subject matter under consideration through his or her own original horizon, which involves “different questions, experiences, struggles, cultural and institutional conditioning, and many other factors too numerous to list”. Both dialogue partners have changed in the process.¹⁰⁷ The subject matter (*die Sache*) under discussion can be anything, e.g., a philosophical idea, nature, Being, difference, a novel’s theme, an individual, etc. Not one of the dialogue partners is in charge. Both the I and the other participate in the dialogue by “mutual probing, questioning, critiquing of each other following the direction of the question”. In the end, it is the *Sache* itself that adjudicates prejudices, and that privileges “neither the I nor the other”. Both dialogue partners are unable to appropriate each other. “[T]he agreement reached, if anything, is more an appropriation of the I and the other by the *Sache* in its activity”.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, one cannot speak of an “assimilation of [o]ther into

¹⁰⁵ Cynthia R. Nielsen, “Hearing the Other’s Voice: How Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizons and Open-ended Understanding Respects the Other and Puts Oneself in Question,” *Otherness: Essays and Studies* 4/1 (2013): at 14–15, https://www.otherness.dk/fileadmin/www.othernessandthearts.org/Publications/Journal_Otherness/Otherness_Essays_and_Studies_4.1/Gadamer_on_Hearing_the_Other_s_Voice.pdf [accessed January 10, 2021]. Italics in the original.

¹⁰⁶ This is also pointed out by Bilen, *The Historicity*, 125–126.

¹⁰⁷ Nielsen, “Hearing the Other’s Voice”: 16.

¹⁰⁸ Schmidt, “Respecting Others”: 373, 375.

[s]ubject, or a subsumption of the particular into the universal”.¹⁰⁹ The subjectivity of the dialogue partners is rather intersubjective and relational.¹¹⁰

Counter criticism two: Joseph Gruber contends that for Gadamer a text must always be both familiar and distant: “familiar so that it can be heard as saying something and distant so that what it says makes the interpreter take notice” (see GW 1.300–302).¹¹¹ In defence of Gadamer, Gruber argues that when the other is considered as radical other, s/he is beyond understanding. To characterise the radical other as anything, e.g., as incomprehensible, is impossible. One cannot accommodate this other, neither as a person nor as a text.¹¹² The other, thus, loses its ability to say anything to us and cannot be noticed by the listener. The only thing that can be said about the other is that s/he cannot be known, reducing the other to incommunicability. Yet, paradoxically, the other is “fully known as unknowable other”.¹¹³ According to Gadamer, this disables us from knowing the other: “[d]er Anspruch, den anderen vorgehend zu verstehen, erfüllt die Funktion, sich den Anspruch des anderen in Wahrheit vom Leibe zu halten.” (GW 1:366) Gadamer’s hermeneutics, on the other hand, allows us to honour “both the otherness of the text and the endeavor of understanding”.¹¹⁴ It allows us to conceptualise otherness “without either making the other same or leaving the other completely other”.¹¹⁵

Counter criticism three: in defence of Gadamer, Dallmayr argues that speaking about absolute otherness essentialises the other, and promotes exclusion by drawing clear borders. This exclusion represses the differences within groups. Difference, however, does not denote “exclusivity, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity”. Difference is relational. It is not “an attribute, but a function of the relations between groups and the interaction of groups with institutions”.¹¹⁶ Since Gadamer does not draw strict borders between self and other, and describes the hermeneutical task as grounded in a polarity of familiarity and strangeness (see GW 1.300), he is in a much better position than his critics to understand difference as a function of relations.

Counter criticism four: Gadamer asks the transcendental-philosophical question: “[w]ie ist Verstehen möglich?” (GW 2.439) Thus, he presupposes that there is commensurability between different historical horizons, whereas thinkers as Jacques Derrida presuppose incommensurability and misunderstanding. Gadamer has a different understanding of authority than Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. For Gadamer, authority is a positive condition for knowledge and understanding, not a distortion of truth. Authority does not have to be associated with “obedience and domination”, but is

¹⁰⁹ Pappas – Cowling, “Toward a Critical Hermeneutics,” 224.

¹¹⁰ See Pappas – Cowling, “Toward a Critical Hermeneutics,” 210.

¹¹¹ Gruber, “Hermeneutic Availability”: 30.

¹¹² See Gruber, “Hermeneutic Availability”: 33.

¹¹³ Gruber, “Hermeneutic Availability”: 34.

¹¹⁴ Dallmayr, “Self”: 514–515.

¹¹⁵ Darren R. Walhof, “Friendship, Otherness, and Gadamer’s Politics of Solidarity,” *Political Theory* 34/5 (2006) 569–593: at 588.

¹¹⁶ Dallmayr, “Self”: 528.

“grounded in human freedom and dependent upon recognition of knowledge, ability, and insight” (see GW 1.290–295).¹¹⁷ As James Risser points out, this implies that the acceptance of authority does not exclude critique but presupposes it, because for Gadamer “the acceptance of authority is tied to the performance of reason, which is engaged in critique by definition”.¹¹⁸ Consequently, we can say that Gadamerian hermeneutics does not offer a procedure for understanding, but works out “the conditions in which understanding takes place, conditions in which a recognition of difference, not a *repression* of difference, constitutes an essential factor for productive understanding”.¹¹⁹ As such, it is “anything but exclusionary”.¹²⁰

8. THE (IN)VALIDITY OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

The present section will further analyse how a historicism, grounded in the historicity of the researcher, is able to distinguish between valid and invalid interpretations of a text. I will first present the criticisms against Gadamer in this respect. Second, I will formulate countercriticisms that will demonstrate that, for Gadamer, the finitude of interpretation is not a restriction to truth, but a condition for disclosing truth and distinguishing between valid and invalid interpretations.

According to his critics, Gadamer does not provide “generalizable criteria or methodological guidelines that would guarantee correct interpretations”.¹²¹ Therefore, he is unable to distinguish between correct and incorrect interpretations, and allows for a “variety of interpretations”. This leads to “complete arbitrariness in the coexistence of interpretations”. This has the unacceptable consequence that rejection of immoral interpretations, such as, e.g., “sexist or racist interpretations” is insupportable.¹²² Gadamer’s critics contend that hermeneutics has to be able to distinguish between “distortion and correct interpretation” in order to claim “emancipatory power”.¹²³ This emancipatory power requires the ability to transcend “the historicity of the subject”, and to “subject tradition to a critical evaluation”.¹²⁴ Gadamer’s inability to provide means for correct interpretation is, in the view of his critics, caused by the subjectivism and historical relativism of his hermeneutics. First, Gadamerian hermeneutics leads to subjectivism, because it: (i) includes application as “an integral part” of understanding. According to Gadamer, every understanding must be applied to the interpreter’s situation; and (ii) undermines “the autonomy of the object of interpretation” by “inserting the

¹¹⁷ Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, “Questioning Authority,” in *Feminist Interpretations*, 307–324, at 322.

¹¹⁸ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 69.

¹¹⁹ Hoffmann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 97. Italics in the original.

¹²⁰ Hoffmann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 89.

¹²¹ Freudenberger, “The Hermeneutic Conversation,” 278.

¹²² Freudenberger, “The Hermeneutic Conversation,” 271.

¹²³ Hoffmann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 101.

¹²⁴ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 90. This criticism was originally formulated by Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften: Materialien*, Edition Suhrkamp 481 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970) and Karl-Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973).

subjective fore-understanding into the process of interpretation”. Second, Gadamerian hermeneutics leads to historical relativism, because of its “reliance on the *a priori* historical conditions of understanding”.¹²⁵ These criticisms against Gadamer have “[t]wo common threads”: (i) A text has “only one invariable meaning”; and (ii) “this meaning is determined by its author and cannot be changed even if a correct understanding of this meaning cannot be accomplished in the present”.¹²⁶

Counter criticism one: according to Osman Bilen, critics of Gadamer “commit the mistake of identifying the finite nature of human knowledge with the relativity of knowledge”.¹²⁷ These critics still think in terms of the subject-object distinction and consider “the subject as confronting an alien object”.¹²⁸ In their view, the limit of knowledge is “a result of empirical obstacles to consensus concerning truth”.¹²⁹ For Gadamer, on the other hand, this limit is due to “the finite nature of human knowledge”. Instead of being an obstruction to knowledge, the historical horizon of the researcher is a condition of knowledge. According to Gadamer’s “transcendental project of dealing with an understanding of Being”, “Being manifests itself in temporality and language”.¹³⁰ The criticisms of subjectivism and historical relativism, therefore, still depend on “the validity of the epistemological scheme which is the basis of the subject-object distinction”.¹³¹ According to Gadamer, this scheme is unable to address the truth claims of classical texts (see GW 1.290–295). As Gadamer seeks to deconstruct the metaphysical subject-object distinction by transforming historical consciousness into *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*, the criticisms of subjectivity and historical relativism are based on a misunderstanding of Gadamer. These criticisms confuse what Gadamer calls the *Geschichtlichkeit* of understanding with the modern historical thesis that “human understanding is the product of the social and historical conditions in which individuals and communities live”.¹³²

Gadamer’s critics conceive history as “the medium in which all cognitive and practical activity of mankind takes place, as well as the standard to evaluate and judge all knowledge claims”. They impute “a certain form of relativism to Gadamer’s theory” by understanding relativism “as the lack of an a-temporal criterion of validity”, and by

¹²⁵ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 92. This criticism was originally formulated by Emilio Betti, *Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962); Eric D. Hirsch, “Truth and Method in Interpretation,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 18/3 (1965) 488–507; Eric D. Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 245–264. For a general discussion of Betti’s, Hirsch’s, and Habermas’ critical reactions to Gadamer, see Arie W. Zwiep, *Tussen tekst en lezer: Een historische inleiding in de bijbelse hermeneutiek*, Deel II, *Van moderniteit naar postmoderniteit* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2014), 206–223.

¹²⁶ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 100.

¹²⁷ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 116.

¹²⁸ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 120.

¹²⁹ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 116–117.

¹³⁰ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 116.

¹³¹ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 120.

¹³² Bilen, *The Historicity*, 128.

understanding “truth in the sense that all validity claims are conditioned in the historical process of life”. According to these critics, this undermines “the traditional concept of objectivity, that is, the possibility of establishing norms of valid textual interpretation”.¹³³ By contrast, Gadamer claims that founding historiography on the historicity of human experience and life provides “a solution to the problem of relativism”, which he identifies as the problem of modern historicism.¹³⁴ The “danger of relativism” is only present if “an absolute knowledge or a notion of progress to a final truth is admitted to be available”.¹³⁵ By founding historical research on the historicity of the researcher, absolute truth or progress to a final truth is not a possibility. As Gadamer denies that there is “an objectively neutral first step providing an unquestionable methodology”, his position cannot be properly called relativism, but is more adequately described as contextualism.¹³⁶ The historical horizon of the researcher, constituted by the prejudices of tradition, always provides a context for being addressed by alterity. Yet, the experience of truth “has nothing to do with the application of a criterion”.¹³⁷ For Gadamer, it suffices to say “daß man *anders* versteht, wenn man *überhaupt* versteht” (GW 1.302).

It remains to be considered, how can the selfsame truth claim, e.g., of a text, be always understood differently? Risser discusses Kierkegaard’s influence on Gadamer’s understanding of repetition to explain this. For Gadamer, understanding is not a reproduction of prior meaning. Risser explains this in terms of Kierkegaard’s distinction between repetition and recollection. Recollection and repetition “are the same movement”, yet, in different directions. Recollection has a retrospective orientation and makes people unhappy, whereas repetition has a prospective orientation and makes people happy. Recollection seeks “to solidify becoming, to see the present in terms of the past by repeating backwards to what was already—an existence finished, in a sense already at its end”. Recollection is always a mediation that brings “thought and reality, ideality and being” to unity. Repetition, on the other hand, “keeps the two separate”.¹³⁸ Recollection is more cognitive, while repetition is more existential. In repetition, “the individual moves forward to a presence yet to be realized, to a self that is not yet”. In its orientation to the future, the self is moved “towards its future possibilities”. For Kierkegaard, repetition thus has no static meaning, and can be called “creative as the production of life itself”, whereas recollection is a “literal recurrence” and can be called a “reproduction of life”.¹³⁹ Risser claims that when Gadamer speaks about the paradox of

¹³³ Bilén, *The Historicity*, 15.

¹³⁴ Bilén, *The Historicity*, 2.

¹³⁵ Bilén, *The Historicity*, 122.

¹³⁶ Bilén, *The Historicity*, 26. Bilén refers to David C. Hoy, *Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1982) in this respect for explaining Gadamer’s position.

¹³⁷ Bilén, *The Historicity*, 113. Bilén refers to Jean Grondin, *Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsbegriff Hans-Georg Gadamer* (Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1982) in this respect for explaining Gadamer’s position.

¹³⁸ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 35–36.

¹³⁹ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 38–39.

“the selfsame message that, by virtue of tradition, is always understood differently”, Gadamer adopts the idea of dynamic repetition from Kierkegaard. Gadamer characterises “Darstellung” as dynamic repetition when he calls it a “Zuwachs an Sein” (GW 1.145).¹⁴⁰

This performative character of understanding is also attested by Gadamer’s characterisation of understanding not as appropriation (*Aneignung*), but as application (*Anwendung*). In order to explain this, Gadamer discusses the distinction between φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, and τέχνη from Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea*. He demonstrates that φρόνησις or practical reasoning functions as a paradigm for understanding hermeneutical experience. Whereas ἐπιστήμη requires “a sense of detachment from the observed situation”, the task of φρόνησις is to see in each “concrete situation what is asked for”. We encounter “the good in the concrete situations which we find ourselves in”. Practical reasoning or φρόνησις, therefore, does not require detachment, nor does it aim “at verifying what is always the case”.¹⁴¹ Yet, in spite of this practical character of φρόνησις, it differs from τέχνη in three ways: (i) Technical knowing “does not change in any fundamental way”, and we can choose to utilise it or not. By contrast, ethical knowing “is such that knowing how to act with respect to a certain moral virtue may indeed change”. We always find ourselves already “in an acting situation and have to apply ethical knowledge to the exigencies of this concrete situation”. One has to see the situation. Ethical knowledge is not a knowledge of the nature of things that we first recognise and then apply. “[T]he norm itself is at stake in ethical life”,¹⁴² (ii) in technical knowing, “the end is a particular end or product” and technical skill is “a calculation of the means for producing it”. These means do not need to “be weighted anew on each occasion” to arrive at this product. For ethical knowing, on the other hand, “there can be no anterior certainty concerning what the good life is directed toward as a whole, for the ends themselves are at stake in deliberating about the means appropriate” to a particular situation.¹⁴³ There are no rules for determining the good; (iii) ethical knowledge always has “a unique relationship to itself”. Unlike technical knowledge, ethical knowledge cannot be generalised, but is “always a specification at a particular moment that can’t be determined in advance” (see GW 1.317–329).¹⁴⁴

For Gadamer, Aristotle’s understanding of φρόνησις functions as a “model for hermeneutic experience”, because, just as practical reasoning is contextual, the interpreter of a text cannot “disregard him or herself and his or her particular hermeneutical situation”.¹⁴⁵ Just as there are no rules or criteria to determine the good, there are no rules or criteria to determine the meaning of a text. The meaning of a text is itself at stake when the reader deliberates about the means of interpretation. By becoming aware of the prejudices that have guided previous interpretations of the text, the reader becomes aware

¹⁴⁰ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 39–40.

¹⁴¹ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 106.

¹⁴² Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 107–108.

¹⁴³ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 108.

¹⁴⁴ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 108–109.

¹⁴⁵ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 108–109.

of the finite character of all knowledge, and the alterity of the text. These are the conditions for understanding the text anew. Gadamer's claim that it suffices to say that one has understood a text differently than one's predecessors should be understood in terms of practical knowledge. In that respect, Gadamer conceives understanding in terms of a dialogue between *ich* (e.g., a reader) and *du* (e.g., a text). In order to keep this dialogue authentic, the reader is restricted in two ways. First, the reader may not use the text as a means, but should consider it as autonomous and an end in itself (cf. Kant's categorical imperative). This prohibits the reader from approaching the text as a someone that can be used to acquire "empirical generalizations about human nature".¹⁴⁶ Second, the reader may not claim to know the meaning of the text in advance (cf. Hegel's understanding of mutual recognition and reciprocity). This enables the reader to acknowledge that the text "asserts its own truth claims, different from" those of the reader (see GW 1.364–366).¹⁴⁷ By not being aware of one's own hermeneutical situation, that is, one's prejudices, the reader (or *ich*) disturbs the ethical relationship with the text (or *du*). Only by allowing the other to disagree with us, can there be mutual recognition. Therefore, historicism needs to be grounded in the historicity of the researcher. This properly lived historicity is the condition for freedom. Gadamer ascribes this condition to *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* (see GW 1.367).

According to Gadamer, there are no methodological criteria that can guide the reader to objective knowledge of the meaning of a text. Each interpretation of the text is guided by particular prejudices. The historicity of the reader does not allow for the idea that a text has a universal and definite meaning. Yet, Gadamer does allow hermeneutical consciousness to discern between true and false prejudices. Hermeneutical consciousness is able to discern between prejudices that enable the reader to understand the text and prejudices that lead to misunderstanding (see GW 1.303–304). Given that Gadamer "eschews a methodology of a correspondence theory", there are no criteria of correspondence to discern between true and false prejudices.¹⁴⁸ Instead, Gadamer formulates the already mentioned *Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit* as a presupposition of hermeneutical consciousness.¹⁴⁹ According to Risser, this presupposition is not a methodological criterion, but what Immanuel Kant calls "a regulative idea".¹⁵⁰ For Kant, regulative ideas "cannot be realized or instantiated in experience at all". They cannot be verified and, thus, do not allow for understanding truth as correspondence. Their task is "to guide empirical enquiry into the objects that can be given in experience". This task is never ending, and "*complete* understanding [...] can only be approached

¹⁴⁶ Kathleen R. Wright, "(En)gendering Dialogue Between Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Feminist Thought," in *Feminist Interpretations*, 39–55, at 47.

¹⁴⁷ Wright, "(En)gendering Dialogue," 48.

¹⁴⁸ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 75.

¹⁴⁹ See *supra*, §7.

¹⁵⁰ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 75.

asymptotically”.¹⁵¹ *Mutatis mutandis*, for Gadamer, the preconception of completeness presupposes that the text has a coherent and immanent meaning, and that it has something truthful to say in order to guide the reader into the *Sache* of which the text speaks. Although this coherence and truthfulness can never be verified or realised, it allows us to understand asymptotically the topic that the text addresses. This maximal unity and coherence of the text is never achieved, and the imagined object, thus, does not really exist. Yet, the preconception of completeness provides us with the task to continue the search without end. This search has nothing to do with reconstructing the intended meaning by the author of the text, but proceeds on the basis of circular movements of whole and part. The preconception of completeness guarantees that the text has a maximum of coherence that allows one to interpret its parts in terms of the whole, and the whole in terms of the parts (see GW 1.195). Thus, multiple successful interpretations of the text are possible. Due to the historicity of interpretation and the alterity of the text, not one of these interpretations exhausts the maximum coherence of the text. The preconception of completeness allows understanding only to proceed asymptotically. It allows one to distinguish between prejudices that hinder enhanced understanding of the text, and prejudices that improve the interpreter’s understanding of the text. Thereby, it helps the reader to establish the most comprehensive coherence possible from within his or her historical horizon.

Counter criticism two: Vitkin observes that the criticism of relativism is in a sense already countered by Gadamer’s notion of the fusion of horizons, because “this notion avoids the extreme relativism of culturally exclusive knowledge”. According to Gadamer, “there are no closed horizons”. Any historical horizon can be extended and enriched “by openness to the truths of others” (see GW 1.457). Moreover, although the partners in an intercultural dialogue start from “within their *different* situations”, their conversation is not an imposing of their own views on the subject matter, but “eine Verwandlung ins Gemeinsame hin, in der man nicht bleibt, was man war”. Each conversation “bildet eine gemeinsame Sprache heraus” (GW 1.384).¹⁵²

Counter criticism three: according to Bilen, Gadamer has “the belief that radical historicism falls into the logical fallacy of claiming that every knowledge claim, except for that of historicism itself, is historically determined” (see GW 2.416). In defence of Gadamer, Bilen claims that Gadamer escapes “the relativism and the paradoxical claim that it entails” by grounding historicism in the historicity or *Geschichtlichkeit* of the researcher.¹⁵³ For Gadamer, this historicity implies that there are no eternal truths. Truth “ist die mit der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins mitgegebene Erschlossenheit des Seins”. The historian does not take a relativistic standpoint over against a historical object anymore. The historicity of the historian is not an “Einschränkung der Wahrheit”, but a condition for the disclosure of Being (GW 2.411).

¹⁵¹ Michael Friedman, “Regulative and Constitutive,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30/S1 (1992) 73–102: at 73. Italics in the original.

¹⁵² Vitkin, “The ‘Fusion of Horizons’”: 58. Italics in the original.

¹⁵³ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 24.

Bilen correctly observes that, for Gadamer, this claim of the historicity of thinking is “itself an historically conditioned view, such that it may prove wrong in another historical period”. Thus, Gadamer “holds open the possibility” that the historicity thesis “might reveal a different aspect over time”. Yet, Gadamer claims that the reason for this is not that the thesis ‘all knowledge is co-determined by the historicity of the researcher’ is in contradiction with the claim that this thesis is unconditionally true. According to Gadamer, one needs to distinguish between “the statements about a fact and the statements about the language stating a fact” (see GW 2.416).¹⁵⁴ The neglect of this distinction would mean the end of all meta-reflection, and, thus, of all thinking as such. The statement ‘all knowledge is co-determined by the historicity of the researcher’ is not on the same level as the statements of fact made by a particular researcher on a particular topic. Mixing these two levels would imply the end of all logical thinking, because it does not allow for meta-reflection on language about facts.

Counter criticism four: according to Bilen, the criticisms of relativism and subjectivism belong to a concept of time and language “different from those held by Gadamer”, and are, therefore, unjustified when levelled against Gadamer. For Gadamer, time is not “a linear concept of a movement of moments”, but “multi-dimensional”:¹⁵⁵

“Die Anwendung der überlegenen Perspektive der Gegenwart auf alle Vergangenheit scheint mir gar nicht das wahre Wesen des historischen Denkens, sondern bezeichnet die hartnäckige Positivität eines ‘naiven’ Historismus. Seine Würde und seinen Wahrheitswert hat das historische Denken in dem Eingeständnis, daß es ‘die Gegenwart’ gar nicht gibt, sondern stets wechselnde Horizonte von Zukunft und Vergangenheit. Es ist ganz und gar nicht ausgemacht (und nie auszumachen), daß irgendeine Perspektive, in der sich überlieferte Gedanken zeigen, die richtige sei.” (GW 2.416–417)

According to Gadamer’s understanding of time, one is unable to describe historical knowledge as “a matter of applying a privileged perspective of the present to the past”.¹⁵⁶ The criticism of historical relativism is, therefore, unjustified.

The criticism of subjectivism presupposes that language is instrumental and conventional. Language is an instrument to describe a pre-given object. The type of linguistic signs that are used to describe particular objects is a matter of convention. For Gadamer, however, “that which comes into language is not something pre-given before language”, but “the being of language is self-presentation”.¹⁵⁷ Language has an ontological dimension. In order to explain this self-presentational character of the being of language, Gadamer employs Plato’s understanding of the idea of the beautiful. For Plato, the idea of the beautiful is “most radiantly manifest” in its appearances. This is not a matter of mediation. There is no distinction between “the intelligible and

¹⁵⁴ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 27.

¹⁵⁵ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 128. See also Bilen, *The Historicity*, 132.

¹⁵⁶ Bilen, *The Historicity*, 128.

¹⁵⁷ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 144.

appearance”, “the illuminated and the illuminating”. Distinctive for the idea of the beautiful is that “it presents itself”.¹⁵⁸ According to Gadamer, this implies that the image “is related to the original in a different way than the relation of the copy to the original”. The image is not “something less than real”.¹⁵⁹ By contrast, every image is a “self-presentation having its τέλος within itself”.¹⁶⁰ Instead of imitating something pre-given, the activity of μίμησις presents something in such a way “that it is actually present in sensuous abundance”. That which is presented “stands in its own right as a completed whole in the presentation”.¹⁶¹ The image “is an ontological event that in its presentation produces an increase in being”. It can be more properly called “the emanation” of the original. Yet, we need to keep in mind that it is only through the image “that the original actually becomes original”. Just as the idea of the beautiful is radiated in its appearances, in language there is “a showing forth”.¹⁶² Just like a play, language is “a performance that has no being, no substantiality, outside the performing”.¹⁶³ Language does not engage us “in a metaphysical quest of seeing truth itself instead of an image”, but entangles us in images, which entangle “us in truth” (see GW 1.141–147, 485–494).¹⁶⁴

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

The present chapter started off with a number of reservations about the current practice of historical criticism, and the call for a transformation of historical objectivism into historical hermeneutics. I have demonstrated that the recent attempts of the scholarly literature of the present century to combine historical criticism with reception-historical methodologies, or to reformulate historical criticism in terms of reception history, were unable to perform this transformation. A renewal of the dialogue between Biblical studies and philosophy has proved to be urgent.

I have demonstrated with Nietzsche that reservations about the historical-critical method indicate surface symptoms of an underlying “historical illness” of modern historical consciousness. Previous scholarly literature in Biblical studies has only looked at the symptoms, but lacked a diagnosis of the underlying disease, and the cure to remedy it. Its criticism, therefore, was not very effective. It has not persuaded anyone, because it has not provided a better alternative, that is, a healthier form of historicism.

Nietzsche’s groundbreaking diagnosis of modern historical consciousness as historical illness has made us aware that modern historicism does not simply provide a method for studying history, but causes self-alienation, because it neglects the historicity of human consciousness and life. Yet, undeniably, humans are not only

¹⁵⁸ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 146.

¹⁵⁹ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 147.

¹⁶⁰ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 147–148.

¹⁶¹ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 148.

¹⁶² Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 149.

¹⁶³ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 150.

¹⁶⁴ Risser, *Hermeneutics*, 151.

situated in history, but their consciousness of history is itself limited by a historical horizon. One can only adequately study history from within one's historical horizon. Thus, knowledge of history is closely connected to knowledge of the self. Given that modern historicism neglects the historical horizon of the historian, Nietzsche seeks to transform historiography into an art form. His aesthetic view on historiography is motivated by the insight that one can only write history from within the limits of one's historical horizon. This means that one can only write history as oriented to the past (antiquarian historiography), the present (critical historiography), and the future (monumental historiography). Only a synthesis of these three forms of historiography guarantees an adequate access to history, that is, from within the limits of one's historical horizon. The problem with Nietzsche's understanding of historicity is that it is paradoxical. Self-knowledge requires that one is able to view one's historical horizon as a totality. Yet, this implies that one can transcend one's own historical horizon. This is problematic because Nietzsche considers historical horizons as closed, and as existing independently of each other.

I have argued that Gadamer deals with this problem. Gadamer points out that historical horizons do not exist independently of each other, and are, therefore, not closed, but forever in motion. The historical horizon of the historian and the historical horizon of the text participate in a dialectic progression oriented to a greater generality that exceeds the particularity of the apparently independently existing historical horizons of the text and the historian. This dialectic progression constitutes the one and only existing historical horizon. The fusion of historical horizons that apparently exist on their own is the process of understanding, which I have identified with Gadamer as the reality of history itself. Understanding is the aim of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. This consciousness is, however, not self-evident, because it is historical consciousness that is conscious of its own historicity. Modern historical consciousness forgets this historicity. Forgetting one's own prejudices, implies that one is blind to the alterity of the text. One cannot understand history adequately. In order to be conscious of one's own prejudices, one has to study the reception history of the text. It is necessary to conceive of different interpretations of the text as possibilities. Each interpretation is guided by different prejudices. By regaining this hermeneutical consciousness of one's hermeneutical situation, one is able to be addressed by the alterity of the text. The expectations that one has, on the basis of the prejudices that one has derived from the reception history of the text, can be thwarted. Consequently, new questions arise. These questions enable the researcher to re-identify with the original audience of the text. The historical horizon of the researcher fuses with the historical horizon of the text. The questions of the researcher fuse with the question that the text seeks to answer. This results in a new interpretation of the text's meaning of which one can ultimately only say that one has understood the text differently than one's predecessors.

All these aspects of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* will be implemented in the present dissertation about the use of *παροιμία* and *παρησία* in the Gospel of John. The overall aim of this dissertation is, moreover, influenced by Gadamer's thinking. Gadamer

has identified our historical horizon as a language horizon. Understanding a text means that one seeks to think in terms of the language of the text. This requires a translation process, and a mediation between the language of the text and the customary language use of the researcher. Understanding the language horizon of the text, thus, implies that one understands how language is used in the text. This necessitates that one focuses on the understanding of language that is (implicitly) present in the text. The present dissertation seeks to provide such a study for the Gospel of John. However, before being able to address John's understanding of language, the present researcher has to become aware of his own hermeneutical situation. Else he cannot be addressed by the alterity of John's text. When one is blind to one's own presuppositions or prejudices, one cannot let the text speak. The next chapter will, therefore, address the history of interpretation of the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel. This chapter will especially focus on the presuppositions of the scholarly literature that are responsible for the interpretations of these terms. The knowledge of the pre-understandings of these terms will enable the present researcher to be addressed by the alterity of the text. New questions will arise from this confrontation with the alterity of the text. These questions require the present researcher to transpose himself in the original historical context of John's Gospel in later chapters of this dissertation. Both the study of reception history and historical criticism are required for understanding John's text from within one's historical horizon. Thus, the present dissertation seeks to provide an example of how historical hermeneutics can be implemented in Biblical studies.

CHAPTER II.

AN EVALUATIVE *STATUS QUAESTIONIS* ON παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

This *status quaestionis* intends to evaluate every study on the terms παροιμία and παρρησία in the Gospel of John that has been published from the late 19th century onwards in English, German, French, Italian, and Dutch. The present researcher is conscious of these limitations, and the possibility of the existence of literature on this research topic that has never been mentioned in bibliographies.

The term παροιμία is used two times in the accusative singular (John 10:6; 16:29) and two times in the dative plural preceded by the preposition ἐν (16:25[2]), always in combination with *verba dicendi* (λέγω and λαλέω). The term παρρησία is used nine times in the dative singular (7:4, 13, 26; 10:24; 11:14, 54; 16:25, 29; 18:20), mainly in combination with *verba dicendi* (λαλέω, λέγω, and ἀπαγγέλλω), but also with εἶμι (7:4) and περιπατέω (11:14).¹⁶⁵ Two out of nine times it is preceded by the preposition ἐν (7:4; 16:29).¹⁶⁶

Some studies on παροιμία and παρρησία are only mentioned in footnotes, because other studies offer the same interpretation but with a more elaborate argumentation. The former studies are sometimes studies that do not have παροιμία and παρρησία as their main subject matter. Studies that do not have these terms as their subject matter, but do contribute to the development of research, are mentioned in the subsections named ‘Related Studies’. All the studies are presented chronologically as much as possible. For thematic reasons, there are sometimes exceptions to this rule. Special attention is given to studies that react to other studies. They offer interesting insights into how research has developed.

The aim of this *status quaestionis* is not only descriptive, but also evaluative. The pros and cons of each interpretation are weighted. In agreement with Gadamer’s understanding of *Wirkungsgeschichte*, each interpretation is presented as a possibility. By formulating the presuppositions that have led to each interpretation, this *status quaestionis* creates awareness of the hermeneutical situation of the present author’s attempt to understand παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel.

¹⁶⁵ Nine times is a large amount for Greek writings of John’s time. John’s use of παρρησία is one of the most prominent stylistic features of his Gospel: see Gilbert Van Belle, *The Signs Source in the Fourth Gospel: Historical Survey and Critical Evaluation of the Semeia Hypothesis*, BETL 116 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), 414.

¹⁶⁶ There are, however, *variae lectiones* in the textual attestation where John 16:25 has ἐν παρ(ρ)ησίᾳ (D, 579) and John 16:29 has παρρησίᾳ without preposition (2^x, A, *et al.*). These *variae lectiones* for John 16:25 are not mentioned in the textual apparatus of NA²⁸, but are listed by *The Center for New Testament Textual Studies NT Critical Apparatus by the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary* (2010). This database can be consulted via Accordance or BibleWorks.

1. JOHANNINE παροιμία IN EARLY SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

All studies, regarding παροιμία written before 1967, have in common that they pay almost no attention to how παροιμία is used in the literary context of John's Gospel. These studies neglect the importance of studying παροιμία in its literary context in John because they consider: (i) παροιμία and παραβολή as synonyms in the LXX (1.1); (ii) the Johannine παροιμίες as not part of the authentic sayings of the historical Jesus (1.2); (iii) the Johannine παροιμία and the Synoptic παραβολή as equivalent translations of a supposed Aramaic *Vorlage* of the Gospels, and more specifically, of the Hebrew לְשׁוֹן and the Aramaic ܠܫܢ (1.3); and (iv) Johannine παροιμίες as the means of communication of a Johannine sect (1.4). The authors of these studies have no interest in John's understanding of language, or the literary form of his thinking. Nevertheless, these studies have established a certain basis for the research of παροιμία in the Fourth Gospel. They have generated critical reactions and questions that were not possible any other way.

1.1 THE TERMS παροιμία AND παραβολή AS SYNONYMS IN THE LXX

Edwin Hatch provided the first study of παροιμία in 1889. He did not study παροιμία in John, but in the LXX and in what he calls the "Hexapla revisers", viz. Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. According to Hatch, the LXX uses παραβολή approximately thirty times as the translation equivalent of לְשׁוֹן.¹⁶⁷ In two of the other cases, the LXX translates לְשׁוֹן with παροιμία (Prov 1:1; 26:7).¹⁶⁸ The "Hexapla revisers" corrected the LXX translations of לְשׁוֹן as follows. In many places, they replaced παραβολή with παροιμία (1 Sam 10:12; 24:14; Ps 77 [78]:2; Eccl 12:9; Ezek 12:22; 18:2), and two times vice versa (Prov 1:1; 26:7).¹⁶⁹ Hatch concludes from this research data that παροιμία and παραβολή are so closely related in meaning that they are interchangeable. According to Hatch, the texts of Num 21:27 (Aq.), Ezek 20:47–49 (LXX, Sm.), and Sir 39:2, 3 (LXX) show that both terms refer to proverbs that require interpretation in order to understand them.¹⁷⁰ Hatch projects his research results of the LXX and the Hexapla onto the Gospels, and claims that ἐν παροιμίαις in John 16:25 is equivalent to the Synoptic ἐν παραβολαῖς (Matt 13:3, 10, 13, 34, 35; 22:1; Mark 3:23; 4:2, 11, 33; 12:1; Luke 8:10).¹⁷¹ According to Hatch, this change from ἐν παραβολαῖς to ἐν παροιμίαις has its

¹⁶⁷ The exact number is 28: see *infra*, Appendix One.

¹⁶⁸ In Job 27:1; 29:1, the LXX uses προοίμιον to translate לְשׁוֹן. Edwin Hatch, "Short Studies of the Meanings of Words in Biblical Greek," in *Essays in Biblical Greek*, ed. Edwin Hatch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1889), 36–93, at 65 considers this to be an error of the scribe when copying the original παροιμία. Although I do not exclude this, the term προοίμιον ("opening", "beginning") does, however, make sense in Job 27:1; 29:1, because both texts introduce a speech of Job.

¹⁶⁹ From the viewpoint that we only have hexaplaric material for 19 out of 28 times that the LXX uses παραβολή to translate לְשׁוֹן, this number of corrections of LXX παραβολή with παροιμία is very high: see *infra*, Appendix One.

¹⁷⁰ See Hatch, "Short Studies," 64–68.

¹⁷¹ Maurits Sabbe, "John 10 and its Relationship to the Synoptic Gospels," in *The Shepherd Discourse of John 10 and its Context*, ed. Johannes Beutler – Robert T. Fortna, SNTSMS 67 (Cambridge: Cambridge

parallel in Ps 77 (78):2, where the “Hexapla reviser” Symmachus changed the phrase ἐν παραβολαῖς to διὰ παροιμίαις.¹⁷²

More recent research of the translation techniques of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion has, however, demonstrated that Hatch’s interpretation of παροιμία and παραβολή as synonyms in the LXX and the Hexapla is questionable.¹⁷³ According to this research, the motivation for the translations by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion was the growing Jewish-Christian polemics and the adoption of the LXX by Christians. All three translators sought to provide a more reliable translation of the Hebrew text, because they regarded the Christians as misinterpreting the LXX.¹⁷⁴

According to scholarship, among the three, Aquila provided the most literal translation and translated the Hebrew text word for word. This has often led to mistakes against the Hebrew syntax. A Greek speaking audience that did not know the Hebrew text, could probably not read his translation. The translation of Symmachus is also literal, although less than Aquila, but still much more than the LXX. Characteristic to Symmachus is his relatively good Greek style. His writing style is comparable to the style of Greek authors of his time, although one may not exaggerate this, because it is still the Greek of a translator. Symmachus had sought to transmit the meaning of the Hebrew to the Greek.¹⁷⁵ The translation technique of Theodotion holds a position between the literal translation by Aquila and the good transmission of meaning by Symmachus, although

University Press, 1991), 75–93, 156–161, at 91 also concludes that the Johannine παροιμία is synonymous to the Synoptic παραβολή on the basis of the interpretation that the LXX uses παροιμία and παραβολή as equivalent translations for מִשְׁלָּה.

¹⁷² See Hatch, “Short Studies,” 70–71.

¹⁷³ Natalio Fernández Marcos, *The Septuagint in Context: Introduction to the Greek Versions of the Bible*, trans. Wilfred G.E. Watson (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 111, 125, 145–148 claims that Aquila and Symmachus lived in the 2nd c. CE. Theodotion is more difficult to situate in history. Research is not even sure that he really existed. Siegfried Kreuzer, “Entstehung und Überlieferung der Septuaginta,” in *Handbuch zur Septuaginta*, Band 1, *Einleitung in die Septuaginta* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2016), 29–88, at 63 dates Aquila’s translation in 125 CE and notes that controversies show that his translation was already spread and well-known in the middle of the 2nd c. CE. Symmachus worked in the second half of the 2nd c. CE. Fernández Marcos, *The Septuagint*, 138 mentions that research agrees that Symmachus knew Aquila’s translation and probably also Theodotion’s. This dependence should, however, not be exaggerated and one ought to regard Symmachus as having made an independent translation.

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., Fernández Marcos, *The Septuagint*, 109; Karen H. Jobes – Moisés Silva, *Invitation to the Septuagint* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 29, 37; Folker Siegert, *Register zur “Einführung in die Septuagint”: Mit einem Kapitel zur Wirkungsgeschichte*, Münsteraner Judaistische Studien 13 (Münster: Lit, 2003), 361–365; Jennifer M. Dines, *The Septuagint*, ed. Michael A. Knibb (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 81; Kreuzer, “Entstehung,” 62.

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., Fernández Marcos, *The Septuagint*, 128–133; Jobes – Silva, *Invitation to the Septuagint*, 38–41; Dines, *The Septuagint*, 87–90; Kreuzer, “Entstehung,” 63–65. Due to the good Greek style of Symmachus, Timothy M. Law, *When God Spoke Greek: The Septuagint and the Making of the Christian Bible* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 78 thinks that Symmachus revised the LXX “for stylistic reasons”, whereas Aquila and Theodotion wanted “to adapt more rigidly to the Hebrew Bible”.

little research has been done on his translation technique. In general, little is known about his style.¹⁷⁶

As a result, because of the intent of Symmachus and Aquila to provide a more accurate translation of the Hebrew text, I consider Hatch's understanding of their corrections of the LXX translations of לִשְׁמֹעַ to be unjustified.¹⁷⁷ It is unlikely that Symmachus and Aquila replaced παραβολή with παροιμία, and vice versa, because they considered them as equivalents. One should, on the other hand, take into account that a word cannot be translated into another language in a perfectly equivalent way. The translator is often forced to use multiple words in the target language to translate a single word of the source language. The literary context of the word in the source language determines which word is preferred in the target language.¹⁷⁸ In some cases, Aquila and Symmachus considered παροιμία as a better translation of לִשְׁמֹעַ than παραβολή, and vice versa. The conclusion of Hatch that παροιμία and παραβολή are synonyms in the LXX and the Hexapla, is, therefore, unfounded.

This view is strengthened by the observation of Hyunsok Doh that in four places (1 Sam 10:12; 24:14; Ezek 12:22; 18:2) that Aquila and Symmachus replace the LXX παραβολή with παροιμία, the corrections are not made because both terms are interchangeable, but for "the restoration of original meaning".¹⁷⁹ In each place, the LXX παραβολή refers to a concrete proverb. Symmachus and Aquila have corrected it with παροιμία because this term properly designates proverbs in classical and Hellenistic literature.¹⁸⁰ According to Doh, these corrections may be explained by the renaissance of Hellenism (Atticism) in the first centuries of the Common Era. In addition, Doh observes that the close contact between παροιμία and παραβολή "began with the LXX because of

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., Fernández Marcos, *The Septuagint*, 146–148; Jobes – Silva, *Invitation to the Septuagint*, 41–42; Dines, *The Septuagint*, 84–87; Kreuzer, "Entstehung," 65.

¹⁷⁷ The name of Theodotion is not mentioned here because Theodotion does not correct the LXX παραβολή or the LXX παροιμία: see *infra*, Appendix One.

¹⁷⁸ Hatch provides a comparable argumentation in one of his other essays. This essay concerns the translation of Hebrew psychological concepts. With psychological concepts, he means terms that do not refer to concrete things in reality. Terms that refer to concrete things in reality are, e.g., the terms 'horse', 'fire', and 'wood'. Edwin Hatch, "On Psychological Terms in Biblical Greek," in *Essays*, 94–130, at 97: "But if it be found, [...], that the members of the group in the one language are each rendered by more than one of the members of the group in the other language, it must be inferred that while the group as a whole in the one language corresponded as a whole to the group in the other, the individual members of the two groups did not so correspond". This implies that these individual members of the target language also do not correspond with each other, but show semantic differences. As לִשְׁמֹעַ is also a psychological concept, according to Hatch's terminology, Hatch contradicts his own conclusion that the "Hexapla revisers" and the LXX use παροιμία and παραβολή as equivalent translations for לִשְׁמֹעַ.

¹⁷⁹ Hyunsok Doh, "The Johannine Paroimia" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Andrews University Berrien Springs MI, 1992), 75. My paraphrase of Doh in the present paragraph is based on Doh, "The Johannine Paroimia," 73–77.

¹⁸⁰ Ezekiel 24:3 can be added to this list, although Aquila and Symmachus do not use παροιμία here, but respectively the variants παροιμιάση and παροιμιάσαι: see *infra*, Appendix One.

the translator's inconsistent use of them".¹⁸¹ Classical and Hellenistic literature, apart from Judaism, does not attest this affinity between these two terms. Doh formulates an interesting explanation for what he calls the semantic shift in the term *παροιμία*. In Sir 39:3, the term *παροιμία* does not denote a proverb, but obscure language.¹⁸² In Sir 8:8, *παροιμία* is the translation equivalent of *הידה* ("riddle"). Doh explains this shift from *παροιμία*, as signifying a proverb, to *παροιμία*, as referring to a riddle, as follows. The Hebrew *לשנ* can mean riddle. Although, according to Doh, *παροιμία* did not translate the meaning of riddle in *לשנ*, but the meaning of proverb, "it received the potential of translating other meanings of the Hebrew word *לשנ*, including the meaning of riddle because the Hebrew word can mean different forms of speech".¹⁸³ Doh, thus, explains how, according to his interpretation, *παροιμία* has obtained the meaning of riddle in Sirach. According to Doh, the term *παροιμία* also has this meaning in John's Gospel.¹⁸⁴ Doh's explanation of how *παροιμία* obtained this meaning is, however, based on only one observation, namely four places where Symmachus and Aquila corrected the LXX *παραβολή* with *παροιμία*. Doh has not studied systematically how these translators and the LXX dealt with the semantics of *לשנ*.

Let us, however, for the sake of the argument assume that *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* are equivalents in the LXX and the Hexapla. Then some difficulties arise. Symmachus substituted *παραβολή* in 1 Sam 24:14; Ps 77 (78):2; Ezek 12:22; 24:3 with *παροιμία* and variants, whereas he did not replace *παραβολή* in Ps 43 (44):15; 68 (69):12; Ezek 20:49. Aquila substituted *παραβολή* in 1 Sam 10:12; Eccl 12:9; Ezek 18:2; 24:3 with *παροιμία* and variants, whereas he kept *παραβολή* in Ps 48 (49):5; 68 (69):12; 77 (78):2; Ezek 12:22. How do we explain these at first sight random adjustments of the LXX text? If one presupposes that *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* are synonyms, these adjustments have no point. The motive of avoiding monotony is not present here, because this would imply that Aquila and Symmachus changed *παραβολή* into *παροιμία* and that in the direct literary context of these adjustments they would have kept the LXX *παραβολή*. This is, however, nowhere attested.¹⁸⁵ Also, when one compares the three translators with each other, their adjustments of the LXX appear pointless when one presupposes that they considered *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* as equivalents. Why would Aquila and Theodotion keep *παραβολή* in Ezek 12:22, whereas Symmachus replaces it with *παροιμία*? Why would Aquila change *παραβολή* in Ezek 18:2 to *παροιμία*, while Theodotion keeps it? Although a similarity in meaning between *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* is not excluded, one cannot argue for semantic equivalence on the basis of this research data. Aquila and Symmachus sought to replace the LXX word because they considered it an inadequate translation.

¹⁸¹ Doh, "The Johannine Paroimia," 77.

¹⁸² We cannot say what the Hebrew equivalent is for *παροιμία* in LXX Sir 39:3 because we do not have the Hebrew text of Sir 39:3.

¹⁸³ Doh, "The Johannine Paroimia," 77.

¹⁸⁴ See *infra*, §2.1 for further discussion of Doh's understanding of *παροιμία* as denoting the literary genre of riddle.

¹⁸⁵ See *infra*, Appendix One.

Their aim was to provide a better translation. Therefore, their corrections of the LXX word might provide us with insights into the semantic difference between *παροιμία* and *παραβολή*.¹⁸⁶

Hatch's projection of his research results of the LXX and the Hexapla onto the Gospels is equally unfounded. Even if one assumed that *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* were synonyms in the LXX and the Hexapla, this would not guarantee that this is also the case in the Gospels. This requires additional research on how the Gospels use these terms.¹⁸⁷ Already in 1915, Kögel had questioned the idea that *παροιμία* in John, and *παραβολή* in the Synoptics, are synonyms.¹⁸⁸

1.2 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AS INAUTHENTIC

The research on *παροιμία* in John has only recently started in the long history of Johannine studies. Adolf Jülicher is usually held responsible for this long delay.¹⁸⁹ Jülicher's influential work *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu* (Band 1: 1886; Band 2: 1899) considered Johannine *παροιμιαί* as not part of the authentic sayings of the historical Jesus. For a long time, historical research viewed Johannine *παροιμιαί* as inauthentic and not worthy of scholarly attention. According to Jülicher, Johannine *παροιμιαί* have nothing in common with what the Synoptics report about Jesus. When there are elements of agreement, the original form of the Johannine *παροιμιαί* is difficult to reconstruct. Jülicher exemplifies this with *παροιμία* in John 10:6. The narrator describes Jesus' sayings in 10:1–5 as a *παροιμία* and claims that Jesus' listeners did not understand it. Jülicher considers the imagery in 10:1–5 as not part of Jesus' authentic sayings, because the imagery is too confused and of poor literary quality. Nor does he think it is possible to reconstruct these sayings on the basis of this imagery.¹⁹⁰ John 10:1–5 is not authentic and, therefore, does not deserve scholarly attention in terms of historical Jesus research.

I agree with Ruben Zimmermann that the literary features of Johannine *παροιμιαί* are not what caused the devaluation of Johannine *παροιμιαί* in Biblical scholarship, but

¹⁸⁶ In a future study, I will provide a detailed analysis of Aquila's and Symmachus' use of *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* to correct the LXX's translation of מִשְׁלָּה in the Hebrew Bible.

¹⁸⁷ See *infra*, Chapter Twelve.

¹⁸⁸ Julius Kögel, *Der Zweck der Gleichnisse Jesu im Rahmen seiner Verkündigung*, BFChTh 19,6 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1915), 111: "[d]enn schon das mag recht zweifelhaft sein, wieweit sich wirklich beide Begriffe berühren [...]"

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., Uta Poplutz, "Paroimia und Parable: Gleichniskonzepte bei Johannes und Markus," in *Imagery in the Gospel of John*, 103–120, at 103; Mira Stare, "Gibt es Gleichnisse im Johannesevangelium?," in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu: Methodologische Neuansätze zum Verstehen urchristlicher Parabeltexte*, ed. Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 231 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 321–364, at 341.

¹⁹⁰ Adolf Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, Erster Teil, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu im Allgemeinen* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1910), 115: "[...] denn bald ist Jesus die Stallthür, bald der Hirte, der durch sie eintritt [...] Ich kann diese *παροιμιαί*, denen in den Synoptikern nichts Verwandtes zu Hülfe kommt, nicht für echt halten, oder wenn authentische Reminiszenzen darin vorliegen, so wage ich nicht, über die ursprüngliche Form irgend etwas zu erraten."

Jülicher's methodological assumption that the aim of Biblical scholarship is to reconstruct the authentic sayings of the historical Jesus. This type of Biblical scholarship regards the Synoptic reports about Jesus as normative for reconstructing the authentic sayings of the historical Jesus. As the sayings of the Johannine Jesus differ too much from the Synoptic reports, with regard to content and literary form, they are considered as inauthentic.¹⁹¹

1.3 JOHANNINE παροιμία AND SYNOPTIC παραβολή AS EQUIVALENT TRANSLATIONS OF AN ARAMAIC *VORLAGE*

Another methodological presupposition that has caused the lack of attention for Johannine παροιμία in early Biblical scholarship is Charles Dodd's belief that the Greek text of the Fourth Gospel was preceded by an oral Aramaic tradition independent of the other gospels. Dodd considers παροιμία and παραβολή as equivalent translations of the Hebrew לְפָנָיִם and the Aramaic מִלְּפָנָיִם (*sic*). John's παροιμία and the Synoptics' παραβολή refer to the same literary genre.¹⁹² Dodd minimalises the importance of studying the characteristics of Johannine παροιμία. Just like in Jülicher's case, Dodd's understanding of Johannine παροιμία is based on the methodological assumptions of his research. The term is not examined in John's literary context, because Dodd has *a priori* concluded that παροιμία and παραβολή are equivalent translations of the Aramaic.

Dodd's presupposition of an Aramaic *Vorlage* for the Fourth Gospel has, however, been firmly criticised, and has been abandoned by scholarly literature.¹⁹³ First, if there was such an Aramaic tradition, there would be a large variety of Greek translations. This variety is, however, not attested by the manuscripts that we have. The variants that are present in these manuscripts can easily be explained as scribal errors or corrections.¹⁹⁴ Second, the overall presence of Aramaisms in the Koine Greek of John's time makes it unnecessary to presuppose an Aramaic tradition to explain the presence of Aramaisms in John's Gospel. Ernest Colwell has examined 200 non-literary papyri from the Roman period of the 1st c. BCE until the 2nd c. CE and has observed that the so-called Aramaisms in John's Gospel are also present in these texts.¹⁹⁵ Third, features of Johannine style are also present in authors contemporary to John. The hypothesis of an Aramaic tradition is not necessary to explain the presence of these literary features in John. Eugen Ruckstuhl

¹⁹¹ See Ruben Zimmermann, "Parabeln im Johannesevangelium," in *Kompendium der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 699–709, at 699.

¹⁹² See Charles H. Dodd, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 382–383. Dodd's presentation of the Aramaic form is incorrect. It should read מִלְּפָנָיִם.

¹⁹³ The presentation of the second and third argument is indebted to Gilbert Van Belle, "Style Criticism and the Fourth Gospel," in *One Text, Thousand Methods: History, Meaning and the Multiple-Interpretability of the Bible. In Memory of S. van Tilborg*, ed. Patrick Chatelion Counet – Ulrich Berges (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 291–316, at 304–305.

¹⁹⁴ See Raymond E. Brown, *An Introduction to the Gospel of John: Edited, Updated, Introduced, and Concluded by Francis J. Moloney* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 281.

¹⁹⁵ See Ernest C. Colwell, *The Greek of the Fourth Gospel: A Study of Its Aramaisms in the Light of Hellenistic Greek* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

and Peter Dschulnigg have studied 32 Hellenistic authors who wrote between 100 BCE and 150 CE. They have looked for features of Johannine style, and have observed that these are not limited to, but nonetheless characteristic of John, because they are more frequent and mutually connected in his Gospel.¹⁹⁶ They have composed a list of 153 stylistic features of John. One of the top stylistic features is the use of *παρρησία* in the dative case without a preposition, article, and attribute.¹⁹⁷ A previous list of Ruckstuhl, also, contained *παροιμία* as an important stylistic feature of John.¹⁹⁸ Since *παροιμία* is also frequently used by the literature of John's time, this stylistic feature is not taken up in the new list.

Although these arguments do not exclude that some Aramaisms in John are not present in other Koine Greek texts of his time, the hypothesis of a large-scale Aramaic tradition that has preceded the Fourth Gospel is made redundant. It might be possible that small pieces of the historical tradition preceding John were not only spoken in Aramaic, but also written. One can, however, not prove this.

1.4 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AS THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION OF THE JOHANNINE GROUP

In an influential article, Wayne Meeks asks in what socio-historical situation the “literary puzzle” of Johannine language provides “an appropriate means of communication”.¹⁹⁹ Meeks argues that one of the functions of the “symbolic universe” of the Fourth Gospel is to distinguish the Johannine group “over against the sect of John the Baptist and even more passionately over against a rather strong Jewish community, with which highly ambivalent relationships had existed”. The language of the Gospel was to make sense of alleged “defections, conflicts of leadership, and schisms” of the Johannine group's history.²⁰⁰ According to Meeks, the metaphors in John are “irrational, disorganized, and incomplete”. One can only understand the function of the “closed system of metaphors” in the Gospel when one views it as the “*means of communication*” of the Johannine group.²⁰¹ Since outsiders could not understand these metaphors, they reinforced “the community's social identity”, and at the same time provided “a symbolic

¹⁹⁶ See Eugen Ruckstuhl – Peter Dschulnigg, *Stilkritik und Verfasserfrage im Johannesevangelium: Die johanneischen Sprachmerkmale auf dem Hintergrund des Neuen Testaments und des zeitgenössischen hellenistischen Schriftums*, NTOA 17 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991).

¹⁹⁷ See Ruckstuhl – Dschulnigg, *Stilkritik*, 75–76.

¹⁹⁸ See Eugen Ruckstuhl, *Die literarische Einheit des Johannesevangeliums: Der gegenwärtige Stand der einschlägigen Forschungen*, NTOA 5 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 297. Originally published as Eugen Ruckstuhl, *Die literarische Einheit des Johannesevangeliums: Der gegenwärtige Stand der einschlägigen Forschungen*, Studia Friburgensia N.F. 3. (Freiburg: Paulus, 1951), 297

¹⁹⁹ Wayne A. Meeks, “The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism,” *JBL* 91/1 (1972) 44–72: at 47.

²⁰⁰ Meeks, “The Man from Heaven”: 49.

²⁰¹ Meeks, “The Man from Heaven”: 68. Italics in the original.

universe which gave religious legitimacy, a theodicy, to the group's actual isolation from the larger society".²⁰²

I remark with David Lamb that the "direct allusions" to the history of the Johannine group that Meeks thinks to have found in the Fourth Gospel are in reality not "historical facts taken directly from the text, but rather interpretations of the text in the Brown–Martyn mould".²⁰³ In my reading, Meeks' interpretation and evaluation of Johannine language is guided by a particular pre-understanding of the socio-historical situation of a putative Johannine group. Not only Meeks, but many other scholars guided by the two-level reading of the Gospel read Johannine language in terms of a historical report about an alleged conflict between the Johannine group and the Jewish community.²⁰⁴ Such immense projections of historical situations on the Gospel text can only be possible by a devaluation of Johannine language as irrational and incomplete. The evaluation of Johannine language as an idiolect of a putative Johannine group/sect is, however, not the result of an in-depth study of this language and *παροιμία* in particular, but of a particular pre-understanding of the socio-historical situation of a putative Johannine group.

David Brakke has interpreted *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John 16:25 from the perspective of the socio-historical situation of the Johannine group as depicted by Martyn and Meeks. According to Brakke, *ἐν παροιμίαις* and *παρρησία* refer to the same words of Jesus that could be either "parables" or "plain speech". The distinction between them refers rather to "the hermeneutical and social location of the hearer/reader than the precise mode of Jesus' speech".²⁰⁵ The members of the Johannine group, who are represented by the disciples in the narrative, understand Jesus' words *παρρησία*, whereas for the wider Jewish community, who are represented by especially the *κόσμος* and the 'Jews' in the narrative, Jesus' words remain *ἐν παροιμίαις*. In addition to 16:25, Brakke sees affirmation for this view in 7:1–9, where Jesus' brothers argue that Jesus' ministry *ἐν παρρησία* "will win the disciples to complete faith".²⁰⁶

Brakke neglects, however, that Jesus' *παρρησία* is not only addressed to the disciples, but also to the 'Jews' and the *κόσμος* in general (John 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 7:26; 11:54). Jesus' brothers exhort Jesus to be *ἐν παρρησία* not only for the disciples, but for the whole *κόσμος* (7:4). The use of *καιρός* in 7:6, 8 implies that there is a critical moment of Jesus' *παρρησία* in which Jesus' *παρρησία* is effective for both the disciples and the 'Jews'. In

²⁰² Meeks, "The Man from Heaven": 70.

²⁰³ David A. Lamb, *Text, Context and the Johannine Community: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of the Johannine Writings*, LNTS 477 (Bloomsbury: T&T Clark, 2014), 106. The reference to the "Brown–Martyn mould" is to J. Louis Martyn, *History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel* (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 32003, 1st ed. 1968); Raymond E. Brown, *The Community of the Beloved Disciple* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), and Brown's commentary on the Gospel of John.

²⁰⁴ For a critical evaluation of the two-level reading of the Fourth Gospel, see Jonathan Bernier, *Aposynagōgos and the Historical Jesus in John: Rethinking the Historicity of the Johannine Expulsion Passages*, BibInt 122 (Leiden: Brill, 2013) and Lamb, *Text, Context and the Johannine Community*.

²⁰⁵ David Brakke, "Parables and Plain Speech in the Fourth Gospel and the Apocryphon of James," *JECS* 7/2 (1999) 187–218: at 218.

²⁰⁶ Brakke, "Parables and Plain Speech": 193.

Chapter Seven, I will provide a rhetorical-historical analysis of how Jesus' *παρρησία* is used towards the disciples and the 'Jews'. I will additionally explain why Jesus' *παρρησία* is effective for both the disciples and the 'Jews' at the time of Jesus' death on the cross.²⁰⁷ The socio-historical situation of the Johannine group as depicted by Martyn, Brown, and Meeks cannot be derived from the use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel.

2. THE GENRE-CRITICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AS *TERMINUS TECHNICUS* FOR A LITERARY GENRE

As is often the case, 'progress' in research is a consequence of methodological change.²⁰⁸ Biblical scholarship became sceptical about the possibility of reconstructing the authentic words of the historical Jesus on the basis of the Fourth Gospel.²⁰⁹ It has abandoned the hypothesis of an Aramaic tradition for interpreting the semantic value of Johannine vocabulary. Although the semantics of the Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible are still used to interpret John, there is a critical awareness that these semantics may not be taken for granted when interpreting the Gospels. Biblical scholarship has diverted its attention from these external criteria to the text itself. A text is first of all its own exegete. The first criterion for interpreting Johannine language is the literary context of the Fourth Gospel itself. This turn to the synchronic-literary level has led to the actual start of *παροιμία* research in Johannine studies.

²⁰⁷ See *infra*, Chapter Seven.

²⁰⁸ Of course, what 'progress' is in Biblical studies is not straightforward. The notion of progress has been questioned by the philosophy of science. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 1962) has demonstrated that scientific revolutions are not caused by an accumulative knowledge progress, but by so-called paradigm shifts. What 'progress' is, can only be defined from within a certain paradigm. Methodological changes cause paradigms to shift. Consequently, it is questionable what progress means when it is caused by methodological changes.

²⁰⁹ More recent scholarship has, however, introduced what it calls the fourth quest for Jesus. This fourth quest for Jesus considers historicity as always fraught with theological meaning, and does not divide between a historical and a theological Jesus. Although the Johannine Jesus is very theological, this does not imply that he is not historical. I especially mention the *John, Jesus, and History* project: see Paul N. Anderson – Felix Just – Tom Thatcher (eds.), *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 1, *Critical Appraisals of Critical Views*, SBLSymS 44 (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 2007); Paul N. Anderson – Felix Just – Tom Thatcher (eds.), *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 2, *Aspects of Historicity in the Fourth Gospel*, SBLECL 2 (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 2009); Paul N. Anderson – Felix Just – Tom Thatcher (eds.), *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, *Glimpses of Jesus through the Johannine Lens*, SBLECL 18 (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 2016). However, inside the *John, Jesus, and History* project, there is, also, scepticism about the possibility of reconstructing the authentic words of the historical Jesus on the basis of the Fourth Gospel: see, e.g., R. Alan Culpepper, "Jesus Sayings in the Johannine Discourses: A Proposal," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, 353–382, at 354, 381; Jörg Frey, "From the 'Kingdom of God' to 'Eternal Life': The Transformation of Theological Language in the Fourth Gospel," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, 439–458, at 443–444, 458; Udo Schnelle, "The Signs in the Gospel of John," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, 231–243, at 242; Michael Theobald, "Johannine Dominical Sayings as Metatexts of Synoptic Sayings of Jesus: Reflections on a New Category within Reception History," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, 383–405, at 386, 404; Jan G. van der Watt, "Some Reflections on the Historicity of the Words 'Laying Down Your Life for Your Friends' in John 15:13," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 3, 481–491, at 488–489, 491.

The first authors to discuss this term were guided by the presupposition that *παροιμία* is a *terminus technicus* of the literary genre of Jesus' sayings. Their pre-understanding of this genre is static, because they believe that it can be identified on the basis of formal criteria. They first identify to which sayings *παροιμία* in John 10:6 and 16:25 refer. After having identified the literary features of these sayings, they look for other sayings with the same features. Finally, they enlist all these sayings.²¹⁰ These lists are very diverse. The only text on which all studies agree that it is a *παροιμία* is 10:1–5. The simple reason for this agreement is that the narrator reports in 10:6 that this text is a *παροιμία*.²¹¹ As to the use of *παροιμία* in 16:25, there is disagreement about whether it refers to 16:16 or 16:21. Concerning all the other sayings of Jesus, where *παροιμία* is not explicitly mentioned, the collection varies enormously depending on the author. The phrase *ἐν παροιμίαις* in 16:25 is a prepositional phrase complementing the verb *λελάληκα*. The authors of this genre-critical approach interpret *ἐν παροιμίαις* as indicating a means. Jesus has spoken by means of, e.g., proverbs, riddles, or parables.

2.1 THE LITERARY GENRE OF JOHANNINE *παροιμία*

According to Kim Dewey, the phrase *ἐν παροιμίαις* refers to “a range of literary forms, devices, and concepts, including riddle, proverb, parable, metaphor, allegory, irony, paradox, enigma, aporia, and so on”.²¹² Despite this broad definition of *παροιμία*, Dewey is often presented by the scholarly literature as the author who has identified *παροιμία* with the literary genre of proverb.²¹³ The reason for this is that she has limited herself to a literary analysis of the “proverbial-parabolic” material in John.²¹⁴ She has identified 34 proverbs as Johannine *παροιμία*.²¹⁵ The recognition of the literary genre of the Johannine proverbs presupposes a common social context, namely that of the Johannine community. Inside this community, these proverbs are easy to understand. They are like pieces of wisdom from the past that are easy to apply to the present. Johannine *παροιμίαι* are dualistic and concern typically Johannine themes.²¹⁶

Mark Stibbe has identified the literary genre of Johannine *παροιμία* as the riddle. A riddle contains cryptic imagery that requires much expertise to unravel. Johannine

²¹⁰ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

²¹¹ Yet, even for John 10:1–5, there is disagreement whether it contains one or two *παροιμίαι*: see *infra*, Appendix Two.

²¹² Kim E. Dewey, “*Paroimiai* in the Gospel of John,” *Semeia* 17 (1980) 81–99: at 82.

²¹³ See, e.g., Zimmermann, “Imagery in John,” 12. The understanding of *παροιμία* as referring to a proverb is widespread in Greek literature: see Karl Rupprecht, “*παροιμία*,” *PW* 18,2 (1949) 1707–1735: esp. at 1708; Friedrich Hauck, “*παροιμία*,” *TWNT* 5 (1954) 852–855: esp. at 852–853; Dietmar Peil, “Sprichwort,” *HWRh* 8 (2007) 1292–1296: esp. at 1292. The understanding of Johannine *παροιμία* as denoting the literary genre of proverb is also influenced by the only other occurrence of *παροιμία* in the NT outside John's Gospel, that is, in 2 Pet 2:22. In the later passage, the term *παροιμία* depicts the proverb *κύων ἐπιστρέψας ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐξέραμα, καὶ ὡς λουσαμένη εἰς κυλισμὸν βορβόρου*.

²¹⁴ See Dewey, “*Paroimiai*,” 82.

²¹⁵ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

²¹⁶ See Dewey, “*Paroimiai*,” 82–84.

παροιμίας are difficult to understand because of their double meaning. The meaning of Jesus is elusive for his listeners. The phrase (ἐν) παρρησίᾳ means ‘without riddles’, that is, transparent and univocal.²¹⁷ In spite of this definition, Stibbe has not compiled a list of Johannine παροιμίας.

Doh regards 27 riddles as Johannine παροιμίας.²¹⁸ These riddles conceal meaning, and evoke questions for their audience. They reveal the misunderstanding of the audience with the intent of leading it to a fuller understanding in the future. The Johannine riddles or παροιμίας have seven literary features: (i) They contain ambiguous words or imagery; (ii) they evoke questions and misunderstanding for the audience; (iii) Jesus is always the speaker. Johannine παροιμίας emphasise Jesus’ origin and destination, and, especially, Jesus’ relationship with the Father; (iv) the term παρρησία indicates the absence of a riddle; (v) the riddles are not solved until after Jesus’ resurrection; (vi) the riddles can be supplemented with proverbs and parables; and (vii) they can be introduced by the ἀμὴν ἀμὴν formula.²¹⁹

Tom Thatcher has identified 38 riddles as Johannine παροιμίας.²²⁰ He considers a technical definition of the genre of riddle as impossible, because its form and style vary. A riddle is rather a function of language, or a rhetorical strategy that manifests itself in different ways in different cultures. One of the features of a riddle is ambiguity. A riddle can refer to multiple things and the listener cannot discern which is the correct referent. This ambiguity is intentional, and calls for an answer from the listener/reader. Riddles use everyday language, but in an uncommon way. Thatcher has analysed riddles of different cultures and times to illustrate the universality of these features.²²¹ He has also found these features in the Johannine riddles.²²²

All these authors have in common that they understand Johannine παροιμίας as having a double meaning. Saeed Hamid-Khani has further studied ambiguity in John. He understands the opposition between ἐν παροιμίαις and (ἐν) παρρησίᾳ as the opposition between “equivocation” and “univocal”. Equivocation means consciously evoking

²¹⁷ See Mark W.G. Stibbe, “The Elusive Christ: A New Reading of the Fourth Gospel,” *JSNT* 44 (1991) 19–38: at 27.

²¹⁸ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

²¹⁹ See Doh, “The Johannine Paroimia,” 134, 168. The association of παροιμία with obscurity and misunderstanding is not common in Greek literature, but can also be found in the LXX, see, e.g., Sir 39:3.

²²⁰ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

²²¹ See Tom Thatcher, “The Riddles of Jesus in the Johannine Dialogues,” in *Jesus in Johannine Tradition*, ed. Robert T. Fortna – Tom Thatcher (Louisville KY: Westminster J.K., 2001), 263–277, at 264–268. See also: Tom Thatcher, *The Riddles of Jesus in John: A Study in Tradition and Folklore*, SBLMS 53 (Atlanta GA: SBL, 2007), 109–182.

²²² See Thatcher, “The Riddles of Jesus in the Johannine Dialogues,” 268–277. See also: Thatcher, *The Riddles of Jesus in John*, 183–294.

ambiguity.²²³ According to Hamid-Khani, John 16:25 proves that Johannine ambiguity is conscious.²²⁴

2.2 RELATED STUDIES

Herbert Leroy has studied the misunderstandings in John's Gospel.²²⁵ Although he does not mention *παροιμία*, his research is important to understand this term, because he aims to reconstruct the literary form of the Johannine misunderstandings. Leroy employs a form-critical method. He concludes that Johannine misunderstandings have the literary form of a riddle. This literary genre has six literary features: (i) It contains a saying with a homonymic term. This saying is never formulated as a question; (ii) this homonymic term has a "sonderssprachliche[n] Charakter". The homonymic term has a different meaning in the Johannine community ("Sondersprache") than the one common in society ("Gemeinsprache"), e.g., γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν, ὕδωρ ζῶν, ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς, ὑπάγειν, ἐλευθεροῦν, ναὸς τοῦ σώματος; (iii) this *Sondersprache* brings about a special knowledge inside the Johannine community, e.g., γεννηθῆναι ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, ἄρτον φαγεῖν, τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαγεῖν. This knowledge sometimes has a ritual character; (iv) if one obtains this knowledge, one is connected with Jesus. If not, one is excluded from ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος; (v) the possibility of a correct understanding of a riddle can only be given by revelation and is reserved for the time of the πνεῦμα; and (vi) the solution of a riddle is almost never explicitly mentioned. Usually, the question of the listeners remains. The correct understanding of the reader is, however, presupposed.²²⁶ Leroy has identified and analysed eleven riddles in John 2–8: John 2:19–22; 3:3–5; 4:10–15; 4:31–34; 6:32–35, 41–42; 6:51–53; 7:33–36; 8:21; 8:31–33; 8:51–53; 8:56–58. Thus, the scope of his study is limited to a part of John's Gospel. Given that *παροιμία* in John 10:6 and 16:25 is also associated with misunderstanding, one can, although Leroy does not explicitly do this, call these riddles *παροιμία*.

Donald Carson has criticised the form-critical approach of Leroy. According to Carson, the Johannine misunderstandings are so diverse that they cannot be defined by means of a form-critical method. Such definitions, for example, Leroy's definition of the riddle, exclude too many forms of Johannine misunderstandings (e.g., John 2:1–11; 4:46–54; 7:2–14; 11:1–44). There are also Johannine misunderstandings that have all the literary features that Leroy sums up, but that are left out of Leroy's list of Johannine

²²³ See Saeed Hamid-Khani, *Revelation and Concealment of Christ: A Theological Enquiry into the Elusive Language of the Fourth Gospel*, WUNT 2/120 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 86.

²²⁴ See Hamid-Khani, *Revelation*, 90.

²²⁵ My presentation of Leroy is based on Herbert Leroy, *Rätsel und Missverständnis: Ein Beitrag zur Formgeschichte des Johannesevangelium*, BBB 30 (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1968). Leroy has summarised his research in Herbert Leroy, "Das Johanneische Missverständnis als literarische Form," *BibLeb* 9 (1968) 196–207.

²²⁶ See Leroy, *Rätsel und Missverständnis*, 46–47.

riddles.²²⁷ Since John constantly repeats the same theme, but with variations, it is impossible to outline the literary genre of the misunderstandings.²²⁸ This criticism questions the pre-understanding of genre of the genre-critical approach. It criticises the presupposition of the genre-critical approach that the literary genre of the sayings of the Johannine Jesus can be defined in terms of literary features.

Like Jürgen Becker's commentary on John,²²⁹ Carson divides between *misunderstanding* and *not understanding*. Misunderstanding is a sign of unbelief. It is not based on a false understanding of a word, but on an earthly understanding instead of a spiritual one. Non-understanding is not an earthly understanding, but simply lacks instruction. Both are, however, in Carson's terminology, forms of Johannine misunderstanding.²³⁰ Carson has listed 18 literary features to describe Johannine misunderstandings. These features concern their nature (1–3), context (4), content (5–8), who has misunderstood or failed to understand (9–12), what must happen for the misunderstanding to be cleared up, or for the failure to understand to be overcome (13–16), the nature of the faith reaction of Jesus' interlocutors (17), John's inclusion of narrative asides that shed light on the misunderstanding or failure to understand (18).²³¹

Carson remarks that one cannot divide between disciples ("insiders") and 'Jews' ("outsiders") on the basis of (i) the form-critical features of the Johannine misunderstandings; and (ii) the nature of what they do not understand. Both parties differ from each other rather in terms of how they react to Jesus. Whereas the 'Jews' seek to kill and stone Jesus (John 5:18; 7:30; 8:37, 58; 10:31–33), the disciples are satisfied with Jesus' explanations (16:29). Carson calls for more research into the nature of what is mis/understood. He considers the form-critical method as inadequate for such research.²³²

A look at Carson's list of literary features of the Johannine misunderstandings demonstrates that not one misunderstanding has all the features, nor that there is a group of features that all misunderstandings have in common.²³³ Johannine misunderstandings escape definition. Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance might help to understand Johannine misunderstandings, but this notion contradicts the presupposition of the genre-critical approach that *παροιμία* is a *terminus technicus* for a static literary genre.²³⁴ Given the association of *παροιμία* with misunderstanding and obscurity, the definition of the

²²⁷ See Donald A. Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings in the Fourth Gospel," *TynBul* 33 (1982) 59–91: at 63–64, 71–72.

²²⁸ See Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings": 74–75.

²²⁹ See Jürgen Becker, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes: Kapitel 1–10*, ÖTKNT 4,1 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1979), 135–136.

²³⁰ See Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings": 66.

²³¹ See Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings": 68–71.

²³² See Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings": 73.

²³³ See *infra*, Appendix Three.

²³⁴ For Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition*, ed. Joachim Schulte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2001), §65–71.

genre of *παροιμία* is equally elusive, just as the definition of the Johannine misunderstandings.

2.3 INTERMEDIARY STUDIES

Adrian Simonis has explained *παροιμία* in John 10:6 as a *terminus technicus* for the literary genre of Jesus' sayings, while he has interpreted *ἐν παροιμίαις* and *παρηγήσας* in 16:25 as respectively a concealing and a revealing mode of Jesus' teaching. His study intermediates between the studies of the present section (2) and the studies of the next section (3). He provides two arguments for his interpretation of *παροιμία* in 10:6 as denoting a *terminus technicus*: (i) The literary form of 10:1–5 corresponds to a large extent to the literary form of the parables from the Synoptics; and (ii) John 9:39–41 resembles Mark 4:12. Both texts use Isa 6:9–10 in the context of judgement. The Markan Jesus relates this text to his parabolic teaching. It is no coincidence for Simonis that John uses it in the context of the only Johannine parable in his Gospel. Concerning his interpretation of *παροιμία* in 16:25, Simonis thinks that the meaning of *παροιμία* in 10:6 is different from 16:25, because the latter denotes the modality of Jesus' speech and refers to all the words that Jesus has previously spoken.²³⁵ Simonis is uncertain whether the parable in 10:1–5 is a comparison or an allegory. Does 10:1–5 only compare the behaviour of the Pharisees to that of a thief and a robber (comparison), or are they really portrayed as thieves and robbers (allegory)? The boundary between comparison and allegory is not so clear here. The more likeness there is between the image and the addressees, comparisons appear more as allegories.²³⁶

Mira Stare has identified 15 parables as Johannine *παροιμίες*.²³⁷ These parables have six literary features. They are: (i) Narrative, as they are short narrative texts. Their plot is narrated as a sequence; (ii) fictive, as their stories are invented; (iii) realistic, as they deal with perceptible realities; (iv) metaphorical, as they use imagery that may not be interpreted literally; (v) appellative, as they require interpretation. Their meaning is determined by the reader/listener, and, is, therefore, open-ended; and (vi) contextual, as they are part of bigger narratives or orations and argumentations that determine their meaning, and the role of the reader/listener.²³⁸ Stare's study can also be considered as an intermediary study because she understands *παροιμίαν* in 10:6 as a *terminus technicus* for a literary genre, whereas she interprets *ἐν παροιμίαις* in 16:25 as a *modus dicendi* of Jesus.²³⁹

²³⁵ See Adrian J. Simonis, *Die Hirtenrede im Johannes-Evangelium: Versuch einer Analyse von Johannes 10,1-18 nach Entstehung, Hintergrund und Inhalt*, AnBib 29 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1967), 75–86.

²³⁶ See Simonis, *Die Hirtenrede*, 94–96.

²³⁷ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

²³⁸ See Stare, “Gibt es Gleichnisse,” 337.

²³⁹ See Stare, “Gibt es Gleichnisse,” 338.

2.4 CRITICAL REACTIONS

An important critic of the genre-critical approach is Ruben Zimmermann. Zimmermann considers it impossible to identify the genre of *παροιμία* because John does not characterise different texts with different concepts (e.g., *παροιμία* and *παραβολή*). Therefore, it is impossible to make a terminological distinction between genres. The term *παροιμία* in John 16:25, 29 does indicate John's consciousness of a literary genre, but as a meta-reflection on his own writing (16:25–29).²⁴⁰ According to Zimmermann, literary genres cannot be defined on the basis of literary features, because the genre of a text is always co-constructed by the reader. Genres are open systems that can have many features, without one of them being essential for the genre's identity (Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance). Therefore, the division between literary genres is not well-defined. Literary genres flow into one another. They can expand, shrink, and shift. Their identity is open-ended. Zimmermann compares literary genres to codes. Codes give messages a certain form that can be decoded by the addressees who are familiar with the form of the message. This presupposes that the different groups in this communication process have a certain consciousness of the genre of the text. For the communication process to be successful, their understanding of the genre of the text does, however, not need to be identical. Since the genre of the text is always co-constructed by the reader, and is, thus, part of a hermeneutical process, such an agreement on the understanding of the genre of the text is not an ideal. Our consciousness of the genre of the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus does not have to coincide with the understanding of this genre by the early Christian community, although one may not introduce a definition of this genre that has no textual ground.²⁴¹ Hence, Zimmermann abandons the presupposition that *παροιμία* refers to a static literary genre in the Fourth Gospel. He presupposes that literary genres are dynamic. Zimmermann proposes not to understand *ἐν παροιμαῖς* in 16:25 as a *terminus technicus* for a static and formal literary genre, but as a *modus dicendi* of Jesus.²⁴²

Zimmermann has criticised the view that *παροιμία* denotes a proverb in John, because no proverb is mentioned in combination with *παροιμία*. In John 10:6 *παροιμία* does not refer to a proverb, but to the shepherd imagery of 10:1–5. The clearest example of a proverb in John, ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ σπείρων καὶ ἄλλος ὁ θερίζων (4:37), is not introduced as *παροιμία*, but as *λόγος*. Zimmermann's argumentation is a *reductio ad absurdum*. If *παροιμία* is a *terminus technicus* for the literary genre of the proverb, John would certainly have used it to introduce the clearest example of a proverb in his Gospel. John,

²⁴⁰ See Ruben Zimmermann, "Parabel – sonst nichts! Gattungsbestimmung jenseits der Klassifikation in 'Bildwort', 'Gleichnis', 'Parabel' und 'Beispiel Erzählung'," in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 383–419, at 396–397.

²⁴¹ See Zimmermann, "Parabel – sonst nichts!," 407–408 and Ruben Zimmermann, *Puzzling the Parables of Jesus. Methods and Interpretation* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2015), 133–137.

²⁴² See Zimmermann, "Parabel – sonst nichts!," 418. See also Ruben Zimmermann, "Are There Parables in John? It Is Time to Revisit the Question," *Journ. for the Study of the Hist. Jesus* 9 (2011) 243–276: at 260–262.

however, opts for the more neutral λόγος. The opposite claim, namely, that παροιμία does not denote a proverb, is, therefore, more likely. As John does not use παροιμία elsewhere in his Gospel to refer to a proverb, Zimmermann claims that ἐν παροιμίαις in 16:25 does not refer to specific sayings that formally correspond to a certain literary genre, but to all of the words that Jesus has previously spoken.²⁴³

Uta Poplutz' criticism is similar. She observes that it is not immediately clear to which metaphor or proverb ταῦτα in John 16:25 refers. The first candidate is the image of the woman giving birth (16:21). The demonstrative pronoun ταῦτα cannot refer to this single image, not only because παροιμίαις is in the plural, but also because this image is explained by Jesus in 16:22–24. The image is easy to understand, and, therefore, cannot be considered as παροιμία.²⁴⁴ In my view, the explanation in 16:22–24 does, however, not exhaust the meaning of the image of the woman giving birth, because 16:22–24 only explains the image with reference to the suffering of the disciples. Poplutz presupposes here, and elsewhere, that one single explanation can reduce the obscurity of Jesus' παροιμίαι to conceptual clarity. I agree with Kathleen Rushton that 16:21 can additionally be explained with reference to Jesus' suffering/death and glorification.²⁴⁵

Poplutz resumes that the second option is that ἐν παροιμίαις refers to everything that Jesus says in John 16:16–24. However, not only the image of the woman giving birth, but also the double use of μικρόν in 16:16 is explained by Jesus in 16:20–23. All the imagery in the direct literary context of 16:25 is, thus, explained and easy to understand. Therefore, it is puzzling why Jesus claims that he will speak παρρησία about the Father in the future. Poplutz' argumentation is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The presupposition that ἐν παροιμίαις denotes a formal and static literary genre implies that it refers to certain sayings of Jesus in 16:16–24. This presupposition, however, cannot clarify why Jesus' παρρησία is still necessary. All Jesus' sayings are explained, and do not need further explanation. Therefore, the opposite claim, that ἐν παροιμίαις refers to everything that Jesus has previously said, is more plausible. Poplutz uses the same argument for John 10:1–5. Nothing in these verses makes Jesus' παρρησία necessary. The images in these verses are everyday images and familiar to Jesus' listeners. The only incomprehensible issue is what the author wants us to find difficult to understand in these verses. Equally in 10:6, the term παροιμία does not refer to specific proverbs, parables, or riddles.²⁴⁶ According to Poplutz, the misunderstanding connected to παροιμία expresses a deeper reality.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ See Zimmermann, "Imagery," 13–14.

²⁴⁴ See Poplutz, "Paroimia," 106–107.

²⁴⁵ See Kathleen P. Rushton, *The Parable of the Woman in Childbirth of John 16:21: A Metaphor for the Death and Glorification of Jesus* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010).

²⁴⁶ See Poplutz, "Paroimia," 106–107. Cf. Horst Balz, "παρρησία," *EWNT*³ 3 (2011) 105–112: at 108: "[...] nur die Glaubenden vermögen es (in der Zeit des Geistes) wahrhaft zu hören [...]. Der Grund dafür liegt nicht in der Unverständlichkeit und Rätselhaftigkeit der Botschaft selbst, sondern in den Hörern, vgl. 11, 14 mit 11,11–13.15." Cf. Heinrich Schlier, "παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι," *TWNT* 5 (1954) 871–886: at 878.

²⁴⁷ See Poplutz, "Paroimia," 111.

The present reader should, however, keep in mind that the studies of the genre-critical approach have formulated ambiguity as a literary feature of *παροιμία* in John's Gospel. That the imagery in the Fourth Gospel is either everyday or explained by the Johannine Jesus does not exclude that the term *παροιμία* can be used to present this imagery as ambiguous. The understanding of *παροιμία* as a literary genre has, thus, not suffered a death blow, but the criticisms have opened the path for new interpretations.

3. THE HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* AS *MODI DICENDI* AND *MODI INTELLIGENDI*

In order to understand the deeper reality that is expressed by *παροιμία*, Poplutz abandons the understanding of *παροιμία* as a *terminus technicus* of a static and formal literary genre. She instead focuses more on how *παροιμία* interacts with *παρρησία*. The following studies are based on the presupposition that *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* express the modality of Jesus' language. The phrases ἐν παροιμαῖς and (ἐν) παρρησίᾳ are prepositional phrases complementing *verba dicendi*. These prepositional phrases are looked upon as expressing the modality of Jesus' speech, the *modus dicendi*. Jesus speaks, respectively, in an obscuring and a revealing way. Each *modus dicendi* of Jesus corresponds to a *modus intelligendi* of his listeners/readers. According to the following studies, *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are hermeneutical key terms in John's reflection on the teaching of Jesus. These studies form what I call the hermeneutical approach to *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John, because they interpret these terms in John from the presupposition that John considers Christological knowledge as a possibility.²⁴⁸

3.1 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* AS KEY TERMS OF CHRISTOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

The presupposition that *παροιμία* expresses modality determines Zimmermann's interpretation of the etymology of *παροιμία*. According to Zimmermann, there is an undisputable etymological connection between *παροιμία* and οἶμος ("road", "path", "way"). Ancient lexicographers and *παροιμία* collectors understood *παροιμία* as the word or discourse that accompanies and leads listeners and readers παρ' οἶμον ("along the way"). John's understanding of *παροιμία* is informed by this etymological connection between *παροιμία* and οἶμος. Johannine *παροιμία* accompanies and leads the reader 'along the way' towards Christological knowledge. Instead of a *terminus technicus* for a literary genre, *παροιμία* expresses a *modus dicendi* of Jesus.²⁴⁹ In my view, this etymological argument is an etymological fallacy. On the one hand, the modal interpretation of *παροιμία* in the Fourth Gospel determines Zimmermann's interpretation

²⁴⁸ In contrast to the post-hermeneutical approach, see *infra*, §4.

²⁴⁹ See Zimmermann, "Imagery," 10, 11, 15.

of the etymology of *παροιμία*. On the other, Zimmermann presupposes that the meaning of *παροιμία* in John is restricted to its etymology.²⁵⁰

The other arguments that Zimmermann provides, against the view that *παροιμία* refers to a static and formal literary genre, are equally informed by his presupposition that *παροιμία* expresses modality. The first argument is that *ταῦτα* in John 16:25 refers to all of the words that Jesus has previously spoken. The term *παροιμία* refers to all these words because it supposedly denotes the modality of Jesus' speech. The second argument is what Zimmermann calls the "modal (adverbial) use of the term *παροιμία*" in the phrase *ἐν παροιμίαις*. The possibility that this phrase indicates the means of Jesus' speech is, somehow, excluded by Zimmermann. The third argument is the temporal dimension of *ἐν παροιμίαις*. Words, such as *ὥρα*, *ἡμέρα*, and *νῦν*, emphasise the importance of time for the switch between the *παροιμία* and the *παρρησία* speech. Zimmermann excludes here that this can also mean that there is a period that Jesus teaches by means of, e.g., proverbs, riddles, or parables, and that there is a period in which Jesus teaches without the use of rhetorical figures. The fourth argument is the open formulation of 16:25. This verse seems to address anyone who reads or listens. For some reason, this suggests for Zimmermann that *ἐν παροιμίαις* denotes a *modus dicendi* of Jesus. The fifth reason is the most decisive one, according to Zimmermann, namely, the direct contrast of *ἐν παροιμίαις* with *παρρησία*. Zimmermann presupposes that the latter always expresses modality, and excludes that it can be interpreted as instrumental in the sense of, for example, speaking without rhetorical means. Thus, Zimmermann's arguments are not fatal for the understanding that *παροιμία* denotes a static and formal literary genre, but legitimise an alternative understanding of *παροιμία* based on a different presupposition.²⁵¹

This alternative understanding of *παροιμία* is reflected in a large number of studies. These studies observe that *παροιμία* is always connected to the theme of mis/understanding as a reaction to Jesus' teaching. The term *παροιμία* is a hermeneutical key to understanding the theological function of imagery in John. It does not only denote a *modus dicendi* of Jesus, but also corresponds to a *modus intelligendi* of his listeners. The hour of Jesus' death indicates the change from *παροιμία* to *παρρησία* (John 16:25). Here, it is not that Jesus' *modus dicendi* changes, but the *modus intelligendi* of his listeners. The hour gives new understanding to those who received the Gospel. The Paraclete or the Holy Spirit will cause Jesus' disciples to remember Jesus' words in a univocal way (14:26). He functions as the mouthpiece of Jesus' *παρρησία*. The Christological process of comprehension (revelation) is mediated by memory, and, is, therefore, retrospective (2:22; 12:16). The deeper reality that Johannine *παροιμία* expresses is, thus, Christological. Johannine *παροιμία* fulfils a function for the reader that is narrative-pragmatic and hermeneutical. It leads the reader along the way to the knowledge that Jesus is the Christ. Jesus' sayings are perceived as obscure, because of

²⁵⁰ These dangers are intrinsic to the tendency to etymologise: see James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University, 1961).

²⁵¹ Zimmermann's arguments can be found in Zimmermann, "Imagery," 14.

the absence of the post-paschal perspective of Jesus' death on the cross. The Spirit enables one to perceive Jesus' παρρησία as παρρησία. Jesus always taught παρρησία during his life time (10:24–25; 18:20). In reality, his *modus dicendi* is always παρρησία. Only the *modus intelligendi* of his listeners changes from pre-paschal παροιμία to post-paschal παρρησία (16:25). The subjective incapability to understand Jesus' παρρησία is objectified in 16:25 as a *modus dicendi* of Jesus, i.e., παροιμία.²⁵²

In my view, this interpretation of παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel faces some difficulties: (i) It claims that παροιμία can only refer to a *modus intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners, because Jesus' *modus dicendi* is in reality always παρρησία. This is problematic because παροιμία is always used with *verba dicendi* and with Jesus as the speaker. The interpretation of παρρησία as a *modus intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners faces the same difficulty. This term is used in combination with *verba dicendi*, ἔγωγε, or περιπατέω and with Jesus as the agent; (ii) the accusative παροιμίαν in John 10:6 cannot express modality. The accusative case does not allow the interpretation of a *modus dicendi* or *modus intelligendi*; and (iii) the distinction between παρρησία as a *modus*

²⁵² See especially Konrad Haldimann, *Rekonstruktion und Entfaltung: Exegetische Untersuchungen zu Joh 15 und 16*, BZNW 104 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 382; Zimmermann, *Christologie der Bilder*, 41, 45; Michael Becker, "Zeichen: Die johanneische Wunderterminologie und die früh-rabbinische Tradition," in *Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums: Das vierte Evangelium in religions- und traditions-geschichtlicher Perspektive*, ed. Jörg Frey – Udo Schnelle, WUNT 175 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 233–276, at 246, 254; Michael Labahn, "Die παρρησία des Gottessohnes im Johannesevangelium: Theologische Hermeneutik und philosophisches Selbstverständnis," in *Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums*, 321–363, at 329, 336, 338, 342–343; Poplutz, "Paroimia," 108–109.

Other studies, but also commentaries on John that can be mentioned here are Rudolf K. Bultmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes*, KEK 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ¹¹1950), 452–453; Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium*, vol. 3, *Kommentar zu Kap. 13–21*, HthK 4/3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 182–183; Charles K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text* (London: SPCK, ²1978), 495; Carl J. Bjerkelund, *Tauta Egeneto: Die Präzisierungssätze im Johannesevangelium*, WUNT 40 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 108–109; Andreas Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart des Erhöhten: Eine exegetische Studie zu den johanneischen Abschiedsreden (Joh 13,31–16,33) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Relecture-Charakters*, FRLANT 169 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 256, 285–286; Christian Dietzfelbinger, *Der Abschied des Kommenden: Eine Auslegung der johanneischen Abschiedsreden*, WUNT 95 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 235–236; Brakke, "Parables and Plain Speech": 198–199; Jean Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem der johanneischen Metaphern am Beispiel der Hirtenrede (Joh 10)," in *Paulus und Johannes: Exegetische Studien zur paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie und Literatur*, ed. Dieter Sänger – Ulrich Mell, WUNT 198 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 159–175, at 168–169; Jean Zumstein, *L'évangile selon de Saint Jean (13–21)*, CNT 4b (Genève: Labor et fides, 2007), 151–152.

The tenets of this interpretation of παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel can also be found in Simon Kaipuram, *Paroimiai in the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Parables of Jesus' Self-Revelation (With Special Reference to John 12,24: The Grain of Wheat)* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1993), 2, 23: "παροιμία [...] can serve to denote figurative and imaginative type of speeches. [...] It is also noted that in both contexts the lack of understanding of the listeners of Jesus seems to form part of the reality of παροιμία speech. In fact the words of the Johannine Jesus as a whole could be considered as ἐν παροιμίαις, a mode of revelation proper to the Word Incarnate, unclear without the 'open speech' which begins with 'the hour'." See, also, van der Watt, *Family of the King*, 158–160.

dicendi of Jesus (10:24–25; 18:20) and *παρρησία* as a *modus intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners (16:25) is *ad hoc*. It is not justified by linguistic or textual observations. I conclude from (i)–(iii) that the hermeneutical approach also has its flaws, just like the genre-critical approach.

The studies that I subsume under the hermeneutical approach do not suggest that John's Gospel reflects a historical consciousness of a division between a pre- and post-paschal era. They rather suggest that his Gospel offers a reflection on how the Johannine group relates to the earthly Jesus in the Christological process of comprehension (revelation).²⁵³ Although the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* cannot teach anything about the historical Jesus (cf. Jülicher), they do reveal something about the historical self-understanding of the Johannine group.²⁵⁴

A presupposition of this understanding of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John is that the orientation of the Christological process of comprehension (revelation) is purely retrospective. The Johannine group's understanding of the earthly Jesus is guided by the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete. However, the question is: how can the Paraclete declare the things that are to come (*τὰ ἐρχόμενα*; John 16:13), while the authors of the hermeneutical approach interpret the teaching of the Paraclete as being merely retrospective and oriented to what has already been revealed in Jesus (2:22; 12:16; 14:26)? Chapter Four of the present dissertation will further discuss this issue of the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel.²⁵⁵

3.2 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* AS KEY TERMS OF JOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF LANGUAGE

²⁵³ The phrase 'earthly Jesus' is used instead of 'historical Jesus'. The latter is a modern phrase and the author(s) of the Fourth Gospel did not have a modern historical consciousness. The question of the historical Jesus is a question of modernity, whereas John's Gospel narrates the tradition of the earthly Jesus, namely the miracle stories, Jesus sayings, and passion story redacted by the Johannine group: see Jean Zumstein, *Kreative Erinnerung: Relecture und Auslegung im Johannesevangelium. 2., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage*, ATANT 84 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004), 65–67.

²⁵⁴ The studies of the present subsection have elaborated the following intuition of William Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien: Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Markusevangeliums* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ³1963), 189: "Nein, nicht aus dem Bewusstsein von einem Fortschritte dieser Gegenwart über die apostolische Periode sind die Gegensätze der verhüllten und offenen Rede, der noch vorenthaltenen und der später vom Geiste mitgeteilten Lehre zu erklären. Man legt dem Evangelisten [John; T.T.] zu viel historisches Gefühl bei für den Unterscheid der Zeiten, wenn man das glaubt. Die Gegensätze sind vielmehr erwachsen aus einer historischen Generalansicht über die Stellung der wirklichen Jünger zu Jesus und seiner Lehre." One needs to keep in mind that, for Wrede (*Das Messiasgeheimnis*, 189), "die Jünger in vielen Dingen die typischen Repräsentanten der Gemeinde selbst sind".

²⁵⁵ See *infra*, Chapter Four.

Rainer Hirsch-Luipold has articulated the philosophical views on language that the understanding of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* depicted in the previous subsection implies.²⁵⁶ The divine *λόγος* incarnates and brings truth into the world through Jesus' *παρρησία*. Since the word is mediated by the world, it is, however, ambiguous and interpretable. One can perceive it as either *παροιμία* or *παρρησία*.²⁵⁷ Hirsch-Luipold remarks that the relationship between the divine *λόγος* and the world is not dualistic in John's Gospel. As in the (Middle) Platonic thinking of Plutarch, there is a reciprocal connection between divine reality and the phenomenal world. The one is not understandable without the other. God's *λόγος* provides structure and beauty to the world. His *λόγος* is mediated by the world. The image of the world that appears is ambiguous, but by means of a correct understanding, one can come to know God on the basis of the phenomenal world.²⁵⁸ Incarnation, thus, makes it possible that God can be perceived, although in an ambiguous way. Our perception of his word is always partial because it is recorded by two *modi intelligendi*, *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*.

According to Zimmermann, this understanding of Incarnation has come about because Jesus is remembered as one who spoke in images about God: "[d]er Gleichniserzähler ist selbst das 'Gleichnis Gottes'."²⁵⁹ The nature of Jesus' teaching has caused John to represent Jesus as an image that renders God visible and present. Philosophically, Zimmermann's understanding of John's imagery is similar to Hirsch-Luipold's (Middle) Platonic understanding of this imagery. This is not surprising because they share the same interpretation of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John. Jesus' imagery relates the human world to the divine by means of analogy. It even places the divine in

²⁵⁶ Hirsch-Luipold also defends this understanding of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*: see Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, "Klartext in Bildern: ἀληθινός κτλ., παροιμία – παρρησία, σημεῖον als Signalwörter für eine bildhafte Darstellungsform im Johannesevangelium," in *Imagery in the Gospel of John*, 61–102, at 85.

²⁵⁷ See Hirsch-Luipold, "Klartext," 79.

²⁵⁸ See Hirsch-Luipold, "Klartext," 74. For a more detailed presentation of Plutarch's (Middle) Platonism, see Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, "Der eine Gott bei Philon und Plutarch," in *Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch: Götterbilder – Gottesbilder – Weltbilder*, ed. Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, RVV 54 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 141–168. The influence of Plutarch's (Middle) Platonism on the Fourth Gospel is indirect. One may also not reduce the one to the other: see Klaus Scholtissek, *In Ihm sein und bleiben: Die Sprache der Immanenz in den johanneischen Schriften*, HBS 21 (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), 369–370. Scholtissek has studied whether there is a historical relationship between Plutarch's (Middle) Platonic philosophy and John's Gospel. After an extensive study, he concludes that there is no direct dependence of the sayings about divine immanence in John on extra-biblical sources. The Platonic philosophical systems and schools understand the divine as being naturally present in humans. This understanding does not correspond with the Jewish-Christian view that God has made himself present on his own initiative. This presence can be interpreted in terms of revelation and the history of salvation. The language of divine immanence was already strongly present in ancient history of religion. Therefore, it is relevant for philosophical reflection on religion. One may, however, not forget its differences with the understanding of divine immanence in the Fourth Gospel. One cannot speak about a direct (Middle) Platonic influence on the Johannine sayings about divine immanence.

²⁵⁹ Ruben Zimmermann, "Die Gleichnisse Jesu: Eine Leseanleitung zum Kompendium," in *Kompendium der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 3–46, at 5.

the human world, and identifies them. Yet, this is not a literal identification, because both the ‘is’ and the ‘is not’ remain transparent.²⁶⁰

Hirsch-Luipold and Zimmermann have convincingly demonstrated that the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are key terms for understanding the philosophical views on language in the Fourth Gospel. However, because their understanding of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel is problematic,²⁶¹ their understanding of John’s views on language also needs to be revised.

3.3 DIALECTICS BETWEEN JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* AS *RELECTURE*

According to Jean Zumstein, the dialectic progression between *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* takes place in the diachronic process of *relecture*. The textual model of *relecture* understands John’s text as the result of a series of *Fortschreibungen* by a Johannine school. The members of this school have incorporated earlier pieces of text, reflected upon them, and actualised them to meet the challenges of new historical contexts. Zumstein interprets the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* as referring to this diachronic process. Jesus’ *παρρησία* unfolds in the Gospel because the imagery is explicated further and further by the members of the Johannine school. John 16:25 and other verses (2:22; 8:28; 12:16; 13:7; 14:20; 20:9) indicate this process of *relecture*. All these verses have in common that they refer to the retrospective clarification of Jesus’ teaching. The Johannine school’s diachronic process of *Fortschreibung* is a teaching inspired by the Paraclete. It consists in an ongoing explanation of Jesus’ words (14:25–26). The aim of this hermeneutical process of explanation is to understand Jesus’ *παρρησία* better and better. The divine word is expressed by Jesus’ *παρρησία*.²⁶² Jesus’ *modus dicendi* does not change at the hour of his death (i.e., *παρρησία*), but the *modus intelligendi* of the disciples of the Johannine school does (i.e., from *παροιμία* to *παρρησία*).²⁶³

²⁶⁰ See Zimmermann, “Die Gleichnisse Jesu,” 10.

²⁶¹ See *supra*, §3.1.

²⁶² See Zumstein, *Kreative Erinnerung*, 76–77.

²⁶³ See Zumstein, “Das hermeneutische Problem,” 168–169; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 151–152; Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 256, 285–286. For the exegetical application of the textual model of *relecture*, see, in addition to the already quoted studies: Jean Zumstein, “Mémoire et relecture pascale dans l’Évangile selon Jean,” in *La mémoire et le temps: Mélanges offerts à Pierre Bonnard*, ed. Daniel Marguerat – Jean Zumstein, *MdB* 23 (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1991), 153–170; Jean Zumstein, “Der Prozess der Relecture in der johanneischen Literatur,” *NTS* 42/3 (1996) 394–411; Jean Zumstein, “Le processus de relecture dans la littérature johannique,” *ETR* 73/2 (1998) 161–176; Jean Zumstein, “Ein gewachsenes Evangelium: Der Relecture-Prozess bei Johannes,” in *Johannesevangelium – Mitte oder Rand des Kanons? Neue Standortbestimmungen*, ed. Thomas Söding, *QD* 203 (Freiburg: Herder, 2003), 9–37; Jean Zumstein, “Bildersprache und Relektüre am Beispiel von Joh 15,1–17,” in *Imagery in the Gospel of John*, 139–156; Jean Zumstein, “Le processus johannique de la relecture à l’exemple de Jean 13,1–20,” in *Regards croisés sur la Bible: Études sur le point de vue. Actes du IIIe colloque international du Réseau de recherche en narrativité biblique Paris 8–10 juin 2006*, ed. RRENAB (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2007), 325–338; Jean Zumstein, “Intratextuality and Intertextuality in the Gospel of John,” in *Anatomies of Narrative Criticism: The Past, Present, and Futures of the Fourth Gospel as Literature*, ed. Tom Thatcher – Stephen D. Moore,

Zumstein has demonstrated that *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are not only key terms for interpreting the theological function of Jesus' language, but also for interpreting how the different parts of the Gospel relate to each other. As these terms are used in a meta-reflection on the Christological process of comprehension (revelation), they also indicate how the different parts of the Gospel relate to each other in this process. However, Zumstein's understanding of *relecture* has its hypothetical assumptions, viz. the existence of a Johannine school and its changing historical context. His assumption that the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is purely retrospective is, as argued above, equally problematic.²⁶⁴

4. THE POST-HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH: JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA OF INEXPRESSIBILITY

The studies of the previous section (3) interpreted *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* as key terms in John's reflection on the possibility and progression of Christological knowledge. The following studies abandon the presupposition that knowledge, and progression in knowledge, is possible. Their presupposition is that knowledge is impossible. These studies are, therefore, called the post-hermeneutical approach to *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John. They interpret the same textual data as the studies of the previous section, but produce completely opposite interpretations, because they are guided by an opposite presupposition. The studies of this approach have in common that they employ contemporary philosophical terminology to understand *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John.

4.1 STUDIES INSPIRED BY DERRIDA

Patrick Chatelion Counet considers Derrida's terminology as most suitable for interpreting *παροιμία* in John because he thinks that *ἐν παροιμίαις* in John 16:25 expresses one of the main ideas of John's Gospel, namely, the inexpressibility of Jesus' identity.²⁶⁵ This inexpressibility is evidenced by Jesus' reaction to the eight faith confessions in the Gospel (1:49; 2:23; 3:2; 6:14; 6:69; 13:37; 16:30; 20:28). Jesus does not confirm any of them (1:50; 2:24; 3:3; 6:15; 6:70; 13:38; 16:31–32; 20:29). Chatelion Counet uses the

SBL 55 (Atlanta GA: SBL, 2008), 121–135; Jean Zumstein, "Intratextualität und Intertextualität in der johanneischen Literatur," in *Die Bibel als Text: Beiträge zu einer textbezogenen Bibelhermeneutik*, ed. Oda Wischmeyer – Stefan Scholz, NET 14 (Tübingen: A. Franke, 2008), 217–234; Jean Zumstein, "Intratextualité et intertextualité dans la littérature johannique," in *Écritures et réécritures: La reprise interprétative des traditions fondatrices par la littérature biblique et extra-biblique. Cinquième colloque international du RRENAB, Universités de Genève et Lausanne, 10-12 juin 2010*, ed. Claire Clivaz et al., BETL 248 (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 331–359; Jean Zumstein, "Processus de relecture et réception dans le quatrième évangile," *EstBib* 70 (2012) 37–54.

²⁶⁴ See *supra*, §3.1.

²⁶⁵ See Patrick Chatelion Counet, "Paroimiai (John 16:25): A Post-Hermeneutical Model," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Exegesis*, 252–269, at 269.

Derridean concept “*logocentrisme*”²⁶⁶ to explain this. All of Jesus’ dialogue partners think logocentrically, i.e., in terms of a “*signifié transcendantal*”. Their faith confessions seek to express the ultimate meaning of Jesus’ identity, origin, and function. As the Johannine Jesus does not affirm any of these confessions, Chatelion Counet thinks that John understands language as unable to express Jesus’ identity. According to Chatelion Counet, the evangelist indicates this inability with the phrase ἐν παροιμίαις in 16:25.²⁶⁷ Another indication for Chatelion Counet is 21:25, because it says that the κόσμος is unable to fully describe the λόγος and its acts. The first act of the λόγος was the creation of the κόσμος. The λόγος as creator is outside the κόσμος. It is thus pre-existential and pre-cosmological. John 21:25 indicates this as the reason why the κόσμος cannot fully express the λόγος. The λόγος is pre-textual and inexpressible. Even if the λόγος incarnates into the world, only its δόξα can be seen.²⁶⁸

According to Chatelion Counet, the hour of Jesus does not offer transparency about Jesus’ identity.²⁶⁹ Its future character only confirms and intensifies the idea of the inexpressibility of Jesus’ identity. Jesus’ παρρησία is an eternal promise. In the post-paschal era, revelation is equally open, ateleological, and characterised by what Derrida calls “*différance*”. This last term indicates that language is unable to articulate the content of revelation because it always creates a difference in comparison with the content that it seeks to articulate. The ‘a’ in “*différance*” refers to this active side of language.²⁷⁰ Chatelion Counet concludes that Rudolf Bultmann was right; the Johannine Jesus actually reveals only one thing, i.e., that he is the revealer. Revelation in the Fourth Gospel is “ein bloßes Daß”.²⁷¹ For Chatelion Counet this does not imply that revelation has no content,

²⁶⁶ For the terminology of Derrida used in this presentation of Chatelion Counet, see Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, Collection critique (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967).

²⁶⁷ See Chatelion Counet, “Paroimiai,” 263.

²⁶⁸ See Chatelion Counet, “Paroimiai,” 261. The authenticity of John 21 and 21:24–25 in particular is, however, contested: see Armin D. Baum, “The Original Epilogue (John 20:30–31), the Secondary Appendix (21:1–23), and the Editorial Epilogues (21:24–25) of John’s Gospel: Observations against the Background of Ancient Literary Conventions,” in *Earliest Christian History: History, Literature, and Theology. Essays from the Tyndale Fellowship in Honor of Martin Hengel*, ed. Michael F Bird – Jason Maston, WUNT II/320 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 227–270 and Joseph Verheyden, “A Good Way To End a Gospel? A Note in the Margin of John 21,25,” in *Studies in the Gospel of John and its Christology: FS Gilbert Van Belle*, ed. Joseph Verheyden et al., BETL 265 (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 567–593. For a defence of the authenticity of John 21 and 21:24–25 in particular, see Gilbert Van Belle, “L’unité littéraire et les deux finales du quatrième évangile,” in *Studien zu Matthäus und Johannes / Études sur Matthieu et Jean. FS für Jean Zumstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag / Mélanges offerts à Jean Zumstein pour son 65^e anniversaire*, ed. Andreas Dettwiler – Uta Poplutz, ATANT 97 (Zürich: TVZ, 2009), 297–315.

²⁶⁹ *Contra* the position of the studies mentioned in the third section (§3) of the present chapter.

²⁷⁰ See Chatelion Counet, “Paroimiai,” 268.

²⁷¹ See Rudolf K. Bultmann, “Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen und manichäischen Quellen für das Verständnis des Johannesevangeliums,” *ZNW* 24 (1925) 100–146: at 102, 146 (republished as Rudolf K. Bultmann, “Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen und manichäischen Quellen für das Verständnis des Johannesevangeliums,” in *Exegetica: Aufsätze zur Erforschung des Neuen Testaments. Bultmann Rudolf*, ed. Erich Dinkler [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967], 55–104, at 57, 103) and Rudolf K. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1961), 418–419.

but that it is merely a “*signifiant*”, or signifier, in an endless series of signifiers that does not lead to a “*signifié*” or signified.²⁷² The phrase ἐν παροιμίαις does not indicate that Jesus’ words are without meaning, but that language is unable to express reality. Chatelion Counet proposes to translate παροιμία with “*supplement*”. He paraphrases “*supplement*” as redundant language that replaces the external thing. Another translation that he proposes is “*trace*” or “*signifiant*”.²⁷³ This last translation refers to the infinite trace that language leaves behind to express the identity of Jesus. The referent becomes visible in this trace, but is at the same time hidden. The trace is infinite and does not lead to a “*signifié*”. John’s theology is apophatic. Confirmation is at the same time negation.²⁷⁴

Chatelion Counet’s interpretation, however, does not do full justice to John’s text. His view that the hour of Jesus’ παρρησία is an eternal promise, is not adequate. He does not deal with the difficult issue that Jesus’ hour is presented as both present and future (John 4:23; 5:25).²⁷⁵ In the Farewell Discourse, pre- and post-paschal time are, equally, not always divided from each other, but there is a fusion between both.²⁷⁶ Chatelion Counet’s presupposition that knowledge is impossible hinders him to see that the promise of Jesus’ παρρησία is also presented as fulfilled in John’s Gospel. There is a tension between promise and fulfilment of revelation in John. Thus, not only the genre-critical and the hermeneutical approach, but also the post-hermeneutical approach has its flaws.

²⁷² See Chatelion Counet, “Paroimiai,” 269.

²⁷³ See Chatelion Counet, “Paroimiai,” 267.

²⁷⁴ Elements of this presentation of Chatelion Counet can also be found in his Dutch dissertation and its English translation: Patrick Chatelion Counet, *De sarcofaag van het Woord: postmoderniteit, deconstructie en het Johannesevangelie* (Kampen: Kok, 1995), 243–251, 375–390 and Patrick Chatelion Counet, *John, A Postmodern Gospel: Introduction to Deconstructive Exegesis Applied to the Fourth Gospel* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 195–202, 317–332.

²⁷⁵ For a systematic overview of the discussion on this issue, see Jörg Frey, *Die johanneische Eschatologie*, Bd. II, *Das johanneische Zeitverständnis*, WUNT 110 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 2–22. For more recent discussions of this issue, see Hans-Christian Kammiller, *Christologie und Eschatologie: Joh 5,17–30 als Schlüsseltext johanneischer Theologie*, WUNT 126 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 158–167; Jörg Frey, “Eschatology in the Johannine Circle,” in *Theology and Christology in the Fourth Gospel: Essays by the Members of the SNTS Johannine Writings Seminar*, ed. Gilbert Van Belle – Jan G. van der Watt – Petrus Maritz, BETL 184 (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 47–82 (republished as Jörg Frey, “Eschatology in the Johannine Circle,” in *Die Herrlichkeit des Gekreuzigten: Studien zu den Johanneischen Schriften I*, ed. Jörg Frey, WUNT 307 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013], 663–698); Nicole Chibici-Revneanu, “‘The Hour Comes and Now Is Here’ (John 4,23; 5,25): The Eschatological Meaning of the Johannine ὥρα,” *Sacra Scripta* 6 (2008) 73–94; Timothy T. O’Donnell, “Complementary Eschatologies in John 5:19–30,” *CBQ* 70 (2008) 750–765; Jan G. van der Watt, “Eschatology in John: A Continuous Process of Realizing Events,” in *Eschatology of the New Testament and Some Related Documents*, ed. Jan G. van der Watt, WUNT II/315 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 109–140; Jörg Frey, “Die Gegenwart von Vergangenheit und Zukunft Christi: Zur ‘Verschmelzung’ der Zeithorizonte im Johannesevangelium,” *Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie* 28 (2013) 129–158.

²⁷⁶ According to Christina Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes: Die Abschiedsreden als hermeneutischer Schlüssel zum vierten Evangelium*, WUNT 2/84 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), there is a fusion of pre- and post-paschal time in John 15:3, 9, 10, 11, 15; 16:27, 29, 30, 33; 17:3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25.

All three approaches make different readings of the text possible. We have seen that the text is recalcitrant to all three approaches. The critical awareness of the presuppositions of these approaches enables the present researcher to meet the alterity of the text. Once more the text can speak. The other side of the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* is to posit the researcher in the position of the original audience of John's text. Chapters Six to Eleven will, therefore, provide a broader historical-contextual framework to interpret *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John's Gospel.²⁷⁷

4.2 RELATED STUDIES

Frank Hancock employs the philosophical framework of Martin Heidegger to interpret the idea of the inexpressibility of the identity of the Johannine Jesus. He concludes that the identity of Jesus is inexpressible because John's Gospel contains the Heideggerian idea that *ἀλήθεια* is the event of un-concealment. This event reveals, but equally conceals. Therefore, a complete and definite understanding of divine reality is impossible.²⁷⁸

This interpretation of *ἀλήθεια* in John is, according to Hancock, justified by a contradiction in the narrative of the Gospel that was previously ascertained by William Wrede and Rudolf Bultmann. Jesus claims that he has revealed everything that he has heard from the Father (John 15:15), whereas he equally states that he still has many things to say, and that the Spirit will guide the disciples (in)to the truth (16:12–13).²⁷⁹ On the one hand, there is the promise of future revelation (see also 14:26). On the other, Jesus has already revealed everything that there was to reveal (15:15). Revelation is promised (14:26), then withdrawn (15:15), and then promised again (16:12–13).²⁸⁰ In Hancock's view, such a dynamic is only understandable if revelation, according to John's Gospel, is never complete, because revelation is also concealment. Therefore, future revelation is never excluded.

Hancock considers Wrede as unable to notice this dynamic between revelation and concealment, because, in his view, Wrede has never distanced himself from a historical reading of the Gospel.²⁸¹ He agrees with Bultmann that the hermeneutical problem is a problem of language, but disagrees with Bultmann's view that the hermeneutical problem is caused by mythological language that conceals the true meaning of the Gospel.

²⁷⁷ See *infra*, Chapter Six to Eleven.

²⁷⁸ See Frank C. Hancock III, "Secret Epiphanies: The Hermeneutics of Revealing and Concealing in the Fourth Gospel" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rice University Houston TX, 1994), 120. The use of Heideggerian hermeneutics to understand *ἀλήθεια* in John is inspired by Bultmann: see Rudolf K. Bultmann, "Untersuchungen zum Johannesevangelium, A. Ἀλήθεια," *ZNW* 27 (1928) 113–163 and Rudolf K. Bultmann, "ἀλήθεια," *TWNT* 1 (1933) 239–248.

²⁷⁹ Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis*, 192–193 calls this a "Widerspruch bei Johannes". This contradiction implies that truth or revelation in the Fourth Gospel is paradoxical: "[g]anz offenbar gemacht, scheint sie doch auch ganz verborgen zu bleiben." See also Bultmann, *Johannes*, 441–442.

²⁸⁰ See Hancock III, "Secret Epiphanies," 42–43.

²⁸¹ See Hancock III, "Secret Epiphanies," 53.

Hancock considers the language of the Fourth Gospel difficult to understand because it reveals and conceals at the same time.²⁸²

The narrative contradiction that Hancock (and Bultmann and Wrede) observe(s) in the Gospel confronts the reader with an aporia. Hancock's solution that revelation does not exclude concealment in John is worth considering, because it takes this narrative contradiction in John seriously and acknowledges it as meaningful. This solution also has implications for understanding *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John, although Hancock does not discuss these terms, and, thus, does not draw these implications. The scholarly literature on *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John has neglected the above-mentioned narrative contradiction and has concluded from John 16:25 that Jesus' *παρρησία* is: (i) plain language that excludes the use of *παροιμίες* or rhetorical figures such as proverbs, riddles, etc.;²⁸³ (ii) a *modus intelligendi* of Jesus' interlocutors that corresponds to univocal Christological perception as opposed to the *modus intelligendi* of ἐν *παροιμίας* or misunderstanding;²⁸⁴ and (iii) an eternal promise of a univocal Christological perception as opposed to the reality of ἐν *παροιμίας* or an apophatic Christological knowledge.²⁸⁵ In my view, however, Hancock's observation that revelation is also concealment in John's Gospel suggests that *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* are not opposed to each other, although Hancock himself does not draw this implication. This expectation is justified because *παροιμία* is associated with concealment, and *παρρησία* with revelation, in John's Gospel. Therefore, I formulate the research hypothesis that the terms *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are not antonyms in John's Gospel. Chapter Three of the present study will test this hypothesis by means of further literary research in the Gospel.²⁸⁶

5. THE READER-RESPONSE APPROACH: JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AS A LITERARY STRATEGY

The authors that I subsume under what I call the reader-response approach all have in common that they employ reader-response criticism to study Johannine *παροιμία* and the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus. They presuppose that the term *παροιμία* in the Fourth Gospel is fundamentally reader-oriented, and that it designates the literary strategy or the compositional technique of the evangelist: the readers are invited to posit themselves alongside the individuals in the Gospel narrative in order to understand Jesus' (figurative) language in a "more-than-literal way".²⁸⁷ The authors of this approach do not seek to understand the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus and the term *παροιμία*

²⁸² See Hancock III, "Secret Epiphanies," 87.

²⁸³ See the studies of the genre-critical approach in Section Two (§2) of the present chapter

²⁸⁴ See the studies of the hermeneutical approach in Section Three (§3) of the present chapter.

²⁸⁵ See the study of Chatelion Counet of the post-hermeneutical approach in Section Four (§4.1) of the present chapter.

²⁸⁶ See *infra*, Chapter Three.

²⁸⁷ This first presupposition of the reader-response approach to *παροιμία* has previously been articulated by William M. Wright IV, "Hearing the Shepherd's Voice: The *παροιμία* of the Good Shepherd Discourse and Augustine's Figural Reading," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 6.1 (2012) 97–116: at 102–105.

in their historical context, but are solely concerned with the strategies and the rhetoric of John's text. Not the historical author, nor the first readers of the Gospel are of interest to them, but the implied author and the implied reader. The reader intimately participates in the text and opens him or herself to its influence. The text is seen more as an event than as an object of historical or literary research.²⁸⁸ Instead of defining genre in terms of literary features,²⁸⁹ the authors of the reader-response approach presuppose that genre arises from function. The literary features of the Johannine imagery are not studied, but how the imagery functions for the reader.²⁹⁰ The genre of *παροιμία* is not defined essentialistically, but functionally. This means that the nature of the genre of the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus is not abstracted from the text in which it is found, but from the reader's response to it. The genre of the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus is described in terms of the function that it performs for the reader.²⁹¹ The reader needs to become conscious of how the implied author leads the reader through the imagery. The implied author has employed imagery to lead the reader towards some desired destination.²⁹²

5.1 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND THE COSMOLOGICAL TALE (A. REINHARTZ)

Adele Reinhartz has focused on the *παροιμία* text of John 10:1–5. She has provided a detailed study of the way in which the implied reader may have used what she calls the cosmological tale to interpret the imagery in 10:1–5. In addition to the commonly assumed historical and ecclesiological tale of the Fourth Gospel (i.e., the so-called two-level reading), Reinhartz discerns a third tale, the cosmological tale.

According to Reinhartz, the prologue to John's Gospel functions as "the reader's guide to the cosmological tale as it comes to expression throughout the body of the gospel narrative".²⁹³ The reader can easily observe the main phases of the cosmological tale in John's prologue. In the first phase, the Word is pre-existent and instrumental in the creation of the world (John 1:1, 3). The second phase is the Word's entry into the world (1:9). The two possible reactions of acceptance and rejection are recounted (1:10–13). The third phase is presented by 1:18. The general purpose of the Word is to make the Father known to the world. Implicit in 1:18 is the Word's departure from the world. Reinhartz presupposes that the participle *ὁ ὢν* in 1:18 has no past connotation, but refers

²⁸⁸ This second presupposition of the reader-response approach to *παροιμία* has previously been articulated by Robert Kysar, "The Meaning and Function of Johannine Metaphor (John 10:1-18)," in *Voyages with John. Charting the Fourth Gospel*, ed. Robert Kysar (Waco TX: Baylor University Press, 2005), 161–182, at 162. Originally published as Robert Kysar, "Johannine Metaphor—Meaning and Function: A Literary Case Study of John 10:1-8," *Semeia* 53 (1991) 81–111.

²⁸⁹ See the genre-critical approach *supra*, §2.

²⁹⁰ This third presupposition of the reader-response approach to *παροιμία* has previously been articulated by Kysar, "The Meaning," 165.

²⁹¹ See Kysar, "The Meaning," 176.

²⁹² See Kysar, "The Meaning," 174.

²⁹³ Adele Reinhartz, *The Word in the World: The Cosmological Tale in the Fourth Gospel*, SBLMS 45 (Atlanta GA: Scholars, 1992), 16.

to the present. At the time of John's writing, the Word is with the Father as it was before the Incarnation.²⁹⁴ The cosmological tale can thus be summarised as (i) pre-existence of the Word; (ii) entry of the Word in the world; and (iii) departure of the Word from the world. According to Reinhartz, the first person plural in 1:14, 16 indicates the perspective of the narrator as the voice of the implied author. The implied author is part of those who have beheld the glory of the Word. The implied reader is invited to do the same.²⁹⁵ The implied reader will easily discern the three stages of the cosmological tale in the Prologue and use this outline as the interpretive framework to interpret the other parts of the Gospel.²⁹⁶

According to Reinhartz, the interpretive framework of the cosmological tale is the key to understanding the true significance or plain meaning of all the figurative language in the Fourth Gospel.²⁹⁷ She demonstrates this thesis with an analysis of the *παροιμία* text of John 10:1–5. In the view of Reinhartz, the historical and the ecclesiological tale cannot account for all the elements of the *παροιμία*. Only from within the cosmological tale, the *παροιμία* can be rendered conceptually clear. The following chart lists the parallels between the *παροιμία* text of 10:1–5 and the three tales.²⁹⁸

παροιμία	Historical	Ecclesiological	Cosmological
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •shepherd •sheep •his own sheep •sheepfold •thief/robber •door •gatekeeper 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Jesus •'Jews' •believers •'Jewish' theocracy •'Jewish' leaders •? •? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Jesus/leaders of Joh. community •Joh. community •Joh. community •? •'Jewish' leaders •Jesus? •Jesus? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •the Word •humankind •believers •world •Satan (Jn 8,44) •Jesus' birth/death •the Baptist

According to Reinhartz' analysis, it is difficult to account for the elements of the door and the gatekeeper from within the historical tale. Reinhartz is equally not sure whether these elements refer to Jesus when looked at from within the ecclesiological tale. The element of the sheepfold also has no parallel in the ecclesiological tale. Only the cosmological tale can do full justice to all the elements of the *παροιμία*. Reinhartz retells the *παροιμία* of 10:1–5 in plain language from within the cosmological tale as follows:

“Truly, truly, I say to you, anyone who was not sent by the Father but entered the world a different way is the evil one, or Satan. The one who was sent by God and became flesh is the savior of humankind. It is to him that John the Baptist bore witness, and those who heard him believed in him. He called his own by name and

²⁹⁴ See Reinhartz, *The Word*, 17.

²⁹⁵ See Reinhartz, *The Word*, 18.

²⁹⁶ See Reinhartz, *The Word*, 26.

²⁹⁷ See Reinhartz, *The Word*, 72.

²⁹⁸ The chart is taken from Reinhartz, *The Word*, 93.

led them out of the world, so that while still in the world, they were not of the world. When he had led them all out, he went ahead of them out of the world by means of his death and resurrection, back to the realm of the Father from which he came. His believers will follow him to the Father because they have heard, understood, and accepted his message. They will not follow anyone else, not even the evil one, but they will flee from him because they do not recognize the validity of his message or his power.”²⁹⁹

Thus, Reinhartz clearly has an allegorical interpretation of 10:1–5. We will see in the next subsection that not all the studies of the reader-response approach to *παροιμία* promote such an understanding of Johannine *παροιμία*.

According to Reinhartz, John 16:25–33 supports the thesis that the cosmological tale is not only the frame of reference for 10:1–5, but for all the figurative language in the Fourth Gospel. The disciples are beloved (16:27) because of their “understanding of, and belief in, Jesus as described in the cosmological tale”. Jesus provides a concise summary of this tale in 16:28. The disciples respond in 16:29–30 that Jesus has spoken the plain meaning (cf. ἐν παρρησίᾳ) of the figurative language that Jesus has been speaking throughout the Gospel as a whole.³⁰⁰ In short, the Johannine *παροιμία* obtains its plain meaning (*παρρησία*) for the implied reader from within the cosmological tale.

Reinhartz’ study was highly innovative in its time, because it was the first study with a systematic reader-oriented approach to the Johannine *παροιμία*. Reinhartz does, however, not provide a detailed study of how *παροιμία* relates to *παρρησία* in John 10, and in the Gospel as a whole.³⁰¹ Reinhartz reconstructs an interpretive framework (the cosmological tale) in the Prologue and then employs this framework to interpret the imagery in the Gospel, but does not provide a detailed study of the views on language in the Fourth Gospel as they are expressed by John’s use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. Her understanding of the opposition between a reader-oriented approach and a historical approach is also highly questionable and will be criticised below.³⁰² The importance of a historical-contextual framework to interpret *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Gospel of John has already been argued for.³⁰³ Chapter Six to Eleven of the present study will provide this framework.

5.2 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND PARTICIPATION/TRANSFORMATION (G.R. O’DAY AND R. KYSAR)

According to Gail O’Day, the topic of John 16:25–33 is not the ‘what’, but the ‘how’ of revelation. Jesus’ words in 16:25 explicitly focus the disciples’ and the reader’s attention on the two revelatory modes in which Jesus makes God known: speech that is

²⁹⁹ Reinhartz, *The Word*, 96–97.

³⁰⁰ See Reinhartz, *The Word*, 97–98.

³⁰¹ Chapter Three of the present dissertation will provide this detailed study.

³⁰² See *infra* at the end of §5.3.

³⁰³ See *supra* at the end of §4.1.

in figures (ἐν παροιμίαις) and speech that is plain (παρρησία). O'Day is interested in how these two modes relate to each other.³⁰⁴ Understanding the relationship between παροιμία and παρρησία is “crucial for understanding the function of Johannine revelatory language and the type of participation made possible by such language”.³⁰⁵ O'Day is critical of the interpretation that 16:25 indicates a chronological relationship between ἐν παροιμίαις revelation and παρρησία revelation. In 16:25, the hour of Jesus' παρρησία is presented as still coming, whereas 16:32 speaks about the presence of the eschatological hour. She concludes from this that “[t]he two revelatory modes mentioned in 16:25 are not related to one another in a linear progression but are simultaneously operative in Jesus' revelation.”³⁰⁶ According to O'Day, this simultaneous operation of revelation and concealment results in the “transformation of times” or “the transformations of categories and assumptions” (16:33): “[a]ll of the disciples' assumptions and presuppositions must be transformed by Jesus' ultimate victory over the world.”³⁰⁷ Thus, the terms παροιμία and παρρησία do not legitimate an allegorical reading of the (figurative) language of the Johannine Jesus, but indicate that Johannine imagery functions differently. This imagery seeks to transform the assumptions and presuppositions of the reader, thereby enabling the reader to participate in a new reality.

Robert Kysar comes to similar conclusions on the basis of his study of the imagery in John 10:1–18. This imagery defies “our attempts to translate them into discursive language”. They are not illustrative comparisons, but “carry their own truth which resists generalization”. The series of images has the “poetic power to initiate a new kind of experience”. With each abrupt move to a new image the reader is drawn into “the picture world as members of the sheepfold”. The imagery can, therefore, be called “participatory”. The images produce a “shock to the imagination, a splitting of the ordinary reality which allows the possibility of the new”. The reader is confronted with the paradoxical nature of the imagery. The divine is portrayed in the images of “shepherd, sheepfold, and child”. Jesus is presented as “the gate to the sheepfold as well as shepherd of the sheep himself”. Additionally, the faithful reader visualises “the shepherd-gate” as “the son of a Parent”. The imagery is also “contrastive”, e.g., the good shepherd is opposed to the hired hand. The implied reader is triggered to evaluate experience in terms of the oppositions introduced by the imagery. This suggests the “decisional” character of this imagery. The reader is confronted with the choice to live in the world of the sheepfold of Jesus or another.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁴ See Gail R. O'Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative Mode and Theological Claim* (Philadelphia PA, Fortress Press, 1985), 104–105. For the necessity of this focus on the ‘how’ of revelation for understanding John's theology of revelation, see also Gail R. O'Day, “Narrative Mode and Theological Claim,” *JBL* 105/4 (1986) 657–668.

³⁰⁵ O'Day, *Revelation*, 105.

³⁰⁶ O'Day, *Revelation*, 108.

³⁰⁷ O'Day, *Revelation*, 108–109.

³⁰⁸ Kysar, “The Meaning,” 178–180.

The view of O'Day that *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* do not relate to one another in a linear progression is highly valuable, and is further supported by the thesis that revelation and concealment are not in opposition to each other in the Fourth Gospel.³⁰⁹ O'Day does, however, not provide a detailed study of how *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* relate to each other in the Gospel of John. The observations of O'Day provide further support for the necessity of such a study, which will be provided by the next chapter.³¹⁰ Furthermore, like Reinhartz, both O'Day and Kysar consider a reader-oriented approach to be in tension with a historical approach. The legitimacy of this either-or opposition will be criticised at the end of the next subsection.

5.3 JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND MARK 4:1–20 (C.W. SKINNER)

Christopher Skinner has posed the question how the implied audience of the Fourth Gospel is prepared to receive the *παροιμία* in John 10. Skinner presupposes that John knew the Gospel of Mark and that his Gospel is a response to, or correction of, Mark. The implied audience of John is aware of Jesus' parables and "how to interpret them along the lines of an interpretive model provided in Mark's first Kingdom parable, the Parable of the Sower (Mark 4:1–20)".³¹¹ In addition to this historical assumption, the implied audience is informed by the Prologue in John 1:1–18 that Jesus has come from above to reveal the Father. Jesus speaks in a "heavenly", "other-worldly", or "figurative" way, which is misinterpreted by his listeners, who take his language literally.³¹² The implied audience is informed by the misunderstanding of Jesus' listeners in 2:16–22. The narratorial explanation in 2:17, 21–22 is "John's version of a 'parable-of-the-sower' type moment in the narrative".³¹³ The implied audience is instructed on how to obtain a better interpretation of Jesus' words than his interlocutors, who take his words literally. According to Skinner, the implied audience is "now equipped to decode the 'otherworldly' or 'heavenly' nature of Jesus' words *without narratorial interruption*" in Jesus' conversation with Nicodemus (John 3), the Samaritan woman (John 4), and the Pharisees (John 7).³¹⁴ By means of the narrator's lesson in 2:17, 21–22 and the three mentioned textual examples in John 3, 4, and 7 the implied audience can recognise the metaphorical character of the *παροιμία* in 10:1–21 and has the tools to decipher its meaning.³¹⁵

First, in his analysis, Skinner uncritically presupposes not only that John knew Mark 4:1–20, but also that his understanding of *παροιμία* is very similar to Mark's *παραβολή*. It requires additional enquiry to verify or falsify if this really is the case. In Chapter

³⁰⁹ For this thesis, see *supra*, §4.2.

³¹⁰ See *infra*, Chapter Three.

³¹¹ Christopher W. Skinner, "The Good Shepherd *παροιμία* (John 10:1–21) and John's Implied Audience: A Thought Experiment in Reading the Fourth Gospel," *HBT* 40 (2018) 183–202: at 192.

³¹² Skinner, "The Good Shepherd *παροιμία*": 194.

³¹³ Skinner, "The Good Shepherd *παροιμία*": 195.

³¹⁴ Skinner, "The Good Shepherd *παροιμία*": 196. Italics in the original.

³¹⁵ See Skinner, "The Good Shepherd *παροιμία*": 198.

Twelve, I will provide an analysis of the relationship between παραβολή and παρρησία in Mark, and will compare Mark's use of these terms to how John uses παροιμία and παρρησία.³¹⁶ Second, Skinner's understanding of the implied audience of John neglects that the Gospel was written for an actual audience in the first century CE with a particular pre-understanding of παροιμία. In Chapter Eleven, I will provide a broader historical-contextual framework to interpret the Johannine παροιμία.³¹⁷

A general criticism against the authors of the reader-response approach is that their approach to Johannine παροιμία is defined in opposition to historical study. Yet, as argued by Peter Rabinowitz, every author who wishes to be understood has to adjust to, and guess at, the "beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions" of the audience he or she addresses. Rabinowitz rejects the notions of implied author/reader and speaks in terms of a hypothetical and authorial audience. The work of the author is successful if there is a certain overlap between the actual audience and the authorial audience that he or she has in mind while writing. The aim of interpretation is "to read as the author intended". This does not consist in a "search for the author's private psyche", but in the "joining of a particular social/interpretative community" or in "the acceptance of the author's invitation to read in a particular socially constituted way that is shared by the author and his or her expected readers". In order to join the authorial audience, we do not need "to ask what a *pure* reading of a given text would be", but "what sort of *corrupted* reader this particular author wrote for: what were the reader's beliefs, engagements, commitments, prejudices, and stampings of pity and terror".³¹⁸

In my approach, this identification with the first audience corresponds to what I have called with Gadamer the *Okkasionalität* of the text. The meaning of a text is always co-determined by the occasion for which it is intended. The hermeneutical demand is to understand the text in terms of the specific situation in which it was written. One, therefore, needs to transpose oneself into the historical horizon from which the text speaks.³¹⁹ Yet, unlike Rabinowitz, I do not think that our own historical horizon is confining us from a proper identification with the first audience of the text. The study of the conventions of the first audience do not help us to escape from the "confining effects of our culture by unmasking them".³²⁰ Rabinowitz comments that "distorting presuppositions lie at the heart of the reading process".³²¹ I myself, however, do not consider these presuppositions to be distorting, but necessary for every reading of the text. Even when identifying with the original audience, one can only do this from within one's

³¹⁶ See *infra*, Chapter Twelve.

³¹⁷ See *infra*, Chapter Eleven.

³¹⁸ Peter J. Rabinowitz, *Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21–26. Italics in the original. Rabinowitz' idea of an authorial audience has been adopted in Biblical criticism especially by Charles Talbert, Mikeal Parsons, and their students: see esp. Charles H. Talbert, *Reading Luke-Acts in its Mediterranean Milieu*, NovTSup 107 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

³¹⁹ See *supra*, Chapter One, §6.

³²⁰ Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, 9.

³²¹ Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, 26.

own historical horizon. With Gadamer, I have, therefore, argued in the previous chapter that the identification with the first audience of the text is the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. Only by being as conscious as possible of one's own presuppositions concerning the object of interpretation through a study of the reception history in which one is situated, one's presuppositions can be thwarted and altered by the otherness of the text. This confrontation with the otherness of the text brings about new questions that allow the researcher to re-identify with the first audience. In our intent to answer the question that the text asks us, we are involved in a process of questioning. Our own questions and the question that the text seeks to answer do not exist independently of each other. The reconstruction of the question to which the text provides an answer is subjected to historical mediation, and is, thus, co-determined by our own questions.³²²

The reception-historical study of the presuppositions that have guided previous interpretations of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* is the task of the present chapter. The confrontation with the otherness of the text has already provided us with new questions that enable us to identify with the first audience. The present section has demonstrated that the reader-response approach to Johannine *παροιμία* is guided by a particular pre-understanding of the genre of the language in the Gospel and its rhetorical function: the genre of a text is reader-oriented and arises from function in the sense that the nature of this genre can be described in terms of the function that it performs for the implied reader. As argued above, this focus on the response of the reader, however, does not excuse the interpreter from studying the historical context of John's views on language. The fusion of the historical horizon of the researcher and the historical horizon of the text is essential for the act of interpretation. The necessity of a broader historical-contextual framework to interpret *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel has, moreover, been demonstrated in the previous section³²³ and will be further argued for in the next section (6) with regard to the term *παρρησία*.

6. STUDIES ON THE SEMANTICS OF JOHANNINE *παρρησία*

The present section presents the studies on the semantics of *παρρησία* insofar as they deal with the use of this term in the Gospel of John. A division is made between studies that isolate John's understanding of *παρρησία* from contemporary Greek literature (6.1) and studies that do not (6.2).

6.1 JOHANNINE *παρρησία* AS SPECIFICALLY CHRISTIAN

According to Willem Van Unnik, Stanley Marrow, William Klassen, and Reimund Bieringer, *παρρησία* in John reflects none of the meanings current in contemporary Greek literature. Although Plutarch's contemporary use of the term as a criterion of friendship,

³²² See *supra*, Chapter One, §6 and §7.

³²³ See *supra* at the end of §4.1.

and the Cynics' understanding of it as a moral virtue was current knowledge during the New Testament period, no Plutarchian or Cynic connotations are present in John's Gospel.³²⁴ Jesus' *παρρησία* distinguishes itself from "mere freedom of speech in the political sphere", "the frankness and openness of amity and friendship", or "the cynic boldness of unbridled discourse and mindless criticism". It characterises his "role as the revealer of the Father (John 16:29)" and denotes "an openness towards God".³²⁵ Even when its Greek background and origin is required for understanding its basic meaning of saying everything freely, boldly, and openly, it is not simply a matter of speaking one's mind, but concerns the revelation of God. It is, therefore, a specifically Christian term.³²⁶ The LXX, too, is considered of little use to interpret *παρρησία* in John. The term is seldom used in the LXX and, therefore, could not have much influence on John.³²⁷ The LXX is only important because it initiates "the transit from the secular sphere to the religious". It uses *παρρησία* "in relation to God" (Ps 93 [94]:1), "to wisdom" (Prov 1:20), and "to the believer vis-à-vis God" (Job 22:26; 27:9–10). The use of *παρρησία* in the Gentile Greek world "remained within the sphere of human relations".³²⁸ In the only known example in Greek literature of *παρρησία* in relation to God, *παρρησία* is qualified as blasphemy and godlessness (Isoc., *Or.* 11:40).³²⁹

³²⁴ See Willem C. Van Unnik, "The Semitic Background of *παρρησία* in the New Testament," in *Sparsa Collecta: The Collected Essays of W.C. van Unnik: Part Two*, ed. Cilliers Breytenbach – Pieter W. van der Horst, NovTSup 30 (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 290–306, at 305; Stanley B. Marrow, *Speaking the Word Fearlessly: Boldness in the New Testament* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 67; William Klassen, "Parrēsia in the Johannine Corpus," in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 227–254, at 254; Reimund Bieringer, "Open, vrijmoedig, onverschrokken: De betekenis van parrhesia in de Septuaginta en in het Nieuwe Testament," *CBG* 35 (2005) 59–74: at 72–73. Van Unnik's article was first published as Willem C. Van Unnik, *De Semitische achtergrond van ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in het Nieuwe Testament*, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen afd. Letterkunde Nieuwe Reeks Deel 25 No 11 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche uitgeversmaatschappij, 1962), 585–601.

³²⁵ Stanley B. Marrow, "Parrhesia and the New Testament," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 431–446: at 444.

³²⁶ See Willem C. Van Unnik, "The Christian's Freedom of Speech in the New Testament," in *Sparsa Collecta*, vol. 2, 269–289, at 285 (originally published as Willem C. Van Unnik, "The Christian's Freedom of Speech in the New Testament," *BJRL* 44 [1962] 466–488); Van Unnik, "The Semitic Background," 306; Marrow, "Parrhesia": 439; Marrow, *Speaking the Word*, 65; Bieringer, "Open": 73–74. For the Greek background and origin of the basic meaning of *παρρησία*, see Erik Peterson, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von *παρρησία*," in *Reinhold Seeberg FS*, vol. 1, *Zur Theorie des Christentums*, ed. Wilhelm Koepp (Leipzig: D.W. Scholl, 1929), 283–297.

³²⁷ See Van Unnik, "The Semitic Background," 290. The noun *παρρησία* appears twelve times in the LXX: Lev 26:13; Esth 8:12; 1 Macc 4:18; 3 Macc 4:1; 7:12; 4 Macc 10:5; Prov 1:20; 10:10; 13:5; Job 27:10; Wis 5:1; Sir 25:25. Note that half of the occurrences are in Wisdom literature. The verb *παρρησιάζομαι* occurs five times in the LXX: Ps 11 (12):6; 93 (94):1; Prov 20:9; Job 22:26; Sir 6:11.

³²⁸ Marrow, "Parrhesia," 439–440.

³²⁹ Cf. John T. Fitzgerald, "Cultures of the Greco-Roman World," in *The New Interpreter's Bible One-Volume Commentary*, ed. Beverly R. Gaventa – David Petersen (Nashville TN: Abingdon, 2010), 983–987, at 986, who contrasts *παρρησία* to *δεισιδαιμονία* ("fear of/reverence for divinity") with reference to the use of the term *παρρησία* in Eph 3:12. In my view, it seems that Eph 3:12, unlike Isocrates, does not view

Van Unnik has employed the Syriac translations of the NT, the so-called *Peshitta*, to interpret *παρρησία* in the New Testament. These translations render *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32; John 18:20; Acts 2:29; 4:13, 29, 31; 28:31; Eph 6:19; Heb 4:16 as *bgl* 'yn (litt. 'with uncovered eyes', a standard expression for 'openly'). In addition to the Syriac transcription *prhsy* (e.g., 2 Cor 7:4; Eph 3:12; 1 Thess 2:2; Phlm 1:8; 1 John 5:14), the *Peshitta* also use the expression *bglywt* 'p' (litt. 'uncovering the face') as a translation of *παρρησία* (Phil 1:20; 1 Tim 3:13; Heb 3:6; 10:19, 35; 1 John 2:28; 3:21; 4:17). These metaphorical expressions simply mean confidence or boldness.³³⁰ Van Unnik considers the *Peshitta* as the best texts at our disposal to interpret the semantics of *παρρησία* in John, although he also says that one cannot use Syriac texts that were written after 200 CE as linguistic evidence for the semantics of *παρρησία* in John.³³¹ Thus, Van Unnik has pointed out the main weakness of his interpretation. In my view, there are, however, much better texts at our disposal to interpret the semantics of *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel.³³² Van Unnik has not observed the connections between *παρρησία* in John and its treatment by Greek literature contemporary to John's Gospel.

Concerning the semantics of *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel, Klassen distinguishes three meanings: (i) public versus private (John 7:4, 13, 26; 11:54); (ii) plain versus obscure (10:24; 11:14; 16:25, 29); and (iii) bold or courageous versus timid (7:26; 18:20). The first and the third meaning relate to each other. In both cases *παρρησία* is used explicitly (7:4; 18:20) or implicitly (7:13, 26; 11:54) as an antonym for *ἐν κρυπτῷ*. In the second meaning *παρρησία* is explicitly (16:25, 29) or implicitly (10:24; 11:14) an antonym of *ἐν παροιμίαις*.³³³

Other studies agree with this division,³³⁴ except for Van Unnik and Bieringer. Van Unnik disagrees with the view that the meaning of *παρρησία* in John 7:4 is restricted to

παρρησία towards God as blasphemy, but as characteristic of the relationship of the Christian believer to God.

³³⁰ See Van Unnik, "The Semitic Background," 294–296.

³³¹ See Van Unnik, "The Semitic Background," 297.

³³² See *infra*, Chapter Five to Eleven.

³³³ See Klassen, "Parrēsia," 240–245.

³³⁴ See Paul Joüon, "Divers sens de *παρρησία* dans le Nouveau Testament," *RSR* 30 (1940) 239–242: at 239–240; Schlier, "*παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι*": 877–878; Henri Holstein, "La parrēsia dans le Nouveau Testament," *BVC* 53 (1963) 45–54: at 46–48; Gerard J.M. Bartelink, "Quelques observations sur ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ dans la littérature paléo-chrétienne," in *Graecitas et latinitas christianorum primaeva: Supplementa* 3 (Nijmegen: Dekker & Van de Vegt, 1970), 5–57, at 11; Michel Bouttier, "Sur la parrhesia dans le Nouveau Testament," in *Parola e Spirito: Studi in onore di Settimio Cipriani*, vol. 1, ed. Cesare Casale Marcheselli (Brescia: Paideia, 1982), 611–621, at 617–619; Marrow, "Parrhesia," 442; Marrow, *Speaking the Word*, 65; Giuseppe Scarpata, *Parrhesia greca, parrhesia Cristiana*, Studi biblici 130 (Brescia: Paideia: 2001), 100–102; Balz, "*παρρησία*": 107–108; Kyriakoula Papademetriou, "The Performative Meaning of the Word *παρρησία* in Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible," in *Parrhesia: Ancient and Modern Perspectives on Freedom of Speech*, ed. Peter-Ben Smit – Eva van Urk, Studies in Theology and Religion 25 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 15–38, at 31.

Georg Schelbert, "Evangelium und Öffentlichkeit," *Forum Mission* 9 (2013) 48–61: esp. at 55–59 only discusses *παρρησία* in John 7 and 18:20. Schelbert translates the meaning of *ἐν παρρησίᾳ* in these texts as

‘public’. According to Van Unnik, the term *παρρησία* has the meaning here of “to be known openly”, not only as “an object of talk, but as a person who is not *incognito*”, that is, “whose true nature is open before all”. Like many terms in John’s Gospel, *παρρησία* has a double meaning in 7:4: “in public” and “revealing”.³³⁵ According to Bieringer, this meaning of ‘revealing’ is present in all the occurrences of *παρρησία* in John because Jesus’ *παρρησία* always meets opposition and rejection. The translation ‘in public’ is insufficient.³³⁶ The position of Heinrich Schlier, however, opposes this view and argues for the division that Klassen offers:

“Die Öffentlichkeit des Wirkens Jesu ist nicht mit seinem Offenbarsein zu verwechseln [...]. Wie wenig die Öffentlichkeit des Wirkens Jesu [see John 7:26; 11:54; 18:20; T.T.], so wie sie dem Kosmos sichtbar und verständlich ist, die Parrhesie des Offenbarers ist, geht daraus hervor, daß das öffentliche Wirken Jesu den Juden als messianisches Werk verborgen bleibt [see John 10:24–25; T.T.].”³³⁷

Since the ‘Jews’ do not understand Jesus during his public teaching, Schlier concludes that *παρρησία* can refer either to the public or the revelatory character of Jesus’ teaching, but not to both simultaneously. His interpretation of *παρρησία*, however, renders unclear why Jesus’ *παρρησία* always meets opposition. If *παρρησία* sometimes only denotes the public character of Jesus’ teaching, the reason for this opposition remains unresolved. The ‘Jews’ did not oppose Jesus’ teaching because it was public, but because it opposed their views on revelation. Therefore, Bieringer is right that the meaning of ‘revealing’ is always implied in *παρρησία* in John’s Gospel. The division offered by Klassen is not adequate.

Klassen’s division in meaning between *παρρησία* as ‘public’ and ‘bold’ (meanings i and iii) on the one hand, and *παρρησία* as ‘plain’ (meaning ii), on the other, is motivated by a difficulty in John’s use of *παρρησία*. Whereas Jesus teaches *παρρησία* before his death (John 7:26; 11:54; 18:20), his *παρρησία* is not comprehended (10:24–25) and presented as a future promise (16:25). Thus, Jesus’ *παρρησία* is presented as both present and not present, but future. Klassen *et al.* deal with this apparent contradiction by presupposing that *παρρησία* is homonymic in John’s Gospel. The term can refer to the public and bold nature of Jesus’ teaching (7:4, 26; 11:54; 18:20), but it can also have the meaning of speaking plainly (10:24; 11:14; 16:25, 29). Although Jesus has taught ‘in public’ and ‘boldly’ about his identity (7:26; 11:54; 18:20), he was misunderstood (10:24–25). He will, therefore, speak ‘plainly’ about the Father at the time of his death (16:25). Klassen, however, admits that John’s use of *παρρησία* with the meaning of public (versus ‘private’) “is practically unknown in Hellenistic Greek, although it approaches

“öffentlich” or “in der Öffentlichkeit”. Hence, he agrees with Klassen’s understanding of *παρρησία* as public versus private.

³³⁵ Van Unnik, “The Christian’s Freedom,” 284.

³³⁶ See Bieringer, “Open”: 68.

³³⁷ Schlier, “*παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι*”: 877–878.

the way in which Philo uses it once” (Ph., *Flacc.* 4).³³⁸ His interpretation of the semantics of *παρρησία* in John is indebted to Bultmann, who had remarked similarly before him.³³⁹

There are, however, five problems with this interpretation of the semantics of *παρρησία* in John’s Gospel. First, as mentioned earlier, Bieringer has correctly remarked that the understanding of *παρρησία* as denoting the public character of Jesus’ teaching cannot explain why the ‘Jews’ oppose Jesus’ *παρρησία*. This opposition cannot be caused by the public character of Jesus’ teaching, but only by its revelatory character. Second, it is problematic to presuppose that the meaning of *παρρησία* in a specific context is limited to the opposite meaning of the expression with which it is combined (ἐν κρυπτῷ or ἐν παροιμίαις). The term, as such, has a richer meaning that is not lost in relation to its specific antonym. The following and third criticism is similar: the use of two antonyms for one word does not guarantee that this word is homonymic. For instance, the use of *παρρησία* in John 7:3–4 confirms this. Although *παρρησία* is used there as an antonym for ἐν κρυπτῷ, its meaning is not restricted to ‘in public’, but the meaning of ‘revelation’ is implied. The brothers’ exhortation to Jesus to be ἐν *παρρησία* is clarified with the command φανέρωσον σεαυτὸν τῷ κόσμῳ. Like Jesus’ mother in 2:3, the brothers exhort Jesus not to hide, but to reveal himself as who he claims to be.³⁴⁰ The exhortation is ironic because the brothers do not have faith in Jesus (7:5).³⁴¹ Elsewhere in the Gospel φανερώω also has the meaning of revelation (1:31; 2:11; 3:21; 9:3; 17:6), and not the meaning of being in public, although the occurrences in John 21:1[2] and 21:14 are ambiguous. Fourth, in no other Greek literature is the meaning of *παρρησία* limited to ‘public’. Thus, this translation renders John’s relationship with the contemporary Greek literature unclear. Fifth, the term *παρρησία* is clearly polysemic in the Fourth Gospel. One cannot deal with polysemy in ancient texts by drawing clear lines between possible connotations of a word. I agree with Francis Gerald Downing that this desire to disambiguate language was simply not a concern of ancient authorship, nor readership.³⁴² Polysemy may not be confused with homonymy, because, unlike the latter, the former allows for ambiguity. Given that *παρρησία* is polysemic in the Fourth Gospel, it cannot mean ‘public’ in some occurrences and ‘plain’ in others, as if the term were a homonym.

If one does not disambiguate *παρρησία* in two distinct meanings, viz. ‘public’ and ‘plain’, the question remains how to deal with the difficulty that Jesus spoke and walked

³³⁸ Klassen, “Parrēsia,” 243.

³³⁹ Bultmann, *Johannes*, 219 n. 1: “[π]αρρησία bedeutet hier natürlich nicht, wie ursprünglich im Griechischen, das Recht oder auch den Mut zur Öffentlichkeit, die Redefreiheit oder Offenheit [...], sondern, wie später häufig, Öffentlichkeit.” See also Joüon, “Divers sens”: 239.

³⁴⁰ Michael Theobald, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes: Kapitel 1–12*, RNT (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet Regensburg, 2009), 510 correctly observes in this context that the brothers in John 7:4 unconsciously tell the truth that the whole earthly teaching of Jesus in John 1–12 is “*Offenbarung vor der Welt*” (cf. 18:20).

³⁴¹ Correctly observed by Hartwig Thyen, *Das Johannesevangelium*, HNT 6 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 387.

³⁴² See F. Gerald Downing, “Ambiguity, Ancient Semantics, and Faith,” *NTS* 56/1 (2010) 139–162: esp. at 142.

(ἐν) παρρησία during his life time, whereas John 7:4–8 and 16:25 refer to Jesus’ death as the time of his παρρησία. A look at John’s contemporary Greek literature on παρρησία might be more useful than the studies reviewed in this subsection presuppose.³⁴³ The use of παρρησία, its aim, and its pitfalls was a topic of philosophical reflection in Philodemus’ Περὶ παρρησίας (abbr. *Lib.*; 1st c. BCE) and Plutarch’s Πῶς ἂν τις διακρίνει τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου (abbr. *Adulator*; 90–115 CE).³⁴⁴ I do not contend that there is a direct literary dependence of the Fourth Gospel on these texts, but that John’s use of παρρησία interacts with its Greco-Roman context. On the side of the reader, one may also assume that the first readers of John’s Gospel had a pre-understanding of παρρησία that was influenced by their Greco-Roman context.

For the following five reasons, the research question whether there is an indirect influence of the treatment of παρρησία by *Lib.* and *Adulator* on the Gospel of John is worth pursuing:

(1) Glenn Holland has demonstrated that Lucian of Samosata wrote for an audience in the second century CE that was familiar with the idea of παρρησία as brotherly correction that we can find in Philodemus’ Περὶ παρρησίας. Through his alter-ego Παρρησιάδης, Lucian has extended this idea to public satiric attacks in his dialogue *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman*. His audience could only have understood the use of παρρησία in this dialogue, if it had been familiar with the philosophical understanding of παρρησία that can be found in Philodemus’ Περὶ παρρησίας.³⁴⁵ Plutarch’s *Adulator* can equally be considered as representing the views on παρρησία of “the man of letters” in the Greco-Roman world. *Adulator* uses terms that form “the basis of many τόποι in friendship literature”: ἔπαινος, ψόγος, μέμψις, εὐνοία, ἡδύς, ὁμοιότης, ὅμοιος, παρρησία, συνήθεια, συνήθης, χάρις, χρεία, and ὠφέλιμος. Plutarch knows this literature well and “compiled works that must be considered derivative at best”.³⁴⁶ He further propagates ideas that were already widespread in the Greco-Roman world. Thus, both Philodemus’ *Lib.* and Plutarch’s *Adulator* are sources that inform us about the conventions of παρρησία in the 1st century CE – 2nd century CE. These conventions probably (indirectly) influenced John and his audiences as well.

(2) The influence of *Lib.* and *Adulator* on the early Christian world has already been confirmed by scholars of Pauline literature. Paul uses παρρησία in his epistles according to the conventions embraced by *Lib.* and *Adulator*. Both his audiences and his critics were

³⁴³ See *infra*, Chapter Six.

³⁴⁴ For this dating of Philodemus’ *Lib.* and Plutarch’s *Adulator*, see respectively David Konstan *et al.* (eds.), *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism. Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, SBLTT 43 Graeco-Roman 13 (Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1998), 1 and Robert Klaerr – André Philippon – Jean Sirinelli (eds.), *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, tome 1 – 2e partie, Budé (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1989), 77–79.

³⁴⁵ See Glenn S. Holland, “Call Me Frank: Lucian’s (Self-)Defense of Frank Speaking and Philodemus’ Περὶ Παρρησίας,” in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald – Dirk Obbink – Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 245–267.

³⁴⁶ Edward N. O’Neil, “Plutarch on Friendship,” in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, SBLSBS 34 (Atlanta GA: Scholars, 1997), 105–122, at 120. For commentary on *Adulator*’s use of these terms, see O’Neil, “Plutarch on Friendship,” 113–120.

aware of the philosophical understandings of *παρρησία* as presented by *Lib.* and *Adulator*.³⁴⁷ A comparable study for the Gospels is, however, lacking in the scholarly literature.

(3) Philodemus' *Lib.* seems to be composed of lecture notes on the treatment of *παρρησία* by his Epicurean teacher, Zeno of Sidon. Philodemus studied under Zeno at Athens in the 1st c. BCE and appears to have organised his material by first quoting a topic or question, and then going on to give his teacher's elaboration.³⁴⁸ Epicureanism was a "dominant philosophical force" during the New Testament period. The wide and stable popularity of Epicureanism during this time is attested by Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.9–10. Epicurean concerns were present in "the consciousness of both the literary elite [...] and the populace at large" in the Greco-Roman world.³⁴⁹ As demonstrated by Fergus King, Epicureanism was present in all the potential places where the Fourth Gospel might have been written.³⁵⁰

(4) As observed by scholarship, Epicureans and early Christians were often lumped together in common consciousness from the 2nd c. CE onwards.³⁵¹ Clarence Glad's study has, moreover, demonstrated that there are many similarities between Epicurean and Pauline communities in terms of education.³⁵² Since *Lib.* provides a good picture of education in Epicurean communities, it will function as a broader basis from which to interpret the use of *παρρησία* in John's Gospel. At the same time the Fourth Gospel provides a context for understanding the Epicurean material as well.

(5) In contrast to the mores of the time, women were allowed in Epicurean schools.³⁵³ Notably, as noted by scholarship, women also play a prominent role in the Fourth Gospel:

³⁴⁷ See Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy*, NovTSup 81 (Leiden: Brill, 1995); David E. Fredrickson, "IIAPPHEIA in the Pauline Epistles," in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, 163–183; Benjamin Fiore, "The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of Philodemus' 'On Frank Criticism'," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, 271–293; J. Paul Sampley, "Paul's Frank Speech with the Galatians and the Corinthians," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, 295–321; Peter Lampe, "Can Words Be Violent or Do They Only Sound That Way? Second Corinthians: Verbal Warfare from Afar as a Complement to a Placid Personal Presence," in *Paul and Rhetoric*, ed. J. Paul Sampley – Peter Lampe (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 223–239.

³⁴⁸ This information on Philodemus is taken from Konstan *et al.* (eds.), *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*, 1.

³⁴⁹ Fiore, "The Pastoral Epistles," 274. See also Norman W. DeWitt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota, 1954), 62, 88–89.

³⁵⁰ See Fergus J. King, *Epicureanism and the Gospel of John: A Study of their Compatibility*, WUNT 2/537 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2020), 10–20.

³⁵¹ See Adelaide D. Simpson, "Epicureans, Christians, Atheists in the Second Century," *TAPA* 72 (1941) 372–381; Richard P. Jungkuntz, "Epicureanism and the Church Fathers" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1961), 64–66; Richard P. Jungkuntz, "Fathers, Heretics and Epicureans," *JEH* 17 (1966) 3–10: at 9; Joseph J. Walsh, "On Christian Atheism," *VC* 45/3 (1991) 255–277: at 261; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992) 267–333: at 324 with reference to, e.g., Lucian., *Alex.* 25, 38.

³⁵² See Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*.

³⁵³ For a selection of texts on the positive evaluation of women in Epicureanism, see Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Martin Classical Lectures:

(i) Jesus' mother was instrumental in Jesus' sign of the wine miracle (John 2:1–12); (ii) the Samaritan woman enjoyed Jesus' sympathy and declares Jesus as the Saviour of the world (4:4–42); (iii) Mary and Martha were the first witnesses to the raising of Lazarus from the death (11:1–44); (iv) Mary was the first to proclaim Jesus' forthcoming death by anointing him (12:1–7); (v) the women at the cross (19:25–27); and (vi) Mary Magdalene was the first witness to Jesus' resurrection (20:1–2, 11–18).³⁵⁴ However, as one can learn from a study by Nathan Barnes; not only Epicurean schools allowed women, but so did other philosophical schools of the 1st century CE.³⁵⁵

Due to the five above-mentioned reasons, I will interpret *παρρησία* in John against the background of the conventions of *παρρησία* as depicted in Philodemus' *Lib.* and Plutarch's *Adulator*.³⁵⁶

6.2 AN INITIAL ATTEMPT TO HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION OF JOHANNINE *παρρησία* (G.L. PARSENIOS)

An initial attempt to a historical-contextual understanding of the semantics of *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel is offered by a recent paper by George Parsenius, which studies the connections between Jesus' *παρρησία* and the thoughts of ancient philosophers and orators on *παρρησία*.³⁵⁷ Parsenius reacts against the practice that

New Series 2 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 115, 117 and Nathan J. Barnes, *Reading 1 Corinthians with Philosophically Educated Women* (Eugene OR: Pickwick, 2014), 100–108.

³⁵⁴ See S.J. Nortjé, "The Role of Women in the Fourth Gospel," *Neot* 20 (1986) 21–28; Martin Scott, *Sophia and the Johannine Jesus*, JSNTSup 71 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 174–240; Judith E. McKinlay, *Gendering Wisdom the Host: Biblical Invitations to Eat and Drink*, JSOTSup 216 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 208–237. Scott and McKinlay explain the importance of women in John with reference to parallels between *λόγος* and Jesus in the Fourth Gospel and *σοφία* in wisdom literature. As God's creative power is articulated in both male and female terms, also the disciples who follow Jesus must reflect this gender diversity. Martin Hengel, *Die johanneische Frage: Ein Lösungsversuch*, WUNT 67 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), 264–274 has raised the question whether the Beloved Disciple might be a woman.

³⁵⁵ Barnes, *Reading 1 Corinthians*, 65–120 lists a number of philosophical schools in the 1st century CE that had female members.

³⁵⁶ See *infra*, Chapter Six to Eleven.

³⁵⁷ In addition to this study from Parsenius, Dennis Sylva, *Thomas – Love as Strong as Death: Faith and Commitment in the Fourth Gospel*, LNTS 434 (London: T&T Clark, 2013), 108–129 has studied the character of Thomas in the Gospel of John from the perspective of the views on *παρρησία* in the classical, Hellenistic, and Roman periods through the first century CE. Other studies have used the ancient understanding of psychagogy as an interpretive framework to interpret the teaching of the Johannine Jesus as an adaptable pedagogy: see George L. Parsenius, "Adaptability and the Good Shepherd (John 10:1–11; 1 Cor. 9:19–23)," *PSB* 25 (2004) 248–253; George L. Parsenius, "The Jesus of History and Divine Adaptability in St. John Chrysostom's Interpretation of John 4," in *Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions. The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research, Princeton 2007*, ed. James H. Charlesworth – Petr Pokorný – Brian Rhea (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 863–873; Jason S. Sturdevant, "Incarnation as Psychagogy: The Purpose of the Word's Descent in John's Gospel," *NovT* 56/1 (2014) 24–44; Jason S. Sturdevant, *The Adaptable Jesus of the Fourth Gospel: The Pedagogy of the Logos*, NovTSup 162 (Leiden: Brill, 2015). Although discussions of *παρρησία* were important for the ancient

παρρησία in John's Gospel is generally translated "in a non-technical sense, with words like 'openly' or 'publicly' or 'clearly'". These translations render "the association between the Johannine usage of *parrēsia* and other ancient treatments of 'frank speech' unclear".³⁵⁸ Parsenios discusses six connections between John's use of *παρρησία* and its treatment by other Greek literature. However, he does not claim that John knew these ancient Greek treatments of *παρρησία*.

(1) Ancient authors consider *παρρησία* to be appropriate in two different contexts: in the presence of friends and in the presence of enemies.³⁵⁹ Jesus' *παρρησία* equally occurs in two contexts: a public *παρρησία*, in which there is conflict (John 7:26; 10:24; 11:14, 54; 18:20), and a more intimate *παρρησία* among his disciples (16:25), whom he calls φίλοι (15:13–14).³⁶⁰

However, this connection does not add much to our understanding of the semantics of *παρρησία* in John's Gospel, because it does not explain: (i) how Jesus' public *παρρησία* differs from his intimate *παρρησία* among friends. More fundamental is the question whether John conceives of Jesus' *παρρησία* as private and/or public. I will address this question in Chapter Ten;³⁶¹ and (ii) how to distinguish friends from enemies in John's Gospel. Are the Samaritans (John 4:1–42), the Greeks (12:20–21), Nicodemus (3:1–21), the Roman official (4:46–54), etc. friends or enemies? Parsenios' study lacks an analysis of how Jesus' *παρρησία* adjusts itself to its addressees in the literary context of the Gospel, and how to relate Jesus' strategic use of *παρρησία* to the treatment of *παρρησία* by contemporary Greek literature. In Chapter Seven, I will provide such an analysis.³⁶²

(2) Parsenios takes over John Chrysostom's interpretation of *παρρησία* in John 7:3–4.³⁶³ According to this interpretation, the brothers accuse Jesus of: (i) cowardice when they say that he works ἐν κρυπτῷ; and (ii) vainglory when they say that he seeks (ζητεῖ) to be ἐν παρρησίᾳ. Thus, Jesus' brothers accuse Jesus of cowardice, because he will not behave with ambition.³⁶⁴ Parsenios connects this interpretation with Greek literature in the following way: (i) To choose secrecy over *παρρησία* is a sign of fear and cowardice;³⁶⁵ and (ii) egocentric *παρρησία* is to be despised.³⁶⁶ Self-promoting *παρρησία* is no

understanding of psychagogy, the above-mentioned studies do not pay attention to the interpretation of the term *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel.

³⁵⁸ George L. Parsenios, "Confounding Foes and Counseling Friends: *Parrēsia* in the Fourth Gospel and Greco-Roman Philosophy," in *The Prologue of the Gospel of John: Its Literary, Theological, and Philosophical Contexts: Papers Read at the Colloquium Ioanneum*, ed. Jan G. van der Watt – R. Alan Culpepper – Udo Schnelle, WUNT 359 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 251–272, at 252.

³⁵⁹ See Isoc., *Or.* 2.3; Phld., *Pap.Herc.* 1082 col. II:1–3.

³⁶⁰ See Parsenios, "Confounding Foes," 253.

³⁶¹ See *infra*, Chapter Ten.

³⁶² See *infra*, Chapter Seven.

³⁶³ For this second connection between John's use of *παρρησία* and its treatment by other Greek literature, see Parsenios, "Confounding Foes," 253–257.

³⁶⁴ See Chrys., *Hom. Jo.* 47:2.

³⁶⁵ See D.H., *Ant. rom.* 6.72.5; Demosth., *Or.* 6.31–32; Xen., *Ages.* 11.5; D. Chr., *Or.* 77/78.42, 45.

³⁶⁶ See D. Chr., *Or.* 32.11–12.

παρρησία at all.³⁶⁷ Real παρρησία is not motivated by the ambition of the speaker, but by a concern for the listener.³⁶⁸

That John 7:3–4 is a reprove of cowardice and an exhortation to act with ambition is, in my view, already clear in the literary context of John's Gospel. The connections with Greek literature that Parsenios provides are interesting, but do not add anything to the act of interpretation. There are, however, difficulties with the use of παρρησία in John 7 that cannot be solved from within the literary context of the Gospel and that are not dealt with by Parsenios. Parsenios does not explain: (i) why Jesus answers his brothers that the *καιρός* of his παρρησία has not yet come (7:6, 8); and (ii) why Jesus does go up to Jerusalem and speaks παρρησία there (7:26). The main difficulty of interpreting παρρησία in John 7 is that Jesus' negative response to his brothers is followed by positive action. Jesus' brothers exhort Jesus to be ἐν παρρησίᾳ and go up to Jerusalem to the feast of Tabernacles (suggestion; 7:4–5). Jesus replies to his brothers that the critical moment (*καιρός*) for his παρρησία has not yet come (negative response; 7:6–8). The term *καιρός* is equivalent to ὥρα. The latter term is also articulated as the critical moment of Jesus' παρρησία in 16:25. Both terms refer to the time of Jesus' death.³⁶⁹ However, Jesus goes up to Jerusalem, although [ὡς] ἐν κρυπτῷ (7:10). About the middle of the feast, he goes up to the temple (7:14) and some of the people of Jerusalem report that he speaks παρρησία there (positive action; 7:26). This structure of 'suggestion, negative response, and positive action' is not exceptional in John's text because it is also present in 2:1–11; 4:46–54; 7:2–14; 11:1–44.³⁷⁰ Equally in 2:4, Jesus explains his negative response by saying that his ὥρα has not yet come. John 4:52–53 emphasises the personally relevant hour at which Jesus spoke. All this suggests that there is no inconsistency or change of mind on Jesus' part. He calls the time of his death the critical moment of his παρρησία (7:6, 8; 16:25), yet he teaches παρρησία during his life time (7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54; 18:20). Parsenios has convincingly demonstrated that ἐν παρρησίᾳ cannot be rendered as 'in public' in 7:4–5. This, however, leaves us with the difficulty that I have discussed in the previous subsection. If one does not consider παρρησία in John as homonymic, one

³⁶⁷ See Epict., *Diatr.* 3.1.10–11; D. Chr., *Or.* 32.5.

³⁶⁸ See Plut., *Adulator* 55b.

³⁶⁹ This is a very widespread interpretation of *καιρός* in John 7:6, 8: see, e.g., Barrett, *John*, 312–313; Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel according to John (I–XII)*, AB 29 (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 306–307; Jean Zumstein, *L'évangile selon de Saint Jean (I–12)*, CNT 4a (Genève: Labor et fides, 2014), 251–252.

Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium*, vol. 2, *Kommentar zu Kap. 5–12*, HthK 4/2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 195 sees, however, a small nuance between ὥρα and *καιρός*: “[w]ährend in der ὥρα die vom Vater ausgehende Verfügung liegt, die jede vorzeitige Herbeiführung der Todesstunde verhindert (vgl. 7,30; 8,20) und ihm selbst seine Verherrlichung, als es so weit ist, ansagt (vgl. 12,23; 13,1; 17,1), kommt bei dem *καιρός* das anfordernde Moment hinzu, sich unter dem Anruf Gottes zu entscheiden.” Yet, even if *καιρός* refers to Jesus' decision to accept death, it cannot be seen in disjunction with the ὥρα of the Father's decree. Both terms refer to the same temporal reality.

³⁷⁰ For the analysis of this structure in John 2:1–11; 4:46–54; 7:2–14; 11:1–44, see Charles H. Giblin, “Suggestion, Negative Response, and Positive Action in St John's Portrayal of Jesus (John 2.1–11; 4.46–54; 7.2–14; 11.1–44),” *NTS* 26 (1980) 197–211.

is faced with the difficulty that Jesus spoke and walked (ἐν) παρρησία during his life time, whereas 7:6, 8 and 16:25 refer to Jesus' death as the time of his παρρησία. Parsenios does not offer a solution for this difficulty. In Chapter Six of the present study, I will provide a historical-contextual approach to this difficulty in the Fourth Gospel.³⁷¹

(3) In Lucian's *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman* παρρησία is personified by Παρρησιάδης. This character demonstrates that "his contemporary philosophers are frauds and do not live up to the examples of the grand old masters, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle". The task of παρρησία is to expose faults by separating false appearances from reality and friends from flatterers. Παρρησία shows what people really are beneath the mask. The words ἀμαρτία, ἐλέγχω, and ἀλήθεια are semantically connected to παρρησία.³⁷² Jesus, too, says to the contemporary heirs of Moses (John 5:45–47; 7:19) and Abraham (8:33–58) that they do not live up to the example of their ancestors, although these heirs claim to follow them. The words ἀλήθεια, ἀμαρτία, and ἐλέγχω are also clustered in John 8:46. When viewed from John 18:20, Jesus suggests in 8:46 that he can speak παρρησία to expose sins, but the 'Jews' cannot. However, in John 9, Jesus, also, is reproached. The topic of this chapter is 'who is the sinner?' In 3:20–21, ἀλήθεια is associated with ἀμαρτία. The terms παρρησία, ἀλήθεια, ἀμαρτία, and ἐλέγχω are part of the same mechanism.³⁷³

Again, this is a very interesting connection with Greek literature, because it provides insights into the technicality of παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel, and exposes the interpretations of the previous subsection as inaccurate. However, some questions remain. First, if the aim of παρρησία is to discern true from false and a friend from a flatterer, on what criterion can it succeed in this? Second, how do we have to understand this technical meaning of παρρησία against the background of John's characterisation of Jesus' death as an act of παρρησία (John 7:6–8; 16:25)? In Chapter Nine, I will provide an answer to these questions.³⁷⁴

(4) The fourth connection with Greek literature concerns the reaction of the audience towards παρρησία. Parsenios sees again a connection between the Fourth Gospel and Lucian's *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman*. This connection is based on four agreements between both writings: (i) Socrates and the other philosophers first react with violence towards Παρρησιάδης. They seek to kill him.³⁷⁵ Jesus' audience, too, seeks to kill Jesus (e.g., John 5:18; 8:59); (ii) legal prosecution follows violence. Παρρησιάδης convinces his attackers not to stone him, but to give him an honest trial.³⁷⁶ This is paralleled with Nicodemus' reaction to the Pharisees that their conclusions are hasty, and that Jesus deserves a trial (John 7:47–51). Both Jesus and Παρρησιάδης are brought before a judge. Jesus before the High Priest and Pontius Pilate, Παρρησιάδης in front of

³⁷¹ See *infra*, Chapter Six.

³⁷² See Isoc., *Or.* 2.3; D. Chr., *Or.* 51.4; Phld., *Lib.* col. XVIb:5–8.

³⁷³ See Parsenios, "Confounding Foes," 257–260.

³⁷⁴ See *infra*, Chapter Nine.

³⁷⁵ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 20.

³⁷⁶ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 8.

the personification of philosophy; (iii) the defences of Jesus and Παρρησιάρχης are similar. Παρρησιάρχης claims that he does not oppose the ancient founders of philosophy, but only their modern heirs. These modern philosophers contradict the teaching of their founders. They are a sham. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle wrongly consider Παρρησιάρχης as attacking them, when he was actually attacking their false disciples. His attack on false philosophers is a defence of the true. The ancient philosophers all agree with him and join him in his intent to expose these moderns as fake.³⁷⁷ Jesus, equally, exhorts his interlocutors to look for the true application of an ancient message. Jesus, too, claims not to oppose the ancient teachers. Moses unites with Jesus in accusation, just as the ancient founders of philosophy join with Παρρησιάρχης (John 5:39–40, 45–47; 8:39–40); and (iv) in a second trial, Παρρησιάρχης becomes the persecutor and the modern philosophers are persecuted.³⁷⁸ Such a legal reversal, also, occurs three times in John's Gospel. John 7–8 begins with Jesus being judged, but ends with him being the judge. John 9 finishes with a reversal of judge and sinners (9:41). The trial before Pilate is not a trial of Jesus by Pilate, but a trial of Pilate by Jesus.³⁷⁹

In spite of all these parallels, they offer little insight into the reactions to Jesus' παρρησία: (i) Little is said about how different groups react differently to Jesus' παρρησία and how Jesus adjusts his strategy to these reactions. In Chapter Seven, I will discuss this topic in detail;³⁸⁰ and (ii) the parallels provide no understanding of the connection between Jesus' παρρησία and the different forms of asking. John 16:25 is situated in Jesus' discourse on the different forms of asking (16:23–26), in which ἐρωτάω is systematically used to designate the asking of Jesus before his death, and αἰτέω for the future asking in Jesus' name when Jesus has departed to the Father.³⁸¹ This consistent use of these verbs is found elsewhere in the Gospel (αἰτέω: 14:13–14; 15:7, 16/ ἐρωτάω: 4:31, 40, 47; 9:2, 15; 16:5, 19, 30; 18:19, 21). Due to the strong division between past and future in 16:23–26, παροιμία is associated with ἐρωτάω and παρρησία with αἰτέω (cf. 1 John 3:21–22; 5:14–15). Chapter Five of the present study will research the semantic relationship between these terms.³⁸²

(5) Seneca, *Ep.* 29.1–3 states that speaking boldly to a person who is afraid to hear the truth is a waste of time. Parnsenios uses this idea to explain Jesus' silence in John 19:8–9. Pilate is unable to hear the truth, even if it stands right in front of him (18:38). Jesus' παρρησία is expressed as silence in such a circumstance.³⁸³

³⁷⁷ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 31, 32, 33.

³⁷⁸ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 39.

³⁷⁹ See Parnsenios, "Confounding Foes," 261–266.

³⁸⁰ See *infra*, Chapter Seven.

³⁸¹ Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel according to John (XIII–XXI)*, AB 29A (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 734 remarks that John 16:25 seems "intrusive" between 16:24 and 16:26, "both of which deal with the theme of asking".

³⁸² See *infra*, Chapter Five.

³⁸³ Parnsenios, "Confounding Foes," 266–269.

However, there are many simpler explanations for Jesus' silence in John 19:8–9 that Parsenius does not take into consideration. Pilate asks Jesus where he is from. A possible explanation for Jesus' silence is that Jesus does not answer because "Pilate will not understand the answer to the question and the Johannine reader already does".³⁸⁴ Pilate is not afraid to hear the truth. If one characterises Pilate as aggressive, Pilate is not interested in truth, and considers it as "unknowable, illusory or unreal".³⁸⁵ One can equally characterise Pilate as reluctant. Although Pilate does not understand Jesus, Pilate utters repeatedly that Jesus is the king of the Jews (18:37, 39; 19:14, 15, 19, 21–22). Pilate rather functions as "the mouthpiece of a truth [he, T.T.] does not, indeed cannot, fully comprehend".³⁸⁶ As I have demonstrated elsewhere, both characterisations of Pilate are possible.³⁸⁷ Parsenius' connection with Greek literature, thus, does not do justice to the literary context of Jesus' silence in John's Gospel.

(6) According to Plutarch (*Adulator* 74d), Philo (*Her.* 19, 21), and Philodemus (*Lib.* fr. 15), *παρρησία* appears in the context of friendship. The verb *φιλέω*, also, occurs in the context of *παρρησία* in John 16:25–33. Parsenius refers to an article of Fredrickson to demonstrate that Greek literature often views irony (*τὸ εἰρωνεύεσθαι*) and figures (*σχηματίζειν*) as the opposite of speaking 'simply' (*ἀπλοῦς*) and directly. He, also, sees this opposition in John's Gospel and interprets 16:25 as referring to the opposition between speaking in figures (*ἐν παροιμίαις*) and speaking boldly (*παρρησία*). Jesus' *παρρησία* "is intended to be as clear and unadulterated as possible".³⁸⁸

The interpretation that Jesus' *παρρησία* is opposed to *παροιμία* has, however, been questioned in section four of the present study,³⁸⁹ and will be further evaluated by the next chapter of the present dissertation.³⁹⁰

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

The present *status quaestionis* has provided the necessary insights into the hermeneutical situation of the present researcher. All four approaches (genre-critical, hermeneutical, post-hermeneutical, and reader-response) to *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel are guided by certain presuppositions:

(1) The genre-critical approach presupposes that the genre of Johannine *παροιμία* is static and can be identified on the basis of formal criteria. In this approach, *παρρησία*

³⁸⁴ Martinus C. de Boer, "The Narrative Function of Pilate in John," in *Narrativity in Biblical and Related Texts*, ed. George J. Brooke – Jean-Daniel Kaestli, BETL 149 (Leuven: Leuven University Press – Peeters, 2000), 141–158, at 153. See, also, Christopher M. Tuckett, "Pilate in John 18–19. A Narrative-Critical Approach," in *Narrativity in Biblical and Related Texts*, 131–140, at 137.

³⁸⁵ Tuckett, "Pilate," 135.

³⁸⁶ De Boer, "The Narrative Function," 152–153.

³⁸⁷ See Thomas Tops, "Whose Truth? A Reader-Oriented Study of the Johannine Pilate and John 18,38a," *Bib* 97 (2016) 395–420: at 395–409.

³⁸⁸ Parsenius, "Confounding Foes," 270–272.

³⁸⁹ See *supra*, §4.2.

³⁹⁰ See *infra*, Chapter Three.

refers to language in which the literary features that define the genre of Johannine *παροιμία* are absent. Speaking (ἐν) *παρρησία* means speaking, e.g., ‘without riddles’, ‘without proverbs’, and ‘without parables’.

(2) The hermeneutical approach abandons the view of the genre-critical approach that Johannine *παροιμία* is a *terminus technicus* of a static and formal literary genre, and instead presupposes that literary genres are dynamic and inexhaustive. In this approach, *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are assumed to express the modality of Jesus’ language. The terms refer to *modi dicendi* of Jesus that correspond to *modi intelligendi* of his listeners/readers. *Παροιμία* and *παρρησία* are key terms in John’s reflection on the possibility of Christological knowledge. Here, the implicit assumption is that John considers Christological knowledge as a possibility.

(3) This latter assumption is abandoned by the post-hermeneutical approach, which presupposes that knowledge, and progression in knowledge, is impossible. In this approach, Derrida’s philosophical language is used to articulate that ἐν *παροιμίαις* in John 16:25 denotes the inability of language to express Jesus’ identity. The future character of the hour of Jesus’ *παρρησία* presents a full revelation of Jesus’ identity as an eternal promise and, thus, confirms the idea of the inexpressibility of Jesus’ identity.

(4) The reader-response approach presupposes that genre arises from function and is, fundamentally, reader-oriented. This approach does not study the literary features of Johannine imagery, but how the imagery functions for the reader. The genre of Johannine *παροιμία* is not defined essentialistically, but functionally. The implied author of the Fourth Gospel makes use of this genre to correct the implied reader’s interpretative framework, and to exhort the implied reader to read Johannine imagery from the perspective of the interpretive framework of the cosmological tale (Reinhartz). Others argue that *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* do not legitimate an allegorical reading of Jesus’ language, but indicate that Johannine imagery seeks to transform the assumptions of the reader, thereby enabling him or her to participate in a new reality (O’Day, Kysar).

The present chapter has evaluated each of the four above-mentioned approaches. By providing a balance between their pros and cons, I have conceived of these approaches as providing possible readings of John’s text. I have made explicit, as much as possible, the presuppositions that guide each approach. Just like any other researcher, I belong to history. My historicity is co-determined by the presuppositions of previous interpretations of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John’s Gospel. By becoming aware of these presuppositions, the present chapter has fulfilled one side of the task of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. The other side of this task will be performed by Chapters Six to Eleven. These chapters will transpose the present researcher into the place of the hypothetical first reader of John’s Gospel. My critical discussion of the scholarly literature has led to many new questions that enable me to re-identify with the hypothetical first reader of John’s Gospel. Preliminary to this historical-contextual approach to *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel, Chapters Three, Four, and Five will further analyse the difficulties of interpretation that have been touched upon in the present chapter.

Chapter Three will focus on the relationship between *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Chapter Four will address the question of the orientation of the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete in this Gospel. Chapter Five concerns the semantic relationship between *παροιμία/παρρησία* and *ἔρωτάω/αἰτέω* in John's Gospel.³⁹¹

Chapter Six will provide a historical-contextual understanding of the paradox that the Johannine Jesus spoke and walked (ἐν) *παρρησία* during his life time; whereas John 7:6–8 and 16:25 refer to Jesus' death as the time of his *παρρησία*. Chapter Seven will address the question of how Jesus' *παρρησία* adjusts itself to its addressees in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. I will provide a historical-contextual reading of this adaptability of Jesus' *παρρησία*. Chapter Eight has not yet been introduced in the present chapter, but will ask how Jesus' *παρρησία* is connected to the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Gospel. Chapter Nine will address the question of how Jesus' *παρρησία* relates to the theme of friendship in John. Chapter Ten will ask whether John presents Jesus' use of *παρρησία* as public and/or private. Chapter Eleven will provide a historical-contextual interpretation of the Johannine *παροιμία*. Special attention will be given to the question how to understand the collaboration between *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* in the Gospel.

Finally, Chapter twelve will compare John's use of *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* to Mark's use of *παρρησία* and *παραβολή*. The similarities and differences between both will be explained through the historical framework developed in Chapters Six to Eleven. By reference to ancient rhetorical theory, I will additionally contextualise John's and Mark's use of, respectively, *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* to refer to the figurative language of Jesus.

³⁹¹ To understand the relationship between *αἰτέω* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel, I will make use of Philo, *Her.* 6–7 and Job 27:7–10. Hence, the approach of the sixth chapter is partially historical-contextual.

CHAPTER III.

Παροιμία AND παρρησία IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

The present chapter provides a literary analysis of the relationship between παροιμία and παρρησία in the Gospel of John. The scholarly literature has concluded from John 16:25 that παρρησία and παροιμία are antonyms. Against this dominant view, the previous chapter has provided arguments for the view that revelation is, also, always concealment in the Fourth Gospel.³⁹² Since παροιμία and παρρησία are associated with respectively concealment and revelation in John's Gospel, it is to be expected that there is no opposition between these Greek terms in John, although 16:25 apparently suggests otherwise. The research hypothesis of the present chapter is, therefore, that παροιμία and παρρησία are not antonyms in John's Gospel. The two Greek terms refer to the same language and teaching of Jesus. They do not indicate an opposition between figurative and plain language.³⁹³ Nor do they refer to the temporal opposition between pre-paschal misunderstanding and post-paschal Christological perception.³⁹⁴ The two terms are used in combination in John 10 (Section 1) and John 16:23–33 (Section 3). An analysis of παρρησία in 11:11–16 (Section 2) is, also, included, because this passage suggests an interplay between παρρησία and παροιμία, although the latter term is not mentioned there.

1. JOHN 10

Every understanding of the relationship between the terms παροιμία and παρρησία in John 10 requires that one reads John 10 in connection with John 9. Both chapters need to be read together, because: (i) as noted by Zimmermann and Zumstein, the conclusion of the Good Shepherd imagery (10:19–21) refers explicitly to the healing of the man born blind in John 9: μη δαιμόνιον δύναται τυφλῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀνοῖξαι; (10:21). This conclusion is in continuity with 9:6.³⁹⁵ According to Jan Du Rand, the division among the 'Jews' (10:19–21), also, reminds us of the division among the Pharisees (9:16);³⁹⁶ (ii) I agree with Du Rand, Zimmermann, and Thyen that Jesus remains the speaker and the

³⁹² See *supra*, Chapter Two, §4.2.

³⁹³ *Contra* the authors mentioned *supra*, Chapter Two, §2.

³⁹⁴ *Contra* the authors mentioned *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.

³⁹⁵ See Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 244 and Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem," 163.

³⁹⁶ See Jan A. Du Rand, "A Syntactical and Narratological Reading of John 10 in Coherence with Chapter 9," in *The Shepherd Discourse*, 94–115, 161–163, at 94. In John 9 and John 10, the designations 'Jews' and 'Pharisees' are used interchangeably: see Uta Poplutz, "The Pharisees: A House Divided," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, ed. Steven A. Hunt – D. Francois Tolmie – Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 314 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 116–126, esp. at 123. Another possible interpretation of the term Ἰουδαῖος in John 10:19 is that it designates both the 'Jews' mentioned in 9:22 and the Pharisees in 9:40 as distinct groups, because there is no mention of the departure of the 'Jews' from 9:22: see Ruben Zimmermann, "'The Jews': Unreliable Figures or Unreliable Narration?," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 71–109, at 92.

Pharisees the addressees in the transition from John 9 to John 10. The personal pronoun ὑμῖν in 10:1 refers back to οἱ ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων in 9:40. Jesus' discourse is, thus, uninterrupted during the transition from John 9 to John 10;³⁹⁷ (iii) according to Zimmermann, Zumstein, and Thyen, the transition of 9:39–41 brings about a thematic unity between John 9 and John 10, namely the judgement (κρίμα) for which Jesus came into the world: εἰς κρίμα ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον ἦλθον, ἵνα οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ οἱ βλέποντες τυφλοὶ γένωνται (9:39). The misunderstanding of the Pharisees/'Jews' in 10:6, 19–21 corresponds to the blindness of the Pharisees in 9:40–41. The division (σχίσμα) concerning the reception of Jesus' words (10:19–21) refers to the theme of judgement in 9:39.³⁹⁸ In my view, the inclusion between 9:39 and 10:19–21 can be explained as follows. According to 10:20, most of the 'Jews' know with certainty that Jesus is not the Christ, and are, therefore, in agreement with 9:41, among those who claim to see. As they hold on to their old framework of interpretation (see also 9:16a–c), they are blind and their sin remains. Others do not claim to see or know, but ask questions: ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα οὐκ ἔστιν δαιμονιζομένου· μὴ δαιμόνιον δύναται τυφλῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀνοῖξαι; (10:21; cf. 9:16d–f). In agreement with 9:41, they show initial signs of sight and faith; and (iv) according to Zimmermann, in agreement with Johannine style the double ἀμήν formula (10:1) does not introduce a new start in the Fourth Gospel, but only occurs in the middle of Jesus' speech and dialogues.³⁹⁹

Despite the four above-mentioned forms of continuity between John 9 and John 10, the transition between 9:41 and 10:1 is abrupt. As observed by Zumstein, the imagery and discourse style of 10:1–5 is different from that of John 9.⁴⁰⁰ However, in my view, this form of discontinuity must also be relativized, because both the narrative of the man born blind in John 9 and the shepherd imagery of 10:1–5 seek to clarify Jesus' identity.

Due to the strong continuity between John 9 and John 10, the shepherd imagery in 10:1–5 does not stand on its own, but, according to Zumstein, resumes the theme of Jesus' κρίμα in 9:39–41 by reflecting on the division between the Pharisees and the man born blind.⁴⁰¹ John 10:1–2 uses the image of the door of the sheep in order to divide between the real and the false shepherd. The real shepherd passes through the gate to the sheepfold, whereas the false shepherd climbs in another way (ἄλλαχόθεν), like a thief (κλέπτης) and a robber (ληστής). John 10:3–5 portrays how a relationship of trust comes about between the shepherd and his sheep. For the real shepherd, the gatekeeper opens the gate and the sheep hear his voice (τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει). The real shepherd calls all his sheep by

³⁹⁷ See Du Rand, "A Syntactical and Narratological Reading," 94; Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 243; Hartwig Thyen, "Johannes 10 im Kontext des vierten Evangeliums," in *Studien zum Corpus Iohanneum*, ed. Hartwig Thyen, WUNT 214 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 134–154, at 143.

³⁹⁸ See Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 244; Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem," 165; Thyen, "Johannes 10," 152.

³⁹⁹ See Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 243. For the textual-structural agreements between John 9 and John 10, see Du Rand, "A Syntactical and Narratological Reading," 107–108.

⁴⁰⁰ See Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem," 165 and Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 336.

⁴⁰¹ See Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem," 167.

name and leads them out. Subsequently, he goes before them, and the sheep follow him, because they know (οἶδασιν) his voice. On the other hand, they will never follow (ἀκολουθήσουσιν) a stranger (ἄλλοτρίῳ), because they do not know (οἶδασιν) the voice of strangers.⁴⁰² As noted by Simonis, Zimmermann, and Thyen, John 10:6 forms an inclusion with 9:39–41, because the text of 10:6 functions as the realisation of the prophecy of Isa 6:9–10.⁴⁰³ According to the narrator in John 10:6, the Pharisees did not understand what Jesus was saying to them. The (figurative) language of Jesus in 10:1–5 has blinded the Pharisees. Unable to understand the imagery in 10:1–5, the Pharisees are judged as not being part of the sheep that listen to Jesus' voice. Regardless of how one interprets ἵνα in 9:39, the (figurative) language of Jesus is described as having a blinding effect on its hearers (see also 12:39–40).⁴⁰⁴ John 10:6 characterises this language as παροιμία.

The οὖν in John 10:7 indicates that Jesus seeks to explain the imagery of 10:1–5 because the Pharisees did not understand. This happens in a characteristically Johannine way, namely by means of repetition, variation, and amplification in 10:7–18.⁴⁰⁵ The ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν in 10:7 indicates a new development in the narrative. The four ἐγώ εἰμι-sayings (10:7, 9, 11, 14) structure 10:7–18 and are provided with commentaries. The ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλός-saying (10:11, 14) refers to the exclusive legitimacy of the shepherd in 10:1–3. The ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ θύρα-saying (10:7, 9) to the soteriological dimension of 10:3b–

⁴⁰² Many of the elements of John 10:1–6 can be found in Ezekiel 34 and Psalm 99 (100): see, e.g., Ezek 34:13–16; Ps 99 (100):3–4. John D. Turner, “The History of Religions Background of John 10,” in *The Shepherd Discourse*, 33–52, 147–150, at 43 remarks in this respect: “[...] but while there is no gainsaying that such OT imagery is certainly part of the background of our passage, nowhere can one find the motif of the sheep recognising the model shepherd who gains welcome entrance to the sheepfold through the door as opposed to the thief and robber who steals into the sheepfold by another, illegitimate way and calls the sheep with a strange voice.” In my view, John 10:1–5 is inspired by Old Testament imagery, but expands, and amplifies it.

⁴⁰³ See Simonis, *Die Hirtenrede*, 190–191; Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 254–255; Thyen, “Johannes 10,” 151–152.

⁴⁰⁴ Roman Kühschelm, *Verstockung, Gericht und Heil: Exegetische und bibeltheologische Untersuchung zum sogenannten ‘Dualismus’ und ‘Determinismus’ in Joh 12,35–50*, BBB 76 (Frankfurt a.M.: Hain, 1990), 43 claims that ἵνα in John 12:40 can be understood as either telic or epexegetical. In the second case, John 12:40c–f is interpreted as an “Ironie-Figur”. Kühschelm argues for the second option. In Koine Greek, the meaning of ἵνα is much more varied than in classical Greek. In addition to the classical telic meaning, there is the epexegetical, causal, and consecutive meaning. Concerning ἵνα in John 9:39, the common interpretation is that it has a telic meaning. However, the other possible meanings are not excluded. Only according to the telic meaning, the blinding of Jesus' listeners is not only the effect of Jesus' teaching, but also its aim.

⁴⁰⁵ For further analysis of the stylistic feature of repetition, variation, and amplification in the Gospel of John, see Thomas Popp, *Grammatik des Geistes: Literarische Kunst und theologische Konzeption in Johannes 3 und 6*, ABG 3 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2001) and Gilbert Van Belle – Michael Labahn – Petrus Maritz (eds.), *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel: Style, Text, Interpretation*, BETL 223 (Leuven: Peeters, 2009).

4.⁴⁰⁶ These sayings apply the images ποιμήν and θύρα of 10:1–5 to the speaker Jesus. The commentaries on these sayings amplify and vary the imagery of 10:1–5. John 10:8 elaborates the idea that Jesus is the only access to God by clarifying that all those who claimed revelation anterior to Jesus (cf. πρὸ ἐμοῦ),⁴⁰⁷ were thieves and robbers.⁴⁰⁸ As commented by Bultmann, these accusations do not refer to Moses and other prophets from the Old Testament, nor to John the Baptist, because they are no rivals of Jesus, but bear witness to him (1:6–9; 5:39; 5:45–47; 8:56; 12:41).⁴⁰⁹ The four uses of γινώσκω in 10:14–15 denote a reciprocal knowledge between Jesus and his disciples that is not cognitive, but existential and characterised by love. The τὴν ψυχὴν μου τίθημι ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων-saying in 10:15 identifies the death of the shepherd (see 10:11) with the death of Jesus. The text, therefore, states more directly than the previous imagery (10:10–14) that Jesus will die for the benefit of his disciples.⁴¹⁰ John 10:17–18 further explains Jesus’

⁴⁰⁶ The reading of ἡ θύρα in John 10:7 is probably the more original reading. The *varia lectio* ὁ ποιμήν in P⁷⁵ is probably a later adjustment by the copyist, who found ἡ θύρα problematic. For further discussion of this subject, see Ulrich Busse, “Open Questions on John 10,” in *The Shepherd Discourse*, 6–17, 135–143, at 10 and Johannes Beutler, “Der alttestamentlich-jüdische Hintergrund der Hirtenrede in Johannes 10,” in *The Shepherd Discourse*, 18–32, 144–147, at 20.

⁴⁰⁷ P^{45vid. 75}, κ*, Γ, Δ omit the prepositional phrase πρὸ ἐμοῦ in John 10:8, thereby reading “all who came” instead of “all who came before me”. Veronika Burz-Tropper, “‘Ich bin die Tür’ (Joh 10,7.9),” *Protokolle zur Bibel* 26/1 (2017) 65–83: at 71 correctly explains this *varia lectio* as a simplification of the more original ἦλθον πρὸ ἐμοῦ. The phrase ‘all who came before me’ refers to specific persons, whereas it is difficult to determine who exactly is meant with this phrase. For the discussion of the possible referents, see Burz-Tropper, “‘Ich bin die Tür’”: 73.

⁴⁰⁸ The formulation of John 10:8 is surprising after the ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ θύρα τῶν προβάτων-saying in 10:7, because John 10:8 claims that those that came anterior to the door of the sheep, are thieves and robbers. It is not meaningful to say that a door comes posterior to thieves and robbers. Turner, “The History,” 46–47 deals with this issue by claiming that John 10:8 “clearly relates not to the door, but again to the shepherd, conceived as the revealer who is superior to all his predecessors who are deceivers [...]”. In John 10:9, the image of the door is, however, meaningful. In my view, this implies that one cannot understand the image of the door and the image of the Good Shepherd independently of each other. Although these images contradict each other (e.g., John 10:2–4 presents Jesus as the Good Shepherd and at the same time as the door through which that same shepherd enters and leads the sheep out to the pasture), both images need to be interpreted in close connection to each other.

⁴⁰⁹ See Bultmann, *Johannes*, 286–287.

⁴¹⁰ In addition to the translation “for the benefit of his sheep”, the phrase ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων in John 10:11, 15 can also be rendered as “in place of his sheep”. The preposition ὑπὲρ + genitive case can have the meaning of ‘in place of’ in the NT: see, e.g., ὑπὲρ σοῦ in Phlm 1:13. However, this is not the case here, because the meaning of reconciliation of sins is absent in John 10:11, 15. The evangelist only considers not having faith in Jesus as a sin, and the sheep are characterised as believers in John 10. Xavier Léon-Dufour, *Lecture de l’Évangile selon Jean*, tome II, Parole de Dieu (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 371–372, therefore, correctly concludes that in John 10 the shepherd does not die in place of the sheep to reconcile the sheep with God. Another possibility is to translate that the shepherd dies in place of the sheep in order that the sheep will not die. In that case, the translation of ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων is semantically almost the same as the translation in which the shepherd lays down his life for the benefit of his sheep. In both cases, the shepherd risks and lays down his life to safeguard his sheep. Due to this semantic similarity, the translation “for the benefit of his sheep” is used in the main text.

identity. Jesus is the Good Shepherd and the door of the sheep at the time of his crucifixion.⁴¹¹

According to the narrator in John 10:19, the sayings of Jesus in 10:7–18 caused a σχίσμα among the ‘Jews’. John 10:20–21 reports that many of the ‘Jews’ said that Jesus has a demon and is mad, whereas others, a minority group, opposed this, and claimed that a demon is not able to open the eyes of the blind. In analogy with 9:39–41, one can understand this schism as the division between a majority that is blinded by Jesus’ words and a minority that begins to ask questions. In agreement with 10:6, the text of 10:7–18 can, thus, be characterised as παροιμία.

The term παρρησία occurs in the next phase of the narrative in John 10:22–42. In order to understand the nature of the relationship between the terms παροιμία in 10:1–18 and παρρησία in 10:22–42, the relationship between both texts must first be explained. Both texts can be read in close connection to one another for the following three reasons: (i) In both texts, Jesus’ addressees remain the same, namely, the Pharisees/‘Jews’; (ii) the shepherd and sheep imagery from 10:26–28 is the same as in 10:1–18, see, e.g., the use of ἀκολουθέω, ἀκούω, ἀπόλλυμι, ἀρπάζω, γινώσκω, ζωή, πρόβατον, φωνή in 10:26–28; and (iii) both texts have the same subject, namely, the controversy whether Jesus is the Christ.⁴¹² As a result of these three connections between 10:1–18 and 10:22–42, the

⁴¹¹ Elements of this exegesis of John 10:7–18 are derived from Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 341–346. Becker and Zumstein presuppose that a change in the historical situation of the Johannine school is responsible for the variation and amplification of John 10:1–5 in 10:7–18. They understand 10:7–18 as a *relecture* (Zumstein) or an *Allegorese* (Becker) of 10:1–5. By means of this *relecture* or *Allegorese* the members of the Johannine school have dealt with problems and challenges in their historical situation. For a more detailed presentation of this view, see Jürgen Becker, “Die Herde des Hirten und die Reben am Weinstock: Ein Versuch zu Joh 10,1–18 und 15,1–17,” in *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu 1899–1999: Beiträge zum Dialog mit Adolf Jülicher*, ed. Ulrich Mell, BZNW 103 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 149–178, at 162–170, esp. 168–169 and Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 340–347. In my view, their presupposition of the existence of a Johannine school is problematic because:

(i) The presupposed change in the historical situation of the Johannine school cannot be deduced from John 10:1–18. Zumstein (*Jean [1–12]*, 340–341) argues that, because John 10:6 indicates that the παροιμία discourse of 10:1–5 requires clarification, John 10:7–18 can be viewed as a *relecture*. This clarification and amplification of John 10:1–5 by 10:7–18 does, however, not necessarily imply that there is a change in the historical situation of a presupposed Johannine school. Repetition, variation, and amplification can also be part of the literary style of one author. Zumstein, thus, uncritically postulates that 10:7–18 is a *relecture* of 10:1–5.

(ii) The presupposition of the existence of a Johannine school implies that different writers are at work in John 10. The literary style of John 10 is, however, typically Johannine: see Ruckstuhl – Dschulnigg, *Stilkritik*, 189. Given this uniformity in literary style, John 10 is probably written by one single author. Other scholars have also argued on other grounds that John 10 is written by one author: see Michael Labahn, *Jesus als Lebensspender: Untersuchungen zu einer Geschichte der johanneischen Tradition anhand ihrer Wundergeschichten*, BZNW 98 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 368–369; Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 239–250; Thyen, “Johannes 10”. For the single authorship of John 10:1–18 in particular, see Beate Kowalski, *Die Hirtenrede (Joh 10,1–18) im Kontext des Johannesevangeliums*, SBB 31 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1996), 77–91.

⁴¹² The presentation of these three agreements between John 10:1–18 and 10:22–42 is based on Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 349. In addition to these agreements, there are structural and stylistic agreements

change in location and historical situation indicated by 10:22–23 is not a sufficient argument for a strict division in pericopes between 10:1–18 and 10:22–42. This change in time and space does not introduce a new and isolated narrative, but has a symbolic and theological meaning that connects 10:22–42 to what has preceded: (i) The healing of the man born blind took place at the entrance *in front of* the temple (cf. 8:59–9:1). It is no coincidence that the concluding discourse about the question whether Jesus is the Christ takes place *inside* the temple (10:23–29); (ii) Jesus is located in the portico of Solomon during the feast of the Dedication of the Temple (ἐγκαίνια; 10:22). Solomon built and consecrated this part of the temple (1 Kings 8). In view of the claims that Jesus exceeds Jacob (John 4:12), Moses (5:46–47), and Abraham (8:58), the positioning of Jesus in the portico of Solomon during the feast is no coincidence, but has a symbolic meaning; and (iii) the body of Jesus is identified with the temple (2:19–22). One, therefore, does not have to restrict the meaning of the change in location in 10:22 to a change in space.⁴¹³ According to these three arguments, John 10:1–18 and 10:22–42 are not as strictly divided as some scholars claim.⁴¹⁴ Therefore, it is justified to interpret the terms παροιμία and παρρησία in a shared literary context in John 10.

The οὖν in John 10:24 can be interpreted in three ways: (i) inferential: after the narration of the change in location and historical situation (10:22–23), οὖν in 10:24 indicates that the gathering of the ‘Jews’ around Jesus is the result of the disagreement among the ‘Jews’ about Jesus’ identity (10:19–21); (ii) resumptive: after the narrative aside of 10:22–23 οὖν points to a return to the main theme, that is, in agreement with 10:19–21, the discussion whether Jesus is the Christ; and (iii) continuative: in a less precise use, οὖν functions as a temporal connective in the continuation of the narrative.⁴¹⁵ The encircling movement (κυκλόω) of the ‘Jews’ around Jesus sounds rather hostile and suggests that their impatience is the reason for their command: ἕως πότε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν

between John 10:1–21 and 10:22–42: see Scholtissek, *In Ihm sein*, 322–324 and Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 248–249.

⁴¹³ The presentation of these three arguments is based on Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 246–247. For the symbolic and theological meaning of the Johannine topology in general, see Wayne A. Meeks, “Galilee and Judea in the Fourth Gospel,” *JBL* 85 (1966) 159–169; Birger Olsson, *Structure and Meaning in the Fourth Gospel: A Text-Linguistic Analysis of John 2:1–11 and 4:1–42*, ConBNT 6 (Lund: Gleerup, 1974), 144–146; Mathias Rissi, “Voll großer Fische, hundertdreißig, Joh 21,1–14,” *TZ* 35 (1979) 73–89; René Kieffer, *Le monde symbolique de Saint Jean*, LD 137 (Paris: Cerf, 1989), 11–33; Thyen, “Johannes 10”.

⁴¹⁴ Proponents of a strict division between John 10:1–18 and 10:22–42 are, e.g., Charles H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 354; Alfred Wikenhauser, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes*, RNT 4/3 (Regensburg: Pustet, 1961), 201; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 383; Christian Dietzfelbinger, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes*, Teilband 1, *Johannes 1–12*, ZBK 4.1 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2001), 334; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 351.

⁴¹⁵ These three uses of οὖν in the NT are listed by Friedrich Blass – Albert Debrunner – Friedrich Rehkopf (eds.), *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), § 451 and Walter Bauer – Frederick W. Danker – William F. Arndt – F. Wilbur Gingrich (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 2000), 736–737.

αἴρεις; εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ χριστός, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν παρρησίᾳ (10:24).⁴¹⁶ The combination of αἴρω with τὴν ψυχὴν τινος can have the meaning of (i) keeping someone in suspense or (ii) annoying someone.⁴¹⁷ The phrase ἕως πότε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν αἴρεις can, therefore, either be rendered as “how long will you keep us in suspense?” or “how long will you annoy us?”. Commentators have argued for either one or the other meaning.⁴¹⁸ In my view, the two meanings do not exclude each other. Both the connotations of annoyance and suspense are present in 10:24. On the one hand, the hostile connotation of κυκλόω suggests that the ‘Jews’ were annoyed with Jesus. On the other, the reason for their gathering around Jesus is that they are sincerely interested in finding out the truth about his identity (10:21). Jesus’ reply in 10:25 (εἶπον ὑμῖν καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε)⁴¹⁹ indicates that the ‘Jews’ are unable

⁴¹⁶ The association of κυκλόω with hostility is also made by Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 351. Zumstein (*Jean [1–12]*, 351 n. 19) refers to Ps 21 (22):17; 117 (118):10–11 for other attestations of this association.

⁴¹⁷ Walter Bauer, *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der frühchristlichen Literatur*, ed. Kurt Aland – Barbara Aland (Berlin: de Gruyter, ⁶1988), 45 and BDAG, 29 only mention the first meaning of the expression αἴρ. τὴν ψυχὴν τινος. Bauer mentions only two attestations, namely, John 10:24 and Nicetas, *de Manuele Comm.* 3.5 (PG 139:460a). Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 402–403 correctly observes that the first meaning is not well attested. Bauer (*Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch*, 45) additionally mentions the variant construction αἴρ. τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τινα in Ps 24 (25):1; 85 (86):4; 142 (143):8. This variant has the meaning “to lift one’s soul towards someone”, in the case of the Psalms, towards God. The prepositional phrase πρὸς τινα can also be omitted: see, e.g., Joseph., *A.J.* 3.48. The meaning of the expression is then “to become enthusiastic”. However, in my view, these variations are substantially different from the expression αἴρ. τὴν ψυχὴν τινος in John 10:24. Whereas the prepositional phrase πρὸς τινα functions as a prepositional phrase of the verb αἴρω, and denotes the direction of the movement of this verb, the genitive τινος is an attribute of τὴν ψυχὴν and indicates the possessor. The second possible meaning of the expression αἴρ. τὴν ψυχὴν τινος in John 10:24 is its meaning in Modern Greek, viz. “to annoy/trouble/vex/pester someone”. Barrett, *John*, 380 observes that this “idiom is not wholly modern”, because its modern meaning also occurs in the variation αἴρ. θυμόν (Soph., *Oed. tyr.* 914) and the variation αἴρ. ... δέμασι, φάσμασιν (Eur., *Hec.* 69–70).

⁴¹⁸ For the interpretation of ‘annoyance’, see, e.g., Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 383; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 351; Theobald, *Johannes. Kapitel 1–12*, 691. For the interpretation of suspense, see, e.g., John H. Bernard, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John*, vol. 2, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ⁴1963), 343. Barrett, *John*, 380 provides a good summary of the point of disagreement in the interpretation of ἕως πότε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν αἴρεις in John 10:24. If the expression αἴρ. τὴν ψυχὴν τινος indicates suspense, the ‘Jews’ are portrayed as not unfriendly and simply wishing “to find out the truth”. If the expression denotes annoyance, on the other hand, Jesus’ adversaries are characterised as vexed “by his not wholly explicit claims which give no adequate basis for attack”. The point of discussion is, thus, whether the ‘Jews’ are sincerely interested in truth or whether they just provoke Jesus to say something that provides a ground for putting him to death. In my interpretation, the expression ἕως πότε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν αἴρεις in John 10:24 can have both the meanings of annoyance and suspense. The ‘Jews’ are interested in truth, but they are unable to see Jesus as a truth speaker, because they use different criteria to judge whether one speaks truth. Consequently, they are annoyed by Jesus because they think that he keeps them in suspense.

⁴¹⁹ The *varia lectio* οὐκ ἐπιστεύσατε is attested by Codex Vaticanus and MS 1424. This *varia lectio* can be explained as an adjustment to the aorist εἶπον. The aorist ἐπιστεύσατε views the activity of not having faith in Jesus as a finite moment in the past. The present πιστεύετε, on the other hand, suggests continuation in the present. It is unlikely that πιστεύετε is a historical present.

to understand Jesus as a *παρρησιαστής*.⁴²⁰ Although Jesus has always taught *παρρησία* about his identity (7:26; 11:54; 18:20), the ‘Jews’ are unable to realise this.⁴²¹ As will be argued below, this means that the ‘Jews’ are unable to recognise Jesus as a speaker of the truth. As a result of this inability, they think that Jesus keeps them in suspense. This is what annoys them about Jesus.

The association of *παρρησία* with *ἀλήθεια* and cognate lexemes is very common in ancient Greek literature.⁴²² In John’s Gospel, this association is indirectly present. Jesus is called ἡ ἀλήθεια and the only way to the Father (John 14:6). At the time (ὥρα) of his return to the Father, Jesus will speak *παρρησία* about the Father (16:25). Jesus’ departure is also the condition for the arrival of the post-paschal Paraclete (16:7). The post-paschal Paraclete, therefore, functions as a mouth piece of Jesus’ *παρρησία*. The post-paschal Paraclete will lead the disciples *εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν/ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ* (16:13).⁴²³ He will teach and enable the disciples to remember everything what Jesus has said (14:26). This association of Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the time of his death with the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete is justified because: (i) Jesus is presented as an ἄλλος παράκλητος in 14:16. According to Andreas Dettwiler and Jean Zumstein, this indicates that Jesus and the Spirit of Truth (14:17) or the Holy Spirit (14:26) share the same teaching, but that there is also an order of succession between both. Jesus is the first Paraclete and the Spirit of Truth or the Holy Spirit the second Paraclete;⁴²⁴ (ii) as noted

⁴²⁰ That John 10:24–25 indicates the inability of the ‘Jews’ to recognise Jesus as a *παρρησιαστής* was previously concluded by Labahn, “Die *παρρησία*,” 328–330, 342. Labahn observes correctly that *παρρησία* in 10:24 refers back to 7:26–42 (see also 9:22), where the Messiah question has already received much attention. According to Labahn (“Die *παρρησία*,” 342), the ‘Jews’ do not have the same “Diskursuniversum” as Jesus. The ‘Jews’ have a different understanding of reality that hinders communication with Jesus. Below I will argue that the ‘Jews’ apply certain criteria to discern a *παρρησιαστής*, and that Jesus’ *παρρησία* does not adhere to these criteria. The term *παρρησιαστής* indicates a person who uses *παρρησία*, i.e., a person who speaks the truth. Although this term is not used in the Fourth Gospel, I use it to refer to Jesus as a person who teaches (ἐν) *παρρησία*.

⁴²¹ The interpretation that Jesus’ reply in John 10:25 indicates that Jesus has already said that he is the Christ, but not *παρρησία*, is, therefore, excluded.

⁴²² See Schlier, “*παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι*”: 870–872; Peterson, “Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte,” 289; van Unnik, “The Christian’s Freedom,” 273–274; Michael P. Schmude, “Licentia,” *HWRh* 5 (2001) 253–258: at 254, 256; Michael Hoppmann, “Redefreiheit,” *HWRh* 10 (2012) 1021–1029: at 1024. To quote a few examples: Eur., *Fr.* 737: καλόν γ’ ἀληθὲς κατένης *παρρησία*; Demosth., *Or.* 6.31–32: τάλῃθι μετὰ *παρρησίας* ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι; Demosth., *Or.* 60.26: αἱ δὲ δημοκρατίαι πολλὰ τ’ ἄλλα καὶ καλὰ καὶ δίκαι’ ἔχουσιν, ὧν τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντ’ ἀντέχεσθαι δεῖ, καὶ τὴν *παρρησίαν* ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡρτημένην οὐκ ἔστι τάλῃθες δηλοῦν ἀποτρέψαι.

⁴²³ For the argumentation that either one of these readings is the preferred one, see Reimund Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance Into All the Truth: The Text-Critical Problems of John 16,13,” in *New Testament Textual Criticism and Exegesis: FS J. Delobel*, ed. Adelbert Denaux, BETL 161 (Leuven: Leuven University Press – Peeters, 2002), 183–207.

⁴²⁴ See Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 203–207; Zumstein, *Kreative Erinnerung*, 78; Andreas Dettwiler, “La pneumatologie de l’Évangile de Jean: Un essai de synthèse,” *ETR* 92.2 (2017) 353–377: at 362. Dettwiler (“La pneumatologie”: 376), therefore, correctly concludes that “[l]a pneumatologie johannique est une fonction de sa christologie et de sa sotériologie”. For a more elaborated argumentation that Jesus

by other scholars, the use of ἀπαγγέλλω in 16:25 to describe Jesus' παρρησία at the time of his death reminds us of the use of ἀναγγέλλω to describe the post-paschal teaching of the Paraclete in 16:13–15;⁴²⁵ and (iii) according to Brown, O'Day, and Zumstein, the parallel between 14:25–26 and 16:25 implies that Jesus' παρρησία at the time of his death is mediated by the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete.⁴²⁶ I agree with Van Unnik that the association of παρρησία with ἀλήθεια in the Gospel of John implies that παρρησία concerns divine revelation and, therefore, cannot be considered as a mere human quality in the Fourth Gospel.⁴²⁷

Given the association of παρρησία with ἀλήθεια in the Gospel of John, the dialogue between Jesus and the 'Jews' in John 10:24–25 indicates that Jesus does not adhere to the criteria of παρρησία that the 'Jews' have in mind. The 'Jews' are interested in truth, but use other criteria to identify an authentic truth speaker. In their view, Jesus is someone who makes himself God (cf. ποιεῖς σεαυτὸν θεόν; John 10:33; cf. 8:53d).⁴²⁸ The 'Jews' use two criteria to discern whether Jesus is a παρρησιαστής:

and the Paraclete are not identical, but that the Paraclete is portrayed in the Johannine Farewell Discourse as the successor to Jesus and as the mediator of Jesus' ongoing presence, see Ruth Sheridan, "The Paraclete and Jesus in the Johannine Farewell Discourse," *Pacifica* 20 (2007) 125–141.

⁴²⁵ See Gail R. O'Day, *The Gospel of John: Introductions, Commentary and Reflections*, NIB 9 (Nashville TN: Abingdon, 1995), 781; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 152; Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 198; Jörg Frey, *Die johanneische Eschatologie*, Bd. III, *Die eschatologische Verkündigung in den johanneischen Texten*, WUNT 117 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 218–219. It is interesting that the *varia lectio* ἀναγγεῶ is attested for John 16:25 by MSS from the 5th c. onwards. This would suggest an even stronger allusion to the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete in John 16:13–15. NA²⁸ has probably chosen to put ἀπαγγεῶ in the main text because of its attestation in Codex Alexandrinus and Codex Vaticanus. Remarkable is that the textual apparatus of NA²⁸ has the *varia lectio* λαλήσω for P⁶⁶*, whereas the textual apparatus of NA²⁷ notes ἀπαγγεῶ for P⁶⁶(*). As I examine the papyrus, I find that it has λαλήσω ὑμῖν ἀπαγγεῶ ὑμῖν with supralinear dots on λαλήσω ὑμῖν. The supralinear dots have the meaning of crossing out. The phrase λαλήσω ὑμῖν was probably a scribal error caused by parablepsis. The scribe accidentally wrote down λαλήσω ὑμῖν from the previous line instead of ἀπαγγεῶ ὑμῖν. S/He looked up and was directed to the wrong line because of the presence of ὑμῖν in both lines and the ζ at the end of παροιμίαις and πατρός (homoioteleuton). Instead of writing down ἀπαγγεῶ, s/he wrote down λαλήσω followed by ὑμῖν. S/He then realised that s/he was copying the wrong line, erased λαλήσω ὑμῖν by means of supralinear dots and then wrote down ἀπαγγεῶ ὑμῖν. The text that the scribe was copying, thus, probably had ἀπαγγεῶ ὑμῖν. The presupposition of this argumentation is that the scribe and the corrector are the same person. James R. Royse, *Scribal Habits in Early Greek New Testament Papyri*, NTTSD 36 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 409–421 has argued that, with the possible exception of John 13:19, the corrections of P⁶⁶ are all by the hand of the original copyist.

⁴²⁶ See Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 735; O'Day, *John*, 781; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 152.

⁴²⁷ See van Unnik, "The Christian's Freedom," 285.

⁴²⁸ Previous scholarly literature has mainly tried to interpret John 10:33 against the background of the Synoptics: see, e.g., Tobias Nicklas, "'Du bist nur ein Mensch und machst dich selbst zu Gott' (Johannes 10,33): Das Motiv der Gotteslästerung bei Johannes vor dem Hintergrund der Synoptiker," in *Studies in the Gospel of John and its Christology*, 239–256. In the main text I do not deny the importance of reading John 10:33 against the background of the Synoptics, but seek to provide a more accurate interpretation of this verse in the literary context of John 10 by associating it with the use of παρρησία in this chapter, and the criteria employed by the 'Jews' to identify a παρρησιαστής. This more accurate understanding of 10:33 in

First criterion: social origin/status. In John 7:26–27, some of the people of Jerusalem observe that Jesus is speaking *παρρησία* in the temple.⁴²⁹ That the authorities let this happen is for them a sign that the authorities really think that Jesus is the Christ. The people of Jerusalem object (cf. *ἀλλά*), however, that Jesus cannot be the Christ because they know where Jesus comes from (viz. Galilee), whereas no one will know where the Christ comes from, when he appears.⁴³⁰ The human origin of Jesus in Nazareth withholds them from recognising Jesus as a *παρρησιαστής* (cf. 1:45–46; 6:41–42). Jesus meets a similar rejection by some of the people (7:41–42)⁴³¹ and the Pharisees (7:52).⁴³² In 7:41–42, some people in the crowd (*ὄχλος*) argue from Scripture that the Christ is a descendent from David and, therefore, comes from Bethlehem.⁴³³ As Jesus comes from Galilee, he has no legitimate claim to revelation or truth. The Pharisees also apply this criterion in 7:52, because they claim that no prophet can arise from Galilee. The question of the origin of Jesus returns in the dialogue between Jesus and the ‘Jews’/Pharisees in John 9–10. The ‘Jews’ cannot recognise Jesus as a truth-teller, because they do not know where he comes from (9:29). The criterion of social origin/status is used to evaluate Jesus’ *παρρησία*.⁴³⁴

the literary context of John 10 provides future research with the possibility to better understand how this verse relates to its Synoptic background.

⁴²⁹ Cornelis Bennema, “The Crowd: A Faceless, Divided Mass,” in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 347–355, at 349 n. 8 observes correctly that the Jerusalemites of John 7:25 are probably part of the crowd (*ὄχλος*) mentioned in John 7, because they distinguish themselves from “the authorities” in 7:26. Bennema (“The Crowd,” 349–350) also correctly observes that, on the one hand, the crowd is clearly distinct from the ‘Jews’ and their leaders in John 7: (i) John 7:11–13 mentions the crowd’s fear of the ‘Jews’; (ii) in 7:26 the Jerusalemites distinguish themselves from the leaders of the ‘Jews’; and (iii) in 7:49, the Pharisees contemptuously call the crowd cursed. On the other hand, the crowd also resembles the ‘Jews’ in John 7: (i) Both the ‘Jews’ and the crowd mutter about Jesus (6:41; 7:12, 32); and (ii) both accuse him of having a demon (7:20; 8:48, 52). Zimmermann, “‘The Jews’,” 87, therefore, correctly claims that there is “a close interweaving” of the ‘Jews’ with the people of Jerusalem and the crowd in John 7.

⁴³⁰ See also John 6:42 in this regard.

⁴³¹ John 7:41–42: *μη γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Γαλιλαίας ὁ χριστὸς ἔρχεται; οὐχ ἡ γραφὴ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ καὶ ἀπὸ Βηθλέεμ τῆς κώμης ὅπου ἦν Δαυὶδ ἔρχεται ὁ χριστός;*

⁴³² John 7:52: *ἐραύνησον καὶ ἴδε ὅτι ἐκ τῆς Γαλιλαίας προφήτης οὐκ ἐγείρεται.*

⁴³³ Possible intertextual references to the Old Testament are 2 Sam 7:12; Mic 5:1; Ps 88 (89):4, Jer 23:5; Pss. Sol. 17:21.

⁴³⁴ That the ‘Jews’ are unable to recognise Jesus as a *παρρησιαστής* on the basis of the criterion of social origin/status does not imply that Jesus’ social origin/status is accidental to the incarnational logic in the Gospel of John. On the contrary, the incarnation of God in Jesus, a Jew from Nazareth, changes the criteria for discerning a truth-teller. Unlike Matt 1:1–2:6; Luke 2:1–7; 3:23–38, John does not provide stories about Jesus’ birth in Bethlehem or genealogies that show that Jesus descends from David. Neither does John need stories about the miraculous birth of Jesus, because the description of Jesus as a Jew from Nazareth suffices for his purpose to show that the criterion of social origin/status is inapt to evaluate Jesus’ messianic calling. It is from within the ‘Jews’ that this change of criteria comes about, which explains Jesus’ saying in John 4:22 that salvation is from the ‘Jews’. For other arguments for the view that the identity of Jesus as a Jew from Nazareth is essential to the incarnational logic of the Fourth Gospel, see Thomas Söding, “‘Was kann aus Nazareth schon Gutes kommen?’ (Joh 1.46): Die Bedeutung des Judeseins Jesu im Johannesevangelium,” *NTS* 46 (2000) 21–41. According to Jörg Frey, “How Could Mark and John Do without Infancy Stories? Jesus’ Humanity and His Divine Origins in Mark and John,” in *Infancy Gospels:*

The link of *παρρησία* with social origin/status was already attested in previous ancient literature. In these attestations, being without *παρρησία* is characteristic of the existence of slaves, who cannot oppose the foolishness of their masters. The requirement to be recognised as a *παρρησιαστής* is that one is a full citizen of a Greek πόλις.⁴³⁵ Having two citizen parents gives someone the status of being able to speak one's mind with confidence, although *παρρησία* could also be adopted by others who reside in Athens.⁴³⁶ It is not simply citizenship that enables one to speak one's mind, but the inheritance of social status.⁴³⁷ During the Roman Period, a good family reputation is, equally, considered to be facilitating *παρρησία*.⁴³⁸ Low birth is incompatible with *παρρησία*.⁴³⁹ In Rome's political sphere, freedom of speech or *libertas* continues to be an instrument used by an elite to maintain equality and predominance.⁴⁴⁰ Yet, *παρρησία* was also considered to be the last refuge of the poor.⁴⁴¹ The Cynics did not need a high social status to enable them to use *παρρησία*, but only "knowledge/awareness" (τὸ συνειδός). For them, this is the true form of kingship.⁴⁴² The question in John 10:24–25 whether Jesus is a *παρρησιαστής* reminds us of this discussion of the relationship between *παρρησία* and social status.⁴⁴³

Stories and Identities, ed. Claire Clivaz, WUNT 281 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 189–215, at 215, John has not integrated traditions about Jesus' birth in Bethlehem, or Jesus' infancy, because "Jesus' divine son-ship and divine identity is of such a quality that it is not brought into question by his human appearance". I agree with this view, but note that the reason is more fundamentally that John abandons the criterion of social origin/status to evaluate whether Jesus is telling the truth about his messianic identity.

⁴³⁵ See, e.g., Eur., *Phoin.* 387–394; *Hipp.* 420–425; *Ion* 670–675.

⁴³⁶ See Demosth., *Or.* 9.3 and Eur., *Heracl.* 181–183. For further analysis and discussion, see David M. Carter, "Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech," in *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, ed. Ineke Sluiter – Ralph M. Rosen, Mnemosyne bibliotheca classica Batava Supplementum 254 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 197–220, at 214–215; Michel Foucault, *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres: Cours au Collège de France (1982-1983)*, édition établie sous la direction de François Ewald et Alessandro Fontana, par Frédéric Gros, Hautes Études (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2008), 105–120; Dana F. Fields, "The Rhetoric of *Parrhesia* in Roman Greece" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University NJ, 2009), 78–79. For a more general discussion of the link between the classical use of *παρρησία* and social origin/status, see, e.g., Schlier, "παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι": 869–871. The dissertation of Fields has most recently been published in a reworked form as Dana F. Fields, *Frankness, Greek Culture, and the Roman Empire*, Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies (New York: Routledge, 2021).

⁴³⁷ See Fields, "The Rhetoric," 79.

⁴³⁸ See Plu., *Lib. ed.* 2a–d; *Vit. X orat.* 842d. For further discussion and other examples, see Scarpat, *Parrhesia greca*, 86–87.

⁴³⁹ See D.L., *Lives* 4.51.

⁴⁴⁰ See Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech," in *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, 41–61, at 57.

⁴⁴¹ Nicostr.Comic. fr. 29 in Theodor Kock (ed.), *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*, vol. 2, *Novae Comoediae Fragmenta: Pars I* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1884), 227: ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι τῆς πενίας ὄπλον ἡ παρρησία; ταύτην ἔάν τις ἀπολέσῃ, τὴν ἀσπίδ' ἀποβέβληκεν οὗτος τοῦ βίου.

⁴⁴² See Fields, "The Rhetoric," 79, 81, who quotes Epictetus for this understanding of the Cynics.

⁴⁴³ In a future study, I will consult ancient discussions of *παρρησία* to explain why Jesus' *παρρησία* is not authorised by his social origin/status, but by his divine origin and virtuous character.

Second criterion: the relationship of *παρρησία* with rhetorical figures, such as metaphor. The ‘Jews’ are not satisfied with Jesus’ imagery about his identity in John 10:1–5, 7–18 and, therefore, command him to tell them *παρρησία* that he is the Christ. In their view, *παρρησία* does not require ambiguous language (e.g., Jesus as both the door of the sheep pen and the shepherd that leads the sheep out through the door), but univocal language as, e.g., ‘I am the Christ’.

According to the analysis of Michel Foucault, the understanding of *παρρησία* as being in tension with rhetorical figures that veil what one thinks, is most strong in the Socratic-Platonic tradition (see, e.g., *Gorg.* 487a–b). This understanding of *παρρησία* has lasted for centuries in the philosophical tradition influenced by Plato. For Plato, question-answer dialogue is typical for *παρρησία*. Clear and univocal definitions are the means of truth-telling. The *παρρησιαστής* makes it manifestly clear what s/he thinks.⁴⁴⁴ However, I note that the relationship between figured language and *παρρησία* was highly discussed in the late first and early second centuries. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian, all language is figured.⁴⁴⁵ There is, therefore, no absolute opposition between figured language and *παρρησία*.⁴⁴⁶ The question in John 10:24–25, whether Jesus is a *παρρησιαστής*, reminds us of this discussion of the relationship between *παρρησία* and figured language.⁴⁴⁷

Jesus’ *παρρησία* does not adhere to the two above-mentioned criteria that the ‘Jews’ use to evaluate his *παρρησία*. Jesus’ *παρρησία* is not legitimated by his social status. Neither is his *παρρησία* plain language, but figurative language. Instead of recognising Jesus as a *παρρησιαστής*, the ‘Jews’ accuse Jesus of making himself God (John 10:33).⁴⁴⁸ Jesus’ use of shepherd and sheep imagery to explain their lack of faith (John 10:26–28) reminds us of 10:1–5, 7–18.⁴⁴⁹ Here, he uses the same imagery, and the narrator also

⁴⁴⁴ See the first lecture of Michel Foucault, “Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia. 6 Lectures Given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley University,” <http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/> [accessed January 11, 2021]. For the German translation, see Michel Foucault, *Diskurs und Wahrheit: Die Problematisierung der Parrhesia. Berkeley-Vorlesungen 1983* (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1996).

⁴⁴⁵ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.11–14 (Hermannus Usener – Ludovicus Radermacher [eds.], *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula*, vol. 2 [Stuttgart: Teubner, 1965]); Quint., *Inst.* 9.1.12; 9.3.1; 9.3.101–102.

⁴⁴⁶ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 351.1–3 and Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.27. For further discussion, see Frederick Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome,” *AJP* 105/2 (1984) 174–208: at 195–196; Donald A. Russell, “Figured Speeches: ‘Dionysius,’ *Art of Rhetoric* VIII–IX,” in *The Orator in Action & Theory in Greece & Rome: Essays in Honor of George A. Kennedy*, ed. Cecil W. Wooten, Mnemosyne bibliotheca classica Batava. Supplementum 225 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 156–168; Malcolm Heath, “Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11: Figured Speech, Declamation, and Criticism,” *AJP* 124/1 (2003) 81–105.

⁴⁴⁷ Chapter Eleven will provide a historical-contextual explanation of why Jesus’ *παρρησία* is not opposed to figured speech.

⁴⁴⁸ With regard to the second criterion, Bultmann (*Johannes*, 275) correctly notes: “So, wie sie [the ‘Jews’; T.T.] wollen, daß er es sage, hat er es in der Tat nie gesagt und kann er es nie sagen. Er kann sich nicht durch ‘direkte’, sondern nur durch ‘indirekte’ Mitteilung offenbaren”.

⁴⁴⁹ Leon Morris, *The Gospel according to John: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition and Notes*, NICNT (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, ⁵1979), 519 says that Jesus’ reply in John 10:25 “raises a

states that the ‘Jews’ did not understand (10:6). According to Jesus’ reply in 10:25, the language in 10:1–5, 7–18 can, thus, be characterised as *παρησία*. John 10:6, however, calls Jesus’ language in 10:1–5 *παροιμία*. I have argued above that, in agreement with 10:6, the sayings of Jesus in 10:7–18 can, also, be characterised as *παροιμία*. Consequently, for the Johannine Jesus, *παρησία* is not opposed to *παροιμία*, which corresponds to my research hypothesis.

Thus, Jesus is critical of the criteria that the ‘Jews’ apply to discern a *παρησιαστής*. What is criticised is not the truth claim of the ‘Jews’, but their activity of truth-telling. Although the ‘Jews’ have been told the truth (John 8:40, 45–46), they do not do what is true (cf. 3:21), nor worship the Father in truth (cf. 4:23–24). The ‘Jews’ do not stand in the truth, and there is no truth in them (8:44). They are not freed (cf. 8:32), nor sanctified by the truth (cf. 17:19).

2. JOHN 11:11–16

The term *παρησία* is used once in the Lazarus narrative, namely, in John 11:14. After rejecting the warning of the disciples not to return to Judea (11:8–10), Jesus speaks about his intent to go to the sick Lazarus: *Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν κεκοίμηται· ἀλλὰ πορεύομαι ἵνα ἐξυπνίσω αὐτόν* (11:11). The verb *κοιμᾶσθαι* can either have the meaning of ‘to sleep’ (Matt 28:13; Luke 22:45; Acts 12:6) or ‘to die’ (Matt 27:52; Acts 7:60; 13:36; 1 Cor 7:39; 11:30; 15:6, 18, 20, 51; 1 Thess 4:13, 14, 15; 2 Pet 3:4) in the NT. The verb *ἐξυπνίζειν* (‘to awaken someone from sleep’) is, however, nowhere used in the NT with the meaning of resurrection.⁴⁵⁰ As John 11:11 uses *κοιμᾶσθαι* in combination with *ἐξυπνίζειν*, it is not surprising that the disciples understand *κοιμᾶσθαι* as ‘to sleep’: *κύριε, εἰ κεκοίμηται σωθήσεται* (11:12).⁴⁵¹ The narrator explains in 11:13 that Jesus spoke

problem”, because “He has not said to any of the Jews in set terms that He is the Christ”. Thyen (*Johannes*, 497–498) remarks that this is only a “Scheinproblem”, because the resumption of the shepherd and sheep imagery in 10:26–28 suggests that Jesus already did unequivocally say that he is the Christ in 10:1–5, 7–18. In my view, Thyen correctly says that 10:26–28 refers back to the previous shepherd and sheep imagery in John 10, but not that Jesus has spoken unequivocally about his identity there. Jesus’ understanding of how *παρησία* relates to figurative language is different from that of the ‘Jews’.

⁴⁵⁰ Francis J. Moloney, *The Gospel of John*, SP 4 (Collegeville MN: The Liturgical Press, 1998), 337 notes: “[s]urprisingly, there are no known parallels between waking from sleep and resurrection.” Gérard Rochais, *Les récits de résurrection des morts dans le Nouveau Testament*, SNTSMS 40 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 139–140, however, does find two attestations for the use of *ἐξυπνίζειν* with the meaning of ‘to resurrect’ in the Hexapla, viz. Theodotion’s version of Job 14:12 and Aquila’s version of Isa 26:19. Rochais observes that Origen placed an asterisk at the phrase *οὐκ ἐξυπνισθήσονται ἐξ ὕπνου αὐτῶν* of Job 14:12. According to Rochais (*Les récits*, 139), this indicates that Origen did not find this phrase in the LXX. In my view, this scarcity of attestations demonstrates that the association of *ἐξυπνίζειν* with resurrection was, unlike the association of *κοιμᾶσθαι* with death, uncommon in the Greek language of biblical writings. New Testament writings reserved the verb *ἐγείρειν* for resurrection. The misunderstanding of the disciples in John 11:12 is, therefore, not surprising.

⁴⁵¹ The common interpretation of John 11:12–13 is that the disciples misunderstand Jesus: see, e.g., Barrett, *John*, 393; Bernard Van Meenen, “Le signe du passage de la mort à la vie: Lecture du récit de Lazare: Jean 11,1-53,” *LumVie* 48 (1999) 67–74: at 70; Wendy E. Sproston North, *The Lazarus Story within*

“about his death” (περὶ τοῦ θανάτου), whereas the disciples misunderstood Jesus as speaking “of taking rest in sleep” (περὶ τῆς κοιμήσεως τοῦ ὕπνου). Given that τότε in 11:14 expresses continuation, οὖν has an inferential meaning, and refers to a causal connection between 11:14 and 11:12–13. This οὖν can best be translated as “therefore”. Jesus realises that the disciples have misunderstood his saying in 11:11. He, therefore (οὖν), reformulates: Λάζαρος ἀπέθανεν, καὶ χαίρω δι’ ὑμᾶς ἵνα πιστεύσητε, ὅτι οὐκ ἤμην ἐκεῖ· ἀλλὰ ἄγωμεν πρὸς αὐτόν (11:14–15). After two days (see 11:6), Jesus decides to go to see the already deceased Lazarus. His departure to Judea is beneficial for his disciples, because the resurrection of Lazarus will lead to their faith. The narrator remarks that Jesus has spoken παρρησία (11:14a). Scholars understand the term παρρησία here as an antonym for παροιμία.⁴⁵² In their view, the term παρρησία characterises the plain phrase Λάζαρος ἀπέθανεν in contrast with the ambiguous phrase Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν κεκοίμηται from 11:11.⁴⁵³ According to this interpretation, the term παρρησία does not only signal “den Wechsel von bildhafter Rede hin zu direkter, nicht-metaphorischer Sprache”. This direct non-metaphorical language also corrects “ein irdisch-materielles Mißverstehen der Jünger”.⁴⁵⁴ This results in the clear understanding of the disciples or the *modus intelligendi* of Christological perception. In 11:16, Thomas “ist nicht nur bereit, mit Jesus zu sterben, sondern motiviert auch die anderen, mit ihm in den Tod zu gehen”.⁴⁵⁵

the Johannine Tradition, JSNTSup 212 (Sheffield: Academic Press, 2001), 140; Susan E. Hylen, *Imperfect Believers: Ambiguous Characters in the Gospel of John* (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 64–65; Thyen, *Johannes*, 515. The present author agrees with this interpretation on the basis of John 11:13, but remarks that it is not surprising that the disciples misunderstand Jesus, because this misunderstanding was induced by the juxtaposition of κοιμᾶσθαι and ἐξυπνίζειν in 11:11.

According to Barrett, *John*, 393; Hylen, *Imperfect Believers*, 65; Thyen, *Johannes*, 515, the misunderstanding of the disciples in John 11:12 does not exclude that the disciples unconsciously speak the truth. Thyen (*Johannes*, 515) notes that the verb σῶζω always has the meaning of “eschatologische Rettung aus Tod und Gericht” in John (see 3:17; 5:34; 10:9; 12:27, 47). According to this view, the disciples unconsciously say that death will not be the end for Lazarus. Lazarus will resurrect. Notable in this respect is that P⁷⁵ and the Coptic textual tradition read ἐγερθήσεται instead of σωθήσεται for John 11:12. The passive ἐγερθήσεται expresses more explicitly the meaning of resurrection. Thyen (*Johannes*, 515) considers the use of σῶζω in Mark 5:23 to be an interesting parallel for the double meaning of the same verb in John 11:12. In Mark 5:23, Jairus begs Jesus to heal his mortally ill daughter and is confident that Jesus’ laying on of hands will save (cf. σωθῆ) her. According to Thyen, Jairus unconsciously expresses that his daughter will be eschatologically saved from death. In my view, this *double entendre* of σῶζω in John 11:12 (and Mark 5:23) is possible, but not necessarily so. That σῶζω has the meaning of eschatological salvation from death in all other occurrences in the Gospel of John does not necessarily imply that it, also, has this meaning in John 11:12.

⁴⁵² See *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.1.

⁴⁵³ See, e.g., Bultmann, *Johannes*, 304; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 409–410; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 370; Sylva, *Thomas*, 112. The *varia lectio* Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν (codex Bezae) in John 11:14 makes the parallel with Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν κεκοίμηται in John 11:11 even stronger.

⁴⁵⁴ Labahn, “Die παρρησία,” 332.

⁴⁵⁵ Thomas Popp, “Die konsolatorische Kraft der Wiederholung: Liebe, Trauer und Trost in den Johanneischen Abschiedsreden,” in *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel*, 523–587, at 528–529.

Two criticisms need to be levelled against this interpretation of *παρησία* in John 11. First, the interpretation that Jesus' reformulation of *Λάζαρος κεκοίμηται* to *Λάζαρος ἀπέθανεν* is a move from metaphorical to non-metaphorical language implies that Jesus only says *Λάζαρος κεκοίμηται* to embellish the harshness of the death of Lazarus, but that he is actually saying that Lazarus has died. However, as Hartwig Thyen argues, Jesus cannot be understood as saying that Lazarus has died in the usual sense, because this would be in contradiction with his previous statement in 11:4 that the sickness of Lazarus will not lead to his death. For reasons of consistency, the reader must conclude that Jesus spoke about the death of Lazarus in an unconventional meaning. The phrase *Λάζαρος κεκοίμηται* cannot be a euphemism for expressing the death of Lazarus.⁴⁵⁶ In my view, instead of being an embellishment, the metaphor of sleep is essential to understand the alternative meaning of death that Jesus introduces in 11:14. Instead of expressing an opposition between figurative and non-figurative language, the sayings of Jesus in 11:11 and 11:14–15 are part of the same strategy to redefine the meaning of death. The term *παρησία* in 11:14 thus does not denote plain language (versus figurative language). Given that the death and resurrection of Lazarus refer to and prefigure the death and resurrection of Jesus, Jesus actually teaches that his own death is not the end, but that he will return to his disciples by means of the post-paschal Paraclete.⁴⁵⁷ As elsewhere in the Gospel, *παρησία* in 11:14 concerns Jesus' self-revelation.

Second, the nature of the reaction of Thomas in John 11:16 contradicts the view that *παρησία* in 11:14a denotes the *modus intelligendi* of univocal Christological knowledge. The reaction of Thomas in 11:16 is characterised by ambiguity.⁴⁵⁸ Thomas says against

⁴⁵⁶ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 512. According to Thyen (*Johannes*, 514–515), the pretext for John's use of sleep imagery in John 11:11–16 to alter the meaning of death is Mark 5:35, 39. In Mark 5:39, Jesus also speaks of the death of the daughter of Jairus in terms of sleep. Although the daughter of Jairus has died (Mark 5:35), Jesus says in Mark 5:39 that she did not die (*ἀπέθανεν*), but sleeps (*καθεύδει*). The difference with John is that John reverses the order, because he first speaks of sleep (John 11:12) before speaking about the death of Lazarus (11:14). John also uses *κοιμᾶσθαι*, and not *καθεύδειν*, for sleep.

⁴⁵⁷ For the interpretation of the death and resurrection of Lazarus as a prefiguration of the death and resurrection of Jesus, see Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 404–405 and Ruben Zimmermann, "The Narrative Hermeneutics in John 11: Learning with Lazarus How to Understand Death, Life, and Resurrection," in *The Resurrection of Jesus in the Gospel of John*, ed. Reimund Bieringer – Craig R. Koester, WUNT 222 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 75–101, at 86. Jesus' return from death is first of all pneumatic: see the parallels between John 14:16–17 and 14:18–20. For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation that 14:16–17 and 14:18–20 refer to the same event, see Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 191–192.

Otfried Hofius, "Die Auferweckung des Lazarus: Joh 11,1–44 als Zeugnis narrativer Christologie," *ZTK* 102 (2005) 28–45: at 23 correctly observes that, in addition to the interpretation that the death and resurrection of Lazarus is a prefiguration of the death and resurrection of Jesus, the resurrection of Lazarus also presupposes the saving event of the death of Jesus: "[w]enn Jesus dem Tod des Lazarus ein Ende setzen wird, so tut er das als der Sohn Gottes, der in seinem Tod und seiner Auferstehung die Macht des Todes zerbricht."

⁴⁵⁸ Scholarship is divided on the nature of the reaction of Thomas in John 11:16. E.g., Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 411; Barrett, *John*, 394; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 371; Thomas Popp, "Thomas: Question Marks and Exclamation Marks," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 504–529, at 508–509

his fellow disciples in 11:16: ἄγωμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἵνα ἀποθάνωμεν μετ’ αὐτοῦ. Although μετ’ αὐτοῦ initially refers to Lazarus, Thomas links the destiny of Lazarus with the destiny of Jesus and the disciples. The ambiguity of who is meant with μετ’ αὐτοῦ transfers the reader’s attention from the death of Lazarus to the death of Jesus.⁴⁵⁹ The reader realises that Lazarus cannot be the referent of αὐτοῦ, because Lazarus is already dead. On the one hand, the answer of Thomas in 11:16 is a sign of authentic faith in Jesus, because Thomas agrees with Jesus to go to Judea, despite his awareness of the intent of the ‘Jews’ to stone Jesus (11:8). Thomas, thus, shows more courage than the brothers of Jesus (7:3–5). His willingness to follow and serve Jesus is so strong that he is prepared to lay down his life (cf. 12:26; 13:37), although he, and the other disciples, will abandon Jesus during Jesus’ arrest (cf. 16:31–32; 18:8).⁴⁶⁰ On the other hand, Thomas does not understand Jesus’ death: (i) The exhortation of Thomas in 11:16 does not react to Jesus’ motivation in 11:9–10 to go to Judea. Neither does it correspond to the promise of Jesus in 11:15. Jesus has not asked the disciples “to follow him to Jerusalem for martyrdom”, but “to set out for Jerusalem so that they might come to faith”.⁴⁶¹ While Jesus calls the faith of his disciples the aim of his journey to Judea, Thomas “is fixated on the earthly demise of Jesus and cannot comprehend the deeper meaning of Jesus’ journey to Bethany”;⁴⁶² and (ii) John 14:5 signals that Thomas does not understand that the death of Jesus is the return of Jesus to his Father.⁴⁶³

According to the two above-mentioned criticisms, παρρησία in John 11:14 does not denote plain language (versus figurative language) nor Christological understanding (versus misunderstanding). Consequently, παρρησία is not used as an (implicit) antonym of παροιμία in this context.

3. JOHN 16:23–33

understand it as ambiguous, that is, as both reflecting understanding and misunderstanding. E.g., Francis J. Moloney, “Can Everyone Be Wrong? A Reading of John 11.1–12.8,” *NTS* 49 (2003) 505–527: at 512; Hofius, “Die Auferweckung des Lazarus”: 21; Sproston North, *The Lazarus Story*, 56–57, 141; Glenn W. Most, *Doubting Thomas* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 64; Hylan, *Imperfect Believers*, 65 only observe the misunderstanding of Thomas.

⁴⁵⁹ This interpretation of the referent of μετ’ αὐτοῦ in John 11:16 is taken from Hugues Garcia, “Lazare, du mort vivant au disciple bien-aimé: le cycle et la trajectoire narrative de Lazare dans le quatrième évangile,” *RevScRel* 73 (1999) 259–292: at 266.

⁴⁶⁰ This courageous willingness of Thomas to follow Jesus is also observed by Popp, “Thomas,” 509.

⁴⁶¹ Moloney, “Can Everyone”: 512.

⁴⁶² Moloney, “Can Everyone”: 508.

⁴⁶³ Sproston North, *The Lazarus Story*, 141 calls Thomas in this respect “[n]ever the most perspicacious of John’s characters”. Another issue is whether the Christological confession of Thomas in John 20:28 signals genuine faith: see Christopher M. Tuckett, “Seeing and Believing in John 20,” in *Paul, John, and Apocalyptic Eschatology: Studies in Honour of Martinus C. de Boer*, ed. Jan Krans *et al.*, NovTSup 149 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 169–185 and Gilbert Van Belle, “‘Blessed Are Those Who Have Not Seen and Yet Have Come to Believe’. Rudolf Bultmann’s Interpretation of the ‘Signs’ in the Fourth Gospel,” *ETL* 91/3 (2015) 521–546.

Decisive for any interpretation of παροιμία and παρρησία in John 16:23–33 is the understanding of the literary relationship between 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33. The parallels between the latter two texts are remarkable: (i) the farewell of Jesus and the evaluation of Jesus’ departure as beneficial for the disciples (14:28 par. 16:5–7); (ii) the question where Jesus is going (14:5 par. 16:5); (iii) the troubledness/sadness of the heart (14:1 par. 16:6); (iv) the short duration of Jesus’ absence and the reunion of Jesus and his disciples (14:18–19 par. 16:16–22); (v) the post-paschal Paraclete and his activity (14:12, 15–17, 26–27, 30 par. 16:7–11, 13–15); (vi) ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (14:20 par. 16:23, 26); (vii) ταῦτα λελάληκα ὑμῖν (14:25 par. 16:25); (viii) John 14:9: ὁ ἑώρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα par. 16:25: παρρησία περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαγγελῶ ὑμῖν; (ix) John 14:12: ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα πορεύομαι par. 16:28: πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα; (x) John 13:38: οὐ μὴ ἀλέκτωρ φωνήσῃ ἕως οὗ ἀρνήσῃ με τρίς par. 16:32: ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ ἐλήλυθεν ἵνα σκορπισθῇτε ἕκαστος εἰς τὰ ἴδια; (xi) John 14:27: ὑμῶν ἡ καρδιά μηδὲ δειλιάτω par. 16:33: θαρσεῖτε; (xii) John 14:30: ἔρχεται γὰρ ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων· καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδέν par. 16:33: ἐγὼ νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον; (xiii) Jesus’ promises to the disciples, e.g., that their prayers will be heard (14:9, 12–13, 20–21, 23, 25, 27 par. 16:23–28); (xiv) the unfaithfulness of Jesus’ disciples during the passion narrative (13:38 par. 16:32); and (xv) both John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33 end with the message of peace (14:27–30 par. 16:33).⁴⁶⁴

In addition to this remarkable number of parallels between John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33, there are also texts in 13:31–14:31 for which there are no parallels in 16:4e–33: (i) John 13:31–32: glorification of the Son of Man; (ii) John 13:33: ἔτι μικρὸν μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι; (iii) John 13:33: τεκνία; (iv) John 13:33: theme of looking (and not finding), and of the inability to follow Jesus; (v) John 13:34–35: the new commandment to love one another; (vi) John 14:1b–4: Jesus is going to prepare a place, afterwards he will come back to take the disciples along with him; (vii) John 14:6: Jesus as the way, truth, life; (viii) John 14:7: knowing Jesus equals knowing the Father; (ix) John 14:10: ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐστίν; (x) John 14:10: words are not spoken on Jesus’ own initiative; (xi) John 14:10: the Father performs Jesus’ works; (xii) John 14:11: διὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτὰ πιστεύετε; (xiii) John 14:12–14: the person with faith performing greater works, combined with the theme of asking and receiving; (xiv) John 14:15: loving Jesus and keeping his commandments; (xv) John 14:17: the Spirit of Truth “remains with you and is within you”; (xvi) John 14:20–21: ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ μου καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν ὑμῖν plus the theme of love and of keeping the commandments; (xvii) John 14:24: ὁ λόγος ὃν ἀκούετε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέμψαντός με πατρός; (xviii) John 14:29: νῦν εἶρηκα ὑμῖν πρὶν γενέσθαι, ἵνα ὅταν γένηται πιστεύσητε; and (xix) John 14:31: καθὼς ἐνετείλατό μοι ὁ πατήρ, οὕτως ποιῶ. ἐγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν ἐντεῦθεν.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁴ This list of 15 parallels between John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33 is derived from Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 589–591 and Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 102.

⁴⁶⁵ This list of texts in John 13:31–14:31 for which there are no parallels in 16:4e–33 is adopted from Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 592–593 with minor adjustments.

Recent scholarly literature uses two models to explain these parallels and variations between John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33: the model of *relecture* and *réécriture*.

3.1 RELECTURE AND RÉÉCRITURE

Before opening the discussion on which model is more apt to explain the repetitions and variations between John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33, the theoretical distinction between *relecture* and *réécriture* will be clarified.⁴⁶⁶ The models of *relecture* and *réécriture* differ on how they view the literary relationship between the different parts of the Gospel of John. According to both models, there is an inherent coherence between these parts. One cannot understand the parts of the text independently of each other. This coherence in the Gospel is a result of the literary feature of repetition, variation, and amplification. The models of *relecture* and *réécriture* differ in their understanding of this coherence.

According to the model of *relecture*, the coherence between the different parts of the Fourth Gospel can only be explained on the basis of the diachronic or historical relations between these parts. The aporias in John's Gospel make the reconstruction of different textual layers necessary. These layers consist in *Fortschreibungen* by the members of a presupposed Johannine school, an organised community. These *Fortschreibungen* indicate a reinterpretation or *relecture* of earlier parts of the Gospel text. The motivation for *relecture* is “*einerseits ein genuin innertheologisches Bedürfnis nach weiterer Entfaltung des tradierten Sachverhaltes und andererseits eine neue geschichtliche Situation*”.⁴⁶⁷ The *Fortschreibungen* keep earlier parts of the text intact and explicate them by applying them to these new historical situations of the Johannine school. Dettwiler explains that “das Verhältnis des Rezeptionstextes [i.e., the result of the *Fortschreibung*; T.T.] zum Bezugstext ist nicht ein Verhältnis der Negation, der Kritik und Korrektur, sondern dasjenige der Explikation und Vertiefung, der Weiterführung und Neuakzentuierung”.⁴⁶⁸ This relationship between *Fortschreibungen* and earlier parts of the text explains the presence of repetition, variation, and amplification in the Fourth Gospel. Additionally, “der Rezeptionstext wirft seinerseits auch ein neues Licht auf das

⁴⁶⁶ This theoretical discussion on the distinction between *relecture* and *réécriture* is based on Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 44–52; Scholtissek, *In Ihm sein*, 131–139; Klaus Scholtissek, “Johannes auslegen: II. Methodische, hermeneutische und einleitungswissenschaftliche Reflexionen,” *SNTSU* 25 (2000) 98–140: esp. at 105–106; Klaus Scholtissek, “Relecture und réécriture: Neue Paradigmen zu Methode und Inhalt der Johanneauslegung aufgewiesen am Prolog 1,1–18 und der ersten Abschiedsrede 13,31–14,31,” *TP* 75 (2000) 1–29: at 1–9, 25–29; Popp, *Grammatik*, 77–80. For further discussion on the notions of *relecture* and *réécriture* in the above-mentioned scholarly literature, see Gilbert Van Belle, “Repetition, Variation, and Amplification: Thomas Popp's Recent Contribution on Johannine Style,” *ETL* 79 (2003) 166–178 and Marinus de Jonge, “The Gospels and the Epistles of John Read Against the Background of the History of the Johannine Communities,” in *What We Have Heard From the Beginning: The Past, Present, and Future of Johannine Studies*, ed. Tom Thatcher (Waco TX: Baylor University Press, 2007), 127–144.

⁴⁶⁷ Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 49–50. Italics in the original.

⁴⁶⁸ Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 48.

Verständnis seines Bezugstextes”.⁴⁶⁹ As a result of this form of intertextuality between the different parts of the Gospel, one can only understand these parts correctly by reading them together. The exegete is required to respect the literary unity of the text. However, one can only read the Gospel as a unity if one has understood the historical relations between the different parts of the Gospel. Thus, the model of *relecture* views the relations between the different parts of John’s Gospel “both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective”.⁴⁷⁰ In its practical outworking, this model will explain the tensions and incoherencies in the text diachronically with reference to the changing historical circumstances with which the members of the Johannine school are dealing.

The model of *réécriture*, on the other hand, explains the coherence between the different parts of the Gospel of John by presupposing that the earlier mentioned *Fortschreibungen* are written by one author, the evangelist John. One and the same author constantly repeats, varies, and amplifies the same theme. The theme constantly expands. Each separate narration in the Gospel is, therefore, an “*Evangelium im Evangelium*”. The same “Grundkonstellation”, “das Ganze des Evangeliums” always returns.⁴⁷¹ The parts of the text do not reflect changes in the historical situation of a presupposed Johannine school. Thus, the coherence between the different parts of the Gospel is explained in a synchronic fashion. In its practical outworking, the model of *réécriture* will explain the tensions and incoherencies in the text synchronically with reference to John’s theological thought, which brilliantly makes use of repetition, variation, and amplification.

According to my understanding, the models of *relecture* and *réécriture* offer two ways of looking at how the different parts of the Fourth Gospel relate to each other. Both models seek to render the text comprehensible as a unity. The model of *relecture* views this unity from a diachronic perspective, and presupposes that the members of a Johannine school are responsible for the composition of the Fourth Gospel. The model of *réécriture* views the unity of the Gospel from a synchronic perspective and presupposes that one single author is responsible for the composition of the Fourth Gospel. Both models can be used in Johannine exegesis. One needs to argue for each text individually as to which model should be applied. For two reasons there are no fixed criteria to determine this.

First, the nature of textual aporias. According to Carson, textual aporias do not necessarily indicate different textual layers or sources.⁴⁷² Some possibly exist only in the mind of the interpreter. If they are supposed to be real, it is difficult to reconstruct the textual layer or source that causes the aporia. There are four reasons why an aporia can be devised inadvertently: (i) Human consciousness is not a continuum, but is by nature often interrupted; (ii) the mind sometimes “races ahead of the pen”;⁴⁷³ (iii) due to an illogical step taken unconsciously; and (iv) “because the writer is disturbed at his

⁴⁶⁹ Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 47.

⁴⁷⁰ Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 46. My translation.

⁴⁷¹ Scholtissek, *In Ihm sein*, 139. Italics in the original.

⁴⁷² The presentation of the first reason is based on Donald A. Carson, “Current Source Criticism of the Fourth Gospel: Some Methodological Questions,” *JBL* 97 (1978) 411–429: at 423–425.

⁴⁷³ Carson, “Current Source Criticism”: 423.

work”.⁴⁷⁴ For these four reasons, “an aporia *may* indicate a seam: that must not be denied, but it must not be *assumed* to do so”. In addition, even if an aporia is not devised inadvertently, “there *may* be some factor”, other than a historical layer or source “which has generated it”.⁴⁷⁵ Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether a textual aporia necessitates the model of *relecture*, and its hypothesis of a Johannine school to understand the literary relationship between the different parts of the Fourth Gospel. Despite the presence of textual aporias, one might still presuppose that the Gospel is written by one and the same author. There are no fixed rules to decide this.

The second reason why there are no fixed criteria to determine whether one should apply the model of *relecture* or *réécriture* is the hypothetical nature of the historical situation of the Johannine school. One constantly needs to ask oneself whether the presumed change in the historical situation of the Johannine school can be deduced from the *Fortschreibung* or whether the *Fortschreibung* is part of the reflection of one single author.⁴⁷⁶ In this case, there are, equally, no fixed criteria to decide this.

The next subsection will discuss the aporia of John 16:5. The question is whether this aporia makes the use of the model of *relecture* necessary to interpret the literary relationship between 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33, or whether the model of *réécriture* provides a better understanding of how these two texts relate to each other.

3.2 THE APORIA OF JOHN 16:5

The interpretation of John 16:5 is crucial for Dettwiler’s understanding of 16:4e–33 as a *relecture* of 13:31–14:31, and as indicating a change in the historical situation of the Johannine school. In 16:5, Jesus says to his disciples that no one asks (ἐρωτᾷ) him where he is going, now that he is going to the Father, who sent him. The disciples have, however, already asked Jesus this question two times, namely in 13:36 and 14:5. According to Dettwiler, one can only deal with this aporia by understanding 16:5 as a “*Relecture-Phänomen*”.⁴⁷⁷ John 16:5 explicitly connects to the beginning of the first Farewell Discourse (13:33–35). The question where Jesus is going is a Christological question in the first Farewell Discourse (13:31–14:31). One has to read this question in 13:36 and 14:5 on the literary level of the earthly Jesus. The question where Jesus is going is, on the other hand, an anthropological-ecclesiological question in the second Farewell Discourse (16:4e–33). The question in 16:5 enquires about the way of the Johannine community out

⁴⁷⁴ Carson, “Current Source Criticism”: 423–424.

⁴⁷⁵ Carson, “Current Source Criticism”: 424. Italics in the original.

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Frey, *Die johanneische Eschatologie*. Bd. III, 117: “[u]ngeklärt bleibt angesichts der Arbeit von Dettwiler auch, ob sich aus der Beobachtung einer vertiefenden Weiterführung des zuvor Gesagten wirklich auf eine sukzessive Geschichte der Fortschreibung in gewandelten geschichtlichen Situationen schließen läßt.” This criticism was later also formulated by Udo Schnelle, “Johannes 16 im Rahmen der Abschiedsreden,” in *Studies in the Gospel of John and its Christology*, 425–446, at 441–442 with the conclusion that it is methodologically sound to first try to explain the *Fortschreibung* on the basis of one hand, before presupposing the existence of a second hand.

⁴⁷⁷ Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 219. Italics in the original.

of its sad situation (λύπη) in a hostile world. One has to read this question on the literary level of the post-paschal Johannine community.⁴⁷⁸

According to Dettwiler, John 16:16–24 is a *relecture* of 14:18–24. The paschal experience of the first disciples (14:18–24) functions as a paradigm for the understanding of the relationship of the post-paschal community to Jesus (16:16–24). The paschal event is not only an event in the past, but is dehistoricised by understanding it as the experience of the proximity of the love of God in Jesus. This experience of love changes the λύπη of the post-paschal Johannine community into χαρά. John 16:25–33 represents the paradigmatic way of Johannine faith. John 16:25 refers to a new era of understanding. In this era, the members of the Johannine community have a perfect and immediate relationship with God (16:26–27). John 16:29–32 refutes Christians who think that they can obtain this relationship with God on their own.⁴⁷⁹ In Dettwiler's interpretation, the ground of this relationship is the Christ. The Christ gives ειρήνη. The disciples obtain this eschatological gift when they realise that: (i) the post-paschal Paraclete supports their religious identity against the hostile world (16:8–11), and leads them the way into the future (16:12–15); (ii) the coming of Jesus will turn their hardship into joy (16:16–24); and (iii) their understanding and faith (16:29–30) requires criticism (16:31–32) so that they will recognise Jesus as the only ground of their faith. Only when these three conditions are fulfilled, will the disciples obtain ειρήνη. The eschatological gift of peace overcomes the θλίψις, the external cause of the λύπη of the Johannine community (16:33).⁴⁸⁰

According to Zumstein, John 16:25 and other texts (2:22; 8:28; 12:16; 13:7; 14:20; 20:9) refer to the process of *relecture*. All these texts have in common that they concern the retrospective clarification of the sayings and works of the Johannine Jesus. The diachronic *Fortschreibung* process of the Johannine school is a teaching guided by the post-paschal Paraclete. This teaching explicates the (figurative) language of Jesus further and further (14:25–26). As Jesus has always taught παρησία (7:26; 10:24–25; 11:54; 18:20), the aim of this hermeneutical process of explication is to better understand the

⁴⁷⁸ See Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 219–220, 278. Zumstein (*Jean [13–21]*, 130) agrees with Dettwiler's interpretation of John 16:5. Scholtissek ("Relecture": 5, 25 and "The Johannine Gospel in Recent Research," 459), who is the most important proponent of the use of the *réécriture* model in Johannine exegesis, is persuaded by Dettwiler's understanding of John 16:4e–33 as a *relecture* of 13:31–14:31.

According to Zumstein (*Kreative Erinnerung*, 65–67 and *Jean [1–12]*, 25–26), the level of the earthly Jesus and the level of the post-paschal Johannine community are not historicising, but literary in the Fourth Gospel. Zumstein makes a terminological distinction between the earthly and the historical Jesus. The quest for the historical Jesus is a modern concern alien to the writers of John's Gospel. The level of the earthly Jesus in John's Gospel contains the tradition of the earthly Jesus, that is, miracle stories, Jesus' sayings, and passion story. Both the tradition of the earthly Jesus and the tradition of the post-paschal Johannine community are fiction, not in the sense that they are fabricated, but in the sense that the narrator has selected, emphasised, developed, reformulated, and, thus, interpreted his/her material.

⁴⁷⁹ See Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 287.

⁴⁸⁰ See Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 264.

παρρησία teaching of Jesus.⁴⁸¹ For Zumstein and Dettwiler, the *modus dicendi* of Jesus does not change during the hour of Jesus, but the *modus intelligendi* of the members of the Johannine school does, namely, from παροιμία to παρρησία (16:25).⁴⁸²

The previous chapter has, however, already argued against this interpretation of παροιμία and παρρησία in John's Gospel.⁴⁸³ In addition, the previous subsections of the present chapter have demonstrated that παροιμία and παρρησία are not opposed to each other in John 10–11, whereas the understanding of these terms as *modi intelligendi* presupposes that they are. The present author is, therefore, critical against this legitimization of the model of *relecture* from within the text of John's Gospel itself. The remaining text of the present subsection will argue that John 16:5 can also be interpreted in a synchronic fashion. John 16:4e–33 will not be viewed as a *relecture*, but as a *réécriture* of 13:31–14:31. The meaning of *réécriture* is, however, different here from how Klaus Scholtissek defines it. What is meant here, is not that the different parts of John's Gospel are 'Gospels within Gospels', because each part contains all the propositions necessary to be considered as a Gospel. On the contrary, from the perspective of my research hypothesis that παρρησία is not opposed to παροιμία, the Gospel cannot be defined in terms of propositions. Revelation and concealment are not in opposition to each other in John's Gospel. John's Gospel message is, therefore, not expressible in (plain and clear) propositions. A historical-contextual study of the terms παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel will provide an understanding of John's characterisation of Jesus' language.⁴⁸⁴ The understanding of these terms is fundamental for understanding the repetition, variation, and amplification in John's presentation of the teaching of Jesus. One first has to reconstruct how John understands and characterises the language of Jesus, before one can understand his presentation of the teaching of Jesus. The understanding of the literary feature of repetition, variation, and amplification will, subsequently, lead to an understanding of how the different parts of the Gospel relate to each other.

Synchronic explanations for the aporia in John 16:5 have already been offered by previous scholarship: (i) An obvious and simple explanation is that ἐρωτᾷ in 16:5 is a present indicative. John 16:5 only deals with the immediate reaction of the disciples to the words of Jesus. According to Charles Barrett, only if 16:5 would have the aorist indicative ἠρώτησε, there would be a contradiction with 13:36 and 14:5;⁴⁸⁵ (ii) in John 13:36 and 14:5, the disciples "are not asking where Jesus is going (16:5), because they are unable to reach beyond the identification of departure with physical death". The disciples were not yet able to ask the question ποῦ ὑπάγεις in the correct meaning because

⁴⁸¹ See Zumstein, *Kreative Erinnerung*, 76–77.

⁴⁸² See Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 256; Zumstein, "Das hermeneutische Problem," 168–169; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 151–152.

⁴⁸³ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.3.

⁴⁸⁴ See *infra*, Chapter Six to Eleven.

⁴⁸⁵ For the first synchronic explanation for the aporia in John 16:5, see Barrett, *John*, 485. I add that the imperfect indicative ἠρώτα, or the perfect indicative ἠρώτηκε, would, also, imply a contradiction with John 13:36 and 14:5.

of their “horizontal, time-conditioned understanding” of the destiny of Jesus.⁴⁸⁶ Therefore, Jesus can gently reprove the disciples in 16:5 that they do not ask where he is going. At that time, the disciples have not yet asked this question in the correct meaning; and (iii) Dodd, O’Day, Schnelle, and Wilckens remark that the disciples already know and understand where Jesus is going (see 14:12). Jesus reproves the disciples in 16:5 not because they do not ask him where he is going, but because they are dismayed about the future.⁴⁸⁷

As correctly noticed by Konrad Haldimann, the third explanation does, however, not do justice to the wording of Jesus’ reprove in John 16:5.⁴⁸⁸ If Jesus wanted to tell the disciples that they should not be dismayed about future persecution, it is unclear why he tells them that they are not asking him where he is going. According to Haldimann, the problem with the second explanation is that the first Farewell Discourse has already answered the question where Jesus is going: ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα πορεύομαι (14:12). If the disciples did not understand this answer, it can only be repeated. If they did understand, they do not need to pose the question ποῦ ὑπάγεις anymore.⁴⁸⁹ In my view, this counterargument is only valid if one presupposes that the τέλος of Jesus can be defined in propositions. In that case, the answer in 14:12 to the question where Jesus is going, can only be repeated. The above analysis of the terms παροιμία and παρηγορία in John 10–11, and the observation that revelation is not opposed to concealment in the Fourth Gospel⁴⁹⁰ imply, however, that this presupposition is unjustified. Jesus, the revealer, is paradoxically at the same time the concealer. As the identity of Jesus cannot be defined in (plain and clear) propositions, the question where Jesus is going is never made obsolete. From the viewpoint that revelation is also concealment, a question-answer dialectic is required for the revelatory process. The reason why the disciples are reluctant to engage in this dialectic in John 16, has to do with their desperate situation. The demonstrative pronoun ταῦτα in 16:6 does not refer to ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με in 16:5. The disciples are not saddened because Jesus is returning to the one who sent him. Haldimann correctly points out that 16:6 is only meaningful when one presupposes that ταῦτα in 16:6 has the same referent as ταῦτα in 16:4, that is, the expulsion from the synagogue in 16:2–3. Haldimann correctly paraphrases 16:6: “[a]ber weil ich euch meinen Weggang zu dem, der mich gesandt hat, angekündigt habe, der für euch den Ausschluss aus der Synagoge bedeuten wird, deshalb hat die Trauer euer Herz erfüllt.”⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁶ Francis J. Moloney, *Glory not Dishonor: Reading John 13–21* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 82.

⁴⁸⁷ See Dodd, *The Interpretation*, 412–413 n. 1; O’Day, *John*, 771; Udo Schnelle, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes*, THKNT 4 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, ²1998), 247; Ulrich Wilckens, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes*, NTD 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ¹⁷1998), 249.

⁴⁸⁸ See Haldimann, *Rekonstruktion*, 294.

⁴⁸⁹ See Haldimann, *Rekonstruktion*, 293–294.

⁴⁹⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §4.2.

⁴⁹¹ Haldimann, *Rekonstruktion*, 297.

As a result of this message, the disciples are sad and reluctant to ask further questions.⁴⁹² This interpretation is strengthened by the first explanation of the *aporia* in 16:5. The present ἐρωτᾷ restricts the inability of the disciples to ask questions to the immediate situation of fear and sadness. A further argument for this interpretation of ἐρωτᾷ is the pragmatic information provided by νῦν in 16:5a.

As a consequence of this meaningful synchronic explanation of the *aporia* in John 16:5, it is not necessary to consider 16:4e–33 as a *relecture* of 13:31–14:31. The literary relationship between these two parts of the Gospel can easily be explained in a synchronic fashion. The many parallels and variations between both texts do not indicate a changed historical situation of a presupposed Johannine school, but amplify one theme, namely, the identity of Jesus, the one who is sent by God and returning to God. In 16:4e–33, the emphasis is on the consequences of having faith in Jesus. Having faith in Jesus implies being persecuted by the hostile κόσμος. This persecution is signified as θλίψις, which is the external cause of the λύπη of the disciples. At the same time, 16:4e–33 speaks about the εἰρήνη that Jesus offers, that is, the removal of the θλίψις. Consequently, the λύπη of the disciples changes into χαρά. In John 14, the disciples were not yet conscious of these consequences of having faith in Jesus. As revelation is equally concealment, the disciples are time and time again exhorted to ask questions about the identity of Jesus. The question where Jesus is going (16:5) is part of this dialectical game.

3.3 THE FUSION OF PRE-PASCHAL AND POST-PASCHAL TIME IN JOHN 16:23–33

The position that John 16:4e–33 is a *réécriture* of 13:31–14:31 is further supported by how both texts deal with the division between pre-paschal and post-paschal time. The Farewell Discourse has what Christina Hoegen-Rohls calls a “Begründungsfunktion” for the future.⁴⁹³ As Jesus has glorified the Father during his earthly or pre-paschal teaching, the Father will immediately (εὐθύς) glorify Jesus (13:31–32). The emphatic νῦν in 13:31 indicates that the departure of Judas, and his imminent betrayal of Jesus brings about Jesus’ glorification and the glorification of the Father in Jesus. Obviously implied is that Judas’ betrayal leads to Jesus’ death on the cross, which 12:23–24 has previously identified as the ὥρα or the critical moment of Jesus’ glorification. Thus, the three time use of the aorist ἐδοξάσθη in 13:31–32 indirectly refers to a future event, viz. Jesus’ death on the cross.⁴⁹⁴ The double use of the future δοξάσει in 13:32 is explained by 13:33 as

⁴⁹² Cf. John 9:22; 12:42, where the threat of expulsion from the synagogue is also articulated as a reason to not engage in conversation.

⁴⁹³ Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 136–137.

⁴⁹⁴ This future meaning of the aorist ἐδοξάσθη in John 13:31–32 has previously been observed by Thyen, *Johannes*, 604–605. Thyen (*Johannes*, 604–605) correctly observes that the emphatic use of νῦν in John 13:31 indicates that ἐδοξάσθη refers to Judas’ betrayal, and, therefore, as a “*pars pro toto*” to Jesus’ death on the cross. Other interpretations that have been offered by scholarly literature are more speculative and less grounded in the Gospel text, e.g.: (i) Joseph N. Sanders, *A Commentary on the Gospel according to St John*, ed. and compl. by Brian A. Mastin, BNTC (London: Black, 1968), 315, who interprets ἐδοξάσθη as

referring to Jesus' farewell, that is, his return to the Father (14:12f; 14:28g). Jesus is the glorified one during his post-paschal existence with the Father (7:39c–d; 12:16b–e). Consequently, the contrast of the aorist ἐδοξάσθη with the future δοξάσει in 13:31–32 indicates two distinct moments in the process of Jesus' glorification. The first moment is Jesus' death on the cross. The second moment of glorification will take place soon after Jesus' death, because God will glorify Jesus immediately.⁴⁹⁵ John 13:31–32 grounds this second moment of glorification in the first moment. The pre-paschal teaching of Jesus, including his death, is foundational for the post-paschal time. Hence, the Farewell Discourse begins by grounding post-paschal time in pre-paschal time.

This grounding function is a recurring and unifying theme in the treatment of the relationship between pre-paschal and post-paschal time in John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33. According to the modern understanding of causality, there is a strict division between cause and effect. The understanding of the relationship between pre-paschal and post-paschal time in the Fourth Gospel suggests otherwise. In what follows, I will argue that the Farewell Discourse only stresses the opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in order to demonstrate that there is a fusion between both. On the one hand, the Farewell Discourse functions as a “*Zäsur*” between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era.⁴⁹⁶ On the other, the aim of the Farewell Discourse is not only to demonstrate that the pre-paschal era is foundational for the post-paschal era, but also that the former cannot be viewed independently of the latter. The pre-paschal era grounds the post-paschal era, whereas the latter transforms the former, because the pre-paschal era is viewed from within the Christological perspective of the post-paschal era. In the same way, John 16:25 only stresses the temporal opposition between pre-paschal παροιμία and post-paschal παρησία in order to demonstrate that there is no opposition between both.

The pre-paschal and the post-paschal era are factually separated in John 13:31–14:31, although the continuity between both eras receives attention. Three criteria are used to discern the factual division between both eras: (i) the use of the future indicative to express a promise; (ii) the opposition of temporal adverbs; and (iii) the reference to the time of Jesus' farewell, that is, the return of Jesus to his Father, which is at the same time the glorification of Jesus by God. The phrases ἔτι μικρὸν μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι (13:33a), ... οὐ...

referring to the washing of the disciples' feet (John 13:1–20) as a symbolic anticipation of Jesus' death; and (ii) Barrett, *John*, 449–450, who interprets ἐδοξάσθη as retrospectively referring to the death of Jesus from the viewpoint of the Christian community at the end of the first century. As a result of the future meaning of the aorist ἐδοξάσθη in John 13:31–32, also the view of Frey, “Die Gegenwart,” 140, 147 that there is a fusion of pre- and post-paschal time in John 13:31 is unjustified. According to Frey, the juxtaposition of ἐδοξάσθη with δοξάσει in John 13:31–32 implies a fusion of pre- and post-paschal time in 13:31. Jesus' glorification is presented as in the future by δοξάσει in 13:32, whereas ἐδοξάσθη in 13:31 presents Jesus' glorification as in the past. Frey considers ἐδοξάσθη as projecting a post-paschal event in the pre-paschal time. As ἐδοξάσθη in 13:31–32 has future meaning, the interpretation of Frey is, however, unjustified.

⁴⁹⁵ This interpretation of the contrast of ἐδοξάσθη with δοξάσει in John 13:31–32 has also been defended by Thyen, *Johannes*, 604–605.

⁴⁹⁶ Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 136. Italics in the original.

νῦν.../ ... δὲ ὕστερον (13:36d–e), πρὸς τὸν πατέρα πορεύομαι (14:12e), εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (14:16c), ἔτι μικρὸν κτλ (14:19a), ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (14:20a), παρ’ ὑμῖν μένων (14:25b), πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα (14:28g), νῦν εἶρηκα ὑμῖν πρὶν γενέσθαι/ ὅταν γένηται (14:29a–c), οὐκέτι πολλὰ λαλήσω μεθ’ ὑμῶν, ἔρχεται γὰρ ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων (14:30a–b) refer to this factual division between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era. Two things are constitutive for the continuity between both eras: (i) the relationship between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete; and (ii) the dependence of the post-paschal faith of the disciples on the pre-paschal teaching of Jesus. The phrases τὰ ἔργα ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶ καὶ ἐκεῖνος ποιήσει καὶ μείζονα τούτων ποιήσει (14:12c–e), τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσετε (14:15b), ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς διδάξει πάντα καὶ ὑπομνήσει ὑμᾶς πάντα ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν [ἐγώ] (14:26d–f) indicate the continuity between the pre- and post-paschal era. A fusion of both eras does, however, not take place in 13:31–14:31.⁴⁹⁷ In analogy with 16:25, one can say that the opposition between the pre-paschal παροιμία teaching and the post-paschal παρρησία teaching of Jesus is still preserved in 13:31–14:31, although the continuity between pre-paschal and post-paschal time receives much attention.

In John 16:4e–33, the factual division between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era is still present: ἐξ ἀρχῆς (16:4e), νῦν δὲ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμπσαντά με (16:5a), ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ἀπέλθω (16:7d), ἐὰν δὲ πορευθῶ (16:7f), καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐκεῖνος (16:8a), ἄρτι (16:12b), ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος (16:13a), μικρὸν καὶ οὐκέτι θεωρεῖτέ με, καὶ πάλιν μικρὸν καὶ ὄψεσθέ με (16:16), τὸ μικρόν (16:18c), ἡ ὥρα αὐτῆς (16:21c), νῦν μὲν (16:22a), πάλιν δὲ (16:22b), καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (16:23a), ἕως ἄρτι (16:24a), ἔρχεται ὥρα/ οὐκέτι (16:25b–c), ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (16:26a), πάλιν ἀφήμι τὸν κόσμον καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα (16:28c–d), ἄρτι (16:31b). However, the aim of the division between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in 16:4e–33 is not so much to point at this continuity between both eras, but more prominently to demonstrate their fusion: ὅτι μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἤμην (16:4f), ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου κέκριται (16:11b), αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ φιλεῖ ὑμᾶς (16:27a), ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ πεφιλήκατε καὶ πεπιστεύκατε κτλ (16:27b–d), ἐγὼ νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον (16:33e).⁴⁹⁸ Characteristic for the fusion of the pre-paschal and the post-paschal

⁴⁹⁷ This analysis of the temporal dimension of John 13:31–14:31 is borrowed from Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 137–139, but with minor adjustments. For the criteria to discern factual division and continuity between the pre-paschal and post-paschal era, see Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 227.

⁴⁹⁸ This analysis of the temporal dimension of John 16:4e–33 is taken from Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 206–208, although with some adjustments. Unlike Hoegen-Rohls, my analysis has left out John 16:29–30 as an example of fusion between pre-paschal and post-paschal time: see *infra* in the main text. According to Frey (“Die Gegenwart,” 140), also in John 16:11b there is a fusion of pre-paschal and post-paschal time, because he thinks the judgement of the ruler of the world is connected to the event of Jesus’ death. Hoegen-Rohls (*Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 184), on the other hand, claims that the reason why the ruler of this world is already judged (κέκριται) is mentioned in 16:9, namely, that the world does not have faith (cf. πιστεύουσιν) in Jesus (see also 3:18b). She, apparently, for this reason, does not think that there is a fusion between pre- and post-paschal time in 16:11b. In my view, Frey has the upper hand because of the association of the judgement of the world and the casting out of the ruler of this world

era is: (i) the future indicative used to express promises is exchanged for the perfect, present, and aorist tense; (ii) the opposition between temporal adverbs is exchanged for the temporal adverb *vñv*; and (iii) characters of the pre-paschal era (both Jesus and disciples) show post-paschal faith characteristics.⁴⁹⁹ In analogy with 16:25, one can say that the opposition between the pre-paschal *παροιμία* teaching and the post-paschal *παρρησία* teaching of Jesus is suspended in 16:4e–33.

From the viewpoint of the *relecture* model, one can explain the differences in the understanding of the relationship between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in John 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33 as follows. According to the *relecture* model, John 13:31–14:31 should be read on the literary level of the earthly Jesus, and 16:4e–33 on the literary level of the Johannine community. In this view, it is understandable that in 13:31–14:31, the pre-paschal era and the post-paschal era are presented as factually divided from each other, and that only the continuity between both eras is stressed. From the perspective of the disciples of the earthly Jesus, the hour of Jesus' death on the cross is still in the future, and is, therefore, factually divided from the present. It is the event of Jesus' death on the cross that, in a retrospective way, renders Jesus' words and deeds understandable (14:25–26). The *ᾠρα* of Jesus has a historical meaning here. In John 16:4e–33, on the other hand, the *ᾠρα* of Jesus is dehistoricised. John 16:25 refers to the hermeneutical process that not the *modus dicendi* of Jesus changes at the time of his death, but the *modus intelligendi* of the members of the Johannine school, namely, from *παροιμία* to *παρρησία*.⁵⁰⁰ This self-justification of the use of the *relecture* model is, however, circular. The proponents of the *relecture* model already presuppose that John 16:4e–33 is a *relecture* of 13:31–14:31 in order to be able to understand 16:25 as legitimating the use of this textual model.

Furthermore, they consider it justified to understand John 16:4e–33 as a *relecture* of 13:31–14:31 because of the *aporia* in 16:5. The previous subsection of the present chapter has, however, argued that this *aporia* can also be easily explained in a synchronic fashion, and, therefore, does not justify the use of the *relecture* model. Consequently, the differences in the understanding of the relationship between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33 cannot be explained from the point of view of the *relecture* model. In my view, these differences can be explained from the point of view of the *réécriture* model. According to this model, the texts of 13:31–14:31 and 16:4e–33 are written by one single author. Therefore, in terms of content, there is a thematic unity between both texts so that one cannot properly speak of two distinct Farewell Discourses. The common theme of the two texts is the relationship between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era or, respectively, the *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* teaching of Jesus. As said earlier, John 13:31–14:31 develops the thought that the pre-paschal era

with the event of Jesus' death in 12:31–33. Also, I agree with Frey ("Die Gegenwart," 140) that ὅτι μεθ' ὑμῶν ἤμην in John 16:4f signals a fusion of pre- and post-paschal time. According to Frey, the Johannine Jesus contradicts himself in 16:4, because he says that he is not anymore in the world, whereas, he actually still is in the world. Thus, a post-paschal perspective is projected in pre-paschal time.

⁴⁹⁹ These criteria are borrowed from Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 227–228.

⁵⁰⁰ See *supra*, §3.2. See also *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.3 for our discussion of Zumstein *et al.*

grounds the post-paschal era. For this reason, the text refers to the factual division of both eras and, at the same time, stresses the continuity between them. The works that Jesus has done, the post-paschal believer will also do (14:12). Just as Jesus has kept the commandment of love, the disciples will also do (14:15). The words that Jesus has spoken, the disciples will remember and understand (14:25–26). The pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in 13:31–14:31 are presented as distinct from one another, but the continuity between them is so strong that they almost fuse with one another.

The text of John 16:4e–33 amplifies this topic of the relationship between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in a characteristically Johannine way, namely, by means of repetition and variation. The repetition of the same elements in the parallel texts, in combination with variations, indicates progression in John's reflection on the relationship between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era. As argued in the previous subsection, the aporia in 16:5 is not a sufficient argument to presuppose a changed historical situation and/or a different authorship in 16:4e–33. The sharp opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era is again very much present in this text. The continuity between both eras is made explicit in the general theme of John 16 that the disciples will suffer persecution in the post-paschal era, just as Jesus has in the pre-paschal era. As Raymond Brown correctly notes, the failure to see the post-paschal Paraclete (14:17) results in "the same type of hostility that marked the relationship of the world to Jesus".⁵⁰¹

In John 16:23–33, the opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era is suspended. The text of 16:25 refers to the opposition between the pre-paschal era of Jesus' teaching ἐν παροιμίαις and the post-paschal era of Jesus' teaching παρησίᾳ by means of the opposition ἔρχεται ὥρα/ οὐκέτι. In 16:26, this opposition is kept intact by means of the already introduced opposition in 16:23–24 between the pre-paschal relationship of the disciples to Jesus and the post-paschal relationship of the disciples to the Father. For the first relationship, the verb ἐρωτάω is consistently used, whereas for the second relationship the verb αἰτέω is preserved. The opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era is suddenly suspended in 16:27: αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ πατήρ φιλεῖ ὑμᾶς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ πεφιλήκατε καὶ πεπιστεύκατε ὅτι ἐγὼ παρὰ [τοῦ] θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον. The present indicative φιλεῖ in 16:27 is surprising, because of the use of the future indicative in 16:25–26 (λαλήσω, ἀπαγγελῶ, αἰτήσεσθε, ἐρωτήσω). John 16:27 is the fulfilment of the promise formulated in 14:21. Although ἀγαπάω instead of φιλέω is used in 14:21, this text says that the one who keeps the commandment of love is the one who loves Jesus, and will be loved (ἀγαπηθήσεται) by the Father. The text also says that Jesus will love this person and manifest (cf. ἐμφανίσω) himself to him/her. The latter explains why, in 16:27, the love for Jesus is closely related to the belief that Jesus came from the Father. This faith in Jesus is only possible in the post-paschal era, because it is the Spirit or the post-paschal Paraclete, who enables the disciples to understand that Jesus came from God (14:20, 25–26, 31; 15:26–27; 16:7–11; 16:12–15; 17:23). The resultative aspect of the perfect indicative πεπιστεύκατε in 16:27 indicates, however, that these promises of future faith

⁵⁰¹ Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 711.

are already fulfilled in the pre-paschal era. There is a fusion between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era in 16:27.⁵⁰²

In John 16:28, the opposition between pre-paschal and post-paschal time is again restored, because Jesus' return to the Father is presented as not yet realised, but in the future: ἐξῆλθον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον· πάλιν ἀφίημι τὸν κόσμον καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα.⁵⁰³ From the perspective that Jesus' παρρησία is expressed as a future promise in 16:25, the reply of the disciples in 16:29–30 is surprising: ἴδε νῦν ἐν παρρησίᾳ λαλεῖς καὶ παροιμίαν οὐδεμίαν λέγεις. νῦν οἶδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα καὶ οὐ χρειᾶν ἔχεις ἵνα τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ· ἐν τούτῳ πιστεύομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθες. Unlike Hoegen-Rohls, however, I do not think that the opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era is again suspended in 16:29–30.⁵⁰⁴ There is no projection of post-paschal faith into the pre-paschal era. Unlike some scholars, I do not consider 16:29–30 as reflecting direct Christological knowledge.⁵⁰⁵ The following five arguments speak against the view of these scholars: (i) Jesus spoke about future revelation in 16:25 and “the disciples wrongly apply these words to the present”.⁵⁰⁶ Given that the disciples correct Jesus, they show that they do not fully understand him;⁵⁰⁷ (ii) John 16:28 only expresses what has been said before (see 3:2; 5:36–38, 43; 6:29, 44, 46, 57, 69; 8:16, 18, 42; 11:42; 12:49; 14:2–3, 12, 28; 16:5, 10, 17). Although this does not necessarily imply that the disciples are impetuous and boastful, it does demonstrate that 16:29–30 does not reflect direct Christological knowledge;⁵⁰⁸ (iii) the disciples do not understand what is meant by Jesus' departure from the world (16:16–19; cf. 12:34). Therefore, they cannot

⁵⁰² This analysis of the fusion between pre-paschal and post-paschal time in John 16:27 is derived from Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 199. The projection of post-paschal insights into the pre-paschal era was previously observed by Takashi Onuki, *Gemeinde und Welt im Johannesevangelium: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der theologischen und pragmatischen Funktion des johanneischen “Dualismus”*, WMANT 56 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1984), 156–157. John 16:27 thus does not, as Schnackenburg (*Johannes*, vol. 3, 184) concedes, emphasise “das schon länger bestehende und gefestigte Verhältnis der Jünger zu Jesus, ihre bereits erwiesene Liebe und ihren bereits bewährten Glauben an Jesus den Gottgesandten”. The opposition between the pre-paschal and post-paschal era is indeed suspended in John 16:27.

⁵⁰³ This restoration of the opposition between pre- and post-paschal time in John 16:28 has previously been observed by Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 200.

⁵⁰⁴ *Contra* Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 200–201.

⁵⁰⁵ *Contra* Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 215: “Die dritte Stufe (V29.30) bildet die deutliche Klimax der Jüngerreaktion: formaliter insofern, als die Jünger erstmals sich selbst als vollumfassend Verstehende sehen. Die Jünger sind in ein direktes, verstehendes Verhältnis zu Jesus eingetreten.” Zimmermann (*Christologie*, 38) agrees with Dettwiler's interpretation of John 16:29–30. Becker (*Johannes: Kapitel 11–21*, 505) also considers the reaction of the disciples in 16:29–30 as “nachösterlich”, but does not view the knowledge of the disciples as effected by the Spirit or the post-paschal Paraclete, but as an “antizipierte Erfahrung”.

⁵⁰⁶ O'Day, *Revelation*, 106. Also noted by Hylan, *Imperfect Believers*, 67.

⁵⁰⁷ See Schnackenburg, vol. 3, 185.

⁵⁰⁸ See Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 736 and Hylan, *Imperfect Believers*, 67. Brown does, however, conclude from the fact that John 16:28 does not add anything new that the reaction of the disciples in 16:29–30 is impetuous and boasting.

understand what is meant with the hour of Jesus' παρρησία in 16:25; (iv) the misunderstanding of the disciples is indicated by the many ironic elements in 16:29–31. The double use of νῦν by the disciples in 16:29–30 corresponds with the use of ἄρτι in Jesus' reaction in 16:31. In the dialogue with Peter in 13:36–37, νῦν is also replaced by ἄρτι. Just like in 16:31, Jesus also replies with a doubting question in 13:38. Furthermore, the prediction of Peter's denial is parallel to the announcement of the scattering of the disciples in 16:32. These parallels indicate that the change from νῦν to ἄρτι indicates irony and misunderstanding in 16:29–31. The phrase οἶδας πάντα in 16:30 is also paralleled by Peter's πάντα σὺ οἶδας in 21:17. The φιλεῖν of the disciples for Jesus (16:27) can be compared to the φιλεῖν/ἀγαπᾶν in the dialogue between Peter and Jesus in 21:15–17.⁵⁰⁹ In both cases, the claim that Jesus knows everything has a sense of irony and does not signal an immediate Christological knowledge.⁵¹⁰ The omission of the phrase that Jesus is going to the Father in 16:30 also indicates the irony of the reaction of the disciples in 16:29–30;⁵¹¹ and (v) in 16:32, Jesus actually says that the hour has come, but instead of confirming 16:29–30, the text of 16:32 exposes that the disciples speak about "the ordinary present, but Jesus speaks about the eschatological present".⁵¹²

Unlike most of the scholars who uttered the preceding five arguments against the view that John 16:29–30 indicates the immediate Christological knowledge of the disciples, I do not consider the reaction of the disciples in 16:29–30 as completely lacking understanding. With Bultmann, I propose a middle ground between immediate Christological knowledge and complete misunderstanding. According to Bultmann, the disciples have not obtained a definite immediate Christological knowledge, but nevertheless their answer in 16:29–30 is correct in as far as it anticipates the future: "[S]ie ist der Ausdruck des wagenden Glaubens, der auf das Wort der Verkündigung hin das Künftige als Gegenwärtiges nimmt. In ihrer Antwort ist also das Ja des Glaubens, das sie seither gesprochen haben – ausdrücklich 6,69 – noch einmal ausgesprochen."⁵¹³ The act of faith is based on a conjectural knowledge claim. As such, faith does not have a definite content.

This conjectural nature of the faith/knowledge claim of the disciples in John 16:29–30 is attested by the ambiguous response of Jesus in 16:31. Scholars either interpret this response as affirmative or as critical of the faith/knowledge claim of the disciples in 16:29–30.⁵¹⁴ The idea that one has to make an interpretive choice in this respect is,

⁵⁰⁹ The authenticity of John 21 is, however, contested, see *supra*, n. 268.

⁵¹⁰ These parallels between John 16:27, 28–30 and both 13:36–38 and 21:15–17 are derived from Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 185. O'Day (*Revelation*, 106–107), also, notes the ironic undertone of νῦν/ἄρτι in John 16:29–31.

⁵¹¹ Correctly observed by O'Day, *Revelation*, 107.

⁵¹² O'Day, *Revelation*, 108.

⁵¹³ Bultmann, *Johannes*, 455.

⁵¹⁴ For the interpretation of John 16:31 with an affirmative meaning, see, e.g. Zimmermann, *Christologie*, 38. For the interpretation of John 16:31 with a critical meaning, see, e.g., Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 736; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 186; Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 201; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 154. Barrett (*John*, 497) is less determinate in his formulation, but still emphasises

however, motivated by the interest to disambiguate the phrase ἄρτι πιστεύετε in 16:31. In my view, the ambiguity is, however, intrinsically part of the text.⁵¹⁵ On the one hand, the phrase ἄρτι πιστεύετε can be read as an affirmation of the conjectural claim of the disciples in 16:29–30. On the other, the phrase can also be read as a rhetorical question. John 16:32 suggests that the disciples should not be complacent, and indicates that their faith is only based on conjecture. The formulation of 16:32 fully repairs the opposition between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal era. The death of Jesus, or the return of Jesus to the Father, is presented as lying in the near future. As noted by Hoegen-Rohls, the last words of the Farewell Discourse (ἐγὼ νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον; 16:33e), however, again suspend the opposition between the two eras. The resultative aspect of the perfect indicative νενίκηκα indicates that Jesus has already returned to the Father.⁵¹⁶

Although John 16:25 suggests an opposition between the pre-paschal παροιμία and the post-paschal παρρησία teaching, the present reading of 16:25 in the literary context of 16:25–33 has demonstrated that this opposition is only emphasised by John in order to show that there is no opposition between both eras and teachings.⁵¹⁷ Consequently, the text of 16:25–33 verifies the research hypothesis of the present chapter that there is no opposition between παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

The present chapter has demonstrated that there is no opposition between παροιμία and παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel. The terms παροιμία and παρρησία are not antonyms in John 10; 11:11–16; 16:23–33. On the contrary, Jesus' παρρησία makes use of παροιμία. This paradox, that revelation is not opposed to concealment in the Gospel of John, has been neglected by the scholarly literature. Παροιμία and παρρησία provide a rhetorical structure to the text that explains the literary feature of repetition, variation, and amplification in the Gospel. Instead of explaining this literary feature by postulating more than one author of the Gospel, I have proposed to account for it with reference to the interplay between revelation (cf. παρρησία) and concealment (cf. παροιμία). Repetition, variation, and amplification are essential to John's writing, because he considers Jesus' teaching to be simultaneously revealing and concealing God. Chapter Eleven will provide a historical-contextual approach to understand this collaboration of παρρησία and

the critical meaning of John 16:31 more than the affirmative meaning: "[t]he question does not perhaps deny the existence of some kind and measure of faith; but its complete inadequacy is shown in the next verse."

⁵¹⁵ The desire to disambiguate language was simply not a concern of ancient authorship nor readership: see Downing, "Ambiguity".

⁵¹⁶ See Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 202.

⁵¹⁷ A similar conclusion has been drawn by O'Day (*Revelation*, 108) on the basis of the observation that in John 16:25 the hour of Jesus' παρρησία is presented as still coming, whereas 16:32 speaks about the presence of the eschatological hour. She concludes from this that "[t]he two revelatory modes mentioned in 16:25 are not related to one another in a linear progression but are simultaneously operative in Jesus' revelation." My analysis of the temporal dimension in John 16:25–33 has provided additional and substantial support for this view. For my discussion of O'Day, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §5.2.

παρουσία in the Gospel. The next chapter will examine the orientation of the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ORIENTATION OF THE TEACHING OF THE POST-PASCHAL PARACLETE IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

The aim of the present chapter is to provide a study of the orientation of the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete.⁵¹⁸ A presupposition of the hermeneutical approach to *παροιμία* and *παρησία* in the Fourth Gospel is that the orientation of the Christological process of comprehension (revelation) is purely retrospective.⁵¹⁹ According to this approach, at the time of Jesus' death, not the *modus dicendi* of Jesus changes, but the *modus intelligendi* of his interlocutors (*παροιμία* → *παρησία*). The post-paschal Paraclete will remind Jesus' disciples of his words and deeds, and will enable the disciples to understand the meaning of these words and deeds in a correct and univocal way (John 2:22; 12:16; 14:25–26). Thus, the authors of the hermeneutical approach interpret the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete as being merely retrospective, and oriented to what has already been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. This, however, seems to be at odds with the presentation of the Paraclete as teaching the things that are to come (*τὰ ἐρχόμενα*; 16:13). A further difficulty is that the authors of the hermeneutical approach consider *παροιμία* and *παρησία* to be purely cognitive terms used by John in an epistemological reflection on the possibility of Christological knowledge. Yet, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, *παροιμία* and *παρησία* are not opposed to each other in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Therefore, these terms cannot be hermeneutical key terms that lead the reader along the way towards a univocal Christological knowledge. The term *παρησία* does not denote univocal Christological knowledge in John's Gospel.

As a result of these difficulties of the hermeneutical approach, the present chapter will test the validity of the presupposition that the orientation of the teaching is purely retrospective. Two texts in the Fourth Gospel provide us with information about the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete: John 14:25–26 and 16:12–13. The first two sections will provide an analysis of these texts. Previous scholarly literature has interpreted these texts as representing the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as either prospective or retrospective. I will argue that a synthesis of these two positions is required to make full sense of these texts in the literary context of the Gospel. The third section will demonstrate that Kierkegaard's category of repetition is required to obtain this synthesis.⁵²⁰

1. JOHN 14:25–26

⁵¹⁸ I have previously announced the present chapter in Chapter Two, §3.1, where I have argued why the present chapter is necessary for my study of *παροιμία* and *παρησία* in the Gospel of John.

⁵¹⁹ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.

⁵²⁰ Parts of the present chapter were previously published in Thomas Tops, "The Orientation of the Teaching of the Paraclete in the Gospel of John: Retrospective or Prospective?," *NTS* 66/1 (2020) 68–86.

- 14:25a ταῦτα λελάληκα
 14:25b παρ' ὑμῖν μένων·
 14:26αα ὁ δὲ παράκλητος,
 14:26b τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον,
 14:26c ὃ πέμψει ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου,
 14:26αβ ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς διδάξει πάντα
 14:26d καὶ ὑπομνήσει ὑμᾶς πάντα
 14:26e ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν [ἐγώ].

Scholarly literature has provided two possible interpretations of the orientation of the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete in John 14:25–26. The point of disagreement between these two interpretations is whether teaching and reminding are two different functions of the Paraclete or aspects of the same function. Two criteria are used to discern this: (i) the antecedent(s) of the relative pronoun in 14:26e; and (ii) the semantic value of καί in 14:26d.

Interpretation one: the relative pronoun in John 14:26e has both πάντα in 14:26d and πάντα in 14:26αβ as antecedent. If this is the case, the conjunction καί in 14:26d can only have an explicative (or epexegetical) meaning. This καί can then not be cumulative, because the proposition that the Paraclete will remind the disciples of everything that Jesus has said to them (14:26d–e), does not add additional information to the proposition that the post-paschal Paraclete will teach the disciples everything that the earthly Jesus has said to them (14:26αβ, e). John 14:26, thus, verbatim states that the Paraclete will teach the disciples everything that Jesus has said to them by reminding them of everything that Jesus has said to them. According to the proponents of this interpretation, the teaching function of the Paraclete is restricted to reminding the disciples of the words of Jesus. Teaching and reminding are aspects of one and the same function of the Paraclete.⁵²¹ According to Hans Klein, further support for this interpretation can be found in a parallel in Matt 28:20: διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν.⁵²² In this

⁵²¹ Proponents of the first interpretation of John 14:25–26 are, e.g., Marie-Joseph Lagrange, *Évangile selon Saint Jean*, EBib (Paris: Gabalda, 1936), 391; Bultmann, *Johannes*, 484–485; Felix Porsch, *Pneuma und Wort: Ein exegetischer Beitrag zur Pneumatologie des Johannesevangeliums*, FThSt 16 (Frankfurt a.M.: Josef Knecht, 1974), 257; Ignace de la Potterie, *La vérité dans Saint Jean*, tome I, *Le Christ et la vérité, l'Esprit et la vérité*, AnBib 73 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 367–369; Johanna Rahner, “Vergegenwärtigende Erinnerung: Die Abschiedsreden, der Geist-Paraklet und die Retrospektive des Johannesevangeliums,” *ZNW* 91 (2000) 72–90: at 77; Lothar Wehr, “‘Er wird euch alles lehren und euch an alles erinnern, was ich euch gesagt habe’ (Joh 14,26): Die hermeneutische Funktion des Geist-Parakleten und die Kriterien der Traditionsbildung im Johannesevangelium,” in *Pneuma und Gemeinde: Christsein in der Tradition des Paulus und Johannes. FS für Josef Hainz zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Jost Eckert – Martin Schmidl – Hanneliese Steichele (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 2001), 325–359, at 329 n. 15; Craig S. Keener, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary*, vol. 2 (Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 978; Thyen, *Johannes*, 635; Michael Theobald, “‘Erinnert euch der Worte, die ich euch gesagt habe...’ (Joh 15,20): ‘Erinnerungsarbeit’ im Johannesevangelium,” *Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie* 22 (2007) 105–130: at 126–127.

⁵²² See Hans Klein, “Der Paraklet als Subjekt prophetischer Rede im Johannesevangelium,” *Sacra Scripta* 9/2 (2011) 173–188: at 178.

interpretation of John 14:25–26, the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective. The teaching function of the post-paschal Paraclete cannot properly be called revelatory, because his teaching consists only in reminding the disciples of the past revelation that took place in the earthly Jesus.

Interpretation two: the antecedent of the relative pronoun in John 14:26e is only *πάντα* in 14:26d. If this is the case, the meaning of *καί* in 14:26d can be either explicative or cumulative. If explicative, John 14:26 verbatim states that the Paraclete will teach the disciples everything by reminding them of everything that Jesus has said to them. This is the same result as in interpretation one above. The teaching of the Paraclete is restricted to reminding the disciples of everything that Jesus has said to them. Teaching and reminding are two aspects of the same function of the Paraclete. The orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective.⁵²³ If the meaning of *καί* in 14:26d is cumulative, another interpretation of the orientation of the Paraclete is made possible. The Paraclete teaches everything and, in addition, reminds the disciples of everything that Jesus has said to them. Teaching and reminding are two distinct functions of the Paraclete. As such, the teaching of the Paraclete is not restricted to reminding the disciples of everything that Jesus has said to them. This interpretation, thus, opens up the possibility of viewing the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as prospective. The teaching of the Paraclete does not only teach something about the past, but also about the future. In this interpretation, not only the earthly Jesus, but equally the post-paschal Paraclete has a revelatory function. The post-paschal Paraclete can reveal things that were not yet revealed in/by the earthly Jesus.⁵²⁴

⁵²³ Proponents of this variant of the first interpretation of John 14:25–26 are, e.g., Brown, *John* (XIII–XXI), 650–651; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 94–95; Eskil Franck, *Revelation Taught: The Paraclete in the Gospel of John*, ConBNT 14 (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1985), 42; Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 203; Cornelis Bennema, *The Power of Saving Wisdom: An Investigation of Spirit and Wisdom in Relation to the Soteriology of the Fourth Gospel*, WUNT 2/148 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 229; Michel Gourgues, “Le paraclet, l’esprit de vérité. Deux désignations, deux fonctions,” in *Theology and Christology in the Fourth Gospel*, 83–108, at 97–98; Zumstein, *Jean* (13–21), 82; Andreas Dettwiler, “La pneumatologie”: 365–366.

⁵²⁴ Scholars who claim on the basis of John 14:25–26 that teaching and reminding are two distinct functions of the post-paschal Paraclete are, e.g., Brooke F. Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John* (London: Clarke, 1880; reprint 1958), 208–209; Bernhard Weiss, *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, KEK 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, ⁹1902), 414; Theodor Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Johannes ausgelegt*, KNT 4 (Leipzig: Deichert, ⁵1921), 572–573; Hans Windisch, *Die fünf johanneischen Parakletsprüche: Festgabe für Adolf Jülicher zum 70. Geburtstag 26. Januar 1927* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1927), 116; Walter Bauer, *Das Johannesevangelium*, HNT 6 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, ³1933), 187; Bernard, *John*, 553; Franz Mußner, “Die johanneischen Parakletsprüche und die apostolische Tradition,” *BZ N.F.* 5 (1961) 56–70: at 60; Andreas Feuillet, “De munere doctrinali a Paracrito in ecclesia expleto iuxta evangelium sancti Ioannis (Disquisitio biblica de relationibus inter Scripturam et Traditionem),” in *De scriptura et traditione* (Romae: Pontifica academia Mariana internationalis, 1963), 115–136, at 118; Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 116–117; Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 198–199; Ferdinand Hahn, “Sehen und Glauben im Johannesevangelium,” in *Studien zum Neuen Testament I: Grundsatzfragen, Jesusforschung, Evangelien*, ed. Jörg Frey – Juliane Schlegel, WUNT 191 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 521–537, at 536.

I will evaluate the above-mentioned interpretations of John 14:25–26 by asking what the antecedent is of the relative pronoun in 14:26e (see 1.1) and what the semantic meaning is of καί in 14:26d (see 1.2).

1.1 JOHN 14:26E: ANTECEDENT(S) OF RELATIVE PRONOUN?

According to Ignace de la Potterie and Felix Porsch, the following arguments can be given for the interpretation that the relative pronoun of John 14:26e has two antecedents, namely πάντα of both 14:26d and 14:26aβ: (i) The relative clause of 14:26e cannot be separated from 14:26aβ, because ἐκεῖνος and ἐγώ provide a chiasmic structure to 14:26aβ–e that does not allow such a separation;⁵²⁵ (ii) the *inclusio* between ταῦτα λελάληκα [...] ὑμῖν and εἶπον ὑμῖν ἐγώ, also, does not permit this separation;⁵²⁶ and (iii) Jesus says in 14:26c that the Father will send the Holy Spirit in Jesus' name. If the Paraclete is to reveal Jesus, it would be strange that διδάξει πάντα is detached from ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν ἐγώ.⁵²⁷

However, scholarly literature has also provided counterarguments against the view that the relative pronoun in John 14:26e has both πάντα in 14:26aβ and 14:26d as antecedent: (i) According to Hoegen-Rohls, a first counterargument is that the separation of 14:26e from 14:26aβ provides a much stronger parallel structure between the teaching of the pre-paschal Jesus and the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete. Whereas the pre-paschal era is characterised by the pre-paschal revelatory teaching of Jesus, the post-paschal era is characterised by the post-paschal revelatory teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete. Both Jesus and the post-paschal Paraclete have a revelatory function. This, however, does not mean that the teaching of the Paraclete is detached from the word of Jesus. The parallelism between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete implies that the Paraclete will reveal the word of Jesus, just as Jesus has revealed the word of the Father. Yet, this does not mean that the post-paschal Paraclete only reminds of what has already been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. The orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is not understood as retrospective, but as prospective. The Paraclete will teach what each time (πάντα) is to be said about Jesus and the Father in the future.⁵²⁸ This counterargument presupposes that the meaning of καί in 14:26d is cumulative; and (ii) according to Theodor Zahn, a second counterargument is that if the

⁵²⁵ See Porsch, *Pneuma*, 257 and de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 367–368. De la Potterie structures John 14:26aβ–e as follows:

(a)	(b)	(c)
ἐκεῖνος		
ὑμᾶς	καὶ ὑπομνήσει	ἃ εἶπον
διδάξει	ὑμᾶς	ὑμῖν
πάντα	πάντα	πάντα

⁵²⁶ See Porsch, *Pneuma*, 257 n. 210, 213 and de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 368.

⁵²⁷ See de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 368.

⁵²⁸ See Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 116–117.

relative pronoun in 14:26e has also πάντα in 14:26aβ as antecedent, the use of ὅμας and πάντα in 14:26aβ are superfluous.⁵²⁹

In my view, it is more likely on the basis of these (counter)arguments that only πάντα in John 14:26d is the antecedent of the relative pronoun in 14:26e. The argument of Hoegen-Rohls that this interpretation allows for a stronger parallelism between Jesus' teaching and the Paraclete's teaching is persuasive because of the strong analogies between Jesus and the Paraclete depicted elsewhere in the Gospel: (i) Just as the Paraclete is sent by the Father (14:16, 26), Jesus is sent by the Father (3:17; 5:24, 37–38; 6:38, 44); and (ii) the sending of the Paraclete takes place in Jesus' name (14:26).⁵³⁰ Furthermore, a stronger parallelism between Jesus' teaching and the post-paschal Paraclete's teaching helps to understand why the earthly Jesus is also called παράκλητος (cf. John 14:16; see also 1 John 2:1).⁵³¹

I consider the arguments of the presumed chiasmic structure and *inclusio* in John 14:25–26 to be not persuasive, because: (i) ἐκεῖνος is a demonstrative pronoun, whereas ἐγώ is a personal pronoun. These terms do not correspond to each other in 14:26aβ–e. It is also not clear to me how there can be an *inclusio* between ταῦτα λελάληκα παρ' ὑμῖν μένων and ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν ἐγώ. The personal pronoun ἐγώ does not correspond to the demonstrative pronoun ταῦτα. The personal pronoun ὑμῖν is also not the same as παρ' ὑμῖν μένων. Neither does the word order of 14:26aβ–e allow for a concentric structure; (ii) the presumed chiasmic structure and *inclusio* presuppose the reading of ἐγώ in 14:26e, which is attested by B L 060 0141 (33 ἐγώ εἶπον ὑμῖν) 127 1819, but not by P^{75vid} ⋈ A D Γ Δ Θ f¹ f³ Byz.; (iii) even if one allows for this confused and complex chiasmic structure, it is barely thinkable that an author would have constructed it with the intention to make sure that the relative clause of 14:26e cannot be separated from 14:26aβ; and (iv) furthermore, I do not even see why this presumed chiasmic structure and *inclusio* does not allow for such a separation. In sum, the chiasmic structure and *inclusio* are clearly scholarly constructs to exclude the possibility that the text would say that the post-paschal Paraclete will teach something that the earthly Jesus has not yet taught.

The argument that John 14:26c (ὃ πέμψει ὁ πατήρ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου) implies that ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν [ἐγώ] is attached to διδάξει πάντα is, also, not persuasive. The idea that the Paraclete is sent in Jesus' name does not guarantee that the Paraclete can only remind the disciples of the words of Jesus. I admit that other texts in the Fourth Gospel do convincingly demonstrate that the teaching of the Paraclete is repeating the teaching of

⁵²⁹ See Zahn, *Johannes*, 572. According to de la Potterie (*La vérité*, tome I, 368), the adjective πάντα in John 14:26aβ is, however, not omitted: (i) to give to it a “légère valeur emphatique”. See Edwin A. Abbott, *Johannine Grammar* (London: Black, 1906), n° 2606, for John's use of superfluous words to draw attention; and (ii) to keep the rhythmic balance in the chiasmic structure of (a) and (b). See *supra*, n. 525.

⁵³⁰ These analogies between the presentation of Jesus and the post-paschal Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel were previously observed by Wehr, “Er wird,” 329–330.

⁵³¹ Peter Stuhlmacher, “Spiritual Remembering: John 14.26,” in *The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D.G. Dunn*, ed. Graham N. Stanton – Bruce W. Longenecker – Stephen C. Barton (Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans, 2004), 55–68, at 64, therefore, rightly claims: “[i]n the Fourth Gospel the readers and hearers hear Jesus speak as the Paraclete revealed to the Evangelist and his followers.”

the earthly Jesus. According to 8:40 and 15:15, Jesus revealed everything that he has heard from the Father (cf. 15:15: πάντα ἃ ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου ἐγνώρισα ὑμῖν). The relative clause in 15:15 is non-restrictive. It is not so that Jesus only revealed that which he has heard from the Father, whereas there are still other things that the Father has not told him that can later be revealed by the post-paschal Paraclete. Jesus is the truth (14:6). Jesus has revealed the name of the Father (17:6, 26).

However, the view that the teaching of the Paraclete can only repeat the teaching of the earthly Jesus does not warrant that the teaching function of the Paraclete is restricted to reminding the disciples of the words of Jesus. In other words, this view does not imply that ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν [ἐγώ] is attached to διδάξει πάντα. Even if the Paraclete can only reveal Jesus, this does not mean that teaching and reminding are aspects of one and the same function of the Paraclete. The Paraclete could still have a revelatory function.

Both interpretation one and two of John 14:25–26 presuppose that attributing a revelatory function to the post-paschal Paraclete implies that revelation was incomplete in the earthly Jesus. In my view, this implication is unjustified. Instead of limiting the revelatory function of Jesus, the revelatory function of the Paraclete strengthens the analogy between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of the Paraclete. Whereas Jesus reveals the Father (1:18; 14:7), the Paraclete reveals Jesus (14:20, 25–26; 15:26–27; 16:7–11, 12–15). In their collaboration, there cannot be a competition between Jesus and the Paraclete, because both parties depend on each other in this single revelatory process. The relationship between Jesus and the Paraclete is one of cooperation. Therefore, the claim that the Paraclete can only reveal Jesus cannot be used as an argument against the view that the teaching of the Paraclete is revelatory, or that teaching and reminding are two distinct functions of the Paraclete. The interpretation of the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as prospective is still a possibility. Yet, the proponents of this interpretation need to be corrected as well, because they wrongly suggest that the prospective orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete implies that the Paraclete will teach things that were not yet taught by Jesus.

1.2 JOHN 14:26D: EXPLICATIVE OR CUMULATIVE καί?

The use of καί in the Gospel of John has rarely been systematically studied.⁵³² There is only one systematic study on the subject, viz. the study of Vern S. Poythress.⁵³³ The concordance of Carl Bruder provides some distinctions on the use of καί in the New

⁵³² This is surprising because conjunctions are often very important for interpreting the meaning of sentences, clauses, and words. The present case study of John 14:25–26 demonstrates this view.

⁵³³ See Vern S. Poythress, “The Use of the Intersentence Conjunctions *de*, *oun*, *kai* and Asyndeton in The Gospel of John,” *NovT* 26 (1984) 312–340. In a sequel study, Poythress used the rough rules of these conjunctions to verify the unity of the Gospel of John: see Vern S. Poythress, “Testing for Johannine Authorship by Examining the Use of Conjunctions,” *WTJ* 46/2 (1984) 350–369.

Testament, but surprisingly Bruder does not provide any information on the use of καί in John 14:26. He seemingly found it difficult to determine the meaning of this καί.⁵³⁴

The study of Poythress distinguishes three different meanings of καί in what he calls “expository discourse” in the Fourth Gospel, that is, the sayings of the Johannine Jesus and the commentary of the evangelist on these sayings.⁵³⁵ I will discern which of these meanings can be applied to καί in John 14:26.

(1) The conjunction καί can coordinate two sentences or preferably short clauses that are thematically related to each other. Additionally, these clauses often have individual words in common, see, e.g., John 14:21(2), 28; 15:1, 2, 16.⁵³⁶ I will illustrate this by discussing 15:2:

πᾶν κλῆμα ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴ φέρον καρπὸν αἶρει αὐτό,
καὶ πᾶν τὸ καρπὸν φέρον καθαίρει αὐτό

The common topic of both clauses is the behaviour of the vinedresser. The common words of both clauses are πᾶν, φέρον, καρπὸν, and αὐτό. In my view, a comparable analysis can be given for 14:26aβ-d:

ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς διδάξει πάντα
καὶ ὑπομνήσει ὑμᾶς πάντα

Both clauses share the same topic, i.e., the activity of the post-paschal Paraclete. Here, also, there are some common words, viz. ὑμᾶς and πάντα. This first possible meaning of καί in 14:26 agrees with what we have previously called the cumulative meaning of καί. The teaching and the reminding function of the post-paschal Paraclete are presented as distinct from each other. The conjunction καί in 14:26 coordinates these two functions.

(2) The conjunction καί is used when “the second sentence is a kind of step-wise addition to the first”, either “intensifying the idea in the first” (e.g., John 14:3, 12, 13; 17:26), “adding information about one aspect only of the first” (e.g., 14:4, 30), “making a meta-linguistic comment” (e.g., 14:24, 29; 17:13) or “another parenthetical comment about the first” (e.g., 16:3; 17:10).⁵³⁷ It is clear that 14:26d does not: (i) intensify what is said in 14:26aβ; (ii) make a meta-linguistic statement about 14:26aβ; and (iii) make a parenthetical comment about 14:26aβ. Therefore, I will only discuss the possibility that 14:26d adds information about an aspect of 14:26aβ.

⁵³⁴ See Carl H. Bruder, *Concordantiae omnium vocum Novi Testamenti Graeci* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1904), 453–475.

⁵³⁵ Poythress, “The Use,” 319 defines expository discourse as “discourse primarily integrated in logical, argumentative, and topical fashion”. Poythress borrowed this definition from Robert E. Longacre, *An Anatomy of Speech Notions* (Lisse: de Ridder, 1976), 199–200.

⁵³⁶ See Poythress, “The Use,” 323. The examples given are the ones provided by Poythress. Poythress (“The Use,” 323) adds that “for cases of looser coordination [...] asyndeton is used (e.g., 14:7, 10)”. The notation John 14:21(2) indicates the second use of καί in John 14:21.

⁵³⁷ Poythress, “The Use,” 324. The examples given are the ones provided by Poythress.

As an illustration of where καί connects two sentences in the Fourth Gospel of which the second sentence adds information about an aspect of the first sentence, I will discuss John 14:30:

οὐκέτι πολλὰ λαλήσω μεθ' ὑμῶν, ἔρχεται γὰρ ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων· καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδέν

The phrase introduced by καί, viz. ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδέν, adds information about ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων. The ruler of this world is identified as one who has no power over Jesus. As we have seen, this explicative meaning of καί can also apply to καί in 14:26. The teaching activity of the Paraclete is explained as the activity of reminding the disciples of Jesus' words.

(3) The conjunction καί is used to link “any series of sentences which refer to a series of chronologically successive events connected by at least vague causal relations” (e.g., John 14:8, 16[1], 16[2], 21[2], 21[3], 23[2], 23[3], 23[4]; 15:6[1], 6[2], 6[3], 6[4]).⁵³⁸ This meaning of καί does not apply to 14:26, because the teaching and the reminding of the post-paschal Paraclete cannot be viewed as consecutive events. The Paraclete's teaching of the disciples cannot be viewed as the cause of the Paraclete's reminding of the disciples.

The three above-mentioned uses of καί in the Gospel of John do not help us to determine the meaning of καί in John 14:26. As we have seen, the discussion returns as to whether the meaning of καί in 14:26 is cumulative or explicative.

In my understanding, the view that καί is cumulative is the better interpretation, because it allows for a stronger parallelism between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of the Paraclete. An additional condition for this stronger parallelism is that the only antecedent of the relative pronoun in John 14:26e is πάντα in 14:26d. As demonstrated earlier, this is more in agreement with the strong analogies between Jesus and the Paraclete depicted elsewhere in the Gospel, and explains why Jesus is also called Paraclete.⁵³⁹ Just as the earthly Jesus, the post-paschal Paraclete has a proper revelatory function. Yet, I realise that this stronger parallel presentation is not warranted, but only made more probable by other analogies between Jesus and the Paraclete depicted elsewhere in the Gospel. Therefore, in the next section I will study how the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is presented in 16:12–13.

2. JOHN 16:12–13

16:12a ἔτι πολλὰ ἔχω ὑμῖν λέγειν,

16:12b ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθε βαστάζειν ἄρτι·

⁵³⁸ Poythress, “The Use,” 324. Italics in the original. The examples given are the ones provided by Poythress.

⁵³⁹ See *supra*, §1.1.

- 16:13a ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος,⁵⁴⁰
 16:13b τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας,
 16:13c ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ·
 16:13d οὐ γὰρ λαλήσει ἅφ' ἑαυτοῦ,
 16:13e ἀλλ' ὅσα ἀκούσει λαλήσει
 16:13f καὶ τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν.⁵⁴¹

There are many *variae lectiones* for John 16:13.⁵⁴² According to Bieringer's external text-critical analysis, the main question is whether to read ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ + ἀκούει (κ²) or εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει (B).⁵⁴³ When the prepositions ἐν and εἰς are taken in their strict (i.e., classical) sense, Bieringer considers ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ as indicating the "place where", whereas εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν expresses the "goal where to". According to the first phrase, the Spirit of Truth guides the disciples in the full truth, "where they already are". In the second wording, the Spirit of Truth guides the disciples into the full truth, "where they are not yet".⁵⁴⁴ According to Bieringer, the present tense ἀκούει links the speaking of the post-paschal Paraclete "closely to the revelation of the earthly Jesus". The future tense ἀκούσει, on the other hand, leaves "more room for the newness of future developments".⁵⁴⁵ When the prepositions ἐν and εἰς are taken in their weak (i.e., interchangeable) sense, the interpretation possibilities of 16:13 remain the same.⁵⁴⁶ In that case, it does not matter whether one reads ἐν or εἰς. Both prepositions can express either the meaning of motion, direction, goal or rest, sphere, and place.

⁵⁴⁰ As for ἐκεῖνος in John 16:8, the antecedent of ἐκεῖνος in 16:13a is ὁ παράκλητος in 16:7. Unlike Gourgues ("Le paraclet," 88–90) claims, the designation 'Spirit of truth' in 16:13b is attached to the designation 'Paraclete' in 16:7–11. Therefore, the claim of Gourgues that the designations 'Paraclete' and 'Spirit of truth' indicate two distinct functions of the Spirit is unjustified.

⁵⁴¹ The text of John 16:12–13 is taken from NA²⁸.

⁵⁴² Bieringer, "The Spirit's Guidance," 184–185, 190 distinguishes ten variants in the textual tradition of John 16:13c and three variants for 16:13e.

⁵⁴³ See Bieringer, "The Spirit's Guidance," 184–192.

⁵⁴⁴ Bieringer, "The Spirit's Guidance," 183.

⁵⁴⁵ Bieringer, "The Spirit's Guidance," 184. Crinisor Stefan, "The Paraclete and Prophecy in the Johannine Community," *The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 27/2 (2005) 273–296: at 286 correctly observes that, if the Fourth Evangelist really wanted to present the post-paschal Paraclete as "only recalling and interpreting Jesus' earthly words", he would have "used the past tense of the verb ἀκούω, which would imply that the Paraclete 'will declare what he heard'". This past tense is, however, nowhere attested in the MSS.

⁵⁴⁶ BDR, § 205 speaks about the confusion of ἐν and εἰς in the NT in the sense that ἐν can be used for εἰς and εἰς for ἐν. For this confusion in the Gospel of John in particular, see the chart in Bieringer, "The Spirit's Guidance," 201. Despite this confusion of ἐν and εἰς in the Fourth Gospel, Bieringer ("The Spirit's Guidance," 202) considers it "safest to assume that (at least in cases where the difference in meaning matters) the evangelist is using both prepositions in their strict sense, εἰς for motion, direction, goal and ἐν for rest, sphere, place". I agree with Bieringer ("The Spirit's Guidance," 202) that, although there are places in John where εἰς seems to take the place of ἐν (John 1:18; 9:7; 20:7, 19, 26; 21:4) and vice versa (3:35; 5:4; 8:3), these instances "are either cases of nuances in the language which are difficult for us to grasp today (as in 1,18) or cases where the difference in meaning is of no consequence (cf. 3,35 and 13,3)".

I observe that the interpretation of John 16:12–13 is interrelated with that of 14:25–26. Just as for 14:25–26, scholarly literature has provided the two following interpretations for 16:12–13 concerning the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete.

Interpretation one: when one understands teaching and reminding as the same function of the Paraclete in John 14:25–26, one interprets the prepositional phrase ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ/ εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν in 16:13 as indicating the ‘place where’. The post-paschal Paraclete will guide the disciples in the full truth, where they already are. He will, thus, not reveal entirely new things, but only further develop or deepen what was already revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. This development should be understood in terms of the application/actualisation of something that is pre-given. The post-paschal Paraclete only applies to new contexts what has already been revealed in/by Jesus. According to 16:13f, the Paraclete will declare the coming things (τὰ ἐρχόμενα) by reminding the disciples of the past, that is, in agreement with the retrospective character of his teaching. The post-paschal Paraclete will not announce unknown things that did not yet take place, but will help to understand the things that will come to pass by reminding the disciples of the earthly teaching of Jesus.⁵⁴⁷

Interpretation two: if one understands teaching and reminding as distinct functions of the Paraclete in John 14:25–26, the prepositional phrase ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ/ εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν is interpreted as expressing the ‘place where to’. The post-paschal Paraclete will guide the disciples into the full truth, where they are not yet. Then, John 16:13c is understood as parallel to 14:26aβ. The post-paschal Paraclete will reveal things (16:12a: πολλά) that have not yet been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. According to 16:13f, he will declare the coming things (τὰ ἐρχόμενα), which God and Jesus (will)⁵⁴⁸ communicate to him (cf. John 4:25; see also Isa 41:22–23; 44:7; 45:11). The Paraclete’s teaching is, thus, not oriented to the past, but to the future. Instead of being retrospective, the teaching of the Paraclete is prospective. The Paraclete is prophetic. His revelatory function is, however, not viewed as independent from Jesus. The Paraclete is the mediator of Jesus’ revelation. Yet, this dependence may not be understood as if the Paraclete’s teaching is a recollection of Jesus’ earthly teaching. Just as Jesus is the spokesperson of the Father, the Paraclete is the spokesperson of Jesus. Jesus’ sayings are not a recollection of what the Father spoke to him. Jesus rather speaks *on behalf of* the Father. *Mutatis mutandis*, the teaching of the Paraclete is not a recollection of what the Paraclete hears (or will hear) from Jesus, but the Paraclete speaks *for* Jesus. Nevertheless, the words of

Therefore, it is better to assume that in cases where the difference matters (e.g., 16:12–13), the prepositions ἐν and εἰς are taken in their strict sense.

⁵⁴⁷ See, e.g., Lagrange, *Jean*, 420–423; Bultmann, *Johannes*, 441–443; Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 714–716; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 152–154; de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 422–466; Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart*, 231–236; Rahner, “Vergegenwärtigende Erinnerung”: 89; Wehr, “‘Er wird euch alles lehren,’” 330–332; Gourgues, “Le paraclet,” 96–99; Zumstein, *Jean (13–21)*, 138–139; Thyen, *Johannes*, 665–667; Dettwiler, “La pneumatologie”: 370–371.

⁵⁴⁸ Both the readings ἀκούει and ἀκούσει in John 16:13e are legitimate in this interpretation of 16:13f. The indicative present ἀκούει can be explained as expressing eternal Trinitarian relations: see Lagrange, *Jean*, 422 and de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 441 n. 313.

the Paraclete are still perceived as Jesus' words. Thus, the Paraclete is bound to Jesus, but not to the past. He cannot teach something that contradicts the teaching of the earthly Jesus, but does expand Jesus' teaching.⁵⁴⁹

I will evaluate the above-mentioned two interpretations of John 16:12–13 by engaging in the text-critical discussion of 16:12–13 (see 2.1) and discussing the meaning of: (i) *πάση/πᾶσαν* in 16:13c (see 2.2); (ii) *πολλά* in 16:12a (see 2.3); and (iii.) *τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ* in 16:13f (see 2.4).

2.1 JOHN 16:13C, E: Εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει or ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάση + ἀκούει?

According to Bieringer, the following two internal text-critical arguments can be given for the view that *ἐν* is secondary to *εἰς* and *ἀκούει* to *ἀκούσει*: (i) a stylistic argument: the combination of *ὁδηγέω* + *ἐν* is common in the LXX.⁵⁵⁰ The scribe was influenced by the LXX and replaced the original *ὁδηγέω* + *εἰς* with the more idiomatic *ὁδηγέω* + *ἐν*.⁵⁵¹ The view that the Fourth Evangelist was influenced by the LXX⁵⁵² is less appealing, because one cannot explain on the basis of the LXX why a scribe would have changed *ἐν* into *εἰς*,⁵⁵³ and (ii) a theological argument: the scribe wanted to mitigate “the revelatory role of the Spirit” and avoid “a competition with the revelatory activity of Jesus”.⁵⁵⁴ A first scribe must have changed *εἰς* into *ἐν*, because *ἀκούει* “is never used together with *εἰς* readings” in the textual tradition of John 16:13. This scribe probably understood *εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν* as contradicting 8:40 and 16:7. The aim of this scribe was to emphasise that “after Jesus’ revelatory activity *ἀλήθεια* can no longer be a goal”. “[I]n a second movement after some time, another scribe” changed *ἀκούσει* into *ἀκούει* to stress “that the Paraclete’s activity does not embrace anything that the earthly Jesus has not revealed”.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁴⁹ See, e.g., Westcott, *John*, 230–231; Weiss, *Johannes*, 443–444; Windisch, *Die fünf johanneischen Parakletsprüche*, 121; Zahn, *Johannes*, 593; Bauer, *Johannes*, 198; Bernard, *John*, 509–511; Mußner, *Die johanneischen Parakletsprüche*, 61–62; Feuillet, “De munere,” 119–121; Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 188–192; Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance”; Stefan, “The Paraclet”; Hahn, “Sehen,” 536.

⁵⁵⁰ The verb *ὁδηγέω* occurs 44 times in the LXX. According to my analysis, in 21 occurrences it is used in combination with *ἐν* + dative (Deut 1:3; Josh 24:3; Neh 9:19; Ps 5:9; 24 [25]:9; 26 [27]:11; 66 [67]:5; 72 [73]:24; 76 [77]:21; 77 [78]:14, 53, 72; 105 [106]:9; 118 [119]:35; 138 [139]:24; 142 [143]:10; Wis 9:11; 10:10, 17; 2 Esd 19:19; Eccl 2:3). In three occurrences in combination with *εἰς* (Exod 32:34; Ps 42 [43]:3; 106 [107]:7). For further semantical analysis of the combination *ὁδηγέω* + *ἐν* + dative in the LXX, see Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 195–196.

⁵⁵¹ This view was previously defended by Mußner, *Die johanneischen Parakletsprüche*, 151 n. 16.

⁵⁵² This view is held by Bauer, *Johannes*, 198 and Barrett, *John*, 489.

⁵⁵³ See Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 196–197.

⁵⁵⁴ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 206. This argument was previously formulated by Lagrange, *Jean*, 421: “[I]e datif pourrait être une correction quelque peu pédante destinée à bien établir que la vérité où conduira l’Esprit est déjà celle du Christ: precaution inutile étant donné ce qui suit.”

⁵⁵⁵ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 196.

Bieringer gives more weight to the second than to the first argument, because he considers it “an open question whether John knew and used the LXX in general and in [John] 16:13 in particular”.⁵⁵⁶ According to Bieringer, the question at stake concerning the choice between ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ + ἀκούει or εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει is “whether revelation is complete in Jesus or whether the Paraclete also has a revelatory function”. If the Paraclete has a revelatory function, “the Paraclete reveals new things which Jesus had not yet revealed”.⁵⁵⁷ Bieringer thus presupposes that attributing a revelatory function to the post-paschal Paraclete implies that revelation was incomplete in the earthly Jesus. According to my analysis, this view is generally held by proponents of both interpretations of John 16:12–13.⁵⁵⁸ I have, however, demonstrated in the previous section that this view is incorrect. To attribute a revelatory function to the Paraclete does not imply that one weakens the revelatory function of Jesus, but rather that one strengthens the cooperation and analogy between Jesus and the Paraclete.⁵⁵⁹

In my view, the question as to which reading is more original is not important for understanding the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete, because both ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ + ἀκούει and εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει support the view that this orientation is prospective. It makes no difference whether one reads ἀκούει or ἀκούσει. In both cases, the verb has a future meaning. Even if one reads ἀκούει, the phrase ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος provides the necessary pragmatic information to understand ἀκούει as having future meaning. Compare 16:13 with 15:26 and 16:21:

ὅταν ἔλθῃ ὁ παράκλητος ὃν ἐγὼ πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται, ἐκεῖνος μαρτυρήσει περὶ ἐμοῦ. (15:26)

ἡ γυνὴ ὅταν τίκτη λύπην ἔχει, ὅτι ἦλθεν ἡ ὥρα αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ γεννήσῃ τὸ παιδίον, οὐκέτι μνημονεύει τῆς θλίψεως διὰ τὴν χαρὰν ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν κόσμον. (16:21)

Both ὅταν ἔλθῃ ὁ παράκλητος and ὅταν δὲ γεννήσῃ τὸ παιδίον express a future expectation. As a result of this pragmatic information, the verbs ἐκπορεύεται and μνημονεύει, although morphologically present tense verbs, obtain future meaning. Comparably, the verb ἀκούει in 16:13 obtains future meaning, because of the pragmatic information provided by ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος.⁵⁶⁰ The only difference between ἀκούει and ἀκούσει is the verbal aspect. The verbal aspect of the present ἀκούει is perfective,

⁵⁵⁶ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 202.

⁵⁵⁷ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 183.

⁵⁵⁸ For these interpretations, see *supra*, §2.

⁵⁵⁹ See *supra*, §1.1.

⁵⁶⁰ That morphologically present tense verbs express posterior information is a phenomenon that is also attested in Dutch, German, English, Italian, Modern Greek, and beyond: see Hans Broekhuis – Henk J. Verkuy, “Binary Tense and Modality,” *NLLT* 32/3 (2014) 973–1009 and Anastasia Giannakidou, “The Futurity of the Present and the Modality of the Future: A Commentary on Broekhuis and Verkuy,” *NLLT* 32/3 (2014) 1011–1032.

whereas the verbal aspect of the future ἀκούσει is imperfective. A correct rendering of 15:26; 16:13 and 16:21 would then be:

When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who then is proceeding (ἐκπορεύεται) from the Father, he will bear witness to me. (15:26)

When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he will have heard (ἀκούει), and he will declare to you the things that are to come. (16:13)

When a woman is in labour, she has pain, because her hour has come. But when her child is born, she then no longer remembers (μνημονεύει) the anguish, because of the joy of having brought a human being into the world. (16:21)

For 15:26 and 16:21, the adverb ‘then’ indicates that the proceeding of the Paraclete and the remembering of the woman takes place after the speech utterance of the text of 15:26 and 16:21, that is, in the future. For 16:13, the future perfect (“he will have heard”) expresses likewise that the result of hearing takes place after the speech utterance of the text of 16:13, that is, in the future.

An additional argument for the view that both the *variae lectiones* ἀκούει and ἀκούσει in John 16:13 have future meaning are the phrases ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν and ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν in respectively 16:14 and 16:15. The shift from the future λήμψεται to the present λαμβάνει in these phrases does not imply a temporal division between that which the Paraclete will receive from Jesus in the future and what he is currently receiving in the present. Both verbs have a future meaning.⁵⁶¹

As both the *variae lectiones* ἀκούει and ἀκούσει in John 16:13 have future meaning, it does not matter whether one reads ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ or εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν. The future meaning of ἀκούει and ἀκούσει implies that the Paraclete will lead the disciples into the full truth, where they are not yet. Consequently, the preposition ἐν has the same meaning as εἰς in 16:13. Both ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάσῃ + ἀκούει and εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν + ἀκούσει support the view that the teaching of the Paraclete is prospective.

2.2 JOHN 16:13C: THE MEANING OF ΠΑΣΗ/Πᾶσαν

According to Bieringer’s analysis, the meaning of ΠΑΣΗ/Πᾶσαν in John 16:13c has been understood in two fundamentally distinct ways. “Some exegetes” view the adjective ΠΑΣΗ/Πᾶσαν as expressing “the idea of totality, completeness or fullness of revelation”.⁵⁶² For Bieringer, this idea of totality suggests that the post-paschal Paraclete reveals new

⁵⁶¹ The future meaning of λαμβάνει in John 16:15 has been noticed by modern translators: see, e.g., KJV (“All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take [λαμβάνει] of mine, and shall shew *it* unto you”) and NRSV (“All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take [λαμβάνει] what is mine and declare it to you”).

⁵⁶² Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 200.

things in comparison to what has been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. In my analysis, this view corresponds to interpretation two of 16:12–13. Bieringer observes that, due to this allusion to new revelation, many scholars implicitly apply *πάση/πᾶσαν* not to *ἀλήθεια*, but to “the disciples’ relationship with the *ἀλήθεια*”, which has been revealed in the earthly Jesus.⁵⁶³ Bieringer correctly claims that in this second interpretation, *πάση/πᾶσαν* is not seen as an adjective of *ἀλήθεια*, but as an adverb of *ὁδηγέω*: “that one will guide you completely in/into the truth”.⁵⁶⁴ In my view, this interpretation of *πάση/πᾶσαν* implies that the post-paschal Paraclete will guide the disciples in the truth, where they already are. He will, thus, not reveal entirely new things, but will only further develop or deepen what was already revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. According to my analysis, such an interpretation corresponds to interpretation one of 16:12–13. In the first interpretation of *πάση/πᾶσαν* in 16:13c, the emphasis is on the completeness of truth, which implies that truth was not complete in the earthly Jesus. In the second interpretation, the emphasis is on the completeness of the guidance, which implies that truth was already complete in the earthly Jesus, but that the conditions for understanding the truth were not yet given. These conditions will be accomplished by the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete.

2.3 JOHN 16:12A: THE MEANING OF *πολλά*

Further, I observe that there is an interrelation between the interpretation of the meaning of *πάση/πᾶσαν* in John 16:13c and the interpretation of the meaning of *πολλά* in 16:12a. The noun *πολλά* has been interpreted in two ways, as indicating: (i) additional new revelation that is more difficult and profound than the teaching provided by Jesus during his life time; and (ii) a more complete explication, development, and deepening of that which has been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus.⁵⁶⁵ The first interpretation of *πολλά* corresponds to the first interpretation of *πάση/πᾶσαν*. The second interpretation corresponds to the second interpretation of *πάση/πᾶσαν*.

According to de la Potterie, the first interpretation of *πολλά* is excluded, because it cannot explain why *πολλά* is called a burden in John 16:12b and that, at the same time, the role of the Spirit is described as “une illumination pour aider les disciples à *mieux comprendre* le Christ et son message” (14:25–26; 16:4, 25).⁵⁶⁶ This description of the role of the Spirit opposes the view of the first interpretation of *πολλά* that the additional revelation, which the Paraclete will bring, is more complex, and, therefore, heavier to bear (*βαστάζειν*). However, the argument of de la Potterie is circular, because it presupposes that 14:25–26 characterises the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as retrospective. In other words, the argument of de la Potterie assumes that the teaching

⁵⁶³ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 200.

⁵⁶⁴ Bieringer, “The Spirit’s Guidance,” 200 n. 42.

⁵⁶⁵ See, e.g., Lagrange, *Jean*, 420; de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 429.

⁵⁶⁶ de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 429. Italics in the original.

of the post-paschal Paraclete retrospectively explains what was already revealed in the earthly Jesus, whereas this is the issue under discussion.

De la Potterie argues for the second interpretation of πολλά on the basis of the observation that οὐ δύνασθε and ἄρτι in John 16:12b orient the disciples to the future, and indicate their present incapacity to understand the words of the earthly Jesus.⁵⁶⁷ However, John 16:12–13 does not say, *stricto sensu*, that the disciples are unable to bear words that Jesus has actually spoken during his lifetime. Although the earthly Jesus would have spoken these words, if the disciples were able to bear them, he has chosen not to. The interrelation between πολλά and πάση/πᾶσαν rather suggests that the words that the disciples were unable to bear at that time, will be spoken by the post-paschal Paraclete. Thus, these words of the post-paschal Paraclete cannot be an explication, development, or deepening of the words that the earthly Jesus has actually spoken. Why would the disciples be unable to bear explanations of the words they have already received from the earthly Jesus? Explanations are always easier to understand than what is explained. Therefore, πολλά does not refer to explanations of the words that Jesus has actually spoken during his life. This implies that the Paraclete has a teaching function that cannot be reduced to reminding the disciples of what has already been revealed in/by the earthly Jesus. Just like Jesus' teaching, the teaching of the Paraclete can properly be called revelatory. Yet, as argued in the previous section, the post-paschal Paraclete can also not be held to teach something that was not yet taught by the earthly Jesus.⁵⁶⁸ Here, the paradox that we face is that πολλά in 16:12a designates the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete, which the earthly Jesus could not teach, because his disciples were unable to bear it. Yet, at the same time, the teaching of the Paraclete can only repeat the teaching of Jesus, because Jesus is ἡ ἀλήθεια (14:16) and has revealed everything there is to reveal about the Father (15:15). In the third section, I will argue that Søren Kierkegaard's category of repetition is the key to understanding this paradox. We will see that this category is able to conceive the teaching of the Paraclete as both new and the same in comparison to the teaching of Jesus.⁵⁶⁹

2.4 JOHN 16:13F: THE MEANING OF τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ

The double use of λαλήσει in John 16:13d–e introduces the direct explanation of 16:13c. Given that the meaning of καί in 16:13f is explicative,⁵⁷⁰ the phrase τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν is, also, an explanation of ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πάση/ εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν. There is, therefore, an interrelation between πάση/πᾶσαν and τὰ ἐρχόμενα. The combination of ἀναγγέλλω with τὰ ἐρχόμενα has been interpreted in two

⁵⁶⁷ See de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 429.

⁵⁶⁸ See *supra*, §1.1.

⁵⁶⁹ See *infra*, §3.

⁵⁷⁰ De la Potterie (*La vérité*, tome I, 440) correctly observes that ἀναγγελεῖ in John 16:13f explains and specifies the double use of λαλήσει in 16:13d–e. The conjunction καί in 16:13f is, therefore, “épexégétique”.

ways.⁵⁷¹ (i) The prefix ἀνα of ἀναγγέλλω indicates repetition.⁵⁷² The post-paschal Paraclete will, thus, only re-announce or re-proclaim what the earthly Jesus has said before him. He will not announce unknown things that did not yet take place, but will help to understand the things that will come to pass (τὰ ἐρχόμενα) by reminding the disciples of the earthly teaching of Jesus (see interpretation one of 16:12–13);⁵⁷³ and (ii) the verb ἀναγγέλλω does not denote repetition or announcement of something that has already taken place, but the prophetic function of the Paraclete. The Paraclete is able to predict the future, that is, the things (τὰ ἐρχόμενα) that have not yet taken place (see interpretation two of 16:12–13).⁵⁷⁴

In my view, the second interpretation of τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ in John 16:13f is the better one for three reasons: (i) There is a parallel between τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν in 16:13f and ἀναγγελεῖ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα in 4:25, because of the interrelation between τὰ ἐρχόμενα and πάση/πᾶσαν in 16:13. The verb ἀναγγέλλω occurs five times in the Fourth Gospel. Three times in 16:13–15, once in 4:25, and once in 5:15. It is straightforward that ἀναγγέλλω has the meaning of re-announcing or re-telling in 5:15. The man healed during the Sabbath at first did not know who healed him (5:13). Only after he saw Jesus again (5:14), was he able to announce (ἀναγγέλλω) it to the ‘Jews’ (5:15). However, this meaning of the re-announcing of things that happened in the past is not present in the claim of the Samaritan woman that the Messiah “will proclaim all things to us” (4:25).⁵⁷⁵ Due to the parallelism between τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν and ἀναγγελεῖ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, this meaning of re-announcing or re-proclaiming is also absent in 16:13f; (ii) also, the Johannine Jesus, elsewhere, has the ability to tell things before they happen, e.g., concerning his death (e.g., John 12:23–24, 32–33; 13:1), Judas’ betrayal (13:18–19), and the persecution of the disciples (16:2–3); and (iii) the combination of ἀναγγέλλω with τὰ ἐρχόμενα is unique in the Bible, but “virtually the same” as the combination of ἀναγγέλλω with τὰ ἐπερχόμενα in Isa 41:23 and 44:7.⁵⁷⁶ According to Franklin Young, in Deutero-Isaiah, the verb ἀναγγέλλω designates “a very significant function of God in contrast to false-gods and false-prophets of alien nations”, namely, the power to announce events that are to come “before they actually occur” (see Isa 41:28; 42:9; 44:7; 47:13; 46:9–10).

⁵⁷¹ Due to the indeterminate meaning of τὰ ἐρχόμενα in John 16:13f, this presentation of the interpretation possibilities of 16:13f does not include, for instance, Barrett’s suggestion (*John*, 490) that τὰ ἐρχόμενα might refer to “the events of the passion, which was about to take place, and include perhaps both the crucifixion and the resurrection”.

⁵⁷² See Paul Joüon, “Le verbe ἀναγγέλλω dans Saint Jean,” *RSR* 28 (1938) 234–235.

⁵⁷³ See esp. de la Potterie, *La vérité*, tome I, 448; Rahner, “Vergegenwärtigende Erinnerung”: 89; Gourgues, “Le paraclet,” 99; Ingo Broer, “ἀγγέλλω,” *EWNT*³ 1 (2011) 29–32: at 31.

⁵⁷⁴ See esp. Stefan, “The Paraclete”: 273, 283, 286–287, 294–295.

⁵⁷⁵ Correctly observed by Stefan, “The Paraclete”: 281. Brown (*John* [xiii–xxi], 708), a proponent of interpretation one of John 16:13f, also, doubts whether ἀναγγέλλω in 4:25 has the meaning of re-announcing or re-proclaiming.

⁵⁷⁶ Franklin W. Young, “A Study of the Relation of Isaiah to the Fourth Gospel,” *ZNW* 46 (1955) 215–233: at 226. See, also, Sirach’s passage on Isaiah, Sir 48:25: ὑπέδειξεν τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀπόκρυφα πρὶν ἢ παραγενέσθαι αὐτά.

The correct translation of ἀναγγέλλω in these texts is not to re-announce or re-proclaim, but “to reveal”.⁵⁷⁷

However, as argued earlier,⁵⁷⁸ this prophetic function of the Paraclete does not imply that the post-paschal Paraclete will teach things that were not yet taught by the earthly Jesus. Both Jesus and the Paraclete have a prophetic function, yet there is no competition, but collaboration between both. The next and last section will argue that the key to understanding this enigma is a philosophical reflection on the notion of repetition.

3. REPETITION AS A KEY NOTION FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF THE PARACLETE

The previous two sections have analysed John 14:25–26 and 16:12–13 with special attention to the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete. Both analyses have demonstrated that the orientation of this teaching can be interpreted both as retrospective and prospective. I have argued that the prospective interpretation is the better one. In this interpretation, the reminding and the teaching function of the Paraclete are considered to be distinct from each other. However, the proponents of the retrospective interpretation have correctly pointed out that the post-paschal Paraclete will not teach anything that was not yet taught by the earthly Jesus. The best interpretation is, therefore, a synthesis of the retrospective and prospective interpretation. The present section will argue that Kierkegaard’s category of repetition is a key term for understanding this synthesis.

3.1 KIERKEGAARD’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOLLECTION AND REPETITION

In everyday language, repetition is an “occurrence of similar cases in a temporal succession”, e.g., “the rising of the sun”. Yet, when we think about it, we realise that this ordinary understanding of repetition ignores “the fact that today is distinct from yesterday and that the rise of the sun is qualified by this difference”. Kierkegaard correctly observes that genuine repetition “never takes place when elements within a totality recur, but only when the totality itself recurs”. Repetition “does not allow for a spectator”, because it only “happens to the whole, to a totality, a world, consciousness”.⁵⁷⁹ Repetition is, thus, “not a matter of *something of the past* occurring anew”, but “*the entire past* [...] becomes

⁵⁷⁷ Young, “A Study”: 224–225.

⁵⁷⁸ See *supra*, §1.1.

⁵⁷⁹ Niels N. Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction*, Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series 5 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 9–10. I follow Eriksen’s interpretation of Kierkegaard in this discussion of Kierkegaard’s category of repetition, although I realise that each interpretation of Kierkegaard has its limitations, because of the fragmentary and literary style of his writing on repetition. For the English translation of Kierkegaard’s writing on repetition, see Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling. Repetition*, trans. Howard V. Hong – Edna H. Hong (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). For other interpretations of Kierkegaard’s category of repetition, see, for instance, Paul J. DeHart, “‘The Passage from Mind to Heart is so Long...’: The Riddle of ‘Repetition’ and Kierkegaard’s Ontology of Agency,” *Modern Theology* 31/1 (2015) 91–122, who claims that the object of Kierkegaard’s category of repetition is “God’s eternal ‘idea’ of the temporal individual agent”.

new in the moment of repetition”. It is “a moment in which *nothing is changed but everything has become new*”. According to Kierkegaard, this essence of repetition is adequately captured by the Christological phrase: τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἰδοὺ γέγονεν καινὰ (2 Cor 5:17; cf. Rev 21:5).⁵⁸⁰ Repetition is, therefore, not something that happens *in* time, but something that happens *to* time.⁵⁸¹ It cannot be rendered in terms of abstract thinking or explanation. One cannot understand it because one cannot observe it. Rather, genuine repetition requires one to be explained or transfigured.⁵⁸² Kierkegaard speaks of it in terms of seeing oneself as being seen by God.⁵⁸³

Although Kierkegaard is reluctant to systematically explain repetition, he contrasts repetition with what he calls recollection. Whereas recollection is characterised by a “loyalty to the past”, repetition requires “openness towards the future”. Repetition and recollection are “the same movement, except in opposite directions”. Recollection is a repeating backwards, that is, an understanding of the present in terms of the past. In contrast, genuine repetition is oriented forwards, because it makes the meaning of the past “depend on the otherness of the future”.⁵⁸⁴ Recollection and repetition imply two different understandings of the self and historicity.

Recollection implies a metaphysical view of the self that presupposes the distinction between “the inner and the outer”. The term ‘metaphysical’ is used here in its classical meaning in which being is understood as opposed to becoming. Being is located beyond the sphere of that which is perceivable by the senses. The inner is identified with the Platonian world of ideas. The outer is located in the sphere of becoming. The aim of recollection is self-realisation. Recollection seeks to actualise the pre-given determination of the inner self. Being precedes becoming. Recollection is a matter of remaining faithful to the Platonian “inner world of memories and ideas”.⁵⁸⁵ By means of self-realisation, the self remains stable and a whole. Recollection transforms life into knowledge by “tracing the new back to the old”. The individual moves backwards through life and “the future appears as a mere extension of the past”.⁵⁸⁶ In the paradigm of recollection, the past takes “precedence over the future”. Eternity is viewed as being in a realm beyond time, and as lying behind us as if in the past. Eternity “can only be entered backwards”.⁵⁸⁷ Recollection “traces all differences back to the primordial sameness of being”. The otherness of the other is eliminated in “the sameness of one’s own being”. The other “no longer exists outside the mind of the recollecting individual”. “[A] fundamental unity of thought and

⁵⁸⁰ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 111–112. Italics in the original.

⁵⁸¹ See Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 56.

⁵⁸² See Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 57–58.

⁵⁸³ See Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 60.

⁵⁸⁴ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 165–166.

⁵⁸⁵ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 10.

⁵⁸⁶ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 13.

⁵⁸⁷ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 68.

being” is assumed. Kierkegaard remarks that the problem of this notion of historicity is that it robs the future of “genuine newness and otherness”.⁵⁸⁸

Repetition, on the other hand, implies a post-metaphysical view of the self. Being is no longer defined in opposition to becoming, but intersects with becoming. There is no pre-given determination of the inner self that precedes all becoming. There are only possibilities that show that the individual “has not become who he or she is”.⁵⁸⁹ The self “lies ahead”. It is “something we must become”. Becoming precedes being. Instead of self-realisation, repetition concerns self-appropriation. Self-appropriation involves “a kind of becoming in which the end point coincides with the starting point, and yet remains distinct from it *as an end point*”. In this process, “*nothing new is added to the old, but the old has become new*”.⁵⁹⁰ Passing from a state of possibility to a state of being is not an actualisation of a possibility, but an “*annihilation of possibility*”. The task is to come into being, but there is no pre-given determination of the self that guarantees the continuity with the past. Each coming into being “marks a moment of discontinuity with the past”, because it indicates “a new beginning”, a new creation.⁵⁹¹ The relationship to the future is given primacy over the relationship to the past. The individual is moving forwards through life. Historicity is not understood as “self-constancy through time”, but as “openness towards the future”.⁵⁹² Instead of finding the meaning of the other in the sameness of the self (= ‘recollection’), ‘repetition’ finds “the meaning of the self in the being of the other, i.e., in the self’s being before the other”.⁵⁹³ The eternal is not situated in a sphere behind time, but intersects with time by residing with the future. The past “depends on and belongs to the future in a more primordial way than the future depends on the past”.⁵⁹⁴ In short, “while ‘recollection’ is a repetition *in* consciousness, ‘repetition’ is a repetition *of* consciousness, the transfiguration of the self through the relation to the other”.⁵⁹⁵ Repetition does not seek to reduce life to knowledge, but is existential.⁵⁹⁶

However, Kierkegaard does not seek to reduce repetition “to a kind of mystical openness towards the other”. As a “paradigm of thought” repetition is dependent on recollection.⁵⁹⁷ According to Niels Eriksen, this can be explained on the basis of Luther’s distinction between law and gospel. Eriksen finds this distinction “reflected at various levels” in Kierkegaard’s thinking on repetition. He defines the law as “the word that refers a human being to the horizon of possibilities within his own existence”. This corresponds

⁵⁸⁸ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 13–14.

⁵⁸⁹ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 126.

⁵⁹⁰ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 9. Italics in the original.

⁵⁹¹ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 125. Italics in the original.

⁵⁹² Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 16.

⁵⁹³ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 166–167.

⁵⁹⁴ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 69.

⁵⁹⁵ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 167.

⁵⁹⁶ T. Wilson Dickinson, “Repeating, Not Simply Recollecting, *Repetition*: On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises,” *Sophia* 50/4 (2011) 657–675, also, argues for this existential interpretation of Kierkegaard’s category of repetition.

⁵⁹⁷ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition*, 132.

to Kierkegaard's notion of recollection, because recollection seeks to maintain the self "as a meaningful whole". When confronted with the law, human beings seek to fulfil their possibilities and at the same time realise "the impossibility of this fulfilment". The law gradually closes "the horizon of possibilities" and "makes the individual become as nothing before God". Human beings are in need of the gospel to "create new life" out of nothing. This corresponds to the meaning of repetition as "coming into being".⁵⁹⁸

3.2 THE PARACLETE'S REMINDING AND TEACHING AS RECOLLECTION AND REPETITION

Kierkegaard's distinction between recollection and repetition can be made fruitful to understand the relationship between the reminding and the teaching function of the Paraclete in the Gospel of John. The category of recollection can be used to understand the reminding function of the Paraclete. It is self-evident that the reminding function of the Paraclete is retrospective and cognitive. This is explicitly attested by the following texts:

ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν. εἶπαν οὖν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι· τεσσεράκοντα καὶ ἕξ ἔτεσιν οἰκοδομήθη ὁ ναὸς οὗτος, καὶ σὺ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερεῖς αὐτόν; ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἔλεγεν περὶ τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ. ὅτε οὖν ἠγέρθη ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἐμνήσθησαν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, καὶ ἐπίστευσαν τῇ γραφῇ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ὃν εἶπεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς. (John 2:19–22)

τῇ ἐπαύριον ὁ ὄχλος πολὺς ὁ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν ἑορτήν, ἀκούσαντες ὅτι ἔρχεται ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα ἔλαβον τὰ βαΐα τῶν φοινίκων καὶ ἐξῆλθον εἰς ὑπάντησιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκραύγαζον· ὡσαννά· εὐλογημένος ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου, [καὶ] ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ Ἰσραήλ. εὐρὼν δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὀνάριον ἐκάθισεν ἐπ' αὐτό, καθὼς ἐστιν γεγραμμένον· μὴ φοβοῦ, θυγάτηρ Σιών· ἰδοὺ ὁ βασιλεὺς σου ἔρχεται, καθήμενος ἐπὶ πῶλον ὄνου. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγνωσαν αὐτοῦ οἱ μαθηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ὅτε ἐδοξάσθη Ἰησοῦς τότε ἐμνήσθησαν ὅτι ταῦτα ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γεγραμμένα καὶ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ. (John 12:12–16)

Both texts demonstrate that the reminding function of the post-paschal Paraclete enables the disciples to retrospectively understand Jesus' words and deeds. As such, the reminding function of the Paraclete is essential for opening the horizon of possibilities in the existence of the disciples.

Yet, according to the Gospel story, the knowledge claims of the disciples do not suffice. When confronted with the task to live authentically, they are at the same time hindered by their impotence. On two occasions, the disciples conjecture and say yes to faith:

καὶ ἡμεῖς πεπιστεύκαμεν καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν ὅτι σὺ εἶ ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ. (John 6:69)

⁵⁹⁸ Eriksen, *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition*, 133–134.

λέγουσιν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ· ἴδε νῦν ἐν παρρησίᾳ λαλεῖς καὶ παροιμίαν οὐδεμίαν λέγεις. νῦν οἶδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα καὶ οὐ χρείαν ἔχεις ἵνα τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ· ἐν τούτῳ πιστεύομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθες. (John 16:29–30)

The reaction of Jesus to these confessions painfully reveals the impotence of the disciples to live authentically:

ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· οὐκ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δώδεκα ἐξελεξάμην; καὶ ἐξ ὑμῶν εἷς διάβολός ἐστιν. ἔλεγεν δὲ τὸν Ἰούδαν Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτου· οὗτος γὰρ ἐμελλεν παραδιδόναι αὐτόν, εἷς ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα. (John 6:70–71)

ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς Ἰησοῦς· ἄρτι πιστεύετε; ἰδοὺ ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ ἐλήλυθεν ἵνα σκορπισθῇτε ἕκαστος εἰς τὰ ἴδια καὶ μόνον ἀφήτε. (John 16:31–32)

Characteristic of the pre-paschal era is that Jesus opens up a new possibility of existence for the disciples, but that the disciples are unable to let this possibility come into being. Although they are told the truth, they are unable to do what is true (cf. 3:21), nor worship the Father in truth (cf. 4:23–24). In order to have an authentic existence and let the possibility offered by Jesus come into being, the disciples have to receive the gift of the Spirit (e.g., 14:25–26; 16:12–13).

Just as the category of repetition is a moving forward through life, also the teaching of the Paraclete is oriented to the future (John 14:25–26; 16:12–13). The past depends on the openness to the future, that is, an openness to, and trust in, God.⁵⁹⁹ Kierkegaard's category of repetition cannot only be used to understand the prospective orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel, but also to apprehend that this teaching is not in competition with the teaching of the earthly Jesus. The category of repetition is the means to be able to attribute a revelatory function to both Jesus and the Paraclete. The analogy that the Paraclete reveals Jesus, just as Jesus has revealed the Father can only be adequately understood on the basis of the category of repetition. According to this category, the Paraclete did not teach anything that was not yet taught by the earthly Jesus. The Paraclete repeats Jesus' teaching as a totality, nothing more and nothing less. Yet, his teaching function is not reduced to his reminding function, but is genuinely revelatory. Although his teaching does not add anything new to the old, it does renew the old. Nothing has changed, yet everything has become new. This implies that the Paraclete does not enable the Johannine believer to come to know the truth (ἀλήθεια), which Jesus has revealed, but that the Johannine believer is transfigured by the truth. Instead of enabling the disciples to signify the truth, the disciples are transformed into a designation of the truth. They do not make images of God, but become an image of God. The disciples

⁵⁹⁹ The next chapter of the present study will demonstrate that this openness to, and trust in, God is characteristic of the verb αἰτέω in John's Gospel (see, e.g., John 16:23–26).

do not obtain an explanation, but are themselves explained. Instead of seeing God, they see themselves as being seen by God.⁶⁰⁰

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

The analyses of John 14:25–26 and 16:12–13 have demonstrated that the interpretation of the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as prospective is more valid than the interpretation that it is retrospective. This means that the teaching function of the Paraclete is distinct from his reminding function. Consequently, the post-paschal Paraclete has a revelatory function, just as the earthly Jesus. Yet, the proponents of the retrospective interpretation are right to claim that the post-paschal Paraclete cannot teach anything that was not yet taught by the earthly Jesus. Although the Paraclete's teaching is new and revelatory, it cannot but repeat the teaching of the earthly Jesus. The key to understanding this paradox was offered by Kierkegaard's category of repetition. Genuine repetition can only happen to a totality. It is not a matter of something in the past occurring anew, but the entire past becomes new in the moment of repetition. The believer is not exempt from this totalising event, but is transfigured before God. In John, ἀλήθεια is not propositional or cognitive in the modern sense of the word. The Paraclete does not teach a Christological truth, but transfigures believers into the image of God in order that they are able to do what is true and lead an authentic life.

⁶⁰⁰ As already explained, Kierkegaard's category of repetition implies an understanding of historicity in which the meaning of the past depends on the otherness of the future. This alternative understanding of historicity has proven useful to understand the teaching of the Paraclete in John's Gospel. The importance of reflection on the notion of historicity for interpreting the Fourth Gospel has been neglected by Johannine scholarship. To my knowledge, there has been only one previous study that has reflected on this subject, viz. Hans-Joachim Eckstein, "Das Johannesevangelium als Erinnerung an die Zukunft der Vergangenheit: Gegenwärtiges Erinnern und modalisierte Zeit," in *Memory in the Bible*, 299–319. This article of Eckstein was also published as Hans-Joachim Eckstein, "Die Gegenwart im Licht der erinnerten Zukunft: Zur modalisierten Zeit im Johannesevangelium," in *Der aus Glauben Gerechte wird leben: Beiträge zur Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, ed. Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Beiträge zum Verstehen der Bibel 5 (Hamburg: LIT, 2007), 187–206. Eckstein ("Das Johannesevangelium," 299) asks himself the question on which "Zeitstufe" the teaching of the Paraclete is primarily situated, the past (John 14:26) or the future (16:13). In order to answer this question, Eckstein introduces the notion of historicity. He not only distinguishes between the past, the present, and the future in the Gospel of John, but also understands these temporal dimensions in terms of their historicity. For the past, he speaks about the past of the past, the present of the past, and the future of the past. For the present, he speaks about the past of the present, the present of the present, and the future of the present. And for the future, he speaks about the past of the future, the present of the future, and the future of the future. Viewed from this conceptual framework, Eckstein interprets τὰ ἐρχόμενα in John 16:13 as referring to the future of the past ("Die Zukunft der Vergangenheit"). For Eckstein ("Das Johannesevangelium," 310), John 14:26 implies that teaching and reminding are the same function of the Paraclete. He interprets 16:13 as saying that the Paraclete reminds the disciples of the future of the past. However, as we have seen in the main text, the interpretation that teaching and reminding are two distinct functions of the Paraclete is more likely on the basis of 14:25–26 and 16:12–13.

The terms παροιμία and παρρησία can, therefore, not function as hermeneutical key terms that lead the reader along the way towards a univocal Christological knowledge. The term παρρησία does not denote univocal Christological knowledge in John.⁶⁰¹ As a characteristic of the Paraclete's teaching (John 16:25), παρρησία does not provide the disciples with a univocal knowledge of Jesus, but transforms them into his followers, who do what is true and thus designate the truth. The next chapter will keep the focus on how Jesus' παρρησία affects the disciples by examining the connection between (i) Jesus' παρρησία and the αἰτεῖν of the disciples and (ii) Jesus' teaching ἐν παροιμίαις and the ἐρωτᾶν of the disciples.

⁶⁰¹ *Contra* the hermeneutical approach to παροιμία and παρρησία in John, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.

CHAPTER V.

THE SEMANTICS OF *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* IN CONNECTION TO *ἑρωτάω* AND *αἰτέω* IN JOHN 16:23–27

The present chapter seeks to provide an understanding of the connection between *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John 16:25, on the one hand, and the different forms of asking mentioned in 16:23–24, 26–27, on the other. One of the difficulties of interpretation addressed in Chapter Two is that 16:25 seems “intrusive” between 16:23–24 and 16:26–27. John 16:23–24, 26–27 “deal with the theme of asking”, whereas 16:25 is about the distinction between Jesus’ past teaching ἐν παροιμίαις and his future *παρρησία* teaching about the Father.⁶⁰² Within 16:23–27, *ἑρωτάω* is consistently used for the disciples’ asking of Jesus before his death, and *αἰτέω* for the disciples’ future asking in Jesus’ name when Jesus has departed to the Father. As a result of the strong division between past and future in 16:23–27, *παροιμία* is associated with *ἑρωτάω* and *παρρησία* with *αἰτέω*.⁶⁰³

In the first section, I will evaluate the scholarly literature on *ἑρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* in the Fourth Gospel. Against the dominant view that they are synonymous, I will contend that there is a subtle distinction between these two verbs in John 16:23–27. Whereas the disciples’ *ἑρωτᾶν* of Jesus is fuelled by uncertainty and misunderstanding, the disciples’ *αἰτεῖν* of the Father (and Jesus)⁶⁰⁴ is grounded in a steadfast trust that they will be given everything they ask. The second section will provide an explanation for this distinction in meaning by examining the association of *αἰτέω* with *παρρησία* in 16:23–27. I will argue that the abrupt positioning of 16:25 in 16:23–24, 26–27 can be explained when one envisages that the disciples will participate in Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour. This participation grants to them the boldness and confidence to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus), and they will be given what they ask for. The third section will focus on the prepositional phrase “in Jesus’ name” in connection to *αἰτέω* and *παρρησία*. I will demonstrate that this phrase indicates that the disciples’ boldness and confidence to ask the Father is facilitated by their keeping of Jesus’ commandment of sacrificial love.

1. *ἑρωτάω* AND *αἰτέω* IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

There is not much secondary literature that sees a distinction in meaning between *ἑρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* in the Fourth Gospel. The two verbs are often regarded as synonyms. According to Nigel Turner, John uses these verbs as “needless synonyms” with the sole reason of “avoiding monotony”.⁶⁰⁵ The same goes for Ruckstuhl, who calls them

⁶⁰² Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 734.

⁶⁰³ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.2.

⁶⁰⁴ The reader, who is informed by John 14:13–14, might also include Jesus as the addressee of the disciples’ *αἰτεῖν* in John 16:23–27.

⁶⁰⁵ Nigel Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, vol. 4, *Style* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1976), 76.

“Wechselwörter” or “Synonyme”.⁶⁰⁶ Howard slightly disagrees by saying that, although John seems to use ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω as “synonyms in the same sentence, or the same context”, he does this “in such a way [...] as to raise for any other writer, a wonder whether a distinction of meaning should not be enforced”.⁶⁰⁷ First, I will provide a general overview of the use of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω in the Gospel (1.1). This overview will confirm Howard’s intuition that there is a distinction in meaning between these two verbs. Second, I will try to articulate this distinction by taking into consideration the connection of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω with respect to παροιμία and παρρησία (1.2).

1.1 PRE-PASCHAL ἐρωτάω VERSUS POST-PASCHAL αἰτέω

Throughout the Gospel ἐρωτάω is consistently used for the pre-paschal form of asking (John 1:19, 21, 25; 5:12; [8:7]; 9:2, 15, 19, 21; 16:5, 19, 23, 30; 18:19, 21[2]) and αἰτέω for the post-paschal form of asking (14:13, 14; 15:7, 16; 16:23, 24, 26). This consistent use of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω suggests that these two verbs are not used for the sole reason of avoiding monotony. In addition to the above-mentioned occurrences of ἐρωτάω, where the verb has the meaning of asking questions of enquiry, there are occurrences of ἐρωτάω in the Gospel, where the verb has the meaning of “to request”. In these latter occurrences, ἐρωτάω is in some cases used with a ἵνα clause (4:47; 17:15; 19:31, 38), an infinitive clause (4:40), or an imperative (4:31) to express the request. In other cases, the request is implicit (14:16; 16:26; 17:9[2], 20). The only occurrences of αἰτέω where the verb does not refer to the disciples’ post-paschal form of asking can be found in 4:9, 10 and 11:22. I will discuss these latter occurrences of αἰτέω in more detail.

In John 4:9, the Samaritan woman asks Jesus: πῶς σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὢν παρ’ ἐμοῦ πεῖν αἰτεῖς γυναικὸς Σαμαρίτιδος οὔσης; οὐ γὰρ συγχρῶνται Ἰουδαῖοι Σαμαρίταις. Jesus responds: εἰ ᾔδεις τὴν δωρεάν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων σοι· δός μοι πεῖν, σὺ ἂν ἤτησας αὐτὸν καὶ ἔδωκεν ἅν σοι ὕδωρ ζῶν (4:10). As Maynard remarks, the use of αἰτέω in 4:9 is surprising, because John uses the verb for “prayers to God elsewhere”. Maynard claims that the use of αἰτέω in 4:9 is influenced “by its use in verse 10, and that the word is made to carry a double meaning as does βλέπω in chapter 9”. Jesus praying the Samaritan woman “for a drink becomes a symbol of the way she ought to pray to him for the Water of Life”.⁶⁰⁸ In my view, the Samaritan woman is presented here in a similar position as the disciples in 14:13–14; 15:7, 16; 16:23, 24, 26. Whereas the disciples will be given everything they ask (αἰτέω) from Jesus and the Father, the Samaritan woman would have been given living water, if she had asked (αἰτέω) Jesus. For the disciples, the condition of their asking is that they believe in Jesus (14:12). Similarly, for the Samaritan woman, as is made clear by the conditional clause in 4:10, the condition is that she knows

⁶⁰⁶ Ruckstuhl, *Die literarische Einheit*, NTOA 5, 146 n. 1. Originally published as Ruckstuhl, *Die literarische Einheit*, Studia Friburgensia N.F. 3, 146 n. 1.

⁶⁰⁷ Wilbert F. Howard, *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation* (London: The Epworth Press, 1931), 106.

⁶⁰⁸ Arthur H. Maynard, “The Function of Apparent Synonyms and Ambiguous Words in the Fourth Gospel” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1988), 184.

the gift of God and who Jesus is. Given that knowledge of Jesus' identity is required, the use of αἰτέω in 4:9–10 can be said to introduce a form of asking that prefigures the post-paschal form of asking of the disciples. Just as the Samaritan woman would have been given what she had asked for – if she had asked Jesus –, so, too, the disciples will be given what they ask of the Father (and Jesus).

In John 11:22, Martha says to Jesus: [ἀλλὰ] καὶ νῦν οἶδα ὅτι ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσῃ τὸν θεὸν δώσει σοι ὁ θεός. According to Martha, Jesus can ask anything of God, even the restoration of her brother's life. Martha is right to say that Jesus will be given everything he asks from God, as it is attested by Jesus' saying in 11:41–42: πάτερ, εὐχαριστῶ σοι ὅτι ἤκουσάς μου. ἐγὼ δὲ ᾔδειν ὅτι πάντοτέ μου ἀκούεις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὄχλον τὸν περιεστῶτα εἶπον, ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας. It is not mentioned that Jesus asks the Father to resurrect Lazarus. The pluperfect ᾔδειν indicates that Jesus knew beforehand that the Father always hears him; as if this is self-evident for him. Jesus does not actually need to thank the Father, but only does this for the sake of the crowd standing by, so that they may believe it was the Father who sent him.

Other σημεῖα that Jesus performs have, also, resulted from Jesus' asking something from the Father. Jesus' works and signs can only take place if Jesus asks the Father, and if he gives what Jesus asks for. The phrase ἐπάρας οὖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς (John 6:5) and εὐχαριστήσας (6:11; cf. εὐχαριστήσαντος in 6:23) indicate that the σημεῖον of the feeding of the 5000 was only possible because Jesus was given by God what he asked for. Although Jesus' asking and his being heard by God are not explicitly narrated, it is hinted at by, respectively, his lifting up his eyes to heaven and his saying thanks. In a similar vein, the man born blind explains the σημεῖον of his healing by claiming that God has heard (cf. ἀκούει) Jesus (9:31). Jesus cannot have healed the man, if he did not previously ask God.

Jesus promises the disciples that they will, also, be able to ask (αἰτέω) the Father (and Jesus) and receive what they asked for (John 14:13–14, etc.). The disciples will be able to perform the same ἔργα as Jesus does, and even greater than Jesus' ἔργα (14:12). The use of αἰτέω in 11:22 depicts Jesus as being in the same position as the disciples at the hour of Jesus' death. The reader, who is informed by the use of αἰτέω in 11:22, understands the later use of αἰτέω in 14:13–14, etc. as promising the disciples that they will ask the Father (and Jesus) and will receive what they ask for, just as Jesus asked and received everything from the Father throughout the Gospel.

Given that John uses ἐρωτάω in John 14:16; 16:26; 17:9, 15, 20 to express Jesus' requests to the Father, you would expect the same use in 11:22. Scholars have attempted to explain the unexpected use of αἰτέω here in a number of ways. According to Trench, John's use of ἐρωτάω to express the relationship between Jesus and the Father "implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked". When John uses the verb αἰτέω for this, it has a "more submissive and suppliant" connotation.⁶⁰⁹ In my view, this submissive meaning of αἰτέω can explain the amazement

⁶⁰⁹ Richard C. Trench, *Synonyms of the New Testament* (Kegan Paul: London, ¹¹1890), 144.

of the Samaritan woman in 4:9. The Samaritan woman is amazed by the fact that Jesus asks (αἰτέω) her for a drink, because Jews were expected to feel superior to Samaritans, as were men when compared to women. His submissive way of asking is the cause of her amazement. Given this submissive meaning of αἰτέω, Trench claims that John uses it in 11:22 to express that Martha has a “poor unworthy conception” of Jesus, and that “she recognizes in Him no more than a prophet”, that is, someone who is submissive to God and, therefore, has to beg him.⁶¹⁰ Maynard is more specific about the nature of this submissiveness by saying that John uses αἰτέω when a “distinction between man and God” is at stake, and not “any distinction between various levels of man”.⁶¹¹ Ostmeyer is in agreement with Trench, when he explains John’s use of αἰτέω in 11:22 as follows: “die Aussage [11:22, T.T.] [wird, T.T.] nicht in auktorialer Rede, sondern von Personen gemacht, die, wie die unmittelbar folgenden Verse erweisen, Jesu Wesen und seine Vollmacht noch nicht erkannt haben”.⁶¹² Although Martha misunderstands Jesus’ true identity, I would not consider her faith in Jesus, as expressed by 11:22, to be inadequate. As Thyen has remarked, Martha’s reply in 11:24 is “*förmlich* provoziert” by Jesus’ claim in 11:23.⁶¹³ Also, her claim in 11:22 that Jesus can αἰτεῖν everything from God, and be given it, is accurate. When Lazarus has been resurrected,⁶¹⁴ Jesus thanks God for having listened to him (11:41), although he knows that God always listens to him, and only thanks him “for the sake of the crowd standing by” (11:42). Jesus’ humility, of publicly thanking God for having listened to him, implies that Jesus has asked God in a way that is more accurately depicted by the more submissive form of asking expressed by αἰτέω rather than by ἐρωτάω, which would assume that Jesus and God are equals.⁶¹⁵ John conceptualises Jesus’ asking of God with the verb αἰτέω (11:22) to portray Jesus as a model for how the disciples themselves are to αἰτεῖν God (14:13–14 etc.).⁶¹⁶

I conclude from my discussion until now that the consistent use of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω to denote, respectively, a pre-paschal and a post-paschal form of asking excludes the scholarly view that ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω are synonyms used to avoid monotony. Only in John 4:9–10 and 11:22 does αἰτέω not refer to the disciples’ post-paschal form of asking. The use of αἰτέω in 4:9–10 prepares the reader to understand the disciples’ post-paschal form of asking in terms of how the Samaritan woman would have asked Jesus for living water and it would be given to her, if she had recognised his messianic identity. The use of αἰτέω in 11:22 prepares the reader to understand the disciples’ post-paschal asking of

⁶¹⁰ Trench, *Synonyms*, 145.

⁶¹¹ Maynard, “The Function,” 189.

⁶¹² Karl-Heinrich Ostmeyer, *Kommunikation mit Gott und Christus*, WUNT 197 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 334.

⁶¹³ Thyen, *Johannes*, 521. Italics in the original.

⁶¹⁴ I agree with Barrett, *John*, 402 that the use of the aorist ἤκουσας in John 11:41 implies that the resurrection of Lazarus has already taken place.

⁶¹⁵ Cf. Zumstein, *Jean (I–II)*, 378: “[c]ette assistance divine jamais prise en défaut met en lumière à la fois l’identité entre le Père et le Fils, mais aussi leur différence (Jésus prie pour s’adresser au Père!).”

⁶¹⁶ Cf. Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 436, who claims that Jesus demands the “same confidence in the prayer of his followers (xiv 12–13, xv 16, xvi 23, 6)” as expressed by Jesus’ prayer in John 11:41–42.

the Father (and Jesus) in terms of how Jesus as the performer of σημεῖα was able to ask and receive from the Father.

It is the same distinction between a pre-paschal ἐρωτᾶν and a post-paschal αἰτεῖν that is prominent in John 16:23–27 and connects ἐρωτάω to παροιμία, as well as αἰτέω to παρρησία. In the next subsection, I will articulate this distinction in meaning by looking at these connections.

1.2 POLEMICAL ἐρωτάω VERSUS CONFIDENT αἰτέω

According to Heinrich Greeven, ἐρωτάω is used by John in a special and theologically motivated way.⁶¹⁷ Wolfgang Schenk speaks of it as a “Häufigkeitswort” in the Gospel, and articulates its use in John 16:23 as “christologisch wichtig”.⁶¹⁸ While ἐρωτάω is used 28 times in the Fourth Gospel, the Synoptics only use it, altogether, 22 times. The use of ἐρωτάω in John is reckoned as one of the Johannine style characteristics.⁶¹⁹ Greeven and Schenk agree that ἐρωτάω in 16:23 has the same meaning as in classical Greek, namely, to ask for information. In this regard Schenk speaks of a “befragen” that is no longer necessary “[i]n der Zeit der nachösterlichen Anwesenheit Jesu als des Parakleten”.⁶²⁰ Greeven speaks of “Fragen” that can only be understood as “eine Unvollkommenheit [...] [i]n einer Theologie, in der Wissen und ‘Erkennen’ so zentrale Begriffe sind”.⁶²¹ He considers 16:5 as a verse that points out the necessity of this asking for information to Jesus, an asking that “über sich hinaus zu einem Ziele führen soll”.⁶²² According to Brown, ἐρωτάω in 16:23 has the meaning of “a question that betrays a lack of understanding”.⁶²³ Rudolf Schnackenburg specifies this lack of understanding by speaking of the “Ratlosigkeit” of the disciples.⁶²⁴

I agree with the above-mentioned scholars that the disciples’ ἐρωτᾶν of Jesus is guided by misunderstanding and uncertainty. Yet, their view that the disciples’ ἐρωτᾶν is merely informative needs to be nuanced. The question is whether ἐρωτάω in John 16:5, 19, 23, 30 has a purely informative connotation or whether it, additionally, has polemical meaning in the sense of ‘to question’. At the end of the Farewell Discourse, Jesus is amazed that his disciples do not ask (ἐρωτᾶ) him: ποῦ ὑπάγεις; (16:5) The disciples have, however, already asked Jesus this question two times, namely in 13:36 and 14:5. Jesus has, moreover, already univocally answered this question in 14:12 (ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα

⁶¹⁷ Heinrich Greeven, “ἐρωτάω,” *TWNT* 2 (1935) 682–684: at 683: “[e]in besonderer, theologisch motivierter Sprachgebrauch scheint bei *Johannes* vorzuliegen, auf den fast die Hälfte des gesamten Vorkommens von ἐρωτάω entfällt.”

⁶¹⁸ Wolfgang Schenk, “ἐρωτάω,” *EWNT*³ 2 (2011) 144–145.

⁶¹⁹ See Van Belle, *The Signs Source*, 409.

⁶²⁰ Schenk, “ἐρωτάω”: 145.

⁶²¹ Greeven, “ἐρωτάω”: 683.

⁶²² Greeven, “ἐρωτάω”: 683: “[f]ragen ist gewiß der Weg, um zur vollen Gemeinschaft mit dem Sohn und dem Vater zu gelangen, ein Weg, dessen Notwendigkeit betont werden kann (J 16,5), der aber auch über sich hinaus zu einem Ziele führen soll.”

⁶²³ Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 722.

⁶²⁴ Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 179.

πορεύομαι) and 14:28 (πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα). In 16:5, Jesus also mentions that he is departing to the one who sent him, viz., his Father in heaven. It is, therefore, unlikely that the disciples' ἐρωτᾶν in 16:5, 19, 23, 30 is purely informative. Already, Jesus has provided sufficient information about his destiny throughout the Gospel.

It is more likely that the disciples' ἐρωτᾶν is equally a form of questioning. Jesus does not conform to the disciples' understanding of the Christ as one who, according to Jewish law (cf. Ps 88 [89]:37; Ezek 37:25), remains with them forever (cf. John 12:34). The disciples are baffled by Jesus' imagery (16:17). Their ἐρωτᾶν is motivated by the request for transparent information that agrees with their messianic expectations. In their understanding, παρρησία is opposed to παροιμία (16:29). The meaning of ἐρωτάω in 16:5, 19, 23, 30 can be called both informative and polemical, because the disciples do not only ask for information, but also require that this information is adapted to their understanding of παρρησία. They require of Jesus that he stops hiding behind παροιμία, and that he calls a spade a spade. This is necessarily polemical against how Jesus' παρρησία makes use of παροιμία.⁶²⁵ Even if Jesus adapts to their standards of communication, as in 16:28 (ἐξῆλθον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον· πάλιν ἀφίημι τὸν κόσμον καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα), the disciples can only acknowledge that Jesus comes from God (ἐν τούτῳ πιστεύομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθες, 16:30), but not that Jesus is returning to his Father. The latter claim still opposes their messianic expectations.

As to αἰτέω in the Fourth Gospel, Gustav Stählin notes that it has the meaning of "etwas haben wollen (zunächst natürlich für sich selber)". The verb αἰτέω depicts the requests of the disciples to Jesus and the Father (John 14:13–14, etc.), because they ask for things for themselves, that is, self-interestedly, while ἐρωτάω is used for Jesus' requests to the Father (14:16; 16:26; 17:9[2], 15, 20), because Jesus does not want anything for himself, "sondern daß etwas für andre geschehen soll".⁶²⁶ Stählin states that αἰτέω seems to be less intimate than ἐρωτάω, which explains why ἐρωτάω is used for the questions of the disciples directed to Jesus, and for the questions of Jesus directed to the Father.⁶²⁷ Briefly summarised, we can say that, according to this position, αἰτέω is more self-interested and distant, while ἐρωτάω is more altruistic and intimate. Comparably, Brown speaks of John's use of αἰτέω in the sense of "asking (*aitein*) things of the Father: a request or petition for something that one wants".⁶²⁸ The self-interested aspect is also present here. Barrett, also, thinks that John uses αἰτέω with the meaning of "to ask for something", while ἐρωτάω has the meaning of "to ask a question", which is more cognitive and informative.⁶²⁹ Arthur Maynard agrees with Barrett: "the difference

⁶²⁵ On the collaboration of the Johannine Jesus' παρρησία with παροιμία, see *supra*, Chapter Three.

⁶²⁶ Gustav Stählin, "αἰτέω," *TWNT* 1 (1933) 191–193: at 192.

⁶²⁷ See Stählin, "αἰτέω": 192–193.

⁶²⁸ Brown, *John* (XIII–XXI), 722.

⁶²⁹ Barrett, *John*, 494: "John always uses αἰτεῖν with the meaning 'to ask for something' (see 4.9f.; 11.22; 14.13f; 15.7.16; 16.23f., 26) and does upon occasion use ἐρωτᾶν with the meaning 'to ask a question' (see 1.19, 21, 25; 9.2, 19, 21; 16.5, 19, 30)."

between the two expressions is not between not asking Jesus and asking God, but between asking information, and asking things of God”.⁶³⁰ The common understanding of scholarly literature on αἰτέω in the Gospel is that it is used to express the idea of asking something for oneself.

A connotation of the αἰτεῖν of the disciples neglected by the above-mentioned scholars is that it is guided by the confidence that the Father hears them, and gives them everything they ask for (John 15:16; 16:23–24), or that Jesus will do everything the disciples ask for (14:13–14). It is no coincidence that this form of asking is connected to Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour in 16:23–27. The reader of the Gospel is challenged to reflect on how Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour can affect the disciples in such a way that their disposition radically changes from the pre-paschal form of asking, as depicted by ἐρωτάω, to the post-paschal form of asking, as phrased by αἰτέω. At the hour, when Jesus speaks παρρησία to the disciples about the Father (16:25), the disciples will not question (ἐρωτάω) Jesus about anything (16:23). At that time, the disciples will no longer be made uncertain by the criticism of Jesus’ παροιμίαι against their messianic expectations. Their uncertainty and misunderstanding will be changed into a boldness and confidence that allows them to ask (αἰτέω) the Father (and Jesus) in Jesus’ name, and to receive what they ask for. The question is how Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour can be said to be responsible for the disciples’ boldness and confidence to ask the Father (and Jesus), and to receive what they ask for.

I conclude from the above discussion of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω that there is a difference in nuance between both verbs in John 16:23–27.⁶³¹ Both verbs refer to the activity of asking. However, ἐρωτάω has a polemical connotation that signals the disciples’ resistance to the illocutionary force of Jesus’ παροιμίαι. The disciples understand the propositional content of Jesus’ παροιμίαι (e.g., “I am going to the Father”), but resist Jesus’ attempt to criticise their messianic views in uttering the παροιμίαι.⁶³² The verb ἐρωτάω, therefore, does not simply denote an asking for information, but an asking for information that is fuelled by resistance and mistrust. On the other hand, αἰτέω, is guided by confidence and an acceptance of not only the propositional meaning of Jesus’

⁶³⁰ Maynard, “The Function,” 183.

⁶³¹ I exclude in my analysis the occurrence of ἐρωτάω in John 16:26, where the verb has the meaning of “to request”: see *supra*, §1.1.

⁶³² John L. Austin, *How To Do Things with Words*, The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ²1989) distinguishes between the constative and the performative function of language utterances. Language utterances can report on and describe reality as well as perform actions. In Austin’s terminology, the illocutionary force of an utterance refers to what the speaker is attempting to do by means of the utterance. For Jesus’ παροιμίαι, I would say this illocutionary force consists in criticising the messianic views of the disciples. In the case of criticism, no performative verb (e.g., “I criticise”) is required to perform criticism through a language utterance. Cf. Austin, *How To Do*, 65–66: “Is it always the case that we must have a performative verb for making explicit something we are undoubtedly doing by saying something? For example, I may insult you by saying something, but we have not the formula ‘I insult you’.”

παροιμίας, but also their illocutionary force.⁶³³ The next section will provide a historical-contextual interpretation of the connection of παρρησία to αἰτέω in 16:23–27.

2. Αἰτέω AND παρρησία IN JOHN 16:23–27

For my analysis of John 16:23–27, I use the following sense line division of the text:

16:23a καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν.

16:23b ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν,

16:23c ἂν τι αἰτήσητε τὸν πατέρα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου

16:23d δώσει ὑμῖν.

16:24a ἕως ἄρτι οὐκ ἠτήσατε οὐδέν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου·

16:24b αἰτεῖτε

16:24c καὶ λήψεσθε,

16:24d ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν ᾗ πεπληρωμένη.

16:25a ταῦτα ἐν παροιμίαις λελάληκα ὑμῖν·

16:25b ἔρχεται ὥρα

16:25c ὅτε οὐκέτι ἐν παροιμίαις λαλήσω ὑμῖν,

16:25d ἀλλὰ παρρησία περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαγγελῶ ὑμῖν.

16:26a ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου αἰτήσεσθε,

16:26b καὶ οὐ λέγω ὑμῖν

16:26c ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν πατέρα περὶ ὑμῶν·

16:27a αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ φιλεῖ ὑμᾶς,

16:27b ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ πεφιλήκατε

16:27c καὶ πεπιστεύκατε

16:27d ὅτι ἐγὼ παρὰ [τοῦ] θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον.

I will first provide a short philological analysis of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω in 16:23–27 (see 2.1) before reflecting on how to understand the connection of παρρησία to αἰτέω in the same passage (see 2.2).

2.1 A PHILOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ἐρωτάω AND αἰτέω IN JOHN 16:23–27

John 16:23a: Ἐρωτήσετε is construed with two nouns in the accusative: ἐμέ and οὐδέν. The use of οὐδέν can be viewed as an accusative of respect (or: Greek accusative) in the sense that the disciples will on that day not question Jesus “about anything”. Another possibility is to interpret the accusative οὐδέν as an internal object: the disciples will on that day not ask “any question” to Jesus. The prepositional phrase ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ denotes a time period and restricts the activity of the verb to a particular time (“on that day”) in the future.

⁶³³ In a future study, I will provide a historical-contextual interpretation of this polemical meaning of ἐρωτάω and interrogation in the Fourth Gospel against the background of the ancient theory of dialectical interrogation. The envisaged study will pay special attention to the rhetorical role of Jesus’ παροιμίας when Jesus is asked questions and performs the role of the respondent.

John 16:23c: Αιτήσητε is construed with two nouns in the accusative: τι and τὸν πατέρα. A similar construction is present in 14:13–14 with the main difference that not the Father, but Jesus (cf. με) is the direct object of αἰτέω. In 15:16, τὸν πατέρα is again the direct object of αἰτέω. From the perspective that Jesus has returned to the Father on the day or the hour, it makes little difference whether the αἰτεῖν of the disciples is directed to Jesus or the Father. Essential is that the asking is performed in Jesus' name. The following variant readings of ἅν τι in 16:23c can be noted: οτι ο (ε)αν (N, Θ, 33, *et al.*), ο τι (οτι?) (ε)αν (P^{22vid}, A, W), ο εαν (N), οτι οσα (ε)αν (K, Γ, Δ, *et al.*), (+ οτι D²) εαν τι (D, Ψ). Both ἅν τι and its variant readings confirm that the direct object of αἰτέω is indefinite. Τι is possibly an internal accusative.

John 16:24a: Like ἐρωτήσετε in 16:23a, ἡτήσατε is construed with οὐδέν. Here, also, οὐδέν can be interpreted as an internal object. The conjunction of αἰτέω and the prepositional phrase ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου is again used. Like ἐρωτήσετε in 16:23a, ἡτήσατε in 16:24a is complemented by a prepositional phrase denoting a time period, viz. ἕως ἄρτι.

John 16:24b: The use of the naked imperative αἰτεῖτε. Thanks to 16:23c–24a, the reader already knows which objects and prepositional phrases are implied with the use of αἰτέω. The disciples are encouraged to ask the Father in Jesus' name for everything they want. John 16:24c (καὶ λήμψεσθε) specifies that all their requests will be answered.

John 16:26a: Like in 15:7, a medial form of αἰτέω is used here: αἰτήσεσθε. The medial form is indirect-reflexive: the disciples will ask for their own benefit. The verb αἰτήσεσθε is complemented by the prepositional phrase ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, which was previously used together with ἐρωτάω in 16:23a. The usual combination of αἰτέω and ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου is, again, used.

John 16:26c: Unlike in 16:23a, not the disciples, but Jesus is the grammatical subject of ἐρωτάω here. The verb is construed with the direct object τὸν πατέρα and the prepositional phrase περὶ ὑμῶν. The combination of περὶ with a genitive usually expresses a limitation: Jesus will ask the Father “concerning the disciples”, and not concerning, for instance, the ‘Jews’. The use of ἐρωτήσω in 16:23a is paralleled by the use of the same morphological form of the verb in 14:16, where Jesus says that he will ask the Father to give another Paraclete to the disciples. Like in 14:16, ἐρωτάω in 16:23a refers to a request of Jesus to the Father. The meaning of ἐρωτάω here differs from the meaning of the same verb in 16:23a, where the verb refers back to the disciples' questioning of Jesus in 16:17–19 when they did not understand his double μικρόν saying.

On the basis of the above philological analysis of the use of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω in John 16:23–27, I observe that especially the prepositional phrases complementing the two verbs legitimate my hypothesis that there is a distinction in meaning between them:

First, the prepositional phrase ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου is consistently not used with ἐρωτάω, but only with αἰτέω (John 16:23c, 24a, 26a). This is the case elsewhere in the Gospel (14:13, 14; 15:16). In John's conceptual world, one cannot ἐρωτᾶν, but only αἰτεῖν

in Jesus' name. I will examine this intrinsic connection between αἰτέω and "in Jesus' name" below in section three.⁶³⁴

Second, the prepositional phrase ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ is used with both ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω. John 16:23a claims that the disciples will not question (ἐρωτάω) Jesus about anything on this specific day, whereas 16:26a assures the disciples that they will ask (αἰτέω) in Jesus' name on the same day. Informed by 14:13–14; 15:16; 16:23, the reader knows that Jesus and the Father are the implied addressees of αἰτέω in 16:26a. In order to maintain logical coherency between 16:23a and 16:26a, one has to presuppose that ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω are distinct in meaning. This is the reason for their juxtaposition by means of the prepositional phrase ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. On that day, the disciples will no longer ἐρωτᾶν, but αἰτεῖν in Jesus' name.

Third, the prepositional phrase ἕως ἄρτι in John 16:24a informs us that the disciples have never asked (αἰτέω) anything (οὐδέν) in Jesus' name. The noun οὐδέν is, also, used with ἐρωτάω in 16:23a. In 16:23a, ἐρωτήσετε refers back to the disciples' questioning of Jesus' παροιμία in 16:16–19. If the disciples have questioned (ἐρωτάω) Jesus before, then how can Jesus claim in 16:24a that the disciples have never asked (αἰτέω) in Jesus' name ἕως ἄρτι? This can only be the case, when ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω are distinct in meaning and refer to two different forms of asking.

The next subsection will further examine the difference in meaning between ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω by enquiring into the connection between αἰτέω and παρρησία in John 16:23–27.

2.2 THE DISCIPLES AND JESUS' παρρησία AT THE HOUR (JOHN 16:25)

The key to understanding the distinction between ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω is provided in John 16:25 by the sudden abruption of Jesus' discourse on the two forms of asking. In 16:23–25, the disciples' ἐρωτᾶν of Jesus is connected to Jesus' teaching ἐν παροιμίαις. In 16:5, 19, ἐρωτάω signals the misunderstanding of the disciples concerning Jesus' death as his return to the Father. The disciples do not understand the παροιμία or figurative saying μικρὸν καὶ οὐ θεωρεῖτέ με, καὶ πάλιν μικρὸν καὶ ὄψεσθέ με (16:17). Jesus tries to comfort the disciples by claiming that a day will come that they will no longer question (ἐρωτάω) him concerning his παροιμίαι, but will ask (αἰτέω) the Father in Jesus' name and receive (16:23, 24b–c).⁶³⁵ Until that moment, the disciples did not ask (αἰτέω) for anything in Jesus' name (16:24a). The αἰτεῖν of the disciples is reserved for the hour when Jesus will tell them παρρησία about the Father (16:25b, d).

John 16:23–27 does not provide any explicit information on how Jesus' παρρησία at the hour can enable the disciples to ask (αἰτέω) the Father (and Jesus) for anything, and be given it. The abrupt disruption of 16:23–27 by 16:25 confronts the reader with a

⁶³⁴ See *infra*, §3.

⁶³⁵ Cf. John 16:29–30, where the disciples confirm that when Jesus no longer speaks ἐν παροιμίαις, they will no longer question (ἐρωτάω) him: ἴδε νῦν ἐν παρρησίᾳ λαλεῖς καὶ παροιμίαν οὐδεμίαν λέγεις. νῦν οἶδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα καὶ οὐ χρειᾶν ἔχεις ἵνα τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ.

narrative gap, and invites the reader to reflect on how Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour affects the disciples. As noted in Chapter Three, the use of *ἀπαγγέλλω*, and its *varia lectio* *ἀναγγέλλω*, in 16:25 remind the reader of the use of *ἀναγγέλλω* in 16:13–15 to describe the activity of the Spirit-Paraclete. The parallel of 16:25 to 14:25–26 informs the reader that the Spirit-Paraclete is the mouthpiece of Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour.⁶³⁶ Additionally, the reader is informed that the Spirit-Paraclete will reside in the disciples (cf. *ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται*, 14:17) at the hour of Jesus' death. In 16:25, the informed reader reads between the lines that Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour dwells in the disciples. Through Jesus' *παρρησία*, the disciples obtain the courage and the confidence to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) for everything they want, and be given it. Both the connotations of confidence and courage are intrinsic to the semantics of *παρρησία* in antiquity, and in the Fourth Gospel in particular (see esp. 7:4, 13, 26).

The reason why the disciples will be able to ask (*αἰτέω*) in Jesus' name (John 16:26a) is provided by 16:27: *αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ πατήρ φιλεῖ ὑμᾶς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ πεφιλήκατε καὶ πεπιστεύκατε ὅτι ἐγὼ παρὰ [τοῦ] θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον*. For the sake of the argument, John projects the post-paschal reality that the disciples love and believe in Jesus onto the pre-paschal time.⁶³⁷ As one reads in 14:21, where *ἀγαπάω* is used instead of *φιλέω*: *ὁ ἔχων τὰς ἐντολάς μου καὶ τηρῶν αὐτάς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαπῶν με· ὁ δὲ ἀγαπῶν με ἀγαπηθήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μου, κἀγὼ ἀγαπήσω αὐτὸν καὶ ἐμφανίσω αὐτῷ ἐμαυτόν*. Having and keeping Jesus' commandments is practically identified with loving Jesus. Given that the disciples will keep the commandment of love and love Jesus, they will be granted the love of the Father and Jesus. A similar formulation can be found in 14:15: *ἐὰν ἀγαπᾷτέ με, τὰς ἐντολάς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσετε*. There, the disciples' love for Jesus entails that Jesus will ask (*ἐρωτάω*) the Father, and that the Father will send another Paraclete, who will forever dwell in the disciples (14:16–17). If one takes 14:15–17 and 14:21 into consideration when reading 16:26–27, one has to conclude it is the keeping of the commandment of love that guarantees the disciples will be loved by the Father, and that they will be able to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) in Jesus' name. Part of the logic here is that the keeping of this commandment will grant the disciples to be imbued by the Spirit-Paraclete. Although never mentioned explicitly in 16:23–27, the Spirit-Paraclete is the key to understanding how Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour enables the disciples to ask (*αἰτέω*) in Jesus' name. Through the Spirit-Paraclete and his indwelling, the disciples are affected by Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour. As a result, they obtain the courage and the confidence to ask in Jesus' name, and to receive what they ask for. A question worth asking is, then, how the disciples' love of Jesus and their dedication to his commandment is connected to the idea that Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour enables the disciples to ask (*αἰτέω*) in Jesus' name.

⁶³⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Three, §1.

⁶³⁷ For a thorough discussion of the fusion between the pre-paschal and the post-paschal time in John 16:27, see *supra*, Chapter Three, §3.3.

The logic of the answer to this question can be found in Philo, *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit* 6–7:

πότε οὖν ἄγει παρρησίαν οἰκέτης πρὸς δεσπότην; ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν ἡδίκηκότι μὲν ἑαυτῷ μηδὲν συνειδῇ, πάντα δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράττοντι; πότε οὖν ἄξιον καὶ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ δοῦλον ἐλευθεροστομεῖν πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμόνα καὶ δεσπότην ἢ ὅταν ἀμαρτημάτων καθαρεύῃ καὶ τὸ φιλοδέσποτον ἐκ τοῦ συνειδότος κρίνῃ, πλείονι χαρᾷ χρώμενος ἐπὶ τῷ θεράπων θεοῦ γενέσθαι, ἢ εἰ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνθρώπων γένους ἐβασίλευσε τὸ γῆς ὁμοῦ καὶ θαλάττης ἀναψάμενος ἀκοντι κράτος;⁶³⁸

When then has a slave freedom of speech towards his master? Is it not when he is conscious that he has not wronged him, but that he has done and said everything with a view to the advantage of his owner? When therefore is it proper for the servant of God to use freedom of speech to the ruler and master of himself, and of the whole world? Is it not when he is free from all sins, and is aware in his conscience that he loves his master, feeling more joy at the fact of being a servant of God, than he would if he were sovereign over the whole race of mankind, and were invested without any effort on his part with the supreme authority over land and sea.⁶³⁹

Philo considers it possible that the slave (par. the servant of God) can have παρρησία towards his/her human master (par. God), if he/she is conscious of having done no harm against his/her master, but having loved him. If we follow Philo's logic, it is the disciples' consciousness of having not committed ἀμαρτία, but having loved Jesus (and the Father) by keeping his commandments that grants them παρρησία, so that they have the courage and confidence to ask (αἰτέω) the Father (and Jesus) for everything they want, and be given it.

When Philo discusses examples of Moses' use of παρρησία towards God, he states that Moses participated (cf. μεταδῶς) in God's λόγος. Moses was an emigrant in a foreign country driven away from his family and fatherly house. Moses did not have παρρησία due to his social status. However, God is his "master" (δεσπότης), his "country" (πατρίς), his "family" (συγγένεια), his "paternal hearth" (πατρῶα ἐστία), his "citizenship" (ἐπιτιμία), his παρρησία, and his "great and glorious and inalienable wealth" (μέγας καὶ αἰδιμὸς καὶ ἀναφαίρετος πλοῦτος).⁶⁴⁰ Similarly, the disciples, who will be made ἀποσυνάγωγος (John 16:2), will not have παρρησία on the basis of their social status. Through the Spirit-Paraclete, they will obtain a portion of Jesus' παρρησία. Like Moses, the disciples will participate in God's λόγος.

Philo comes very close to how Epictetus understands παρρησία as authorised by συνειδός.⁶⁴¹ According to Bosman, συνειδός in Philo can be compared to an inner

⁶³⁸ Ph., *Her.* 6–7 (Leopold Cohn – Paul Wendland [eds.], *Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt*, 6 vols., Unveränderter Nachdruck der Ausg. 1896–1915 [Berlin: Reimer, 1962]).

⁶³⁹ Trans. by Yonge.

⁶⁴⁰ Ph., *Her.* 26–27. My translation.

⁶⁴¹ See Epict., *Diatr.* 3.22.93–96.

monitor, which can either applaud when unaware of transgressions or make us feel ashamed when aware of transgressions that have taken place. In the first case, the result is an inner harmony and imperturbability that facilitates *παρρησία*. In the second case, we are reminded of our moral impurity. This torment makes it impossible for us to have *παρρησία*.⁶⁴² *Mutatis mutandis*, one can argue that the κόσμος in John does not have *παρρησία* due to the ἔλεγχος of the Paraclete. The Paraclete's ἔλεγχος causes the world to be aware of its ἀμαρτία of not believing in Jesus (John 16:8–9; cf. 3:20). A true disciple, on the other hand, keeps Jesus' commandments (15:8–10) and will, therefore, not be condemned by the ἔλεγχος of the Paraclete, but facilitated in his/her *παρρησία*. This explains why only the disciples are promised to participate in Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour and to ask (αἰτεῖν) the Father (and Jesus) in Jesus' name (16:24–26).⁶⁴³ This post-paschal asking of the disciples that is captured by αἰτέω is contrasted by the pre-paschal asking of the disciples that is phrased by ἐρωτάω. Whereas the former is guided by courage and confidence, the latter is guided by misunderstanding and uncertainty.

A similar train of thought can be found in what Job says in Job 27:7–10:

οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ εἶψαν οἱ ἐχθροί μου ὥσπερ ἡ καταστροφή τῶν ἀσεβῶν,
καὶ οἱ ἐπ' ἐμὲ ἐπανιστανόμενοι ὥσπερ ἡ ἀπώλεια τῶν παρανόμων.
καὶ τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἐλπίς ἀσεβεῖ ὅτι ἐπέχει;
πεποιθὼς ἐπὶ κύριον ἄρα σωθήσεται;
ἢ τὴν δέησιν αὐτοῦ εἰσακούσεται κύριος;
ἢ ἐπελθούσης αὐτῷ ἀνάγκης
μὴ ἔχει τινὰ παρρησίαν ἔναντι αὐτοῦ;
ἢ ὡς ἐπικαλεσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰσακούσεται αὐτοῦ;

Nonetheless, may my enemies be like the ruin of the impious,
and those who rise up against me like the destruction of the transgressors
To be sure, what hope does the impious have that he hangs on?
When he trusts in the Lord, will he be saved?
Will the Lord listen to his petition?
Or when distress comes upon him,
does he have any confidence before him?
Or as he calls upon him, will he listen to him?⁶⁴⁴

The Lord will not listen to the petitions of “the impious” (see τῶν ἀσεβῶν) or “the transgressors” (see τῶν παρανόμων). They will not have any *παρρησία* before the Lord. Like Philo, Job assumes a logic in which those who have sinned against God will not have *παρρησία*. Consequently, God will not hear them if they ask something of God. John

⁶⁴² See Philip R. Bosman, “Conscience and Free Speech in Philo,” *SPhiloA* 18 (2006) 33–47; Philip R. Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, WUNT II/166 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), esp. 90–95, 177–179.

⁶⁴³ A similar view is present in Phil 1:19–20, where Paul seems to imply that the help of the Spirit of Jesus Christ can either shame him or provide him with *παρρησία*.

⁶⁴⁴ NETS Translation.

assumes the same logic when he writes that the disciples can ask anything of God, and it will be given them. Unlike the enemies of Job, the disciples will have *παρρησία* before God, because they are aware that they have not sinned against him.

Compared to John 16:23–27, the connection between *παρρησία* and *αἰτέω* is more explicit in 1 John 5:14–15: καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ *παρρησία* ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν ὅτι ἐάν τι *αἰτώμεθα* κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ἀκούει ἡμῶν. καὶ ἐὰν οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν ὁ ἐὰν *αἰτώμεθα*, οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἔχομεν τὰ *αἰτήματα* ἃ ἠτήκαμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ. In this text, *παρρησία* has the meaning of the confidence in God that one will receive from God whatever one asks for oneself (cf. *αἰτώμεθα*) according to God’s will. As argued above, the connection between *παρρησία* and *αἰτέω* in John 16:23–27 is of a similar nature. Through the dwelling of the Spirit-Paraclete in the disciples, the disciples will take part in Jesus’ *παρρησία* and will have the courage and confidence to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus). While the Paraclete will reprove/convict (*ἐλέγχω*) the κόσμος for its error (*ἁμαρτία*) of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9; cf. 3:20), the disciples will obtain boldness and confidence through the Paraclete.

Another text where *παρρησία* is explicitly connected to *αἰτέω* is 1 John 3:21–22: ἀγαπητοί, ἐὰν ἡ καρδιά [ἡμῶν] μὴ καταγινώσκη, *παρρησίαν* ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ ὁ ἐὰν *αἰτῶμεν* λαμβάνομεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηροῦμεν καὶ τὰ ἄρεστὰ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ποιοῦμεν. The text says that one has *παρρησία* towards God, if one’s heart does not condemn (*καταγινώσκω*) oneself. In order to have this clean conscience, one has to keep God’s commandments and do what is pleasing to God. Having *παρρησία* towards God allows one to ask (*αἰτέω*) and receive anything from God. The idea seems to be, if one is condemned by one’s heart because one has not kept God’s commandments, then one is ashamed and unable to ask (*αἰτέω*) God for anything. The opposition of *παρρησία* to shame is verbally expressed in 1 John 2:28: καὶ νῦν, τέκνία, μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ, ἵνα ἐὰν φανερωθῇ σχῶμεν *παρρησίαν* καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνοῦμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ.⁶⁴⁵ I have argued above by use of Philo, Epictetus, and LXX Job that a similar logic can be detected in John 16:23–27. Thanks to the disciples’ keeping of Jesus’ commandment of love, they are able to ask (*αἰτέω*) in Jesus’ name. The Paraclete’s *ἔλεγχος* makes it impossible for the κόσμος to have *παρρησία*, because they become aware of their *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus and not keeping the commandment of love. The disciples, on the other hand, keep Jesus’ commandment and are not reproved of *ἁμαρτία* by the Spirit-Paraclete, but are facilitated in their *παρρησία* towards God. Through the Paraclete’s dwelling in them, the disciples participate in Jesus’ *παρρησία* and obtain the boldness to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) and the confidence that they will receive everything they asked for.

The above-noted verbal and conceptual similarities between 1 John 3:21–22 and 5:14–15, on the one hand, and John 16:23–27, on the other, suggest that there is a direct literary relationship between both. Given that the nature of the connection between

⁶⁴⁵ The opposition between shame and *παρρησία* can also be found in Prov 13:5.

παρρησία and αἰτέω is more articulated in 1 John 3:21–22 and 5:14–15, it is probable that the author of these texts knew John 16:23–27.⁶⁴⁶

In the next section, I will study the connection between αἰτέω and its prepositional phrase “in Jesus’ name” in relation to the semantics of παρρησία.

3. IN JESUS’ NAME

The present section will, first, provide an overview and evaluation of the scholarly positions on the prepositional phrase “in Jesus’ name” in the Fourth Gospel (3.1). Second, I will evaluate the role of John 16:26 in determining what the meaning is of the phrase “in Jesus’ name” (3.2). The result will be that the phrase has the meaning of being sent or commissioned by Jesus. In a third step, I will examine what being sent by Jesus means in the Gospel, with special attention to how both Jesus and the disciples are presented as messengers of God with the authority to ask everything of God, and be given it (3.3).

3.1 EVALUATIVE *STATUS QUAESTIONIS*

The prepositional phrase “in someone’s name” has the following forms in the Gospel of John: to come in the Father’s name (ἔρχομαι + ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρὸς μου, John 5:43a; 10:25), to come in one’s own name (ἔρχομαι + ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τῷ ἰδίῳ, 5:43c), to come in the Lord’s name (ἔρχομαι + ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου, 12:13), to ask in Jesus’ name (αἰτέω + ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου, 14:13, 14, 26; 15:16; 16:23, 24, 26), to keep someone in the Father’s name (τηρέω + ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου, 17:11, 12), to have life in Jesus’ name (ἔχω ζώην + ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ, 20:31). I observe that “in Jesus’ name” is used multiple times with αἰτέω and once with ἔχω ζώην.

There are two scholarly positions on the phrase “in Jesus’ name”. In the first position, scholars refer to John 5:43 and 10:25 and claim that to call on someone’s name has the meaning of being sent and assigned by that person (cf. Deut 18:18–20; LXX Jer 36:25). When used with αἰτέω, “in Jesus’ name” then means that the disciples ask (αἰτέω) things of the Father in their status of being sent and commissioned by Jesus.⁶⁴⁷ In the second position, scholars follow Wilhelm Heitmüller in his view that “in Jesus’ name” means that the disciples cry out Jesus’ name in order that Jesus will mediate their requests to the Father.⁶⁴⁸ I will argue for the first position.

⁶⁴⁶ George L. Parsenios, *First, Second, and Third John*, Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 11–13 mentions three views in the scholarly literature regarding the literary relationship between the Fourth Gospel and the Letters of John. In the first two views, there is a direct literary relationship between both in which John’s Gospel either ante-dates or post-dates the Letters. In the third view, there is no literary relationship between the Gospel and the Letters, but both depend on a common tradition.

⁶⁴⁷ See, e.g., Weiss, *Johannes*, 449–450; Bultmann, *Johannes*, 203; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 82.

⁶⁴⁸ See, e.g., Wilhelm Heitmüller, ‘Im Namen Jesu.’ *Eine sprach- und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Neuen Testament, speziell zur altchristlichen Taufe*, FRLANT 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903), 77–86, 364–365; Barrett, *John*, 460; Thyen, *Johannes*, 628.

According to Heitmüller, the first position cannot satisfactorily explain the use of the phrase “in Jesus’ name” in John 14:13–14; 15:16; 16:23–24, 26. In his view, the phrase indicates, in these texts, that the disciples will call on Jesus’ name in order that Jesus will mediate for them and their requests will be answered. The disciples could not have asked in Jesus’ name during Jesus’ life (16:23–24), because Jesus did not yet go back to the Father, so he could not have mediated the requests of the disciples. According to Heitmüller, the disciples can only do the works of Jesus or greater works than Jesus (14:12) if they can call on Jesus’ name and ask him to mediate their requests (14:13–14).⁶⁴⁹

There are three difficulties with Heitmüller’s interpretation of “in Jesus’ name”. First, his view that the phrase means that the disciples call on Jesus to mediate for them is at odds with John 14:13–14, where the direct addressee of αἰτέω is Jesus, and not the Father. If we follow Heitmüller’s proposal, this text claims that the disciples can ask Jesus for everything by calling out Jesus’ name so that Jesus will mediate for them. It is, however, difficult to conceive that Jesus will mediate the requests of the disciples if Jesus is the direct addressee of these requests. In 14:13–14, Jesus is not presented as mediating between the disciples and the Father, but as the direct addressee of the requests of the disciples. Second, Heitmüller recognises that, in 5:43 and 12:13, ἐν ὀνόματι τίνος has the meaning of being sent and commissioned by that person instead of just crying out the name of the person. He, also, does not dispute this interpretation for 10:25.⁶⁵⁰ It is unclear to me why a different meaning of this phrase is necessary in 14:13–14; 15:16; 16:23–24, 26. Third, John 16:26 explicitly states that Jesus will not mediate for the disciples when they ask (αἰτέω) in Jesus’ name. I will provide an exegesis of this verse in the next subsection.

3.2 JOHN 16:26

For my analysis of John 16:26, I use the following sense line division of the text:

John 16:26a ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου αἰτήσεσθε,

John 16:26b καὶ οὐ λέγω ὑμῖν

John 16:26c ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν πατέρα περὶ ὑμῶν.

Is Jesus saying in 16:26b–c that he will not intercede for the disciples in general, thereby, contradicting his earlier statement in 14:16: καὶ ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἄλλον παράκλητον δώσει ὑμῖν?⁶⁵¹ In this reading, the negation οὐ in 16:26b is read with

⁶⁴⁹ See Heitmüller, *‘Im Namen Jesu’*, 79–80.

⁶⁵⁰ See Heitmüller, *‘Im Namen Jesu’*, 85–86.

⁶⁵¹ See Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 735: “vs. 26 [16:26, T.T.] is new in seeming to exclude intercession on Jesus’ part”. Brown (*ibid.*) refers to John 14:16 to claim that Jesus previously said that he will intercede for the disciples. See, also, Bultmann, *Johannes*, 453: “[a]ber als Neues ist gegenüber v. 23f; 15,7.16 betont, daß Jesus nicht den Vater um die Erfüllung der Gebete zu bitten braucht”; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 3, 183–184: “[...] vielmehr liegt [in 16:26, T.T.] der Nachdruck darauf, daß Jesus für die Jünger beim Vater nicht zu intervenieren braucht, weil der Vater selbst die Jünger liebt [16:27a; T.T.]”;

ἐρωτήσω in 16:26c instead of with λέγω in 16:26b.⁶⁵² However, it could be that Jesus is saying in 16:26b–c that his statement in 16:26a does not imply that he will mediate the requests of the disciples to the Father. In the second case, Jesus is not making a general statement in 16:26b–c about whether he will, or will not, intercede for the disciples, but is providing background information to the disciples (and the reader) to help them interpret his statement in 16:26a. In this reading, the negation οὐ is read with λέγω.⁶⁵³ John 16:26b–c has the strength of a clarification in which Jesus is possibly clarifying for the disciples (and the reader) that his claim in 16:26a does not involve what Jesus said earlier in 14:16, viz., that he will request the Father to send another Paraclete to the disciples. The disciples' asking in Jesus' name may not be confused with Jesus' requesting of the Father to send another Paraclete to the disciples.

The difficulty in translating John 16:26 is well formulated by Barclay Newman and Eugene Nida: “[i]n some languages [there are] complications [concerning] the placement of the negative *not* in the sentence *I do not say that I will ask him on your behalf*.” In these languages, this can result in the reading: “I say that I will not ask him on your behalf.” Newman and Nida illustrate this with an example: “the English sentence ‘I don’t think he will go,’ which is really equivalent to ‘I think he will not go.’”⁶⁵⁴ The danger of translating John 16:26 is that one, prejudiced by modern languages, presupposes that Jesus’ denial of saying something (οὐ λέγω) implies that what is said is denied altogether. It is safe to say that such a logic is nowhere assumed, elsewhere, in the Gospel. In all other cases where λέγω is used with οὐ, only λέγω is negated, but not what is said.

With the Graphical Search Engine in BibleWorks 9 I have searched for the combination of οὐ and λέγω with a maximum of five intervening words. I have limited my search query to the Fourth Gospel. After examining the search results, I have found that, in addition to John 16:26, there are four occurrences of the combination of οὐ and λέγω followed by an indirect statement expressed by a ὅτι clause:

John 4:35 οὐχ ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι ἔτι τετράμηνός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ θερισμὸς ἔρχεται;

John 7:42 οὐχ ἡ γραφὴ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ καὶ ἀπὸ Βηθλέεμ τῆς κώμης ὅπου ἦν Δαυὶδ ἔρχεται ὁ χριστός;

John 8:48 οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἡμεῖς ὅτι Σαμαρίτης εἶ σὺ καὶ δαιμόνιον ἔχεις;⁶⁵⁵

John 11:40 οὐκ εἶπόν σοι ὅτι ἐὰν πιστεύσης ὄψῃ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ;

Hoegen-Rohls, *Der nachösterliche Johannes*, 199: “[u]nter erneuter Aufnahme des Motivs vom Bitten wird noch einmal [in 16:26; T.T.] unterstrichen, daß die Jünger nachösterlich ihr Bitten direkt an den Vater richten werden, so daß Jesus nicht als Vermittler in Erscheinung treten wird.”

⁶⁵² See, e.g., the translation of John 16:26 by Thyen, *Johannes*, 673: “[a]n jenem Tage werdet ihr in meinem Namen beten, und ich sage euch (ausdrücklich), daß ich den Vater nicht für euch bitten werde [...]”

⁶⁵³ See, e.g., the Dutch translation by Willibrord (2012): “[o]p die dag zullen jullie gaan bidden in mijn naam. Dat wil niet zeggen dat Ik jullie bij de Vader zal moeten aanbevelen [...]”

⁶⁵⁴ Barclay M. Newman – Eugene A. Nida, *A Translator’s Handbook on the Gospel of John*, HeTr (London: London United Bible Societies, 1980), 517–518. Italics in the original.

⁶⁵⁵ In John 8:48, it is difficult to discern whether οὐ should be read with καλῶς or with λέγομεν.

In all four passages, it is beyond doubt that the negation οὐ only negates λέγω, and not what Jesus said. Yet, I observe that the four texts are all questions in which οὐ has the rhetorical function of suggesting the answer ‘yes’. This is not the case in John 16:26. The difficulty of interpretation that we face in 16:26 is unparalleled in the Gospel.

Within the NT, the closest parallel we have to our difficulty of interpretation in John 16:26 can be found in Matt 16:12, where the narrator provides the following information about the disciples’ understanding of a saying of Jesus: τότε συνῆκαν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν προσέχειν ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν ἄρτων ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῆς διδαχῆς τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων. We have here a combination of οὐ and λέγω followed by an indirect statement expressed by an infinitive clause. Can we apply the logic of some modern languages that the negation of having said something implies that what is said is denied altogether? If this is the case, the text should attest that Jesus previously said that the disciples should not beware the Pharisees’ and Sadducees’ leaven of bread. Yet, Jesus nowhere makes such a statement, but says: ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων (16:6). As Jesus himself explains in 16:11, he is not talking about bread, and repeats: προσέχετε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων. The clarification that Jesus is not talking about bread does not logically imply that Jesus is saying to the disciples to not beware the Pharisees’ and Sadducees’ leaven of bread. Therefore, it is probable that the combination of οὐκ and εἶπεν in 16:12 does not indicate that Jesus said not to beware the Pharisees’ and Sadducees’ leaven of bread. This kind of logic is not attested by the literary context of 16:12. The function of οὐκ εἶπεν is rather to explain for the reader that the disciples understood that Jesus’ saying in 16:6, 11 does not mean that they should be on their guard against the Pharisees’ and Sadducees’ leaven of bread, but against their teaching.

Similarly, the literary context of the Farewell Discourse does not provide any attestation for interpreting John 16:26b–c as excluding intercession on Jesus’ part. On the contrary, 14:16 explicitly states that Jesus will intercede with the Father on behalf of the disciples. The negation οὐ should be read with λέγω, and this reading does not imply that ἐρωτήσω is negated altogether. I propose the following English translation: “In that day, you will ask (αἰτέω) in my name. This does not mean that I will ask (ἐρωτάω) the Father concerning you.” In this translation, 16:26b–c does not contradict Jesus’ previous claim in 14:16 that he will ask (ἐρωτάω) the Father and that the Father will send another Paraclete to the disciples. Jesus will still do this. The only aim of 16:26b–c is to clarify for the reader Jesus’ claim that the disciples will ask in Jesus’ name does not entail that Jesus will mediate the requests of the disciples to the Father. The intercessory role of Jesus as articulated by 14:16 restricts itself to asking the Father to send the Spirit-Paraclete to the disciples. When the Spirit-Paraclete dwells in the disciples, the disciples will no longer need Jesus as an intercessor, but will be able to ask the Father directly, without Jesus having to mediate for them. Therefore, the phrase “in Jesus’ name” cannot have the meaning that the disciples will cry out Jesus’ name and that Jesus will mediate their requests for them to the Father. John 16:26b–c excludes the possibility of interpreting this phrase in terms of Jesus mediating for the disciples.

The other option is to interpret “in Jesus’ name” in terms of being sent by Jesus. What can it mean in the context of John 16:23–27 that Jesus says that his disciples will ask the Father as being sent or assigned by Jesus? This will be the subject of the next subsection.

3.3 BEING SENT BY JESUS

Compared to the Synoptics (Mark 6:6b–13 parr.; Luke 10:1–12 par.), John provides little information about Jesus’ sending of the disciples. Jesus claims that his sending of the disciples is paralleled by how he himself is sent by the Father: καθὼς ἀπέσταλκέν με ὁ πατήρ, καὶ γὰρ πέμπω ὑμᾶς (John 20:21). The moment of Jesus’ sending of the disciples is presented as the time when Jesus breaths the Spirit on them (20:22). This implies that the use of “in Jesus’ name” in 16:23–27 as a reference to the disciples’ status of being sent by Jesus indicates that the disciples are imbued by the Spirit-Paraclete. As argued in the previous section, because the Spirit-Paraclete dwells in the disciples, the disciples participate in Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour (cf. 16:25) and are provided with the courage and confidence to ask (αἰτέω) the Father and receive.⁶⁵⁶ The interpretation of “in Jesus’ name” as referring to the status of being sent by Jesus through the indwelling by the Spirit thus fits perfectly in the logic of 16:23–27.

Characteristic of John among the canonical Gospels is that he combines the idea of being sent with being sanctified or having the task to sanctify oneself. In John 10:36, Jesus is presented as being sent into the world and as being sanctified by the Father: ὃν ὁ πατήρ ἡγίασεν καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. In 17:17–19, Jesus’ being sent into the world is connected to his task to sanctify himself. At the same time, the disciples are presented as being sent into the world and have the task to sanctify themselves:

17:17a: ἀγιάσον αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

17:17b: ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀλήθειά ἐστιν.

17:18a: καθὼς ἐμὲ ἀπέστειλας εἰς τὸν κόσμον,

17:18b: καὶ γὰρ ἀπέστειλα αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

17:19a: καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐγὼ ἀγιάζω ἐμαυτόν,

17:19b: ἵνα ὧσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡγιασμένοι ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.

As Bultmann rightly claims, 17:19b could just as well have read: “damit auch sie sich heiligen für einander”.⁶⁵⁷ The disciples, too, are sent to sanctify themselves for the sake of others. Just as Jesus has served his disciples unto death (cf. 13:6–11), the disciples, too, ought to serve others unto death (cf. 13:12–20). As observed by previous scholars, ἀγιάζω in 17:17–19 denotes both the self-sacrifice of Jesus for the disciples and the self-sacrifice of the disciples for others.⁶⁵⁸ I agree with Wilhelm Thüsing that “also” (καί) in 17:19b, and the parallel presentation in 17:18 of Jesus and the disciples as sent into the

⁶⁵⁶ See *supra*, §2.2.

⁶⁵⁷ Bultmann, *Johannes*, 392.

⁶⁵⁸ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 695 with reference to John Chrysostom and many modern authors.

world, both demonstrate that the disciples have to be sanctified in the same way as Jesus.⁶⁵⁹

Being sent by Jesus, thus, consists in sanctifying oneself. The latter can be paraphrased as living in accordance to Jesus' commandment of love unto death (John 15:13). By means of sacrificial love for others, the disciples show that they are sent by Jesus. Therefore, the use of the phrase "in Jesus' name" in 16:23–27 means that the disciples can only ask God for everything because they have sanctified themselves through sacrificial love for others. The disciples in their status of being sent by Jesus keep Jesus' commandment of love and can, therefore, be said to love Jesus (14:21, cf. 14:15). This explains the claim in 16:26–27 that it is the disciples' love for Jesus that allows the disciples to ask in Jesus' name. With "in Jesus' name" as a reference to the disciples' keeping of the commandment of love, it makes sense why 16:27 mentions that the disciples have loved Jesus. Only when the disciples loved Jesus by keeping his commandment, can they ask in Jesus' name or in the status of being sent/commissioned by Jesus. At the same time, as argued in the previous section, the disciples' keeping of the commandment of love warrants that they will participate in Jesus' *παρρησία*. Jesus' *παρρησία* will grant them the boldness and confidence to ask and receive everything they want from the Father (and Jesus).⁶⁶⁰ Thus, the phrase, "in Jesus' name", refers to the authority with which the disciples ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) at the hour. The disciples take the place of Jesus as being sent into the world, and have the authority to ask anything of God, and be given it.

Concerning this authority, Jesus and the disciples are presented in a parallel way. As argued above, the post-paschal asking of the disciples is articulated in terms of how Jesus himself was able to ask and receive everything from God (John 11:22; cf. 9:31).⁶⁶¹ According to Schnackenburg, because of Jesus' unity with God, whose will Jesus does, God does everything that Jesus asks of him. Vice versa, because Jesus prays to God, he is one with God.⁶⁶² Brown is of the same opinion, and claims that Jesus' prayer to God is "a form of union with God". Therefore, "Jesus is always praying, for he and the Father are one" (10:30). It is this prayerful attitude that Brown sees summed up in *ἐγὼ δὲ ᾔδην ὅτι πάντοτέ μου ἀκούεις* (11:42).⁶⁶³ I agree with Schnackenburg and Brown that it is Jesus' unity with God that allows him to ask anything of God. Brown correctly observes that Jesus' asking of God is more of a continuous attitude of Jesus than a momentous act. Essential for understanding Jesus' unity with the Father is his sanctified state. As the argument in 10:34–36 goes: "if those to whom the word of God came" are called gods by Scripture, "him whom the Father consecrated (*ἡγίασεν*)" will definitely not be blaspheming if he calls himself God's Son. Jesus is *ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ* (6:69) in whom God

⁶⁵⁹ See Wilhelm Thüsing, *Herrlichkeit und Einheit: Eine Auslegung des Hohepriesterlichen Gebetes Jesu (Johannes 17)*, Die Welt der Bibel 14 (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1962), 92.

⁶⁶⁰ See *supra*, §2.2.

⁶⁶¹ See *supra*, §1.1.

⁶⁶² See Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 425.

⁶⁶³ Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 436.

indwells as in a temple altar. Just as Jesus can ask the Father for everything thanks to his self-sanctification through his self-sacrificial love for others, the disciples will be able to ask everything from the Father (and Jesus) thanks to their self-sanctification through their self-sacrificial love for others. Thus, the phrase, “in Jesus’ name”, is a further indication that the disciples are presented in a similar way to Jesus concerning their ability to ask anything from God, and be given it. Again, the semantics of *παρρησία* offer an indication of this shared authority of Jesus and his disciples. The disciples have the authority to ask the Father (and Jesus), because they participate in Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

The present chapter has argued that *ἐρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* in John 16:23–27 refer to two distinct forms of asking by the disciples. The verb *ἐρωτάω* refers to the pre-paschal polemical questioning of Jesus, which is characterised by uncertainty and resistance to the illocutionary force of Jesus’ *παροιμία*. The verb *αἰτέω*, on the other hand, indicates the post-paschal asking for something of the Father (and Jesus). This form of asking is characterised by the confidence and the boldness that one will receive what one has asked for. In 16:25, the informed reader reads between the lines that Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour is mediated by the Paraclete and dwells in the disciples. Through Jesus’ *παρρησία* the disciples obtain the courage and the confidence to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) for everything and to receive it. Given that the disciples have loved Jesus (16:27) and kept his commandments, they will partake in Jesus’ *παρρησία*. The *κόσμος*, on the other hand, is reproved by the Paraclete and made aware of its error/sin of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9). The key to understanding the connection between Jesus’ *παρρησία* and the boldness of the disciples is the phrase “in Jesus’ name”. The disciples will receive a portion of Jesus’ *παρρησία*, because they keep Jesus’ commandment of love by sanctifying themselves through sacrificial love for others. The disciples can only perform this self-sanctification if Jesus’ *παρρησία* is at the same time effective. It is this logic that enables John to say that Jesus will teach *παρρησία* about the Father at the same time that the disciples will ask the Father in Jesus’ name (16:25d–16:26a).

The following chart provides an overview of the research results of my enquiries into the different meanings of *ἐρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* in the Fourth Gospel:

	“To request” (usually for others)	Questions of enquiry	“To ask for things” (self- interestedly)
<i>ἐρωτάω</i> : Jesus’ requests for the disciples. <i>Characteristics</i> : altruistic, non- submissive	14:16; 16:26; 17:9[2], 15, 20		

ἐρωτάω: formal requests by others than Jesus	4:31, 40, 47; 19:31, 38		
ἐρωτάω: the disciples' pre-paschal polemical questioning of Jesus. <i>Characteristics:</i> uncertain, resistant		9:2; 16:5, 19, 23, 30	
ἐρωτάω: questions of enquiry by others than the disciples		1:19, 21, 25; 5:12; [8:7]; 9:15, 19, 21; 18:19, 21[2]	
αἰτέω: asking for (living) water. <i>Characteristics:</i> confident, submissive, self-interested			4:9, 10
αἰτέω: Jesus' asking for something of God. <i>Characteristics:</i> confident, submissive, self-interested			11:22
αἰτέω: the disciples' post-paschal asking of Jesus (and the Father). <i>Characteristics:</i> confident, submissive, self-interested			14:13, 14; 15:7, 16; 16:23, 24, 26

In the next chapter, I will provide a historical-contextual interpretation of the ambiguity in the Fourth Gospel that Jesus' death is called the *καιρός/ῥα* of his *παρρησία* (John 7:6, 8; 16:25) while Jesus is teaching *παρρησία* throughout his lifetime (7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54; 18:20).

CHAPTER VI.

THE *παρρησία* OF THE JOHANNINE JESUS AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TEACHING METHOD

The present chapter aims to provide an explanation for the fact that Jesus spoke and walked *παρρησία* during his lifetime (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54; 18:20), whereas, in 7:4–8 and 16:25, Jesus, respectively, refers to his death on the cross as the *καιρός* or the *ῥα* of his *παρρησία*. Why Jesus refers to his upcoming death as the time when he will speak *παρρησία* about the Father is puzzling, because he has already spoken *παρρησία* about his identity during his lifetime. As argued in Chapter Two, this ambiguity in the text is difficult to explain from within the literary context of the gospel itself and, as such, requires a broader historical-contextual framework.⁶⁶⁴

In order to provide an understanding of this ambiguity in the Fourth Gospel, I will look at how other authors in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE compared *παρρησία* to the use of medicine to express its experimental nature. One of the benefits of medical imagery is that it suggests that one cannot know in advance when *παρρησία* will be effective. The doctor aims to heal a patient by giving medication, but can never be sure in advance whether the medication will work. Similarly, one aims for the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*, but can never be certain if he/she will be successful. The use of *παρρησία* is a matter of trial and error. I will first present Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method (Section 1). In a second step, I will argue that this understanding of *παρρησία* can be found beyond the philosophical movement of Epicureanism, as similar theoretical views on *παρρησία* are articulated by Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria (Section 2). Third, I will demonstrate that Jesus' *παρρησία* in the Gospel shows many parallels with Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method (Section 3). In the present chapter, I do not seek to argue for a direct literary dependence of the Gospel of John on Philodemus and Epicureanism in general, but will defend that the idea of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method was influential beyond the confines of Epicureanism, informing not only Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria, but also John and his intended audience. Philodemus' theoretical views on *παρρησία* will enable me to clarify why the Johannine Jesus teaches *παρρησία* during his lifetime, although the *καιρός/ῥα* of his *παρρησία* is not yet present.

1. PHILODEMUS: *παρρησία* AS AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

Many ancient authors consider the critical moment or *καιρός* to be essential for the proper use of *παρρησία* and speech in general.⁶⁶⁵ Philo, for instance, considers *παρρησία*

⁶⁶⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.1 and §6.2.

⁶⁶⁵ For a good overview, see Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘In Season and Out of Season’: 2 Timothy 4:2,” in *Light From the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity. Collected Essays, 1959–2012*, by

ἄκαιρος to be suicide. Untimely παρρησία can be compared to a drunk and intoxicated captain of a ship that sets sail during a storm. All the weather signs tell the captain not to set sail, but he neglects them and his ship is swallowed by the sea.⁶⁶⁶ Philo advises to use παρρησία towards our enemies only when the καιροί are present. If not, it is better to remain silent.⁶⁶⁷

The pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus was already aware of the danger of discerning the καιρός of παρρησία: οἰκεῖον ἐλευθερίας παρρησία, κίνδυνος δὲ ἢ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις.⁶⁶⁸ It is unclear whether διάγνωσις has a medical meaning here or simply means discernment. The fragment states that the discernment of the καιρός of παρρησία entails risk and danger. This suggests that one can never be sure in advance that the καιρός of παρρησία is present. Discerning the καιρός of παρρησία always involves the risk of employing παρρησία ἀκαίρως.⁶⁶⁹ This experimental nature of παρρησία as suggested by Democritus was later theorised by Philodemus.

The term καιρός is used three times in total by Philodemus in the fragments of his essay Περὶ παρρησίας.⁶⁷⁰ Only once is καιρός explicitly associated with παρρησία:

οὐδ' εἰς καιρὸν ἐνχρονίζειν ἐπιζη[τ]οῦμεν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διὰ παρρησίας ἐπιτενοῦμεν τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὖνοιαν τῶν κατ[ασκε]υαζομ[έ]νων παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πεπαρρησιάσθαι.⁶⁷¹

...nor do we seek to dawdle up to the critical moment, nor in some other way, and of how, through frankness, we shall heighten the goodwill towards ourselves of those who are being instructed by the very fact of speaking frankly.⁶⁷²

Philodemus recommends to not wait for the καιρός. Even when the καιρός is not present, we should use παρρησία. In the reading of David Konstan and others, the reflexive αὐτοὺς refers to the implied grammatical subject of ἐπιτενοῦμεν: the untimely use of παρρησία is required to heighten the goodwill of the students towards ourselves as teachers.⁶⁷³

Abraham J. Malherbe, vol. 1, ed. John T. Fitzgerald *et al.*, NovTSup 150/1 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 187–196. Originally published in *JBL* 103 (1984) 235–243.

⁶⁶⁶ See Ph., *Somn.* 2.85–86.

⁶⁶⁷ See Ph., *Somn.* 2.92.

⁶⁶⁸ Democr., fr. 226 (Hermann Diels – Walther Kranz [eds.], *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch von Herman Diels*, vol. 2 [Zürich: Weidmann, 2005]). My translation: “παρρησία is proper to freedom, but the discernment of its critical moment is a dangerous challenge”.

⁶⁶⁹ This experimental nature of παρρησία might be suggested by 2 Tim 4:2: κήρυξον τὸν λόγον, ἐπίστηθι εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως, ἔλεγξον, ἐπιτίμησον, παρακάλεσον, ἐν πάσῃ μακροθυμίᾳ καὶ διδαχῇ.

⁶⁷⁰ See Phld., *Lib.* frs. 22:5; 25:1; col. XVIIb:3.

⁶⁷¹ Phld., *Lib.*, fr. 25:1–8 (Konstan *et al.* [eds.], *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*). The square brackets in the quotations indicate conjectures for missing letters or words due to the fragmentary state of the text.

⁶⁷² Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁶⁷³ Konstan *et al.* (*Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*, 43 n. 49) mention that this reading is also followed by Norman W. DeWitt, “Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups,” *CP* 31 (1936) 205–211: at 207 and Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 130, 142.

Another possible reading is that αὐτούς refers to the students.⁶⁷⁴ If this is the case, untimely παρρησία ought to be used to heighten the goodwill of the students towards themselves. In my view, the first mentioned reading is more probable, because Philodemus considers “being saved by one another”, presumably through the use of παρρησία towards one another, to be “supplies toward contentment and great goodwill (εὐνοία)”.⁶⁷⁵ The use of παρρησία is, furthermore, often associated with εὐνοία in Philodemus and other authors.⁶⁷⁶ Therefore, the first mentioned reading in which παρρησία strengthens the εὐνοία of the students towards those who use παρρησία is more probable.

The advice of Philodemus to not dawdle up to the καιρός of παρρησία can be explained by referring to his understanding of παρρησία as a “stochastic” method.⁶⁷⁷ In the rendering of Glad, “stochastic” means “pertaining to chance or conjecture”.⁶⁷⁸ As I will explain below, with reference to Philodemus’ text, “experimental” is a better rendering of stochastic, because it clarifies that, for Philodemus, the use of παρρησία is a matter of trial and error. Even when proven unsuccessful, ἀκαιρός, παρρησία ought to be used again and again. Given the intent to always improve the result, the use of παρρησία is not conjectural, but approximate. The result does not only depend on chance, but also on the skill to evaluate situations and on the capacity to learn from experience. Although the result of the use of παρρησία can never be assured in a deterministic way, the result is, also, not completely unpredictable, but can be guessed at on the basis of probable inferences. Like the bowman who aims at his target, one should aim for (στοχάζομαι) the καιρός of παρρησία.

Philodemus employs medical imagery to express his thoughts on παρρησία as an experimental teaching method. The Epicurean teacher uses παρρησία as a method of curing ethical illness, comparable to the methods employed by physicians in the art of healing:

παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὑπολαβὼν διὰ σημείων εὐλόγων
προσδεῖσθαι τουτονί τινα κενώματος, εἴτα διαπεσὼν ἐν τῇ σημειώσει, μηδέποτε πάλι
κενῶσαι τοῦτον ἄλλῃ νόσῳ συνεχόμενον. ὥστε νο[ῶ]ν καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάλι
π[αρ]ρησ[ιά]σεται.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁴ Konstan *et al.* (*Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*, 43 n. 49) mention that this reading is followed by Marcello Gigante, *Ricerche filodemee*, Biblioteca della Parola del Passato 6 (Napoli: Macchiaroli, ²1983), 68.

⁶⁷⁵ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 36. Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁶⁷⁶ See, e.g., Phld., *Lib.* fr. 31; Pl., *Gorg.* 487a; Plu., *Adulator* 74c.

⁶⁷⁷ For the use of στοχάζομαι in connection to παρρησιάζομαι, see *Lib.* fr. 1:5–9. For the use of στοχαστόν, see *Lib.* fr. 57:5–6. On the understanding of παρρησία as a τέχνη στοχαστική (“conjectural art”) in Philodemus, see Gigante, *Ricerche filodemee*, 62–75; Marcello Gigante, “‘Philosophia medicans’ in Filodemo,” *CErc* 5 (1975) 53–61: at 55; Elizabeth Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” *ANRW* 2.36.4 (1990) 2369–2406: at 2393 n. 56; Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 133–137.

⁶⁷⁸ Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 133 n. 117.

⁶⁷⁹ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 63:3–13.

For it is like when a doctor assumes because of reasonable signs that a certain man is in need of a purge, and then, having made a mistake in the interpretation of the signs, never again purges this man when he is afflicted by another disease. Thus, [judging] by this very thing {i.e., the analogy}, he will again [speak frankly].⁶⁸⁰

Here, *παρρησία* is compared to a purge or drugs. Doctors apply medicines on the basis of their interpretation of the symptoms of a disease. They can never be sure in advance that their medicines will work. *Mutatis mutandis*, the use of *παρρησία* is always a conjecture based on probable inferences. In the same way as the doctor does not give medicines at random, the *παρρησιαστής* also does not apply *παρρησία* at random, although both do not know in advance whether their treatment will be efficient. In both cases, it is a matter of trial and error.

Using the same medical imagery of the doctor and the purge, Philodemus contends that, even if *παρρησία* does not work, one ought to keep using it:

καὶ μηδὲν π[εράνα]ς πάλι χρή[σ]εται πρὸς [τ]ὸν α[ὐ]τόν. εἰ δ' ἡμαρτηκῶς οὐχ ὑπήκουσε τῆς παρρησίας, πάλι παρρησιάζεται· καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἐπ[ὶ] τῆς αὐτῆς νόσου διὰ κλυστήρος οὐδὲν περάνας, πάλ[ι] κε]νοῖ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάλ[ι] π[α]ρρησιάζεται, διότι πρότερον οὐδὲν ἤνυσε, καὶ πάλι ποιήσει τοῦτο καὶ πάλιν, ἢν' εἰ μὴ νῦν ἀλλὰ νῦν [τελεσφορήσῃ].⁶⁸¹

[εἰ δὲ παρρησί]α χρήσεται π[άλιν], φανε[ῖται] οὕτως ἐφικέσθαι. πολλάκι δ' ἀντιστρόφως, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ποιήσας, ἢ ἐξῆς πρότερον ἢ δευτέρ[α], τάχα δ' ἢ τρίτη τελεσφορήσει.⁶⁸²

...and [having accomplished] nothing he will again employ {frankness} toward the same man. If, although he has erred, he {the student} did not heed the frank criticism, he {the teacher} will criticize frankly again. For although a doctor in the case of the same disease had accomplished nothing through a clyster, he would again purge {the patient}. And for this reason he will again criticize frankly, because before he accomplished nothing, and he will do this again and again, so that if not this time then another time...⁶⁸³

... [if] he will employ [frankness again], he will be seen to succeed thus. And often conversely, at times even when he has done it, either the second one in turn, or perhaps the third {application of frankness} will first succeed.⁶⁸⁴

When a doctor misinterpreted the signs of the patient and his treatment of the patient was not effective, this does not mean that he will never again purge this patient. Similarly, we

⁶⁸⁰ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁶⁸¹ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 64. Alexander Olivieri (1914) supplemented τελεσφορήσῃ (“he will succeed”).

⁶⁸² Phld., *Lib.* fr. 65:1–8. Cf. *Lib.* fr. 85:2–5: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὸν [αἰ]σχ[υ]ν[ό]μ[ενον] καὶ πάλιν παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πάλ[ι]ν εἴρηται. Trans. by Konstan *et al.*: “[a]nd it has been said that he will speak frankly again and again about these things to the one [who is ashamed].”

⁶⁸³ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁶⁸⁴ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

will use *παρρησία* again towards a person, even when our *παρρησία* was unsuccessful the first time due to our misinterpretation of his disease. When the first use of *παρρησία* did not work, the second or the third use might succeed. One does not know in advance. Just as the doctor modifies his approach in light of his failure, we ought to learn from our mistakes, and modify our use of *παρρησία* and apply it again and again until we are successful. This explains how Philodemus can claim that we ought not to dawdle up to the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*, but tentatively apply *παρρησία* in an approximate way.

In the next section, I will argue that the idea of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method exceeds the confines of Epicureanism in the first century BCE, and can also be detected in Plutarch's *Adulator* and Clement's *Paedagogus*.

2. ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ AS AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD BEYOND EPICUREANISM

The present section will show that the idea of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method can also be traced in how medical and surgical imagery is used by Plutarch (2.1) and Clement of Alexandria (2.2) to depict the use of *παρρησία*.

2.1 PLUTARCH

Like Philodemus, Plutarch, writing between 90 and 115 CE,⁶⁸⁵ often uses medical and surgical imagery to express his thoughts on *παρρησία*.⁶⁸⁶ Through the comparison of *παρρησία* to a medicine, Plutarch addresses the topic of the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*. According to Plutarch, only few know how to use *παρρησία* correctly. The majority of people wrongly identify *παρρησία* with abusing and finding fault.⁶⁸⁷ They forget to adapt to the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*:

καίτοι καθάπερ ἄλλω τινὶ φαρμάκῳ, καὶ τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι μὴ τυχόντι καιροῦ τὸ λυπεῖν ἀχρήστως καὶ ταραττεῖν περίεστι καὶ ποιεῖν τρόπον τινὰ μετ' ἀλγηδόνης ὃ ποιεῖ μεθ' ἡδονῆς τὸ κολακεύειν. βλάπτονται γὰρ οὐκ ἐπαινούμενοι μόνον ἀκαίρως ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεγόμενοι· καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα τοῖς κόλαξιν εὐλήπτους καὶ πλαγίους παραδίδωσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν σφόδρα προσάντων καὶ ἀντιτύπων ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὰ κοῖλα καὶ μαλακὰ δίκην ὕδατος ἀπολισθάνοντας.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵ On this dating of Plutarch's *Adulator*, see *supra*, n. 344.

⁶⁸⁶ See Plu., *Adulator* 60b; 63b; 66b; 67e–f; 69a; 71a; 74c–d. On the use of medical and surgical imagery in Plutarch's thinking on *παρρησία*, see Birgit Van Meirvenne, "Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ: Observations in Favour of a Political Reading of *De Adulatore et Amico*," in *Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98-117 A.D.)*, ed. Philip A. Stadter – Luc Van der Stockt, Symbolae Facultatis Litterarum Lovaniensis Series A/29 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 141–160, at 144–153; Fields, "The Rhetoric," 182; Evangeline Zephyr Lyons, "Hellenistic Philosophers as Ambassadors to the Roman Empire: Performance, Parrhesia, and Power" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan MI, 2011), 128–129.

⁶⁸⁷ See Plu., *Adulator* 66a.

⁶⁸⁸ Plu., *Adulator* 66b (William R. Paton – Max Pohlenz – Hans Wegehaupt [eds.], *Plutarchus: Moralia*, vol. 1, BSGRT [Berlin: de Gruyter, 31993]).

Yet frankness, like any other medicine, if it be not applied at the proper time, does but cause useless suffering and disturbance, and it accomplishes, one may say, painfully what flattery accomplishes pleasantly. For people are injured, not only by untimely praise, but by untimely blame as well; and it is this especially that delivers them over, broadside on, to the flatterers, an easy prey, since like water they glide away from the steeps that repel toward the valleys that softly invite.⁶⁸⁹

Just as a doctor scares away his patients when he treats them with hurtful medicines without actually healing them, untimely *παρρησία* injures people without improving their conduct. As a result, people become repulsed by *παρρησία* and are driven into the hands of the flatterer, whose treatments are always soft and pleasing.

Plutarch's use of medical imagery to describe the use of *παρρησία* as a *τέχνη* suggests that we can never be really sure when the *καιρός* of *παρρησία* is present. Just as the doctor is never sure in advance that his surgery or medicine will be effective, one can never know with certainty the outcome of the use of *παρρησία*. Plutarch encourages us to use *παρρησία* as a *τέχνη* that is stochastic or experimental:

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὴν παρρησίαν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ὅσῳ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ κράτιστον ἐν φιλίᾳ φάρμακον, εὐστοχίας τε καιροῦ μάλιστα καὶ κράσεως μέτρον ἐχούσης ἀεὶ δεομένην.⁶⁹⁰

This is the reason why it is necessary to practice *παρρησία* as an art, inasmuch as it is the greatest and the best medicine in friendship, always needing, however, all care to hit the right occasion, and a tempering with moderation.⁶⁹¹

The use of *παρρησία* requires the skill to aim accurately for the *καιρός*. The translation of *εὐστοχίας* [...] *καιροῦ* as “care to hit the right occasion” preserves the idea of the *εὐστοχία* of a bowman as the “skill in shooting at a mark, good aim”.⁶⁹² The image of the *εὐστοχία* of the bowman suggests that the use of *παρρησία* is approximate. One does not wait for or dawdle up to the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*, but tentatively applies *παρρησία* like the bowman accurately aims at his target. The *καιρός* of *παρρησία* is something that can be aimed for through exercise and experiment requiring careful practice of trial and error.

Plutarch, thus, has theoretical views on the use of *παρρησία* similar to the ones of Philodemus. We may, however, not forget that Plutarch and Philodemus wrote in different contexts.⁶⁹³ The context of Plutarch's writing on *παρρησία* is the aristocracy of the Roman Empire, whereas Philodemus wrote about the use of *παρρησία* among

⁶⁸⁹ LCL translation.

⁶⁹⁰ Plu., *Adulator* 74d.

⁶⁹¹ Adjusted LCL translation.

⁶⁹² LSJ, 733.

⁶⁹³ For the differences between the contexts of Philodemus' and Plutarch's writings on *παρρησία*, see Italo Gallo, “La *parrhesia* epicurea e il trattato *de adulator et amico* di Plutarco: qualche riflessione,” in *Aspetti dello stoicismo e dell'epicureismo in Plutarco: Atti del II convegno di studi su Plutarco, Ferrara, 2–3 aprile 1988*, ed. Italo Gallo, Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese 9 (Ferrara: Giornale filologico Ferrarese, 1988), 119–128, at 123–128.

members of his Epicurean community. Without neglecting that their writings on *παρρησία* are imbedded in different contexts, they at the same time share similar theoretical views on the stochastic or experimental use of *παρρησία*.

2.2 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Writing at the end of the second century CE, Clement of Alexandria seeks to reconcile the goodness and philanthropy of the divine pedagogue with his practice of punishing humans through blame.⁶⁹⁴ He calls “praise” (ἔπαινος) and “blame” (ψόγος) and their likes to be “medicines most necessary of all to human beings”.⁶⁹⁵ He considers: (i) “reproof” (ὁ ἔλεγχος) to be “the surgery of the passions of the soul” (χειρουργία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν); (ii) “reproach” (ὁ ὀνειδισμός) to be like “the use of medicine” (cf. φαρμακεία) healing us from the “callosities of the passions”, purging “the impurities of the lewdness of life”, “reducing the excrescences of pride”, and “restoring the patient to the healthy and true state of humanity”; and (iii) “admonition” (ἡ νουθέτησις) to be the “regimen (δίαιτα) of the diseased soul prescribing what it must take and forbidding what it must not”. All three (reproof, reproach, and admonition) lead to “salvation and eternal health”.⁶⁹⁶ According to Clement, the divine pedagogue adjusts himself to every addressee in an experimental way by applying “mild, but also stringent medicines”.⁶⁹⁷

Although Clement does not use the term *παρρησία* in the direct literary context of this imagery, Glad rightly regards the different forms of hortatory blame (ἔλεγχος, ὀνειδισμός, νουθέτησις, κτλ) as being part of the divine word’s *παρρησία* towards humans.⁶⁹⁸ In my view, Clement’s portrayal of the different forms of blame in terms of medical and surgical imagery reminds us of the understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method as depicted by Philodemus. Clement is aware that the teaching of the divine pedagogue consists in *παρρησία* because he: (i) claims that the divine pedagogue is trustworthy thanks to his ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοία, and *παρρησία*;⁶⁹⁹ and (ii) compares the exhortatory blame of the divine pedagogue to the *παρρησία* of Paul towards the Galatians.⁷⁰⁰ In his intent to explain how the good and loving divine pedagogue can punish humans, Clement assumes the semantics of *παρρησία* throughout his discussion of the different forms of hortatory blame exercised by the divine pedagogue.

⁶⁹⁴ E.g., Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.64.3 (GCS 12, 127:33–128:1): πῶς οὖν, φασίν, εἰ φιλόανθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ κύριος, ὀργίζεται καὶ κολάζει; Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson: “[h]ow then, say they, if the Lord loves man, and is good, is He angry and punishes?”

⁶⁹⁵ Clem., *Paed.* 1.10.94.1 (GCS 12, 145:27–28). My translation.

⁶⁹⁶ Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.64.4–1.8.65.2 (GCS 12, 128:4–14). Slightly adjusted translation from Roberts-Donaldson.

⁶⁹⁷ Clem., *Paed.* 1.9.83.2 (GCS 12, 138:26–139:1). Translation taken from Roberts-Donaldson. See also Clem., *Paed.* 1.2.6.1–1.2.6.4 (GCS 12, 93:8–25).

⁶⁹⁸ See Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 62–64, 107.

⁶⁹⁹ See Clem., *Paed.* 1.11.97.3 (GCS 12, 148:2–7).

⁷⁰⁰ See Clem., *Paed.* 1.9.83.1 (GCS 12, 138:18–21).

The medical and surgical imagery used by Clement to depict *παρρησία* underlines the approximate nature of its use and the importance of adaptability for its user. There are no general rules for the use of *παρρησία*. Each situation creates its own rules to which the *παρρησιαστής* has to adapt.

In the next section, I will examine whether the idea of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method was not only influential in Philodemus, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria, but can also be traced in the Gospel of John.

3. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

Jesus is aware of the dangers of untimely *παρρησία* when he responds to his brothers that he is not going up to Jerusalem to be *ἐν παρρησία*, because his *καιρός* is not yet present (John 7:3–4, 6–8). Jesus, however, does go up to Jerusalem [*ὡς*] *ἐν κρυπτῷ* (7:10) and is observed by the bystanders to speak *παρρησία* there (7:26). Similarly, Jesus claims that the *ῥα* of his *παρρησία* lies in the future (16:25), although he equally claims to have taught *παρρησία* before (10:24–25; 18:20). The evangelist, also, narrates that Jesus has used *παρρησία* before in the narrative (11:14, 54). All these texts attest that Jesus takes the risk of employing untimely *παρρησία*. In the present section, I will argue that Jesus faces the dangers of using untimely *παρρησία* because his *παρρησία* can be compared to Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method.

Jesus' teaching of the *κόσμος*, which is always *παρρησία* (John 18:20), seeks to bring those from this *κόσμος* to faith, and to cure them from their sickness by taking away their errors/sins (*ἁμαρτία*, 8:23–24; cf. 1:29). Jesus' *παρρησία* is the method of his self-revelation that proceeds by trial and error. Jesus knows that the “critical moment” (*καιρός/ῥα*) of his *παρρησία* has not yet come (7:4–8; 16:25), but tentatively speaks *παρρησία* about his identity to the ‘Jews’ without knowing the outcome (7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20). Only at the time of his death, Jesus' *παρρησία* will be effective (7:6, 8; 16:25) and through the Paraclete effectively convict/reproach the *κόσμος* concerning its *ἁμαρτία* (16:8–9).

I will illustrate the tentative and experimental nature of Jesus' *παρρησία* by discussing John 7:1–44 (see 3.1) and 10:1–30 (see 3.2).

3.1 JOHN 7:1–44

When his brothers request him to be *ἐν παρρησία* (John 7:4) at the feast of Tabernacles, Jesus at first remains in Galilee claiming that his *καιρός* has not yet come (7:6–9). As demonstrated by Olivia Rahmsdorf, in 7:1–10, Jesus' perception of time as determined by the *καιρός* of his death is opposed to his brother's public perception of time as presented by the ritual cycles of Jewish feasts.⁷⁰¹ According to my analysis, Jesus' reply in 7:6 (*ὁ δὲ καιρός ὁ ὑμέτερος πάντοτε ἐστὶν ἔτοιμος*) suggests that Jesus' brothers

⁷⁰¹ See Olivia L. Rahmsdorf, *Zeit und Ethik im Johannesevangelium: Theoretische, methodische und exegetische Annäherungen an die Kunst der Stunde*, WUNT II/488 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2019), 367–378.

have in common with the ‘Jews’ in 10:24 that, for them, the *καιρός* of *παρρησία* is always present regardless of the circumstances. They can speak their mind in every situation and on every occasion. The world does not hate them (7:7a) and will easily accept what they have to say. In their view, a large public event like the feast of Tabernacles would be a perfect situation for Jesus to reveal himself to the world (7:4). Jesus’ reply in 7:6–8 clarifies that he disagrees with his brothers. For Jesus, the *καιρός* of his *παρρησία* is not always present, but only at the time of his death. The world cannot accept what Jesus has to say, because they hate him due to the fact that Jesus testifies of the world that its works are evil. Only at the time of his death, will Jesus through the Spirit-Paraclete effectively convict/reproach the *κόσμος* concerning its *ἀμαρτία* (16:8–9).

Only after his brothers had gone up to the feast, did Jesus go up, although not openly, but (as it were) in secret (οὐ φανερώς ἀλλ’ [ὥς] ἐν κρυπτῷ, John 7:10).⁷⁰² Although Jesus previously responded to his brothers that the *καιρός* of his *παρρησία* is not present, and that he is not (yet)⁷⁰³ going to the feast (7:6, 8), about the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and taught *παρρησία* there (7:14–24). This is both confirmed by some of the Jerusalemites (7:25–26), and Jesus himself, who claims to have always spoken *παρρησία* in the temple (18:20). As Philodemus recommends, Jesus is not dawdling up to the *καιρός* of his *παρρησία*, but is using *παρρησία* aiming for the *καιρός*.

As can be seen in the reactions to Jesus’ *παρρησία*, his use of *παρρησία* is approximate, rather than deterministic. Jesus is not sure in advance what the result will be, but through trial and error aims to obtain the best result possible. The ‘Jews’ first reject Jesus’ *παρρησία*, because Jesus has never studied (John 7:15). Jesus’ *παρρησία* is without success. Yet, as Philodemus prescribes, this does not imply that Jesus should stop employing *παρρησία*. Jesus resumes his teaching (7:16–19), but for the second time his teaching is rejected: the *ὄχλος* objects that Jesus has a demon (7:20). Thus, Jesus’ *παρρησία* is again without success. As Philodemus advises, Jesus attempts for the third time and applies *παρρησία* (7:21–24). Some Jerusalemites observe that no one reacts to Jesus’ *παρρησία* (cf. καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ λέγουσιν) and conclude that the authorities possibly recognise Jesus as the Christ (7:26). In their eyes, the fact that no one objects to Jesus’ *παρρησία* suggests that the authorities possibly accept Jesus’ messianic claim. This is against their expectations, because they recognise Jesus as the man whom the ‘Jews’ seek to kill (cf. 7:25). Of course, the reader knows that the *καιρός* of Jesus’ *παρρησία* is the time of his death. Jesus’ *παρρησία* cannot be successful at this stage of the narrative. Yet,

⁷⁰² It is difficult to discern whether ὥς is original or not. Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, ²1994), 217 explains that, on the one hand, “external evidence strongly supports the reading with ὥς” (P⁶⁶, P⁷⁵, B, L, W, *et al.*). On the other hand, “transcriptional probability seems to favor the originality of the reading without ὥς” (x, D, *et al.*), “since a copyist may have inserted the word ὥς in order to soften the force of the expression ἐν κρυπτῷ”.

⁷⁰³ An alternative reading (P⁶⁶, P⁷⁵, B, *et al.*) states that Jesus is “not yet” (οὐπω) going to the feast: ἐγὼ οὐπω ἀναβαίνω εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν ταύτην. For the view that the reading οὐκ (x, D, K, *et al.*) followed by NA²⁸ is the earliest attainable reading, see Tyler Smith, “Deception in the Speech Profile of the Johannine Jesus (John 7.1-10),” *JSNT* 40/2 (2017) 169–191. Smith (*ibid.*), further, argues that the latter reading depicts Jesus as intentionally deceiving his brothers, as he does go to the feast in John 7:10.

John does not present Jesus as a teacher who waits for his *καιρός*, but as a teacher who applies *παρρησία* to obtain the best possible result. As Philodemus writes, instead of waiting for the *καιρός*, the teacher ought to tentatively apply *παρρησία* to heighten the goodwill of the students towards him. In John 7:26, some of the Jerusalemites have the impression that Jesus possibly succeeded in this attempt.

The Jerusalemites themselves, however, object to Jesus' *παρρησία*, because they know where Jesus comes from. They assume that "when the Christ comes, no one knows where he comes from" (John 7:27).⁷⁰⁴ Jesus' *παρρησία* towards the Jerusalemites was without success. As Philodemus prescribes, Jesus again applies *παρρησία* and cries out with a loud voice in the temple (7:28–29). John 7:30–31 reports that the Jerusalemites react by seeking to seize Jesus, while many of the *ὄχλος* start to believe in Jesus. In 7:20, the *ὄχλος* still objected to Jesus' *παρρησία*. Now, Jesus has obtained the goodwill of many of them through his *παρρησία*. In reaction to the objection of the Jerusalemites in 7:27, they respond in a wording similar to the one used by the Jerusalemites: *ὁ χριστὸς ὅταν ἔλθῃ μὴ πλείονα σημεῖα ποιήσει ὢν οὗτος ἐποίησεν*; (7:31). Their public refutation of the Jerusalemites' objection to Jesus shows that their goodwill towards Jesus has become stronger than their fear of the 'Jews', which previously inhibited them from speaking *παρρησία* about Jesus (see 7:12–13). When the Pharisees heard the crowd say this, they, and the chief priests, immediately sent officers to arrest Jesus (7:32).

Jesus does not stop employing *παρρησία* after the Pharisees and the chief priests sent officers to arrest him, but adapts to the situation and through doublespeak criticises the 'Jews': *ἔτι χρόνον μικρὸν μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι καὶ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με. ζητήσετέ με καὶ οὐχ εὐρήσετέ [με], καὶ ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἔλθεῖν* (John 7:33–34; cf. 8:21; 13:33, 36; 16:10). The 'Jews' misunderstand Jesus' saying *ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἔλθεῖν*. They suggest that Jesus is saying that he intends "to go to the Dispersion among the Greeks and teach the Greeks" (7:35). In the understanding of the 'Jews', Jesus is saying that they will not be able to find him, because he is going abroad. Jesus claims to have always taught *παρρησία* in the temple (18:20). Jesus' doublespeak (7:33–34) and the misunderstanding by the 'Jews' (7:35–36) suggest that he, also, spoke *ἐν παροιμίαις* (cf. 10:6; 16:25). Like 10:24–25, the text of 7:33–34 attests that Jesus' *παρρησία* is mediated by a *παροιμία*.⁷⁰⁵ The adaptability of Jesus' *παρρησία* is in conformity with the claim of Philodemus that the use of *παρρησία* should adapt to circumstances. The use of *οὖν* in 7:33 might be causal and might, in this case, suggest that Jesus expressed his *παρρησία* through the doublespeak of a *παροιμία* to adapt to the danger of the officers who were sent to arrest him (7:32).⁷⁰⁶

On the last day of the feast, when Jesus becomes gentler, by inviting people to come to him and promising that those who have faith in him will receive the Spirit (John 7:37–

⁷⁰⁴ John 7:27: *ὁ δὲ χριστὸς ὅταν ἔρχεται οὐδεὶς γινώσκει πόθεν ἐστί.*

⁷⁰⁵ Jesus' use of *παρρησία* through a *παροιμία* in John 7:33–34 will be further discussed in Chapter Eleven, §4.1.

⁷⁰⁶ A future systematic study of the use of *οὖν* in the Fourth Gospel is required to determine the probability that *οὖν* in John 7:33 is causal.

39; cf. 19:34),⁷⁰⁷ some of the crowd openly proclaim Jesus as a prophet (7:40) and even as the Christ (7:41a–b). Their goodwill towards Jesus has obtained such heights that even their fear of the ‘Jews’ (cf. 7:13), whose officers were present to arrest Jesus, did not restrain them from speaking *παρρησία* about Jesus. Others among the crowd reject the view that Jesus is the Christ because of Jesus’ human origin in Galilee (7:41c–42). In 7:43–44, the narrator mentions that there is a *σχίσμα* among the crowd. Just as patients react differently to medicines, Jesus’ *παρρησία* does not affect everyone in the same way.

3.2 JOHN 10:1–30

In John 10:24, the ‘Jews’ command Jesus to speak *παρρησία* about his messianic identity. If Jesus is the Christ, he has to tell them *παρρησία*. Jesus replies that he already did so, but that the Jews do/did not believe (*οὐ πιστεύετε/ οὐκ ἐπιστεύσατε*, 10:25). For Jesus, *παρρησία* is only effective at the time of his death (7:6, 8; 16:25). As Philodemus advises, Jesus does not wait for the *καιρός*, but has applied *παρρησία* before towards the ‘Jews’. The ‘Jews’ in 10:24 did, however, not perceive Jesus’ *παρρησία* towards them. For them, Jesus did not speak plainly about his identity, but hid his identity from them through the *παροιμία* of the Good Shepherd (10:1–18; esp. 10:6).

John 10:19 narrates that Jesus’ teaching in 10:7–18 caused a *σχίσμα* among the ‘Jews’. Many of the ‘Jews’ reply: *δαιμόνιον ἔχει καὶ μαίνεται· τί αὐτοῦ ἀκούετε;* (10:20). Given that they do not listen (*ἀκούω*) to Jesus’ voice, they are not part of Jesus’ flock (cf. 10:3, 16). For them, Jesus’ *παρρησία* is without success. Others reply: *ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα οὐκ ἔστιν δαιμονιζομένου· μὴ δαιμόνιον δύναται τυφλῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀνοῖξαι;* (10:21). Jesus’ *παρρησία* in combination with his *σημεῖον* have heightened the goodwill of these ‘Jews’ towards him to such a degree that they refute the view of many ‘Jews’ that Jesus has a demon. They have conquered their fear of their fellow ‘Jews’ and speak *παρρησία* about Jesus (cf. 7:13). Their sympathy for Jesus has become so strong that they publicly recognise that Jesus healed the man born blind and, so, are prepared to take the risk of being made *ἁποσυνάγωγος* (cf. 9:22). As Philodemus prescribes, Jesus does not wait for his *καιρός*, but tentatively uses *παρρησία* to heighten the goodwill of his hearers towards himself.

The *σχίσμα* among the ‘Jews’ (John 10:19) shows that Jesus’ *παρρησία* can be compared to a medicine that has different effects on different people. Jesus does not know in advance what the result of his *παρρησία* will be. Like in 7:43, the reaction of Jesus’ audience shows that Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* is experimental. Although Jesus says that the *καιρός* of his *παρρησία* has not yet come (7:6–8), he does use it in a tentative way (see 7:26; 10:24–25), not knowing in advance whether it will be beneficial.

⁷⁰⁷ On the discussion of the punctuation of John 7:38–39 and the referent of *αὐτοῦ* in this text, see, e.g., Maarten Menken, “The Origin of the Old Testament Quotation in John 7:38,” *NovT* 38 (1996) 160–175 and Gilbert Van Belle, “‘Bloed en water’ in Joh 19,34,” in *‘Volk van God en gemeenschap van de gelovigen’: Pleidooien voor een zorgzame kerkopbouw*, ed. Jacques Haers – Terrence Merrigan – Peter De Mey (Averbode: Averbode Uitgeverij, 1999), 89–112, esp. at 95–96.

If not beneficial, Jesus does not stop applying *παρησία*, but, as Philodemus prescribes, keeps on using it. For the ‘Jews’ in 10:24, Jesus’ *παρησία* in 10:1–5, 7–18 was without success. Jesus again applies *παρησία* towards them with a slight variation in his use of the shepherd imagery (10:26–30).

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF *παρησία*

I conclude that, in my discussion of John 7:1–44 and 10:1–30, four parallels were observed between Jesus’ use of *παρησία* and Philodemus’ understanding of *παρησία* as an experimental teaching method comparable to how doctors apply medicine to their patients.

(i) Just as Philodemus prescribes, Jesus does not wait for the *καιρός* of his *παρησία*, but employs *παρησία* towards his dialogue partners to improve their goodwill towards him.

(ii) Just as a doctor will not stop applying medicines to his patients, if these medicines do not work immediately, Jesus is shown to not stop teaching *παρησία* towards his interlocutors, if *παρησία* does not work immediately.

(iii) Just as patients react differently to medicines, Jesus’ *παρησία* affects his audience in a variety of ways.

(iv) Just as a doctor cannot know the result of the medical treatment of his patients in advance, Jesus does not know in advance how his audience will react to his *παρησία*. Both Jesus and the doctor experiment and proceed through trial and error. They aim for the best result possible by adapting themselves to circumstances.

On the basis of these four parallels, I conclude that John adopted conventions of *παρησία* that were widespread in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. The understanding of *παρησία* as an experimental teaching method cannot only be found in Philodemus and John, but also in Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria. In Chapter Eleven, I will discuss how Jesus’ *παρησία* also differs from the ancient conventions of *παρησία*: the collaboration of *παρησία* with *παροιμία* was unconventional in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE.⁷⁰⁸ In the next chapter, I will focus on how Jesus’ *παρησία* adapts to its addressees and how this adaptability of Jesus’ *παρησία* relates to the ancient conventions of *παρησία*.⁷⁰⁹

John presents Jesus’ death as the *καιρός* of his *παρησία*. Through the Spirit-Paraclete Jesus’ *παρησία* will be effective at the hour. John is, thereby, legitimating his own writing. As imbued by the Spirit-Paraclete, John can fully grasp Jesus’ words (cf. John 14:25–26; 16:12–13). By presenting Jesus’ teaching in conformity with the ancient conventions of *παρησία*, John authorises his own writing as affected by the *καιρός* of Jesus’ *παρησία*. At the same time, John tries to explain why the Jewish interlocutors of Jesus did not accept Jesus’ teaching during his lifetime. This was not Jesus’ fault, because

⁷⁰⁸ See *infra*, Chapter Eleven.

⁷⁰⁹ See *infra*, Chapter Seven.

Jesus applied *παρηγσία* before the *καιρός* took place in order to aim for the *καιρός*, and to heighten the goodwill of his interlocutors towards him. Jesus' teaching followed an experimental teaching method that allowed him to learn from his errors and adapt to circumstances, but not to ascertain success in a direct way. This explains why he failed to persuade many of his contemporaries during his lifetime. The risk of failure was inherent to the experimental teaching method Jesus followed, which ancients knew by the term *παρηγσία*.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE *παρρησία* OF JESUS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The present chapter will address the question of how Jesus' *παρρησία* adjusts itself to its addressees in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel, and how to relate this adaptability of Jesus' *παρρησία* to the treatment of *παρρησία* by contemporary Greek literature.⁷¹⁰ The first section (1) will elaborate how Philodemus in the first century BCE prescribes two different forms of *παρρησία* for two different types of students. In the second section (2), I will describe how similar ideas of *παρρησία* circulated outside Epicureanism in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. The idea of two distinct forms of *παρρησία*, or two distinct strategies of using *παρρησία*, is not confined to Philodemus and Epicureanism, but was conventional at the time John wrote his Gospel. Third (3), I will provide an analysis of the adaptability of Jesus' teaching on the basis of the conventions of *παρρησία* described in the previous two sections. In order to present Jesus as the Saviour of the entire κόσμος John adopts contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* to portray Jesus as an adaptable teacher, who employs basically two different strategies to adjust his teaching to the psychological disposition of his interlocutors: a severe or pure form of *παρρησία* consisting in only blame, and a mixed or mild form of *παρρησία* involving both blame and praise.

1. PHILODEMUS: THE TWO FORMS OF *παρρησία*

Philodemus distinguishes between two forms of *παρρησία*: a “mixed” (μεικτός)⁷¹¹ or “multi-faceted” (ποικίλος)⁷¹² form of *παρρησία* involving both praise and blame and a “pure” or “simple” (cf. ἀπλῶς)⁷¹³ form, which uses only blame.⁷¹⁴ Whereas the first form of *παρρησία* is “gentle” or “mild” (cf. πραέως),⁷¹⁵ the second form is “sharp” (πικρός)⁷¹⁶

⁷¹⁰ I have formulated this research question in dialogue with scholarly literature: see *supra*, Chapter Two, §1.4 and §6.2.

⁷¹¹ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 58:7–8.

⁷¹² Phld., *Lib.* fr. 68.

⁷¹³ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 10.

⁷¹⁴ For previous scholarly discussion of these two forms of *παρρησία* in Philodemus, see Marcello Gigante, “Motivi paideutici nell’opera filodemea *Sulla libertà di parola*,” *CErc* 4 (1973) 37–42; at 41; Abraham L. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress Press, 1987), 84–87; Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2393; Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 137–152; Clarence E. Glad, “Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,” in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, 21–59, at 33–44.

⁷¹⁵ Phld., *Lib.* col. XVIa:5–12.

⁷¹⁶ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 60 and col. XVIa:5–12.

and “harsh” (σκληρός).⁷¹⁷ Philodemus connects the two forms of παρρησία to two types, or better said, two dispositions of students:

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μᾶλλον τῶν ἀπαλῶν ἰσχυροὺς καὶ τοὺς πλεῖόν τι [τ]ῆς ἐπιστάσεως δεομένους ἐπιτίνει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἰσχυροὺς καὶ μόλις, ἂν ἐγκραυγασθῶσ[ι], μεταθησομένους καὶ τῷ σκληρῷ χρήσεται τῆς παρρησίας εἶδει.⁷¹⁸

... and toward those stronger than the tender ones and those somewhat more in need of treatment, he intensifies {frankness}, and toward the strong who will scarcely change {even} if they are shouted at, he will also employ the harsh form of frankness.⁷¹⁹

Οἱ ἰσχυροί (“the strong”) are the recalcitrant students, who are easily agitated and violently resist παρρησία. They can only be forced to learn by means of the pure and harsh form of παρρησία. Οἱ ἀπαλοί (“the tender ones”) are the obedient students, who are able to learn by means of the mixed and mild form of παρρησία.

The pure form of παρρησία is a riskier procedure that is to be applied when the more gentle approach does not work:

τὰ πολλὰ μὲν διαφι[λ]οτεχν[ή]σει τοιοῦτῳ[ι] τρόπῳ[ι. οὐ μ]ὴν ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ ἀ[πλ]ῶς ποιήσεται τὴν παρ[ρη]σίαν, παρακινδυνευτέ[ον ε]ἶναι νομίζων, <ἐὰν> ἄλλως μὴ ὑπ[α]κούωσι[ν. καὶ] μέντοι [γ]ε τοὺς [ύπε]ρβαλλόντως ἰσχυροὺς καὶ φύσει κ[αὶ] διὰ προκοπὴν πα[ν]τὶ θυμῷ [κ]αὶ [κα]κι[σ]μῷ καὶ⁷²⁰

...in most instances he {the teacher} will practice the art in such a way. But at times he will also practice frankness [simp]ly, believing that it must be risked [if] otherwise they {the students} do not pay heed. {[And]} those who are exceedingly strong, both by nature [and] because of their progress, {he will criticize} with all passion and <[blame] and> ...⁷²¹

According to Glad, Philodemus refers here to the “simple” (cf. ἀπλῶς) use of παρρησία as opposed to the “mixed way/method” (μεικτὸς τρόπος)⁷²² of using παρρησία.⁷²³ In my view, this interpretation is persuasive thanks to the use of διαφιλοτεχνέω in this fragment.⁷²⁴ The verb probably refers here to the “multi-faceted artistry” (ποικίλη φιλοτεχνία)⁷²⁵ of the mixed form of παρρησία that Philodemus mentions in fragment 68. In the above-quoted text (= fr. 10), Philodemus, thus, claims that the mixed form of

⁷¹⁷ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 7:9.

⁷¹⁸ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 7:1–10. Konstan *et al.*, *Philodemus*, 31 n. 16 note that “ἐπιτίνει = ἐπιτείνει”.

⁷¹⁹ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁷²⁰ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 10. The < > refer to letters or words added by various editors.

⁷²¹ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁷²² Phld., *Lib.* fr. 58:7–9.

⁷²³ See Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 143.

⁷²⁴ This is the only known occurrence of διαφιλοτεχνέω in ancient Greek sources. There is no entry on the verb in LSJ and it cannot be found in the TLG.

⁷²⁵ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 68:1–2.

παρρησία is preferable in most cases. Most of the students, presumably οἱ ἀπαλοί, already submit to the mixed form. Yet, there are other students, οἱ ἰσχυροί, who do not obey (cf. μὴ ὑπακούωσιν) to the mixed form. They are in need of more treatment, and can only be challenged by the simple form of παρρησία.

Οἱ ἰσχυροί are stubborn and recalcitrant. When reproved, they believe that they have not erred or that their errors will not be detected:

[...] δὲ κα[ί] το δυσκίνητον ἐνοχλεῖ, καὶ μηδὲ τῶν οἰ[κ]ε[ί]ων ἀμαρτημάτων ἐπαισθάνεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων μὲν ἐπιτιμώμενοι, τ[ὸ] νομίζειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν π[λ]εῖστον οὐχ ἡμα[ρτή]κασι.]⁷²⁶

[...] their obduracy too gives them trouble and the fact that they are not aware of their own errors, and, though they reproach others, that they believe that for the most part they have not erred.⁷²⁷

καὶ [κ]αθάπερ σ[οφ]οὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπὶ διαίρεσιν παρακαλοῦντες ὅταν δῶσι τὸ ζμίλιον νο[σ]οῦσιν, οὕτως ὅταν <τ>ο[ύ]τοι<ς> τὸ δηκτικὸν ἐν ὄμματι γένηται τῆς παρρησίας καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐθὲν ἀμάρτημα ποιήσιν, ἢ λήσεσθαι κἂν πολλάκις ἡμαρτηκότας, παρακαλοῦσι νο[υ]θετεῖν⁷²⁸

And just like those who call skilled doctors to an operation when they apply the scalpel to those who are ill, so too when what is stinging in frank criticism meets the eye of these people and they believe that they will commit no error, or that they will escape notice even if they have erred many times, they call upon {their teachers} to admonish...⁷²⁹

Due to this recalcitrance, the mixed or mild form of παρρησία has no effect on οἱ ἰσχυροί. According to Glad, in *De ira*, Philodemus provides an explanation for the disability of οἱ ἰσχυροί to make progress through the mixed form of παρρησία. Due to their anger, οἱ ἰσχυροί are “unable to put up with the teacher or their fellow students who reprove and correct them”.⁷³⁰ “[J]ust as malignant ulcers cannot bear the use of soothing pharmacies”,⁷³¹ they can only be healed by a stronger dose of παρρησία.⁷³²

In the next section, I will argue that the above-depicted two forms of παρρησία cannot only be found in Philodemus and Epicureanism of the first century BCE, but were very

⁷²⁶ Phld., *Lib.* col. XVb:8–15.

⁷²⁷ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁷²⁸ Phld., *Lib.* col. XVIIa:4–14. See also Phld., *Lib.* cols. XVIIIb:13–14 and XIXb:8–9.

⁷²⁹ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

⁷³⁰ Phld., *Ir.* col. XIX:12–17. Trans. by Glad.

⁷³¹ Phld., *Ir.* col. XIX:17–21. Trans. by Glad.

⁷³² See Glad, “Frank Speech,” 42.

influential beyond the confines of Epicureanism throughout the 1th century BCE – 2nd century CE.⁷³³

2. THE TWO FORMS OF *παρρησία* BEYOND EPICUREANISM

The present section will document in chronological order with reference to Philo (2.1), the Cynic Epistles (2.2), Plutarch (2.3), Dio Chrysostom (2.4), and Clement of Alexandria (2.5) that there is a widespread consciousness of the simple/severe form and the mixed/mild form of *παρρησία* in the 1th century BCE – 2nd century CE.⁷³⁴

2.1 PHILO

Philo speaks about the fortunes of those who have displayed *παρρησία* ἀκαιρός towards “kings and tyrants” by “daring to speak and to do things in opposition to their will”. They “have not only put their necks under the yoke like brute beasts”, but “have also surrendered and betrayed their whole bodies and souls likewise, and their wives and children, and their parents, and all the rest of the numerous kindred and community of their other relations”.⁷³⁵ After “being pricked with goads, and flogged, and mutilated, and suffering all the cruelties which can be inflicted in an inhuman and pitiless manner before death, all together, they are led away to execution and are put to death”.⁷³⁶ The use of untimely *παρρησία* can have fatal consequences when opposing a person who is much more powerful than you.

Philo recommends to not use *παρρησία* directly towards raging and intemperate kings and tyrants, but to wait for more favourable conditions. Just as the ship captain does not set sail when a storm is “at its height” and “a violent gale” is opposing him, one can better wait for “calm weather and a smooth and favourable breeze” when wanting to employ *παρρησία* towards kings and tyrants.⁷³⁷ The following advice suggests that these favourable conditions for the use of *παρρησία* can be triggered by the speaker himself:

τί δέ; ἄρκτον τις <ἢ σὺν ἄγριον ἢ> λέοντα μετὰ συρμοῦ θεασάμενος ἐπιόντα, πρᾶναι καὶ τιθασεῦσαι δέον, ἐξαγριαίνει καὶ ἀνερεθίζει, ὅπως θοίναν καὶ εὐωχίαν ὁμοβόροις ἀνηλεεστάτοις εὐτρεπίσῃ ἑαυτόν; εἰ μὴ καὶ φαλαγγίοις καὶ ἄσπίσι ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα τὸν φθοροποιὸν ἰὸν <ἐπιφέρεται> οὐδενὶ λυσιτελεῖς ἀνθίστασθαι, θάνατον ἀπαραίτητον τοῖς ἅπασι δηχθεῖσιν ἐπάγουσιν· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ

⁷³³ Glad (*Paul and Philodemus*, 71–77) has reported that, in addition to Philodemus, the mixing of praise and blame is also valued by Cicero, Quintilian, Plutarch, Seneca, Dio Chrysostom, Maximus of Tyre, Sextus Empiricus, and Clement of Alexandria.

⁷³⁴ The chronological order of my discussion is sometimes difficult to uphold, because some of the mentioned authors are more or less contemporaries, for instance, Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom. The Cynic Epistles by Ps.-Diogenes and Ps.-Heraclitus are dated respectively in the 1th century BCE and the 1th century CE: see Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition*, SBL SBS 12 (Missoula MT: Scholars Press, 1977), 14–15, 22.

⁷³⁵ Ph., *Somn.* 2.83. Translated by Charles D. Yonge.

⁷³⁶ Ph., *Somn.* 2.84. Adjusted translation from Yonge.

⁷³⁷ Ph., *Somn.* 2.85–86. Slightly adjusted translation from Yonge.

κατεπάδοντας καὶ χειροήθη ποιοῦντας μηδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῶν δεινὸν παθεῖν. εἴτ' οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι τινες συῶν, φαλαγγίων, ἀσπίδων ἀγριώτεροι καὶ ἐπιβουλότεροι; ὧν τὸ ἐπίβουλον καὶ δυσμενὲς ἀμήχανον ἐτέρως ἢ τιθασεῖαι καὶ μειλίγμασι χρωμένους διεκδῶναι.⁷³⁸

What then? Would anyone who has seen a wild bear or a lion coming on with violence, although it is necessary to soothe and calm it, provoke it and make it savage in order to offer himself as a banquet to satisfy the cruel appetites of the carnivorous brutes? Unless indeed anyone will assert that it is of no use to anyone to fight against scorpions and asps of Egypt and all other creatures possessed of fatal poison whose single bite carries with it inevitable death—creatures whom we may well be content to tame with charms and ensure that they do us no grievous harm. For those must be content to use incantations, and so to tame those beasts, and by such means to avoid suffering any evil from them. Moreover, are there not certain men who are more savage and more treacherous than scorpions or asps? whose treacherous and malignant disposition it is impossible to escape otherwise than by gentleness and caresses?⁷³⁹

Just as dangerous snakes are tamed by incantations, we ought to escape the “treacherous and malignant disposition” of “certain men” through “gentleness and caresses”. Philo’s discussion is not restricted anymore to violent kings and tyrants, but compares people to wild animals that cannot bear *παρρησία* without first being soothed and calmed through gentleness and caresses.

He provides the example of Abraham, who worships (*προσκυνέω*) the sons of Cheth (Gen 23:7).⁷⁴⁰ Philo explains that Abraham does not worship the sons of Cheth out of honour, but “because he fears their present power and their scarcely conquerable strength”. Abraham is “on his guard not to provoke them” and “takes refuge in that great and powerful possession and weapon of virtue”.⁷⁴¹ Thus, even Philo allows for false praise when one’s life is in danger.

Unlike Philodemus, Philo does not distinguish between a mild/mixed and a harsh/simple form of *παρρησία*. Philo recognises that the conditions for using *παρρησία* are not always optimal and that, therefore, gentleness and even false praise through, for instance, admiration or worship are required. One first has to soothe and calm the addressee in order that *παρρησία* can have effect. The idea of a mixed form of *παρρησία* can, also, be traced in Philo. Yet, the context in which this idea is embedded is very different from the context we meet in Philodemus. For Philodemus, the psychological disposition of the student justifies to mix *παρρησία* with praise. Philo, on the other hand, does not focus on the relationship between teacher and pupil, but on those situations in which the addressee is unrestrained and the speaker risks his life by applying *παρρησία*.

⁷³⁸ Ph., *Somn.* 2.87–89. The text between < > is added by Cohn and Wendland.

⁷³⁹ Adjusted translation from Yonge.

⁷⁴⁰ See Ph., *Somn.* 2.89.

⁷⁴¹ Ph., *Somn.* 2.90. Trans. by Yonge.

For Philo, the mixing of *παρρησία* with praise is done to guarantee the security of the speaker.

The idea of a pure/simple/severe form of *παρρησία* can, also, be traced in Philo:

καὶ διδόντων μὲν τῶν καιρῶν ἐπιτιθεμένους τὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν βίαν καλὸν καταλῦσαι, μὴ ἐπιτρεπόντων δὲ ἀσφαλὲς ἡσυχάσαι, βουλομένοις δὲ τιν' ὠφέλειαν εὐρίσκεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀρμόττον τιθασεῦσαι.⁷⁴²

And when an opportunity offers, it is a good thing to attack our enemies and put down their power; but when we have no such opportunity, it is better to be quiet; but if we wish to find perfect safety as far as they are concerned, it is advantageous to caress them.⁷⁴³

The context is again very different from the one we encounter in Philodemus. The use of *παρρησία* without gentleness or praise is not, like for Philodemus, justified by the psychological disposition of the student, but by the safety of the speaker. Only when one wants to find perfect safety, it is of use to mix *παρρησία* with praise. If safety is guaranteed, it is better to use *παρρησία* directly to destroy the power of one's enemies.

2.2 THE CYNIC EPISTLES

In the so-called Cynic epistles, Ps.-Diogenes presents the Cynic in a way that reminds us of what Philodemus calls the simple or severe form of *παρρησία*:

ἀλλ' οὔτε οἱ συνόντες ὁρῶσιν ὅσον τὸ κακὸν ἔχεις, οὔτε αὐτὸς αἰσθάνη, οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ τέ σου καὶ σφόδρα ἥπται ἡ νόσος. σκύτους οὖν δεῖ σοι καὶ δεσπότην, οὐχ ὅς σε θαυμάσει καὶ κολακεύσει· ὡς ὑπὸ γε τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου πῶς ἂν τίς ποτε ὠφεληθείη, ἢ πῶς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὠφελήσειέ τινα; εἰ μὴ ὥσπερ ἵππον ἢ βοῦν κολάζοι τε ἄμα καὶ σωφρονίζοι, φροντίζοι τε τῶν δεόντων. ἀλλὰ σύ γε πόρρω ἤκεις διαφθορᾶς. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον τομάς τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ φαρμακείας ποιεῖσθαι.⁷⁴⁴

But your companions do not see how evil you are nor do you yourself perceive it, for so long and so thoroughly has the sickness gripped you. Consequently, you need a whip and an overlord and not someone who will admire and flatter you. Because how would anyone ever be benefitted by such a person [viz., the overlord; T.T.] and how would such a person [viz., the overlord; T.T.] benefit someone, if he does not punish him like a horse or an ox and at the same time chastise him and pay heed to what is lacking. But you are in an advanced state of corruption. Therefore, cutting, cautery, and medication must be employed.⁷⁴⁵

Although *παρρησία* is not explicitly mentioned here, the medical and surgical imagery of “cutting, cautery, and medication” and the contrast with flattery justify my view that the text is speaking of the *παρρησία* of the Cynic (here: *δεσπότης* [“overlord”]). Like

⁷⁴² Ph., *Somn.* 2.92.

⁷⁴³ Trans. by Yonge.

⁷⁴⁴ Ps.-Diog., *Ep.* 29.4–5 (Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles*).

⁷⁴⁵ Adjusted translation from Benjamin Fiore.

Philodemus, Ps.-Diogenes connects the psychological disposition of the addressee to the severe/simple form of *παρρησία*. The addressee is depicted as being thoroughly sick for a long time and unable to detect his own moral depravity. Like Philodemus, Ps.-Diogenes claims that the addressee can only be healed by the simple/severe form of *παρρησία* consisting in “cutting, cautery, and medication”. The addressee of the letter is, in this regard, similar to οἱ ἰσχυροί or the recalcitrant students in Philodemus.

Just as Philodemus prefers the mild or mixed form of *παρρησία*, it is not that Cynics wish to be morbid, but the wickedness of other people made them sullen and excised their gentleness:

θαυμάζουσι πῶς αἰεὶ σκυθρωπὸς Ἡράκλειτος, οὐ θαυμάζουσι πῶς αἰεὶ πονηροὶ ἄνθρωποι. μικρὰ τῆς κακίας ὑπανεῖτε, κἀγὼ τάχα μειδιάσω. καίτοι πραότερος ἐν τῇ νόσῳ νῦν ἐγενόμην, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντυγχάνω ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνος νοσῶ.⁷⁴⁶

They wonder why Heraclitus is always sullen; they do not wonder why men are always evil. If you reduced your vice a little, I would quickly smile. And yet in my disease, I have now become gentler, because I do not meet men, but am ill all alone.⁷⁴⁷

ὦ ἄνθρωποι, οὐ θέλετε μαθεῖν, διὰ τί αἰεὶ ἀγελαστῶ; οὐ μισῶν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ κακίαν αὐτῶν [...] ἢ τοῦτο ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἀγαπήσω, ὅτι μου τὸ ἥμερον ἐξεκόψατε;⁷⁴⁸

O you men, don't you want to learn why I never laugh? It is not because I hate men but because I hate their wickedness [...] Shall I love you mainly for this, that you have cut out my mildness?⁷⁴⁹

According to tradition, the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus was exiled due to his misanthropy. Ps.-Heraclitus portrays himself as a Cynic and explains that he was not severe towards others by nature, but that the vices of people required him to be severe. The severity of the *παρρησία* of the Cynic is not an ideal, but is made necessary by the moral depravity of his addressees. The Cynic adapts the intensity of his *παρρησία* to his addressees. The more wicked his addressees are, the more severe his *παρρησία* is.

2.3 PLUTARCH

Plutarch distinguishes between a “therapeutic” *παρρησία* and a “practical” *παρρησία*: τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ θεραπευτικὴ παρρησία ζητεῖ τρόπον, ἡ δὲ πρακτικὴ τὸν ἐναντίον.⁷⁵⁰ Each form of *παρρησία* follows a “way” or “method” (*τρόπος*) that is “opposite” (*ἐναντίος*) to the way or method followed by the other form of *παρρησία*. Pohlenz proposes to emend

⁷⁴⁶ Ps.-Heracl., *Ep.* 5.3 (Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles*).

⁷⁴⁷ Trans. by David Worley.

⁷⁴⁸ Ps.-Heracl., *Ep.* 7.2–3.

⁷⁴⁹ Slightly adjusted translation from Worley.

⁷⁵⁰ Plu., *Adulator* 74a. Plutarch elliptically drops *παρρησία* in ἡ [...] πρακτικὴ [*παρρησία*] and τρόπον in τὸν ἐναντίον [*τρόπον*].

the text by reading προφυλακτική instead of πρακτική. Other conjectural emendations are προτρεπτική (Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff) and ἐπρακτική (Gregorios Bernardakis).⁷⁵¹ As we will see in the present subsection (2.3), all the mentioned emendations have a certain plausibility: προτρεπτική, like (ἐ)πρακτική, verbalises the protreptic character of παρρησία as exhorting others to good actions; προφυλακτική expresses the preventive character of παρρησία as stirring others to not commit errors in the future. With other words: even when one reads (ἐ)πρακτική or προτρεπτική, παρρησία is still depicted as prophylactic (or preventive) in use. Vice versa, when one reads προφυλακτική, παρρησία is still practical (or protreptic) in the sense that it directs people to perform good actions. Conscious that all manuscripts at our disposal read πρακτική, I will consistently refer to this form of παρρησία as “practical” παρρησία in distinction to the “therapeutic” form of παρρησία. First, I will discuss the method of the therapeutic form of παρρησία (2.3.1) before discussing the method of the practical form of παρρησία (2.3.2).

2.3.1 Therapeutic παρρησία

The therapeutic form of παρρησία follows a method that reminds us of what Philodemus calls the “mixed way/method” (μεικτὸς τρόπος) of applying παρρησία:

εἴθ' ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος πυκνοῦται τῇ περιψύξει καὶ δέχεται τὴν στόμωσιν ἀνεθείς
πρῶτον ὑπὸ θερμότητος καὶ μαλακὸς γενόμενος, οὕτω τοῖς φίλοις διακεχυμένοις καὶ
θερμοῖς οὖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων ὥσπερ βαφὴν ἀτρέμα τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπάγειν.⁷⁵²

Then later, just as steel is made compact by cooling, and takes on a temper as the result of having first been relaxed and softened by heat, so when our friends have become mollified and warmed by our praise we should give them an application of frankness like a tempering bath.⁷⁵³

The imagery speaks for itself. Plutarch claims that we first have to relax and warm our friends with praise before giving them “a cooling bath” with παρρησία. The idea is that praise makes a person susceptible to criticism. He provides the following example:

ἄρ' ἄξιον ἐκεῖνα τούτοις παραβάλλειν; ὁρᾷς τὸ καλὸν οἴους καρποὺς ἀποδίδωσι;
ταῦτ' ἀπαιτοῦμεν οἱ φίλοι, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν οἰκεῖα, πρὸς ταῦτα πέφυκας· ἐκεῖνα δ'
ἀποδιοπομπτέον εἰς ὄρος ἢ ἐς κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης.⁷⁵⁴

“Is this conduct worthy to compare with that? Do you see what fruits the good yields? These your friends demand of you; these befit your own character; nature intended

⁷⁵¹ See Paton – Pohlenz – Wegehaupt (eds), *Plutarchus: Moralia*, vol. 1, 147 and Klaerr – Philippon – Sirinelli (eds.), *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, tome 1 – 2e partie, 139.

⁷⁵² Plu., *Adulator* 73c–d.

⁷⁵³ Slightly adjusted LCL translation.

⁷⁵⁴ Plu., *Adulator* 73d.

you for these things”. But those other promptings must be exorcised– “Off to the mountain or else to the surge of the loud-roaring ocean”.⁷⁵⁵

In this example, both praise and criticism are not isolated from one another. They appear to collaborate with one another in the sense that praise enables one to be criticised. The person is, on the one hand, praised as someone who is intended by nature to do the fruits that the good brings forth. On the other hand, the praise projects an image of the person that is highly contrastive with the actual behaviour of the person. By comparing his actual behaviour to this image, the person realises how deplorable his current conduct is.

Plutarch develops four important insights on why *παρρησία* ought to be mixed with praise:

(i) As a ground rule, Plutarch thinks *παρρησία* should hurt as little as possible. Just as “a considerate doctor would prefer to relieve a suffering man of his sickness by sleep and diet rather than by castor and scammony, so a kindly friend, a good father, and a teacher, take pleasure in using praise rather than blame for the correction of character”.⁷⁵⁶ One thing above all makes *παρρησία* “hurt as little as possible and as therapeutic as possible”: “to refrain from showing anger, and to approach the erring tactfully and with goodwill”.⁷⁵⁷ Plutarch promotes a mild form of *παρρησία* in which there is no place for “sharp reproving” (*πικρῶς ἐξελέγγειν*) of those who deny to have erred.⁷⁵⁸ “[T]he therapeutic *παρρησία*” that Plutarch promotes to correct wrongdoers helps them to find “noble excuses” (*προφάσεις εὐσχήμονας*) for their errors by “repudiating the worse cause (*αἰτίας*) and providing a more tolerable one ourselves”.⁷⁵⁹ From among others, Plutarch provides the example of Hector, who does not reproach his brother of cowardice when he withdraws from battle, but instead says to his brother that he has done this out of anger. Although Hector’s brother runs away from battle out of cowardice, he is criticised for running away from battle out of anger.⁷⁶⁰ Anger is in this case a nobler excuse for his running away than cowardice. Hector provides a more tolerable cause than the actual cause to explain his brother’s error. Other practical examples: “[y]ou were inadvertent” instead of “[y]ou were ignorant”, “[d]on’t be contentious with your brother” instead of “[d]on’t be jealous of your brother”.⁷⁶¹

(ii) Plutarch claims that “complaining and fault-finding” are generally viewed as “unfriendly and unsociable”. “[P]raise for noble acts”, on the other hand, is generally

⁷⁵⁵ My translation.

⁷⁵⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 73d–e. Adjusted LCL translation.

⁷⁵⁷ Plu., *Adulator* 73e. My translation.

⁷⁵⁸ Plu., *Adulator* 73e. My translation.

⁷⁵⁹ Plu., *Adulator* 73e. My translation. My translation “cause” has tried to give the most neutral rendering possible of *αἰτία* without specifying the nature of the cause, e.g., efficient or final. Other translators have opted for “reason” (Waterfield), “justification” (Budé), and “motive” (LCL). By means of these translations they all limit the potential meaning of *αἰτία* to the final cause. The examples provided by Plutarch show, however, that *αἰτία* potentially has a much broader meaning. For instance, it is difficult to imagine that cowardice and anger is the end or purpose of Hector’s brother running away from battle.

⁷⁶⁰ See Plu., *Adulator* 73e–f.

⁷⁶¹ Plu., *Adulator* 73f–74a (LCL translation).

thought of as a manifestation of εὐνοία. The experience of the εὐνοία of the speaker allows us to “cheerfully and without distress” bear his παρρησία, since “we believe, and are content, that the man who is glad to praise blames only when he must”.⁷⁶² The mixing of παρρησία with praise thus makes it easier for us to submit to παρρησία.

(iii) Just as “a brilliant light should not be brought close to an inflamed eye”, “a mind which has been taken over by the emotions” cannot submit to παρρησία and “undiluted reproof”.⁷⁶³ One should mix παρρησία with praise (cf. ὁ παραμιγνύμενος [...] ἔπαινος).⁷⁶⁴ Plutarch claims that, in addition to the benefit of softening the harshness of blame, sayings in which παρρησία is mixed with praise “arouse in a man a desire to emulate his better self, since he is made to feel ashamed of disgraceful conduct by being reminded of his honourable actions, and is prompted to look upon himself as an example of what is better”.⁷⁶⁵ The argument here is that παρρησία mixed with praise creates an internal rivalry in a person. The praise of good behaviour will cause the praised person to feel ashamed of his or her bad behaviour that is criticised. The result is that the person is encouraged to look upon himself or herself as an example for imitation in order to improve his or her bad behaviour. From among others, Plutarch provides the following example from Homer’s *Iliad*: “You are the best men in the army, so you can no longer do well by refraining from fierce heroism. For my part, I have no argument with anyone who refrains from fighting – provided he is a weakling; but in my heart I am furious with *you*.”⁷⁶⁶ Poseidon’s criticism of the absence of the Greeks in battle is mixed with his praise that they are the best in his army. By praising the Greeks as the best in his army, he causes them to feel ashamed of their bad behaviour of not partaking in the fighting against the Trojans. Poseidon projects an image of the Greeks that allows them to improve their behaviour by imitating this image.

(iv) As already suggested by the above-quoted imagery of the brilliant light and the inflamed eye, Plutarch mentions, in particular, that παρρησία needs to be mixed with praise when the addressee is already hurt and in pain: “[w]hen children fall down, the nurses do not rush up to them to berate them, but they take them up, wash them, and straighten their clothes, and, after all this is done, they then rebuke and punish them.”⁷⁶⁷ When a person is in good health, he will not be “harsh or ferocious against a friend who blames him for yielding to women and wine [...]”. A man on his deathbed, on the other hand, will not accept the criticism that his sickness is the consequence of his life style. The criticism will rather be “an aggravation of the sickness”.⁷⁶⁸ Plutarch promotes the

⁷⁶² Plu., *Adulator* 50b. Adjusted LCL translation.

⁷⁶³ Plu., *Adulator* 72b–c. Trans. by Waterfield.

⁷⁶⁴ Plu., *Adulator* 72c.

⁷⁶⁵ Plu., *Adulator* 72d (LCL translation).

⁷⁶⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 72c with reference to Hom., *Il.* 13.116–118. Trans. by Waterfield. Italics by Waterfield.

⁷⁶⁷ Plu., *Adulator* 69c (LCL translation). See, also, D. Chr., *Or.* 4.74, for the imagery of the gentle nurse and παρρησία.

⁷⁶⁸ Plu., *Adulator* 69b (LCL translation).

adaptation of *παρρησία* to the disposition of the person that is treated. A person who is already hurt and in pain is not helped by a harsh use of *παρρησία*, but can best be treated with a gentler use of *παρρησία*. This can be accomplished by combining *παρρησία* with praise.

2.3.2 Practical *παρρησία*

Plutarch considers the above-depicted “therapeutic” or soft form of *παρρησία* to be corrective. As described above, when we want to correct wrongdoers, *παρρησία* ought to be softened by praise, or by providing a noble excuse for the committed error. The error is explained by means of a more tolerable cause than the one that actually caused the error. Practical *παρρησία*, on the other hand, as I will show in the present subsection, follows the opposite method by looking for a less creditable cause than the one that is about to cause a person to commit error. Practical *παρρησία* is preventive rather than corrective in the sense that it seeks to prevent a person from committing errors in the future.

Plutarch describes the following three situations in which “practical” *παρρησία* ought to be used:

ὅταν γὰρ ἢ μέλλοντας ἀμαρτάνειν ἐκκροῦσαι δεήσῃ ἢ πρὸς ὀρμὴν τινα βίαιον ἰσταμένους ἐξ ἐναντίας φερομένην ἢ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀπροθύμως ἔχοντας ἐντεῖναι καὶ παρορμησάιν θελήσωμεν, εἰς αἰτίας δεῖ περιφέρειν ἀτόπους καὶ μὴ πρεπούσας τὸ γινόμενον.⁷⁶⁹

When it is necessary to drive back people who are about to do wrong, or when we want to energise and stimulate people who are trying to make a stand against some powerful impulse that is tending in a direction opposite to what is required, or who are being weak and unready with regard to correct conduct, then it is necessary to attribute what is taking place to causes which are disgusting and discreditable.⁷⁷⁰

The first situation refers to people who are about to do wrong. The aim of practical *παρρησία* is to drive these people back. The second situation mentions people who are trying to make a stand against a violent impulse/passion. Waterfield proposes to emend

⁷⁶⁹ Plu., *Adulator* 74a. In my quotation I have followed the edition by Frank Babbitt (LCL), who adds ἢ after δεήσῃ to make the construction less obscure. In this reading, three situations are enumerated in which the use of practical *παρρησία* is recommended. The reading without ἢ before δεήσῃ is assumed in the Teubner and Budé editions. In the latter reading, there are only two situations in which practical *παρρησία* ought to be applied. In the translation of the Budé edition: “[e]n effet quand il nous faut détourner des gens qui vont commettre une faute vers une passion violente qui les entraîne malgré eux à l’opposite, ou quand nous voulons revigorer et encourager à des actions d’éclat des gens mous et sans ardeur, nous devons ramener ce qui se passe à des mobiles inconvenants et peu honorables.” (Klaerr – Philippon – Sirinelli [eds.], *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, tome 1 – 2e partie, 139.) In both the reading by Babbitt and the reading in Teubner and Budé, practical *παρρησία* aims for the prevention of committing errors and exhorts people to perform correct actions. Practical *παρρησία* is both prophylactic and protreptic.

⁷⁷⁰ My translation. On my translation of αἰτία with “cause”, see *supra*, n. 759.

the text by reading *παρισταμένους* instead of *ισταμένους*.⁷⁷¹ The translation would then be: “when we want to energise and stimulate people who are being won over when faced with some powerful impulse [...]”. Although not attested in any manuscript, I think such a reading is motivated by the fact that Plutarch writes that “it is necessary to attribute what is taking place to motives which are disgusting and discreditable”. If those who ought to be criticised were already trying to make a stand against the powerful impulse, it would not make sense that Plutarch advises to look for the worst motive possible to explain what is taking place. Resisting this impulse would be laudable instead of blamable. In the reading by Waterfield, the second situation is speaking about those who are being won over by a powerful impulse instead of those who are resisting this impulse. In the third situation, Plutarch speaks of those who are weak and unready with regard to good actions. In the second and the third situation, practical *παρρησία* seeks to energise and stimulate people to fight their emotions and act in a correct way. The over-all aim of practical *παρρησία* is, thus, both to prevent others from committing errors and to exhort them to perform correct actions. Practical *παρρησία* is both prophylactic and protreptic. In all three situations, “practical” *παρρησία* will proceed by referring to disgusting and discreditable causes to explain what is in the process of taking place (cf. *τὸ γινόμενον*).⁷⁷² Only then will people be driven back from doing wrong, and, they will resist the impulse of doing wrong and they will be stirred into correct conduct. Whereas the therapeutic form of *παρρησία* requires of us to think of a nobler excuse for the error committed by the person or to praise the wrongdoer, the use of the practical form of *παρρησία* prescribes that we explain the errors that a person is about to commit by referring to disgusting and discreditable explanatory grounds.

Plutarch provides the example of Odysseus’ use of “practical” *παρρησία* to incite Achilles: “[a]s soon as you caught sight of the buildings of Troy, you were afraid.”⁷⁷³ Plutarch explains that instead of claiming that the meal has made him angry, Odysseus presents a “courageous hero” as a “coward”. Achilles is “full of indignation” and says that he is “sailing away”.⁷⁷⁴ Again, Odysseus reacts by referring to a discreditable explanatory ground to explain what Achilles is doing: “I know what you are running away from, and it is not slander, but Hector is nearby: it is not good to stay.”⁷⁷⁵ Achilles, the courageous hero, is again presented as a coward. Plutarch explains:

τὸν μὲν οὖν θυμοειδῆ καὶ ἀνδρώδη δειλίας δόξῃ, τὸν δὲ σώφρονα καὶ κόσμιον ἀκολασίας, τὸν δ’ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ μικρολογίας καὶ φιλαργυρίας δεδιττόμενοι παρορμῶσι πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπελαύνουσι, μέτριοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἐξεταζόμενοι καὶ τὸ λυπούμενον καὶ τὸ συναλγοῦν πλέον ἐν τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι τοῦ ψέγοντος ἔχοντες, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κωλύσει τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων καὶ

⁷⁷¹ See Robin Waterfield (trans.), *Plutarch: Essays*, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin, 1992), 402.

⁷⁷² The verbal aspect of the participle *τὸ γινόμενον* is durative.

⁷⁷³ Plu., *Adulator* 74a (trans. Waterfield).

⁷⁷⁴ Plu., *Adulator* 74b (trans. Waterfield).

⁷⁷⁵ Plu., *Adulator* 74b (trans. Waterfield).

πρὸς τὰ πάθη διαμάχαις σφοδροὶ καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι καὶ συνεχεῖς ὄντες· οὗτος γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς εὐνοίας ἀθρύπτου καὶ παρρησίας ἀληθινῆς ἐστὶ.⁷⁷⁶

So by alarming the spirited and manly man with an imputation of cowardice, the chaste and orderly with an imputation of licentiousness, the generous and magnificent with an imputation of pettiness and avarice, they give to such persons an impulse towards what is noble, and turn them away from what is disgraceful, proving themselves moderate in matters beyond remedy, and owing more to sorrow and sympathy than to blame in their frank speaking; but in efforts to prevent the commission of error and in fights with the emotions they are severe, inexorable, and unremitting. For this is the right time for a resolute goodwill and genuine frankness.⁷⁷⁷

By presenting the conduct of people in a discreditable way – e.g., by calling the courageous cowards, the generous avaricious, etc. – practical παρρησία attempts to turn them away from what is disgraceful towards what is noble. Plutarch claims that in order to succeed, the practical use of παρρησία ought to be, on the one hand (cf. μέν), moderate in cases that are beyond remedy. In cases beyond remedy, one ought to be rather sorrowful and sympathetic in one's use of παρρησία. On the other hand (cf. δέ), when one has to prevent the commission of error and fight with emotions, as in the example of Odysseus and Achilles, the practical use of παρρησία ought to be “severe, inexorable, and unremitting”. Plutarch calls this “the καιρός of resolute εὐνοία and true παρρησία”. This second strategy for using παρρησία that Plutarch describes reminds us of Philodemus' depiction of the simple or sharp form of παρρησία.

According to Birgit Van Meirvenne, for Plutarch, one always has to make “a ‘reasonable guess’ about the proper mean between deficiency and excess in using praise, blame and frank criticism”.⁷⁷⁸ In my view, this stochastic talent is required for both the therapeutic and the practical form of παρρησία, and is in agreement with Plutarch's advice to use παρρησία as a stochastic or experimental τέχνη.⁷⁷⁹ For Plutarch, the circumstances and the addressees determine with which intensity παρρησία is to be applied. The correct use of παρρησία is a matter of practical reasoning.

Plutarch has in common with Philodemus that he thinks παρρησία should be as painless as possible. Like Philodemus, he prefers the mixed form of παρρησία over the pure form of παρρησία. Characteristic of Plutarch in comparison to Philodemus is that the psychological disposition of the addressee is not the only factor for determining how pure and severe παρρησία ought to be. The distinction between a therapeutic and a

⁷⁷⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 74b–c.

⁷⁷⁷ Adjusted LCL translation.

⁷⁷⁸ Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 143. The stochastic talent of reasonably guessing the proper mean between deficiency and excess is also thematised by Aristotle: see Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp, “Das Fundament stochastischen Verhaltens nach Aristoteles, EN VI 13,” *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* NF 123 (1980) 41–50.

⁷⁷⁹ For my discussion of Plutarch's advice to use παρρησία as a stochastic τέχνη, see *supra*, Chapter Six, §2.1.

practical form of *παρρησία* shows that the intensity of *παρρησία* also depends on whether the addressed person has already committed, or is about to commit, the error under discussion. Therapeutic (or corrective) *παρρησία* allows for less severity than practical (or preventive) *παρρησία*.

2.4 DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Dio Chrysostom claims that “the courageous and the high-minded” (ὁ [...] ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγαλόφρων) would not sacrifice his *παρρησία* “for the sake of any dishonourable payment of either power or riches”.⁷⁸⁰ In the following text, Dio describes how this *παρρησία* shows itself in two forms:

αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν πειράσεται διαφυλάττειν εὐσχημόνως καὶ βεβαίως, μηδέποτε λείπων τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν, ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην τιμῶν ἀεὶ καὶ αὖξων καὶ πάντα ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἄγων, τὰ μὲν πείθων καὶ παρακαλῶν, τὰ δὲ λοιδορούμενος καὶ ὀνειδίζων, εἴ τινα δύναίτο ἐξελέσθαι ἀφροσύνης καὶ φάυλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ τρυφῆς, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ἀθρόους νουθετῶν, ὅσάκις ἂν καιροῦ τύχη τινός, ἄλλον μιλίχίοις, ἄλλον στερεοῖς ἐπέεσσι [...]⁷⁸¹

But as for himself, the man of whom I speak will strive to preserve his individuality in seemly fashion and with steadfastness, never deserting his post of duty, but always honouring and promoting virtue and sobriety and trying to lead all men thereto, either by persuading and exhorting or by abusing and reproaching, in the hope that he may thereby rescue somebody from folly and from low desires and intemperance and soft living, taking them aside privately one by one and also admonishing them in groups every time he finds the opportunity, with gentle words at times, at others harsh [...]⁷⁸²

Although Dio provides little information, the quoted text suggests that Dio recognised two forms of *παρρησία*: a mild form consisting of gentle words to persuade and exhort others, and a harsh form consisting of harsh words to abuse and reproach others. The aim of both forms of *παρρησία* reminds us of Plutarch’s formulation of the aim of practical *παρρησία*: the struggle with emotions. For Dio, the aim of the philosopher’s *παρρησία* is to prevent the addressee from committing errors by helping him in the struggle with his emotions. It is clear from the quotation that the philosopher leads others to virtue by adapting his means of persuasion to his addressees.

2.5 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

As argued in the previous chapter, Clement of Alexandria assumes the meaning of *παρρησία* in his discussion of the different forms of hortatory (προτρεπτικός) blame

⁷⁸⁰ D. Chr., *Or.* 77–78.37 (adjusted LCL translation).

⁷⁸¹ D. Chr., *Or.* 77–78.38 (LCL).

⁷⁸² Adjusted LCL translation.

exercised by the divine pedagogue.⁷⁸³ In this discussion, Clement defends that one has to adapt one's hortatory means to one's addressees:

ἀλλὰ οὐ συγκρῶμαι τῷ λόγῳ τῷδε, φημί δ' οὖν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον ἢ ἐπαίνῳ τι ἔοικὸς καὶ ψόγῳ μάλιστα πάντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιότατα φάρμακα. Οἱ μὲν οὖν δυσίατοι, καθάπερ ὁ σίδηρος πρὸς τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ σφύρας καὶ ἄκμονος, τουτέστιν ἀπειλῆς, ἐλέγχου, ἐπιτιμήσεως ἐλαύνονται, οἱ δὲ αὐτῇ προσέχοντες τῇ πίστει οἷον αὐτοδίδακτοι καὶ προαιρετικοὶ αὖξονται τῷ ἐπαίνῳ· ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινεομένα δένδρον ὥς ἀέξεται. Καί μοι δοκεῖ συνεῖς τοῦτο ὁ Σάμιος παραγγέλλειν Πυθαγόρας· δειλὰ μὲν ἐκπρήξας ἐπιπλήσσειο, χρηστὰ δὲ τέρπου.⁷⁸⁴

I say, then, that praise or blame, or whatever resembles praise or blame, are medicines most essential of all to men. Some are ill to cure, and, like iron, are wrought into shape with fire, and hammer, and anvil, that is, with threatening, and reproof, and chastisement; while others, cleaving to faith itself, as self-taught, and as acting of their own free-will, grow by praise: For virtue that is praised grows like a tree. And comprehending this, as it seems to me, the Samian Pythagoras gives the injunction: When you have done base things, rebuke yourself; But when you have done good things, be glad.⁷⁸⁵

The quoted text reminds us of Philodemus' distinction between the recalcitrant students (οἱ ἰσχυροί) and the obedient students (οἱ ἀπαλοί). Clement claims that there are people who are "difficult to cure". Like iron, they resist every form of treatment except the harshest treatment "with fire, hammer, and anvil". Softer forms of treatment involving praise, and whatever resembles praise, are lost on them. They can only learn from "threatening, reproof, and chastisement". On the other hand, there are people who "act of their own free will" and learn by means of praise. They can be said to be "self-taught".

In the above quotation Clement speaks about "whatever resembles praise or blame". The following text illustrates what other medicines beside blame and praise Clement thinks are "most essential of all to men":

παντὶ τοίνυν σθένει ὁ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος παιδαγωγός, ὁ θεῖος ἡμῶν λόγος, πάση καταχρώμενος σοφίας μηχανῇ, σφίζειν ἐπιβέβληται τοὺς νηπίους, νουθετῶν, ἐπιτιμῶν, ἐπιπλήττων, ἐλέγχων, ἀπειλούμενος, ἰώμενος, ἐπαγγελλόμενος, χαρίζόμενος, «πολλοῖς τισιν οἶονεὶ χαλινοῖς» τὰς ἀλόγους τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος «δεσμεύων» ὁρμάς.⁷⁸⁶

With all His power, therefore, the Instructor of humanity, the Divine Word, using all the resources of wisdom, devotes Himself to the saving of the children, admonishing,

⁷⁸³ See *supra*, Chapter Six, §2.2.

⁷⁸⁴ Clem., *Paed.* 1.10.94.1 (GCS 12, 145:28–32).

⁷⁸⁵ Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁷⁸⁶ Clem., *Paed.* 1.9.75.1 (GCS 12, 133:28–134:1).

upbraiding, blaming, chiding, reproving, threatening, healing, promising, favouring; and as it were, by many reins, curbing the irrational impulses of humanity.⁷⁸⁷

Not only praising, but also healing, promising, and favouring are accounted among the medicines necessary to save human beings. Similarly, not only blaming, but also admonishing, upbraiding, chiding, reproving, and threatening are part of the medicine box of the divine pedagogue.

Clement assumes that there are different gradations of exhortation. If the softer forms do not work, the stronger will be more efficient:

οὓς γὰρ ὁ ἔπαινος οὐ προτρέψατο, τούτους παρώξυνεν ὁ ψόγος· καὶ οὓς ὁ ψόγος οὐκ ἐξεκαλέσατο εἰς σωτηρίαν καθάπερ νεκροὺς, τούτους πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἢ βλασφημία διανίστησι.⁷⁸⁸

For those who are not induced by praise are spurred on by censure; and those whom censure calls not forth to salvation, being as dead, are by denunciation roused to the truth.⁷⁸⁹

Again, we are reminded of Philodemus' view that some need a more severe treatment of *παρρησία* than others. Clement mentions at least twelve different forms of hortatory blame: *νουθέτησις*, *ἐπιτίμησις*, *κατανεμέσησις*, *ἐπίπληξις*, *ἐπισκοπή*, *μέμψις*, *ἐλεγχος*, *φρένωσις*, *λοιδορία*, *ἐγκλησις*, *μεμψιμοιρία*, and *διάσυρις*.⁷⁹⁰ Almost all of these forms except for *κατανεμέσησις* and *ἐπισκοπή* are also mentioned by Philodemus: *νουθετέω* and cognates;⁷⁹¹ *ἐπιτιμάω* and cognates;⁷⁹² *ἐπιπλήττω* and cognates;⁷⁹³ *μέμφομαι* and cognates;⁷⁹⁴ *ἐλέγχω*;⁷⁹⁵ *φρενώω*;⁷⁹⁶ *λοιδορέω* and cognates;⁷⁹⁷ *ἐγκαλέω*;⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁸⁷ Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁷⁸⁸ Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.66.3 (GCS 12, 128:34–129:2).

⁷⁸⁹ Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁷⁹⁰ See Clem., *Paed.* 1.9 (GCS 12, 133:28–142:7).

⁷⁹¹ For *νουθετέω*, see *Lib.* frs. 13:4–5; 23:5; 35:2; *38:9–10; 45:3; 61:2; 73:1–2; 84:6; cols. XVIIa:14; XVIIIb:12; XIXb:2–3; XIXb: 8; XXIb:6–7; XXIIa: 6; Tab. V. For *νουθετεία*, see *Lib.* fr. 66:5–6. For *νουθετέον*, see *Lib.* col. VIIa:12. For *νουθετεύω*, see *Lib.* fr. 20:2. For *νουθετησία*, see *Lib.* fr. 91N:6. For *νουθέτησις*, see *Lib.* frs. 26:7; 32:4; 36:7–8; *39:15; *40:14; *73:1–2; 77:6–7. The asterisks refer to fragmentary texts where the editor of the text has conjecturally filled in the word himself.

⁷⁹² For *ἐπιτιμάω*, see *Lib.* frs. 6:8; 31:3; 38:7–8; *62:1; #93N:7; cols. IXb:9; XVb:12–13; XVIa:9; XIXa:11–12; XXIa:7; XXIIIa:3; XXIVb:4–5. For *ἐπιτίμησις*, see *Lib.* frs. 30:11; 75:2; 82:1; 84:7; cols. XXIa:3; XXIVa:1–2; tab. 4:I:2–3. The # refers to fragmentary texts where an alternative reading is possible that includes the word.

⁷⁹³ For *ἐπιπλήττω*, see *Lib.* col. XVIa:11–12. For *ἐπίπληξις*, see *Lib.* cols. XVIb:7; XIXb:4.

⁷⁹⁴ For *μέμφομαι*, see *Lib.* frs. 13:2–3; 87:8–9; col. XIXa:1–2. For *μεμπτός*, see *Lib.* cols. IXb:3; IXb:4; IXb:5; IXb:12.

⁷⁹⁵ See *Lib.* col. XVIb:7–8.

⁷⁹⁶ See *Lib.* col. XVIIb:4–5.

⁷⁹⁷ For *λοιδορέω*, see *Lib.* frs. 60:6–7; 79:12; col. Ib:10. For *λοιδορία*, see *Lib.* frs. 21:11; 60:5–6.

⁷⁹⁸ See *Lib.* fr. 74:8.

μεμψίμοιρος;⁷⁹⁹ διασυρτικός.⁸⁰⁰ Thus, Clement is akin to Philodemus in his depiction of the means of hortatory blame.

Reminiscent of Plutarch's formulation of the aim of practical παρρησία, Clement states that "dealing stringently with humanity is good and salutary [...] and conducive to repentance and the prevention of sins".⁸⁰¹ According to Clement, "stringent medicines" bring about a "salutary fear" in us with the result that "[t]he bitter roots of fear then arrest the eating sores of our sins".⁸⁰² Again reminiscent of Plutarch's formulation of the aim of practical παρρησία, Clement writes about the exhortatory discourse of the divine pedagogue:

προσμαρτυρεῖ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὁ παιδαγωγός, ἐκκαλεῖται δὲ τοὺς κλητοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω καὶ τοὺς ἀδικεῖν σπεύδοντας ἀποτρέπει τῆς ὀρμῆς, μεταθέσθαι δὲ εἰς ἀμείνω βίον παρακελεύεται.⁸⁰³

For the instructor testifies to the good, and summons forth to better things those that are called; dissuades those that are hastening to do wrong from the attempt, and exhorts them to turn to a better life.⁸⁰⁴

Like Plutarch, Clement promotes harsher forms of criticism towards those who need help in the struggle with their emotions and need to be exhorted to correct conduct. The aim is to "effect their release from the slavery, error, and captivity of the adversary" and to bring them "peacefully to the sacred concord of citizenship".⁸⁰⁵

In conclusion to the present section (2), I note that the idea of the two forms of παρρησία, or the two strategies of applying παρρησία, was widespread in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. The next section will research whether these two different strategies of applying παρρησία are also used by Jesus in the Fourth Gospel.

3. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

The present section will research to what extent the two forms of παρρησία, or, better said, the two strategies of using παρρησία, can also be traced in the Fourth Gospel. According to Jason Sturdevant, the Johannine Jesus uses sometimes only harsh instruction (John 6:26–27), and on other occasions a mixed method of gentle and harsh instruction (3:10; 7:37–38; 8:12). He only discusses the mentioned texts to illustrate how adaptable Jesus' teaching is in terms of mixing harshness with gentleness.⁸⁰⁶ I will

⁷⁹⁹ See *Lib.* col. IIa:3.

⁸⁰⁰ See *Lib.* fr. 37:8–9.

⁸⁰¹ Clem., *Paed.* 1.10.89.1 (GCS 12, 142:10–13). Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁸⁰² Clem., *Paed.* 1.9.83.2 (GCS 12, 138:26–139:2). Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁸⁰³ Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.74.3 (GCS 12, 133:18–21).

⁸⁰⁴ Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁸⁰⁵ Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.65.3 (GCS 12, 128:20–23). Trans. by Roberts – Donaldson.

⁸⁰⁶ See Sturdevant, *The Adaptable Jesus*, 84 and Sturdevant, "Incarnation as Psychagogy": 34.

provide a more elaborate analysis of the adaptability of Jesus' teaching against the background of the conventions of *παρρησία* depicted in the previous two sections.

Three elements in the text justify reading the adaptability of the Johannine Jesus' teaching through the lens of the conventions of *παρρησία* in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE: (i) Jesus is depicted as having a pre-knowledge of the psychological dispositions of his addressees: *αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐγίνωσκεν τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ* (John 2:25; cf. 6:64; 13:11; 16:30; 21:17); (ii) a second element is that Jesus intends to save the whole *κόσμος* (1:7; 3:14) implying that Jesus has to adapt to both those who receive him and those who violently resist his teaching; and (iii) a third element is that Jesus has always taught *παρρησία* (18:20; cf. 7:26; 10:24–25, 11:14, 54). When John integrated these three elements in his characterisation of Jesus, he most probably had particular expectations of the ability of his readers to detect the different forms/strategies of Jesus' *παρρησία* in Jesus' attempts to adapt to the psychological disposition of his interlocutors. At the same time, the first and second century readers of the Gospel could have had particular expectations when reading, Jesus taught *παρρησία* and knew what was in his interlocutors. Jesus' intent to save the whole *κόσμος* could have caused these readers to view Jesus' adaptability in light of the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* that prescribe the adaptation of *παρρησία* to both obedient and recalcitrant students/people. The present study does not assume that these readers necessarily knew the writings mentioned in the previous two sections. It is, however, reasonable to assume that John and his readers were indirectly influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*.

First, I will discuss passages where Jesus applies a mixed form of teaching involving both blame and praise (3.1 and 3.2). Second, I will look at passages where Jesus applies a simple form of teaching consisting of only blame (3.3). A separate treatment will be given to the composite parts of John 8:12–47, where Jesus applies a simple form of teaching in which he gradually intensifies the intensity of the harshness of his teaching (3.4). I will conclude the present section with an analysis of Jesus' death on the cross (3.5). All passages will be analysed from the perspective of the conventions of *παρρησία* contemporary to John.

3.1 THE MIXED FORM OF *παρρησία* IN THE FAREWELL DISCOURSE

Throughout the Farewell Discourse, Jesus' disciples are characterised as emotionally stressed by Jesus' teaching (John 14:1a; 16:6, 22a). They are similar to the obedient students or *οἱ ἀπαλοί* in Philodemus. They simply cannot bear too much of Jesus' *παρρησία* (16:12). The present subsection will discuss how Jesus adapts to the psychological disposition of the disciples in John 13:36–14:10 (see 3.1.1), 14:11–24 (see 3.1.2), 14:25–28 (see 3.1.3), and 16:25–32 (see 3.1.4).

3.1.1 John 13:36–14:10

In John 14, Jesus repeatedly mixes blame with praise. There is no break between 13:36–38 and John 14. Peter is the spokesperson of the disciples with his question *ποῦ*

ὑπάγεις; (13:36). In 13:36–38, Jesus corrects Peter that he will not be able to follow him into death and that he will deny him three times. Given that, here, Peter is presented as the spokesperson of the entire group of disciples, this criticism does not only affect Peter, but also the other disciples. Jesus immediately notices the troubled state of the disciples (including Peter) and softens his criticism by claiming that the disciples actually do believe in God and himself, and that they actually do know the way where Jesus is going, and can, thus, follow him (14:1–4).⁸⁰⁷ The praise in this text is not adequate to the state of the disciples, since Thomas begs to disagree and states that the disciples do not know the way (14:5). The rhetorical aim of this praise is to prepare the disciples for further criticism. By means of the *irrealis*, εἰ ἐγνώκεῖτε ἐμέ, καὶ τὸν πατέρα ὃν ᾔδειτε (14:7a–b), Jesus blames the disciples that they did not know him and the Father until now.⁸⁰⁸ This criticism is mixed with the praise that from now onwards the disciples know Jesus and have seen the Father: καὶ ἀπ’ ἄρτι γινώσκετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐώρακατε αὐτόν (14:7c–d). The rhetorical nature of Jesus’ praise is made visible by Philip’s reply: κύριε, δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ἄρκεῖ ἡμῖν (14:8). Jesus’ praise of the disciples that they see the Father in Jesus is inadequate, and has the rhetorical purpose to soften his criticism. In 14:9, Jesus responds to Philip with the questions: τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωνάς με, Φίλιππε; ὁ ἐώρακὼς ἐμέ ἐώρακεν τὸν πατέρα· πῶς σὺ λέγεις· δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν πατέρα; The question in 14:10 continues this criticism, because it implies that Philip does not believe in Jesus.

⁸⁰⁷ I assume here that the two occurrences of πιστεύετε in John 14:1 are present indicative instead of present imperative. In Johannine logic, believing in God implies believing in Jesus: see 14:6–7.

⁸⁰⁸ I follow here the reading of Codex Vaticanus *et al.* The *irrealis* is attested by many important MSS with small variations: (i) εἰ ἐγνώκετε με καὶ τὸν πατέρα μου ἀν ᾔδειτε (B *et al.*); (ii) εἰ ἐγνώκετε καὶ τὸν πατέρα μου ἐγνώκετε ἀν (A); and (iii) εἰ ἐγνώκετε ἐμε (D¹). Nestle-Aland 28, on the other hand, has a *realis*, εἰ ἐγνώκατέ με, καὶ τὸν πατέρα μου γνῶσεσθε, in the main text. The *realis* construction is attested by 8, D*, etc. In the reading of NA²⁸, John 14:7 consistently praises the disciples. For a more detailed depiction of the manuscript tradition of John 14:7, see Rueben J. Swanson (ed.), *New Testament Greek Manuscripts: Variant Readings Arranged in Horizontal Lines against Codex Vaticanus. John* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 199–200.

As Brown, *John (XIII–XXI)*, 621 remarks, “[t]he ms. evidence is almost evenly divided on what type of condition is meant”. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary*, 207 defends the view that the reading with the *realis* in John 14:7 is the more original reading. The reading with the *irrealis* is secondary “either because copyists recalled Jesus’ reproach against unbelieving Jews in 8.19 or because Philip’s question (ver. 8) and Jesus’ reply (ver. 9) suggested to them that the disciples knew neither Jesus nor the Father”. Kurt Aland criticises Metzger on the same page: “The Purpose of the Evangelist as well as the laws of textual development have been misunderstood. If a negative and a positive statement about the Apostles stand side by side in the textual tradition, the positive one is usually the later.” I agree with Aland on this matter. It is more likely that a corrector wanted to give a more positive view of the disciples that is contrasted by how the unbelieving ‘Jews’ are presented in John 8:19. The reading of John 14:7 in which Jesus criticises the disciples in the same way as the ‘Jews’ is the *lectio difficilior*. An additional argument for this position is, as mentioned by Brown (*John [XIII–XXI]*, 621), that John 14:7c–d fits the *realis* better. This makes the reading with the *realis* “suspect as an amelioration of a difficulty”. Therefore, I conclude that the reading with the *irrealis* is the earliest attainable reading. Another possibility is that both readings of John 14:7 existed independently of one another.

Jesus' approach throughout John 13:36–14:10 is consistent with Philodemus' and Clement's advice to apply a mild form of *παρρησία* towards those who are obedient and willing to learn from themselves. By mixing his *παρρησία* with praise, Jesus adapts to the psychological disposition of his disciples. Jesus is trying to correct the disciples in a way that they can bear. Jesus' approach also reminds us of Plutarch's depiction of therapeutic (corrective) *παρρησία*. Jesus is trying to correct the disciples' understanding of him in a way that is as painless as possible. Jesus' mixing of blame with praise seeks to convince the disciples that he only criticises them if necessary. At the same time, Jesus' praise, although inadequate to the disciples' state of mind, creates an image of the disciples that is in contrast with their actual behaviour. They are prompt to look upon themselves as examples of what is better, which causes them to feel ashamed about their actual deficient understanding of Jesus.

3.1.2 John 14:11–24

The focus changes in John 14:11 from the corrective to the exhortative: πιστεύετε μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· εἰ δὲ μή, διὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτὰ πιστεύετε. The exhortation is accompanied by a series of promises to the disciples. Throughout 14:12–24, Jesus is exceedingly gentle by presenting to the disciples the benefits of their future faith. Jesus promises the disciples that he who believes in him, will, also, do the works he does, and even greater works (14:12). Jesus will do everything they ask in Jesus' name (14:13–14). Jesus' promises need to encourage the disciples to keep Jesus' commandments (14:15). The exhortation is swiftly followed by the promise that Jesus will ask the Father to send "another Paraclete", "the Spirit of Truth" to the disciples, who will dwell in the disciples (14:16–17). Through this Paraclete, Jesus will come to the disciples and there will be a mutual indwelling of the disciples, Jesus, and the Father (14:18–20). This implies that the disciples will live just as Jesus will live (14:19). All these promises are again part of Jesus' strategy to motivate the disciples to keep Jesus' commandments (14:21). When not understood by Judas (not Iscariot) (14:22), Jesus repeats that the disciples need to keep Jesus' word(s) to become indwelled by Jesus and the Father (14:23–24).

Even when Jesus is protreptic and is exhorting the disciples to believe in him and hold his commandments, he is not harsh, but mild. Exhortations are accompanied by many promises. The disciples are not overcome by their emotions and do not violently need to be driven back from committing error. Plutarch's advice to use the harsh form of *παρρησία* does not apply here. Instead, just as Philodemus and Plutarch prescribe, Jesus adapts himself to the psychological disposition of the disciples and applies gentle admonishment.

3.1.3 John 14:25–28

The focus again shifts from the exhortative to the corrective. The disciples are, on the one hand, promised the teaching of the Paraclete (John 14:25–26) and Jesus' peace

(14:27). They are also reminded of Jesus' promise that he will come to them and dwell in them (14:28a–d). On the other hand, the disciples are criticised for not loving Jesus: εἰ ἡγαπᾶτέ με ἐχάρητε ἂν ὅτι πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα (14:28e–g).⁸⁰⁹ The *irrealis* construction ('contrary to fact') states: if the disciples loved Jesus, they would (have) rejoice(d) that Jesus is returning to his Father.⁸¹⁰ Their current state of fear (14:1, 27) shows that they do not love Jesus.

The strategy Jesus adopts in John 14:25–28 is one of mixing blame with the softening effects of promise. Promising is, as noted by Clement, similar to praising. Consequently, it is not surprising that Jesus softens his criticism by combining it with promises. It is part of Jesus' strategy to adapt his teaching to the psychological disposition of the disciples, who are at the moment in crisis (14:1, 27). As Plutarch prescribes, it is not good to punish and rebuke someone who is already in pain. Jesus follows Plutarch's advice to first strengthen and encourage them before criticising them.

3.1.4 John 16:25–32

Jesus promises the disciples that he will teach *παρησία* about the Father and that they will be able to ask everything of the Father, and they will receive it (John 16:25–26; cf. 16:23). The causal γάρ in 16:27a explains that the disciples can ask everything from the Father, because the Father himself loves them. The Father loves the disciples because they have loved Jesus and have believed that Jesus came from God (16:27b–d). In contradiction with what Jesus claimed earlier in 14:28e–g, he now praises the disciples for having loved (φιλέω) him, and for their belief that he came from the Father (16:27). Jesus' claim that he will return to his Father has previously troubled and saddened the hearts of the disciples (14:1, 27; 16:6). It can, therefore, not be said that Jesus' claim that he came from the Father and will return to the Father (16:28) is responsible for the disciples' recognition of Jesus' *παρησία* (16:29–30). Their acceptance of Jesus' *παρησία* is triggered by Jesus' praise of the disciples in 16:27. This praise seems to prepare the disciples for the criticism that their faith and love is inadequate or insufficient, because they will be scattered to their own and abandon Jesus at the hour of his death (16:31–32).⁸¹¹ We meet, again, Jesus' rhetorical strategy of creating an image of the disciples that contrasts with their actual behaviour and state of mind. The opposition

⁸⁰⁹ Some copyists (D, L, f¹³, 33, etc.) considered this presentation of the disciples as lacking love to be inadequate and changed the *irrealis* into a *realis* by reading ἀγαπᾶτε.

⁸¹⁰ The difficulty in translating the *irrealis* in John 14:28e–g is caused by the aorist ἐχάρητε, which can be either translated as “you would rejoice” (e.g., NRSV, KJV) or “you would have rejoiced” (e.g., Revised Standard Version, New American Standard Bible). The verbal aspect of the aorist allows for both translations.

⁸¹¹ John 16:32 implies that ἄρτι πιστεύετε; (16:31b) should be punctuated and read as a question. However, 16:31b remains ambiguous and can also be read as an affirmative claim: see *supra*, Chapter Three, §3.3.

between pre- and post-paschal time is suspended in John 16:27.⁸¹² The rhetorical aim of this suspension is to encourage the disciples to look at their present state and actions from the perspective of their post-paschal faith. The disciples are encouraged to look upon themselves as examples of what is better.

John 16:25–32 portrays Jesus as a teacher who combines blame with promises and praise. As Philodemus and Plutarch prescribe, Jesus adapts himself to the psychological disposition of his disciples, who are already in pain (16:6) and cannot bear too much criticism (16:12). As Plutarch advises, Jesus does not immediately correct those who are already in pain, but first strengthens them through promises (16:25–26; see also 16:7–11, 13–15, 22–24) and finally praise (16:27). Only after the disciples have recovered and have recognised Jesus' *παρρησία*, does Jesus correct the inadequate faith of the disciples (16:31–32). Yet, still in a moderate way, because Jesus' blame is immediately softened by his promise of peace and his victory over the *κόσμος* (16:33). The way Jesus corrects the disciples is in agreement with Plutarch's discussion of therapeutic (corrective) *παρρησία*. Through praise an image of the disciples is created that functions as a means of comparison for them. By comparing their actual behaviour and faith in Jesus with the post-paschal image of the disciples that Jesus projects into the pre-paschal time, the disciples are encouraged to improve themselves.

Jesus' use of the mixed form of *παρρησία* towards the disciples throughout the Farewell Discourse shows how adaptable Jesus is as a teacher. Jesus always looks for the limits of how much criticism his disciples can bear without crossing them: ἔτι πολλὰ ἔχω ὑμῖν λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθε βαστάζειν ἄρτι (John 16:12). The aim of the Farewell Discourse is to prepare the disciples for the *παρρησία* of Jesus' death on the cross (16:25). In order that the disciples do not fall away (*σκανδαλίζω*) or stumble over the *σκάνδαλον* of the cross (16:1),⁸¹³ Jesus repeatedly praises the disciples.

3.2 THE MIXED FORM OF *παρρησία* OUTSIDE THE FAREWELL DISCOURSE

The present subsection will focus on passages where Jesus applies a mild form of teaching outside the Farewell Discourse: John 1:46–51 (see 3.2.1), 3:9–10 (see 3.2.2), and 20:24–29 (see 3.2.3).

3.2.1 John 1:46–51

Nathanael is rather sceptical about Philip's view that Jesus is the promised Messiah: ἐκ Ναζαρετ δύναται τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; (John 1:46). Jesus seems to be aware of Nathanael's

⁸¹² For the argumentation for this understanding of pre- and post-paschal time in John 16:27, see *supra*, Chapter Three, §3.3.

⁸¹³ In my interpretation of John 16:1, ταῦτα is anaphoric and refers to all what has been said in John 14–15. Just like in 6:61, *σκανδαλίζω* refers here to the *σκάνδαλον* τοῦ σταυροῦ in the Pauline sense. The event of Jesus' life-giving and salvific death on the cross is presented here as a scandal. *Contra*, e.g., Thyen, *Johannes*, 371–372, who regards the persecutions mentioned in 16:2 as the *σκάνδαλα* that could cause the disciples to lose faith.

precarious state of faith, and, therefore, does not employ *παρρησία* directly, but first praises Nathanael in an unveiled way: ἴδε ἀληθῶς Ἰσραηλίτης ἐν ᾧ δόλος οὐκ ἔστιν (1:47). Nathanael reacts surprised as to how Jesus can know him, and Jesus explains that he previously saw him under a fig tree (1:48). Nathanael enthusiastically reacts: ῥαββί, σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, σὺ βασιλεὺς εἶ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ (1:49). Now, Jesus perceives that Nathanael can receive criticism and he reacts: ὅτι εἰπὼν σοι ὅτι εἶδόν σε ὑποκάτω τῆς συκῆς, πιστεύεις; μείζω τούτων ὄψῃ (1:50). According to many scholars, regardless of whether one reads πιστεύεις as an affirmative or an interrogative proposition, Jesus' response does not contain criticism, but approves of Nathanael's confession.⁸¹⁴ Schnackenburg articulates what these scholars silently assume: Nathanael could not have come to faith in any other way than on the basis of Jesus' words in 1:48.⁸¹⁵ In my view, these authors neglect that Philip became a willing follower of Jesus solely on the basis of Jesus' invitation to follow him (1:43). Philip is portrayed as an imitative agent of Jesus by means of his invitation to Nathanael: ἔρχου καὶ ἴδε (1:46; cf. 1:39).⁸¹⁶ He did not require a miracle to recognise Jesus as the one about whom Moses and the prophets wrote. His confession seems to rely only on his knowledge that Jesus is from Nazareth as the son of Joseph (1:45).⁸¹⁷ Unlike for Philip, this origin in Nazareth made Nathanael sceptical about Jesus (1:46). Nathanael resembles the 'Jews' in 6:42 in this regard. Aware of Nathanael's scepticism, Jesus realises that he cannot criticise Nathanael directly, but first praises him (1:47) before criticising that he requires miracles to come to faith (1:50). Jesus' praise has the rhetorical aim to prepare his disciples for criticism.

The fact that Nathanael accepts Philip's invitation and goes to Jesus (cf. ἐρχόμενον πρὸς αὐτόν, John 1:46) shows that Nathanael is willing to take Jesus' messianic claim into consideration, although he knows Jesus is from Nazareth. This willingness to go and see makes Nathanael alike to Philodemus' obedient students (οἱ ἀπαλοί). As Philodemus prescribed in his time, Jesus employs a mixed form of *παρρησία* involving both blame and praise to teach Nathanael. In agreement with Plutarch's depiction of therapeutic (corrective) *παρρησία*, Jesus corrects Nathanael in a way that is as painless as possible. Furthermore, thanks to Jesus' praise, Nathanael is made susceptible to Jesus' *παρρησία*.

⁸¹⁴ See, e.g., Bultmann, *Johannes*, 74 n. 2; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 90; Cornelis Bennema, *Encountering Jesus: Character Studies in the Gospel of John* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 66–68; Thyen, *Johannes*, 142.

⁸¹⁵ See Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium*, vol. 1, *Einleitung und Kommentar zu Kap. 1–4* (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), 317.

⁸¹⁶ Cf. Paul N. Anderson, "Philip: A Connective Figure in Polyvalent Perspective," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 168–188, at 176: "Philip's recognizing and following Jesus at the outset signals the exemplary path for others to follow".

⁸¹⁷ I agree with Steven A. Hunt, "Nathanael: Under the Fig Tree on the Fourth Day," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 189–201, at 199–201 that the emphasis on Ναζαρέτ in John 1:45–46 in connection to Nathanael's confession of Jesus as the king of Israel (1:49) suggests that Ναζαρέτ has a double meaning here. This requires further enquiry.

By being praised, Nathanael is convinced of Jesus' good will towards him so that he can better accept his criticism.

3.2.2 John 3:9–10

Nicodemus is unable to understand how γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν can take place: πῶς δύναται ταῦτα γενέσθαι; (John 3:9). Jesus reacts by both praising and blaming Nicodemus: σὺ εἶ ὁ διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ γινώσκεις; (3:10). There is disagreement among commentators whether the article in ὁ διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ presents Nicodemus as the greatest teacher of Israel or that Nicodemus is depicted as a teacher of Israel among others who represent the teaching of Israel.⁸¹⁸ What is certain is that Jesus presents Nicodemus as a teacher of Israel, just as Nicodemus has called Jesus a teacher (ῥαββί, 3:2). This is undoubtedly viewed as a respectable title with which Jesus praises Nicodemus. The praise is immediately followed by the blame καὶ ταῦτα οὐ γινώσκεις; Jesus blames Nicodemus that he is not familiar with γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν.

Nicodemus calls Jesus ῥαββί and “a teacher coming from God” (John 3:2c–e). His nocturnal visit (3:2a) might signal that he does not publicly want to become a disciple of Jesus. He is, rather, depicted as a secret disciple of Jesus. His willingness to learn from Jesus characterises him as similar to Philodemus' obedient students (οἱ ἀπαλοί). Given the psychological disposition of Nicodemus, Jesus applies, as Philodemus prescribes, a mixed form of παρρησία involving both blame and praise. As Plutarch advises, praise is used to provide Nicodemus with an image of himself that is highly contrastive with his factual misunderstanding of Jesus' words. An internal rivalry is created between the idea of Nicodemus as a teacher of Israel and Nicodemus' factual misunderstanding of γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν. The aim is to make Nicodemus feel ashamed of his actual misunderstanding of Jesus' words. Jesus' use of παρρησία in 3:10 is corrective, and is consistent with Plutarch's depiction of therapeutic (corrective) παρρησία.

3.2.3 John 20:24–29

Thomas was not present when Jesus appeared to the disciples after his death (John 20:24). He cannot believe that Jesus has risen without having seen this for himself, and having felt the marks of the nails in Jesus' hands and having put his hand in Jesus' side (20:25). Jesus is aware of this and provides Thomas with the opportunity to do so (20:27). Thomas' reaction in 20:28 (ὁ κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου) is considered by Thyen to be “das adäquateste und gefüllteste Bekenntnis des gesamten Evangeliums”, the culmination of the previous predications about Jesus. At the same time, as equally noted by Thyen, Thomas is repeating elements from the Prologue (θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος [1:1]; μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο [1:18]) that have previously not been

⁸¹⁸ For the first position, see, e.g., Barrett, *John*, 211; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 1, 388; BDR, §273. For the second position, see, e.g., Bultmann, *Johannes*, 103 n. 1; Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 131; Thyen, *Johannes*, 193.

uttered by any literary character in the Gospel.⁸¹⁹ When read as a question, Jesus' reply in 20:29b–c (ὅτι ἑώρακάς με πεπίστευκας) questions, and is critical of, the faith of Thomas. As Thomas is the first to unambiguously declare that Jesus is God, I consider it inapt to read Jesus' reply as questioning the faith of Thomas. It is more probable that Jesus' reply should be read as a statement. When read as a statement, Jesus' reply praises the faith of Thomas. As I have shown above in the present section, Jesus has praised the faith of his disciples for less.⁸²⁰

As in the previously mentioned cases, Jesus' praise has the rhetorical aim to prepare his disciples for criticism: μακάριοι οἱ μὴ ἰδόντες καὶ πιστεύσαντες (John 20:29d). I agree with Sylva that Thomas is contrasted here with those who do not see and yet believe. Unlike Thomas, the royal official has learned from Jesus' signs (4:48) that Jesus has power over death and is, therefore, able to believe in the sign of the healing of his son without having to experience it (4:50).⁸²¹ This implies that the faith of Thomas is praiseworthy, but valued less than the faith of those who have faith in Jesus' power over death without having experienced the resurrection of Jesus. Jesus praises Thomas' perception of Jesus as God, but criticises that he requires an experience of the resurrection to come to faith. Some, like Thomas, require an experience of the resurrection to come to faith, whereas others, like the royal official, have faith in Jesus' power over death without having to experience a resurrection appearance.

Thomas is definitely willing to follow Jesus (John 11:16) and to learn from him (14:5). As such, he is similar to Philodemus' obedient students (οἱ ἀπαλοί). As Philodemus prescribed in his time, Jesus employs a mixed form of *παρρησία* involving both blame and praise to teach Thomas. The corrective character of the blame in 20:29 makes Jesus' use of the mixed form of *παρρησία* similar to Plutarch's therapeutic (corrective) *παρρησία*. As Plutarch advises, Jesus' *παρρησία* hurts as little as possible by first praising Thomas before criticising him. Furthermore, the praise itself makes Thomas susceptible to criticism. As Plutarch claims, by being praised we experience the *εὐνοία* of the speaker that enables us to endure his *παρρησία*.

The present subsection (3.2) has demonstrated that, also, outside the Farewell Discourse, the Johannine Jesus uses a mixed form of *παρρησία* towards the disciples and Nicodemus. By combining criticism with praise, the Johannine Jesus adapts to the psychological disposition of the disciples and Nicodemus in agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*. Given that the disciples and Nicodemus are willing to learn from Jesus, the mild or mixed form of *παρρησία* suffices to teach them.

3.3 THE SIMPLE FORM OF *παρρησία*

The 'Jews' and the crowd are characterised as blind and hardened throughout the Fourth Gospel (e.g., John 9:39–41; 12:40). They are similar to the recalcitrant students or

⁸¹⁹ Thyen, *Johannes*, 767.

⁸²⁰ See the examples of Jesus' praise mentioned above, under §§3.1–2.

⁸²¹ See Sylva, *Thomas*, 102–103.

οἱ ἰσχυροί in Philodemus. The present subsection will discuss how Jesus adapts to their psychological disposition in John 5:37–38 (see 3.3.1), 5:41–42 (see 3.3.2), 6:26–27, 36 (see 3.3.3), and 7:14–31 (see 3.3.4).

3.3.1 John 5:37–38

The first example where we find Jesus' use of a simple form of παρρησία is in John 5:37–38:

καὶ ὁ πέμψας με πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος μεμαρτύρηκεν περὶ ἐμοῦ. οὔτε φωνὴν αὐτοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε οὔτε εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἐωράκατε, καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε ἐν ὑμῖν μένοντα, ὅτι ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος, τοῦτο ὑμεῖς οὐ πιστεύετε.

The sharpness and the polemical character of John 5:37–38 have been noted by Schnackenburg and Thyen.⁸²² I agree with Bieringer that Jesus cannot be criticising the whole Jewish people, because biblical passages attest that the people of Israel have heard God's voice (Deut 4:12), and saw the appearance (εἶδος) of his glory (Exod 24:17; cf. Gen 32:31).⁸²³ Bieringer's literary analysis of John 5:31–47 has made plausible that ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, and ἔχετε in 5:37–38 are directed to the same persons as the 'Jews' addressed in 5:33–35. According to Bieringer, this implies that οὔτε φωνὴν αὐτοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε οὔτε εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἐωράκατε (5:37b–c) is not an insult to the Jewish people, but an exhortation to the 'Jews' addressed in this particular context to hear the voice of God, and see his appearance, just as their forefathers have done.⁸²⁴ In agreement with Bieringer's analysis, I remark that 5:37b–c serves to explain why the 'Jews' did not believe in Jesus, the one sent by God. God has born witness to Jesus (5:37a). The reason why the 'Jews' were unable to accept Jesus is because they have never heard the voice of God (5:37b), nor seen his appearance (5:37c). The καί in 5:38a is cumulative, because one has to distinguish between φωνή and λόγος. The 'Jews' do not have the word of God in them, because they do not believe in Jesus (5:38). Although Jesus is aware that God spoke to the people of Israel, and Moses in particular, Jesus is providing a discreditable explanatory ground to explain why the 'Jews' reject him: the 'Jews' have never heard the voice of God, nor seen his form.

Jesus' use of the severe or simple form of παρρησία towards the 'Jews' in John 5:37–38 is motivated by the 'Jews'' persecution of Jesus (5:16), and their intent to kill Jesus (5:18). Similar to the recalcitrant students (οἱ ἰσχυροί) in Philodemus, the 'Jews' resist Jesus' teaching, and require a severe form of παρρησία. The 'Jews' are to commit ἁμαρτία by killing Jesus. As Plutarch prescribes, Jesus employs a severe form of παρρησία in which he explains what is taking place in a discreditable way, namely, by stating that the

⁸²² See Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 175 and Thyen, *Johannes*, 322.

⁸²³ Additional biblical passages, not mentioned by Bieringer, attest that God spoke to the people of Israel (Deut 6:5) and with Moses as with a friend (Exod 33:11).

⁸²⁴ See Reimund Bieringer, "'Ihr habt weder seine Stimme gehört noch seine Gestalt je gesehen' (Joh 5,37): Antijudaismus und Johanneische Christologie," in *Studies in the Gospel of John and its Christology*, 165–188, at 180–188.

‘Jews’ never heard the voice of God, nor saw his appearance. The aim of this severe criticism is to drive the ‘Jews’ back from doing wrong, and to stir them into correct conduct. The use of the simple or severe form of παρρησία in 5:37–38 is, thus, in agreement with what Plutarch prescribes concerning the use of practical (preventive) παρρησία. Although the criticism in 5:37–38 is often regarded as being anti-Jewish, the text can also be viewed as integrating a pedagogical strategy by means of which Jesus seeks to bring the ‘Jews’ to believe in him.⁸²⁵

3.3.2 John 5:41–42

The second text where we see Jesus using a simple form of παρρησία is in John 5:41–42: δόξαν παρὰ ἀνθρώπων οὐ λαμβάνω, ἀλλὰ ἔγνωκα ὑμᾶς ὅτι τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. Schnackenburg states that 5:41–42 has a “polemische Schärfe, die nur von 8,37–58 (Teufelskindschaft) noch übertroffen wird”.⁸²⁶ Parallel to the blame in 5:38 that the ‘Jews’ do not have the word of God abiding in them, Jesus criticises the ‘Jews’ in 5:42 for not having, in themselves, the love of God. The genitive in τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ θεοῦ can be interpreted as subjective or objective.⁸²⁷ The ambiguity might be conscious. John 3:19 suggests an objective genitive: καὶ ἠγάπησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον τὸ σκότος ἢ τὸ φῶς. The fact that humans loved darkness more than light entails that the ‘Jews’ did not love God and, therefore, rejected Jesus. John 3:16 implies a subjective genitive, because it presents Jesus as the revelation of God’s love to the world. Given that the ‘Jews’ reject Jesus, they have at the same time rejected God’s love for them. When viewed as an objective genitive, the ‘Jews’ are blamed to have disobeyed the first commandment: to love God (Deut 6:5; cf. Mark 12:28–29 par. Matt 22:37). When viewed as a subjective genitive, the ‘Jews’ are criticised for having rejected God’s love for them through Jesus. For John, both criticisms are complementary to one another: rejecting God’s love entails not loving God, and vice versa.

In John 5:41–42, Jesus is, again, adapting his παρρησία to the psychological disposition of the ‘Jews’, who, like Philodemus’ recalcitrant students, can only be taught by means of a severe or simple form of παρρησία. As Plutarch advises, Jesus explains what is taking place by means of a discreditable explanatory ground: the ‘Jews’ are persecuting and seeking to kill Jesus, because they do not love God. The aim of the severe criticism is to drive the ‘Jews’ back from doing wrong and to stir them into correct conduct. The use of the simple or severe form of παρρησία in 5:41–42 is, thus, in agreement with what Plutarch prescribes concerning the use of practical (preventive)

⁸²⁵ For the view that John 5:37–38 is anti-Jewish, see, e.g., Ulrich Wilckens, “Das Neue Testament und die Juden,” *EvTh* 34 (1974) 602–611: at 611. See also the studies mentioned under n. 837 and my reflection on the theme in the intermediate conclusion of the present chapter.

⁸²⁶ Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 178.

⁸²⁷ For the interpretation of τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ θεοῦ as a subjective genitive, see, e.g., Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 226; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 178. For the interpretation as an objective genitive, see, e.g., Bultmann, *Johannes*, 202 n. 5; Barrett, *John*, 269; Zumstein, *Jean (I–I2)*, 202 n. 145; Thyen, *Johannes*, 325.

παρρησία. Although often read as being anti-Jewish, the text can also be evaluated as integrating a pedagogical strategy through which Jesus seeks to bring the ‘Jews’ to believe in him.⁸²⁸

3.3.3 John 6:26–27, 36

The third and fourth examples where Jesus uses a simple form of παρρησία are in John 6:26–27 and 6:36. In 6:26–27, Jesus responds to the crowd who seeks Jesus:

ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ζητεῖτέ με οὐχ ὅτι εἶδετε σημεῖα, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐφάγετε ἐκ τῶν ἄρτων καὶ ἐχορτάσθητε. ἐργάζεσθε μὴ τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν ἀπολλυμένην ἀλλὰ τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν μένουσαν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἣν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑμῖν δώσει.

The crowd is reproached by Jesus for seeking him, not because they saw signs but, because they were filled with bread when Jesus performed the miracle of the feeding of the 5000 (6:1–14). Thyen, correctly, observes that εἶπον ὑμῖν in 6:36 refers back to 6:26.⁸²⁹ In 6:36, Jesus criticises the crowd in a way that is completely opposite to how he later praises the disciples in 14:7c–d: ἐωράκατέ [με] καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε (6:36).⁸³⁰ Why does Jesus treat the crowd in a more severe way than the disciples?

One possible explanation is that the criticism in John 6:26 itself suggests that the crowd is overcome by its emotions and, therefore, tends to commit error. The crowd only seeks Jesus to satisfy its appetites. That the crowd is overcome by emotion is also implied by 6:15, where the crowd is said to intend to grasp Jesus to make him king. They want to turn Jesus into a national leader. As Plutarch prescribes, to prevent the crowd from doing wrong, and to help them fight their emotions, Jesus uses a severe form of παρρησία. The exhortative blame in 6:26–27, 36 is, thus, in agreement with what Plutarch writes about the use of practical (preventive) παρρησία. Jesus refers to a discreditable explanatory ground to explain why the crowd is seeking Jesus.

Furthermore, in retrospect, one can say that Jesus also adapted himself to the psychological disposition of at least a subgroup of the crowd. When Jesus’ interlocutors become hostile, John no longer calls them the crowd, but the ‘Jews’ (John 6:41–52). According to Cornelis Bennema, “[w]hile it is possible that the crowd consists of ‘the Jews,’ it is more likely that from among the crowd of common Galileans a group of ‘the Jews’ emerges and becomes openly hostile towards Jesus.” Both this emerging out of the crowd and their “increased hostility demand that they be distinguished from the crowd”.⁸³¹ In my view, if the ‘Jews’ emerge from the crowd, this means that they were initially part of the crowd. In retrospect, one can say that the recalcitrance of the ‘Jews’ (6:41, 52), who were initially part of the crowd, caused Jesus to opt for a severe form of

⁸²⁸ For the view that John 5:42 is anti-Jewish, see, e.g., Klaus Wengst, *Das Johannesevangelium*, Neuausgabe, THKNT 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2019), 181–182. See, also, the studies mentioned under n. 838 and my reflection on the theme in the intermediate conclusion of the present chapter.

⁸²⁹ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 353.

⁸³⁰ John 14:7c–d: καὶ ἂπ’ ἄρτι γινώσκετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐωράκατε αὐτόν.

⁸³¹ Bennema, “The Crowd,” 348.

παρρησία in 6:26–27, 36. This is in agreement with what Philodemus writes on the treatment of recalcitrant students.

3.3.4 John 7:14–31⁸³²

In John 7:26, the Jerusalemites note that Jesus spoke παρρησία in the temple. Which strategy does Jesus adopt to teach παρρησία in the temple? The ‘Jews’ resist Jesus’ teaching, and wonder how Jesus can read without having received education: πῶς οὗτος γράμματα οἶδεν μὴ μεμαθηκώς; (7:15). In response, Jesus applies a simple or severe form of παρρησία consisting only in blame:

ἢ ἐμὴ διδαχὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὴ ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέμψαντός με· ἐάν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, γνώσεται περὶ τῆς διδαχῆς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐγὼ ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ λαλῶ. ὁ ἀφ’ ἐαυτοῦ λαλῶν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἰδίαν ζητεῖ· ὁ δὲ ζητῶν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν οὗτος ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν καὶ ἀδικία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὸν νόμον; καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐξ ὑμῶν ποιεῖ τὸν νόμον. τί με ζητεῖτε ἀποκτεῖναι; (7:16–19)

The blame, especially that the ‘Jews’ do not practice the law of Moses, is rather severe. No praise or other softening elements are used in 7:16–19. In response, not the ‘Jews’, but the crowd is agitated by Jesus and reacts with verbal violence: δαιμόνιον ἔχεις· τίς σε ζητεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι; (7:20). Again, Jesus reacts by using only blame without softening his criticism with praise or other elements:

ἐν ἔργον ἐποίησα καὶ πάντες θαυμάζετε. διὰ τοῦτο Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὴν περιτομήν· οὐχ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Μωϋσέως ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν πατέρων· καὶ ἐν σαββάτῳ περιτέμνετε ἄνθρωπον. εἰ περιτομὴν λαμβάνει ἄνθρωπος ἐν σαββάτῳ ἵνα μὴ λυθῇ ὁ νόμος Μωϋσέως, ἐμοὶ χολᾶτε ὅτι ὅλον ἄνθρωπον ὑγιῇ ἐποίησα ἐν σαββάτῳ; μὴ κρίνετε κατ’ ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν κρίνετε (7:21–24).

Although Jesus directly replies to the crowd (7:21a–b: ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς), the criticism that follows in 7:21–24 refers back to Jesus’ healing of the paralytic on the Sabbath, where the ‘Jews’ react by persecuting Jesus (5:16). Thus, not only the crowd, but also the ‘Jews’ are blamed for judging by appearances, instead of judging with right judgement (7:24). Some of the Jerusalemites are surprised that the authorities allow Jesus to speak παρρησία (7:25–26). They cannot accept Jesus’ παρρησία, because they know where Jesus comes from and suppose that “no one will know where the Christ comes from” (7:27). Jesus, in response, resumes teaching with a simple or severe form of παρρησία crying out in the temple:

⁸³² John 7:14–31 has previously been discussed in Chapter Six, §3.1 to illustrate the tentative and experimental nature of Jesus’ παρρησία. In the intermediate conclusion of the present chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the stochastic or experimental use of παρρησία and the two forms of παρρησία.

κάμῃ οἶδατε καὶ οἶδατε πόθεν εἰμί· καὶ ἀπ’ ἐμαντοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς ὁ πέμψας με, ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἶδατε· ἐγὼ οἶδα αὐτόν, ὅτι παρ’ αὐτοῦ εἰμι καὶ ἐκείνός με ἀπέστειλεν (7:28–29).

Again, no praise or other softening elements are present. Only the blame that they do not know the one who sent Jesus. Jesus’ audience is affected in a double way. Whereas presumably the ‘Jews’ attempted to arrest Jesus (7:30), many of the crowd considered the possibility that Jesus is the Christ: ὁ χριστὸς ὅταν ἔλθῃ μὴ πλείονα σημεῖα ποιήσει ὢν οὗτος ἐποίησεν; (7:31).

Three distinct groups of people who receive Jesus’ teaching are mentioned in John 7:14–31: the ‘Jews’ (7:15, 30), the crowd (7:20, 31), and the Jerusalemites (7:25–27). The crowd is clearly distinct from the ‘Jews’ because the former does not speak *παρρησία* about Jesus due to fear of the latter (7:11–13). The Pharisees later label the crowd as ignorant of the law (7:49). The Jerusalemites, also, distinguish themselves from the authorities (7:26). At the same time, the psychological disposition of the ‘Jews’ and the crowd are similar to one another. As noted by Bennema, “both ‘the Jews’ and the crowd” grumble (γογγύζω) about Jesus (6:41; 7:12, 32) and “both accuse him of being demon-possessed” (7:20; 8:48, 52).⁸³³ In contrast with its theological discernment (7:25–27, 31, 40–41), the crowd is aggressive towards Jesus (7:12, 20, 32, 44).⁸³⁴ In my view, both the ‘Jews’ and the crowd are, thus, similar to Philodemus’ recalcitrant students (οἱ ἰσχυροί), who are easily agitated and violently resist *παρρησία*. As Philodemus prescribed in his time, Jesus applies a severe or simple form of *παρρησία* to teach them. Jesus obtains positive results among the crowd in 7:31. Concerning the Jerusalemites, I remark that we only know of them that they are surprised that Jesus’ *παρρησία* is tolerated, and that they reject Jesus on the basis of their knowledge of Jesus’ origin. Although they are not violent in their rejection, their open rejection of Jesus shows that they are rather recalcitrant towards Jesus. From the perspective of Philodemus, it is, therefore, not surprising that Jesus, also, addresses them with a simple or severe form of *παρρησία*.

The strategy of Jesus’ *παρρησία* in John 7:14–31 is exhortative/preventive rather than corrective. Faced with the grumbling of the crowd (7:12) and the fact that the ‘Jews’ seek to kill Jesus (7:19c–d), Jesus tries to prevent them from committing error/sin by providing discreditable explanatory grounds to explain what is taking place. Jesus presents his interlocutors as not keeping the law of Moses (7:19a–b), as judging artificially (7:24), and as not knowing God (7:28). All three explanatory grounds seek to explain why they violently reject Jesus and seek to kill him. The aim of this severe/simple use of *παρρησία* is to drive them back from committing error/sin and to exhort them to act correctly. Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* in 7:14–31 is, thus, in agreement with what Plutarch writes on the use of practical (preventive) *παρρησία*.

The present subsection (3.3) has demonstrated that Jesus consistently applies a severe or simple form of *παρρησία* when his addressees are recalcitrant and violently resistant

⁸³³ Bennema, “The Crowd,” 349–350.

⁸³⁴ See Bennema, “The Crowd,” 352.

to his teaching. Jesus' *παρρησία* adapts to the psychological disposition of his addressees in agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*.

3.4 THE GRADUAL INTENSIFICATION OF *παρρησία*

The present subsection will discuss the composite parts of the dialogue in John 8:12–47, where Jesus gradually intensifies the severity of his teaching: John 8:12–20 (see 3.4.1), 8:21–30 (see 3.4.2), 8:31–37 (see 3.4.3), and 8:38–47 (see 3.4.4).

3.4.1 John 8:12–20

Addressing the arguing Pharisees (αὐτοῖς, John 8:12) from the previous scene in 7:45–52, Jesus says: ἐγὼ εἰμι τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ ἀκολουθῶν ἐμοὶ οὐ μὴ περιπατήσει ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἔξει τὸ φῶς τῆς ζωῆς (8:12). Jesus, at first, adopts a rather mild form of instruction involving both promise and threat/warning simultaneously. Those who follow him are promised the light of life, whereas those who do not follow him will walk in darkness. Jesus' approach proves much too gentle for the Pharisees, who immediately object to Jesus: σὺ περὶ σεαυτοῦ μαρτυρεῖς· ἡ μαρτυρία σου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής (8:13). In a harsher way Jesus corrects the view of the Pharisees that his testimony is false, because he bears witness to himself. Jesus claims that his testimony is true, because he knows where he comes from and where he is going (8:14c–f). He, first, blames the Pharisees that they do not know where he comes from and where he is going: ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ οἴδατε πόθεν ἔρχομαι ἢ ποῦ ὑπάγω (8:14g–i). He explains their error by claiming that they judge “according to the flesh” (κατὰ τὴν σάρκα, 8:15). Second, Jesus blames the Pharisees that they do not know him nor the Father: οὔτε ἐμὲ οἴδατε οὔτε τὸν πατέρα μου· εἰ ἐμὲ ᾔδειτε, καὶ τὸν πατέρα μου ἂν ᾔδειτε (8:19). This explains why the Pharisees do not see that there are two witnesses to Jesus: Jesus and the Father (8:18). The testimony of two men is true (8:17).

What we see in John 8:12–20 is a strategy that is valued by Philodemus, Plutarch, and Clement: gradually intensifying *παρρησία*. The aim is to heal someone with as less pain as possible. If the milder form of *παρρησία* is not effective, a harsher form will be tried. The milder form of instruction in John 8:12 was not very productive, so that Jesus intensifies his *παρρησία* throughout 8:13–19 by using blame without praise or other softening elements. In the next subsection, we will see how Jesus further intensifies his *παρρησία* throughout 8:21–30.

3.4.2 John 8:21–30

Addressing the same audience (αὐτοῖς, John 8:21) as in 8:12–20, Jesus says: ἐγὼ ὑπάγω καὶ ζητήσετέ με, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ ὑμῶν ἀποθανεῖσθε· ὅπου ἐγὼ ὑπάγω ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν (8:21). The threat/warning in 8:21 is much more severe than the one in 8:12. In 8:12, Jesus' addressees were exhorted to follow him combined with the threat/warning that they will, otherwise, walk in darkness. In 8:21, Jesus says that they are unable to follow him where he is going. They will seek him, but unable to follow

Jesus where he is going, they will die in their sin/error. The ‘Jews’ misunderstand Jesus and think that Jesus is talking about killing himself (8:22). The aim of the threat, that they will die in their sin/error, is clarified in 8:24: εἶπον οὖν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν· ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ πιστεύσητε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν. The aim of the threat/warning, that they will die in their sins/errors, is to bring them to believe who Jesus is. Whereas Jesus’ interlocutors rejected the exhortation in 8:12, they receive the harsher exhortation in 8:24 with more interest, and ask who Jesus is (8:25b). Rhetorically interesting, in Jesus’ reply (8:25d–26, 28), is that Jesus promises them that they will know his true identity when they have lifted up the Son of Man: ὅταν ὑψώσητε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τότε γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι (8:28b–d). The narrator states that many believed in Jesus, when he spoke these words (8:30).

The harsher treatment with παρρησία throughout John 8:21–30 seems to have a greater effect on Jesus’ addressees than the milder treatment in 8:12–20. The recalcitrant reaction of the Pharisees in 8:13 certainly justified Jesus in intensifying his παρρησία. By gradually becoming more severe, Jesus adapts to the psychological disposition of the ‘Jews’. The harsh threats/warnings in 8:21, 24, followed by the promise in 8:28b–d, resulted in the faith of many of the ‘Jews’ (8:30). Jesus’ gradual intensification of his παρρησία is in agreement with what Philodemus and Plutarch prescribe.⁸³⁵

3.4.3 John 8:31–37

The intensity of Jesus’ παρρησία in John 8:21–30 did not prove to be sufficient to permanently bring the ‘Jews’ to faith. According to Thyen *et al.*, the hostility of the ‘Jews’ and their intention to kill Jesus (8:37, 40, 59) imply that the perfect participle τοὺς πεπιστευκότας in 8:31, has a pluperfect meaning. The participle indicates that the ‘Jews’ who are reported to have faith in Jesus (8:30) already had lost their faith by 8:31.⁸³⁶ As I will argue in the present subsection, just like in 8:12–20 and 8:21–30, Jesus applies the same strategy of intensifying his παρρησία in 8:31–37.

Towards the ‘Jews’ who had believed in him, Jesus promises: ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μένητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ μου ἔστε. καὶ γνώσεσθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς (John 8:31–32). This mild form of instruction has no effect on the ‘Jews’, as they object that they are “descendants of Abraham, and have never been slaves to anyone”. They do not understand why Jesus can say: “you will be made free” (8:33). Jesus intensifies his παρρησία by reformulating the former promise in 8:31–32 as a threat/warning. Jesus explains that “everyone who commits error/sin (ἁμαρτία) is a slave to error/sin” (8:34). Only Jesus can free someone from error/sin (8:35–36). The error/sin that the ‘Jews’ are to commit, and are enslaved to, is identified by Jesus as the intent of the ‘Jews’ to kill him (8:37). With other words: if they do not remain in Jesus’ word, the ‘Jews’ will commit error/sin and become slaves to error/sin.

⁸³⁵ The gradual intensification of παρρησία throughout John 8:12–30 is, also, a fine illustration of Jesus’ experimental or stochastic use of παρρησία.

⁸³⁶ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 433–434 and the literature mentioned there.

The shift from promising to threatening in John 8:31–37 is subtle. Nowhere does Jesus directly address the ‘Jews’ as being slaves of ἁμαρτία. He even admits that the ‘Jews’ are σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ (8:37a–b). As Jesus’ word finds no place in them, they seek to kill Jesus (8:37c–e). The ‘Jews’ are encouraged to see themselves as being slaves to error/sin because they seek to kill Jesus. Although Jesus knows that the ‘Jews’ are the descendants of Abraham, and have never been enslaved, he presents the ‘Jews’ as the slaves of error/sin in order to explain why they do not accept his word and seek to kill him. As Plutarch prescribes, Jesus provides a discreditable ground of explanation to explain what is taking place. In agreement with Plutarch’s understanding of practical (or preventive) παρρησία, Jesus seeks to drive the ‘Jews’ back from committing error/sin by means of a severe or pure form of παρρησία. He exhorts them to correct conduct and to remain in his word. Jesus’ παρρησία will further intensify in 8:38–47.

3.4.4 John 8:38–47

To provide an explanation for the ἁμαρτία that the ‘Jews’ are to commit, Jesus claims that the ‘Jews’ are doing what they have heard from their father (John 8:38c–d). The ‘Jews’ respond that Abraham is their father (8:39b). Jesus replies:

εἰ τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐστε, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐποιεῖτε· νῦν δὲ ζητεῖτέ με ἀποκτεῖναι ἄνθρωπον ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑμῖν λελάληκα ἣν ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ· τοῦτο Ἀβραάμ οὐκ ἐποίησεν. ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν. (8:39–41)

Although Jesus knows that the ‘Jews’ are descendants of Abraham (8:37a–b), he seeks to explain the conduct of the ‘Jews’ by presenting the ‘Jews’ as doing the actions of their father, presumably not Abraham. Jesus attempts to explain what is taking place by postulating a less creditable explanatory ground than their actual descendancy from Abraham. The ‘Jews’ object that they are not born out of πορνεία, but that they have only one father, God (8:41). Jesus responds that, if God were their father, they would love him, the one who proceeded from God (8:42). The severe criticism that follows provides a name to the father, whose actions the ‘Jews’ perform:

διὰ τί τὴν λαλίαν τὴν ἐμὴν οὐ γινώσκετε; ὅτι οὐ δύνασθε ἀκούειν τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐμόν. ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστε καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν. ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἔστηκεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ. ὅταν λαλήῃ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ, ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ. (8:43–44)

The reason why the ‘Jews’ do not understand Jesus and are not able to hear his word is because they want to do the desires of their father, the devil.⁸³⁷ Although Jesus knows that the ‘Jews’ are the descendants of Abraham, he chooses to explain their inability to

⁸³⁷ Unlike some scholars claim, the reading of ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου in the sense of “of your father, the devil” is grammatical: see Stephen R. Llewelyn – Alexandra Robinson – Blake E. Wassell, “Does John 8:44 Imply that the Devil Has a Father?,” *NovT* 60 (2018) 14–23.

hear his words by postulating a discreditable explanatory ground to explain their conduct of seeking to kill him: the ‘Jews’ want to do the desires of their father, the devil, who was a murderer from the beginning, and is a liar and the father of lies. If their father is the devil, the father of lies, then the ‘Jews’ are unable to listen to the truth and, therefore, do not believe in Jesus (8:45–46). Their origin in the devil explains their inability to hear the words of God (8:47).

The ‘Jews’ previously presented themselves as resisting milder forms of teaching involving promise (John 8:31–33). In agreement with what Philodemus and Plutarch prescribe, Jesus gradually intensifies his *παρησία* to the point that he explains the conduct of the ‘Jews’ by means of a discreditable explanatory ground. As Philodemus claims, the recalcitrant violently resist *παρησία* and can only be forced to learn by means of the pure and harsh form of *παρησία*. Complying with what Plutarch writes on the use of practical (preventive) *παρησία*, Jesus tries to prevent the ‘Jews’ from committing error/sin by explaining what is taking place through means of a discreditable explanatory ground. Jesus knows that the ‘Jews’ are descendants of Abraham (8:37a–b). Yet, he presents them as the children of the devil (8:44), who do what they have heard from their father (8:38c–d). He uses this fictive explanation in order to explain why the ‘Jews’ seek to kill Jesus (8:40), do not love Jesus (8:42), do not understand his teaching (8:43), and do not have faith in him, although he speaks the truth (8:45–46). The aim of this rhetorical strategy is to drive the ‘Jews’ back and to stimulate them to make a stand against their will to do the desires of their father, the devil. The severe criticism throughout 8:38–47 exhorts the ‘Jews’ to perform correct actions.

John 8:38–47, and 8:44 in particular, is considered to be the most anti-Jewish text in the Fourth Gospel.⁸³⁸ According to Urban von Wahlde, the text was, however, not anti-Jewish in its original historical context. The text deals with the issue of why the ‘Jews’ seek to kill Jesus (8:40), do not love Jesus (8:42), do not understand his teaching (8:43), and do not have faith in him, although he speaks the truth and is without *ἁμαρτία* (8:45–46). The provided explanation is that their failure to respond to God is because their father is the devil (8:44).⁸³⁹ My analysis has affirmed most of these insights except for the view that Jesus is presented as being without *ἁμαρτία* in 8:46a.⁸⁴⁰ Von Wahlde, also, did not

⁸³⁸ On anti-Judaism in the Gospel of John, see the articles in Reimund Bieringer – Didier Pollefeyt – Frederique Vandecasteele-Vanneuville (eds.), *Anti-Judaism and the Fourth Gospel: Papers of the Leuven Colloquium, 2000* (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2001) and R. Alan Culpepper – Paul N. Anderson (eds.), *John and Judaism: A Contested Relationship in Context*, RBS 87 (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 2017). See also, e.g., David Rensberger, “Anti-Judaism in the Gospel of John,” in *Anti-Judaism and the Gospels*, ed. William R. Farmer (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), 120–157; Johannes Beutler, *Judaism and the Jews in the Gospel of John*, SubBi 30 (Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2006), 145–151; Adele Reinhartz, *Cast Out of the Covenant: Jews and Anti-Judaism in the Gospel of John* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2018); Wengst, *Johannes*, 281–283.

⁸³⁹ See Urban C. von Wahlde, “‘You Are of Your Father the Devil’ in its Context: Stereotyped Apocalyptic Polemic in John 8:38–47,” in *Anti-Judaism and the Fourth Gospel*, 418–444, at 441.

⁸⁴⁰ This view ignores that John 8:46a is formulated as a question instead of a proposition: see Thomas Tops, “Dialectical Interrogation in the Fourth Gospel” (*to be submitted*).

explain why, particularly, the ‘Jews’ are called children of the devil. Most of the criticisms against the ‘Jews’ in 8:38–47 are also levelled against the disciples. Although the disciples do not seek to kill Jesus, the *irrealis*, in 14:7, 28, reproaches them for not having known and loved Jesus.⁸⁴¹ This would imply, in the argumentation of von Wahlde, that John also considers the disciples to be children of the devil. This is, of course, not the case because Jesus calls the disciples brothers, who share the same Father in heaven (20:17). My analysis has shown that Jesus’ different treatment of the ‘Jews’ (in comparison to his treatment of the disciples) does not reveal an inconsistency in Jesus’ approach, but illustrates Jesus’ adaptability to the psychological disposition of his interlocutors. In agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, John presents Jesus as applying a severe form of *παρρησία* towards the ‘Jews’ in order to deal with their recalcitrance.

Von Wahlde concludes from his reading of John 8:38–47 that John “is not saying that the Jewish perspective is wrong”, but that “his opponents do not have the true Jewish perspective”. The author was not anti-Jewish, because he himself operated within Judaism and promotes not “Johannine Christianity”, but more correctly, “Johannine Judaism”.⁸⁴² In agreement with the main line of his conclusion, I conclude on the basis of my analysis that John’s presentation of the severity of Jesus’ teaching in 8:38–47 is motivated by the intent to adopt the pedagogical means of his time to convince his Jewish readers to believe in Jesus. Just as the Johannine Jesus exhorts οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι to resist their tendency to commit error/sin, John himself through the text of 8:38–47 exercises a severe form of *παρρησία* towards those Jewish readers who persecute and seek to kill Jesus followers (cf. 16:1–2). These killings will take place because they have not known the Father nor Jesus (16:3). Through his writing, John exhorts these readers to turn away from their present conduct by challenging them to identify with οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, who are presented as the children of the devil. Just as οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, the Jewish readers are exhorted to become Jesus followers.

The present subsection (3.4) has demonstrated that throughout John 8:12–47 Jesus applies the strategy of gradually intensifying his *παρρησία* in order to heal his addressees with as little pain as possible. If a milder form of *παρρησία* is not effective, a harsher form will be tried. As we have seen, this is a strategy that is prescribed by both Philodemus and Plutarch.⁸⁴³

3.5 John 19:19–22

As I have repeatedly argued in the present section, the ‘Jews’ violently resist Jesus’ *παρρησία*.⁸⁴⁴ Similar to Philodemus’ recalcitrant students, only a pure or simple form of *παρρησία* can be effective for the ‘Jews’. That is why John views Jesus’ death on the

⁸⁴¹ See *supra*, §3.1.1 and §3.1.3, for my discussion of the *irrealis* in, respectively, John 14:7 and 14:28.

⁸⁴² Von Wahlde, ““You Are of Your Father the Devil”,” 443.

⁸⁴³ See *supra*, §1 and §2.3.

⁸⁴⁴ See *supra*, §3.3 and §3.4.

cross as the critical moment of *παρρησία* against the ‘Jews’ (John 7:6, 8; cf. 16:25). The cross is the severest and purest form of *παρρησία* in the Gospel. The ‘Jews’ denounce their religious tradition by claiming that not God, but Caesar is their king (19:15) in order to persuade Pilate to crucify Jesus (19:16). Their denunciation ironically brings about Jesus’ self-revelation as the king of the ‘Jews’: Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων (19:19).⁸⁴⁵ Pilate has written this on the cross in Greek, Latin, and Hebrew for the whole world to see (19:20d). John explicitly mentions that “many of the ‘Jews’ read” the title on the cross, because “the place where Jesus was crucified was near the city” (19:20a–c). This further stresses the public character of Jesus’ *παρρησία* on the cross, and the idea that the whole world could see that Jesus was crucified as the king of the ‘Jews’. The authorities of the ‘Jews’ ask Pilate to change the title into ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν· βασιλεὺς εἰμι τῶν Ἰουδαίων (19:21). Pilate replies: ὁ γέγραφα, γέγραφα (19:22). The double use of the present perfect γέγραφα stresses that the depiction of Jesus as king of the ‘Jews’ has been written down with a certain finality, and cannot be altered. Although the ‘Jews’ still resist Jesus’ *παρρησία*, they cannot prevent that the world will come to know the crucified Jesus as their king. Against their will, Jesus is revealed to the ‘Jews’ as their king.

I conclude the present subsection (3.5) by stating that Jesus’ death on the cross can be interpreted as a severe or pure form of *παρρησία* towards the ‘Jews’. In agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, the Johannine Jesus applies a simple and severe form of *παρρησία* to teach the ‘Jews’, who aggressively resist his teaching. By means of his death on the cross, and his revelation as ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων, Jesus corrects the view of the ‘Jews’ that Caesar is their king (19:15). The intention of this severe use of *παρρησία* by Jesus is to save the ‘Jews’. This is consistent with how Jesus’ death on the cross is presented as saving the ‘Jews’ in John 8:28 and 12:32.⁸⁴⁶

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF *παρρησία*

In conclusion of the present chapter, I state that John creatively interacts with the idea of the two forms of *παρρησία* by portraying Jesus as a teacher who adapts the intensity of his *παρρησία* to the psychological disposition of his interlocutors. The more recalcitrant and aggressive his interlocutors are, the more severe Jesus’ *παρρησία* is. Vice versa, the more complying and tender his interlocutors are, the milder Jesus’ *παρρησία* is. Jesus mixes his *παρρησία* with praise and promise in order to make it milder and more effective. The Johannine Jesus is an adaptable teacher, whose teaching is not a static given, but adapts itself to the recipients. The universal reach of Jesus’ teaching ultimately required John to present Jesus in this way. In the next chapter, I will address the question

⁸⁴⁵ Cf. de Boer, “The Narrative Function of Pilate”, 155: “[...] John exploits the ironic implications of the crucifixion of Jesus as ‘the king of the Jews’ for the Johannine reader. Jesus comes to function as the king of the Jews precisely in their successful campaign to have him killed on that very charge.”

⁸⁴⁶ The next chapter will address the question how Jesus’ *παρρησία* is connected to the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Fourth Gospel.

as to how Jesus' *παρρησία* is connected to the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Gospel.⁸⁴⁷

Although Jesus has a pre-knowledge of the psychological disposition of his addressees, he still has to make a reasonable guess to discern the correct intensity of his *παρρησία*. This stochastic element in Jesus' teaching is what I have previously depicted as the experimental nature of Jesus' teaching.⁸⁴⁸ Jesus does not know beforehand which intensity of *παρρησία* will be effective. On the basis of the reactions of his addressees, he adjusts the intensity of his *παρρησία* and approximates the dose of *παρρησία* required to be effective for his addressees. This is a matter of trial and error. There are no universal rules for discerning the correct intensity of *παρρησία*. The experimental or stochastic use of *παρρησία* and the idea of the two forms of *παρρησία* presuppose one another. Only thanks to experience acquired through experiment, can one reasonably guess whether a rather mild or rather severe form of *παρρησία* will prove to be effective in a particular situation. The use of *παρρησία* is contextual and a matter of practical reasoning. In order to be careful, one can better start with an intensity of *παρρησία* as low as possible, yet, adapted to the psychological disposition of the addressees and the situation at hand. In the present chapter, we have seen that, in agreement with the conventions of his time, John depicts Jesus as gradually intensifying his *παρρησία* to make it more effective. The underlying idea is that *παρρησία* has to be as painless as possible.

Another tendency in the Fourth Gospel, identified by the present chapter, is that in agreement with Plutarch's distinction between the therapeutic (or corrective) and the practical (or preventive) form of *παρρησία*, Jesus' *παρρησία* towards the disciples is corrective and less severe than his *παρρησία* towards οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, which is preventive. Jesus corrects his disciples by means of a mild form of *παρρησία* mixed with praise, whereas he applies a severe or pure form of *παρρησία* towards οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in order to prevent them from committing error/sin and to stir them into correct conduct. As Plutarch prescribed in his time, Jesus follows opposite methods in his use of *παρρησία* towards the disciples and οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι. In order to correct the disciples, Jesus not only criticises the disciples, but also praises them. Through praise, Jesus provides the disciples with an image of themselves that is better than they actually are, and highly contrasts with their actual behaviour (e.g., the disciples have loved Jesus and have believed that he came from the Father [John 16:27]). When trying to prevent οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι from committing error/sin, Jesus follows the opposite method by explaining the conduct of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι by means of discreditable causes (e.g., they have never heard the voice of God, nor seen his appearance [5:37], their father is the devil [8:44]). Jesus thereby provides οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι with an image of themselves that is worse than they actually are in order to drive them back from doing wrong.

The research results of the present chapter present a different perspective on Jesus' harsh treatment of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι throughout the Gospel of John. Instead of explaining Jesus'

⁸⁴⁷ See *infra*, Chapter Eight.

⁸⁴⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Six.

harshness in terms of anti-Jewish polemics, the present study has shown that Jesus' treatment of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι can better be explained from the perspective of the conventions of παρρησία in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. The majority of John's readers in the first and second century CE would probably not have perceived Jesus' treatment of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι as anti-Jewish, but as intending to save οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι by adapting his pedagogical means to their recalcitrance. Jesus treats οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι with a severe or simple form of παρρησία not out of resentment, but to save the κόσμος out of love (cf. John 3:16–17; 12:46–47).

By presenting Jesus as harsh and οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι as recalcitrant, John is indirectly addressing the problem that the followers of Jesus are being made ἀποσυνάγωγος, and are persecuted until death after Jesus' death (cf. John 16:2). The Jews who persecute Jesus' followers in John's time are led to identify themselves with οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in the Gospel narrative and to be addressed by the παρρησία of the Johannine Jesus. The text of the Gospel, as it is authorised by the teaching of the post-paschal Paraclete, is itself a harsh form of παρρησία towards the Jews who persecute Jesus' followers. Jesus' παρρησία on the cross (16:25) is mediated by the post-paschal Paraclete. As John himself writes, the Paraclete will reproach the κόσμος for the ἁμαρτία of their unbelief (16:8–9) after Jesus has departed (16:7). Jesus' protreptic παρρησία towards οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι does not intend to be anti-Jewish, but ought to be read in agreement with the over-all aim of the Gospel: exhorting readers to believe that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" in order that through their faith they may have "life in his name" (20:31). At the same time, the question remains whether John's missionary effort provides the Jews with enough freedom to be who they are. Jesus' severe criticism of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι suggests that the Jews ought to change their behaviour radically. The pedagogical strategy of employing a severe or simple form of παρρησία towards the recalcitrant is, moreover, problematic by our contemporary standards. Although John's intention was not anti-Jewish, it is not surprising that the Johannine Jesus' severe criticism of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι has continued to be interpreted as anti-Jewish.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁹ On this reception history of Jesus' severe criticism of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in the Fourth Gospel, see, e.g., Ruth Sheridan, "Seed of Abraham, Slavery, and Sin: Reproducing Johannine Anti-Judaism in the Modern Commentaries on John 8:31–34," in *John and Judaism*, 313–331.

CHAPTER VIII.

JESUS' παρρησία AND THE SALVATION OF THE κόσμος IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The present chapter will address the question as to how Jesus' παρρησία is connected to the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Fourth Gospel.⁸⁵⁰ I will, first, look at the Paraclete's ἐλέγχειν of the κόσμος (John 16:9–11) in relationship to Jesus' παρρησία at the hour (16:25) (Section 1). My research hypothesis is that the Paraclete's ἔλεγχος leads to the repentance and the salvation of the recalcitrant κόσμος. Even those who strongly resist Jesus' παρρησία will be reproved of their ἀμαρτία of not believing in Jesus and will be ashamed. Second, in order to test this hypothesis, I will research whether such an interpretation of the Paraclete's ἔλεγχος of the κόσμος is plausible from the perspective of the conventions of παρρησία contemporary to John (Section 2). In a third step, I will enquire whether other passages in the Gospel, in which the salvation of the recalcitrant κόσμος is promised, can be understood from the perspective of these conventions of παρρησία (Section 3).

1. THE PARACLETE'S ἐλέγχειν IN JOHN 16:9–11

The verb ἐλέγχω occurs seventeen times in the NT. In all occurrences, the verb relates to showing someone's ἀμαρτία. In many cases, the aim is to elicit shame and to summon up to repentance.⁸⁵¹ According to Friedrich Büchsel, the meaning of ἐλέγχω in the NT is “*jem[andem] seine Sünde vorhalten und ihn zur Umkehr auffordern*”.⁸⁵² Concerning the meaning of ἐλέγχω in John 16:9–11, he writes: “[d]ies ἐλέγχειν ist nicht nur: ‘tadeln’, ‘schelten’, auch nicht nur: ‘überführen’ im Sinne des Beweisen, auch nicht nur: ‘offenkundig machen’, ‘dartun’, sondern *zurechtweisen*, nämlich: *von der Sünde zur Buße weisen*.”⁸⁵³ Carson agrees with Büchsel and concludes that ἐλέγχω in 16:9–11 does not have the meaning of “arguing the case for the world’s objective guilt before God at the final great Assize”, but has a more personal meaning in the sense of “shaming the world and convincing it of its own guilt, thus calling it to repentance”.⁸⁵⁴ In Carson’s view, the ἐλέγχειν of the Paraclete is a gift of grace for the world. The world did not earn this gift, because it rejected Jesus. Thanks to this gift, the world can realise that “it walks in death and *needs* life”. The ἐλέγχειν of the Paraclete “is designed to bring men and women of the world to recognize their need, and so turn to Jesus, and thus stop being ‘the world’”.⁸⁵⁵

⁸⁵⁰ I have announced this research question in the intermediate conclusion of the previous chapter.

⁸⁵¹ See, e.g., Matt 18:15; 1 Cor 14:24–25; Eph 5:11–14[2]; Titus 1:13; Heb 12:5–8; Rev 3:19.

⁸⁵² Friedrich Büchsel, “ἐλέγχω,” *TWNT* 2 (1935) 470–473: at 471. Italics in the original.

⁸⁵³ Büchsel, “ἐλέγχω”: 471. Italics in the original.

⁸⁵⁴ Donald A. Carson, *The Gospel According to John* (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1991), 536–537.

⁸⁵⁵ Carson, *John*, 537. Italics in the original.

In my view, this interpretation of the Paraclete's ἐλέγχειν is confirmed by its relationship to Jesus' παρρησία. As argued in Chapter Three, the Paraclete functions as the mouth piece of Jesus' παρρησία at the time of his death (John 16:25).⁸⁵⁶ Jesus' παρρησία is effective towards the 'Jews' at the time of his death, because at this critical moment, the ruler of the world will be judged (12:31; 16:11) and the world is overcome (16:33).⁸⁵⁷ While the disciples will be made ἀποσυνάγωγος and will be persecuted (16:2–3), the κόσμος will be reproved (ἐλέγχω) for their ἁμαρτία of not believing in Jesus (16:8–11). The logic here is that Jesus' παρρησία effects a cure or change for the κόσμος through shame. The immorality of the actions of the world is exposed (ἐλέγχω) by Jesus, the light of the world (cf. 3:20). Whereas the disciples obtain παρρησία through the Paraclete, the world will become aware of its sin/error of not believing in Jesus, and will be ashamed.⁸⁵⁸ In this sense, the 'Jews' and the κόσμος in general will, also, be saved through Jesus' παρρησία. Although the text does not explicitly mention that the κόσμος will be ashamed by the Paraclete's ἔλεγχος, the next section will research whether the readers of John, who are (indirectly) influenced by the conventions of παρρησία of their time, would confer from their reading of 16:8–9, 25 that the κόσμος will be ashamed and, as a consequence, will repent of its ἁμαρτία of not believing in Jesus.

2. Παρρησία, SHAME, AND REPENTANCE

The present section will start with a discussion of the relationship between παρρησία, shame, and repentance in LXX Proverbs. Special attention will be given to LXX Proverbs thanks to the probability that John's audience was familiar with LXX Wisdom tradition (2.1). Then, I will depict, in a chronological order, how other authors in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE viewed the relationship between παρρησία, shame, and repentance: Philodemus (2.2), Philo (2.3), Plutarch (2.4), and Clement of Alexandria (2.5). In the last subsection, I will discuss how John's first readers probably understood the Paraclete's ἔλεγχος of the κόσμος (John 16:8–9) in connection to Jesus' παρρησία at the hour (16:25) (see 2.6).

2.1 LXX PROVERBS

Many scholars assume that John wrote for an audience that was familiar with the presentation of σοφία in Wisdom literature.⁸⁵⁹ Raymond Brown and Martin Scott have

⁸⁵⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Three, §1.

⁸⁵⁷ I assume in the present chapter that οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι are a subgroup of κόσμος in the Fourth Gospel. Κόσμος in John 13–17 has a universal meaning and refers to Jesus' antagonists in all places and times. For the argumentation for this view, see Lars Kierspel, *The Jews and the World in the Fourth Gospel: Parallelism, Function, and Context*, WUNT II/220 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 92–93, 165–167.

⁸⁵⁸ I have previously discussed this logic in Chapter Five, §2.2.

⁸⁵⁹ See Elizabeth A. Johnson, "Jesus, the Wisdom of God: A Biblical Basis for Non-Androcentric Christology," *ETL* 61/4 (1985) 261–294: at 284–289 and the literature mentioned there.

enumerated many Wisdom motifs in the portrayal of the Johannine Jesus.⁸⁶⁰ Brown has concluded that the Johannine Jesus is “personified Wisdom”.⁸⁶¹ John “saw in Jesus the culmination of a tradition that runs through the Wisdom Literature of the OT”.⁸⁶² According to Andreas Obermann, John’s audience could never have understood John’s abrupt introduction of the λόγος as a pre-existent and independent entity (John 1:1–3), if they were not familiar with how σοφία is presented in Wisdom literature.⁸⁶³ Endorsing this insight, I observe that the following parallels between John’s λόγος and σοφία in Proverbs enabled the reader to understand John’s abrupt introduction of the λόγος: (i) Σοφία is considered to be a hypostasis (Prov 1:20–33) through which God founded the earth (Prov 3:19). John introduces the λόγος as a separate and independent entity through which God has created everything (John 1:1–3); (ii) σοφία is the first creation and has been present with God as “the beginning of his ways, for the sake of his works” (ἀρχὴν ὁδοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ, Prov 8:22–23).⁸⁶⁴ The λόγος was also “in the beginning with God” (ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν, John 1:2). The difference is that the λόγος is not created by God, but was ἐν ἀρχῇ (1:1a) and “was God” (1:1c); and (iii) σοφία was a delight to God in his creational works (Prov 8:30). By providing the world with its being (e.g., Prov 8:27–31), σοφία enabled those who listen to wisdom to know the order in the world and to become wise (Prov. 8:31–36). The λόγος is presented as the life and the light of all people. As he shines in the darkness, the λόγος provides enlightenment for humanity (John 1:4–5).⁸⁶⁵

The public character of Jesus’ παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel could possibly be another motif that John inherited from the Wisdom tradition:

σοφία ἐν ἐξόδοις ὑμνεῖται, ἐν δὲ πλατείαις παρρησίαν ἄγει, ἐπ’ ἄκρων δὲ τειχέων
κηρύσσεται ἐπὶ δὲ πύλαις δυναστῶν παρεδρεύει ἐπὶ δὲ πύλαις πόλεως θαρροῦσα
λέγει [...] (Prov 1:20–21)⁸⁶⁶

⁸⁶⁰ See Brown, *John (I–XII)*, cxxii–cxxv, 519–524 and Scott, *Sophia and the Johannine Jesus*, 115–168. For the influence of Wisdom literature on John 4 in particular, see McKinlay, *Gendering Wisdom the Host*, 179–207.

⁸⁶¹ Brown, *John (I–XII)*, cxxv.

⁸⁶² Brown, *John (I–XII)*, cxxii.

⁸⁶³ See Andreas Obermann, *Die christologische Erfüllung der Schrift im Johannesevangelium*, WUNT 2/83 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 282–283.

⁸⁶⁴ NETS Translation.

⁸⁶⁵ For further discussion of the parallels between λόγος in John 1:1–18 and σοφία in Wisdom literature, see Scott, *Sophia and the Johannine Jesus*, 94–115 and Claudia Sticher, “‘Frau Weisheit hat ihr Haus gebaut’ Alttestamentliche Anknüpfungspunkte der Johanneischen Logos-Christologie,” in *Der Johannesprolog*, ed. Günter Kruck (Darmstadt: WBG, 2009), 27–47.

⁸⁶⁶ NETS translation: “Wisdom sings hymns in the streets, and in the squares she leads frankly, and on the top of the walls she proclaims, and at the gates of the powerful she waits, and at the gates of the city she speaks boldly: [...]”

ἐγὼ παρρησίᾳ λελάληκα τῷ κόσμῳ, ἐγὼ πάντοτε ἐδίδαξα ἐν συναγωγῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ὅπου πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι συνέρχονται, καὶ ἐν κρυπτῷ ἐλάλησα οὐδέν. (John 18:20)

Just as σοφία “speaks”⁸⁶⁷ or “leads”⁸⁶⁸ (ἄγει) παρρησίαν in the public squares, Jesus teaches παρρησίᾳ to the κόσμος in public spaces, and never ἐν κρυπτῷ.⁸⁶⁹ The public character of Jesus’ παρρησία is strongly emphasised by John, as is additionally attested by other passages in which παρρησία is juxtaposed with ἐν κρυπτῷ (see 7:4, 26; cf. 11:54).⁸⁷⁰ An additional parallel between the Fourth Gospel and Wisdom literature is that Jesus authorises his παρρησία with reference to his divine origin and pre-existence with God (John 7:26–28). Similarly, σοφία refers to her pre-existence in the presence of God (Prov 8:22–31) to authorise her exhortation to listen to her words (8:32–36).⁸⁷¹

John’s readers who presumably were acquainted with the book of Proverbs had particular expectations when they read about the Paraclete’s ἔλεγχος and Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour of Jesus’ death (John 16:8–9, 25). These expectations were influenced by the semantics of παρρησία in LXX Proverbs. One of these expectations concerns the relationship between παρρησία, shame, and repentance. Proverbs 13:5–6 juxtaposes παρρησία to shame:

13:5a λόγον ἄδικον μισεῖ δίκαιος,
13:5b ἀσεβῆς δὲ αἰσχύνεται καὶ οὐχ ἔξει παρρησίαν.
13:6a δικαιοσύνη φυλάσσει ἀκάκους,
13:6b τοὺς δὲ ἀσεβεῖς φαύλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία.

13:5a A just person hates an unjust word,
13:5b but the impious is ashamed and will have no confidence.
13:6a Justice guards the innocent,
13:6b but sin makes the impious worthless.⁸⁷²

According to 13:5b, the impious is ashamed of himself and will have no παρρησία. The parallel verse of 13:6b explains that ἁμαρτία “makes the impious worthless”. The logic connecting both verses is that the impious has no παρρησία and is ashamed of himself because sin has made him worthless.⁸⁷³ Such a logic is also suggested by Prov 20:9:

⁸⁶⁷ Trans. by Brenton.

⁸⁶⁸ NETS translation.

⁸⁶⁹ The combination of ἄγω with παρρησία as a direct object in the accusative can also be found in, e.g., Ph., *Her.* 6, where the combination is used to depict how a slave has παρρησία towards his master.

⁸⁷⁰ On this public character of Jesus’ παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel, see *infra*, Chapter Ten.

⁸⁷¹ The authorisation of the ἐξουσία of σοφία by reference to her pre-existence can also be found in Sir 24:9–11 and throughout the Wisdom of Solomon: see Scott, *Sophia and the Johannine Jesus*, 133–134. Scott argues that the same motif is present in John 6:62 and 8:38.

⁸⁷² NETS translation.

⁸⁷³ See Arlene W. Saxonhouse, *Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) for an overview and discussion of classical authors and texts, who juxtapose παρρησία to shame. See also 1 John 2:28 and my discussion of Philo below under §2.3.

τίς καυχῆσεται ἀγνήν ἔχειν τὴν καρδίαν;
ἢ τίς παρρησιάζεται καθαρὸς εἶναι ἀπὸ ἁμαρτιῶν;

Who can boast that he keeps his heart pure?
Or who can declare confidently that he is pure from sins?⁸⁷⁴

The text can be read as affirming that being free from sins/errors is a condition for παρρησιάζεσθαι. On the other hand, such a reading is influenced by our interpretation of 13:5–6. One could object that being pure from sins is not articulated as a condition for παρρησία in 20:9, but only as the object of what is said with παρρησία.

The connection between παρρησία and ἐλέγχω is made in Prov 10:10–12:

10:10a ὁ ἐννεύων ὀφθαλμοῖς μετὰ δόλου συνάγει ἀνδράσι λύπας,
10:10b ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ.
10:11a πηγὴ ζωῆς ἐν χειρὶ δικαίου,
10:11b στόμα δὲ ἀσεβοῦς καλύπτει ἀπώλεια.
10:12a μῖσος ἐγείρει νεῖκος,
10:12b πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας καλύπτει φιλία.

10:10a He who winks with his eyes deceitfully garners grief for men,
10:10b but he who reproves openly makes peace.
10:11a A spring of life is in the hand of a righteous person,
10:11b but destruction covers the mouth of the impious.
10:12a Hatred stirs up strife,
10:12b but friendship covers all who are not fond of strife.⁸⁷⁵

The chiasmic structure between the verses draws a connection between, first, reproaching (ἐλέγχω) with παρρησία that results in peace (10:10b), second, having a spring of life (10:11a), and, third, friendship, which “covers [i.e., protects] all who are not contention-loving”⁸⁷⁶ (10:12b). Τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας in 10:12b is the translation equivalent of פִּשְׁעִים. According to Michael Fox, the LXX translator assumed that פִּשְׁעִים means “offenders” (i.e., חַיִּיִּם). The LXX translator rephrased “offenders” as “contention-loving” “for the sake of tighter parallelism” with 10:12a. The LXX translator was “puzzled by the notion that any virtue could ‘cover’—i.e., hide or protect—offenders of any sort”. Therefore, he or she added “a negative to produce a more acceptable sentiment”.⁸⁷⁷ This resulted in the translation τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας. Another translation is offered by Aquila and Theodotion, who render 10:12b as follows: καὶ ἐπὶ πάσας ἀθεσίας καλύπτει ἀγάπη. Symmachus and E’ read, respectively, ἀδικίαν and ἀδικίας instead of ἀθεσίας.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁴ NETS translation.

⁸⁷⁵ NETS translation.

⁸⁷⁶ Michael V. Fox, *Proverbs: An Eclectic Edition with Introduction and Textual Commentary* (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 2015), 178.

⁸⁷⁷ Fox, *Proverbs*, 178.

⁸⁷⁸ See Frederick Field (ed.), *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, sive veterum interpretum graecorum in totum Vetus Testamentum fragmenta. Post Flaminium Nobilium, Drusium, et Montefalconium, adhibita etiam versione syro-hexaplari, concinnavit, emendavit, et multis partibus auxit*

Ἀθεσία means “faithlessness” or “fickleness”.⁸⁷⁹ All these translators assume that פשעים means “sins” or “transgressions” (i.e., חַטֹּאת). When following these other translators, a connection is made in Prov 10:10–12 between making peace through reproaching with παρρησία and the concealing of faithlessness or unrighteousness.

Whether one follows the LXX translation, or the other mentioned translations, ἐλέγχειν with παρρησία is depicted as having a peace-making effect. The chiasmic structure of Prov 10:10–12 suggests that this peace-making effect consists in a friendship or love that either (i) protects all who are not contention-loving (LXX); or (ii) conceals all faithlessness (Aquila and Theodotion) or unrighteousness (Symmachus and E’).

Other passages in LXX Proverbs, also, claim that reproof or rebuke has positive pedagogical effects. According to Anne Stewart, rebuke is “at the heart of Proverb’s pedagogy”.⁸⁸⁰ Stewart discerns a pedagogical model of rebuke in Proverbs.⁸⁸¹ I observe that many passages in LXX Proverbs attest to the positive pedagogical effects of rebuke/reproof.⁸⁸²

In the mind of Prov 3:12, disciplining and punishment is characteristic of the love of the Lord, and necessary for becoming a son of God: ὃν γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ κύριος παιδεύει μαστιγοῖ δὲ πάντα υἱὸν ὃν παραδέχεται.⁸⁸³ Repentance is viewed as the natural outcome of παιδεία and ἔλεγχος:

καὶ μεταμεληθήσῃ ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων ἡνίκα ἂν κατατριβῶσιν σάρκες σώματός σου καὶ ἔρεῖς πῶς ἐμίσησα παιδείαν καὶ ἐλέγχους ἐξέκλινεν ἡ καρδιά μου (Prov 5:11–12).

You, however, will repent at the end, when the flesh of your body is consumed, and you will say, “How I hated discipline, and my innermost turned away reproofs!”⁸⁸⁴

Although the innermost of the son turned away the reproofs (ἐλέγχους) and hated discipline, the text claims that the son will nevertheless repent (μεταμέλομαι) at the end when the flesh of his body is consumed. All the quoted passages evoke the semantics of παρρησία and show a positive evaluation of hurtful ἔλεγχος to bring people to repentance.

I conclude that John’s readers who were influenced by the semantics of παρρησία in LXX Proverbs, probably, inferred from their reading of the Paraclete’s ἔλεγχος and Jesus’

Fridericus Field (Oxford: Clarendon, 1875), vol. 2, 329. For the historical background and information on the translation technique of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §1.1. E’ refers to fragmentary texts known by Origen that he added in the so-called Heptapla.

⁸⁷⁹ LSJ, 31.

⁸⁸⁰ Anne W. Stewart, *Poetic Ethics in Proverbs: Wisdom Literature and the Shaping of the Moral Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 83.

⁸⁸¹ See Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 80–101.

⁸⁸² See Prov 19:25; 27:5–6; 28:13, 23; 29:15.

⁸⁸³ NETS Translation: “for whom the Lord loves, he disciplines, and he punishes every son he accepts”. The tradition of corporal punishment in Prov 3:11–12 is widespread in antiquity: see John T. Fitzgerald, “Proverbs 3:11–12, Hebrews 12:5–6, and the Tradition of Corporal Punishment,” in *Scripture and Traditions: Essays on Early Judaism and Christianity in Honor of Carl R. Holladay*, ed. Patrick Gray – Gail R. O’Day, NovTSup 129 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 291–317.

⁸⁸⁴ NETS Translation.

παρρησία at the hour (John 16:8–9, 25) that the κόσμος will repent of its ἁμαρτία of not believing in Jesus. The disciples themselves, who are imbued by the Paraclete, will reproof the κόσμος with παρρησία. Although persecuted and made ἀποσυνάγωγος by the world, they will have παρρησία towards the world because they will live in agreement with Jesus’ commandment of love (cf. 15:8–10). Thanks to their knowledge of being free of ἁμαρτία, they will have παρρησία.⁸⁸⁵ The world, on the other hand, will be made aware of their ἁμαρτία against God and will be ashamed. The result is a social reversal. The ruler of the world is judged (12:31; 16:11). The disciples, who are made ἀποσυνάγωγος, and are without social status, obtain παρρησία, whereas the κόσμος and its rulers will lose their παρρησία and will be brought to shame.⁸⁸⁶

The following subsections (2.2–6) will research whether similar inferences will be made by readers who were not influenced by the semantics of παρρησία in LXX Proverbs, but are (indirectly) influenced by the contemporary conventions of παρρησία.

2.2 PHILODEMUS

As expounded in the previous chapter, Philodemus thinks that everyone, even those who strongly resist παρρησία (i.e., οἱ ἰσχυροί), can be cured from moral depravity if treated with the form of παρρησία that is required for their psychological disposition.⁸⁸⁷ Οἱ ἰσχυροί will “scarcely change” (cf. μόλις [...] μεταθισομένους), even “if they are shouted at”. Therefore, Philodemus prescribes use of “the harsh form of παρρησία” towards them.⁸⁸⁸ Philodemus, thus, presupposes that οἱ ἰσχυροί can change, but only by means of a pure or harsh form of παρρησία. Although Philodemus nowhere explicitly speaks about repentance as the effect of παρρησία, he does mention shame:

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὸν [αἰ]σχ[υ]νό[μενον] καὶ πάλιν παρρησιάσασθαι καὶ πάλ[ι]ν εἴρηται.⁸⁸⁹

And it has been said that he will speak frankly again and again about these things to the one [who is ashamed].⁸⁹⁰

The text does not mention the referent of ταῦτα. The iterative aspect of the passive present participle τὸν αἰσχυνόμενον suggests that the use of παρρησία repeatedly causes the addressed person to feel ashamed. Thus, Philodemus is aware that παρρησία brings about shame in a person. This suggests that he viewed shame as an important step in the process

⁸⁸⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2 for my argumentation that the disciples will participate in Jesus’ παρρησία at the hour.

⁸⁸⁶ Social status has been authorising παρρησία since the first attestation of the word in ancient Athens up until the Roman period: see *supra*, Chapter Three, §1.

⁸⁸⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §1.

⁸⁸⁸ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 7. My translation.

⁸⁸⁹ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 85:2–5.

⁸⁹⁰ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

of changing someone's mind. The shame caused by a severe form of *παρρησία* can even cause οἱ ἰσχυροί to change their mind.

2.3 PHILO

Παρρησία and shame are juxtaposed to one another by Philo. Previous scholarship has observed with reference to, e.g., *Her.* 6–7, that, according to Philo, *παρρησία* is authorised by *συνειδός*.⁸⁹¹ As explained in Chapter Five, *συνειδός* in Philo can be compared to an inner monitor that either applauds when unaware of transgressions or makes one feel ashamed when aware of transgressions that have taken place. In the first case, the result is an inner harmony and imperturbability that facilitates *παρρησία*. In the second case, the bad person is reminded of his/her moral impurity. This torment makes it impossible for the person to use *παρρησία*. For Philo, one has *παρρησία* if one is aware that one is free from all error/sin, and that one has loved God. Even as an exile in Egypt, Moses has *παρρησία*, because God is his “master” (*δεσπότης*), his “country” (*πατρίς*), his “family” (*συγγένεια*), his “paternal hearth” (*πατρῶα ἐστία*), his “citizenship” (*ἐπιτιμία*), his *παρρησία*, and his “great and glorious and inalienable wealth” (*μέγας καὶ ἀοίδιμος καὶ ἀναφαίρετος πλοῦτος*).⁸⁹² Irrespective of his social status, Moses can speak with *παρρησία* towards social superiors (e.g., the pharaoh), because he loves his master (God) and is conscious that he lives a virtuous life according to God's commandments.

For Philo, the truly free and virtuous person is exemplified by Diogenes, whose *παρρησία* functions as a paradigm to emulate.⁸⁹³ Even when a ‘slave’, Diogenes still has *παρρησία*. Diogenes once said to an ‘effeminate’ buyer: “[b]uy me, you seem to be in need of a man.” The ‘free’ buyer “became conscious of himself” (*ἐαυτῷ συνήδει*) and was ashamed.⁸⁹⁴ Philip Bosman, correctly, concludes that a social reversal takes place here. The slave Diogenes shows himself to be free by means of his *παρρησία*, whereas the ‘free’ buyer is enslaved by becoming aware of his ‘effeminacy’.⁸⁹⁵ Being effeminate is viewed here as being enslaved by one's passions.⁸⁹⁶ Philo explains that “noble souls” (*εὐγενεῖς ψυχαί*), like Diogenes, have “something kingly” (*τι βασιλικόν*), which allows them to use *παρρησία* against their social superiors.⁸⁹⁷ Philo, thus, still views *εὐγένεια* as authorising *παρρησία*, but considers it to be a nobility of the soul that shows itself in virtuous behaviour, and has nothing to do with hereditary succession.⁸⁹⁸ As mentioned above, for Philo, the virtuous person, like Moses, who employs *παρρησία* thanks to his/her conscience, is family to God.

⁸⁹¹ See Van Unnik, “The Christian's Freedom of Speech”, 274 and Scarpit, *Parrhesia greca*, 91.

⁸⁹² See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2 for my discussion of Ph., *Her.* 6–7, 26–27.

⁸⁹³ See Ph., *Prob.* 121–125.

⁸⁹⁴ Ph., *Prob.* 124 (my translation).

⁸⁹⁵ See Bosman, *Conscience in Philo*, 117.

⁸⁹⁶ Philo's view that effeminacy enslaves someone to the passions is indebted to the culturally bound view of his time that women are enslaved by their passions.

⁸⁹⁷ See Ph., *Prob.* 126.

⁸⁹⁸ See Ph., *Prob.* 99.

Philo observes that those who are slaves by hereditary succession can without fear and in perfect security “speak freely” (cf. ἐλευθεροστομοῦντας) in the temple as if they enjoy equal privileges and burdens with the rest. Some slaves are even superior to their owners in their use of παρρησία, because they show more energy and disdain when they discuss questions of justice with them. In that case, Philo observes a reversal. “The nobly born” (εὐπατρίδαι) become slaves because “their conscience convicts” them (cf. ὁ τοῦ συνειδότος ἔλεγχος), whereas the souls of the slaves exhibit freedom and “very high nobility” (εὐγενῇ σφόδρα), because the temple provides them with an asylum for παρρησία.⁸⁹⁹ If it is so that places can enable one to use παρρησία, Philo argues that this must also extend to virtue, the most God-like existing thing. Both places and everything else that participates in φρόνησις acquire sanctity through virtue.⁹⁰⁰ Those who obtain “security” (ἀσφαλείαν) from places only, turn out to be in bondage by a number of other things, for instance, a wife wanting gifts, disgraced children, and betrayal in love matters. Only those who seek their refuge in virtue are safe from the darts and arrows thrown by the passions.⁹⁰¹

I conclude that, for Philo, regardless of their social status, the virtuous, who act in agreement with God’s commandments, are facilitated by their moral conscience (συνειδός) and have παρρησία. They are family to God, whom they love as their master. Transgressors and sinners, on the other hand, aware of their sins/errors are convicted by their moral conscience, and, so, experience shame. Although the sinners could be socially superior to the virtuous, the virtuous have παρρησία towards the sinners. Whereas the sinners are convicted by their conscience and feel ashamed of their errors/sins, the virtuous are facilitated in their παρρησία thanks to their being conscious of their love of God and their keeping of his commandments.

2.4 PLUTARCH

Plutarch is aware that παρρησία brings about shame and repentance in the addressed person. Plutarch mentions in his discussions on παρρησία: ὁ μὲν ἐλέγχῳ καὶ ψόγῳ δηγμὸν ἐμποιῶν καὶ μετάνοιαν ἐχθρὸς δοκεῖ καὶ κατήγορος.⁹⁰² He, who applies παρρησία only through blame and reproach, at first sight, seems to be an enemy and an accuser. His severe treatment brings about the positive effect of repentance, which is depicted as an “act of biting” (δηγμός).

The effect of repentance can also be brought about indirectly by criticising other people for the errors committed by the persons who are the actual target of the criticism: ἔνιοι δὲ κομψότερον, ἄλλους ψέγοντες, ἐπιστρέφουσι τοὺς συνήθεις· κατηγοροῦσι γὰρ

⁸⁹⁹ See Ph., *Prob.* 148–150.

⁹⁰⁰ See Ph., *Prob.* 150.

⁹⁰¹ See Ph., *Prob.* 151.

⁹⁰² Plu., *Adulator* 56a. My translation: “he, who, by reproof and blame, engenders a bite of repentance seems to be an enemy and an accuser.”

ἐτέρων ἂ πράττοντας ἐκείνους ἴσασιν.⁹⁰³ Plutarch provides the following example from personal experience:

ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος καθηγητὴς Ἀμμώνιος ἐν δειλινῇ διατριβῇ τῶν γνωρίμων τινὰς αἰσθόμενος ἡρισθηκότας οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἄριστον ἐκέλευσεν ἰδίῳ παιδί πληγὰς ἐμβαλεῖν τὸν ἀπελεύθερον, ἐπειπὼν ὅτι χωρὶς ὄξους ἀριστᾶν οὐ δύναται. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπέβλεψεν, ὥστε τῶν ἐνόχων ἄψασθαι τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν.⁹⁰⁴

My professor, Ammonius, at an afternoon lecture perceived that some of his students had eaten a luncheon that was anything but frugal, and so he ordered his freedman to chastise his own servant, remarking by way of explanation that “that boy can’t lunch without his wine!” At the same time he glanced towards us, so that the rebuke took hold of the guilty.⁹⁰⁵

Plutarch mentions that a less painful way to shame someone is to mix *παρρησία* with praise. Plutarch observes that blame, combined with praise, can bring about the feeling of shame in a person:

οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀνίησι τοῦ ψόγου τὸ τραχὺ καὶ κελευστικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῆλον ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν αἰδουμένῳ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομνήσει καὶ παράδειγμα ποιουμένῳ τῶν βελτιόνων ἑαυτόν.⁹⁰⁶

For not only do they mitigate the harsh and peremptory tone of the censure, but they also arouse in a man a desire to emulate his better self, since he is made to feel ashamed of disgraceful conduct by being reminded of his good actions, and is prompted to look upon himself as an example of what is better.⁹⁰⁷

By means of being praised for past good actions, some people are made ashamed of their disgraceful conduct that is under criticism. A mild form of *παρρησία* can, thus, also bring about shame and presumably repentance. Plutarch thinks politicians can only be brought to repentance by means of this mild form of *παρρησία*:

ὁ γὰρ μεμιγμένος ἐπαίνῳ ψόγος οὐκ ἔχων ὕβριν ἀλλὰ παρρησίαν, οὐδὲ θυμὸν ἀλλὰ δηγμὸν ἐμποίων καὶ μετάνοιαν, εὐμενὴς φαίνεται καὶ θεραπευτικός· αἱ δὲ λοιδορίαι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἥκιστα πρέπουσιν.⁹⁰⁸

For blame that is mingled with praise and contains nothing insulting but merely frankness of speech, and arouses not anger but a pricking of the conscience and

⁹⁰³ Plu., *Adulator* 70a. LCL translation: “[b]ut some persons manage more cleverly, and by finding fault with strangers, turn their own intimate acquaintances to repentance; for they accuse the others of what they know their own acquaintances are doing.”

⁹⁰⁴ Plu., *Adulator* 70a.

⁹⁰⁵ LCL translation.

⁹⁰⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 72d.

⁹⁰⁷ Adjusted LCL translation.

⁹⁰⁸ Plu., *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 810c (Curtius Hubert – Max Pohlenz – Hans Drexler [eds.], *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. 5/1, BSGRT [Leipzig: Teubner, 1960]).

repentance, appears both kindly and healing; but abusive speech is not at all fitting for statesmen.⁹⁰⁹

Although this mixed form of παρρησία appears as kind and healing, Plutarch still views repentance as an “act of biting” (δηγμός). As Plutarch says elsewhere: ἡ νοουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην, ὧν τὸ μὲν λύπη τῷ γένει τὸ δὲ φόβος ἐστί.⁹¹⁰ Repentance and shame are brought about by “blame and admonition”. Repentance is categorised as a pain.

2.5 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Clement considers ἔλεγχος to be one of the forms of hortatory blame through which the divine pedagogue applies παρρησία to save his children.⁹¹¹ Clement refers to Prov 10:10 as a scriptural argument for this thesis: ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ. With reference to Ezek 18:23, Clement explains why the divine pedagogue teaches in this way: τὴν γὰρ μετάνοιαν τοῦ ἁμαρτωλοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν θάνατον αἰρεῖται.⁹¹² For Clement, it is clear that the pedagogue reproves the sinner with παρρησία, because he prefers the repentance of the sinner above his death. Clement repeats multiple times that the aim of the pedagogue’s ἔλεγχος is the repentance of the sinner, e.g.: ὁ φιλόανθρωπος λόγος, ἐλέγχει δέ, ἵνα μετανοήσωσιν.⁹¹³ The aim of his ἔλεγχος is the salvation of the ones who are reproved: ἐλέους γὰρ καὶ ἐλέγχου σκοπὸς ἡ τῶν ἐλεγχομένων σωτηρία.⁹¹⁴

2.6 JOHN

The previous subsections have ascertained that many authors, more or less contemporary to John, viewed παρρησία as having the natural result that the reproved person is ashamed and repents of his or her errors/sins. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that readers in the first and second century CE, who read that the Paraclete reproved the κόσμος with παρρησία concerning its ἁμαρτία of not believing in Jesus (John 16:7–9, 25), inferred from this reading that the κόσμος will be ashamed and will repent of its committed ἁμαρτία. John, who was equally influenced by the contemporary conventions of παρρησία, equally expected his readers to make this inference.

Although the disciples will be made ἀποσυνάγωγος (John 16:2), they will obtain παρρησία through the Paraclete (16:25), because they, as true disciples, will keep Jesus’ commandments (15:8–10). We have seen a similar logic in Philo: the consciousness of

⁹⁰⁹ Adjusted LCL translation.

⁹¹⁰ Plu., *Virt. mor.* 452c (William R. Paton – Max Pohlenz – Wilhelm Sieveking [eds.], *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. 3, BSGRT [Leipzig: Teubner, 21972]). My translation: “blame and admonition engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a pain of kind, the second a fear.”

⁹¹¹ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §2.5.

⁹¹² Clem., *Paed.* 3.12.86.1 (GCS 12, 283:17–22).

⁹¹³ Clem., *Paed.* 1.7.58.2 (GCS 12, 124:22).

⁹¹⁴ Clem., *Paed.* 1.8.72.1 (GCS 12, 132:7–8).

having loved God and having kept his commandments facilitates *παρρησία* and allows one to participate in God's *λόγος*. The disciples will not have *παρρησία* on the basis of their social status because they will be made *ἀποσυνάγωγος*. Only their being conscious of having loved God, and of having kept his commandments, provides them with *παρρησία*. The disciples are socially inferior to the *κόσμος*, due to their being made *ἀποσυνάγωγος*. In spite of this socially inferior status, they will have *παρρησία* towards the *κόσμος* thanks to the Paraclete. Having been born anew/from above (*ἄνωθεν*, 3:3, 7), the disciples have become brothers and sisters, who have the same Father (20:17). Comparable to what Philo says about Moses, God is the *πατρίς*, citizenship, family, and *παρρησία* of the disciples. As agents of the Holy Spirit, the disciples will reproach the *κόσμος* with *παρρησία* concerning its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9). The reader has to read between the lines that the *κόσμος*, who will be made conscious of committing this *ἁμαρτία*, will feel ashamed and will repent. The benefit for the disciples, of which Jesus speaks in 16:7–8, is that they will receive the Paraclete, and will be at peace with the *κόσμος*.

I agree with Beutler and Thyen that Jesus' words *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν* in John 20:19 are the fulfilment of Jesus' promise of peace to the disciples in John 14:27 and 16:33.⁹¹⁵ Before Jesus breathes the Holy Spirit on the disciples (20:22), he says to the disciples: *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν· καθὼς ἀπέσταλκέν με ὁ πατήρ, κἀγὼ πέμπω ὑμᾶς* (20:21). No longer will the disciples have to hide behind locked doors for fear of the 'Jews' (cf. 20:19), as peace is given to them through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Jesus has overcome the *κόσμος*. Despite the persecution the disciples are experiencing, they have peace in Jesus (16:33; cf. 14:27).

The task of the disciples to either forgive or "conquer/overcome" (*κρατέω*)⁹¹⁶ *ἁμαρτίαι* (John 20:23) corresponds to their role as agents of the Holy Spirit, who will reproach the *κόσμος* with *παρρησία* concerning its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9).⁹¹⁷ I agree with Wendelin Seitz that the translation of *κρατέω* with "to

⁹¹⁵ See Johannes Beutler, "Resurrection and the Forgiveness of Sins: John 20:23 against Its Traditional Background," in *The Resurrection of Jesus*, 237–251, at 240 and Thyen, *Johannes*, 764. A similar position is taken by Bultmann (*Johannes*, 536), who refers only to John 14:27. Brown (*John [XIII–XXI]*, 1021) and Barrett (*John*, 568) recognise without specification that *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν* is not an ordinary greeting in John 20:19, 21, 26. Schnackenburg (*Johannes*, vol. 3, 382–383) specifies that it is an "österlichen Gruß" that conquers "Furcht und Verwirrung".

⁹¹⁶ This translation of *κρατέω* in John 20:23 has been proposed by Wendelin E. Seitz, "Philologische Bemerkungen zu einer problematischen Bibelübersetzung: Joh 20,22–23," *MTZ* 51/1 (2000) 55–61. A critical response was formulated by Hans-Ulrich Weidemann, "Nochmals Joh 20,23: Weitere philologische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu einer problematischen Bibelübersetzung," *MTZ* 52/2 (2001) 121–127. For a defence of the traditional translation of *κρατέω* with "to retain", see Jan Lambrecht, "A Note on John 20,23b," *ETL* 83/1 (2007) 165–168. Another possible translation is offered by Sandra Schneiders ("The Raising of the New Temple: John 20.19–23 and Johannine Ecclesiology," *NTS* 52/3 [2006] 337–355, at 353–354), who translates *κρατέω* with "to hold fast", and claims that "what is held is not sins but people". Further study is required to enquire which translation of *κρατέω* in John 20:23 is to be preferred.

⁹¹⁷ Cf. Bultmann, *Johannes*, 537: "War die Aufgabe des Geistes 16,8–11 als ein *ἐλέγχειν* beschrieben worden, so entspricht dem hier die mit Geistverleihung den Jüngern erteilte Vollmacht [20:23, T.T.]. The

conquer/overcome” makes more sense in the literary context of John 20:22–23 than the conventional translation “to retain”. Given that the direct literary context speaks of peace (20:19, 21), it is unlikely that the disciples are given the task to retain sins. Overcoming or conquering sins is more characteristic of a situation of peace.⁹¹⁸

In the next section, we will see that other passages in John’s Gospel promise salvation/healing to the recalcitrant κόσμος. These passages, thereby, affirm that there will be peace between the disciples and the κόσμος.

3. THE SALVATION OF THE ΚΟΣΜΟΣ IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Many passages in John allude to the salvation of the recalcitrant κόσμος. The present section will discuss (i) John 8:28; 19:37 (see 3.1); (ii) John 12:32 (see 3.2); (iii) John 12:39–40 (see 3.3); and (iv) John 3:16–17; 12:46–47 *et al.* (see 3.4) from the perspective of the conventions of παρρησία depicted in the previous section.

3.1 JOHN 8:28; 19:37

In John 8:28, Jesus says to the ‘Jews’: ὅταν ὑψώσητε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τότε γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι, καὶ ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ ποιῶ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς ἐδίδαξέν με ὁ πατὴρ ταῦτα λαλῶ. According to some commentators, Jesus threatens the ‘Jews’ here by referring to their coming judgement at the time of his death at the cross.⁹¹⁹ I agree with Thyen that John 8:28 cannot be a threat of coming judgement, because 8:30 reports that many of the ‘Jews’ have faith in Jesus because of what he said in 8:28–29. According to Thyen, 8:28 promises salvation to the ‘Jews’ with whom Jesus dialogues. He sees confirmation for this view in the Scripture quotation in 19:37: ὄψονται εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν. Seeing is closely related to knowing in the Fourth Gospel. The use of ὁράω in 19:37 signals that those who pierced Jesus will also come to know him and obtain salvation.⁹²⁰ I add, to Thyen’s analysis, that the soldiers did not only pierce Jesus (19:34), but have previously also crucified Jesus (19:18). The actions of the soldiers are instigated by the ‘Jews’, because the latter call on Pilate to crucify Jesus (19:15) and to have his body removed from the cross on the day of the Sabbath (19:31). I agree with Labahn that the piercing of Jesus’ body is a way for the soldiers to verify whether Jesus was really dead.⁹²¹ In my view, the piercing performs the will of the ‘Jews’ to remove Jesus’ body from the cross. Consequently, ὄψονται in 19:37 not only refers to the soldier who pierced Jesus, but also to the ‘Jews’ who wanted Jesus’ body to be removed from the cross. This

connection between John 16:8–11 and 20:23 has not been observed by Steven E. Hansen, “Forgiving and Retaining Sin: A Study of the Text and Context of John 20:23,” *HBT* 19 (1997) 24–32.

⁹¹⁸ See Seitz, “Philologische Bemerkungen,” 59–60. Further study is, however, required to establish this translation of κρατέω in John 20:23 with more certainty.

⁹¹⁹ See, e.g., Barrett, *John*, 344; Bultmann, *Johannes*, 266.

⁹²⁰ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 430–431.

⁹²¹ See Michael Labahn, “The Soldiers Who Crucify: Fulfilling Scripture,” in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 601–606, at 604.

is, moreover, suggested by the plural number of the verb, whereas only “one of the soldiers” (εἷς τῶν στρατιωτῶν) performed the actual piercing of Jesus (19:34).

In John 8:28, the ‘Jews’ are promised that when they crucify Jesus, they will know that Jesus teaches the teaching of the Father and that he is authorised by God. The text is in accordance with the convention that παρρησία can also save the recalcitrant. The scriptural quotation in 19:37 attests that the ‘Jews’ will change their mind about Jesus and will believe (cf. ὁψονται) him. Although they have always resisted Jesus’ παρρησία, the ‘Jews’ will be saved at the καιρός of Jesus’ παρρησία at the time of his death.

3.2 JOHN 12:32

In John 12:32, Jesus states: καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ὑψωθῶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πάντας ἐλκύσω πρὸς ἐμαυτόν. The scholarly discussion on John 12:32 focuses around the question whether πάντας refers to the whole of humanity or only to those whom the Father has given to Jesus (6:37, 39; 17:12; 18:9).⁹²² According to Meeks, the reaction of unbelief in John 12:34 warns against the view that πάντας in 12:32 has a universal meaning.⁹²³ In my view, Meeks neglects that Jesus is speaking in 12:32 about the time of his being lifted up on the cross. Even when the crowd in 12:34 does not submit to Jesus’ teaching, this does not mean that they will not be drawn to Jesus at the time of Jesus’ death when his παρρησία is effective (7:6, 8; 16:25). The remark by the Pharisees that the κόσμος has gone after Jesus (12:19) suggests that πάντας in 12:32 includes reference to the κόσμος. I agree with Barrett that κόσμος refers, here, to everyone and that, in 12:19, the ‘Jews’ ironically express the truth that Jesus was sent into the world to save the world (3:17).⁹²⁴ This is affirmed by the following verses, where the Greeks wish to see (ὁράω) Jesus (12:20–21).⁹²⁵ As noted by Brown, seeing is equivalent to believing in the Fourth Gospel. It is possible that the Greeks express their hope to believe in Jesus.⁹²⁶ All the above-mentioned passages attest the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Fourth Gospel, and the convention that παρρησία can heal/save everyone, even those who resist it. Jesus’ cross makes his παρρησία effective for everyone, ‘Jews’ and disciples alike. Even those who resist Jesus, will be drawn to him at the time of his death.

⁹²² For an overview of these two positions among Church Fathers and modern scholars, see Patrick Adeso, “Universal Salvation in John 12:32” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae Roma, 1998), 57–65.

⁹²³ See Meeks, “The Man from Heaven”: 64.

⁹²⁴ See Barrett, *John*, 420. According to Ned H. Cassem, “A Grammatical and Contextual Inventory of the Use of κόσμος in the Johannine Corpus with Some Implications for a Johannine Cosmic Theology,” *NTS* 19/1 (1972) 81–91: at 88, the use of κόσμος in John 12:19 has a neutral meaning, although he adds that the use is vague in this text.

⁹²⁵ On the discussion whether Ἕλληνες in John 12:20 refers to Gentiles or Greek Jews from the Diaspora, see Sherri Brown, “The Greeks: Jesus’ Hour and the Weight of the World,” in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 397–402 and Thyen, *Johannes*, 555–556.

⁹²⁶ See Brown, *John (I–XII)*, 466.

3.3 JOHN 12:39–40

For my discussion, I use the following sense line division of John 12:40:

- 12:40a τετύφλωκεν αὐτῶν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς
 12:40b καὶ ἐπώρωσεν αὐτῶν τὴν καρδίαν,
 12:40ca ἵνα μὴ ἴδωσιν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς
 12:40cb καὶ νοήσωσιν τῇ καρδίᾳ
 12:40cγ καὶ στραφῶσιν,
 12:40d καὶ ἰάσομαι αὐτούς.

Many translators and scholars view God as the implied subject of τετύφλωκεν and ἐπώρωσεν in John 12:40a–b.⁹²⁷ Maarten Menken claims that John has interpreted עָוַר (‘‘to blind’’) and מָשַׁח (‘‘to fatten’’) in MT Isa 6:10 as hiphil perfects (מָשַׁח: ‘‘he has fattened’’ and עָוַר: ‘‘he has blinded’’) instead of hiphil imperatives in order to present God, and not the prophet Isaiah, as the subject of these verbs.⁹²⁸ Some of these scholars additionally read 12:40d as part of the ἵνα clause. According to Menken, God is often ‘‘presented as the one who determines to salvation, and Jesus as the one who brings or realizes salvation’’ (6:39; cf. 6:37, 44–45; 10:27–29; 17:2, 6, 9, 24; 18:9). Menken thinks ‘‘[t]his theological connection’’ implies that 12:40d is still dependent on ἵνα μὴ.⁹²⁹ In this reading, the ‘Jews’ are denied salvation/healing by Jesus because they are determined by God.

A recent study of Hans Förster has shown that the above-depicted traditional interpretation of John 12:40 is problematic for two reasons: First, it is a mistake to insert ‘God’ as the subject of the verbs in 12:40a–b. In agreement with 9:39 it is Jesus, who blinded the eyes of the ‘Jews’ and hardened their hearts.⁹³⁰ This is also suggested by the Hebrew and Greek pretext of Isa 6:10 in which the prophet, although commissioned by God, is the cause of the hardening. The proposal by Menken that John reads הִשְׁמַח and הִעָוַר as hiphil perfects is faced with the problem that there is an incongruity in number between the *duales* עֵינָיו (‘‘both his eyes’’) and אָזְנוֹ (‘‘both his ears’’) and the third person singular of the mentioned verbs. Moreover, even if one reads these verbs as hiphil perfects, one cannot infer from this that God is their implied subject. Second, 12:40d is not part of the ἵνα clause, because of the future indicative and the change of person of the

⁹²⁷ For a detailed discussion of these scholars and translators, see Hans Förster, ‘‘Ein Vorschlag für ein neues Verständnis von Joh 12,39–40,’’ ZNW 109/1 (2018) 51–75: at 52–57. The most systematic study on John 12:35–50 is Kühnischelm, *Verstockung, Gericht und Heil*.

⁹²⁸ See Maarten J.J. Menken, ‘‘‘He Has Blinded Their Eyes...’ (John 12:40),’’ in *Old Testament Quotations in the Fourth Gospel: Studies in Textual Form*, CBET 15 (Kampen: Pharos, 1996), 99–122, at 110.

⁹²⁹ Menken, ‘‘‘He Has Blinded,’’ 120.

⁹³⁰ The view that Jesus is the subject of the verbs in John 12:40a–b was previously suggested by Judith M. Lieu, ‘‘Blindness in the Johannine Tradition,’’ NTS 34 (1988) 83–95: at 86.

verb ἰάσομαι. Just like in the Hebrew and the Greek pretexts of Isa 6:10, God brings about healing and salvation and is the implied subject of ἰάσομαι in John 12:40d.⁹³¹

Förster's analysis demonstrated that John 12:40 is not an anti-Jewish text, but promises salvation to those who have rejected Jesus' teaching. Although Jesus is presented as having blinded and hardened the 'Jews' in order that they will not turn to him (12:40a–b, *cf.* γ), they will nevertheless be healed by God (*cf.* 12:40d). On the basis of my analysis in the previous two sections, I claim that God's agency of salvation consists in sending the Paraclete (14:16, 26; 15:26), who will with *παρρησία* reproach the *κόσμος* concerning its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9, 25). John is, here, consistent with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, which, as described in the previous chapter, claim that the recalcitrant require a severe form of *παρρησία*.⁹³² Only through harsh criticism can they be saved. Jesus' teaching has hardened and blinded them, but they will nevertheless be saved through the Paraclete. By means of the Paraclete's *ἔλεγχος*, the *κόσμος* will be ashamed, repent, and be saved (*cf.* ἰάσομαι in 12:40d). The logic of hardening and salvation in 12:40 is another indication that the teaching of Jesus in the Gospel is in conformity with the conventions of *παρρησία* in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. By means of a severe form of *παρρησία* Jesus saves even those who resist him.

3.4 JOHN 3:16–17; 12:46–47 *ET AL.*

Jesus did not come to condemn (κρίνω) the *κόσμος*, but to save it through his teaching (John 3:16–17; 12:46–47). Jesus desires that the whole world will believe (17:21, 23) and have eternal life (17:3). The view that *κόσμος* refers only to Israel in these passages contradicts the universalistic overtones of other passages in the Gospel (4:42; 10:16; 12:19, 20).⁹³³ Given that the recalcitrant world did not believe in Jesus, they are already judged (3:18; 12:48). Yet, this does not mean that they will not be saved. By means of the Paraclete's *ἔλεγχος* the world will be both judged (16:11; *cf.* 12:31) and made aware of its *ἁμαρτία* (16:9). The world will be ashamed, and will repent and be healed from its moral depravity. By means of his *παρρησία*, Jesus is the Saviour of the world (4:42), who gives life to the world (6:33).

A counterargument might be that Jesus says to his disciples that at the time of his death he will reveal himself only to them, and not to the recalcitrant world (John 14:19–20; *cf.* 14:22). Yet, this does not imply that Jesus will not save the recalcitrant world as well. As can be seen in Jesus' strategic use of *παρρησία*, not everyone is healed/saved in the same way.

⁹³¹ See Förster, "Ein Vorschlag": 51–75.

⁹³² See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §1 and §2.

⁹³³ For most scholars, the anthropological meaning of *κόσμος* in the Fourth Gospel is universal: see Joan B.C. Infante, "A World Beyond the Divide: A Cognitive-Linguistic and Historical-Critical Analysis of the Construal of 'Kosmos' in Select Texts of the Fourth Gospel" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, KU Leuven, 2017), 11–50 and the literature mentioned there.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Jesus treated the disciples with a mixed form of *παρρησία* throughout the Farewell Discourse.⁹³⁴ He mollified the disciples with praise because they are soft and cannot bear much *παρρησία* (cf. John 16:12). This mollification prepared them for the teaching of the Paraclete, who will guide them into the full truth at the hour in which Jesus will tell (cf. ἀπαγγεῖν) *παρρησία* about the Father (16:13, 25). The Paraclete will not speak on his own authority, but will only declare (ἀναγγελεῖ) what he has received from Jesus (16:13–14). The use of similar verbs here (ἀπαγγέλλω/ἀναγγέλλω) and the fact that the Paraclete can only declare what he has received from Jesus, show that Jesus' *παρρησία* towards the disciples at the hour of his death is mediated by the Paraclete.⁹³⁵ The disciples will be saved by means of a form of *παρρησία* that is adapted to their psychological disposition.

As shown in the previous chapter, Jesus treated the 'Jews' and the recalcitrant world in general with a pure form of *παρρησία* consisting solely in blame and reproach.⁹³⁶ Although they cannot receive the Paraclete (John 14:16–17), Jesus' *παρρησία* will be efficient towards them though the Paraclete's ἐλέγχειν (16:8–11). Due to their recalcitrance, only this severe form of *παρρησία* can be effective for them. The recalcitrant world will be saved by means of a form of *παρρησία* that is adapted to their psychological disposition. They, too, will be saved/healed, but not in the same way as the disciples.

For both the disciples and the 'Jews', Jesus' *παρρησία* can only be effective at the time of his death (and resurrection).⁹³⁷ Both groups do not adequately understand Jesus before his death. I agree with Kierspel that not having faith in Jesus is "a universal phenomenon and not the stigma of one particular group".⁹³⁸ My analysis of Jesus' *παρρησία* has shown that salvation, too, is not restricted to a particular group.

Jesus saves all who have been given to him by the Father (cf. John 6:37, 39; 17:12; 18:9). The overcoming of the world (16:33; cf. 12:31; 14:30; 16:11) is an essential part of the pedagogy of the Gospel and results in the salvation of the world. Disciplining and punishment of the world is characteristic of God's love of the world and of his desire that they become his children (cf. Prov 3:12). This explains why, despite the hostility of the world towards the disciples (John 16:2–3), Jesus does not pray to the Father to take them

⁹³⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §3.1.

⁹³⁵ For further argumentation for the view that the Spirit-Paraclete is the mouthpiece of Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour, see *supra*, Chapter Three, §1.

⁹³⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §§3.3–5.

⁹³⁷ The *καιρός* or *ῥα* of Jesus' *παρρησία* (John 7:6, 8; 16:25) refers to both Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection as constituting the event of Jesus' glorification. For the view that Jesus' glorification consists of both his death and resurrection, see, e.g., Maarten J.J. Menken, "Interpretation of the Old Testament and the Resurrection of Jesus in John's Gospel," in *Resurrection in the New Testament: FS J. Lambrecht*, ed. Reimund Bieringer – Veronica Koperski – Bianca Lataire, BETL 165 (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 189–205, at 201; Craig R. Koester, "Jesus' Resurrection, the Signs, and the Dynamics of Faith in the Gospel of John," in *The Resurrection of Jesus*, 47–74, at 52; Udo Schnelle, "Cross and Resurrection in the Gospel of John," in *The Resurrection of Jesus*, 127–151.

⁹³⁸ Kierspel, *The Jews and the World in the Fourth Gospel*, 122.

out of the world (17:15). Rather, he sends them into the world to sanctify themselves, just as he has done (17:18–19).⁹³⁹ The mission of the salvation of the world is to be continued by the disciples.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF *παρρησία*

The present chapter has demonstrated that the idea of the salvation of the κόσμος in the Fourth Gospel is intrinsically connected to Jesus' *παρρησία*. This intrinsic connection can be understood from the perspective of the conventions of *παρρησία* in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE. Although the recalcitrant κόσμος resists Jesus' *παρρησία*, it will be saved/healed by being reproved with *παρρησία*, and being made aware of its *ἀμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus. The disciples, although being made *ἀποσυνάγωγος* (John 16:2), will have *παρρησία* towards the κόσμος through the Paraclete (16:25), whom they will receive at the time of Jesus' crucifixion (and resurrection).⁹⁴⁰ The readers of the Gospel, who are (indirectly) influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* will easily confer, from the *ἔλεγχος* of the κόσμος (16:8–9), that the same κόσμος will be ashamed and will repent of its *ἀμαρτία*. Many other passages in the Gospel attest to this idea of the salvation of the κόσμος (e.g., 3:16–17; 8:28; 12:32, 39–40, 46–47; 19:37), and can be understood from the perspective of the earlier mentioned conventions of *παρρησία*. The peace that is promised to the disciples (14:27; 16:33) is given to them in 20:19, 21. In 20:22, the disciples become agents of the Holy Spirit, who will be at peace with the κόσμος. No longer will they have to hide behind locked doors for fear of the 'Jews' (cf. 20:19), because peace is given to them through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Their task to either forgive or conquer *ἀμαρτίαι* (20:23) corresponds to their role as agents of the Holy Spirit, who will reproach the κόσμος concerning its *ἀμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9).

In addition to the above conclusion of the present chapter, I remark that the identification of the author of the Gospel with the Beloved Disciple (John 19:35; 21:24) suggests that the Gospel itself is a form of *παρρησία* towards the κόσμος.⁹⁴¹ By

⁹³⁹ For the argumentation for this interpretation of the disciples' mission of self-sanctification in John 17:18–19, see *supra*, Chapter Five, §3.3.

⁹⁴⁰ Cf. Harold W. Attridge, "From Discord Rises Meaning: Resurrection Motifs in the Fourth Gospel," in *The Resurrection of Jesus*, 1–19, at 15, who claims that "the Spirit has been given up" in John 19:30, "but not given out". The latter takes place with the resurrection appearance in 20:22. I remark that this justifies my view that John conceives of crucifixion *and* resurrection as constituting the hour of Jesus' glorification: see *supra*, n. 937.

⁹⁴¹ The thesis that John 19:35 and 21:24 identify the beloved disciple as the author of the Fourth Gospel is defended by, e.g., Martin Rese, "Das Selbstzeugnis des Johannesevangelium über seinen Verfasser," *ETL* 72/1 (1996) 75–111: at 90–91; Richard Bauckham, *The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 87–89; Van Belle, "L'unité littéraire," 305–306; James L. Resseguie, "The Beloved Disciple: The Ideal Point of View," in *Character Studies*, 537–549, at 544, 548–549. These authors assume that ὁ ἑωρακὼς μεμαρτύρηκεν in John 19:35a refers back to the only male person, viz. the Beloved Disciple, standing by the cross (19:25–27).

identifying the Gospel as written by the Beloved Disciple, who is presented as following Jesus (1:35–40; 18:15; 21:20), the Gospel is interpreted as embodying the *παρρησία* that is promised to the disciples (16:25).⁹⁴² The Beloved Disciple is the exemplary model of the student who will obtain *παρρησία* towards his persecutors, because he acts in agreement with Jesus' commandment of love.⁹⁴³ Although the disciples are persecuted by the *κόσμος* and made *ἀποσυνάγωγος*, the text of the Gospel is a way of reproving the *κόσμος* in order to shame the *κόσμος* of its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus, and to bring it to repentance of this *ἁμαρτία*. The Gospel reflects the socio-historical reality of persecuted Jesus followers who have lost the social status that originally warranted their *παρρησία*. In agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, these Jesus followers reacted to this loss of *παρρησία* by reformulating the conditions of *παρρησία*. It is not their belonging to the synagogue that authorises their *παρρησία*, but their following of Jesus, which consists in living in agreement with Jesus' commandment of love unto death.

Furthermore, the Gospel is authorised by presenting its author as witnessing the critical moment of Jesus' *παρρησία* on the cross (John 19:35).⁹⁴⁴ Affected by Jesus' *παρρησία*, the author of the Gospel is depicted as having a superior access to Jesus. John, thereby, presents his Gospel as trustworthy. Unlike for the Synoptics, John's story of Jesus is to a large extent not attested in the other Gospels. Since John presents Jesus in a way that largely differs from how Jesus is presented in the Synoptics, he had to persuade sceptical readers of the authenticity of his Gospel.⁹⁴⁵ He, therefore, depicted the author of the Gospel as a witness of the critical moment of Jesus' *παρρησία*.⁹⁴⁶

Another possibility is that ὁ ἑωρακὼς μεμαρτύρηκεν refers to the soldier who pierced Jesus in 19:34. John 19:35a, then, presents the soldier in a similar way as Mark 15:39 the centurion. This interpretation is defended by Maurits Sabbe, "The Johannine Account of the Death of Jesus and Its Synoptic Parallels (Jn 19,16b-42)," *ETL* 70/1 (1994) 34–64: at 48–50. Sabbe (*ibid.*, 49), additionally, argues that ἐκεῖνος in John 19:35c refers to the Beloved Disciple. Hence, in Sabbe's interpretation, too, John 19:35 indirectly identifies the Beloved Disciple as the author of the Fourth Gospel.

⁹⁴² The position that the Beloved disciple is possibly one of the two unnamed disciples mentioned in John 1:35–40 is defended by Bauckham, *The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple*, 85. For the argumentation that the "other disciple" in John 18:15–16 can be identified with the Beloved Disciple, see Frans Neirynck, "The 'Other Disciple' in Jn 18,15-16," *ETL* 51/1 (1975) 113–141.

⁹⁴³ On the Beloved Disciple as a faithful follower of Jesus who represents the ideal point of view of the Gospel, see Resseguie, "The Beloved Disciple".

⁹⁴⁴ I assume that ὁ ἑωρακὼς μεμαρτύρηκεν in John 19:35a refers to the Beloved Disciple: see *supra*, n. 941.

⁹⁴⁵ I assume in my argumentation that John and his audience knew the Synoptic Gospels. This assumption is based on the Louvain hypothesis on John's literary dependency on the Synoptics. On this hypothesis, see *infra*, n. 1371.

⁹⁴⁶ On John's use of the literary strategy of eyewitness testimony to authenticate his story of Jesus, see Susanne Luther, "The Authentication of the Past: Narrative Representations of History in the Gospel of John," *JSNT* 43/1 (2020) 67–84: esp. at 74–76 and Susanne Luther, *Die Authentifizierung der Vergangenheit: Literarische Geschichtsdarstellung im Johannesevangelium*, WUNT (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) (*forthcoming*).

CHAPTER IX.

FRIENDSHIP AND *παρρησία* IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The present chapter will address the question of how Jesus' *παρρησία* relates to the theme of friendship in the Fourth Gospel.⁹⁴⁷ First, I will provide an analysis of friendship language in John to define the main characteristics of friendship in the Gospel (Section 1). Second, I will compare these characteristics with the Greco-Roman ideal of friendship (Section 2). In a third and fourth step, I will analyse the characteristics of friendship in the Gospel from the perspective of the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* (Sections 3 and 4).

1. FRIENDSHIP LANGUAGE IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The present section will provide an analysis of the semantics of the noun φίλος (1.1) and the related verbs φιλέω and ἀγαπάω (1.2) in the Fourth Gospel. By reconstructing what kind of relations these words depict, I will provide the essential characteristics of friendship in the Gospel.

1.1 Φίλος

John the Baptist is depicted as ὁ φίλος τοῦ νυμφίου in John 3:29. John openly proclaims to his disciples that he is not the Christ (3:28). Identifying himself as Jesus' friend, he claims to listen to Jesus' voice (3:29). He states that Jesus must increase, whereas he must decrease (3:30). According to Eldho Puthenkandathil, John is presented here as the first to enter into the state of friendship with Jesus to which Jesus later invites all of the disciples (15:13–15).⁹⁴⁸ Puthenkandathil calls this friendship “a master-disciple relationship” based on inequality and obedience.⁹⁴⁹ I remark, however, that this inequality is only initially present. John considers friendship relations with Jesus as superseding this initial inequality. Friendship with Jesus entails that one is no longer called a servant, but shares in the equal status of friends (15:15). Puthenkandathil's view that friendship in the Gospel is based on obedience is inaccurate.

The next occurrence of φίλος is in John 11:11, where Jesus calls Lazarus ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν. Lazarus is described as a mutual friend of Jesus and the disciples. Puthenkandathil has observed the following two parallels between the presentation of the friendship relationship between Jesus and Lazarus and the depiction of friendship in 15:13–15: (i) Just as a friend is described as laying down one's life for one's friends (15:13), Lazarus

⁹⁴⁷ *Supra*, Chapter Two, §6.2, I have formulated this research question in dialogue with scholarly literature.

⁹⁴⁸ See Eldho Puthenkandathil, *Philos: A Designation for the Jesus-Disciple Relationship – An Exegetico-Theological Investigation of the Term in the Fourth Gospel*, European University Studies XXIII/475 (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1993), 83.

⁹⁴⁹ Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 85.

will die for the glorification of his friend Jesus (11:4). Vice versa, Jesus' raising of Lazarus leads to the death of Jesus for his friends, including Lazarus (11:45–53),⁹⁵⁰ and (ii) parallel to 15:14, Lazarus is obedient to Jesus (11:43–44) and thereby shows faith in Jesus (cf. 3:36).⁹⁵¹ I agree with Puthenkandathil's analysis. However, as argued above, and as we will further argue below, obedience is an inaccurate category for depicting friendship relations in the Fourth Gospel.

Puthenkandathil further observed that John 11:11 and 11:14 are paralleled by 15:14–15. First, Jesus reminds the disciples of the friendship bonds between them (11:11 par. 15:14). Second, Jesus shares his knowledge of the death of Lazarus with the disciples (11:14 par. 15:15).⁹⁵² According to O'Day, the occurrence of *παρησία* in 11:14 should be read in the light of the depiction in 11:11 of Jesus and the disciples as being part of the same friendship group. Jesus' *παρησία* is an act of friendship towards the disciples communicating the hard truth that their mutual friend Lazarus has died. The disciples can only understand the *σημεῖον* of Lazarus' resurrection, if they realise that Lazarus is dead, and not merely ill and sleeping.⁹⁵³ Endorsing this interpretation,⁹⁵⁴ I observe that Jesus immediately softens his *παρησία* by claiming that he is glad for the sake of the disciples that he was not there. The disciples will benefit from Lazarus' death by obtaining faith (11:15).⁹⁵⁵

“[T]he climax of the Johannine teaching on” friendship can be found in John 15:13–15.⁹⁵⁶ The passage functions “as a lens through which to view the theme” of friendship in the Gospel as a whole.⁹⁵⁷ O'Day has observed that the motif of open communication in 15:15 is a reference to the idea of *παρησία* among friends.⁹⁵⁸ Scholtissek and Zimmermann agree with O'Day and conclude from 18:20 that the friendship ethics in the Gospel are universalistic. Jesus has taught the entire world *παρησία*, including enemies.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁰ See Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 98–100.

⁹⁵¹ See Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 135–136.

⁹⁵² See Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 100–101.

⁹⁵³ See Gail R. O'Day, “Jesus as Friend in the Gospel of John,” in *Transcending Boundaries: Contemporary Readings of the New Testament. Essays in Honor of Francis J. Moloney*, ed. Rekha M. Chennattu – Mary L. Coloe, Biblioteca di Scienze Religiose 187 (Roma: LAS, 2005), 75–92, at 88–89.

⁹⁵⁴ A disagreement between O'Day and my interpretation is that I argue that Jesus is speaking about Lazarus' death in an unconventional meaning: see *supra*, Chapter Three, §2.

⁹⁵⁵ The softening of Jesus' *παρησία* in John 11:15 is in agreement with how the Johannine Jesus, elsewhere, teaches the disciples and softens his *παρησία* by mixing it with praise and promise: see *supra*, Chapter Seven, §3.1 and §3.2.

⁹⁵⁶ Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 155.

⁹⁵⁷ Sharon H. Ringe, *Wisdom's Friends: Community and Christology in the Fourth Gospel* (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 65.

⁹⁵⁸ See O'Day, “Jesus as Friend,” 90.

⁹⁵⁹ See Klaus Scholtissek, “‘Eine größere Liebe als diese hat niemand, als wenn einer sein Leben hingibt für seine Freunde’ (Joh 15,13): Die hellenistische Freundschaftsethik und das Johannesevangelium,” in *Kontexte des Johannesevangelium*, 413–439, at 430, 435; Ruben Zimmermann, “Is There Ethics in the Gospel of John? Challenging an Outdated Consensus,” in *Rethinking the Ethics of John: “Implicit Ethics”*

According to Zeba Crook, ἐντέλλω in John 15:12–17 clarifies that there is no status equality between Jesus and his disciples. Friendship language is used to hide the hierarchical relationship between Jesus and his disciples. Crook calls this “fictive-friendship” in which there is no παρρησία. He presupposes that there can only be παρρησία between social equals.⁹⁶⁰ I remark that Crook’s interpretation contradicts the already noted presence of the idea of παρρησία in 15:15 and the fact that Jesus speaks παρρησία towards his disciples (e.g., 11:14; 18:20). John conceived of the friendship between Jesus and the disciples as a real friendship authenticated by παρρησία. Furthermore, the status inequality between Jesus and the disciples is only initially present. John 15:15 clarifies that the open communication between Jesus and the disciples justifies that the disciples are no longer called servants, but friends. Becoming friends with Jesus, thus, entails a progression from an initial state of inequality between master and servant to a friendship relationship between equals.

As mentioned above, obedience is an inaccurate category to depict friendship relations in the Gospel. Friendship in the Fourth Gospel is an emotional bond of intimacy (John 11:5, 35–36) that cannot be captured in terms of obedience. The verb ὑπακούω cannot be found in the Gospel. John uses τηρέω to refer to “keeping my word” (14:23–24; 17:6) and “keeping my commandments” (14:15, 21; 15:10, 20). According to Lee, the verb τηρέω suggests “guarding or holding what is precious and life-giving”.⁹⁶¹ Lee concludes from this that the Johannine Jesus does not ask the disciples for “servile obedience”, but draws them into “a divine sovereignty that seeks their allegiance and commitment” and at the same time provides them with “freedom and insight”.⁹⁶² In agreement with her conclusion, I assert that friendship relations in the Gospel are not based on obedience, which is, per definition, servile and dependent on force. Instead, I consider commitment, which is dependent on freedom and insight, to be a more accurate category to depict the friendship relations in the Gospel.⁹⁶³

in the *Johannine Writings*, ed. Jan G. van der Watt – Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 291 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 44–82, at 76, 78; Mirjam Zimmermann – Ruben Zimmermann, “Freundschaftsethik im Johannesevangelium: Zur öffentlichen und politischen Reichweite eines ethischen Konzepts,” in *Biblical Ethics and Application: Purview, Validity, and Relevance of Biblical Texts in Ethical Discourse*, ed. Ruben Zimmermann – Stephan Joubert, WUNT 384 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 163–183, at 177–178.

⁹⁶⁰ See Zeba A. Crook, “Fictive-Friendship and the Fourth Gospel,” *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 67/3 (2011), <https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/997/1880> [accessed January 3, 2021].

⁹⁶¹ Dorothy Lee, “Friendship, Love and Abiding in the Gospel of John,” in *Transcending Boundaries*, 57–74, at 70.

⁹⁶² Lee, “Friendship,” 70.

⁹⁶³ As observed by Christopher Seglenieks, “Untrustworthy Believers: The Rhetorical Strategy of the Johannine Language of Commitment and Belief,” *NovT* 61/1 (2019) 55–69, the language of commitment is essential to understand the different gradations of faith narrated in the Gospel (e.g., John 2:23–25; 6:60–71; 8:30–31; 15:1–6). Seglenieks (*ibid.*, 55) argues that these passages serve the rhetorical function to provoke the reader to question why the narrated faith “falls short, and what genuine faith entails”. John’s rhetorical strategy challenges the readers “to understand the nature of genuine belief, in order that they might take on such genuine belief themselves”.

The last occurrence of φίλος can be found in John 19:12. John 19:12–16 has adequately been called the “Kontrastbild” of 15:13–15.⁹⁶⁴ Scholars have observed that φίλος τοῦ Καίσαρος refers to the patron-client relationship between Pilate and Caesar.⁹⁶⁵ The designation of Pilate as a friend of the Caesar hides the asymmetrical relationship between Pilate and the emperor. Crook rightly claims that the “the friendship between Pilate and Tiberius is fictive”.⁹⁶⁶ Pilate has no παρρησία towards the Caesar, as he cannot oppose the Caesar in any way. Although Pilate seeks to release Jesus, he is unable to do so, because releasing Jesus implies association with someone who “speaks against” (ἀντιλέγει) the Caesar (19:12).

I conclude my discussion of φίλος in the Fourth Gospel by summarising that the noun depicts a relationship characterised by open communication (παρρησία) and commitment. The only exception is John 19:12, where φίλος is used to depict the patron-client relationship between Pilate and Caesar.

1.2 Φιλέω, ἀγαπάω

I will not discuss all the occurrences of φιλέω and ἀγαπάω nor will I enter into the debate about the question whether φιλέω is synonymous to ἀγαπάω or not. The intention of the present subsection is to research whether the verbs φιλέω and ἀγαπάω denote relations with the same characteristics as the relations referred to by the noun φίλος. First, I will discuss the use of the two verbs to depict the relationship between the Father and the Son (1.2.1), before focusing on the relationship between Jesus and the disciples (1.2.2).

1.2.1 Father – Son

In John 5:20, Jesus states: ὁ γὰρ πατήρ φιλεῖ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, καὶ μείζονα τούτων δείξει αὐτῷ ἔργα, ἵνα ὑμεῖς θαυμάζητε. The Father’s φιλεῖν of the Son entails that he “shows him all that he himself is doing, and greater works than these will he show him”.⁹⁶⁷ The aspect of open communication is inherent to the Father’s love/friendship towards the Son. Vice versa, Jesus shows his love/friendship towards the Father through commitment to his commandments: ἀλλ’ ἵνα γνῷ ὁ κόσμος ὅτι ἀγαπῶ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ καθὼς ἐνετείλατό μοι ὁ πατήρ, οὕτως ποιῶ (14:31). The world can know that Jesus loves (ἀγαπάω) the Father, because Jesus does what the Father has commanded him. The Father loves the Son for this allegiance: διὰ τοῦτό με ὁ πατήρ ἀγαπᾷ

⁹⁶⁴ Scholtissek, “Eine größere Liebe,” 428.

⁹⁶⁵ See Ringe, *Wisdom’s Friends*, 65; E.D.H. Carmichael, *Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love* (London: T&T Clark International, 2004), 38; Boris Repschinski, “Freundschaft mit Jesus: Joh 15,12-17,” in *Im Geist und in der Wahrheit: Studien zum Johannesevangelium und zur Offenbarung des Johannes sowie andere Beiträge. FS für Martin Hasitschka SJ zum 65. Geburtstag* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008), 155–167, at 163.

⁹⁶⁶ Crook, “Fictive-Friendship,” 7.

⁹⁶⁷ My translation.

ὅτι ἐγὼ τίθημι τὴν ψυχὴν μου, ἵνα πάλιν λάβω αὐτήν (10:17). The love/friendship of the Father is conditioned by whether or not Jesus practices his commandment of love (unto death). Jesus' commandment of love to the disciples is the same commandment that he himself is given by the Father: καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ἀκούετε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέμψαντός με πατρός (14:24).

1.2.2 Jesus – Disciples

In John 14:15, Jesus says: ἐὰν ἀγαπᾷτέ με, τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσετε. Loving (ἀγαπάω) Jesus entails keeping his commandments. John 14:21 repeats the aspect of commitment and adds the aspect of open communication: ὁ δὲ ἀγαπῶν με ἀγαπηθήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγαπήσω αὐτὸν καὶ ἐμφανίσω αὐτῷ ἐμαυτόν. Jesus' love/friendship is characterised by the open manifestation of himself. The verb ἀγαπάω depicts a relationship characterised by both commitment and open communication. This open communication is continuous and characteristic of durable friendship/love relations with Jesus: καὶ ἐγνώρισα αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄνομά σου καὶ γνωρίσω, ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ἣν ἠγάπησάς με ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς (17:26).

In a previous chapter, I have argued that John 16:25–27 states that the disciples will obtain the courage and confidence to ask the Father (and Jesus) in Jesus' name because they keep Jesus' commandments.⁹⁶⁸ Open communication (depicted by *παρηρησία*) and commitment are essential characteristics of the friendship relationship between Jesus and the disciples.

I conclude the present section by summarising that the verbs ἀγαπάω and φιλέω depict relations with the same characteristics as those referred to by the noun φίλος: open communication and commitment. Friendship with Jesus is not based on servile obedience or force, but on allegiance and commitment, which depend on freedom and insight. In the next section, I will compare friendship in the Fourth Gospel to the Greco-Roman ideal of friendship.

2. THE GRECO-ROMAN IDEAL OF FRIENDSHIP

In the previous section, we have seen that friendship relations with Jesus, in the Fourth Gospel, develop from an initial hierarchical relationship in which Jesus is the teacher and the lord (e.g., John 13:13; cf. 13:16; 15:20). Only when the disciples prove to dedicate themselves to Jesus' commandment of love (John 15:14), and when open communication is established between them and Jesus (15:15e–f), the initial master-servant relationship becomes a friendship relationship (15:15a–d).⁹⁶⁹ In the Gospel, equality is not a condition, but the outcome of friendship. According to the Greco-Roman ideal of friendship, friendship between a master and a servant is unthinkable. Greco-Roman writers agree that friendship can only come about and endure between equals who

⁹⁶⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2.

⁹⁶⁹ John 15:15a (οὐκέτι λέγω ὑμᾶς δούλους) implies that the disciples, initially, were the servants of Jesus before they became his friends.

agree with one another in thought, word, and deed. Friendship requires unity, mutuality, equality, and reciprocity.⁹⁷⁰ As some writers confirm, the requirement of equality made it impossible to conceive of friendship between God and humans.⁹⁷¹ In the Fourth Gospel, equality is not a condition of friendship. Jesus is depicted as the teacher and the lord of the disciples (e.g., John 13:13). Despite this initial inequality, Jesus befriends the disciples (15:15). Similarly, John the Baptist recognises Jesus as his superior (1:27, 30; 3:31), and is depicted as a friend of Jesus (3:29). The disciples and John the Baptist become friends of Jesus/God through their commitment to his commandment of love. Their initial inequality is not an obstacle for entering into a friendship relationship of equality with Jesus. Being a friend of Jesus entails that one can no longer be called a servant anymore (15:15).

According to Alfons Fürst, the paradigm of the Greco-Roman understanding of friendship relied fundamentally upon its underlying understanding of truth as singular and unchangeable. Change and dissonance were not considered to be part of reality, and, therefore, not of real friendship.⁹⁷² I observe that John's understanding of truth allows for change, because he writes that truth became flesh in Jesus Christ (e.g., John 1:14; 14:6). The consequence is that dissonance, struggle, inequality, plurality, in short, the reality of this world, became part of his understanding of friendship. Instead of using friendship language to hide or suppress this reality, the implied friendship ethics in the Gospel is critical of the Greco-Roman ideal of friendship. In 15:19, the κόσμος is negatively presented as only able to love (cf. ἐφίλει) its own (τὸ ἴδιον). Abandoning Jesus, is described in 16:32 as being scattered to one's own (εἰς τὰ ἴδια). These passages strongly contrast with how Jesus is depicted as the lord and the teacher (e.g., 13:13), who befriends his servants and disciples (15:14–15). Whereas the κόσμος is only able to love equals and people of the same mind, the love and friendship of Jesus is not conditioned by equality.

In John 19:12, the fictive friendship relations in the Roman empire are indirectly criticised by using φίλος τοῦ Καίσαρος as a negative term in contrast to being a friend of

⁹⁷⁰ On this friendship ideal among Greco-Roman writers, see Alfons Fürst, *Streit unter Freunden: Ideal und Realität in der Freundschaftslehre der Antike*, BzA 85 (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1996). See also Martin M. Culy, *Echoes of Friendship in the Gospel of John*, New Testament Monographs 30 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2010), 49–86, who argues that this ideal is also normative in the NT (esp. John), Church Fathers, and extra-canonical Christian literature. Other general discussions of friendship in the Greco-Roman world, also, attest the ideal of equality among friends: see David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: University Press, 1997) and Carmichael, *Friendship*, 7–35.

⁹⁷¹ See, e.g., Arist., *Eth. nic.* 8.9.1158b33–1159a12; Phld., *D.* 1.17–18. Not all Greco-Roman writers were, however, so pessimistic about friendship relations between gods and humans: see Puthenkandathil, Philos, 332–333 and Culy, *Echoes*, 58, 66–76 for examples and discussion. The latter studies also discuss examples of friendship between humans and God in the OT and Jewish literature. For additional discussions of examples of friendship between humans and God in the OT and Pauline literature, see respectively John T. Fitzgerald, “Friendship,” in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Ethics*, vol. 1, ed. Robert L. Brawley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 318–322 and John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, vol. 1, ed. J. Paul Sampley (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 331–362.

⁹⁷² See Fürst, *Streit unter Freunden*, 229.

Jesus. Regardless of the status inequality between them, Jesus can befriend humans by teaching *παρρησία* to the world.⁹⁷³ According to the Greco-Roman ideal of friendship, Pilate can, however, due to his lower social status not be a friend of the Caesar. The friendship language to depict the relationship between Pilate and the Caesar gives the impression of equality, but actually hides Pilate's dependency on the Caesar and his inability to speak against him through *παρρησία*.

John is, however, not critical of all Greco-Roman conventions of friendship. As argued by Ronald Hock, by keeping Jesus' commandment of love the Beloved Disciple complies with the Greco-Roman convention that friends share "a friend's life and fortunes".⁹⁷⁴ When Jesus faces betrayal and arrest and is in need of a friend, the Beloved Disciple is for the first time named (John 13:23). He goes together with (*συνέρχομαι*) Jesus to his trial (18:15).⁹⁷⁵ He takes on the "posthumous responsibility of a friend to care for the friend's family members by accepting Jesus' request" to take care of his mother (19:26–27) and again shows his responsibility "by running to see where Jesus' missing body had gone (20:4)".⁹⁷⁶ Similarly, Sharon Ringe has shown that, although friendship language is not always used, the Greco-Roman convention of sharing a friend's life and fortunes is present in how Jesus is presented as sharing the daily life and dangers of others. For instance, unlike in the Synoptics, the Johannine Jesus does not 'hit-and-run' when he has healed someone, but remains in contact with and shares the dangers of the people whom he heals (5:14–47; 9:35–10:21). Even when Jesus leaves the stage, he will send the Paraclete to share in the dangers of the disciples (15:26–16:4). Ringe also mentions the use of *μένω* (e.g., 1:38, 39; 2:12; 7:9; 10:40; 11:6, 54) and Jesus' providing of food (6:1–14) as examples of how Jesus shows himself to be a friend in sharing the life and fortunes of those whom he meets. Other examples can be found in how Jesus shows himself to be a friend in times of crisis: (i) Jesus' caring in time of sickness and death (e.g., 11:1–44); (ii) Jesus' caring for a friend's family members (2:1–11; cf. the presentation of the Beloved Disciple in 19:26–27); (iii) Jesus' presentation as the Good Shepherd, who takes care of his friends, even if this implies death (10:1–18); and (iv) Jesus' shepherding friendship in terms of helping the disciples to accept the reality of his resurrection (20:11–18; cf. Peter in 21:15–17).⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷³ In John 13:13, Jesus explicitly draws attention to this status inequality between him and the disciples: ὑμεῖς φωνεῖτέ με· ὁ διδάσκαλος, καί· ὁ κύριος, καὶ καλῶς λέγετε· εἰμὶ γάρ.

⁹⁷⁴ Ronald F. Hock, "Jesus, the Beloved Disciple, and Greco-Roman Friendship Conventions," in *Christian Origins and Greco-Roman Culture: Social and Literary Contexts for the New Testament*, ed. Stanley E. Porter – Wendy J. Porter, Text and Editions for New Testament Study 9, Early Christianity in Its Hellenistic Context 1 (Brill: Leiden, 2013), 195–212, at 202.

⁹⁷⁵ I assume that the "other disciple" in John 18:15–16 can be identified with the Beloved Disciple: see *supra*, n. 942.

⁹⁷⁶ Hock, "Jesus, the Beloved Disciple, and Greco-Roman Friendship Conventions," at 212.

⁹⁷⁷ See Ringe, *Wisdom's Friends*, 75–82.

I conclude the present section by summarising that John is rather critical of the Greco-Roman ideal of equality as a condition of friendship.⁹⁷⁸ If John can be said to adhere to Greco-Roman conventions of friendship, then it is the convention of sharing a friend's life and fortunes. By keeping Jesus' commandment of love, the disciples share in Jesus' life and the dangers this life entails. The friendship characteristic, in the Fourth Gospel, of committing oneself to Jesus' commandment of love remains, however, difficult to explain from the perspective of the Greco-Roman conventions of friendship. Jesus' commanding of the disciples presupposes a master-servant relationship. The initial inequality between Jesus and the disciples is in contradiction with the Greco-Roman ideal that friendship can only come about between equals. The next section will enquire how the audience of John could have interpreted the combination of friendship and commitment from the perspective of how the relationship between friendship, commitment, and *παρρησία* was conventionally understood by Jewish-Hellenistic authors.

3. FRIENDSHIP, *παρρησία*, AND COMMITMENT

The present section will first discuss the relationship between friendship, commitment, and *παρρησία* in LXX Wisdom tradition (3.1) and Philo (3.2). I will then address the question of the relationship between friendship and *παρρησία* in John and the role of commitment herein (3.3).

3.1 LXX WISDOM TRADITION⁹⁷⁹

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the connection of *παρρησία* to friendship in Prov 10:10–12.⁹⁸⁰ Other passages, also, show that the theme of friendship in LXX Proverbs is informed by the semantics of *παρρησία*:

ἡνίκα ἂν σε ὀνειδίσῃ ὁ σὸς φίλος, ἀναχώρει εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω, μὴ καταφρόνει, (Prov 25:8–9)

When your friend reproaches you, withdraw; do not show contempt,⁹⁸¹

κρείσσους ἔλεγχοι ἀποκεκαλυμμένοι κρυπτομένης φιλίας. ἀξιοπιστότερά ἐστιν τραύματα φίλου ἢ ἐκούσια φιλήματα ἐχθροῦ. (Prov 27:5–6)

⁹⁷⁸ John is definitely not the only author, who reacted against the Greco-Roman ideal that friendship required status equality. For instance, Seneca (*Ep.* 47) criticises the custom that slave owners do not choose their friends among their slaves. He claims that slave owners should become friends with their slaves who have a “moral character” (*mores*, 47.15).

⁹⁷⁹ For a more general overview of the use of friendship language in Wisdom literature, see Graham Davies, “The Ethics of Friendship in Wisdom Literature,” in *Ethical and Unethical in the Old Testament: God and Humans in Dialogue*, ed. Katharine J. Dell, LHBOTS 528 (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 135–150 and Jeremy Corley, “Friendship in the Hebrew Wisdom Literature,” *PIBA* 38 (2015) 27–51.

⁹⁸⁰ See, *supra*, Chapter Eight, §2.1.

⁹⁸¹ NETS translation.

Better is open reproof than hidden friendship. More trustworthy are the wounds inflicted by a friend than the voluntary kisses of an enemy.⁹⁸²

The reproaching by a friend, “open reproof”, and “the wounds inflicted by a friend” refer to the idea of *παρρησία* among friends. The positive evaluation of the *παρρησία* of a friend in the above-quoted texts is contrasted by the negative evaluation of flattery in MT Prov 29:5: “[w]hoever flatters a neighbor is spreading a net for the neighbor's feet.”⁹⁸³

The association of friendship with reproof can also be found in Sir 19:13–17:

ἔλεγχον φίλον, μήποτε οὐκ ἐποίησεν, καὶ εἴ τι ἐποίησεν, μήποτε προσθῇ.
ἔλεγχον τὸν πλησίον, μήποτε οὐκ εἶπεν, καὶ εἰ εἶρηκεν, ἵνα μὴ δευτερώσῃ.
ἔλεγχον φίλον, πολλάκις γὰρ γίνεται διαβολή, καὶ μὴ παντὶ λόγῳ πιστεύε.
ἔστιν ὀλισθάνων καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς, καὶ τίς οὐχ ἥμαρτεν ἐν τῇ γλώσσῃ αὐτοῦ;
ἔλεγχον τὸν πλησίον σου πρὶν ἢ ἀπειλῆσαι καὶ δὸς τόπον νόμῳ ὑψίστου.

Reprove a friend; perhaps he did not do it; or if he did, so that he may not do it again.
Reprove a neighbour; perhaps he did not say it; or if he said it, so that he may not repeat it.

Reprove a friend, for often it is slander; so do not believe everything you hear.
A person may make a slip without intending it. Who has not sinned with his tongue?
Reprove your neighbour before you threaten him; and let the law of the Most High take its course.⁹⁸⁴

According to Jeremy Corley, the use of *ἐλέγχω* in this passage not only echoes the Levitical law of reproof (Lev 19:17), but also matches the Greek concern for *παρρησία* within friendship.⁹⁸⁵

My discussion of friendship and *παρρησία* up until now has shown that Wisdom literature refers frequently to the idea of *παρρησία* among friends. In previous chapters, I have observed that Wisdom literature considers *ἁμαρτία* as eliciting shame and the absence of *παρρησία* (Prov 13:5–6; Job 27:7–10).⁹⁸⁶ Conversely, keeping the commandments of God and the absence of *ἁμαρτία* facilitates *παρρησία*. Allegiance to God is, thus, quintessential to obtain the necessary ingredient for friendship: *παρρησία*. Without commitment to God's commandments, there is no *παρρησία* and, thus, no genuine friendship possible.

3.2 PHILO

In biblical tradition, Abraham and Moses are called friends of God (Isa 41:8 [Sm.]; Exod 33:11 [LXX]). According to Puthenkandathil, faithful obedience is a major

⁹⁸² My translation.

⁹⁸³ NRSV translation. MT Prov 29:5: גבר מחליק על־רעהו רשת פורש על־פעמיו.

⁹⁸⁴ I have adjusted the NRSV translation, which translates *ἐλέγχω* with “to question”.

⁹⁸⁵ See Corley, *Friendship*, 43. For a detailed exegetical analysis of Sir 19:6–19, see Hans Volker Kieweler, “Freundschaft und böse Nachrede: Exegetische Anmerkungen zu Sir 19,6–19,” in *Freundschaft bei Ben Sira*, ed. Friedrich V. Reiterer, BZAW 244 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), 61–85.

⁹⁸⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2, and Chapter Eight, §2.1.

characteristic of the friendship of Abraham and Moses to God.⁹⁸⁷ Commenting on LXX Exod 33:11, Philo explains that Moses is called the friend of God to show that “all the audacities of his bold discourse were uttered in friendship, rather than in presumption”.⁹⁸⁸ Moses is called the friend of God thanks to his *παρρησία* towards God:

*παρρησία δὲ φιλίας συγγενές· ἐπεὶ πρὸς τίνα ἂν τις ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φίλον παρρησιάσαιτο;*⁹⁸⁹

Frankness of speech is akin to friendship. For to whom should a man speak with frankness but to his friend.⁹⁹⁰

Philo sees a genial relationship between *παρρησία* and friendship: one can only employ *παρρησία* towards a friend. As discussed in Chapter Five, Philo articulates that Moses has *παρρησία* towards God, because he is conscious of being free of *ἁμαρτία* and having kept the commandments of his Master.⁹⁹¹ In my view, this implies that Philo views Moses’ allegiance to God to be intrinsic to the friendship relationship between them. Without his commitment to God’s commandments, Moses would have no *παρρησία* towards God. Without *παρρησία*, there is no genuine friendship.

3.3 JOHN

As John probably wrote for an audience familiar with Wisdom literature, it is likely that his audience read the friendship motif in the Gospel from the perspective of the above-depicted views on *παρρησία* in Wisdom literature.⁹⁹² John’s readers presumably knew from Wisdom literature that humans can become friends with God through personified *σοφία* (Wis 7:14, 27; 8:18). The presentation of Jesus as the personified *λόγος*, who invites the disciples to become friends with him (John 15:12–17) could have reminded John’s readers of the friendship language in Wisdom literature. John’s readers possibly, also, knew that *σοφία* employed *παρρησία* to the world in public places (Prov 1:20–21). The presentation of Jesus as teaching *παρρησία* to the world in full public (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54; 18:20) helped them to associate the friendship language in the Fourth Gospel with the friendship language in Wisdom literature. John’s readers would have easily detected the reference to the idea of *παρρησία* in John 15:15 along with other connections to the friendship language in Wisdom literature.

One of these connections is the claim that friendship with Jesus requires commitment to his commandments (John 15:14). Readers familiar with Wisdom literature knew that keeping God’s commandments facilitates *παρρησία*, the necessary ingredient of genuine

⁹⁸⁷ See Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 15–21.

⁹⁸⁸ *Ph., Her.* 21 (LCL translation).

⁹⁸⁹ *Ph., Her.* 21.

⁹⁹⁰ LCL translation.

⁹⁹¹ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2 with reference to *Ph., Her.* 6–7.

⁹⁹² For the depiction of these views, see *supra*, §3.1. For the argumentation that John probably wrote for an audience familiar with Wisdom literature, see *supra*, Chapter Eight, §2.1.

friendship. John's presentation of friendship as characterised by open communication and commitment was not difficult to understand for them. John's audience possibly already knew from Wisdom literature that without keeping God's commandments, there is no open communication and friendship possible. Commitment to God's commandments is the *conditio sine qua non* of παρρησία.

For John's readers, it was equally not surprising that John 15:16 mentions that the disciples will be able to ask (αἰτέω) the Father for everything, and be given it. The same text explains that this open communication is only possible if the disciples bear fruit and if their fruit abides.⁹⁹³ I agree with Puthenkandathil that the image of bearing fruit only, secondarily, has a missionary connotation, but primarily refers to the idea of becoming a disciple through practicing the commandment of love.⁹⁹⁴ John 15:7 similarly formulates the abiding of Jesus' words in the disciples as a condition for the disciples to receive whatever they ask: ἐὰν μείνητε ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμῖν μείνη, ὃ ἐὰν θέλητε αἰτήσασθε, καὶ γενήσεται ὑμῖν. As argued in Chapter Five, it is only by keeping Jesus' commandment of love that the disciples can obtain παρρησία towards God and have the confidence to ask anything of God, and to receive it.⁹⁹⁵

The open communication between Jesus and the disciples will change the social status of the disciples, as they will no longer be called slaves, but friends (John 15:15). John's readers knew that there is no παρρησία between a slave and his master: ὁ δοῦλος οὐκ οἶδεν τί ποιῇ αὐτοῦ ὁ κύριος (15:15b). If they were informed by LXX Wisdom literature, they also knew that slaves can obtain παρρησία when they have kept God's commandments. In the latter case, they obtain παρρησία towards their master and are no longer slaves, but friends of their master. John embraces the same logic when he views committing ἁμαρτία as defining a slave: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν δοῦλός ἐστιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας (John 8:34). Whereas the reward for having faith in Jesus is eternal life, those who do not commit themselves to Jesus will not see life. Instead of becoming friends with God, God's anger will remain on him: ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον· ὁ δὲ ἀπειθὼν τῷ υἱῷ οὐκ ὄψεται ζωὴν, ἀλλ' ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μένει ἐπ' αὐτόν (3:36).

We have seen above that Philo, also, viewed commitment to God as necessary for παρρησία and friendship.⁹⁹⁶ The wider dissemination of this view on friendship and παρρησία shows that readers of the Fourth Gospel, who were not familiar with the LXX Wisdom tradition might, also, have interpreted the role of commitment in John's understanding of friendship in the above-depicted way.

In the following section, I will address the question of how to interpret Jesus' death as both an act of friendship (John 15:13) and as the critical moment (καιρός, ὥρα) of his παρρησία (7:6,8; 16:25).

⁹⁹³ John 15:16: οὐχ ὑμεῖς με ἐξελέξασθε, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐξελεξάμην ὑμᾶς καὶ ἔθηκα ὑμᾶς ἵνα ὑμεῖς ὑπάγητε καὶ καρπὸν φέρητε καὶ ὁ καρπὸς ὑμῶν μένη, ἵνα ὃ τι ἂν αἰτήσητε τὸν πατέρα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου δῶ ὑμῖν.

⁹⁹⁴ See Puthenkandathil, *Philos*, 231–232.

⁹⁹⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2 and §3.

⁹⁹⁶ See *supra*, §3.2.

4. JESUS' DEATH AS ACT OF FRIENDSHIP

The present section will, first, critically evaluate the scholarly interpretations of the motif of laying down one's life for one's friends in John 15:13 (see 4.1). Second and third, I will enquire into the conventions of *παρρησία* to explain how the first readers of the Fourth Gospel might have interpreted the presentation of Jesus' death as both the critical moment of his *παρρησία* and as the climax of his friendship towards the disciples and the world in general (see 4.2 and 4.3).

4.1 SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

In John 15:13, Jesus says to the disciples: *μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ*. There are two main scholarly interpretations of the friendship motif in John 15:13. First, I will describe each interpretation and the criticisms levelled against them, before providing my own evaluation.

In the first interpretation, John 15:13 adopts the profane Greek *topos* of dying for the wellbeing or protection of one's friends, *πόλις*, or *πατρίς*.⁹⁹⁷ According to Schröter, John 15:13 does not provide any information that allows us to interpret Jesus' death as expiatory or vicarious. Like in 11:51–52, Jesus is presented as dying for the wellbeing or protection of the community.⁹⁹⁸ Craig Koester similarly views 15:13 as construing Jesus' death as an expression of human love for one's friends.⁹⁹⁹ According to Koester, John employs “multiple frames of reference” to interpret the crucifixion. The motif of the crucifixion as “an expression of love in human terms” co-exists with the motif of the crucifixion as “a sacrifice for sin”.¹⁰⁰⁰ Zimmermann agrees with Schröter that John 15:13 presents Jesus' death as an “‘effective death’, which is consciously accepted or even desired in order to protect the community or the group”.¹⁰⁰¹ In a footnote, he, however, adds that there is “no consensus as to whether this is the prevalent interpretation”, leaving room for the possibility that John 15:13 can also be interpreted in terms of atonement.¹⁰⁰²

⁹⁹⁷ For a collection of examples of this *topos* in profane Greek literature, see J. Massyngbaerde Ford, *Redeemer – Friend and Mother: Salvation in Antiquity and in the Gospel of John* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1997), 168–176 and Udo Schnelle – Michael Labahn – Manfred Lang (eds.), *Neuer Wettstein: Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechenland und Hellenismus*, vol. I/2, *Texte zum Johannesevangelium* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), 715–725.

⁹⁹⁸ See Jens Schröter, “Sterben für die Freunde: Überlegungen zur Deutung des Todes Jesu im Johannesevangelium,” in *Religionsgeschichte des Neuen Testaments: FS für Klaus Berger zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Axel von Bobbeler *et al.* (Tübingen: Francke, 2000), 263–287. Schröter is inspired by the earlier attempt of Klaus Berger to interpret Jesus' death in the Fourth Gospel not as expiatory or vicarious, but as ethical-heroic against the background of the Jewish martyr tradition.

⁹⁹⁹ See Craig R. Koester, “The Death of Jesus and the Human Condition: Exploring the Theology of John's Gospel,” in *Life in Abundance: Studies of John's Gospel in Tribute to Raymond E. Brown S.S.*, ed. John R. Donahue (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 2005), 141–157, at 143–145.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Koester, “The Death of Jesus,” 143.

¹⁰⁰¹ Zimmermann, “Is There Ethics,” 77.

¹⁰⁰² Zimmermann, “Is There Ethics,” 77 n. 118.

I will now present the two main criticisms levelled against the first interpretation of John 15:13. First, according to Klaus Scholtissek, it is impossible that John adopted the motif of dying for the protection of the community in an unmediated way. If he had adopted this motif from profane Greek literature, he would have adapted it to the story line and theology of his Gospel.¹⁰⁰³ It is impossible that John interpreted Jesus' death as vicarious and expiatory, and at the same time as a human action of love for the protection of the community. The two motifs cannot be present in the Gospel in an unconnected way.¹⁰⁰⁴ Second, according to Massyngbaerde Ford and Jörg Frey, Jesus' death is caused by the love of the Father (John 3:16), and not by heroic courage as presupposed by the profane Greek motif of giving one's life for one's friends, πόλις, or πατρίς.¹⁰⁰⁵

In the second interpretation of the friendship motif in John 15:13, an atonement model is used in which Jesus' death at the cross is interpreted as an act of friendship because he dies for the reconciliation of the sins of his friends. Frey refers to John 1:29, 36; 6:51 and 1 John 1:7; 2:2; 4:10 to establish the view that Jesus' death is vicarious in the Gospel and that this vicarious death is also presupposed by John 15:13.¹⁰⁰⁶ Scholtissek argues for the same interpretation of 15:13 with reference to 1:29; 11:51–52; 17:19 and the ὑπέρ sayings in 6:51; 10:11, 15; 11:51–52; 15:13; 17:19; 18:14.¹⁰⁰⁷

I will also give an overview of the two main criticisms levelled against the second interpretation of John 15:13: (i) Scholtissek self-critically admits that John 15:13 does not *expressis verbis* speak about vicarious and expiatory death, but about laying down one's life for one's friends;¹⁰⁰⁸ and (ii) according to Schröter, it is philologically unsound to assume that the ὑπέρ sayings in the Gospel describe Jesus' death as vicarious. In themselves, τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέρ and ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπέρ do not express this meaning.¹⁰⁰⁹

The above-mentioned criticisms against the two interpretations of John 15:13 show that both interpretations are not without difficulties. The main methodological limitation of both interpretations is that they do not pay attention to how the friendship motif is further depicted in 15:14–15 and how the first audience might have interpreted Jesus' saying of laying down one's life for one's friends in this direct literary context. Surprisingly, scholarship eagerly referred to other texts in the Gospel (e.g., 1:29; 6:51;

¹⁰⁰³ See Scholtissek, “‘Eine größere Liebe,’” 433.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See Scholtissek, “‘Eine größere Liebe,’” 434 n. 102.

¹⁰⁰⁵ See Ford, *Redeemer*, 175 and Jörg Frey, “Die ‘theologia crucifixi’ des Johannesevangelium,” in *Kreuzestheologie im Neuen Testament*, ed. Andreas Dettwiler – Jean Zumstein, WUNT 151 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 169–238, at 224.

¹⁰⁰⁶ See Frey, “Die ‘theologia crucifixi’ des Johannesevangelium”.

¹⁰⁰⁷ See Scholtissek, “‘Eine größere Liebe,’” 434.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See Scholtissek, “‘Eine größere Liebe,’” 434.

¹⁰⁰⁹ See Schröter, “Sterben für die Freunde,” 266–278. For a general discussion of the meaning of ὑπέρ sayings in the NT, see Reimund Bieringer, “Traditionsgeschichtlicher Ursprung und theologische Bedeutung der *YIIEP*-Aussagen im Neuen Testament,” in *The Four Gospels: FS Frans Neirynck*, vol. 1, ed. Frans Van Segbroeck *et al.*, BETL 100 (Leuven: Peeters, 1992), 219–248.

11:51–52) to justify their interpretation of 15:13 without taking 15:14–15 into consideration.

The reference to the idea of *παρρησία* among friends in John 15:15 probably triggered the first readers to interpret Jesus' saying of laying down one's life for one's friends from the perspective of the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*. John's audience equally read or heard that Jesus' death is the critical moment (*καιρός*, *ῥα*) when Jesus will teach *παρρησία* about the Father (7:6, 8; 16:25). When reading or hearing 16:25, they surely were reminded of Jesus' earlier saying in 15:13 that there is no greater love than to lay down one's life for one's friends. Jesus' death is both an act of friendship and the critical moment of his *παρρησία*. In the next subsection, I will, therefore, discuss how the relationship between friendship and *παρρησία* was conventionally conceived in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE.

4.2 FRIENDSHIP AND *παρρησία*

In a chronological order, I will discuss the relationship between friendship and *παρρησία* in Philodemus (4.2.1) and Plutarch (4.2.2).

4.2.1 Philodemus

Philodemus calls the successful combination of saying what is in one's heart and being listened to, the finest thing that results from friendship:

κἂν π[ε]ριδεικνύμεν ἐπιλογιστικῶς, ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐκ φιλίας περιγινομένων οὐδέν ἐστι τηλικούτον ὡς τὸ ἔχει<ν>, ὃ τὰ[γ]κάρδ[ι]ά τις ἐρεῖ καὶ λ[έγ]οντος ἀκούσεται. σφόδρ[α] γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὀρέγεται πρ[ό]ς τινος ἐκκαλύπτειν ἃ [ν]οεῖ.¹⁰¹⁰

Even if we demonstrate logically that, although many fine things result from friendship, there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one's heart and who will listen when one speaks. For our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.¹⁰¹¹

Although *παρρησία* is not mentioned in the fragment, saying what is in one's heart and being listened to, is beyond doubt a reference to *παρρησία*. Philodemus calls the person who repeatedly applies *παρρησία* to be “a friend to a friend” (*φιλοφίλος*).¹⁰¹² According to Philodemus, “a wise man will use *παρρησία* towards his friends in the way that Epicurus and Metrodo[rus]...”.¹⁰¹³ The text is fragmentary, but one can reasonably conjecture that Philodemus is advising to employ *παρρησία* towards friends in the same way as his teacher Epicurus did. In other texts, Philodemus states that reforming the

¹⁰¹⁰ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 28:3–12.

¹⁰¹¹ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

¹⁰¹² Phld., *Lib.* fr. 85. My translation.

¹⁰¹³ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 15:7–10: [...] οὕτω *παρρησία* <χρήσεται> σοφὸς ἀνὴρ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητροδω[ρος]. My translation.

character of friends and correcting their behaviour are actions of a friend (instead of a slanderer).¹⁰¹⁴ Admonishment is, also, done on account of friendship: βού[λεται μὲν δ]ιὰ φ[ιλίας νουθετεῖν].¹⁰¹⁵ In a fragment that probably belongs to his essay *Περὶ κολακεία*, Philodemus articulates *παρρησία* as characteristic of friendship and contrasts friendship with flattery.¹⁰¹⁶ According to Jerome Kemp, this Philodeman view of *παρρησία* and friendship can be traced in Horace.¹⁰¹⁷ Konstan sees the same literary *topos* return in Seneca and Cicero.¹⁰¹⁸

Philodemus notes the difficulty that even if students submit to a teacher's *παρρησία*, this does not assure that *παρρησία* will be effective or will have *ὠφελία*.¹⁰¹⁹ In order to be effective the teacher has to strengthen the *εὐνοία* of the students towards him.¹⁰²⁰ Students are not immediately convinced of the teacher's friendly intentions. Philodemus observes that students do not abide *παρρησία* "because they believe that they are surpassed only in {regard to} theoretical arguments, but that in point of character and in perceiving what is preferable, and most especially affairs in {real} life, they themselves are far better".¹⁰²¹ Not only theoretical, but also practical persuasion is necessary for *παρρησία* to be effective. For those who "have [seldom] endured *παρρησία*", Philodemus recommends "[t]o persuade also through [deeds], and not just [through speaking]".¹⁰²² To establish durable friendship bonds between teacher and disciples, *παρρησία* is a matter of both words and actions.

¹⁰¹⁴ See Phld., *Lib.*, frs. 43:1–4; 50.

¹⁰¹⁵ Phld., *Lib.* Tab. 5. Trans. Konstan *et al.*: "...[he] wishes [to admonish on] account of [friendship]..."

¹⁰¹⁶ See Phld., *PHerc.* 1082 (col. 2:1–14) in Tristano Gargiulo, "PHerc. 222: Filodemo sull'adulazione," *CErc* 11 (1981) 103–127; at 104–105. This is one of the papyri that probably belonged to Philodemus' *Περὶ κολακεία*. The others are *PHerc.* 222, 223, 1082, 1457, and 1675. For discussion on Philodemus' understanding of flattery, see Vittorio De Falco, "Appunti sul ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΛΑΚΕΙΑΣ di Filodemo: Pap. erc. 1675," *RIGI* 10 (1926) 15–26; Eiko Kondo, "Per l'interpretazione del pensiero filodemeo sulla adulazione nel *PHerc.* 1457," *CErc* 4 (1974) 43–56; Eduardo Acosta Méndez, "PHerc. 1089: Filodemo 'Sobre la adulación'," *CErc* 13 (1983) 121–138; Francesca Longo Auricchio, "Sulla concezione filodemea dell'adulazione," *CErc* 16 (1986) 79–91; Glad, "Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus," 23–29. For a general discussion of psychagogy and friendship among Epicureans, see Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 161–181.

¹⁰¹⁷ See Jerome Kemp, "Flattery and Frankness in Horace and Philodemus," *Greece & Rome* 57/1 (2010) 65–76.

¹⁰¹⁸ See David Konstan, "Friendship, Frankness and Flattery," in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, 7–19, at 13–15.

¹⁰¹⁹ See Phld., *Lib.*, fr. 59.

¹⁰²⁰ See Phld., *Lib.* 25:1–8 and my discussion of this text, *supra*, Chapter Six, §1. See also Phld., *Lib.* col. XVIIb.

¹⁰²¹ Phld., *Lib.* col. XXa:5–12: [δι]ό[τι] νομίζουσιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πρόβλημα λόγοις ὑπερέχεσθαι μόνον, ἐν δὲ τῇ διαθέσει κ[α]ὶ τῷ συννοῶν τὰ κρείττω καὶ μάλιστα τὰν τῶ[ι] βίῳ, πολὺ βελτεῖον ἑαυτοῦς ὑπάρχειν. Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

¹⁰²² Phld., *Lib.* fr. 16:5–9. Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

4.2.2 Plutarch

First, I will provide a short sketch of the societal situation in which Plutarch's reflections on friendship and *παρρησία* are imbedded, before discussing his actual views.

The ethics of friendship was a popular topic in antiquity. Ancient society was profoundly stratified. According to Konstan, in their system of patronage both Romans and Greeks frequently referred to the relations between patrons and clients as friendship relations, although they knew the difference between friendship and patronage.¹⁰²³ Richard Saller and Rowland Smith consider the friendship language used in patronage to be a dressing up of status and exchange inequalities.¹⁰²⁴ According to Troels Engberg-Pedersen, the clients pretended to share the same interests with the patron and to be of one mind with him. Criticism was, therefore, no part of 'friendship'. Instead of genuine friendship, there was only flattery. All were very conscious of their position in society and wanted to end at the top. Engberg-Pedersen argues that Plutarch, in *Adulator*, reacts to this fake understanding of friendship by articulating *παρρησία* as the ultimate criterion for genuine friendship. *Παρρησία* is a counter-value for the values that found expression in the system of patronage, because it creates an open relationship between people without them being afraid to lose status. *Παρρησία* brings about a moral system with four basic moral values: trust, simplicity, steadfastness of character, and truthfulness.¹⁰²⁵

Plutarch calls *παρρησία* "the greatest and most potent medicine in friendship".¹⁰²⁶ In my reading of Plutarch's *Adulator*, the effective or beneficial use of *παρρησία* is the ultimate criterion of friendship for Plutarch. The flatterer imitates "the pleasant and attractive characteristics of the friend" always presenting himself "in a cheerful and blithe mood, with never a whit of crossing or opposition".¹⁰²⁷ Even when the flatterer imitates the *παρρησία* of the true friend, his or her *παρρησία* is "not genuine or beneficial" (*ἀληθινὴν οὐδ' ὠφέλιμον*), but "as it were, winks while it frowns, and does nothing but tickle".¹⁰²⁸ Plutarch's answer to the question of his essay – "How to distinguish a flatterer from a friend?" – is, thus, not simply "*παρρησία*", but "genuine or beneficial *παρρησία*". In his essay, Plutarch is depicting in a simultaneously descriptive and normative way what genuine or beneficial *παρρησία* is.

¹⁰²³ See David Konstan, "Patrons and Friends," *CP* 90 (1995) 328–342 and Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 135–137.

¹⁰²⁴ See Richard Saller, "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in *Patronage in Ancient Society*, ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (New York: Routledge, 1989), 49–62, at 57 and Rowland B.E. Smith, "'Restored Utility, Eternal City': Patronal Imagery at Rome in the Fourth Century AD," in *'Bread and Circuses': Evergetism and Municipal Patronage in Roman Italy*, ed. Kathryn Lomas *et al.* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 142–166, at 145.

¹⁰²⁵ See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend," in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, 61–79, esp. at 78–79.

¹⁰²⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 74d (LCL translation).

¹⁰²⁷ Plu., *Adulator* 50b (LCL translation).

¹⁰²⁸ Plu., *Adulator* 51c–d (LCL translation).

According to Plutarch, *παρρησία* is not beneficial if it is pure fault-finding, for this is seen as “selfish (φίλαντον) and mean”.¹⁰²⁹ Unlike the moderate *παρρησία* of Achilles to Agamemnon, the aggressive *παρρησία* of Odysseus to Agamemnon was effective, because Odysseus was not speaking out of personal bitterness, as Achilles was, but ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.¹⁰³⁰ The effectiveness of *παρρησία* depends not only on the receptiveness of the hearer, but also on the ἦθος of the speaker:

παρρησία δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἦθους ἴσως δεῖται, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀληθέστατόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐτέρους νοουθετούντων καὶ σωφρονιζόντων λεγόμενον. ὁ γοῦν Πλάτων ἔλεγε νοουθετεῖν τῷ βίῳ τὸν Σπεύσιππον, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ Πολέμονα Ξενοκράτης ὀφθεῖς μόνον ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ καὶ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐτρέψατο καὶ μετέθηκεν. ἐλαφροῦ δὲ καὶ φαύλου τὸ ἦθος ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ παρρησίας ἀπτομένῳ περίεστι προσακοῦσαι τὸ

ἄλλων ἰατρὸς αὐτὸς ἔλκεσιν βρύων.¹⁰³¹

so it may well be that every man’s frank speaking needs to be backed by character, but this is especially true in the case of those who admonish others and try to bring them to their sober senses. Plato at any rate used to say that he admonished Speusippus by his life, as, to be sure, the mere sight of Xenocrates in the lecture-room, and a glance from him, converted Polemon and made him a changed man. But the speech of a man light-minded and mean in character, when it undertakes to deal in frankness, results only in evoking the retort:

Wouldst thou heal others, full of sores thyself!¹⁰³²

The ἦθος of the speaker authorises one’s *παρρησία*. If one’s own conduct is full of errors/sins, one cannot employ *παρρησία* to correct or exhort others. There has to be a consistency between one’s teaching and one’s conduct. According to Michel Foucault, the idea that the adequacy between teaching and life authorises *παρρησία* can already be found in Plato’s *Laches*.¹⁰³³ In the above-quoted text, Plutarch also refers to Plato, who is

¹⁰²⁹ Plu., *Adulator* 66e (LCL translation). On the opposition between *παρρησία* and *φιλαυτία* in *Adulator*, see Jan Opsomer, “Eine platonische Abhandlung über die freimütige Rede Plutarchs *De adulatore et amico*,” in *Geist und Sittlichkeit: Ethik-Modelle von Platon bis Levinas*, ed. Edith Düsing – Klaus Düsing – Hans-Dieter Klein, *Geist und Seele* 7 (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2009), 91–119, at 104–106.

¹⁰³⁰ See Plu., *Adulator* 66f–67a. One could argue that it is a general feature of *παρρησία* in antiquity that the speaker has to convince the audience of his or her goodwill for the audience, although this was, also, emulated by flatterers in ancient Greek democracy. According to Elisabeth Markovits, “As if We were Codgers: Flattery, *Parrhēsia* and Old Man Demos in Aristophanes’ *Knights*,” *Polis* 29/1 (2012) 108–129, Aristophanes removes himself from the perverse logic of the δημοφιλία motive by claiming that his *παρρησία* is not motivated by goodwill for the audience, but by his hatred for an enemy shared by him and his audience.

¹⁰³¹ Plu., *Adulator* 71e–f.

¹⁰³² LCL translation.

¹⁰³³ See Michel Foucault, *Le courage de la vérité: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France (1983-1984)*, édition établie sous la direction de François Ewald et Alessandro Fontana, par Frédéric Gros, *Hautes Études* (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2009), 156–157.

said to have admonished people by his life. This implies that one ought not just teach *ex cathedra*, but risk one's own existence by putting one's teaching into action. This theme also returns in Lucian, *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman*, in which *παρρησία* is personified into the figure of Παρρησιάδης, and is pointing out the inconsistencies between philosophical doctrines and the practices of the followers of these doctrines. Παρρησία demands a life in line with what one teaches.¹⁰³⁴ Moral philosophers often refer to the principle of conformity of words and deeds to justify their exhortations or to attack other philosophers.¹⁰³⁵

In the next subsection, I will interpret Jesus' action of laying down his life for his friends with the above-depicted conventions of *παρρησία* as my guideline.

4.3 JOHN

As seen in the previous subsection (4.2), Philodemus and Plutarch view genuine friendship as requiring genuine and beneficial *παρρησία*. For *παρρησία* to be beneficial, *παρρησία* involves both words and actions. Beneficial *παρρησία* is not pure fault-finding, but requires that one also persuades through actions. One's words can only be effective if they are translated into action. Harmony between words and actions authenticates *παρρησία* and friendship.

The first readers of the Fourth Gospel probably interpreted the idea of laying down one's life for one's friends in John 15:13 in close interaction with the characteristics of friendship: commitment (15:14) and open communication or *παρρησία* (15:15). Open communication or *παρρησία* is the condition of friendship: ὑμᾶς δὲ εἶρηκα φίλους, ὅτι πάντα ἃ ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου ἐγνώρισά ὑμῖν (15:15c–e).¹⁰³⁶ John's audience also knew that Jesus' death is the critical moment (καιρός, ὥρα) of his *παρρησία* towards the disciples and the world in general (7:6, 8; 16:25). Directly or indirectly influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, John's audience probably understood that Jesus' death is the time that his *παρρησία* will be effective or beneficial, and that Jesus will become genuine friends with the disciples and the world in general. The cross makes Jesus' *παρρησία* effective (7:6, 8; 16:25), because Jesus' death translates his teaching of

¹⁰³⁴ See esp. Lucian., *Pisc.* 31, 34 (quoted *infra*, Chapter Ten, §2.3). For a general discussion of *παρρησία* in Lucian's writings, see Valérie Visa-Onderçuhu, "La notion de *parrhèsia* (*παρρησία*) chez Lucien," *Pallas* 72 (2006) 261–278.

¹⁰³⁵ For a compilation of examples, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook*, LEC (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), 38–40. The principle of conformity of words and deeds in moral exhortation was widespread in antiquity: see H. Wayne Merritt, *In Word and Deed: Moral Integrity in Paul*, Emory Studies in Early Christianity 1 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993) and John T. Fitzgerald, review of *In Word and Deed: Moral Integrity in Paul*, by H. Wayne Merritt, *JBL* 114 (1995) 743–745.

¹⁰³⁶ Cf. John T. Fitzgerald, "Christian Friendship: John, Paul, and the Philippians," *Int* 61/3 (2007) 284–296: at 285, who claims that revelation in John "creates friendship rather than presupposes it". Fitzgerald observes that this is in opposition to Cic., *Amic.* 22; *Fin.* 2.85; Sen., *Ep.* 3.2–3; Plin., *Ep.* 5.1.12, who articulate friendship as a condition for self-disclosure.

the commandment of love into action (15:12–13; cf. 1 John 3:16–18).¹⁰³⁷ Jesus' παρρησία is not pure fault-finding or selfish, but puts his life at stake. Jesus does not only speak παρρησία (7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14; 18:20), but also walks παρρησία (11:54). In 7:4, Jesus' brothers exhort Jesus to be (εἶναι) ἐν παρρησία. Jesus replies that his καιρός has not yet (fully) come (7:6, 8). He, thereby, affirms that at the hour of his death, his παρρησία is effective not as a *modus dicendi*, but as a *modus essendi*.

At the hour of Jesus' death, the social barriers between people are broken down and all are united as friends of Jesus (John 10:16; 17:11, 21; cf. 11:52). According to van der Watt, friends, just like members of a family, were considered in the ancient world to share everything because they are one (κοινωνία). Friends were, therefore, viewed as part of the extended family. Van der Watt claims that this explains why, in the Fourth Gospel, friendship with Jesus constitutes family relations.¹⁰³⁸ I agree with van der Watt that friendship with Jesus creates family relations, but do not consider friendship relations as an extension of family relations in the Gospel. In the Gospel, family relations are primarily friendship relations, and not vice versa.¹⁰³⁹ Influenced (indirectly) by the contemporary conventions of παρρησία, the reader of the Gospel understands that, as witnesses of the critical moment of Jesus' παρρησία on the cross, the Beloved Disciple and Jesus' mother have become friends of Jesus. In John 19:26–27, John reports that Jesus' mother and the Beloved Disciple are united as mother and son at the time of Jesus' death. Friendship with Jesus, thus, constitutes family relations. As a result of this creation of family relations, Jesus knows that everything is fulfilled (19:28): his self-revelation is effective and the bonds of friendship are created. The Beloved Disciple and Jesus' mother have become part of the family of God. Another attestation for the view that Jesus self-revelation at the cross creates bonds of friendship and thereby the family of God is 20:17, where Jesus calls his disciples his brothers (and sisters) and says: ἀναβαίνω πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου καὶ πατέρα ὑμῶν καὶ θεὸν μου καὶ θεὸν ὑμῶν.

The first readers of the Fourth Gospel did not have to interpret the idea of laying down one's life for one's friends in John 15:13 as referring to the vicarious death of Jesus for the reconciliation of sins (Frey *et al.*), nor as referring to Jesus' heroic death for the protection of the community (Schröter *et al.*). It is just as possible, and more likely, that (indirectly) influenced by the contemporary conventions of παρρησία, John's audience understood that Jesus could only effectively teach the commandment of love by

¹⁰³⁷ Cf. O'Day, "Jesus as Friend," 85: "[...] the convergence of Jesus' words with his actions shows that his words and promises can be trusted. Jesus does what he says. There is complete unanimity between what Jesus says about laying down his life and what Jesus does."

¹⁰³⁸ See van der Watt, *Family of the King*, 360–367.

¹⁰³⁹ *Contra* van der Watt, *Family of the King*, 365–366: "The friendship language strengthens the familial relations between Jesus and his own and among the disciples. Friendship language does occur in this Gospel, but in a secondary way as far as metaphorical use is concerned. [...] In these interpersonal dynamics the intimate familial relations are dominant." Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck, "Kirche als Freundesgemeinschaft? Auf Spurensuche im Neuen Testament," *MTZ* 42/1 (1991) 1–14, who suggests that φίλος is the primary metaphor to refer to believers in the Gospel of John, whereas, in Paul's letters, this is ἀδελφοί.

translating it into practice. Jesus' laying down of his life for his friends is the practical implementation of his teaching of love. By bringing his conduct in perfect harmony with his teaching, Jesus authenticates his *παρρησία*, which results in genuine friendship bonds with the disciples and the world in general. As seen in the previous chapter, Jesus' *παρρησία* towards the world entails peace with the world, but not through a vicarious death. Jesus' *παρρησία* will cause the world to be ashamed of, and to repent of, its *ἀμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus.¹⁰⁴⁰ The previous and the present chapter have demonstrated that John adopted the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία* to show that Jesus becomes the friend of the world by laying down his life on the cross (John 15:13). Instead of through an expiatory and vicarious death, Jesus brings about peace with the world through friendship and *παρρησία*.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

I conclude that John characterises friendship relations in the Gospel by means of two main characteristics: commitment, and open communication or *παρρησία*. The characteristic of commitment entails that equality is not a condition of friendship in the Gospel. This is in contradiction with the Greco-Roman ideal that friendship can only come about between equals. I have demonstrated that John is rather critical of this Greco-Roman ideal to the advantage of the Jewish-Hellenistic understanding of friendship in which commitment to God's commandments is required for obtaining *παρρησία*, the true sign of friendship. By keeping Jesus' commandments, the disciples can become friends of Jesus (John 15:14). Thanks to their allegiance to Jesus, they will obtain *παρρησία* and be able to ask everything of Jesus and the Father, and be given it (15:7, 16). No longer will Jesus call them slaves, but they will communicate openly as friends, who have *παρρησία* to one another (15:15). This open communication will be beneficial or efficient at the time of Jesus' death, which is the *καιρός* or *ῥα* of Jesus' *παρρησία* (7:6, 8; 16:25). In agreement with the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, Jesus' death translates his teaching of love into action (15:12–13). Thanks to the adequacy between his words and conduct, Jesus' *παρρησία* is effective and genuine. At the cross, Jesus reveals himself to be a genuine friend. Through friendship bonds with Jesus, Jesus' disciples and the world in general become family to God. Jesus brings about peace with the world not through an expiatory or vicarious death, but by creating friendship bonds through *παρρησία*.

¹⁰⁴⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Eight.

CHAPTER X.

JESUS' *παρρησία* IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL: PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE?

The present chapter will address the question whether Jesus' use of *παρρησία* is characterised as public and/or private in the Fourth Gospel.¹⁰⁴¹ In the first section, I will discuss the scholarly distinction between the public (or political) and the private (or ethical) use of *παρρησία* (Section 1). Second, I will enquire whether John's readers, who were (indirectly) informed by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, distinguished between a private and a public use of *παρρησία* (Section 2). In a third step, I will focus on the information that John provides us about the public and/or private character of Jesus' *παρρησία* (Section 3).

1. THE SCHOLARLY DISTINCTION OF PUBLIC/POLITICAL AND PRIVATE/ETHICAL *παρρησία*

The word *παρρησία* first occurs in the context of Greek democracy. Each male Athenian citizen was able to speak with *παρρησία* in the *βουλή* and *ἐκκλησία* on political and legal issues. The gatherings of the *ἐκκλησία* opened with the official proclamation *τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται*; and every male Athenian citizen present could respond to it.¹⁰⁴² Arnaldo Momigliano and Michel Foucault have labelled this use of *παρρησία* as the public or political use of *παρρησία*, in distinction to the later private or ethical use of *παρρησία* introduced by Plato and Aristotle. According to these scholars, Plato and Aristotle detached *παρρησία* from the public political institutions of ancient Greek democracy, and no longer considered *παρρησία* to be a political right. Instead of being a matter of politics, *παρρησία* became a personal feature of one's ethical character. The context of *παρρησία* has changed from the public speech in the political institutions of ancient Athens to the private speech between individuals (e.g., the Socratic dialogues).¹⁰⁴³

Although some recent studies still uncritically assume that there is a fundamental difference between the public/political and the private/ethical use of *παρρησία*,¹⁰⁴⁴ other

¹⁰⁴¹ *Supra*, Chapter Two, §6.2, I have formulated this research question in dialogue with scholarly literature.

¹⁰⁴² For this use of *παρρησία* in Greek democracy and the *ἐκκλησία* in particular, see Scarpata, *Parrhesia greca*, 15–54; Carter, "Citizen Attribute," 199–202; Raaflaub, "Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech," 46–49.

¹⁰⁴³ See Arnaldo Momigliano, "Freedom of Speech in Antiquity," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* 2 (1974) 252–263 and Foucault, *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*, esp. 59–70, 91–104, 137–156, 275–297, 311–327. For the original Italian text of Momigliano's article, see "La libertà di parola nel mondo antico," *RSI* 83 (1971) 499–524.

¹⁰⁴⁴ See, e.g., David Konstan, "The Two Faces of *Parrhêsia*: Free Speech and Self-Expression in Ancient Greece," *Antichthon* 46 (2012) 1–13; Valéry Laurand, "La parrhêsia tragique: l'exemple d'un échec," *Itaca: Quaderns Catalans de Culture Clàssica* 28–29 (2012–2013) 147–165; Benjamin Fiore,

scholars have questioned this assumption. According to Arlene Saxonhouse, the distinction between a public/political *παρρησία* and a private/ethical *παρρησία* depends on the modern liberal distinction between public and private speech. Saxonhouse objects that this distinction was not made by the inhabitants of ancient Athens. Guided by our modern liberal prejudice, we as present-day readers view Socrates' speech about the nature of virtue as private, whereas ancient Athens perceived Socrates' dialogues as "a public threat to the life of a political regime that had not encountered early liberalism's efforts to distinguish between public and private worlds".¹⁰⁴⁵ John Mulhern, similarly, argues that Aristotle's understanding of *παρρησία* is not informed by a distinction between the ethical and the political. Aristotle does not view *παρρησία* as a private ethical virtue, but as inherent to the public existence of being a citizen of the *πόλις*.¹⁰⁴⁶ Conversely, what we conceive as a public/political use of *παρρησία* might as well be viewed in terms of a private/ethical use of *παρρησία* by ancient Greeks. According to Matthew Landauer, already in ancient Greek democracy *παρρησία* was not used by every citizen, but was a private virtue required to oppose the unaccountable *δῆμος*. The *δῆμος* was unwilling to grant *παρρησία* to everyone in the Assembly. The individual virtue of *παρρησία* was required to remedy the institutional power of the *δῆμος*.¹⁰⁴⁷

Endorsing these criticisms, I conclude that there was no absolute distinction between a public/political and a private/ethical use of *παρρησία*. The understanding of *παρρησία* as a private ethical virtue has a clear political meaning, whereas the public/political use of *παρρησία* can also be viewed in terms of a private virtue. The public use of *παρρησία* in the political assembly of Athens is comparable to the private use of *παρρησία* of the individual to social superiors. Both the publicly addressed *δῆμος* of Greek democracy and, for instance, the privately addressed tyrant are unaccountable, and the way the speaker has to use *παρρησία* against this *δῆμος*/tyrant should not fundamentally differ from one another. According to Dana Fields, Foucault even did not consider ethical *παρρησία* as truly depoliticising. Political *παρρησία* in later Greece came to resemble the ethical, Socratic form, "since personal interaction between kings and their advisors was more and more frequently the context in which frank political speech appeared".¹⁰⁴⁸

The present section has made us aware that the question of whether *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel is characterised as public and/or private is not easy to answer, because both forms, or better said, both uses of *παρρησία* were not really distinct from another in the minds of ancient Greeks. In the next section, I will enquire how discussions of *παρρησία* more or less contemporary to John viewed the public and private use of *παρρησία*.

"Frank Speech at Work in Hebrews," in *Christian Origins and Greco-Roman Culture*, 615–627, esp. 621–622; Parnsenios, "Confounding Foes and Counseling Friends," esp. 253.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Saxonhouse, *Free Speech*, 28.

¹⁰⁴⁶ See John J. Mulhern, "ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in Aristotle," in *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, 313–339.

¹⁰⁴⁷ See Matthew Landauer, "*Parrhesia* and the *Demos Tyrannos*: Frank Speech, Flattery and Accountability in Democratic Athens," *History of Political Thought* 33/2 (2012) 185–208.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Fields, "The Rhetoric," 144–145.

2. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE *παρρησία* IN 1TH CENTURY BCE – 2ND CENTURY CE

In a chronological order, the present section will discuss the views on the public and private use of *παρρησία* in Philodemus (2.1), Plutarch (2.2), and Lucian of Samosata (2.3). I am aware that, in my discussion of these authors, the distinction I make between the public and private use of *παρρησία* is guided by the modern liberal distinction between public and private speech. I will examine whether, and if so how, the private use of *παρρησία* differs from its public use.

2.1 PHILODEMUS

In a fragment probably belonging to his lost work *Περὶ κολακείας*, Philodemus distinguishes between *παρρησία* “directed towards one’s intimate associates” (*πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις*) and *παρρησία* “directed towards all people” (*πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους*).¹⁰⁴⁹ The distinction is, however, nowhere mentioned in *Περὶ παρρησίας*, where Philodemus seems to treat the use of *παρρησία* among one’s intimate associates.

In *Περὶ παρρησίας*, Philodemus focuses on the use of *παρρησία* in the context of the interactions between members of his Epicurean community:

χρὴ γὰρ αὐτῷ δεικνύνειν ἀν[υ]ποστόλως τὰς διαμαρ[τί]ας καὶ κοινῶς εἰπ[εῖ]ν [ἐ]λαττώσεις. εἰ γὰρ [ἡ]γ[η]σ[ά]μενος ἓνα τοῦτ[ο]ν [ὁ]δηγὸν ὀρθοῦ καὶ λ[ό]γου κα[ὶ] <ἔργου>, [ὁ]ν φ[η]σ[ι] σωτῆρ[α] μόνο[ν, κ]αὶ ἐπιφωνή[σ]ας τὸ “τούτου [γ’ ἐ]σπομένοιο,” παρέδωκεν [ἐαυ]τὸν θεραπεύ[ε]ιν, πῶς οὐχὶ μέλλει ταῦτ’, ἐν [οἷ]ς δεῖται θεραπεύσε[ως, δει]κνύνειν αὐτῷ κα[ὶ] νουθέτησιν προσδέχεσθαι;]¹⁰⁵⁰

...for it is necessary to show him {the teacher, T.T.} his errors {the student’s, T.T.} forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly. For if he {the student, T.T.} has considered this man to be the one guide of right speech and [action], whom he calls the only savior, and {to whom}, citing the phrase, “with him accompanying {me},” he has given himself over to be treated, then how is he not going to show to him those things in which he needs treatment, and [accept admonishment]?¹⁰⁵¹

If a student submits to the teacher’s *παρρησία*, the student has to communicate to him openly and publicly his errors. Here, *κοινῶς* means publicly in front of other group members. According to Glad, Philodemus prescribes a “communal practice of openness” in which “mutual correction and confession of faults” is stimulated. Instead of an indirect

¹⁰⁴⁹ Phld., *PHerc.* 1082 (col. 2:1–4). My translation. See Konstan *et al.*, *Philodemus*, 7–8 and Kemp, “Flattery and Frankness,” 74–75 for further discussion of the fragment.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Phld., *Lib.* fr. 40.

¹⁰⁵¹ Trans. by Konstan *et al.*

pedagogy, *Περὶ παρρησίας* reflects the ideal of “non-concealment” and “plainly speaking the truth”.¹⁰⁵²

For Philodemus, the use of *παρρησία* in the correction of faults is restricted to what we as present-day readers would consider to be the private sphere of the Epicurean community. The use of *παρρησία* in groups is common among philosophers. Dio Chrysostom writes with approval that the ideal Cynic employs *παρρησία* towards all people “taking them aside privately one by one and also admonishing them in groups every time he finds the opportunity”.¹⁰⁵³ We will see in the next subsections that the ideal of open mutual correction of faults is not restricted to the private sphere of philosophical communities, but is also striven for in the public sphere of politics (Plutarch) and satiric criticism (Lucian).

2.2 PLUTARCH

Plutarch tells many anecdotes to illustrate that it is better to use *παρρησία* in private instead of in public.¹⁰⁵⁴ He narrates, for instance, an incident in which Socrates had handled one of his acquaintances, rather severely, in a conversation that took place near the money-changers, whereupon Plato said to Socrates: οὐκ ἄμεινον ἢν ἰδίᾳ ταῦτα λελέχθαι;¹⁰⁵⁵ Socrates retorted: σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἄμεινον ἐποίησας ἂν ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἐμὲ τοῦτ’ εἰπὼν;¹⁰⁵⁶ With this example, Plutarch warns us against using *παρρησία* towards a friend in places where many people are present (cf. ἐν πολλοῖς).¹⁰⁵⁷ It is better to reproof friends “in private” (ἰδίᾳ).¹⁰⁵⁸ Another anecdote is that Pythagoras once criticised a devoted pupil roughly in the presence of many people. The pupil hung himself, and from that time onwards Pythagoras never admonished anybody when anyone else was present.¹⁰⁵⁹ Plutarch advocates that “error should be treated as a foul disease, and all admonition and disclosure should be in secret (ἀπόρητον), with nothing of show or display in it to attract a crowd of witnesses and spectators”.¹⁰⁶⁰ Plutarch strongly advises against employing

¹⁰⁵² Glad, “Frank Speech,” 48–49 with reference to Phld., *Lib. frs.* 40, 55; col. IXa. See also Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 127–128.

¹⁰⁵³ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §2.4, for the full Greek quotation and English translation.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See Plu., *Adulator* 70e–71d.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Plu., *Adulator* 70f. LCL translation: “[w]ere it not better that this had been said in private?”

¹⁰⁵⁶ Plu., *Adulator* 70f. LCL translation: “[s]hould you not have done better if you had addressed your remark to me in private?”

¹⁰⁵⁷ Plutarch uses the phrase ἐν πολλοῖς two times in *Adulator* 70e–71d. The Budé edition translates the phrase as “en public”. The LCL translation translates the first occurrence of the phrase with “before a large company”, the second occurrence with “in public”. The translators associate “many people” (cf. πολλοῖς) with the public sphere.

¹⁰⁵⁸ LCL translation. The Budé edition translates with “en privé”. These translators associate one-to-one conversations with the private sphere.

¹⁰⁵⁹ See Plu., *Adulator* 70f.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Plu., *Adulator* 70f–71a: δεῖ γὰρ ὥς νοσήματος οὐκ εὐπρεποῦς τῆς ἀμαρτίας τὴν νοσήτησιν καὶ ἀνακάλυψιν ἀπόρητον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πανηγυρικὴν μηδ’ ἐπιδεικτικὴν μηδὲ μάρτυρας καὶ θεατὰς συνάγουσαν. LCL translation in the main text. The Budé edition translates more freely: “[...] on ne doit reprendre ni

παρρησία towards “a husband in the hearing of his wife, and a father in the sight of his children, and a lover in the presence of his beloved, or a teacher in the presence of his students”.¹⁰⁶¹ He suggests that it is more of a disgrace for man and wife to use παρρησία against one another in public than to show intimacy and pleasures (e.g., kissing) in public.¹⁰⁶² Concerning the use of παρρησία, he recommends to follow the general rule: ἄγχι σχῶν κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ πευθοῖαθ’ οἱ ἄλλοι.¹⁰⁶³ Plutarch prescribes to use παρρησία in all discretion so that other people are unable to hear what is said. The above-mentioned examples illustrate that Plutarch prefers that παρρησία is used in one-to-one conversations. Guided by the modern liberal distinction between private and public speech, we regard these conversations as belonging to the private sphere.

Plutarch’s predilection for discretion in the use of παρρησία does not imply that he considers παρρησία to be apolitical. According to Jan Opsomer, *Adulator* conceives friendship as a political institution. Παρρησία aims at bettering other people and helping them to make better judgements, whether these people are close friends or, for instance, people with whom one shares the membership of a political society.¹⁰⁶⁴ As demonstrated by Van Meirvenne, the admonitions about the use of παρρησία in *Adulator* towards friends are paralleled by Plutarch’s advice to politicians in some of his more obvious political writings, viz. the *Prooemium of Phocion* and the *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*. These moral admonitions for the behaviour of the true friend are also valid for the good politician, and guarantee a successful political career:

(i) Just as Plutarch advises to correct the faults of a friend and to steer him towards better behaviour, the philosopher-statesman “criticizes and instructs his fickle subjects on macro-scale” (*Adulator* 59c–d par. *Phoc.* 2.3).¹⁰⁶⁵

(ii) The opposition between a flatterer and a friend is articulated in the same way as the opposition between “a flattering and a straightforward politician”. By using παρρησία, “a true friend/ straightforward politician shocks his addressees”. “[A] flatterer/demagogue”, on the other hand, “never resists and only makes himself popular” (*Adulator* 55d, 56a par. *Phoc.* 2.2–3).¹⁰⁶⁶

(iii) The image of the inflamed eye is used in both *Adulator* 68f–69c and *Phoc.* 2.4 to show that both friends and politicians ought to be moderate in their use of παρρησία. When the addressees are already hurt and in pain, Plutarch advises both friends and

dévoiller le vice qu’en secret et non en public [...]” (Klaerr – Philippon – Sirinelli [eds.], *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, tome 1 – 2e partie, 132.)

¹⁰⁶¹ Plu., *Adulator* 71c (LCL translation).

¹⁰⁶² See Plu., *Conj. praec.* 139e–f.

¹⁰⁶³ Plu., *Adulator* 71b. LCL translation: “[h]old one’s head quite close, that the others may not hear it.”

¹⁰⁶⁴ See Opsomer, “Eine platonische Abhandlung über die freimütige Rede,” 93. Cf. Lyons, “Hellenistic Philosophers,” 131: “Plutarch’s emphasis on realism and concord, and his view that virtues like parrhesia and philia must be used not only for private but for civic benefit, would have defined how [he; T.T.] conducted himself in his role as an ambassador and a philosopher for his community.”

¹⁰⁶⁵ Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 149.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 149–150.

politicians to mix *παρρησία* with praise and to avoid the extremes of being too indulgent and being too severe (*Adulator* 72c–e par. *Phoc.* 2.6–8; *Praec. ger. reip.* 810c).¹⁰⁶⁷

(iv) Both *Adulator* 55c–d and *Phoc.* 2.9; *Praec. ger. reip.* 809e use the image of musical harmony to prescribe the combination of praise and *παρρησία*. Van Meirvenne concludes that “the moral admonition for the behaviour of the true friend in guiding other people to τὸ καλόν is also valid for the good politician”.¹⁰⁶⁸

(v) “[T]he idea of a harmonious mixing of the opposites of severity and indulgence” is a primary theme in both *Adulator* 55e and *Praec. ger. reip.* 809d; *Phoc.* 10.5–7.¹⁰⁶⁹ Both a true friend and a good politician have absolute mastery over mixing severity and indulgence.

I conclude that, for Plutarch, *παρρησία* was both a private and a public matter. When used among friends or intimates, *παρρησία* can better be used in the private sphere of one-to-one conversations. Yet, for politicians, this is not possible, nor is this the ideal. For Plutarch, friendship is a political institution. Politicians have to use *παρρησία* in public and should comply with the same prescriptions as intimate friends. There is, thus, in Plutarch’s mind, no real difference between the private and the public use of *παρρησία*.

2.3 LUCIAN OF SAMOSATA

Holland has observed that, for Lucian, *παρρησία* is not a matter of privately correcting “an erring fellow philosopher”, but rather of publicly ridiculing “those who fail to live up to the standards of the great philosophers they claim to follow”.¹⁰⁷⁰ According to Holland, Lucian’s personification of *παρρησία* in the figure of Παρρησιάδης evokes the meaning *παρρησία* has in Philodemus’ *Περὶ παρρησίας*. The fact that Lucian is able to assume his “audience’s knowledge and approval of the various attributes and virtues of *παρρησία*, and to evoke them in terms that echo those used by” Philodemus, demonstrates “the general acceptance of the ideas worked out and explained” in *Περὶ παρρησίας*. Holland considers it to be probable that these ideas were familiar among “the educated elite” in Philodemus’ time “and the centuries that followed”.¹⁰⁷¹ He observes that Παρρησιάδης refers to “several of the characteristics of a true friend – suffering on the friend’s behalf, looking out for his best interests, providing benefits – to persuade his accusers that he is their friend” (*Pisc.* 5). When Παρρησιάδης succeeds through a public trial in proving himself to be innocent, his accusers, represented by Plato and Diogenes, recognise him to be their friend (φίλος) and benefactor (εὐεργέτης) (*Pisc.* 38).¹⁰⁷²

¹⁰⁶⁷ See Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 150–151.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 152.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Van Meirvenne, “Plutarch on the Healing Power of (a Tricky) ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ,” 152.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Holland, “Call me Frank,” 263.

¹⁰⁷¹ Holland, “Call me Frank,” 265.

¹⁰⁷² Holland, “Call me Frank,” 259.

In agreement with Holland's analysis, I observe that, just like Philodemus' *Lib.*, Lucian's *Piscator* reflects the ideal of open correction and plainly speaking the truth. Παρρησιάδης proposes a public trial in order to prove that he is either guilty or innocent.¹⁰⁷³ He seeks to show that his satiric attack on the followers of philosophy narrated in *Philosophies for Sale* was not an error.¹⁰⁷⁴ The philosophers agree to the trial and Παρρησιάδης identifies himself as Παρρησιάδης Ἀληθίωνος τοῦ Ἐλεγκτικέως.¹⁰⁷⁵ The presentation of Παρρησιάδης as "son of Renowned Reprover" associates the use of παρρησία with ἔλεγχος. Just as Παρρησιάδης enquired into the followers of philosophy and found them to be "pretenders and cheats",¹⁰⁷⁶ he invites the resurrected philosophers to test whether he committed error in his judgement on the followers of philosophy. This openness of both parties for the mutual correction of errors reminds us of Philodemus' ideal of open correction and the communication of errors among the members of the Epicurean community. The difference with Philodemus is that Lucian does not pursue this ideal in the private sphere of a philosophical community, but through satiric attacks carried out in public.

The way Παρρησιάδης defends himself reminds us of Philodemus' view that not only theoretical, but also practical persuasion is required for παρρησία to be effective.¹⁰⁷⁷ Παρρησιάδης seeks to show that the error of the followers of philosophy is not purely theoretical, but concerns their moral character and behaviour in real life. Παρρησιάδης presents himself as suffering for his friends and doing everything for their best interests, whereas he claims that the followers of philosophy do not act in agreement with the philosophies they ought to represent:

When I saw, however, that many were not in love with Philosophy, but simply coveted the reputation of the thing, and that although in all the obvious, commonplace matters which anyone can easily copy they were very like worthy men (in beard, I mean, and walk and garb), in their life and actions, however, they contradicted their outward appearance and reversed your practice and sullied the dignity of the profession, I became angry.¹⁰⁷⁸

It is most extraordinary, too, that most of them are thoroughly up in your writings [i.e., the writings of the philosophers, T.T.], but live as if they read and studied them simply to practice the reverse. Their book tells them they must despise wealth and reputation, think that only what is beautiful is good, be free from anger, despise these people of eminence, and talk with them as man to man; and its advice is beautiful, as Heaven is my witness, and wise and wonderful, in all truth. But they teach these very doctrines for pay, and worship the rich, and are agog after money; they are more

¹⁰⁷³ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 8.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Philosophies for Sale* is the prequel of *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman* (abbr. *Pisc.*).

¹⁰⁷⁵ Lucian., *Pisc.* 19 (LCL). My translation: "[f]rankness, son of Truthful, son of Renowned Reprover."

¹⁰⁷⁶ Lucian., *Pisc.* 29 (LCL translation).

¹⁰⁷⁷ See Phld., *Lib.* fr. 16 and col. XXa. For my discussion of these texts, see *supra*, Chapter Nine, §4.2.1.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Lucian., *Pisc.* 31 (LCL translation).

quick-tempered than curs, more cowardly than hares, more servile than apes, more lustful than jackasses, more thievish than cats, more quarrelsome than game-cocks.¹⁰⁷⁹

The philosophers are persuaded by the discourse of Παρρησιάρχης. They redraw their complaints and recognise him as their friend and benefactor. Philosophy admits Παρρησιάρχης to her household.¹⁰⁸⁰

I conclude that Lucian adopted the idea of παρρησία as the characteristic of friends, who openly correct each other's mistakes and steer one another to good behaviour. One can also find this idea in Philodemus and Plutarch. Lucian transposed this idea from the private sphere of philosophical communities to the public sphere of satiric criticism. We have seen in the previous subsection that Plutarch, also, extended this idea to the public sphere, but the public sphere of politics. I conclude the present section (2) by summarising that, in the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE, παρρησία was viewed as something that can be used in private as well as in public. I have observed no notable differences in both uses that might allow us to speak of two distinct uses of παρρησία. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the idea of a distinct private use of παρρησία and a distinct public use of παρρησία was not present in the mind of John's first readers, who were (indirectly) influenced by the contemporary conventions of παρρησία. In the next section, I will pay attention to the information which John himself provides to interpret Jesus' public and/or private use of παρρησία.

3. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE παρρησία IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

In the present section, I will, again, in my analysis, distinguish between what we, as present-day readers, consider to be the public and the private use of παρρησία. I will examine whether there is a real distinction between both uses of παρρησία in the Fourth Gospel.

Jesus' παρρησία is presented as public in John 7:4 and 18:20, where (ἐν) παρρησία is contrasted with ἐν κρυπτῷ. As present-day readers, we associate ἐν κρυπτῷ ("in secret") with the private sphere. Hence, (ἐν) παρρησία in 7:4 and 18:20 has the connotation of "in public", although, as argued in a previous chapter, the meaning of the phrase is not restricted to "in public".¹⁰⁸¹ In these passages, the phrase, thus, refers to a public use of παρρησία. The same public use of παρρησία is implied in 7:13 and 7:26. In 7:13, the narrator states that the crowd did not speak παρρησία about Jesus at the public feast of Tabernacles "for fear of the Jews". In 7:26, the crowd observes that Jesus spoke παρρησία in the temple during the same public festivities. Jesus, later, testifies himself that he has always taught παρρησία "in the synagogue and in the temple, where all the Jews come together". He adds that he has said nothing ἐν κρυπτῷ (18:20). This testimony

¹⁰⁷⁹ Lucian., *Pisc.* 34 (LCL translation).

¹⁰⁸⁰ See Lucian., *Pisc.* 38.

¹⁰⁸¹ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.1.

is consistent with his reply to the ‘Jews’ in the temple during the public festival of the Dedication that he had already spoken *παρρησία* to them about his messianic identity (10:24–25). The official decree to put Jesus to death (11:53) signals the end of Jesus’ public teaching, as the narrator claims that Jesus no longer walked *παρρησία* among the ‘Jews’ (11:54a). Instead, Jesus went “to a town called Ephraim in the region near the wilderness”, where he remained with his disciples (11:54b–d). At the end of the Farewell Discourse, Jesus himself states that he will speak *παρρησία* about the Father at the hour (16:25). The hour of Jesus’ crucifixion takes place just before the public feast of the Passover (13:1); at the day of Preparation before the eating of the Passover (18:28, 39; 19:14, 31, 42). John narrates that “many of the Jews” read the title Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων under the cross, because Jesus was crucified “near the city” and the title “was written in Hebrew, in Latin, and in Greek” (19:19–20). John, thus, pays much attention to the public character of Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour.¹⁰⁸² All the attestations of *παρρησία* mentioned in the present paragraph present Jesus as a teacher who, unlike the Epicurean teacher mentioned by Philodemus, used *παρρησία* in what we, as present-day readers, consider to be the public sphere.¹⁰⁸³ The only philosophers who equally used *παρρησία* in public were the Cynics, with whom the Johannine Jesus shows more similarities in this regard, as I will argue below.

Only one occurrence of *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel attests what we as present-day readers would consider to be a private use of *παρρησία*. In John 11:14, where Jesus is among his friends (cf. φίλος in 11:11), he speaks *παρρησία* to the disciples and says that Lazarus has died. Jesus, furthermore, often corrects the mistakes of his disciples in private conversations. Although the term *παρρησία* is not used there, I have demonstrated that the way he corrects his disciples is in agreement with the conventions of *παρρησία* contemporary to the Fourth Gospel.¹⁰⁸⁴

The question is whether John presents Jesus’ private use of *παρρησία* among the disciples and his public use of *παρρησία* among the ‘Jews’ as two distinct uses of *παρρησία*. In the summary text of John 18:20, the ‘private’ conversations between Jesus and his disciples are depicted as occasions on which Jesus spoke *παρρησία* instead of ἐν κρυπτῷ to the world. As a present-day reader, I associate ἐν κρυπτῷ (“in secret”) with the private sphere. John 18:20, thus, presents Jesus’ ‘private’ conversations with the disciples as a public use of *παρρησία*. I will use the following sense line division for my analysis of the passage:

- 18:20a ἐγὼ παρρησία λελάληκα τῷ κόσμῳ,
 18:20b ἐγὼ πάντοτε ἐδίδαξα ἐν συναγωγῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ,
 18:20c ὅπου πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι συνέρχονται,
 18:20d καὶ ἐν κρυπτῷ ἐλάλησα οὐδέν.

¹⁰⁸² On Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour and its public character, see also *supra*, Chapter Seven, §3.5.

¹⁰⁸³ For Philodemus, see *supra*, §2.1.

¹⁰⁸⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §3.1 and §3.2.

In John 18:19, the high priest asks Jesus not only about his teaching, but also about his disciples. Given that Jesus is asked about his disciples, it is probable that κόσμος and πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in 18:20a, c include a reference to the disciples.¹⁰⁸⁵ The phrase πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι only occurs once in the Fourth Gospel and refers to all the Jews, including the disciples.¹⁰⁸⁶ Both the ‘Jews’ and the disciples react to Jesus’ teaching in the synagogue (6:25–66). Since 18:20b–c claims that the synagogue is the place “where all the Jews come together”, the disciples are unanimously included in the reference to “all the Jews”. The same can be said about κόσμος in 18:20a. Just like in 1:10 and 7:4, κόσμος in 18:20a includes the disciples.¹⁰⁸⁷ I agree with Thyen that the use of ὅσοι (instead of οἱ δέ) in 1:12 implies that those who have received (λαμβάνω) Jesus are among the ἴδιοι and the κόσμος mentioned in 1:10–11.¹⁰⁸⁸ The active meaning of λαμβάνω in 1:12 suggests that among the κόσμος in 18:20a, there were ‘Jews’ who accepted Jesus’ παρρησία and obtained the ἐξουσία to become children of God. In 18:20, κόσμος and πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι include a reference to the disciples.

The Johannine Jesus is actively engaged in protecting his disciples (John 18:8) and, therefore, does not mention them by name when the high priest interrogates him about them. One of the dangers for the disciples to be recognised as such is to be made ἀποσυνάγωγος. The ‘Jews’ have previously agreed that everyone who acknowledges Jesus as the Christ will be made ἀποσυνάγωγος (9:22; cf. 12:42; 16:2). Whereas in Mark 14:50 and Matt 26:69 the disciples forsake Jesus and flee before his interrogation by the high priest, this is not reported in the Fourth Gospel and John 18:15–18 mentions that Peter and an anonymous disciple follow Jesus into the court of the high priest. Within the context of the high priest’s interrogation of Jesus concerning his disciples, Peter denies twice being a disciple of Jesus (18:17, 25). His disciples were under threat and this further explains why Jesus avoids to mention his disciples by name in his reply to the high priest, but speaks of κόσμος and πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι. In his reply, Jesus shows himself to be independent of the high priest and to not comply with his demands. In 18:22, one of the officers struck Jesus with his hand and said that Jesus’ answer was disrespectful to the high priest. Jesus replied that he did not say anything wrong (18:23). In many ways, Jesus’ reply in 18:20 is not only a statement about, but also an illustration of his παρρησία teaching addressed to the world. Jesus acts in agreement with his teaching of love by not providing the high priest with information about his disciples. By his opposition to the power of the high priest, he risks his life and shows himself to be a true friend. He shows the truth of his teaching without saying anything wrong.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Some MSS (C³, D^s, *et al.*) read παντοτε οἱ Ιουδαιοι in John 18:20c. The external textual evidence for παντες οἱ Ιουδαιοι is, however, much stronger: 8, A, B, *et al.* This explains why NA²⁸ has the latter reading in the main text.

¹⁰⁸⁶ On the Jewish identity of the disciples, see, e.g., Jesus’ response to Nathanel in John 1:47: ἴδε ἀληθῶς Ἰσραηλῆτης ἐν ᾧ δόλος οὐκ ἔστιν.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Cassem, “A Grammatical and Contextual Inventory”: 88 views κόσμος in John 18:20 as having a neutral meaning, although adding that its meaning is vague.

¹⁰⁸⁸ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 84.

Jesus' claim that he did not say anything wrong suggests that he did not lie to the high priest. The claim in John 18:20a, d, therefore, is broader than the claim in 18:20b–c. John 18:20a refers to the totality of his teaching, which is characterised by *παρρησία*. This includes his teaching of, for instance, the Samaritans, and the disciples outside the temple and the synagogues. The text then jumps asyndetically from the universal to the particular in 18:20b–c with reference to Jesus' teaching of all the Jews in the temple and the synagogue. This particular example of his *παρρησία* teaching is brought forward by Jesus because the high priest can easily consult those who have heard him teach in the temple and the synagogue (18:21). The continuation in 18:20d is not asyndetic, but explains (καί explicativum) that the totality of Jesus' *παρρησία* teaching did not take place ἐν κρυπτῷ. His hearers, including his disciples, are allowed to say everything that they have heard from him (18:21). In Jesus' view, there is no private teaching, but everything is proclaimed openly. His *παρρησία* is always public.

John's depiction of Jesus' *παρρησία* as always public can be explained with reference to John 1:11. The latter passage presents the incarnated λόγος as coming to his own (εἰς τὰ ἴδια), although his own did not receive him. The phrase εἰς τὰ ἴδια in 1:11 has the meaning of going to the private sphere of one's home.¹⁰⁸⁹ John 1:11 does not simply repeat the parallel construction of 1:10, but specifies that the κόσμος is "his own" (τὰ ἴδια) in the meaning of his home.¹⁰⁹⁰ The divine λόγος came into his home, the κόσμος, but his own (οἱ ἴδιοι), the inhabitants of the κόσμος, did not receive him.¹⁰⁹¹ Unlike Thyen, I do not see why the meaning of τὰ ἴδια and οἱ ἴδιοι should be narrowed down to, respectively, Israel and the 'Jews' to avoid repetition with 1:10.¹⁰⁹² Even if the universal meaning of κόσμος in 1:10 is retained in τὰ ἴδια and οἱ ἴδιοι in 1:11, repetition is avoided. The presentation of the κόσμος as Jesus' home is consistent with Jesus' claim that he always taught *παρρησία*, and never ἐν κρυπτῷ (18:20). For Jesus, the private life of his home, the κόσμος, is at the same time fully public. Jesus' teaching is fully public; not secret nor private.

This public character of Jesus' *παρρησία* is paralleled by the *παρρησία* of the Cynic. According to Dmitri Nikulin, the private is viewed in antiquity as "that which lies within

¹⁰⁸⁹ Thyen (*Johannes*, 82) considers "nach Hause" or "in die Heimat" to be the meaning of εἰς τὰ ἴδια throughout the NT and the LXX.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Repetition is always combined with variation and amplification in the Fourth Gospel: see Popp, *Grammatik des Geistes* and Van Belle – Labahn – Maritz (eds.), *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel*.

¹⁰⁹¹ The presentation of the λόγος in John 1:11 is paralleled by how the dwelling of σοφία takes on cosmological proportions, and how she sought to repose in different nations and among different peoples before settling down in Jerusalem (Sir 24:3–14). The ambiguity in John 4:44 of what the πατρίς of Jesus is might be a literary motif to bring the reader to the insight that the home of the divine λόγος cannot be restricted to a particular city, but is the whole κόσμος. For a general overview of the discussion on πατρίς in 4:44, see Gilbert Van Belle, "The Faith of the Galileans: The Parenthesis in Jn 4,44," *ETL* 74/1 (1998) 27–44.

¹⁰⁹² See Thyen, *Johannes*, 82–83.

the house (οἶκος)”.¹⁰⁹³ The Cynic Diogenes does not have a house. He, therefore, does not have a private life. Every place in the world is his house. The private is fully public for the Cynic. His *παρρησία* can only be fully public.¹⁰⁹⁴ I observe a similar logic in the depiction of the teaching of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. Jesus’ home, the κόσμος, is at the same time fully public. He cannot hide his teaching anywhere. Therefore, his teaching is always *παρρησία*, and never ἐν κρυπτῷ (John 18:20). Just as for the Cynic, Jesus’ *παρρησία* can only be fully public.¹⁰⁹⁵

I conclude the present section by summarising that John viewed the totality of Jesus’ teaching as taking place in public. Jesus’ teaching is not secret nor private, but can be communicated in all openness to everyone. The world is both the home of Jesus and the public space in which he teaches *παρρησία*. John did not understand Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* among the disciples to be distinct from Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* among the ‘Jews’. Both the disciples and the ‘Jews’ are taught *παρρησία* instead of ἐν κρυπτῷ. The scholarly distinction between a public or political use of *παρρησία* and a private or ethical use of *παρρησία* is nowhere to be found in the Fourth Gospel.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS AN ACT OF *παρρησία*

The present chapter has demonstrated that John characterises Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* as fully public. The κόσμος is both the home (John 1:11) and the public teaching room of the divine λόγος (cf. 7:4, 26; 18:20). John’s depiction of Jesus’ teaching follows a Cynical logic. Jesus can only teach *παρρησία* in public, since he has no private home to keep his teaching hidden from the world. Even his teaching among the disciples is considered to be public, as Jesus never teaches ἐν κρυπτῷ, but always *παρρησία* (18:20). The disciples are allowed to communicate Jesus’ teaching to the outside world (18:21).

I have argued that the scholarly distinction between a public/political *παρρησία* and a private/ethical *παρρησία* is problematic, because there was no distinction between both uses of *παρρησία* in antiquity. It is, therefore, no surprise that John did not articulate a distinction between what we as present-day readers, guided by the modern liberal distinction between private and public speech, view as Jesus’ public use of *παρρησία* among the ‘Jews’, and his private use of *παρρησία* among the disciples. John’s first readers, too, did not know this modern liberal distinction. Directly or indirectly influenced by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, they probably did not consider Jesus’ public use of *παρρησία* among the ‘Jews’ to be any different from his private use of *παρρησία* among the disciples.

¹⁰⁹³ Dmitri Nikulin, “Diogenes the Comic, or How to Tell the Truth in the Face of a Tyrant,” in *Philosophy and Political Power*, ed. Cinzia Arruzza – Dimitri Nikulin, Studies in Moral Philosophy 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 114–133, at 115.

¹⁰⁹⁴ See Nikulin, “Diogenes the Comic,” 114–133.

¹⁰⁹⁵ In a future study, I will compare Jesus’ *παρρησία* in the Gospel of John to how the Cynic’s *παρρησία* is presented by authors in the 1st century BCE – 1st century CE.

By means of his presentation of Jesus' *παρρησία* as fully public, John justifies that his Gospel (as an act of *παρρησία*) is addressed to the whole *κόσμος*.¹⁰⁹⁶ Instead of being an esoteric teaching for a sectarian Johannine community, John's writing addresses all the inhabitants of the world.¹⁰⁹⁷ John wrote his Gospel in agreement with Jesus' saying that his teaching of the *κόσμος* is never *ἐν κρυπτῷ*, but always *παρρησία* (John 18:20).

¹⁰⁹⁶ For the view that the Fourth Gospel is itself an act of *παρρησία*, see *supra*, Chapter Six, Seven, and Eight under "Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Gospel as an Act of *παρρησία*".

¹⁰⁹⁷ For a critical evaluation of the thesis that the Fourth Gospel was written for a sectarian Johannine group, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §1.4.

CHAPTER XI.

Παροιμία AND παρρησία IN LXX PROVERBS, THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH, PLUTARCH, AND THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

In Chapter Three, I have concluded that Jesus' παρρησία collaborates with παροιμία in the Fourth Gospel. For Jesus, παρρησία and the corresponding event of truth-telling is not a matter of employing plain and direct language, but of παροιμίαι. The 'Jews' and the disciples, on the other hand, consider παρρησία and truth-telling to consist in plain and direct speech without παροιμίαι (John 10:24–25; 16:29–30).¹⁰⁹⁸ The present chapter aims to provide an analysis of how the first reader of the Gospel might have understood the collaboration of παρρησία and παροιμία in Jesus' teaching.¹⁰⁹⁹ First, I will provide an analysis of παροιμία in LXX Proverbs and its early reception in the second to the fifth century CE (Section 1). Second, I will enquire into the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech with special attention to how παρρησία relates to figured speech (Section 2). Third, I will look at what Plutarch says about the relationship between παρρησία and παροιμία (Section 3). In a fourth and last step, I will provide an analysis of how the first readers of John probably read particular texts in the Gospel where Jesus employs παρρησία by means of παροιμίαι (Section 4).

1. LXX PROVERBS AND ITS EARLY RECEPTION

The present section will, first, provide an analysis of the notion of παροιμία in Prov 1:1–6 (see 1.1). Second, I will enquire into the early reception of the text in search of the rhetorical framework through which readers in the second to the fifth century CE interpreted the concept of παροιμία (see 1.2).

1.1 LXX PROVERBS 1:1–6

In the prologue of LXX Proverbs, the reader is provided important information about how to read the παροιμίαι that will follow:

- 1:1a παροιμίαι Σαλωμῶντος υἱοῦ Δαυίδ,
- 1:1b ὃς ἐβασίλευσεν ἐν Ἰσραὴλ,
- 1:2a γνῶναι σοφίαν καὶ παιδείαν
- 1:2b νοῆσαι τε λόγους φρονήσεως
- 1:3a δέξασθαι τε στροφὰς λόγων
- 1:3b νοῆσαι τε δικαιοσύνην ἀληθῆ
- 1:3c καὶ κρίμα κατευθύνειν,

¹⁰⁹⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Three.

¹⁰⁹⁹ This entails that I will provide a historical-contextual interpretation of Johannine παροιμία in the present chapter. I have argued for the necessity of such an enquiry *supra*, Chapter Two, §5.3.

- 1:4a ἵνα δῶ ἀκάκοις πανουργίαν,
 1:4b παιδὶ δὲ νέῳ αἰσθησὶν τε καὶ ἔννοιαν·
 1:5a τῶνδε γὰρ ἀκούσας σοφὸς σοφώτερος ἔσται,
 1:5b ὁ δὲ νοήμων κυβέρνησιν κτήσεται
 1:6a νοήσει τε παραβολὴν καὶ σκοτεινὸν λόγον
 1:6b ῥήσεις τε σοφῶν καὶ αἰνίγματα.
- 1:1a Παροιμίαι of Solomon, son of David,
 1:1b who reigned in Israel:
 1:2a to learn wisdom and instruction
 1:2b and to understand words of prudence
 1:3a and to receive turns of words
 1:3b and to understand true righteousness
 1:3c and to direct judgement
 1:4a in order that he {Solomon} might give rhetorical dexterity to the innocent
 1:4b and both perception and insight to a young child,
 1:5a because by hearing these things the wise will become wiser
 1:5b and the discerning will acquire direction,
 1:6a and he will understand a parable and an obscure word,
 1:6b both the sayings and the riddles of the wise.¹¹⁰⁰

The aim of παροιμίαι is not to conceal something, but to teach “wisdom and instruction”, “words of prudence”, and “true justice” (1:2–3). “[P]erception and insight” are promised to “the young child” and “the wise will become wiser” (1:4–5). Παροιμίαι do not provide a direct or plain knowledge of something, but “direction” for understanding “a parable and an obscure word, both the sayings and the riddles of the wise” (1:5–6). Instead of being a direct or plain form of teaching, παροιμίαι instruct through “turns of words” (στροφᾶι λόγων, 1:3).¹¹⁰¹

The phrase στροφὰς λόγων in Prov 1:3 is the translation equivalent of מוסר. According to Johann Cook, στροφὰς λόγων “seems to be a technical term”. The LXX translator probably read מוסר, the Hof’al masculine participle of the verb סור (“to turn aside, to withdraw, to evade”), thereby, stressing the nuance of “problematic, complicated”. Sirach 6:22, also, reads מוסר as having to do with the “enigmatic, problematic”. Additionally, στροφή is associated with αἰνίγματα in both Sir 39:2–3 (no Hebrew preserved) and Wis 8:8.¹¹⁰² A similar analysis of στροφὰς λόγων in Prov 1:3 has later been provided by Fox, who calls στροφὰς λόγων a “puzzling translation”, as מוסר is otherwise rendered by παιδεία, σοφία, and synonyms in the book of Proverbs.¹¹⁰³

¹¹⁰⁰ My translation.

¹¹⁰¹ Modern English translations render στροφὰς λόγων as “hard saying” (Brenton) or “subtlety of words” (NETS). As I will argue in the main text, such translations obscure the technical-rhetorical meaning of στροφᾶι λόγων.

¹¹⁰² Johann Cook, *The Septuagint of Proverbs: Jewish and/or Hellenistic Proverbs? Concerning the Hellenistic Colouring of LXX Proverbs*, VTSup 69 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 49–50.

¹¹⁰³ Fox, *Proverbs*, 84.

According to Al Wolters, the only attestation of *στροφὰς λόγων* that pre-dates LXX Proverbs, and is not influenced by the use of the phrase in the latter text, can be found in Menander, *Monostichoi* 793, where Menander compares writing to the weaving of *στροφὰι λόγων*.¹¹⁰⁴ Wolters remarks that the isolated fragment provides little context to recover the exact meaning of *στροφὰς λόγων*. He concludes that the phrase refers to “literary artistry”.¹¹⁰⁵ Although I would not go so far as Wolters to postulate that LXX Prov 1:4 alludes to Menander, I consider Menander’s comparison of *στροφὰι λόγων* to the artistry of weaving to support the view that the phrase has a technical-rhetorical meaning in LXX Prov 1:4.

Building on the analyses of Cook and Fox, I observe that the technical meaning of *στροφὰς λόγων* concerns the use of language and can, therefore, better be specified as rhetorical. The genitive *λόγων* (“words”) refers to the object of the action implied in *στροφὰς*. Moreover, the final clause in Prov 1:4 explains that the aim of receiving *στροφὰι λόγων* is that presumably Solomon “may give *πανουργία* (‘rhetorical dexterity’) to the innocent”. The *παροιμίαι* of Solomon, thus, teach wisdom by means of “turns of words” with the aim to provide rhetorical dexterity to innocent people.¹¹⁰⁶

The importance of *παροιμίαι* for teaching wisdom shows that the author of LXX Proverbs probably did not consider *παρρησία* and the corresponding event of revealing the truth to be irreconcilable with *παροιμίαι*. This is also suggested by the introduction of wisdom as a person singing hymns in the streets and ἄγειν *παρρησίαν* in the squares (Prov 1:20). There is no perceivable tension in the text between the idea that *παροιμίαι* teach σοφία and the presentation of σοφία employing *παρρησία* in public.

1.2 EARLY CHURCH FATHERS

The present subsection will provide a survey of how some early Church Fathers have interpreted the notion of *παροιμία* and *στροφὰι λόγων* in Prov 1:1–6.¹¹⁰⁷ I will pay special attention to the rhetorical concepts these authors used to elucidate these two notions. Through this survey I hope to provide insights into how ancient readers in the second to the fifth century CE interpreted the term *παροιμία*, and its ability to teach wisdom through *στροφὰι λόγων*.

¹¹⁰⁴ See Al Wolters, *Proverbs: A Commentary Based on Paroimiai in Codex Vaticanus*, Septuagint Commentary Series (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 126–127 with reference to Men., *Mon.* 793: ὕφασμ’ ὑφαίειν μάθανε στροφὰς λόγων. Trans. by Wolters: “[l]earn to weave the windings of (your) words as a woven cloth.”

¹¹⁰⁵ Wolters, *Proverbs*, 127.

¹¹⁰⁶ Throughout LXX Proverbs, the rhetorical use of language is positively valued: see the positive use of *πανουργία* in Prov 8:5 and *πανοῦργος* in Prov 12:16; 13:1, 16; 14:8, 15, 18, 24; 15:5; 21:11; 22:3; 27:12; 28:2.

¹¹⁰⁷ To my knowledge, I am the first author to provide such a survey. For a short and incomplete compilation of fragments of the early Church Fathers on Prov 1:1–6, see J. Robert Wright (ed.), *Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon*, ACCS Old Testament 9 (Downers Grove IL: Inter Varsity, 2005), 1–6.

Some of the early Church Fathers provided short definitions of *παροιμία* that show clear dependence on the ancient rhetorical definition of figured speech as saying one thing, but meaning another.¹¹⁰⁸ Origen in the third century wrote: *παροιμία ἐστὶ λόγος ἀπόκρυφος δι' ἐτέρου προδήλου σημαίνόμενος*.¹¹⁰⁹ For Origen, *παροιμία* denotes speech in which the language that is used is at first sight clear, but actually signifies something else that is hidden. Evagrius of Pontus in the fourth century similarly wrote: *παροιμία ἐστὶν λόγος δι' αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνων πράγματα νοητά*.¹¹¹⁰ Evagrius describes *παροιμία* as speech that directly speaks of the sensible, but indirectly refers to the intelligible.

In the following subsections, I will provide an analysis of the more elaborate treatments of *παροιμία* and *στροφαι λόγων* by Clement of Alexandria (1.2.1) in the second century, the brothers Basil of Caesarea (1.2.2) and Gregory of Nyssa (1.2.3) in the fourth century, and the later *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* of Ps.-John Chrysostom and Ps.-Athanasius (1.2.4).

1.2.1 Clement of Alexandria

Commenting on the use of language in prophecy, Clement wrote:

εἰκότως ἄρα κηρύσσουσα ἡ προφητεία τὸν κύριον, ὥς μὴ παρὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὑπολήψεις λέγουσα βλασφημεῖν τισι δοκοίη, ἐσχημάτισε τὰ σημαίνόμενα φωναῖς ταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ ἐτέρας ἐννοίας ἄγειν δυναμέναις.¹¹¹¹

It is reasonable then that the prophecy proclaiming the Lord, in order not to appear to some as blaspheming while speaking in violation of the assumptions of the many, figured its expressions with utterances capable of leading to other meanings.¹¹¹²

Clement claims that in order to prevent persecution because of blasphemy, prophets had to use figured speech allowing them to proclaim the Lord indirectly. By figuring their “expressions with utterances capable of leading to other meanings”, prophets did not appear to some as blaspheming, while they were “speaking in violation of the assumptions of the many”. Clement affirms the view of many ancient rhetoricians that figured speech is used out of circumspection (*ἀσφάλεια*). The obvious meanings of the figures are harmless and do not offend anyone, whereas figures also produce hidden meanings that criticise the opponent. Whereas the audience perceives the veiled criticism of, for instance, the emperor, the emperor does not.¹¹¹³ As Clement states, not everyone can

¹¹⁰⁸ For my discussion of the ancient rhetorical understanding of figured speech, see *infra*, §2.

¹¹⁰⁹ Or., *Exp. Prov.* 1 (PG 17:161a). My translation: “a *παροιμία* is a hidden word signified by another word that is clear in advance.”

¹¹¹⁰ Evagr. Pont., *Schol. 1 ad Prov.* 1.1 (Paul Géhin [ed.], *Évagre le Pontique: Scholies aux Proverbes. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes, appendices et index*, SC 340 [Paris: Cerf, 1987]). My translation: “a *παροιμία* is a saying that signifies intelligible things through sensible things.”

¹¹¹¹ Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.127.4 (GCS 52, 496:17–20).

¹¹¹² My translation.

¹¹¹³ For my discussion of these rhetoricians, see *infra*, §2.

detect the “other meanings” that figures produce. Hence, the speaker does not appear as blaspheming to them, although he or she is actually violating their assumptions.

Clement associates the use of figured speech in prophecy with παροιμία:

ἡ προφητεία δὲ οὐδ’ ὅλως τοὺς περὶ τὰς λέξεις σχηματισμοὺς ἐπιτηδεύει διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς φράσεως, τῷ δὲ μὴ πάντων εἶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπικρύπτεται πολυτρόπως, μόνοις τοῖς εἰς γνῶσιν μεμνημένοις, τοῖς δι’ ἀγάπην ζητοῦσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὸ φῶς ἀνατέλλουσα. λέγεται δ’ οὖν εἶδος τῆς προφητείας ἡ «παροιμία» κατὰ τὴν βάρβαρον φιλοσοφίαν λέγεται τε καὶ «παραβολή» τό τε «αἶνιγμα» ἐπὶ τούτοις.¹¹¹⁴

But prophecy does not employ figures in expressions of language for the sake of beauty of diction. But because truth is not for all, it is concealed in many ways. Prophecy causes the light to arise only for those who are initiated into knowledge and who seek the truth through love. Παροιμία is, according to barbarian philosophy, thus called a form of prophecy, and also the parable and the riddle in addition.¹¹¹⁵

Clement repeats his earlier claim that figures are used in prophetic language to reveal the truth indirectly. For some who should not receive the truth, figures conceal the truth. Only to those “who are initiated into knowledge and who seek the truth through love”, does prophecy reveal the truth indirectly through figures. Clement mentions approvingly that, therefore, παροιμία is called εἶδος τῆς προφητείας by barbaric (or Greek) philosophy. The latter Greek phrase has been translated as “a mode of prophecy”¹¹¹⁶ and “une figure stylistique de la prophetie”.¹¹¹⁷ In my view, the latter rendering seems to neglect that, for Clement, prophetic language does not use figures for stylistic reasons. In my translation (“a form of prophecy”), “form” has a generic meaning. The term παροιμία refers to a form among other forms of prophecy, which all use figures in expressions of language. Clement additionally mentions that παραβολή and αἶνιγμα are also forms of prophecy.¹¹¹⁸

A bit further in the text, Clement claims with reference to Prov 1:3 that παροιμία is also known as στροφαὶ λόγων.¹¹¹⁹ I conclude my discussion by summarising that Clement interpreted παροιμία and στροφαὶ λόγων in terms of the ancient rhetorical understanding

¹¹¹⁴ Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.129.4–6.15.130.1 (GCS 52, 497:15–21).

¹¹¹⁵ My translation.

¹¹¹⁶ Alexander Roberts – James Donaldson (trans.), *The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325*, vol. 2, *Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire)* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 510.

¹¹¹⁷ Patrick Descourtieux (ed), *Clément d’Alexandrie: Les Stromates – Stromate 6: Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes*, SC 446 (Paris: Cerf, 1999), 329.

¹¹¹⁸ For a general discussion of αἶνιγμα and αἰνιττομαι in Clement’s writings, see Andrew Dinan, “Αἶνιγμα and αἰνιττομαι in the Works of Clement of Alexandria,” in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 46, *Papers Presented at the Fifteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 2007: Tertullian to Tyconius, Egypt before Nicaea, Athanasius and his Opponents*, ed. Jane Baun et al. (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 175–180.

¹¹¹⁹ See Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.130.1 (GCS 52, 497:22–23).

of figured speech, and that he considers *παροιμία* to be a form of prophecy.¹¹²⁰ We will see in the following subsections that the language of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech is a stable reference source for interpreters of *παροιμία* and *στροφαι λόγων*, at least until the fifth century CE.¹¹²¹

1.2.2 Basil of Caesarea

Commenting on *δέξασθαι τε στροφάς* in Prov 1:3, Basil of Caesarea wrote:

Ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ ὑγιοῦς διανοίας προῶν, ἀπλοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ μονότροπος, τὰ αὐτὰ λέγων πάντοτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ δὲ ποικίλος καὶ ἔντεχνος πολὺ τὸ ἐπίπλοκον καὶ ἐγκατάσκευον ἔχων, μυρία κατασχηματίζεται, καὶ στρέφεται στροφὰς ἀμυθήτους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ἀρέσκον μεταμορφούμενος.¹¹²²

The true word, which also comes from a sound intellect, is simple and has only one way, always communicating the same things concerning {its} subject matter. But the variegated and artistic {word}, having a quite intricate constitution, is figured in innumerable ways and is being turned in innumerable “turns,” being transformed continually for the enjoyment of those who are reading.¹¹²³

Basil contrasts the one true word with the variegated and artistic word. Whereas the former is simple and knows only one way, the latter is figured in a thousand ways. The true word communicates the same things again and again, because it can only signify in one way. The artistic word, on the other hand, is constantly transformed by the reader’s turns (*στροφαί*) and, always, communicates something different generating an innumerable number of meanings. The association of *στροφαί* with *κατασχηματίζω* suggests that Basil interprets *στροφαι λόγων* in terms of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

Basil resumes:

Πρὸς οὖν τὸ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ἰσχυρῶς ἀντέχειν τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνικῶν λόγων προσβολῇ μέγα ὄφελος αἱ Παροιμίαι χαρίζονται. Διότι ὁ προσέχων αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν παραινέσεις μὴ ἀργῶς προσιέμενος, οἷονεὶ καθωπλισμένος τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ, δέχεται ἀβλαβῶς τὰς στροφὰς τῶν λόγων, μήτε περιτρεπόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, μήτε ἐξανιστάμενός που τῆς ἀληθείας. Ὅταν γὰρ ἄλλως μὲν φύσεως ἔχῃ τὰ πράγματα, ἄλλως δὲ οἱ λόγοι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναπείθωσι, στροφή τις ἐστὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ διαστροφή, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν γινομένη. Καὶ ὁ ἄλλος μὲν φαινόμενος, ἄλλος δὲ ὢν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, στροφαῖς κέχρηται λόγων, ἀπατῶν τοὺς συνόντας, ὥσπερ τοὺς κύνας λαγωοὶ καὶ ἀλώπεκες, ἐτέραν δεικνύντες, καὶ ἐτέραν τρεπόμενοι.¹¹²⁴

¹¹²⁰ My discussion of the ancient rhetorical understanding of figured speech will follow *infra*, under §2.

¹¹²¹ See *infra*, §§1.2.2–4.

¹¹²² Bas., *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 7 (PG 31:400c).

¹¹²³ Adjusted translation from Justin Gohl.

¹¹²⁴ Bas., *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 7 (PG 31:400c–401a).

Therefore, so that we are able to firmly withstand the advance of artistic words, the παροιμῖαι afford much benefit. Since the one who attends to them {the παροιμῖαι}, and does not come near their advice idly, as if being armed with experience {as a result}, receives the “turns of words” without injury, neither being turned around by them, nor departing from the truth in any way. For whenever {a saying} presents things of one nature, but the words concerning them persuade of something else, this is a “turn,” or even a “distortion,” accompanying the word concerning the truth. When one thing appears, but another thing is according to reality, one has used “turns of words,” tricking those who are gathered, just as hares and foxes indicate one direction to dogs yet turn another way.¹¹²⁵

Basil compares στροφαὶ λόγων to hares and foxes that trick dogs by showing another direction than the one that they are running to. He defines στροφαὶ λόγων as words that present things of one nature, but are persuading the reader/listener of something else. This is the definition of figured speech (λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος) in ancient rhetorical theory.¹¹²⁶ Basil views παροιμῖαι as a safeguard against the ability of the reader/listener to produce στροφαὶ λόγων without end. Παροιμῖαι prevent στροφαὶ from becoming διαστροφαί (“distortions”). By arming the readers/listeners with experience, παροιμῖαι enable them to receive στροφαὶ λόγων without becoming injured or departing from the truth.

Basil continues to elaborate on the dangers of στροφαὶ λόγων and on the defence παροιμῖαι provide against them:

Ἡ στροφαὶ τινές εἰσι λόγων αἱ ἐκ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως ἀντιθέσεις. Οὐ καταδεχόμενοι γὰρ τὸ ἀπλοῦν τῆς πνευματικῆς διδασκαλίας, οἱ ἐκ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς πρὸς τὰς ἀντιλογίας ἠκονημένοι, περιτρέπουσι πολλάκις τὴν ἰσχὺν τῆς ἀληθείας τῇ πιθανολογίᾳ τῶν σοφισμάτων. Δέχεται οὖν ταύτας τὰς στροφὰς τῶν λόγων ὁ ταῖς Παροιμίαις ὠχυρωμένος. Κἂν εὖρη ποτὲ προβλήματα, ἰσοπαλεῖς τὰς ἐφ’ ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειρήσεις ἔχοντα, ἐν οἷς δυσδιάκριτος τοῦ πιθανωτέρου ἢ εὖρεσις· ὅμως διὰ τὸ ἐγγεγυμνάσθαι ταῖς Παροιμίαις, οὐ συγχυθήσεται τὸν νοῦν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα δοκῶσιν οἱ προσδιαλεγόμενοι ἐξίσου τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων πλεονάζας ἀλλήλοις ἀντεπιφέρειν.¹¹²⁷

Now certain “turns of words” are the “arguments that come from falsely-named knowledge” (1 Tim 6:20). For those who do not receive the simplicity of spiritual teaching, being sharpened for disputations by dialectic skill, often pervert the force of the truth by the plausible argumentation of sophistries. The one, therefore, who is fortified by παροιμῖαι receives {the attack of} these “turns of words”. Although one may at times encounter problems that have well-matched arguments on either side, in which the interpretation of something very persuasive is hard to discern, still, because one has been trained in παροιμῖαι, this will not confound the mind, even if

¹¹²⁵ Adjusted translation from Gohl.

¹¹²⁶ See *infra*, §2 for my discussion of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

¹¹²⁷ Bas., *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 7 (PG 31:401a–b).

those who are disputing may seem to bring the blows of {their} arguments against one another equally.¹¹²⁸

Basil is convinced that παροιμῖαι provide the reader/listener with a spiritual teaching that will allow them to fortify themselves against the attacks of στροφαὶ λόγων. Only the simplicity of spiritual teaching guards against sophistries.

It is surprising that Basil opposes παροιμῖαι to στροφαὶ λόγων, because he equally considers παροιμῖαι to be artistic language that indirectly refers to a hidden meaning:

[...] παροιμία ἐστὶ λόγος ὠφέλιμος, μετ' ἐπικρύψεως μετρίας ἐκδεδομένος, πολὺ μὲν τὸ αὐτόθεν χρήσιμον περιέχων, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ βάθει τὴν διάνοιαν συγκαλύπτων [...] ὥς τοῦ παροιμιακοῦ λόγου τὸ πεπαρρησιασμένον καὶ δεδημοσιευμένον τῆς διανοίας μὴ ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ πλαγίως ἑαυτοῦ τὸ βούλημα τοῖς ἐντρεχεστέροις παραδηλοῦντος.¹¹²⁹

[...] a παροιμία is a useful saying, given forth with a fitting degree of concealment, which presents much value immediately, but also conceals much meaning in {its} depth. [...] as the meaning of a *paroimiac* word is not spoken out boldly and made known publicly, but obliquely signifies its intention to those who are more skilful of mind.¹¹³⁰

Like στροφαὶ λόγων, παροιμῖαι are like hares and foxes that point to one direction, but run to another direction. The use of the rhetorical concept πλάγιος indicates the idea of indirect signification. In order to obtain the spiritual teaching of παροιμῖαι, the reader/listener has to perform a turn of words. As Basil says himself of Solomon: Πάντα δι' ἑμφάσεως λέγει, διὰ τῶν σωματικῶν τὰ πνευματικὰ ἡμῖν παραδεικνύς.¹¹³¹ The rhetorical concept of ἑμφασις also refers to the idea of indirect signification.¹¹³² Basil seems to believe that this particular turn of words will provide the correct spiritual teaching that can protect the reader/listener against others who want to change the meaning of Solomon's παροιμῖαι through other possible στροφαὶ λόγων.

I conclude that Basil's use of the rhetorical concepts of ἑμφασις and πλάγιος and the general definition of figured speech to interpret παροιμία and στροφαὶ λόγων in Prov 1:1–6 attests his dependence on the ancient rhetorical understanding of figured speech.

1.2.3 Gregory of Nyssa

Commenting on the use of παροιμία in the Gospel of John and Prov 1:1–6, Gregory of Nyssa wrote:

¹¹²⁸ Adjusted translation from Gohl.

¹¹²⁹ Bas., *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 2 (PG 31:388c).

¹¹³⁰ Slightly adjusted translation from Gohl.

¹¹³¹ Bas., *Homilia in principium proverbiorum* 4 (PG 31:393a). My translation: “[h]e says all things by implication, exhibiting spiritual things to us through somatic things.”

¹¹³² My discussion of the rhetorical concepts of ἑμφασις and πλάγιος will follow *infra*, under §2.

ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ παρὰ πάντων ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ καταχρήσει τὸ τῆς παροιμίας ὄνομα μὴ κατὰ φανεροῦ τετάχθαι νοήματος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινος κεκρυμμένης λέγεσθαι διανοίας, οὕτω τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τὰς αἰνιγματώδεις τε καὶ ἀσαφεῖς ῥήσεις παροιμίας κατονομάζοντες, ὥς εἶναι τὴν παροιμίαν, εἴ τις ὄρω τὴν ἐρμηνείαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου διαλαμβάνει, λόγον δι' ἐτέρων τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρόχειρον νοουμένων ἑτερόν τι κατὰ τὸ κρυπτὸν ἐνδεικνύμενον, ἢ λόγον οὐκ ἐπ' εὐθείας τὸν τοῦ νοήματος σκοπὸν προδεικνύοντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λοξὸν τὴν διδασκαλίαν ποιούμενον διὰ πλαγίας ἐμφάσεως.¹¹³³

As it is generally agreed that in scriptural usage the word παροιμία is not applied to the manifest meaning, but is said of some hidden meaning. Thus, the Gospel calls puzzling and obscure sayings παροιμίας, so that παροιμία, if one considers a rule to understand this word, is a form of speech revealing a hidden meaning through words that on first sight mean another thing; or a form of speech that does not directly draw out the intention of the thought, but delivers its teaching obliquely by some indirect signification.¹¹³⁴

Gregory describes παροιμία as a form of speech using everyday language in a way that the language used refers to hidden things through indirect signification. At first sight, παροιμίας refer to things that are obvious, but actually they indicate other hidden meanings. Like Origen, Clement, and Basil, Gregory is clearly dependent on the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech in his interpretation of παροιμία.¹¹³⁵ He refers to the general definition of figured speech as saying one thing, but meaning another. Additionally, he mentions the rhetorical notions of ἔμφασις and πλάγιος to refer to the idea of indirect signification.¹¹³⁶

On στοφαὶ λόγων in Prov 1:3, Gregory comments:

φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι λόγους, φησί, διὰ στροφῆς τὸν σκοπὸν ἐκκαλύπτοντας. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπ' εὐθείας νοούμενον στροφῆς τινος χρῆζει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κεκρυμμένου κατάληψιν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ Παῦλος ἀλλάξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπιγγείλατο, μέλλων μετατιθέναι τὴν ἱστορίαν εἰς τροπικὴν θεωρίαν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ἢ τῶν κεκρυμμένων φανέρωσις στροφή λόγου παρὰ τοῦ Σολομῶντος κατονομάζεται, ὥς οὐ δυναμένου κατανοηθῆναι τοῦ κάλλους τῶν νοημάτων, εἰ μὴ τις τοῦ λόγου τὸ προφανόμενον εἰς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρέψας ἴδοι τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην αὐγὴν τοῦ νοήματος· οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πτεροῦ συμβαίνει, ᾧ κατὰ τὸ οὐραῖον ὁ ταῶς καλλωπίζεται. ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ ὁ μὲν τὰ νῶτα τοῦ πτεροῦ θεασάμενος κατὰ τὸ ἀκαλλές τε καὶ ἄμορφον καταφρονεῖ

¹¹³³ Gr. Nyss., *Eun.*, ed. Jaeger, vol. 2, lib. 3 tom. 1 s. 23.

¹¹³⁴ Adjusted translation from Stuart Hall.

¹¹³⁵ For my discussion of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, see *infra*, §2.

¹¹³⁶ On the rhetorical education of Gregory of Nyssa and the role of rhetoric in *Contra Eunomium* and other writings of Gregory, see Fabian Sieber, “Mehr als schöner Schein—Rhetorische Bildung als konstitutives Element von Theologie am Beispiel der überlieferten Briefe Gregors von Nyssa,” in *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the 12th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Leuven, 14–17 September 2010)*, ed. Johan Leemans – Matthieu Cassin, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae: Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and Language 124 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 686–703 and the literature mentioned there.

πάντως ὡς εὐτελοῦς τοῦ θεάματος· εἰ δέ τις ἀναστρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἑτέραν ὄψιν προδείξειεν, ὁρᾷ τὴν ποικίλην ζωγραφίαν τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸν ἡμιτελῆ κύκλον ἐν πορφυρᾷ τῇ βαφῇ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἐκλάμποντα καὶ τὸν χρυσοειδῆ περὶ τὸν κύκλον ἄερα ταῖς πολυχρόοις ἴρισι κατὰ τὸ ἄκρον διεζωσμένον τε καὶ λαμπόμενον.¹¹³⁷

There are, he says, “words of prudence”, which reveal their purpose “by a turn” (Prov 1:3; cf. Wis 8:8). What is not immediately intelligible needs a “turn” for its secret to be grasped; just as Paul announced that he would “change his voice”, when he was about to transpose history into a figurative spectacle (Gal 4:20), so here the manifestation of hidden things is called by Solomon a verbal turn; as though the beauty of the thinking could not be understood unless one were to see the hidden light shining from the thought by having turned around again the apparent meaning of the word. The same happens for instance with the feathers that the peacock displays in its tail. Because in him {the tail}, one who sees the back of the feathers certainly despises the spectacle as uninteresting due to the unattractive and shapeless appearance; but if one perhaps turns them {the feathers} around and exposes their other side, one sees the varied artwork of nature, the semicircle shining in the middle with purple tint, and the golden radiance round the edge alive and shining with many-coloured rainbows.¹¹³⁸

Through the beautiful comparison of the tail of the peacock, Gregory explains that “words of prudence” (Prov 1:2) communicate their purpose through a “turn” (στροφή). Just as the back of the feathers of the tail of a peacock is “unattractive and shapeless”, these words of prudence are at first sight ordinary and uninteresting. This uninteresting side of the feathers of the peacock is contrasted with “the varied artwork of nature”, which is revealed by turning the feathers of the peacock around, just as one turns around the apparent meaning of the words of prudence and discovers the hidden light of the beauty of thinking.

Unlike his brother Basil, Gregory does not oppose παροιμία to στροφαι λόγων, but contends that the turn of words is required to interpret Solomon’s παροιμία:

ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐδὲν τῷ προχείρῳ τῆς λέξεως ἔπεστι κάλλος (Πᾶσα γάρ, φησὶν, ἡ δόξα τῆς θυγατρὸς τοῦ βασιλέως ἔσωθεν, ἐν τοῖς χρυσοῖς νοήμασι τῷ κρυπτῷ διαλάμπουσα κόσμῳ), ἀναγκαίως ὁ Σολομών τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ τὴν τοῦ λόγου στροφήν ὑποτίθεται, ἵνα διὰ τούτου νοήσωσι παραβολὴν καὶ σκοτεινὸν λόγον, ῥήσεις τε σοφῶν καὶ αἰνίγματα. Ταῦτα τοίνυν περιεχούσης τῆς παροιμιακῆς ταύτης διδασκαλίας, οὐδὲν ἄν τις τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἀνεξετάστως τε καὶ ἀθεωρήτως τῶν ἐκ τῆς βίβλου ταύτης προφερομένων δέξεται, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα σαφὲς ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου καὶ γνώριμον τυγχάνῃ. πάντως γὰρ ὕπεστί τις καὶ τοῖς προδήλοις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἢ κατὰ ἀναγωγὴν θεωρία. εἰ δὲ τὰ πρόχειρα τῆς γραφῆς

¹¹³⁷ Gr. Nyss., *Eun.*, ed. Jaeger, vol. 2, lib. 3 tom. 1 s. 24–26.

¹¹³⁸ Adjusted translation from Stuart Hall.

ταύτης ἀναγκαίως ἐπιζητεῖ τὴν λεπτομερεστέραν ἐξέτασιν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνα οἷς πολὺ τὸ ἀσαφές τε καὶ δυσθεώρητον ἐκ τῆς αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ κατανοήσεως;¹¹³⁹

Since, therefore, there is no beauty in the obvious meaning of the term, (“All the glory,” as it says, “of the king’s daughter is on the inside” [Ps 44:14/45:13], lighting up the hidden beauty with golden thoughts) Solomon is bound to propose to the readers of this book the “turn” of the word, so that they may thereby “understand a parable and an obscure word, both the sayings and the riddles of the wise” (Prov 1:6). Since these are the things that this παροιμία teaching contains, a prudent person will accept nothing set out in this book without examination and inspection, however clear and intelligible it may at first sight appear. Because some viewpoint leading upwards always lies under the things that appear to be obvious. But if the obvious parts of this scripture of necessity require the most minute examination, how much more those, for which by means of immediate apprehension there is much that is obscure and difficult to understand.¹¹⁴⁰

Gregory argues that “the turn of the word” is required to “understand a parable and an obscure word, both the sayings and the riddles of the wise” (Prov 1:6). Conceiving the latter as making up the totality of Solomon’s παροιμίαι, he infers that “turns of words” are required to understand all of Solomon’s παροιμίαι. Nothing in the book of Proverbs may be accepted “without examination and inspection”. Even the obvious παροιμίαι require scrutiny, since they, also, require of us a turn of words. If the obvious language in Proverbs require “minute examination”, even more attention is needed for those parts of the text that resist immediate apprehension.

I conclude that Gregory’s interpretation of παροιμία and στροφαὶ λόγων in Prov 1:1–6 is highly dependent on the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. Like Basil, he perceived παροιμία as figured speech revealing a hidden meaning through indirect signification (ἔμφασις, πλάγιος). Both Basil and Gregory were “highly talented orators and received their extraordinary intellectual education among other places in the great metropolis of Athens”.¹¹⁴¹ It is no surprise that they were familiar with the rhetorical theory of figured speech and the related concepts of ἔμφασις and πλάγιος. Their application of this theory and its concepts to interpret the meaning of biblical παροιμία shows us how rhetorically educated readers in the fourth century CE probably interpreted the latter term in LXX Proverbs and the Fourth Gospel.

¹¹³⁹ Gr. Nyss., *Eun.*, ed. Jaeger, vol. 2, lib. 3 tom. 1 s. 26–27.

¹¹⁴⁰ Adjusted translation from Stuart Hall.

¹¹⁴¹ Andreas Schwab, “From a Way of Reading to a Way of Life: Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus About Poetry in Christian Education,” in *Religious Education in Pre-Modern Europe*, ed. Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler – Marvin Döbler, SHR 140 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 147–162, at 148.

1.2.4 *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* (Ps.-John Chrysostom/ Ps.-Athanasius)¹¹⁴²

Ps.-John Chrysostom and Ps.-Athanasius provide, in practicality, the same wording for the following definition of παροιμία in LXX Proverbs and the Gospel of John:

Εἰσὶ δὲ παροιμίαι λόγοι σοφοὶ, ὡς αἰνίγματα, ἅτινα ἕτερον μὲν τι αὐτόθεν δηλοῦντά ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ ἐπαγγέλλονται.¹¹⁴³

Παροιμίαι are wise words, like riddles, which, announce, on the one hand, something else being immediately clear, on the other hand, another thing by insinuation.¹¹⁴⁴

The notion of παροιμία is again interpreted in a way that is influenced by the ancient rhetorical definition of figured speech: saying one thing, but meaning another.¹¹⁴⁵ Like riddles, παροιμίαι refer to things that are immediately clear. At the same time, παροιμίαι reveal other things ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ (“by insinuation”). Ὑπόνοια is a technical-rhetorical term often used in connection with figured speech. Like ἔμφασις, ὑπόνοια refers to the idea of indirect signification.¹¹⁴⁶ What is important in παροιμίαι and riddles, is not the direct plain meaning that is communicated, but the deeper meaning that is expressed indirectly:

Αἰνίγματα δὲ καὶ σκοτεινοὶ λόγοι, οἵτινες ἀσφαλεῖς μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν, ὥστε ἀνιᾶν τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα τὸ μὴδὲν ἐμφαίνειν, μὴδὲ τινα ὑπόνοιαν παρέχειν· ἐρευνώμενοι δὲ ὁμῶς δεικνύουσι τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦν. [...] καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν αἰνίγματα· ἕτερα γάρ τινα δηλοῖ, καὶ ἐτέρων ἔννοιαν παρίστησι· καὶ ἀσαφῆ μὲν ἐστὶ, κεκρυμμένον δὲ ἔχει τὸν νοῦν.¹¹⁴⁷

¹¹⁴² Gilles Dorival, “L’apport des *Synopses* transmises sous le nom d’Athanasie et de Jean Chrysostome à la question du corpus littéraire de la Bible,” in *Qu’est-ce qu’un corpus littéraire? Recherches sur le corpus biblique et les corpus patristiques*, ed. Gilles Dorival (Paris: Peeters, 2005), 53–93 has refuted the idea that John Chrysostom and Athanasius are the authors of the two writings known as *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae*. Dorival (“L’apport des *Synopses*”, 70) proposes a *terminus ante quem* for the *Synopsis* by Ps.-John Chrysostom in either 428, if Theodore of Mopsuestia is the real author, or in 600 when the text is written by an unknown author inspired by the writings of John Chrysostom. Given the overlap with the *Synopsis* by Ps.-John Chrysostom, Dorival (“L’apport des *Synopses*,” 80–81) claims that the *Synopsis* by Ps.-Athanasius is certainly later and can be dated between 500 and 600, although he does not exclude the possibility of Theodor Zahn’s dating of the text in the second half of the fifth century.

¹¹⁴³ Ps.-Chrys., *synops.* 375 (PG 56:370). See also Ps.-Ath., *synops.* 22 (PG 28:340b–c), for almost the same wording.

¹¹⁴⁴ My translation.

¹¹⁴⁵ For my discussion of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, see *infra*, §2.

¹¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.8; Aps., *On Figured Problems* 5. See, also, the examples of ὑπόνοια in connection to figured speech discussed by Bernard Schouler, “Le déguisement de l’intention dans la rhétorique grecque,” *Ktêma* 11 (1986) 257–272: esp. at 260–262, 267 and Kathy Eden, “Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition,” *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 5/1 (1987) 59–86. See, also, my discussion of ὑπόνοια in Plutarch, *infra*, under §3.2.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ps.-Chrys., *synops.* 378–379 (PG 56:373). See, also, Ps.-Ath., *synops.* 22 (PG 28:345d–348a), for almost the same wording.

Riddles are obscure words, which are safe, in as far as he who meets them is tormented and does not reveal anything nor provide any conjecture {about their meaning}. But at the same time, those who search bring to light the meaning that is in them. [...] And all these who are similar are riddles; because they make visible some things and produce the meaning of other things; and they are obscure and have a hidden meaning.¹¹⁴⁸

Riddles do not easily reveal their meaning. Someone who reads/hears them occasionally will not provide any ὑπόνοια (“conjecture”) about their meaning. Only he or she who diligently searches can reveal their hidden meaning. Their evident meaning is subordinate to their hidden meaning.

The present section (1) has demonstrated that ancient readers in the second to the fifth century CE interpreted biblical παροιμία in terms of the contemporary rhetorical theory of figured speech. In the next section, I will study this ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech with special attention to the question how figured speech relates to παρρησία.

2. RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH

The present section will enquire how the relationship between παρρησία and figured speech was viewed in the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech (λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος). In a chronological order, I will discuss Demetrius (2.1), Quintilian (2.2), Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.3), and Ps.-Hermogenes (2.4).¹¹⁴⁹

2.1 DEMETRIUS

Demetrius’ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας (“On Style”) is the oldest source containing theoretical reflection on figured speech.¹¹⁵⁰ According to Doreen Innes, both authorship and dating

¹¹⁴⁸ My translation.

¹¹⁴⁹ For general discussions of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, see Richard Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1963), 108–123; Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism”; Françoise Desbordes, “Le texte caché: Problèmes figurés dans la déclamation latine,” *Revue des études latines* 71 (1993) 73–86; Michael Hillgruber, “Die Kunst der verstellten Rede: Ein vernachlässigtes Kapitel der antiken Rhetorik,” *Philologus* 144/1 (2000) 3–21; Pierre Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos ou discours figuré,” in *La parole polémique*, ed. Gilles Declercq – Michel Murat – Jacqueline Dangel, *Colloques, congrès et conférences sur l’Epoque moderne et contemporaine* 11 (Paris: Champion, 2003), 223–254; Pierre Chiron, “Les rapports entre persuasion et manipulation dans la théorie rhétorique du discours figuré,” in *Argumentation et discours politique: Antiquité grecque et latine, Révolution française, monde contemporain*, ed. Simone Bonnafous *et al.* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2003), 165–174; Laurent Pernot, “Greek ‘Figured Speech’ om Imperial Rome,” *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 18/2 (2015) 131–146.

¹¹⁵⁰ The first definitions of σχῆμα (“figure”), however, predate Demetrius, because they were provided by the fourth century BCE rhetorician Zoilos and the fifth or sixth century BCE rhetorician Phoebammon. E.g., Phoeb., *Fig. 1.1* (Christianus Walz [ed.], *Rhetores Graeci* [Osnabrück: Zeller, 1968], vol. 8, 493 vv. 15–16): σχῆμά ἐστιν ἕτερον μὲν προσποιεῖσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ λέγειν. A figure is defined as “pretending to say one thing and actually saying something else”.

of the text are uncertain. A tenth-century manuscript attributes the text to Demetrius of Phalerum (360–280 BCE), a student of Aristotle, but this alleged authorship is contradicted by how Demetrius of Phalerum is cited in §289 of *On Style*. Demetrius was a common name in antiquity. Identification with any specific Demetrius is impossible. Innes reports that scholarship has variously dated the text somewhere between the third century BCE and the first century CE.¹¹⁵¹

Demetrius mentions two motives for using figured speech.¹¹⁵² The first motive is tact or εὐπρέπεια: figured language is used when plain language would violate good taste. Demetrius provides the example of Plato, who does not openly reproof Aristippus and Cleombrotus for feasting in Aegina when Socrates was imprisoned in Athens. When Phaedo is asked who was with Socrates, he lists them one by one. When asked where Aristippus and Cleombrotus were, Phaedo replied, “they were in Aegina”. Demetrius explains that, although Plato could have directly insulted them “without any personal risk”, Plato did not want to show bad manners and reproved them “allusively” (ἐν σχήματι) through the words of Phaedo.¹¹⁵³

The second motive is circumspection or ἀσφάλεια: figured speech is used when it is not safe to speak directly, for instance, when addressing violent individuals.¹¹⁵⁴ Demetrius provides the example of Plato, who not openly reproves the tyrant Dionysius for breaking a promise and denying to have ever made the promise. He says: “I, Plato have not made you any promises, but *you*—well, heaven knows!” Demetrius explains that, through this figured saying, Dionysius “is convicted of telling lies, while the form of the words is at once dignified and circumspect” (ἐλήλεγται ἐψευσμένος, καὶ ἔχει τι ὁ λόγος σχῆμα μεγαλεῖον ἅμα καὶ ἀσφαλές).¹¹⁵⁵ I observe that Plato indirectly criticises Dionysius for being a liar by stating that the gods surely know that he made a promise. By using this figured saying he conceals his intention for Dionysius.

Demetrius, additionally, specifies two ways in which figured speech can be used to protect the speaker: (i) the use of equivocal words that can be explained in two ways. Demetrius refers to a text in Aeschines in which Aeschines’ words can either be interpreted as mockery or admiration of Telauges;¹¹⁵⁶ and (ii) criticising a particular person by praising others who acted in the opposite way or blaming others who acted in a similar way.¹¹⁵⁷

George Grube comments that, for Demetrius, figured speech is distinct from allegory. Demetrius views allegory as being “plainer, more frightening, and vivid than the simple

¹¹⁵¹ See Doreen C. Innes (ed.), *Demetrius: On Style*, LCL 199 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 310–311.

¹¹⁵² For general discussions of these two motives of figured speech in Demetrius’ *On Style*, see Dirk M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1964), 116–134; Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism”: 185–187; Chiron, “Le logos eskhēmatisménos,” 232–236.

¹¹⁵³ Demetr., *Eloc.* 288 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁵⁴ See Demetr., *Eloc.* 289.

¹¹⁵⁵ Demetr., *Eloc.* 290. Adjusted translation from Rhys Roberts.

¹¹⁵⁶ See Demetr., *Eloc.* 291.

¹¹⁵⁷ See Demetr., *Eloc.* 292–293.

statement would be”. When using figured speech, on the other hand, “*you do not want or do not dare to speak plainly*”.¹¹⁵⁸ Although agreeing with this comment, I observe that Demetrius does not view figured speech as being weaker than plain and direct language: [...] καὶ ἡ ἀσάφεια πολλαχοῦ δεινότης ἐστί· δεινότερον γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐξαπλωθὲν καταφρονεῖται.¹¹⁵⁹ Obscurity often inspires awe.¹¹⁶⁰ What is implied in figured language inspires awe, whereas plain and simple language is despised. Demetrius previously explained: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούμενον φοβερώτερον, καὶ ἄλλος εἰκάζει ἄλλο τι· ὃ δὲ σαφὲς καὶ φανερόν, καταφρονεῖσθαι εἰκός, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἀποδεδυμένους.¹¹⁶¹ Being open to interpretation, indirect language is more feared, whereas direct and plain language is despised like a man without his clothes. Demetrius is of the opinion that “some things seem more significant when they are not openly expressed but only implied (ὑπονοηθέντα)”.¹¹⁶² The ὑπόνοιαι contained in figured language seem to generate more meaning than direct or plain language is able to.

Although Demetrius often juxtaposes figured language to direct or plain language, he does not perceive a strict opposition between them. Demetrius considers “the figured” (τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον) to be the middle course between “flattery” (cf. κολακεύειν) and “open criticism” (cf. ἐπιτιμᾶν).¹¹⁶³ Through this definition, he avoids identifying figured language with the distorting language used by the flatterer. Instead of being the opposite of plain or direct language, figured language takes the middle ground between plain or direct language and distorting language.

Demetrius does not use the term παρρησία or its cognates to refer to the idea of speaking plainly or directly. As we will see in the following subsections, later rhetorical treatments of figured speech will use the term παρρησία in juxtaposition to figured speech to refer to direct or plain speech.

2.2 QUINTILIAN

Writing in the first century CE, Quintilian identifies figured speech with “the very common device” called *emphasis* (Gr. ἔμφασις). He defines the latter as dropping “a hint to show that what we want to be understood is not what we are saying – not necessarily

¹¹⁵⁸ George M.A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style*, The Phoenix Supplementary Volumes 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 124 n. 287 with reference to Demetrius’ views on allegory in *Eloc.* 100. Italics by Grube.

¹¹⁵⁹ Demetr., *Eloc.* 254 (LCL). LCL translation: “[...] obscurity is often a sort of forcefulness, since what is implied is more forceful, while what is openly stated is despised.”

¹¹⁶⁰ For a more systematic discussion of the notion of obscurity in Demetrius’ *On Style*, see George L. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, Analekta Vlatadhon 17 (Thessaloniki: Patryarchikon idhrama paterikon meleton, 1973), 68–72.

¹¹⁶¹ Demetr., *Eloc.* 100. LCL translation: “[w]hat is implied always strikes more terror, since its meaning is open to different interpretations, whereas what is clear and plain is apt to be despised, like men who are stripped of their clothes.”

¹¹⁶² Demetr., *Eloc.* 103 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁶³ Demetr., *Eloc.* 294. My translation.

the opposite (as in irony), but something hidden and left to the hearer to discover”.¹¹⁶⁴ Quintilian mentions three uses of figured speech (or *emphasis*): (i) “if it is unsafe to speak directly (*palam*)”; (ii) “if it is unseemly to do so”; and (iii) “when it is employed simply for elegance and gives more pleasure by its freshness and variety than the straightforward statement would have done”.¹¹⁶⁵ The first and the second use of figured speech coincide with the motive of respectively ἀσφάλεια and εὐπρέπεια in Demetrius. The third use or motive is unique to Quintilian among the other rhetoricians.¹¹⁶⁶

Concerning the first use of figured speech, Quintilian notes that it is “common in the schools”. He specifies that “you can speak with success against those declamation tyrants as openly (*apertum*) as you please, so long as what you say can be given a different interpretation, because it is only the risk of conviction, not also offence that has to be avoided”.¹¹⁶⁷ Although it is dangerous to speak “directly” (*palam*) to a tyrant, one can speak “openly” (*apertum*) against a tyrant on the condition that one uses ambiguous expressions that insult the tyrant and at the same time provide the speaker with the ability to avoid danger by understanding and explaining the same expressions in another way. According to Frederick Ahl, the difference between speaking directly (*palam dicere*) and speaking openly (*aperte dicere*) is as follows: “To say something that is *apertum* is to say it so that its meaning is, like a book, open, but inactive until the reader, the audience, spots it. To say something *palam* is to proclaim it unmistakably, to speak bluntly.” In other words, “[w]hat is spoken *palam* by the plain speaker is stated *aperte* in figured speech.”¹¹⁶⁸ Where Quintilian uses the phrase “speaking directly” (*palam dicere*) in juxtaposition to figured speech, later rhetoricians, as we will see in the next subsections, will use the term παρησιία in juxtaposition to figured speech.

Quintilian considers παρησιία to refer to the least figured speech there is: “[f]or what is less ‘figured’ than true freedom?” Quintilian at the same time claims that, if παρησιία is sincere, it is least figured, but if it is “feigned and artificially produced”, it is definitely a figure and even a form of flattery.¹¹⁶⁹ According to Foucault, Quintilian is depicting παρησιία as “a sort of ‘figure’ among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that

¹¹⁶⁴ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.65 (LCL translation). On Quintilian’s famous example of *emphasis* in *Inst.* 9.2.73–74, see Olga Tellegen-Couperus, “Style and Law: How To Win a Case by Means of *Emphasis*,” in *Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics*, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 237–245 and Christopher Craig, “Quintilian on Not Saying What One Means (*Inst.* 9.2.73–74),” in *Papers on Rhetoric VI*, ed. Lucia Calboli Montefusco (Roma: Herder, 2004), 101–115.

¹¹⁶⁵ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.66 (slightly adjusted LCL translation).

¹¹⁶⁶ For further scholarly discussion of Quintilian’s three uses of figured speech, see Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism”: 187–192 and Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 236–239.

¹¹⁶⁷ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.67 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁶⁸ Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism”: 193.

¹¹⁶⁹ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.27 (LCL translation). The understanding of παρησιία as a rhetorical figure can also be found in Rutil. 2.18 and Rhet. Her. 4.48–50. On παρησιία as a rhetorical figure, see Luigi Spina, “*parrhesia* et retorica: un rapporto difficile,” *Paideia* 60 (2005) 317–346: at 322–338.

it is without any figure since it is completely natural". Foucault speaks of a "zero[-] degree" figure in the sense of an unnoticed figure.¹¹⁷⁰

Quintilian's understanding of *παρρησία* as a "zero[-]degree" figure is, in my view, grounded in his deconstruction of the opposition between the literal and the figurative. Quintilian observes that figures of speech are subject to change. Almost all language used in the present can be conceived as a figure when compared to the language used in the past.¹¹⁷¹ Figures are language in motion: they bring movement in the process of presentation. Quintilian compares figures to the movements of a face. Oratory has "its natural face, which must of course not be fixed in motionless rigidity". At the same time, "if a speaker never stopped pulling extraordinary faces and showing his nervousness by constantly varying his expression and eye movement, he would be a laughing-stock".¹¹⁷² If a speaker does not introduce new figures, but repeatedly uses the same figures, the face of oratory will become lifeless. The complete opposite of constantly using new figures will ridicule the speaker. The idea is that by repeatedly using the same figures, they stop being figures. I observe, with Barend van Heusden, that Quintilian has deconstructed "the distinction or opposition between the literal or normal (grammatical) and the figurative (poetical and/or rhetorical) [...] by revealing the thoroughly figurative nature of the literal, as well as the literal fate of the figurative".¹¹⁷³ For Quintilian, the distinction is, rather, between unnoticed or zero-degree figures and alive figures. "[F]igures come to life" only when they deviate "from a normal way of talking".¹¹⁷⁴ Consequently, *παρρησία* as an unnoticed or a zero-degree figure is opposed to figured speech or alive figures. Yet, language use perceived as *παρρησία* in one period of time can be received as figured speech in another period of time, and vice versa. For Quintilian, the opposition between *παρρησία* and figured speech is, thus, not absolute, but fluid and dynamic.

In Book Five of the *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian calls *παροιμία* "a sort of abbreviated fable understood allegorically".¹¹⁷⁵ In Book Eight, Quintilian mentions *παροιμία* as an example of the use of allegory "to disguise unpleasant facts in better words to achieve an effect of urbanity, or to give a hint of something by mentioning its contrary". At the same time, Quintilian calls it "a shrewd view" to not regard *παροιμία* as a species of allegory, but as a trope in its own right, because "[a]llegory is more obscure", whereas in *παροιμία* "our intentions are obvious (*aperte*)".¹¹⁷⁶ He argues that *παροιμία* and allegory are different species. Given that allegory has a distinct property in being more

¹¹⁷⁰ First lecture of Foucault, "Discourse and Truth".

¹¹⁷¹ See Quint., *Inst.* 9.3.1.

¹¹⁷² Quint., *Inst.* 9.3.101 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁷³ Barend van Heusden, "The Semiotic Minuet in Quintilian's Rhetoric: On the Treatment of Figures in Book IX of the *Institutio Oratoria*," in *Quintilian and the Law*, 223–236, at 229. The deconstruction of the opposition between the literal and the metaphorical was, thus, not first introduced by modern cognitive theory of metaphor, but can already be traced in the ancient rhetorical theory of the first century BCE.

¹¹⁷⁴ Van Heusden, "The Semiotic Minuet," 229.

¹¹⁷⁵ Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.21 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁷⁶ Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.57–58 (LCL translation).

obscure, allegory cannot be the genus of παροιμία.¹¹⁷⁷ Quintilian, thus, seemingly contradicts his earlier view of παροιμία as an abbreviated fable understood allegorically. Quintilian adds that, although the understanding of παροιμία as a species of allegory is inaccurate, “this of course does not matter to those who use it”.¹¹⁷⁸ In its general use, παροιμία is viewed by others as a species of allegory.

Quintilian, from his side, views παροιμία as a trope in its own right distinct from allegory. According to Quintilian, a trope is “a shift of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another, in a way that has positive value”.¹¹⁷⁹ He, also, defines a trope as “language transferred from its natural and principal meaning to another for the sake of embellishment” or as “an expression transferred from a context in which it is proper to one in which it is not”.¹¹⁸⁰ Quintilian’s treatment of παροιμία as a trope in its own right is comparable to Tryphon’s understanding of παροιμία. According to Tryphon, παροιμία ἐστὶ λόγος εἰρημένος ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς ἕτερον, λεγόμενος δὲ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν κατὰ ἀνακύκλησιν πρὸς τινα τῶν ὁμοιοθῶν.¹¹⁸¹ The use of a παροιμία requires from the speaker “a turning around” (ἀνακύκλησις) of a word or saying in order that the used word or saying has the same meaning as another word or saying of the same character. Thus, both Quintilian and Tryphon view παροιμία as denoting a shift of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another. This is consistent with the previously discussed understanding of παροιμία in LXX Proverbs as requiring a turning around of the apparent meaning of the saying (cf. στροφὰς λόγων).¹¹⁸²

I conclude that Quintilian has deconstructed the opposition between παρρησία and figured speech. Both are figured speech, with the difference that παρρησία is an unnoticed figure. The distinction between *dicere aperte* and *dicere palam*, furthermore, shows that Quintilian thinks that what is said directly can be said openly in figured speech guaranteeing the safety of the speaker. Direct speech or παρρησία can be mitigated by figured speech without the speaker losing his or her ability to say what he or she thinks. We have seen that Quintilian views παροιμίαι as language in which our intentions are obvious (*aperte*). Less obscure than allegory, παροιμία is a trope on its own. According to Marsh McCall, it is difficult to say whether Quintilian and ancient rhetoric in general really saw a distinction between a trope and a figure.¹¹⁸³ I observe that the distinction becomes meaningless when one takes into consideration Quintilian’s view that all

¹¹⁷⁷ See Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.58.

¹¹⁷⁸ Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.58 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁷⁹ Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.1 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁸⁰ Quint., *Inst.* 9.1.4 (LCL translation).

¹¹⁸¹ Leonhard von Spengel (ed.), *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 3, BSGRT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1856), 206 vv. 19–21. My translation: “[π]αροιμία is in principle a word or saying spoken to another word or saying, spoken by us according to a revolution to a word or saying of the same character.”

¹¹⁸² See *supra*, §1.1.

¹¹⁸³ See Marsh H. McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison*, Loeb Classical Monographs (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 186–187.

language is figured. Quintilian, probably, would not have disagreed with the view that παροιμία is a figure, although he discusses παροιμία as a trope.

2.3 PS.-DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

Chapters Eight and Nine of the *Ars Rhetorica*, by Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, are two treatises on figured speech.¹¹⁸⁴ According to Malcolm Heath, the two treatises were written by the same author in the first half of the second century CE.¹¹⁸⁵ Older scholarship has argued on the basis of parallels with Ps.-Hermogenes, *On Method*, for a date not earlier than the third century CE.¹¹⁸⁶ For my purposes, I assume the dating by Heath, who has offered the most recent and detailed examination of the dating of the text.

Ps.-Dionysius was aware of the criticism that figured language has no actual reason of existence and, therefore, cannot be said to properly exist. This criticism was fuelled by the following dilemma: a figure is eliminated if figured language is understood and, also, if it is not understood. If the hearer understands, he or she might as well have heard a plain story and, if the hearer does not understand, the speaker has failed in his or her task of communication. In both cases, the figure has no use and *raison d'être*.¹¹⁸⁷

Ps.-Dionysius objected to the critics of figured speech by claiming that all language is figured,¹¹⁸⁸ even the most simple expressions,¹¹⁸⁹ for instance, saluting someone,¹¹⁹⁰ inviting someone to dinner,¹¹⁹¹ asking a loan from someone.¹¹⁹² At the same time, Ps.-Dionysius distinguishes between “artistic” (ἐντεχνος) and “non-artistic” (ἄτεχνος)

¹¹⁸⁴ For the only modern translation of these two chapters, see Stefano Dentice di Accadio, *Pseudo-Dionigi di Alicarnasso: I discorsi figurati I e II (Ars Rhet. VIII e IV Us.-Rad.)* (Pisa-Roma: Fabrizio Serra, 2010).

¹¹⁸⁵ See Heath, “Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11”: 100–102.

¹¹⁸⁶ See the authors mentioned in Heath, “Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11”: 100 n. 22. A later dating at the end of the second century or the beginning of the third century CE is also assumed by Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 245.

¹¹⁸⁷ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 295.3–6; 323.6–25. A similar formulation of the criticism against the existence of figured speech can be found in Quint., *Inst.* 5.10.70; 9.2.69. See, also, Alex., *Fig.* 11.18–13.20 (Spengel [ed.], *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 3, 11–13), whose opponent, also, denies the existence of figured speech. For scholarly discussion on the controversy about the existence of figured speech, see Timothy-Douglas Smith, “Studies in the Pseudo-Dionysian *Techne Rhetorike*” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania PA, 1973), 64–65, 82, 90–91; Schouler, “Le déguisement”: 260–262; Russell, “Figured Speeches,” 156–159; Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 245–246; Heath, “Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11”: 92–93, 102.

¹¹⁸⁸ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.11–14; 349.2–3.

¹¹⁸⁹ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 351.1–3.

¹¹⁹⁰ Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.15–17 (Usener – Radermacher [eds.], *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula*, vol. 2): τὸ προσαγορεύειν ἄνευ σχήματος οὐ γίνεται ὁ μὲν φιλοφρόνως προσαγορεύει, ὁ δὲ αἰδημόνως, ὁ δὲ σκώπτων, ὁ δὲ ἱλαρῶς, ὁ δὲ ὡς θαυμάζων. My translation: “saluting cannot take place without a figure: one person salutes in a friendly way, another in a respectful way, another in a mocking way, another in a cheerful way, another by feigning admiration.”

¹¹⁹¹ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.17–20.

¹¹⁹² See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 323.20–23.

requests with the latter referring to all forms of directness without obvious rhetorical figures.¹¹⁹³ According to Heath, the concept of non-artistic language is surprising, because it undermines Ps.-Dionysius' claim that all language is figured in the relevant sense. Consequently, his attempt to show that all language is figured in this relevant sense has failed. Heath thinks that this failure possibly explains the unfinished state of his treatise on figured speech.¹¹⁹⁴

Ps.-Dionysius argues for the existence of three types of figured speech, thereby, seeking to prove the existence of wholly figured speech: (i) The speaker says what he means, but with tact (εὐπρέπεια) out of respect for the opponents or out of circumspection (ἀσφάλεια) towards the audience; (ii) the speaker says one thing, but achieves something else; and (iii) the speaker says one thing, but achieves the opposite.¹¹⁹⁵ Ps.-Dionysius explains that the first type of figured speech requires us to refrain from παρρησία and to soften our expressions.¹¹⁹⁶ Special cases of (ii) and (iii) are: (a) The speaker seems to say the same things as a previous speaker, but actually provides a different hypothesis; (b) the speaker seems to oppose a speech, while he is factually supporting it; and (c) the speaker covertly makes his point postponing his παρρησία to a later moment.¹¹⁹⁷

I conclude that Ps.-Dionysius claims that the use of figured speech implies that one refrains from or postpones παρρησία. One cannot employ figured speech and παρρησία at the same time. In practice, παρρησία is juxtaposed to figured speech. In theory, Ps.-Dionysius considers all speech to be figured, including παρρησία. Figured speech and παρρησία are not antithetical to one another. In theory, they can be reconciled with one another.

2.4 PS.-HERMOGENES

The treatise entitled Περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων ("On Figured Problems") is generally thought of as not being part of the original work of Περὶ εὐρέσεως ("On Invention"). The author of this treatise is sometimes identified with Apsines of Gadara and dated around 175–225 CE.¹¹⁹⁸ Heath has disputed the former view, and has formulated the hypothesis that the text is written by a pupil of Apsines named Aspasius

¹¹⁹³ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 353.10–354.11.

¹¹⁹⁴ See Heath, "Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11": 93.

¹¹⁹⁵ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 295.15–296.5.

¹¹⁹⁶ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 296.8–9.

¹¹⁹⁷ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 297.18–23. For further scholarly discussion of Ps.-Dionysius' three types of figured speech, see Chiron, "Le logos eskhèmatisménos," 245–252 and Heath, "Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11": 82–85. For a comparison of Ps.-Dionysius with other ancient theoretical discussions of figured speech, see Pierre Chiron, "Quelques observations sur la théorie du discours figuré dans la Τέχνη de Ps.-Denys d'Halicarnasse," in *Papers on Rhetoric III*, ed. Lucia Calboli Montefusco (Bologna: Clueb, 2000), 75–94.

¹¹⁹⁸ See Chiron, "Le logos eskhèmatisménos," 239 n. 28 and George A. Kennedy, *Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermogenic Corpus. The Greek Text, Edited by Hugo Rabe, Translated with Introductions and Notes by George A. Kennedy*, WGRW 15 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), xv, 187.

(perhaps Aspasius of Tyre).¹¹⁹⁹ In my discussion, I will refer to the author of this text as Ps.-Hermogenes because the text is part of the Hermogenic corpus, but is obviously not written by Hermogenes.

Ps.-Hermogenes is original insofar as he does not distinguish different motives for the use of figured speech, but different forms of figured speech: (i) ἐναντίον: saying the opposite of what is meant; (ii) πλάγιον: saying the opposite of what is meant plus something extra; and (iii) ἔμφασις: saying one thing, but meaning another. In the first form, the orator argues for the thesis opposite to the one that he pretends to defend. In the second form, the orator additionally argues for something else.¹²⁰⁰ The third form of figured speech is specified as follows:

κατὰ ἔμφασιν δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν λέγειν μὴ δυνάμενοι διὰ τὸ κεκωλῦσθαι καὶ παρρησίαν μὴ ἔχειν ἐπὶ σχήματι ἄλλης ἀξιώσεως ἐμφαίνωμεν κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐξὸν εἰρησθαι, ὡς εἶναι τε νοῆσαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιλήψιμον εἶναι τῷ λέγοντι.¹²⁰¹

It is by implication, whenever we are not able to speak {directly} because hindered and lacking παρρησία, but in the figure of giving a different opinion we also imply what cannot be spoken by the way the speech is composed, so that the hearers understand and it is not a subject of reproach to the speaker.¹²⁰²

When the speaker has no παρρησία, he or she can “by implication” (κατὰ ἔμφασιν) speak his or her mind. The listeners who infer what actually cannot be said by the composition of the speech are unable to reproach the speaker, because the speaker does not seem to have said what they inferred.¹²⁰³

Ps.-Hermogenes mentions three procedures through which ἔμφασις is used: (i) “[B]y invention of a figure of such a sort that when saying the thing outright one does not seem to say it”;¹²⁰⁴ (ii) the use of “words that can have two meanings”;¹²⁰⁵ and (iii) word order:

¹¹⁹⁹ See Malcolm Heath, “Apsines and Pseudo-Apsines,” *AJP* 119/1 (1998) 89–111.

¹²⁰⁰ See Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 204–205.

¹²⁰¹ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 206 (Kennedy, *Invention and Method*). An almost identical, but shorter formulation can be found in Aps., *On Figured Problems* 4 (Michel Pattillon (ed.), *Apsinès. Ars rhétorique. Problèmes à faux-semblant. Texte établi et traduit*, Budé [Paris: Les belles lettres, 2001]): κατὰ ἔμφασιν δέ ἐστιν ὅταν λέγειν μὴ δυνάμενοι τῷ κεκωλῦσθαι καὶ παρρησίαν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν σχήματι ἄλλης ἀξιώσεως ἐμφαίνωμεν κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ λόγου, οἷον [...]

¹²⁰² Adjusted translation from George Kennedy.

¹²⁰³ For further discussion of the three forms of figured speech in Ps.-Hermogenes, see Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 239–242. An almost identical presentation of the three forms of figured speech can be found in Aps., *On Figured Problems* 1–4. The first four paragraphs of Apsines, *On figured problems* are obviously derived from Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 204–206. Chiron (“Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 242) dates Περὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων (“On figured problems”) by Apsines of Gadara in the first quarter of the third century CE. For further discussion of Apsines, who is considered to be “un épigone du Ps.-Hermogène”, see Chiron, “Le logos eskhèmatisménos,” 242–244.

¹²⁰⁴ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 208 (trans. by Kennedy).

¹²⁰⁵ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 209 (trans. by Kennedy).

“the sequence of composition indicates one thing when the words are closely joined and implies something else when they are separated”.¹²⁰⁶ Concerning the first procedure, Ps.-Hermogenes provides the example of a man whose wife has sexual intercourse with his father. Unable to address the adultery directly, the son “claims he (*himself*) should go into exile because he is insane”, knowing that “the law has ordered persons suffering from madness to go into exile”. The son is speaking about exile, but is “hinting at the adultery of his father with his wife”.¹²⁰⁷ The idea is that the audience would infer that the father has committed adultery with the son’s wife. Note that the speaker assumes that the hearers are familiar with the rumour about his father’s actions. The hearers (including the father) cannot reproof the son for accusing his father of adultery, because he did not actually say this.

Concerning the use of ἔμφασις by means of ambiguous words, Ps.-Hermogenes provides the example of a father having sexual intercourse with his daughter. The mother hanged herself after having told “the unspeakable thing” to her son. “The father asks what the unspeakable thing was and when the son does not say, he disowns him”. The son, unable to directly accuse his father of incest, says: “[n]ow this disinheritance is of little concern to me, but I am distressed for my father if after such abundance of family, he will be left with (συνέσται) only a daughter and will live with (συζήσεται) her alone.” Ps.-Hermogenes explains that συνέσται and συζήσεται are “common of other aspects of human life and seem most suited for the underlying implication as being able to indicate both what is unexceptionable and what has been implied”.¹²⁰⁸ The verbs σύνειμι and συζάω have a double meaning, and can refer to both having sexual intercourse and living or being together. In the example, the son uses ἔμφασις through ambiguous words, because he cannot directly accuse his father of incest. The ambiguity of his words guards him against the possible accusation of the audience (including the father) to have slandered his father’s name, and at the same time allows his audience to infer that the father has an incestuous relationship with his daughter.

I conclude that Ps.-Hermogenes juxtaposes παρρησία to figured speech. As the previously discussed authors, Ps.-Hermogenes viewed figured speech as guaranteeing the safety of the speaker without robbing the speaker of the ability to speak his or her mind. As such, παρρησία is not antithetical to figured speech. Figured speech is not the distorting rhetorical language of the flatterer, but, just as παρρησία, refers to a speech through which someone can boldly speak the truth.

The present section (2) has demonstrated that ancient rhetoricians considered figured speech to enable the speaker to speak his or her mind indirectly. Whereas some hearers/readers understand the veiled message, others do not. Although often defined in juxtaposition to παρρησία, figured speech is not irreconcilable with παρρησία, as both are often considered to be figured (Quintilian, Ps.-Dionysius). Figured speech and παρρησία

¹²⁰⁶ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 210 (trans. by Kennedy).

¹²⁰⁷ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 206 (trans. by Kennedy).

¹²⁰⁸ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 209–210 (slightly adjusted translation from Kennedy).

have, furthermore, in common that they both refer to the activity of speaking one's mind, which often involves criticism. As such, figured speech is to be distinguished from the distorting language used by the flatterer. The difference between *παρρησία* and figured speech is that the latter is indirect and veiled, whereas the former is direct and plain. In the following section we will see with Plutarch that this opposition between direct *παρρησία* and veiled figured speech is not universal. Plutarch refers to times in which people considered it necessary to proclaim the truth and employ *παρρησία* in a veiled and indirect way.

3. PLUTARCH

The present section will, first, focus on the connection of *παρρησία* to *πανουργία* in Plutarch's writings (3.1) before discussing Plutarch's views on the relationship between *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* (3.2).

3.1 Παρρησία AND πανουργία

Like Philodemus, Plutarch views *παρρησία* as directly communicating errors and 'plainly' speaking the truth without concealment.¹²⁰⁹ In praising the effects of wine, Plutarch writes:

τὸν δὲ δὴ φόβον οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἐμποδῶν ὄντα βουλευομένοις ἐξελαύνει, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν ἀφιλότημα καὶ ἀγεννῆ κατασβέννυσι, καὶ <τὸ> κακότηες καὶ τὸ ὑπουλον ὥσπερ τινὰς διπλόας ἀναπτύσσει τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ παντὸς ἥθους καὶ πάθους ποιεῖ καταφάνειαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ παρρησίας καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀληθείας γονιμώτατος· ἥς μὴ παρούσης οὐδὲν ἐμπειρίας οὐδ' ἀγχινοίας ὄφελος. ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τῷ ἐπιόντι χρώμενοι μᾶλλον κατορθοῦσιν ἢ <εἰ> κρύπτουσιν ἐπιβούλως καὶ πανούργως τὸ παριστάμενον.¹²¹⁰

The fear that is not the least obstacle for those who deliberate, wine drives it out. And many other not honourable and ignoble emotions, it {wine} quenches. It {wine} unfolds wickedness and what festers under the surface, as if these things are some folds of the soul. It {wine} reveals every character and emotion by means of words. Wine is the most fertile seed of *παρρησία*, and thereby of truthfulness. And if truth be not present, neither experience, nor a quick mind have any use. On the contrary, many do better by using whatever words come to them than if they secretly and cunningly conceal their minds.¹²¹¹

Plutarch praises wine for driving out a person's timidity and manifesting his or her character and emotions through transparent language. In the same breath, he calls wine "the most fertile seed of *παρρησία* and thereby of truthfulness". Plutarch, thus, associates

¹²⁰⁹ For Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as plain or direct speech, see *supra*, Chapter Ten, §2.1.

¹²¹⁰ Plu., *Quaest. conv.* 715e–716a (Curt Hubert [ed.], *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. 4, BSGRT [Leipzig: Teubner, 1971]). The text between < > is added by the editor.

¹²¹¹ My translation.

παρρησία with directly or plainly communicating one's character and emotions. He opposes παρρησία to "secretly and cunningly" (ἐπιβούλως καὶ πανούργως) concealing one's mind.

The opposition between παρρησία and πανουργία ("rhetorical dexterity") can also be found in Plutarch's opinion that "the speech of the statesman, counsellor, and ruler must not exhibit shrewdness or rhetorical dexterity (πανουργία), and it must not be to his credit to speak fluently or artistically or sophisticatedly, but his speech must be full of unaffected character, true high-mindedness, paternal frankness (παρρησίας πατρικῆς), foresight, and thoughtful concern for others".¹²¹² The idea that παρρησία is opposed to rhetoric can be traced back as far as Plato, and has influenced the opposition between philosophy and rhetoric ever since.¹²¹³ Thus, Plutarch refers to an established view on παρρησία in agreement with his general image as a Platonic philosopher.¹²¹⁴

Plutarch's opinion that παρρησία is irreconcilable with rhetorical trickery explains why Plutarch considers παρρησία to be the discerning feature of a friend in comparison to a flatterer. According to Otto Ribbeck, from Plato onwards, flattery is characterised as self-interested deception and is practically identified with rhetoric.¹²¹⁵ In agreement with his analysis, I observe that Plutarch adopts this understanding of flattery when he writes that flatterers call vices with the names that belong to virtues and change the commonly accepted meaning of words. Flatterers call, for instance, reckless daring 'devoted courage', circumspection 'specious cowardice', moderation 'a craven's pretext', a keen understanding for everything 'want of energy to understand anything', prodigality 'liberality', cowardice 'self-preservation', impulsiveness 'quickness', stinginess 'frugality', the amorous man 'companionable and amiable', the irascible and overbearing 'spirited', the insignificant and meek 'kindly', an ugly man 'handsome', a short man 'tall', etc.¹²¹⁶ The examples show that, like Plato, Plutarch depicts flattery as self-interested deception. Plutarch considers flattery as a bad ἀπάτη leading the flattered person to ignorance and a deceptive self-knowledge.¹²¹⁷ Whereas παρρησία is a matter of calling a

¹²¹² Plu., *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 802f (adjusted LCL translation). Jean-Claude Carrière, *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, tome 11 – 2e partie, *Préceptes politiques: Texte établi et traduit*, Budé (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1984), 168 suggests that παρρησία πατρική might refer to παρρησία that is hereditary, because Plutarch (*Lib. ed.* 2a–d) claims that both parents should be of good birth for the children to have παρρησία.

¹²¹³ See, e.g., Pl., *Gorg.* 487a–b. For discussion of the opposition between παρρησία and rhetoric in Plato's writings and other authors, see the first lecture of Foucault, "Discourse and Truth" and Foucault, *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*, 298–308, 328–344.

¹²¹⁴ 2 Corinthians 4:2 also seems to use πανουργία as an antonym of παρρησία.

¹²¹⁵ See Otto Ribbeck, *Kolax: Eine ethologische Studie*, Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 9.1 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1884), 16–17, 105.

¹²¹⁶ See Plu., *Adulator* 56b–e.

¹²¹⁷ See Plu., *Adulator* 49b. On Plutarch's distinction between a good and a bad ἀπάτη, see Diotima Papadi, "Theatricality and Dramatic Vocabulary in Plutarch's *Moralia* *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*," in *Plutarch a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII simposio internacional de la sociedad Española de Plutarquistas. Barcelona 6-8 de Noviembre de 2003*, ed. Montserrat Jufresa et al. (Barcelona: Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas, 2005), 401–411, at 407–408.

spade a spade, flattery distorts reality through a rhetorical use of language. In the Platonic tradition in which Plutarch stands, rhetoric is identified as the art of distorting reality through language. In order to discern a flatterer from a friend, Plutarch considers *παρρησία* to be irreconcilable with rhetorical cunning. Whereas friends speak direct or plain language to criticise and exhort one another, the flatterer self-interestedly distorts reality by means of rhetorical trickery.

3.2 Παρρησία AND παροιμία

Although Plutarch seems to assume that there is a universal opposition between *παρρησία* and rhetorical trickery, this is not the case for *παρρησία* and *παροιμία*. Comparing “the use of language” to the “currency of coinage in trade”, Plutarch remarks that “the coinage which is familiar and well known is also acceptable, although it takes on a different value at different times”.¹²¹⁸ In a genealogical fashion, Plutarch depicts a time in which *παρρησία* was not considered to be irreconcilable with *παροιμίες* and *μύθοι*:

ἦν οὖν ὅτε λόγου νομίμασιν ἐχρῶντο μέτροις καὶ μέλεσι καὶ ᾠδαῖς, πᾶσαν μὲν ἱστορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πᾶν δὲ πάθος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν καὶ πρᾶγμα σεμνοτέρως φωνῆς δεόμενον εἰς ποιητικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν ἄγοντες. οὐ γὰρ μόνον νῦν ὀλίγοι μόλις ἐπαῖουσι, τότε δὲ πάντες ἠκροῶντο καὶ ἔχαιρον ἄδομένοις μηλοβόται τ' ἄρόται τ' ὀρνιθολόχοι τε κατὰ Πίνδαρον· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς πρὸς ποιητικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητος οἱ πλεῖστοι διὰ λύρας καὶ ᾠδῆς ἐνουθέτουν ἐπαρρησιάζοντο παρεκελεύοντο, μύθοις καὶ παροιμίαις ἐπέβαινον, ἔτι δ' ὕμνους θεῶν εὐχὰς παιᾶνας ἐν μέτροις ἐποιοῦντο καὶ μέλεσιν οἱ μὲν δι' εὐφυΐαν οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν.¹²¹⁹

There was, then, a time when they used as the coinage of speech verses and tunes and songs; and all history and philosophy and, in a word, every emotion and action that required a holier utterance, they led to the domain of poetry and music. Because not only, nowadays few people understand little of this diction, but in those days everyone, “Shepherds and ploughmen and fowlers as well”, as Pindar says, were listening and rejoiced at the singing. Indeed, thanks to this aptitude for poetic composition, most people through lyre and song admonished, employed *παρρησία*, and exhorted; they attained their ends by the use of myths and *παροιμίες*, and besides composed hymns, prayers, and paeans in honour of the gods in verse and music, some through their natural talent, others because it was the prevailing custom.¹²²⁰

Plutarch narrates about a time in the past in which “the coinage of speech” was very different from the one in the present. In this period of history, all emotions and actions requiring a holier utterance were expressed in poetry and music, even in the fields of philosophy and historiography. Although only a few people understood such poetic use

¹²¹⁸ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406b (LCL translation).

¹²¹⁹ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406b–c (LCL).

¹²²⁰ Adjusted LCL translation.

of language in his time, Plutarch claims that, in earlier times, everyone used to listen to such language with joy. Important for my discussion is Plutarch's use of *παρρησιάζομαι* in combination with the semantically related verbs *νουθετέω* and *παρακελεύομαι*. This combination of verbs refers here to an exhortatory discourse in which *παρρησία* is not viewed as speaking directly or plainly, but in which *παρρησία* is used through *παροιμίας* and *μύθοι*. In the past, of which Plutarch is speaking, people did not employ *παρρησία* by calling a spade a spade, but attained their ends in exhortation by means of *παροιμίας* and *μύθοι*.¹²²¹ For *παρρησία* to be effective, the use of *παροιμίας* and/or *μύθοι* was required.

Plutarch speaks of a time in the past in which people spoke “indirectly and through circumlocution” (cf. *περιπεφρασμένον εἰς ὑπόνοιαν*).¹²²² In previous times, this language was looked upon as “an assumed manifestation of divine power”.¹²²³ Yet, in later times, Plutarch resumes, the use of poetic language was blamed “for obstructing the understanding of the oracles in their true meaning and for combining vagueness and obscurity with the communication”. “[M]etaphors, riddles, and ambiguous statements” were viewed as “secluded nooks of refuge devised for further withdrawal and retreat for him who should err in his prophecy”.¹²²⁴ The coinage of speech had changed and the poetic use of language was not valued anymore:

ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν ἅμα ταῖς τύχαις καὶ ταῖς φύσεσι λαμβάνοντος ἐξωθοῦσα τὸ περιττὸν ἢ χρεῖα κρωβύλους τε χρυσοῦς ἀφήρει καὶ ξυστίδας μαλακὰς ἀπημφιάζε καὶ πού καὶ κόμην σοβαρώτεραν ἀπέκειρε καὶ ὑπέλυσε κόθορνον, οὐ φαύλως ἐθιζομένων ἀντικαλλωπίζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολυτέλειαν εὐτελεία καὶ τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ λιτὸν ἐν κόσμῳ τίθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περιέργον· οὕτω τοῦ λόγου συμεταβάλλοντος ἅμα καὶ συναποδυομένου, κατέβη μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν μέτρων ὥσπερ ὀχημάτων ἢ ἱστορία καὶ τῷ πεζῷ μάλιστα τοῦ μυθώδους ἀπεκρίθη τὸ ἀληθές· φιλοσοφία δὲ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ διδασκαλικὸν ἀσπασαμένη μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἐκπληττον τὴν διὰ λόγων ἐποιεῖτο ζήτησιν.¹²²⁵

But, as life took on a change along with the change in people's fortunes and their natures, when usage banished the superfluous and did away with the golden topknots and dressing in soft robes, and, on occasion, cut off the stately long hair and caused the buskin to be no longer worn, men accustomed themselves (nor was it a bad thing) to oppose expensive outlay by adorning themselves with economy, and to consider the plain and simple as a superior ornament rather than the ornate and elaborate. So, as language also underwent a change and put off its clothes, history descended from versification as from chariots, and going on foot, it mostly separated the truth from

¹²²¹ Daniel Wytttenbach proposes to emend the text by reading the accusative nouns *μύθους* καὶ *παροιμίας* instead of the dative cases attested in the manuscripts. Although not understanding the necessity of this conjectural emendation, I remark that also Wytttenbach's reading suggests that the exhortatory discourse made use of *παροιμίας* and *μύθοι*.

¹²²² See *infra*, in the same subsection, for further discussion of the term *ὑπόνοια*.

¹²²³ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407a (LCL translation).

¹²²⁴ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407a–b (adjusted LCL translation).

¹²²⁵ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406d–e.

the fabulous. Philosophy welcomed clearness and teachability in preference to creating amazement, and pursued its investigations through prose.¹²²⁶

Plutarch speaks with appreciation about a change in “people’s fortunes and their natures”. Usage (χρεία) became the norm for the use of language. “[T]he superfluous”¹²²⁷ (τὸ περιττόν) or “the unusual”¹²²⁸ was banished out. Language use became plain and simple instead of ornate and elaborate, like a person who removed his/her clothes. In Plutarch’s view, this change in the use of language separated the truth from the fabulous. He mentions that historians did not write in verses anymore, but presumably wrote in prose, as if they descended from chariots and are going by foot. The same goes for philosophy, which “welcomed clearness and teachability in preference to creating amazement”.

Although Plutarch has a clear predilection for the view that παρρησία is plain or direct, he mentions two benefits of the use of poetic language to communicate the truth:

(i) Plutarch claims that “there is nothing in poetry more serviceable to language than that the communicated thoughts, by being bound up and interwoven with verse, are better remembered and kept firmly in mind”.¹²²⁹ Plutarch refers to the fact that people in ancient times had to memorise many things. He provides examples of people who made serious mistakes because they had to memorise many things.¹²³⁰ Plutarch seems to suggest that people would better remember and make less mistakes, if they are instructed by poetic language.

(ii) Plutarch is not surprised that people in the past needed “double entendre, indirect statement, and obscurity”. The people who translated the message of the oracle to “powerful states, kings, and despots” often had things to say that the latter did not want to hear. Given that they did not want to “vex or provoke these men by unfriendliness”, they used poetic language to soften their message.¹²³¹ Plutarch thinks the god himself protects his servants and prophets by letting them use poetic language:

χρώμενος δὲ θνητοῖς ὑπέρταις καὶ προφήταις, ὧν Εὐκλιδεσθαι προσήκει καὶ φυλάττειν, ὅπως ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται πονηρῶν θεῶν λατρεύοντες, ἀφανίζειν μὲν οὐ θέλει τὸ ἀληθές, παρατρέπων δὲ τὴν δήλωσιν αὐτοῦ καθάπερ αὐγὴν ἐν τῇ ποιητικῇ πολλὰς ἀνακλάσεις λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πολλαχοῦ περισχιζομένην, ἀφήρει τὸ ἀντίτυπον αὐτοῦ καὶ σκληρόν. ἦν δ’ ἄρ’ ἃ <καλόν> τυράννους ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ πολεμίους μὴ προαισθῆσθαι. τούτοις οὖν περιέβαλεν ὑπονοίας καὶ ἀμφιλογίας, αἱ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποκρύπτουσιν τὸ φραζόμενον, οὐ διέφευγον αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ παρεκρούοντο τοὺς δεομένους καὶ προσέχοντας.¹²³²

¹²²⁶ Adjusted LCL translation.

¹²²⁷ My translation above is inspired by the Budé edition, which translates τὸ περιττόν with “le superflu”.

¹²²⁸ LCL translation.

¹²²⁹ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407f (adjusted LCL translation).

¹²³⁰ See Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407f–408b.

¹²³¹ Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407c–d (adjusted LCL translation).

¹²³² Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 407d–e. I have adopted the conjectural emendation καλόν by Babbitt. Others propose to add ἔδει (Paton) or συνέφερε (Pohlenz). I recognise the syntactical necessity of these

But inasmuch as he {the god} employs mortals as servants and prophets, whom he needs to care for and protect, so that they may not be killed by bad people while ministering to a god, he does not want to hide the truth, but he caused the manifestation of it to be deflected, like a ray of light, in the medium of poetry, where it submits to many reflections and undergoes subdivisions in many places, and thus he removed its repellent harshness. There were thus some things which it was well that despots should fail to understand and enemies should not perceive beforehand. Around these things, therefore, he threw intimations and ambiguities which concealed the communication for others, but did not escape nor mislead those who wanted to know and pay attention.¹²³³

In order to protect his servants and prophets, the god did not let them speak in plain or direct language. Not wanting to hide the truth, the god caused the manifestation of the truth to be deflected. The imagery of light suggests that the poetic language of the servants and the prophets of the god could be interpreted in many ways making the language less painful and harsh for its hearers. Plutarch specifies that there are some things which despots and enemies can better not understand or perceive beforehand. By throwing a cloak of ambiguities and ὑπόνοιαι around these things, they are concealed for others, except for those who want to know and pay attention. Although παρηρησία is not used in this text, the idea that ambiguities and ὑπόνοιαι soften the harsh truth that is to be communicated suggests that Plutarch still has in mind that, in the past, people employed παρηρησία through παροιμίας and μύθοι. They attained their aims in exhortation by expressing them in language that could be interpreted in many ways. This allowed them to both reveal the truth and soften its harshness. The notion of ὑπόνοια seems to play an important role here.

Plutarch devaluates ὑπόνοιαι as violating and distorting the meaning of myths in Homer. He mentions that they are now known as “allegories”.¹²³⁴ Plutarch’s claim that ὑπόνοιαι distort and violate the meaning of myths might ignore that ὑπόνοιαι follow their own rules of signification. According to Kathy Eden, in the history of rhetorical tradition, ὑπόνοιαι are designed to hide the author’s or speaker’s intention (διάνοια/*voluntas*) through ambiguity. Obscurity is the intended effect of ὑπόνοια.¹²³⁵ Ὑπόνοια is a feature of style and, as such, “it depends on the inherent capacity of words to signify in more than one way; that is to move between familiar and unfamiliar contexts, between literal and figurative statement”.¹²³⁶ Ὑπόνοιαι have their own “laws of signification”.¹²³⁷ When these laws are neglected, ὑπόνοιαι are rejected as ambiguous and obscuring the original author’s or speaker’s intention. The ambiguity and obscurity that result from ὑπόνοιαι

emendations of the text to introduce the infinitive clause that follows. I consider all emendations to be equally possible. All proposed emendations support my reading of the text.

¹²³³ My translation.

¹²³⁴ See Plu., *Adol. poet. aud.* 19e–f.

¹²³⁵ See Eden, “Hermeneutics”: 59–86.

¹²³⁶ Eden, “Hermeneutics”: 75

¹²³⁷ Eden, “Hermeneutics”: 85.

are, however, intentional. Texts written as ὑπόνοιαι require their own “method of interpretation”.¹²³⁸

I conclude by summarising that Plutarch does not view παροιμία as a form of πανουργία. The term παροιμία does not refer to speech that distorts reality, but to speech that indirectly reveals the truth to those who pay attention. At the same time, παροιμίες hide the truth to despots and enemies by means of ambiguities and intimations. As such, they mitigate the harshness of παρρησία and provide the necessary safety to speak one’s mind. Plutarch negatively evaluates the ὑπόνοιαι of this form of speech, because they make speech obscure and ambiguous. Nevertheless, he recognises the benefits of this form of speech in providing safety to the speaker and helping the listener to memorise what is said. Plutarch claims that there was a time in the past when this was the standard way of using παρρησία and speaking the truth. Παρρησία was not effective without the use of poetic language like παροιμίες and myths. In the following section, we will see that the same logic is adopted in the Fourth Gospel.

4. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

The first readers of the Fourth Gospel, who were presumably acquainted with Wisdom literature, probably easily detected the following two parallels between both: (i) In addition to John 10:6; 16:25, 29, the only biblical texts that associate παροιμία with obscurity are Prov 1:1–6 and Sir 39:3; and (ii) just as σοφία is taught by παροιμίες (Prov 1:1–2) and is revealed by the act of speaking as a person with παρρησία in full public (1:20–21), the λόγος has become flesh in Jesus (John 1:14), and Jesus is the exegete of God (1:18) by speaking ἐν παροιμίαις and (ἐν) παρρησίᾳ about the Father in full public to the whole world (e.g., 16:25; 18:20).¹²³⁹ Inspired by these two parallels, the first readers of the Gospel, just like the early Church Fathers, probably interpreted the capacity of παροιμία to reveal hidden meanings in terms of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.¹²⁴⁰ Readers of the Gospel who were not familiar with Wisdom literature, also, probably read Jesus’ παροιμίες in a way that is guided by the pre-understanding of figured speech that is reflected in the rhetorical theories of their time.¹²⁴¹ Previous scholarship has already demonstrated that authors of other New Testament texts and Flavius Josephus wrote for audiences (indirectly) influenced by these rhetorical theories of figured speech.¹²⁴² One can, therefore, expect that the Fourth Gospel was also written for an audience influenced (indirectly) by these theories.

¹²³⁸ See Eden, “Hermeneutics”: 85–86.

¹²³⁹ For the argumentation that John probably wrote for an audience acquainted with Wisdom literature, see *supra*, Chapter Eight, §2.1.

¹²⁴⁰ For the early Church Fathers, see *supra*, §1.2.

¹²⁴¹ For the ancient rhetorical theories of figured speech, see *supra*, §2.

¹²⁴² For the New Testament, see Benjamin Fiore, “‘Covert Allusion’ in 1 Corinthians 1–4,” *CBQ* 47 (1985) 85–102; John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence*, SBLDS 99 (Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1988), 119–122; David Hall, “A Disguise for the Wise: μετασχηματισμένος in 1 Corinthians 4.6,” *NTS* 40 (1994) 143–149;

For the first readers of the Gospel, Jesus' παροιμίαι probably had a rhetorical function comparable to what ancient rhetoricians called ἔμφασις.¹²⁴³ Jesus' sayings are called παροιμίαι, because they at first sight are familiar to his listeners/readers. In order that this ordinary language can reveal a hidden God, these listeners/readers have to distance themselves from the 'normal' meanings of this language, e.g., the presentation of Jesus as both the giver of the bread of life and the bread itself (John 6:1–60). Jesus can only be both the lamb (1:29), the shepherd of the sheep (10:1–16), and even the door of the sheep pen through which that same shepherd enters and leads the sheep out to the pasture (10:1–9), if this language is not understood in its ordinary sense.¹²⁴⁴ John's imagery is difficult to classify and analyse, because it seeks to exceed the borders set out by the conventions and standards of language.¹²⁴⁵

James Jaquette, "A Not-So-Noble Death: Figured Speech, Friendship and Suicide in Philippians 1:21–26," *Neot* 28 (1994) 177–192; J. Paul Sampley, "The Weak and the Strong: Paul's Careful and Crafty Strategy in Romans 14:1–15:13," in *The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks*, ed. L. Michael White – O. Larry Yarbrough (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1995), 40–52; Malcolm Heath, "John Chrysostom, Rhetoric and Galatians," *BibInt* 12 (2004) 369–400; Ian H. Henderson, "Reconstructing Mark's Double Audience," in *Between Author and Audience in Mark: Narration, Characterization, Interpretation*, ed. Elisabeth Struthers Malbon, New Testament Monographs 23 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2009), 6–28; Corin Mihaila, *The Paul-Apollos Relationship and Paul's Stance Toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric: An Exegetical and Socio-Historical Study of 1 Corinthians 1–4*, LNTS 402 (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 61–65, 203–212; Jason A. Whitlark, "'Here We Do Not Have a City That Remains': A Figured Critique of Roman Imperial Propaganda in Hebrews 13:14," *JBL* 131/1 (2012) 161–179; Jason A. Whitlark, *Resisting Empire: Rethinking the Purpose of the Letter to "the Hebrews"*, LNTS 484 (London: T&T Clark, 2014); Justin R. Howell, *The Pharisees and Figured Speech in Luke-Acts*, WUNT II/456 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017); Drew J. Strait, *Hidden Criticism of the Angry Tyrant in Early Judaism and the Acts of the Apostles* (Lanham MD: Lexington/Fortress Academic, 2018).

For Josephus, see Steve Mason, "Figured Speech and Irony in T. Flavius Josephus 1," in *Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome*, ed. J.C. Edmondson – Steve Mason – James B. Rives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 243–288. Other studies, too, have demonstrated the enormous influence of the ancient rhetorical theories of figured speech on ancient authors and readers. For Heliodorus of Emesa, see John R. Morgan, "Un discours figuré chez Héliodore: 'Comment, en disant l'inverse de ce qu'on veut, on peut accomplir ce qu'on veut sans sembler dire l'inverse de ce qu'on veut'," in *Discours et débats dans l'ancien roman: Actes du Colloque de Tours, 21–23 octobre 2004*, ed. Bernard Pouderon – Jocelyne Peigney, Collection de la Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée 36 Série littéraire et philosophique 10 (Lyon: Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2006), 51–62. For Isocrates, see Pierre Chiron, "Le Panathénaique d'Isocrate et la doctrine rhétorique du discours figuré," in *Isocrate: Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques. Colloque de Lyon 5–7 juin 2013*, ed. Christian Bouchet – Pascale Giovannelli-Jouanna, CEROR 47 (Lyon: CEROR, 2015), 59–69. For a general discussion of the use of figured speech by the authors of the so-called Second Sophistic in the first until the third century CE, see Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic, Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics* 35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 57–73.

¹²⁴³ For my discussion of ἔμφασις, which was identified to figured speech by Quintilian, see *supra*, §2.

¹²⁴⁴ On the confusing and contradictory nature of Johannine παροιμίαι, see Zimmermann, "Imagery in John".

¹²⁴⁵ The categories of similitude or comparison, parable proper, and example story, which are used to classify the parables of the Synoptic Jesus, cannot be used to analyse and classify the imagery of the Johannine Jesus: see Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, vol. 1, 115.

According to Harold Attridge, the Fourth Gospel is filled with indirect and veiled language. In the Gospel, the way to liberating knowledge is a process that “involves encounters with what is not known or cannot be known in a simple way”, e.g., “the gospel’s ‘riddles’, provocative statements in Jesus’ conversation, elements of Johannine characterisation, tensions or apparent contradictions in the conceptual affirmations of the text”.¹²⁴⁶ Attridge argues that John adopts the same strategy of confronting his readers with the unknown in his presentation of the identity of the Beloved Disciple, the σημεῖα of Jesus, and Jesus’ origin. The first step on the path to knowledge is knowing what you do not know.¹²⁴⁷ Building on the insights of Attridge, I note that the important role of the unknown in Johannine epistemology probably triggered the first readers of the Gospel to read Johannine παροιμίας as figured speech that reveals a hidden meaning through ἔμφασις. The close association of ἔμφασις with the concept of ὑπόνοια in ancient rhetorical theory strengthens my view that Johannine παροιμίας call on the reader’s or listener’s ability to guess at the hidden meaning of these sayings. Just as ὑπόνοια intentionally conceal the intention of the author through the use of ambiguity, Johannine παροιμίας conceal the intention of the author and are intentionally obscure through the use of ambiguity leaving room for the reader/hearer to guess at their hidden meaning.¹²⁴⁸

Directly or indirectly influenced by the rhetorical theories of their time, the first readers of John’s Gospel probably considered παροιμία to be figured language that allows one to speak openly when one is in danger. The Johannine Jesus can speak παρρησία about his messianic identity against the ‘Jews’ (John 10:24–25; 18:20), although he does not have the required safety to do so because the ‘Jews’ seek to kill him (e.g., 7:1; 10:31). The people at the feast of Tabernacles did not dare to speak παρρησία about Jesus due to fear of the ‘Jews’ (7:13). Jesus, on the other hand, can speak παρρησία about his identity against the ‘Jews’, because he speaks παρρησία through παροιμίας (10:6; 16:25). Jesus can openly criticise the ‘Jews’, and at the same time warrant his safety because his παροιμίας confront his hearers with words that can be explained in more than one way. The ambiguity of Jesus’ language provides the necessary safety for Jesus to use παρρησία. This enables Jesus to reveal himself and to prevent his enemies from harming him. Just as Plutarch describes that prophets in former days proclaimed the messages of the oracle to powerful states and individuals in veiled speech, Jesus mitigates his παρρησία by παροιμίας and adjusts himself to the psychological disposition of his addressees and the amount of criticism they can accommodate.¹²⁴⁹ This is also the reason why Jesus has taught the disciples ἐν παροιμίας (16:25). The disciples cannot bear too much criticism (16:12).

¹²⁴⁶ Harold W. Attridge, “Ambiguous Signs, an Anonymous Character, Unanswerable Riddles: The Role of the Unknown in Johannine Epistemology,” *NTS* 65 (2019) 267–288: at 268–269. See, also, the scholarly literature mentioned by Attridge.

¹²⁴⁷ See Attridge, “Ambiguous Signs”: 269–288.

¹²⁴⁸ On ὑπόνοια in the ancient rhetorical discussions of figured speech, see the ancient sources and modern studies mentioned under n. 1146. See, also, our discussion of ὑπόνοια *supra*, §3.2.

¹²⁴⁹ For my discussion of Plutarch, see *supra*, §3.2.

I will further illustrate this use of figured speech (viz., παροιμία) by Jesus in John 7:32–36 (see 4.1) and John 10:1–6 (see 4.2).

4.1 JOHN 7:32–36¹²⁵⁰

John 7:32 mentions that officers were sent to arrest Jesus because the crowd started to believe in Jesus (7:31). Jesus was, thus, certainly in danger and could not use παρρησία in the same way as the Jerusalemites perceive in 7:26. He, therefore (οὖν),¹²⁵¹ adapts his strategy and speaks παρρησία through the παροιμία saying ἔτι χρόνον μικρὸν μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι καὶ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με. ζητήσετέ με καὶ οὐχ εὐρήσετε [με], καὶ ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν (7:33–34). Through this figured saying Jesus can openly speak about his messianic identity and criticise the messianic understanding of the ‘Jews’, while at the same time warranting his safety because his saying can be understood and explained in a different way.

The ambiguity of ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν (John 7:34c–d) allows Jesus to openly express his messianic identity as the one who is going to the Father and be critical of the unbelief of the ‘Jews’. Jesus’ παρρησία is corrective to the messianic expectations of the ‘Jews’. Like the crowd in 12:34, the ‘Jews’ are probably informed by the law that the Messiah will remain with them forever. Jesus’ claim that he is going to the one who sent him rejects such an understanding of the Messiah. Jesus’ παρρησία is also exhortative, because Jesus is saying, in the paraphrase by Thyen, that “die Zeit für die *Umkehr* seiner Hörer kurz ist, daß die ‘kleine Weile’, in der er noch unter ihnen ist und mit all seinen Gaben gesucht und gefunden werden kann, bald verronnen sein wird” (cf. 12:35; 13:33).¹²⁵² Jesus is exhorting the ‘Jews’ to turn to him fast, because he will not be among them anymore in the near future.

The ambiguity of ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν (John 7:34c–d) at the same time provides Jesus with the possibility to explain his saying in a different way. That this possibility is a reality for Jesus is illustrated by the misunderstanding of the ‘Jews’: ποῦ οὗτος μέλλει πορεύεσθαι ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐχ εὐρήσομεν αὐτόν; μὴ εἰς τὴν διασπορὰν τῶν Ἑλλήνων μέλλει πορεύεσθαι καὶ διδάσκειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας; τίς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὃν εἶπεν· ζητήσετέ με καὶ οὐχ εὐρήσετε [με], καὶ ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν; (7:35–36) The ‘Jews’ understand Jesus as speaking of going to “the Dispersion among the Greeks and teach the Greeks”. The underlying critical meaning of Jesus’ saying remains hidden for the ‘Jews’. Consequently, Jesus openly spoke about his identity without being harmed. Jesus remains safe by using παρρησία through a παροιμία.

¹²⁵⁰ John 7:32–33 was previously discussed as an example of the experimental-stochastic nature of Jesus’ παρρησία: see *supra*, Chapter Six, §3.1. I have argued there that Jesus’ use of παρρησία through a παροιμία in 7:32–33 illustrates how his παρρησία adapts to circumstances in an experimental way. The present subsection will provide an analysis of this strategy against the background of the uses of figured speech depicted in the ancient rhetorical theories of figured speech.

¹²⁵¹ A future systematic study of the use of οὖν in the Fourth Gospel is required to determine the probability that οὖν in John 7:33 is causal.

¹²⁵² Thyen, *Johannes*, 396. Italics in the original.

Although the officers clearly wanted to arrest him, they went back to the Pharisees and chief priests empty handed (7:44–45).

When asked why they did not bring Jesus (John 7:45), the officers give the short reply: οὐδέποτε ἐλάλησεν οὕτως ἄνθρωπος (7:46). According to some scholars, this answer expresses the awe and admiration of the officers for Jesus.¹²⁵³ Other scholars claim that the officers were unable to capture Jesus because of the authority of his words.¹²⁵⁴ In my view, these interpretations are not justified by the text. John 7:44 mentions that some among the crowd wanted (ἤθελον)¹²⁵⁵ to arrest Jesus after having heard Jesus' words. The phrase τινές [...] ἐξ αὐτῶν in 7:44, probably, refers to the officers, who were sent to arrest Jesus (7:32). The officers neither admired nor recognised the authority of Jesus' words. They were not unwilling, but unable to arrest Jesus. This is confirmed by their claim in 7:46, which contains no title that attests that they have faith in Jesus or recognised his authority. The μή in the question by the Pharisees (μή καὶ ὑμεῖς πεπλάνησθε; 7:47) either indicates that a negative answer is expected or that it is a hesitant question like in 4:29. Even if interpreted as a hesitant question, this does not imply that the officers really were led astray by Jesus. The information about the officers up until now in the narrative suggests the opposite. The later characterisation of the officers in 18:23 affirms that they neither admired Jesus nor recognised his authority. One of the officers strikes Jesus and rebukes him that he is disrespectful of the authority of the high priest. The officers recognise the authority of the high priest at the expense of Jesus.

The answer of the officers in John 7:46 clarifies that it is not what Jesus said, but how (cf. οὕτως) he spoke that kept them from arresting him. The reason why they were unable to arrest Jesus is because his παροιμία in 7:33–34 prevented them from doing so. The ambiguity of his language enabled Jesus to use παρρησία openly, but at the same time to remain safe for those who wanted to arrest him. According to 7:30 and 8:20, Jesus can only be arrested at the hour. At the hour, Jesus will no longer speak ἐν παροιμίαις, but will employ a pure form of παρρησία (16:25). The hour presents the time when Jesus' enemies will no longer be prevented from arresting him.

4.2 JOHN 10:1–6

In order to understand Jesus' use of παρρησία by means of παροιμία in John 10:1–5, I will provide a brief comparison with how Dio Chrysostom presents Diogenes as adapting his παρρησία to the mindset of Alexander the Great. In his fourth oration on

¹²⁵³ See, e.g., George R. Beasley-Murray, *John*, WBC 36 (Waco TX: Word Books, 1987), 119; Gary T. Manning, "The Temple Police: Double Agents," in *Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, 388–396, at 389–390.

¹²⁵⁴ See, e.g., Bultmann, *Johannes*, 234; Barrett, *John*, 331; Schnackenburg, *Johannes*, vol. 2, 221; Zumstein, *Jean (1–12)*, 273.

¹²⁵⁵ The one occurrence of βούλομαι in the Fourth Gospel (viz., John 18:39) does not suggest that there is a distinction in meaning between θέλω and βούλομαι in the Gospel. According to Bauer, *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch*, 289 and the literature mentioned there, there is no difference in meaning between βούλομαι and θέλω in the NT.

kingship, Dio narrates the legendary meeting of the Cynic Diogenes with King Alexander. Dio, probably, delivered the oration to the Roman emperor, Trajan, at the beginning of the second century CE.¹²⁵⁶ The topic of the oration is what constitutes real kingship. Diogenes functions as the mouthpiece of Dio's views on kingship.

Valéry Laurand has correctly noted that the *παρρησία* of Dio's Diogenes is not the short and blunt Cynical *παρρησία* that seeks to injure and provoke, but has a technical meaning in as far as it adapts itself to Alexander's state of mind.¹²⁵⁷ Alexander wonders which divinity (*δαίμων*) it is that makes Diogenes king, and which sacrifices or purifications he himself has to perform to obtain this kingship.¹²⁵⁸ When Diogenes realises that Alexander misunderstands him in this way, he hopes to move Alexander away from his pride and thirst for glory by adapting his *παρρησία* to Alexander's state of mind. Alexander is not capable of hearing the truth, because he is not initiated into the truth and is used to hearing the flattery of Sophists.¹²⁵⁹ Diogenes is aware that his *παρρησία* up until now in the narrative has been ineffective. He tries to win Alexander's favour by not telling the blunt truth, but a non-offensive story:

[...] οὐκ εἰσὶν ἔξωθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ δαίμονες, οἱ τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας φέροντες αὐτοῖς, ὁ δὲ ἴδιος ἐκάστου νοῦς, οὗτός ἐστι δαίμων τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀνδρός, ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμων, πονηρὸς δὲ ὁ τοῦ πονηροῦ, ὡσαύτως δὲ ἐλεύθερος μὲν ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, δοῦλος δὲ ὁ τοῦ δούλου, καὶ βασιλικὸς μὲν ὁ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ καὶ μεγαλόφρονος, ταπεινὸς δὲ ὁ τοῦ ταπεινοῦ καὶ ἀγεννοῦς.¹²⁶⁰

[...] the good and the bad divinities who bring happiness and misery are not outside human beings. The mind of each human being, this is the divinity of each human individual. The divinity of the wise and good individual is good, the one of the evil individual evil. Likewise, the one of the free individual is free, the one of the slave slavish. The one of the kingly and high-minded individual is kingly, the one of the abject and base individual is abject.¹²⁶¹

By means of this story Diogenes does not bluntly criticise Alexander for being a fake king and a slave to his passions and fears, but instructs him about kingship in a way that Alexander can grasp; although Alexander, ultimately, remains blind for the veiled criticism of the story that he himself is guided by a bad *δαίμων* in his passion for kingship.

¹²⁵⁶ John Moles, "The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom," *ClAnt* 2/2 (1983) 251–278 dates *Oratio* 4 to 100 CE on the birthday of Trajan (September 18).

¹²⁵⁷ See Valéry Laurand, "La ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ: apprendre à dire vrai. Une lecture de Dion Chrysostome, *Sur la royauté*," in *Transmettre les savoirs dans les mondes hellénistique et romain*, ed. Frédéric le Blay, Collection « Histoire » (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 309–322, at 316–322 with reference to D. Chr., *Or.* 4.76–79.

¹²⁵⁸ See D. Chr., *Or.* 4.76.

¹²⁵⁹ See D. Chr., *Or.* 4.77–79.

¹²⁶⁰ D. Chr., *Or.* 4.79–80. The story about the different *δαίμονες* goes on until the end of Dio's fourth discourse in 4.139.

¹²⁶¹ Adjusted LCL translation.

The *παρρησία* of Dio's Diogenes is similar to Jesus' *παρρησία* in terms of its adaptability. As discussed in previous chapters, Jesus' *παρρησία* can be blunt and hurtful, but is, also, mixed with praise and is veiled by *παροιμία*.¹²⁶² Similarly, Dio's Diogenes adjusts to Alexander's capacity to accommodate criticism by employing *παρρησία* through a story. Compare, for instance, the rhetorical function of the *παροιμία* in John 10:1–5 to the story of Diogenes. The Pharisees were unable to accept the criticism that they are among the blind who cannot perceive Jesus' messianic identity, while the man born blind can see thanks to his faith in Jesus (9:39–41). Jesus adjusts his strategy by employing the *παροιμία* of 10:1–5. Just as the story of Diogenes does not explicitly criticise Alexander for being led by a bad δαίμων, who inhibits him to be the true king, Jesus' *παροιμία* does not explicitly criticise the Pharisees for being thieves and robbers, who cannot properly lead the sheep fold.

Alexander is shown to be incapable of accepting such criticism, even if it is veiled by a story. Similarly, the Pharisees cannot accommodate Jesus' *παροιμία* and its veiled criticism that they do not properly fulfil their leadership role (John 10:6). I agree with Thyen that 10:6 does not indicate that the Pharisees did not understand what is said in 10:1–5. The language used in 10:1–5 is familiar biblical language (see, e.g., Psalm 23), so that it is impossible that the Pharisees did not understand its propositional content. According to Thyen, τίνα ἦν ἃ ἐλάλει in 10:6 does not refer to the propositional content of what is said in 10:1–5, but to what this language does as a speech act, viz. offering a mirror for the Pharisees in which they have to identify their loveless treatment of the man born blind with the behaviour of the thieves and robbers.¹²⁶³ Endorsing this interpretation of τίνα ἦν ἃ ἐλάλει in 10:6, I note that the first readers of the Gospel probably considered the Pharisees as having failed to understand the ἔμφασις of Jesus' *παροιμία* that invited them to view their own behaviour in terms of the thief/robber who mistreats the sheep. Jesus, on the other hand, is identified with the Good Shepherd, who lays down his life for his sheep (10:11). Through his death on the cross, Jesus reveals himself to be the proper leader or king of the 'Jews' (18:36–37; 19:19). The difference between Jesus' *παροιμία* and Diogenes' story is that, unlike Alexander, the Pharisees are not presented as fake leaders/kings because they are enslaved by their passions and fears and cannot reduce their life to simplicity, but because they are sinful (9:41) and do not live according to God's commandment of love.

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION ON THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SITUATION OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

I conclude the present chapter by summarising that the first readers of the Fourth Gospel were probably influenced (indirectly) by the contemporary rhetorical theories of figured speech. Consequently, they interpreted *παροιμία* as a form of figured speech that indirectly, or in a veiled way, revealed the truth (or Jesus, John 14:6). In its basic meaning

¹²⁶² See *supra*, Chapter Three and Chapter Seven, §3.1 and §3.2.

¹²⁶³ See Thyen, *Johannes*, 476.

of saying one thing to mean another, παροιμία intentionally obscures the intention of the speaker/writer and requires of the listener/reader to look for hidden meanings. Jesus' sayings as παροιμιαί evoke a plurality of meanings depending on the creativity of the listeners/readers. One can speak of a collaboration of speaker/writer and listener/reader to generate new meanings. The main motive of παροιμία in the Gospel is circumspection (or ἀσφάλεια). Jesus speaks ἐν παροιμαίαις to prevent him from being harmed, and to adapt himself to the ability of his audience to accommodate criticism.

Characteristic of John in comparison to the rhetorical theories of figured speech in the 1st century BCE – 3rd century CE, is that he does not juxtapose παρρησία to figured speech. We have seen that these rhetorical theories define figured speech in juxtaposition to παρρησία, although they often do not think there is an opposition between παρρησία and figured speech, because they consider both to be figured. John seems to agree that both παρρησία and figured speech are figured when he presents Jesus as teaching παρρησία through παροιμιαί. Both are reconcilable with one another. This is paralleled by how Plutarch speaks of a former time when it was the custom of using παρρησία through παροιμιαί and myths. Not only John's presentation of Jesus, but also Dio's presentation of Diogenes shows that this particular use of παρρησία was still in practice at the end of the first century CE and the beginning of the second century CE. For John, truth (or Jesus) can only be revealed in an indirect or veiled way, because the revelation of truth through παρρησία entails being critical of the presuppositions of the hearers/readers. Jesus speaks παρρησία through παροιμιαί to guarantee his safety, and to adapt to the ability of his audience to accommodate criticism. Jesus' use of παρρησία through veiled speech illustrates the experimental-stochastic nature of his παρρησία.

With regards to the socio-historical situation of the Fourth Gospel, the present chapter has demonstrated that the view of Meeks *et al.* that Johannine παροιμία is the idiolect of a putative Johannine group/sect needs to be revised.¹²⁶⁴ Unlike these authors claim, Johannine παροιμιαί did not intend to inhibit understanding to those outside the alleged Johannine sect. Influenced by the rhetorical theories of their time, both John and his audience, probably, considered παροιμία to be a form of indirect communication. By presenting Jesus as teaching παρρησία through παροιμιαί, John adopts the view that revelation cannot be direct or plain, but adjusts itself to the ability of its receivers to accommodate criticism. Given that truth and παρρησία are always critical of the presuppositions of the listeners/readers, John mitigates Jesus' παρρησία by παροιμιαί. Just as sun light needs to be deflected to be able to be perceived by human eyes, John thinks that the revelation of God (= subjective and objective genitive) requires mediation and indirect signification to be accessible for human minds. John, thus, opted for παροιμία with the intent to convince those who would definitely not be convinced if addressed in a direct way. With other words, John anticipated that his audience would violently resist

¹²⁶⁴ For a critical evaluation of this interpretation of Johannine παροιμία by Meeks *et al.*, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §1.4.

his παρρησία (= the παρρησία of the Johannine Jesus).¹²⁶⁵ Therefore, he chose to express his παρρησία through παροιμία (= the παροιμία of the Johannine Jesus). Through the concept of παροιμία John affirms the capacity of Jesus' words to engender new interpretations through the ages among people of different social, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds. Unlike Meeks *et al.* claim, John did not opt for the genre of παροιμία to enforce the social identity of a putative Johannine group, and to justify this group's presupposed isolation from the larger society, but to start a movement of Jesus followers on a grand scale. By proclaiming Jesus as the one who spoke παρρησίᾳ to the world through παροιμία, John intended to instigate a world movement instead of a sect.

¹²⁶⁵ For the view that the Fourth Gospel is itself an act of παρρησία, see *supra*, Chapter Six, Seven, and Eight, under "Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Gospel as an Act of παρρησία".

CHAPTER XII.

A HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN JOHN TO παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK THROUGH THE LENS OF THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH

The aim of the present chapter is to provide a historical-contextual comparison of the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία to the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία.¹²⁶⁶ To provide this comparison, I will, first, critically evaluate the previous scholarly literature on παρρησία in Mark 8:32a with special attention to the question of how to understand the term in relationship to παραβολή (Section 1). Second, I will provide a historical-contextual study of Mark's use of παραβολή and παρρησία against the background of the ancient rhetorical understanding of figured speech (Section 2). In the previous chapter, I have conducted a similar study for John's use of παροιμία and παρρησία.¹²⁶⁷ Taking into consideration the research results of these two studies, I will in a third step compare the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία to the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία. Through the lens of ancient rhetorical theory, this last section will additionally contextualise John's and Mark's use of different terms, respectively παροιμία and παραβολή, to refer to the figured language of Jesus (Section 3).

1. EVALUATIVE STATUS *QUAESTIONIS* ON παρρησία (MARK 8:32A)

Two questions have been raised in the scholarly discussion on παρρησία in Mark 8:32a: (i) the question of the opposite term of παρρησία (1.1); and (ii) the question whether παρρησία refers to univocal language (1.2).

1.1 THE OPPOSITE TERM OF παρρησία?

Previous scholarly literature has interpreted the meaning of παρρησία in Mark 8:32a in two ways depending on which term they consider to be the opposite term of παρρησία:

(i) Many scholars consider παρρησία in Mark 8:32a to be the opposite term of παραβολή. The 'outsiders' only receive Jesus' teaching ἐν παραβολαῖς (4:11–12, 33–34a), whereas the disciples additionally receive the explanation (4:34b), which is spoken "openly" or "plainly" (παρρησία, 8:32a).¹²⁶⁸ According to Jonathan Bishop, the use of

¹²⁶⁶ *Supra*, Chapter Two, §1.1 and §5.3, I have formulated this research aim in dialogue with scholarly literature.

¹²⁶⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §2 and §4.

¹²⁶⁸ For commentaries, see, e.g., Eduard Schweizer, *Das Evangelium nach Markus*, NTD 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 93; Joachim Gnllka, *Das Evangelium nach Markus (Mk 8,27–16,20)*, EKK II/2 (Zürich: Benziger, 1979), 16; Dieter Lührmann, *Das Markusevangelium*, HNT 3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 150; Craig A. Evans, *Mark 8:27–16:20*, WBC 34B (Nashville TN: Nelson, 2001), 18; Ben Witherington III, *The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids MI:

παρρησία in 8:32a introduces “a contrast between two modes of discourse”. The one mode of discourse presents “the divine mystery” ἐν παραβολαῖς, “the other explicates the apparently contradictory human consequences” παρρησία, “or as near that as possible, since ‘cross,’ ‘follow,’ and ‘life’ continue to quiver metaphorically”. “[T]he combination of parable and explanation” provided Mark with “a model for the rhetorical pattern” that can also be found “in other contexts, most explicitly at” 4:10–12, 33–34; 7:17; 9:11, 28; 10:10; 12:12.¹²⁶⁹ Bishop calls this “the *parabole/parrhesia* structure”.¹²⁷⁰ He is of the opinion that this structure presents Mark not as a prophet, but as a teacher, who explains.¹²⁷¹

(ii) In the second interpretation of παρρησία in Mark 8:32a, the term has the meaning “in public”. Vittorio Fusco has criticised the view that παρρησία is the opposite term of παραβολή in Mark. In his view, ἐν παραβολαῖς is opposed to “explication” (cf. ἐπέλυσεν) in Mark 4:33–34. Mark comments there that Jesus tells every parable in combination with an explanation for the disciples. Fusco considers the possibility that παρρησία is opposed to the secrecy that Jesus requires of his disciples concerning his messianic identity (8:29–30).¹²⁷² R.T. France speaks of a contrast of παρρησία with “the secrecy of v. 30” that “shows that the disgrace involved in rejection and execution (8:31) is not a matter for embarrassment or concealment”.¹²⁷³ In both the interpretations of Fusco and France, παρρησία has the connotation of “publicly”. Eugene Boring observes that this interpretation “clashes with the private scene of Jesus with his disciples”. Despite this observation, Boring claims that παρρησία is presenting Jesus “as a model of those who forthrightly testify to the Christian faith in public rather than ‘being ashamed’ (see 8:38)”.¹²⁷⁴ Joel Marcus similarly comments that παρρησία means “publicly”, but observes that the three passion predictions “are delivered only to Jesus’ followers” (8:31; 9:30; 10:32).¹²⁷⁵ Walter Grundmann speaks of the “Rätsel” of the use of παρρησία in 8:32a: the

Eerdmans, 2001), 243; John R. Donahue – Daniel J. Harrington, *The Gospel of Mark*, SP 2 (Collegeville MN: The Liturgical Press, 2002), 262; Camille Focant, *L'évangile selon Marc*, Commentaire biblique: Nouveau Testament 2 (Paris: Cerf, 2004), 322, 324; Peter Dschulnigg, *Das Markusevangelium*, Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament 2 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), 235; Joel Marcus, *Mark 8–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 27A (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 606; D. Benoît Standaert, *Évangile selon Marc: Commentaire - Deuxième partie Marc 6,14 à 10,52*, EBib 61 (Pendé: Gabalda, 2010), 620. For articles, see, e.g., Bieringer, “Open, vrijmoedig, onverschrokken,” 219; Adela Yarbro Collins, “The Discourse in Parables in Mark 4,” in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 521–538, at 532.

¹²⁶⁹ Jonathan Bishop, “Parabole and Parrhesia in Mark,” *Int* 40/1 (1986) 39–52: at 40.

¹²⁷⁰ Bishop, “Parabole and Parrhesia”: 41.

¹²⁷¹ See Bishop, “Parabole and Parrhesia”: 42.

¹²⁷² See Vittorio Fusco, “L’économie de la Révélation dans l’ évangile de Marc,” *NRTh* 104 (1982) 532–554: at 551–552.

¹²⁷³ R.T. France, *The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 337.

¹²⁷⁴ M. Eugene Boring, *Mark: A Commentary*, NTL (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 241.

¹²⁷⁵ Marcus, *Mark 8–16*, 606.

latter term normally refers to “Öffentlichkeit”, yet Jesus is teaching “im engsten Jüngerkreis”.¹²⁷⁶

Concerning interpretation (i), I remark that Mark does not directly connect his sole use of the word *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a to his multiple use of *παραβολή*. The use of *κατ’ ἰδίαν* and *λαλέω* + *τὸν λόγον* in 4:33–34 suggests that *παρρησία* in 8:32a is indirectly juxtaposed to *ἐν παραβολαῖς*. First, the phrase *κατ’ ἰδίαν* indicates that the disciples will receive the explanations of the parables in private. Jesus’ passion prediction in 8:31 is, also, expressed in private to the disciples and can, therefore, be characterised as being spoken *κατ’ ἰδίαν*. Second, the combination of *λαλέω* with *τὸν λόγον* is complemented by *τοιαύταις παραβολαῖς πολλαῖς* in 4:33, while it is supplemented by *παρρησία* in 8:32a.¹²⁷⁷ This suggests that *ἐν παραβολαῖς* and *παρρησία* are two contrastive modes of speaking the word.

Given that *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a is (indirectly) juxtaposed to *ἐν παραβολαῖς*, I agree with Bishop that the *παραβολή/παρρησία* structure is a model for how Mark presents Jesus’ teaching as consisting of parables and supplementary explanatory discourse. I will briefly discuss the examples of the *παραβολή/παρρησία* structure provided by Bishop. In Mark 4:10–12, 33–34; 7:17, the disciples are presented as asking questions about the parables and as receiving a private explanation. Here, the *παραβολή/παρρησία* structure is implicitly present. In 9:11, the subject of the disciples’ questions is a statement of the scribes. In 9:28, the subject of the disciples’ questions is equally not a parable, but the question why they could not cast out a demon. In 10:10, the disciples ask Jesus about his teaching about divorce (10:5–9). In these latter examples, there is no mention of a parable. Hence, the *παραβολή/παρρησία* structure is absent. In 12:12, the religious leaders are presented as understanding that Jesus spoke the parable against them. It is not clear to me how Jesus is assumed to provide an explanation of his parable to the religious leaders in Mark 12:12. I conclude that only some of Bishop’s examples (4:10–12, 33–34; 7:17) provide evidence of the presence of the *παραβολή/παρρησία* structure in Mark’s Gospel.

I further observe that the passion prediction of Mark 8:31 has a parabolic counterpart in Mark 12:10: *λίθον ὃν ἀπεδοκίμασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες, οὗτος ἐγενήθη εἰς κεφαλὴν γωνίας*. As noted by Adela Yarbro Collins, *ἀποδοκίμαζω* creates a “textual link” with the only other occurrence of the verb in Mark, i.e., in 8:31: “the stone that the builders rejected (*ἀποδοκιμάζειν*) is Jesus, the Son of Man, who must be rejected (*ἀποδοκιμάζειν*) by the elders, chief priests, and scribes”. Yarbro Collins also observes that the imagery of building in 12:10 “may be significant”, as “[t]he implication may be that, with the resurrection of Jesus, God will begin to build a living temple that will consist of the

¹²⁷⁶ Walter Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Markus*, THKNT 2 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1980), 170.

¹²⁷⁷ The combination of *λαλέω* + *τὸν λόγον* also occurs in Mark 2:2 with Jesus being the speaker. Here, no prepositional phrase is supplemented.

communities founded in Jesus' name."¹²⁷⁸ In agreement with her observation, I remark that this implication also resonates with 8:31, where it is said that Jesus will rise again after three days. In sum, the parable in 12:10 is indirectly formulating what Jesus said in a direct way in 8:31. The same Christological message is communicated in two different ways: in a parabolic and veiled way to the religious leaders in 12:10 and in a direct and plain way to the disciples in 8:31.

Interpretation (i) of *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a does not necessarily exclude interpretation (ii): *παρρησία* can mean both "plainly" and "publicly". However, I disagree with Fusco and France that *παρρησία* obtains the meaning of "publicly" through the alleged contrast with the secrecy that Jesus requires of his disciples in 8:30. The disciples are charged to tell no one else about Jesus' identity as the Christ. The information about Jesus' identity has to stay within the group of the disciples. Similarly, Jesus' *παρρησία* is only directed to the inner group of the disciples. Therefore, in terms of their public character, there is no contrast between Jesus' *παρρησία* and the secrecy that Jesus demands from the disciples. With Robyn Whitaker, I claim that Jesus' *παρρησία* is instead contrasted with how Peter takes Jesus aside (*προσλαμβάνω*) to rebuke him (Mark 8:32b–d).¹²⁷⁹ According to Whitaker, *παρρησία* in 8:32a "portrays Jesus behaving in a manner befitting a teacher who is correcting a disciple". Philodemus' *Περὶ παρρησίας* suggests that *παρρησία* "is a term of friendship and moral reform": "[a] true friend or philosophical teacher does not flatter but speaks frankly when the need to admonish occurs."¹²⁸⁰ I observe that Jesus, like the Epicurean teacher, uses *παρρησία* publicly in front of the other group members. Just like in the case of the Epicurean teacher, the public character of Jesus' *παρρησία* is limited to the sphere of his students.¹²⁸¹ Jesus' *παρρησία* can, therefore, be said to have a limited public character in contrast with how Peter takes Jesus aside to rebuke him. At the same time, *παρρησία* is also, as argued above, indirectly juxtaposed to *ἐν παραβολαῖς*.

1.2 Παρρησία AS UNIVOCAL LANGUAGE?

There is disagreement among scholars about how to understand the clarity of speech to which *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a refers. The majority of scholars claims or assumes that *παρρησία* refers to the univocality of Jesus' passion prediction in 8:31 in opposition to the equivocality of Jesus' parables.¹²⁸² William Lane comments that "Peter's reaction [8:32b–d, T.T.] shows that it was impossible to miss what Jesus intended to say, even

¹²⁷⁸ Adela Yarbro Collins, *Mark: A Commentary*, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 2007), 548.

¹²⁷⁹ See Robyn Whitaker, "Rebuke or Recall? Rethinking the Role of Peter in Mark's Gospel," *CBQ* 75 (2013) 666–682: at 671.

¹²⁸⁰ Whitaker, "Rebuke or Recall?": 672.

¹²⁸¹ See Phld., *Lib. fr.* 40 and my discussion of this text *supra*, Chapter Ten, §2.1.

¹²⁸² See the commentaries and articles mentioned *supra*, n. 1268.

though the divine necessity for his suffering appeared inconceivable.”¹²⁸³ Benoît Standaert similarly claims that *παρρησία* indicates that 8:31 is “un énoncé crûment réaliste”. Even the expression ‘Son of Man’ is not “cryptique ou énigmatique”.¹²⁸⁴ George Aichele, on the other hand, opines that Peter’s reaction in 8:32b–d reveals that Jesus’ *παρρησία* remains parabolic to the disciples. The naturalness of Jesus’ saying in 8:31 is “an elaborate set of metaphysical and theological conventions which enable the reader to encounter this narrative as though it were transparent”. The reader is presented as “an insider, aware of the saying’s connotations”, while the disciples are outsiders for whom Jesus can only parabolically be the Son of Man.¹²⁸⁵

I agree with Aichele that *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a presents Jesus’ passion prediction in 8:31 as transparent to the informed reader of the Gospel, but not to the disciples. Peter does not perceive Jesus’ language as univocal. Jesus’ use of *παρρησία* shows that his messiahship is not so much secret as mysterious for the disciples. Whereas a secret implies that it can be known, a mystery is inherently inaccessible to cognition. Peter’s inability to accept Jesus’ messianic identity presents him as one of the ‘outsiders’ who can see and hear, but not understand Jesus’ language in the sense of being able to accept what is said (cf. Mark 4:12). Jesus’ *παρρησία*, thus, has the same effect as his parabolic language and cannot be distinguished from the parables by the ‘outsiders’. For Peter, Jesus’ first passion prediction (8:31) is parabolic. The second and the third passion prediction by Jesus are, also, misunderstood by the disciples (9:32; 10:35–37).¹²⁸⁶

The present section (1) has argued that *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a is contrasted with both the parable teaching of Jesus (4:11–12, 33–34a) and Peter’s taking Jesus aside (8:32b–d). The term refers to both the ‘plain’ and the public character of Jesus’ self-identification in 8:31, although with two qualifications: (i) Jesus’ self-depiction is not perceived as univocal by the disciples for whom Jesus’ messianic identity remains a mystery (8:32b–d; 9:32; 10:35–37); and (ii) the public character of Jesus’ *παρρησία* is limited to the open correction of the disciples. Others do not hear Jesus’ *παρρησία*. The next section will interpret the above-mentioned juxtaposition of *παρρησία* to *παραβολή* in Mark through the lens of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

2. Παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK AND THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH

The question of the historical origin of the Markan use of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* has not yet been addressed by scholarly literature. Yarbrow Collins mentions three parallels for the juxtaposition of *παραβολή* to *παρρησία* in Mark: (i) Artemidorus Daldianus,

¹²⁸³ William L. Lane, *The Gospel According to Mark: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition and Notes*, NICNT (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 303.

¹²⁸⁴ Standaert, *Marc: 6, 14 à 10, 52*, 620.

¹²⁸⁵ George Aichele, “Jesus’ Frankness,” *Semeia* 69–70 (1995) 261–280: at 273.

¹²⁸⁶ Cf. J. Coutts, “The Messianic Secret in St. John’s Gospel,” in *SE III*, TU 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964), 45–57, at 54, who emphasises the misunderstanding of the disciples in spite of the clarity of the three passion predictions.

Onirotica 4.71, where ἀπλῶς λέγουσι is contrasted with αἰνίσσονται (“they speak in riddles”); (ii) John 16:25, where ἐν παροιμίαις is contrasted with παρρησία; and (iii) Epistle to Diognetus 11.2, where παρρησία leads to knowledge of the mysteries. Yarbrow Collins is aware that all these sources are later than Mark and that the second and the third source are possibly influenced by his use of παρρησία and παραβολή.¹²⁸⁷ I consider all three sources as not useful to explain the historical origin of the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία. The present section will examine whether Mark’s use of these two terms can be explained with reference to the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

It is probable that the first readers of Mark interpreted παραβολή and παρρησία in terms of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. I agree with Ian Henderson that Mark’s idea of leadership as “self-sacrificial” and “voluntarily servile” could not have been communicated in a direct way to Mark’s audience, but required figured speech. This idea of leadership made “the boundary between slave and free ambiguous”.¹²⁸⁸ Due to the criticism this idea implied to the leaders/rulers of contemporary societies, Greco-Roman readers would have expected Mark to formulate his thoughts on leadership in parabolic and ironic figuration. Henderson discusses key Markan audience references in Mark 4:1–25; 9:42–50; 13:14; 14:6–9 that signal the figured character of Jesus’ speech.¹²⁸⁹ Reader signals like ὁ ἀναγινώσκων νοεῖτω in Mark 13:14 give the impression that Jesus’ speech in Mark 13 is “a schematized address to the projected historical audience of the book”.¹²⁹⁰ Another scholar who has observed the presence of figured speech in Mark’s Gospel is Esther Miquel. According to Miquel, the intentional concealment by parables (Mark 4:11–12) indicates that parables do not amend ideas, “but transmit them in a careful way”. Parables are a “disguising strategy of communication”. A direct communication of the ideas present in 4:1–34 would have been “politically dangerous in the situation of domination that characterised all societies under the Roman Imperial rule”.¹²⁹¹ Miquel agrees with Joachim Jeremias that Jesus’ parables in 4:3–9, 26–29, 30–32 “were indeed meant to proclaim that, despite its opposing enemies, its humble beginning and its hidden and painful progress, the triumphant revelation of God’s kingdom was absolutely warranted”.¹²⁹² The ambiguity of these parables disguises this politically dangerous message.

Inspired by the insights provided by Henderson and Miquel, I suggest to read Mark’s use of παραβολή and παρρησία in terms of how ancient rhetorical theory conceived of the relationship between figured speech and παρρησία. I will, first, compare Mark’s genre

¹²⁸⁷ See Yarbrow Collins, *Mark*, 406.

¹²⁸⁸ Henderson, “Reconstructing Mark’s Double Audience,” 15.

¹²⁸⁹ See Henderson, “Reconstructing Mark’s Double Audience,” 15–21.

¹²⁹⁰ Henderson, “Reconstructing Mark’s Double Audience,” 16.

¹²⁹¹ Esther Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse as an Instance of Resistance Language,” in *Reading the Gospel of Mark in the Twenty-First Century: Method and Meaning*, ed. Geert Van Oyen, BETL 301 (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), 665–677, at 676–677. I will further discuss her interpretation of figured speech in Mark 4:1–34 below under §2.2.1.

¹²⁹² Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 673.

consciousness of παραβολή to Demetrius' definition of figured speech (2.1). Second, I will compare the Markan Jesus' use of parables with the different uses of figured speech mentioned by ancient rhetoricians (2.2).

2.1 MARKAN PARABLE THEORY AND DEMETRIUS' DEFINITION OF FIGURED SPEECH

Demetrius defined "the figured" (τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον) as the middle course between "flattery" (cf. κολακεύειν) and "open criticism" (cf. ἐπιτιμᾶν).¹²⁹³ Figured language may not be equated with the distorting language of the flatterer nor with the plain language of the adverse critic. Figured language is not opposed to plain language, but is the middle course between the distorting language of flattery and the plain language of παρρησία. Figured language entails concealment through ambiguity, yet those who pay attention and scrutinise the language are able to perceive what is said. Figured language, paradoxically, establishes communication through concealment. The difference with direct or plain language is that the harshness of the latter is mitigated in figured language. Figured language can be interpreted in multiple ways. This makes it easier for opponents to accept a figured saying than a direct or plain saying.¹²⁹⁴

The paradox of simultaneous concealment and revelation is not only a feature of figured language, but also of the parabolic language of the Markan Jesus. According to Mark 4:11–12, 21–22, concealment and revelation are simultaneously involved in Jesus' teaching ἐν παραβολαῖς. Mark 4:22 notes that revelation takes place through concealment: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κρυπτόν ἐὰν μὴ ἵνα φανερωθῇ, οὐδὲ ἐγένετο ἀπόκρυφον ἀλλ' ἵνα ἔλθῃ εἰς φανερόν.¹²⁹⁵ The ἵνα clauses of 4:22b, d correct 4:10–12, where we read that the aim of the parables is to conceal and to darken the senses of those who hear them. This results in the paradox that parables cloud and deafen, but at the same time operate as instruments of revelation.¹²⁹⁶

Many texts confirm that this paradox is inherent to Mark's understanding of the genre of παραβολή. Those who pay attention can understand the parables (cf. Mark 4:9). The disciples are expected to understand the parables without having received the explanation (4:13). The crowd, too, can understand Jesus' parables, as Jesus is speaking in parables "as they were able to hear it" (4:33). These texts show that parables conceal revelation to both the 'outsiders' and the 'insiders' mentioned in 4:11–12. There is no absolute

¹²⁹³ Demetr., *Eloc.* 294. My translation. See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §2.1, for my discussion of Demetrius' theoretical views on figured speech.

¹²⁹⁴ All these aspects of figured speech have previously been discussed in Chapter Eleven, under §2 and §3.

¹²⁹⁵ Matthew 10:26 and Luke 8:17 avoid this paradoxical combination of revelation and concealment by not using ἵνα: οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν κεκαλυμμένον ὃ οὐκ ἀποκαλυφθήσεται καὶ κρυπτόν ὃ οὐ γνωσθήσεται (Matt 10:26); οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κρυπτόν ὃ οὐ φανερόν γενήσεται οὐδὲ ἀπόκρυφον ὃ οὐ μὴ γνωσθῇ καὶ εἰς φανερόν ἔλθῃ (Luke 8:17).

¹²⁹⁶ On this paradox in Mark, see further Laura C. Sweet, *The Theological Role of Paradox in the Gospel of Mark*, LNTS 492 (London: T&T Clark, 2013), 28–62.

distinction between the two groups. This was already suggested by the vague formulation of the ‘insiders’ as οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν σὺν τοῖς δώδεκα (4:10). The boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is porous.¹²⁹⁷ The aim of the parables is to communicate the mystery of the kingdom of God to those who cannot accept the mystery when formulated directly or plainly. Through parables, Jesus adapts to the ability of his audience to receive the mystery (cf. 4:33). As the disciples’ misunderstanding of the three passion predictions (8:32; 9:32; 10:35–37) shows, direct communication of this mystery is without success even for the hard core of the ‘insiders’ consisting of the disciples. The mystery can only be communicated to the disciples in an indirect way through parables. Jesus’ parabolic speech and his plain speech (cf. *παρρησία*) are not strictly opposed to one another, because they both intend to establish communication. The difference is that parabolic speech is indirect, whereas *παρρησία* is direct.¹²⁹⁸ As a form of figured speech, the ambiguity of parabolic speech takes away the harshness of *παρρησία*.

Without asserting that the Markan *παραβολή* has any equivalent term in ancient rhetorical theory,¹²⁹⁹ I observe that *παραβολή* and other terms denoting figurative comparison are regularly discussed as figures by ancient rhetoricians. My enumeration follows a chronological order as much as possible.¹³⁰⁰ The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* discusses *similitudo* as a figure of thought.¹³⁰¹ Ps.-Longinus does not discuss *παραβολή*

¹²⁹⁷ See also Mark 8:17, where the disciples are characterised as ‘outsiders’. Yarbrow Collins (“The Discourse,” 522) refers to Mark 4:40; 6:51–52; 7:18; 8:17–21 to argue that “the disciples, who have been given the secret of the kingdom of God, show the same lack of understanding as the outsiders”. At the same time, Yarbrow Collins (“The Discourse,” 522) observes that the ‘outsiders’ or “the opponents of Jesus seem to understand Jesus’ speech in parables” in 3:22–27 and 12:12. Sweat (*The Theological Role of Paradox*, 50), additionally, refers to the disciples’ misunderstanding in Mark 4:13; 8:32–33; 9:6, 10, 32; 10:35–38; 14:27–31 to argue that they are presented as ‘outsiders’ according to the Markan parable theory. Poplutz (“*paroimia*,” 117–118) observes that an ‘outsider’ like the Roman centurion under the cross (Mark 15:39) is presented as an ‘insider’. For other textual elements in Mark that attest the porous boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in Mark, see T. Alec Burkill, “The Cryptology of Parables in St. Mark’s Gospel,” *NovT* 1 (1956) 246–262: at 251–252 and Coutts, “The Messianic Secret in St. John’s Gospel,” 56.

¹²⁹⁸ On the idea of Jesus’ parables as indirect prophetic communication, see previously Klyne Snodgrass, “Stories with Prophetic Intent: The Contextualization of Jesus’ Parables,” in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 150–164. The present section provides a historical-contextual reading of this feature of Jesus’ parables in Mark against the background of the ancient rhetorical understanding of figured speech.

¹²⁹⁹ On the dangers of equating the Synoptic *παραβολή* with *παραβολή* and related terms in ancient rhetorical writings, see Ruben Zimmermann, “Jesus’ Parables and Ancient Rhetoric: The Contributions of Aristotle and Quintilian to the Form Criticism of the Parables,” in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 238–258 (= Revised translation of Ruben Zimmermann, “Urchristliche Parabeln im Horizont der antiken Rhetorik: Der Beitrag von Aristoteles und Quintilian zur Formbestimmung der Gleichnisse,” in *Jesus als Bote des Heils: Heilsverkündigung und Heilserfahrung in frühchristlicher Zeit: Detlev Dormeyer zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Linus Hauser – Ferdinand R. Prostmeier – Christa Georg-Zöller, SBB 60 [Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2008], 201–225) and Zimmermann, *Puzzling the Parables of Jesus*, 127–132.

¹³⁰⁰ For a general discussion of *παραβολή* and related terms in ancient rhetoric, see McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories* and Elian Cuvillier, *Le concept de παραβολή dans le second évangile: Son arrière-plan littéraire, sa signification dans le cadre de la rédaction marcienne, son utilisation dans la tradition de Jésus*, EBib NS 19 (Paris: Gabalda, 1993), 21–47.

¹³⁰¹ See Rhet. Her. 4.59–61.

under σχήματα, but under the heading of noble diction. Due to a lacuna, the only thing that we can retrieve is that he writes that παραβολαί “resemble metaphors”.¹³⁰² Metaphors are also discussed under the heading of noble diction.¹³⁰³ Quintilian considers *comparatio* to be a figure of speech, although he admits that it sometimes can be viewed as a form of proof.¹³⁰⁴ He discusses *parabole* (or *collatio*) as a technical proof,¹³⁰⁵ while he considers the Latin equivalent *similitudo* to be a figure of style.¹³⁰⁶ Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions παραβολή four times in his treatise on figured speech (= Chapter Eight and Nine of the *Ars Rhetorica*), but he does not explicitly label παραβολή as a figure.¹³⁰⁷ Ps.-Hermogenes speaks of τὸ ἐκ παραβολῆς σχῆμα.¹³⁰⁸ My presentation of ancient rhetoric shows that παραβολή and related terms are discussed as figures by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian, Ps.-Hermogenes, and possibly Ps.-Dionysius. In the 1st century BCE – 2nd century CE, many rhetoricians, thus, thought of παραβολή as a form of figured speech. Hence, it is probable that the Markan παραβολή was viewed as a figure as well by ancient readers.

Clement of Alexandria mentions παραβολή as a form of prophecy and figured speech. Those who are initiated and seek the truth through love can understand parables.¹³⁰⁹ According to Clement, the aim of figured speech in prophetic language is to not appear “to some as blaspheming while speaking in violation of the assumptions of the many”.¹³¹⁰ Figured speech, and also parables, reveal the truth, indirectly, to keep the speaker from being harmed by those whose assumptions the speaker violates.¹³¹¹ The fact that Clement in the second century CE understood παραβολή to be a form of figured speech renders it plausible that other early readers of Mark, who were also influenced (indirectly) by the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, would have interpreted παραβολή as a form of figured speech. These readers probably thought of parables as a way for the Markan Jesus to reveal the mystery of the kingdom of God to those whose assumptions the mystery violated. The ambiguity of the parables mitigated the harshness of the mystery rendering the mystery perceivable even for those who oppose it.

The present subsection has argued that Mark’s understanding of παραβολή has much in common with the ancient definition of figured speech. Both the Markan παραβολή and λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος make use of ambiguity in order to communicate to those who

¹³⁰² Ps.-Longin., *Subl.* 37 (my translation).

¹³⁰³ See Ps.-Longin., *Subl.* 32.

¹³⁰⁴ See Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.100–101.

¹³⁰⁵ See Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.23–25. The understanding of παραβολή as a form of proof in a demonstrative discourse can already be found in Arist., *Rhet.* 2.1393b3–7.

¹³⁰⁶ See Quint., *Inst.* 8.3.72–74. Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.1 (LCL translation) mentions that Latin writers “have generally preferred *similitudo* to render what the Greeks call *parabolē*”. On παραβολή and related terms in Quintilian, see Cuvillier, *Le concept de παραβολή*, 40–43.

¹³⁰⁷ See Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 307.13; 307.17–18; 313.6; 348.20.

¹³⁰⁸ Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 179.3.

¹³⁰⁹ See Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.129.4–6.15.130.1 (GCS 52, 497:15–21).

¹³¹⁰ Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.127.4 (GCS 52, 496:17–20). My translation.

¹³¹¹ I have earlier discussed Clement of Alexandria in Chapter Eleven, under §1.2.1.

cannot accept the message when formulated directly or plainly. Just like figured speech, παραβολή can be viewed as the middle course between plain and distorting language. As such, παραβολή is not the antonym of παρρησία, but a contrasted term which mitigates the harshness of παρρησία. I have also advocated that it is probable that the first readers of the Gospel would have understood the Markan παραβολή as a form of figured speech. The next subsection will compare the different motives/uses of figured speech in ancient rhetorical theory to the use of parables in the Gospel of Mark.

2.2 THE MARKAN παραβολή AND THE MOTIVES/USES OF FIGURED SPEECH IN ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY

The present subsection does not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of the different motives/uses of parables in Mark. Past scholarly literature has argued with reference to Mark 4:10–12 that Markan parables have a separating function in terms of excluding the *massa perditionis*.¹³¹² This view does not take into account that the aim of parables is, ultimately, revelation (4:22).¹³¹³ If the Markan Jesus teaches ἐν παραβολαῖς in order to communicate his message, the aim cannot be eschatological discernment between the damned who misunderstand Jesus and the saved who receive the mystery. Although misunderstanding might occur, this does not exclude revelation as the intended effect of Jesus' parables. Another influential misperception is that Jesus' parables are esoteric and gnostic. According to Elian Cuvillier, the parabolic discourse of the Markan Jesus is “mystérieux et incompréhensible tant que Jésus, le révélateur gnostique, n'a pas offert à ses disciples la connaissance nécessaire qui leur [sic] permet d'interpréter et de donner la clef de tous mystères passés présents et à venir”.¹³¹⁴ The aim of the parables is, however, not to exclude outsiders who do not have this alleged gnostic knowledge. Rather, through parables, Jesus seeks to include those who cannot be reached except through indirect communication. The present subsection will provide a more detailed analysis of this function of the Markan παραβολή against the background of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

Ancient theorists of figured speech deliberate that the two main motives for using figured speech are “tact” (εὐπρέπεια) and “circumspection” (ὀσφάλεια). Figured speech is used when it is not safe to speak directly through παρρησία or when the latter would

¹³¹² See Heikki Räisänen, *Die Parabeltheorie im Markusevangelium*, Schriften der Finnischen Exegetischen Gesellschaft 26 (Helsinki: Finnische exegetische Gesellschaft, 1973), 115–121. Similar views can be found in Craig A. Evans, “The Function of Isaiah 6:9–10 in Mark and John,” *NovT* 24/2 (1982) 124–138 and Kurt Erlemann, “Die eschatologisch-kritische Funktion der synoptischen Parabeln,” in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 283–293.

¹³¹³ See *supra*, §2.1, for the paradoxical view of Mark that parables aim to reveal and conceal at the same time.

¹³¹⁴ Cuvillier, *Le concept de παραβολή*, 238–239. The double use of “nécessaire qui leur” is due to a typographical error by Cuvillier.

violate good taste.¹³¹⁵ Quintilian, for instance, asserts that the aim of figured speech is to criticise the addressees and at the same time avoid the risk of conviction. Through ambiguous expressions one can criticise a tyrant and at the same avoid danger by understanding and explaining the same expressions in another way.¹³¹⁶

I will, first, enquire whether tact and circumspection play a role in the motivation of Jesus' use of parables in Mark 4:1–34 (see 2.2.1). Second, I will do the same for Jesus' use of parables in Mark 12:1–9 (see 2.2.2). Third, I will research which conditions allow Jesus to speak *παρησιᾶ* instead of in parables (see 2.2.3).

2.2.1 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 4:1–34

Mark 4:1–34 contains three agricultural parables: 4:3–9; 4:26–29; 4:30–32. According to Miquel, all three parables can be viewed as figured speech concealing a hidden meaning. At first sight, the parables are speaking of “conversion or individual salvation”: “[t]he life cycle of cereals and other cultivated plants” can be interpreted as a cultic symbol referring to “the salvation of the soul after death or the vicissitudes of the person in her journey towards salvation”. Mark 4:11–12, 33–34 give the impression that the main concern of the parables is “individual conversion and salvation”.¹³¹⁷ When read from this perspective, the parables are completely harmless on a political level. Miquel argues that the parables can also be read as proclaiming that “the triumphant revelation of God's kingdom was absolutely warranted”, “despite its opposing enemies, its humble beginning and its hidden and painful progress”. In this reading, the parables are “not about the topics of conversion or individual salvation, but about the irresistible triumph of the movement set off by Jesus' preaching”.¹³¹⁸ Due to the political implications of this message, Mark was unable to communicate it directly. The parables are figured in as far as they are ambiguous and conceal a political-critical message.

Miquel observes that a similar ambiguity is present in Mark 4:13–20 and 4:24–25. Mark 4:13–20 can be read as referring to the “different moral attitudes people may adopt when confronted with Jesus' message” (individual soteriology). Another possible reading is that the text is speaking of “the different dangers and obstacles the Markan Jesus' message has to overcome in order to attain its final success”.¹³¹⁹ A naive reading would say that 4:24–25 is about individual retribution. The sympathetic and biased reader, on the other hand, would read 4:24 “as Jesus' promise to his faithful followers that they would be gifted with much more” than they deserve on the basis of their work for Jesus'

¹³¹⁵ See my discussion of Demetrius, Quintilian, Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §§2.1–3. Quintilian additionally adds the motive of elegance, but I do not mention this motive in the present subsection, as it does not play a role in the use of parables by the Markan Jesus.

¹³¹⁶ See Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.67.

¹³¹⁷ Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 674.

¹³¹⁸ Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 673 with reference to Joachim Jeremias, *Rediscovering the Parables* (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1966), 119–120.

¹³¹⁹ Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 674.

cause. Mark 4:25 would then be read as “an ironic rationalization of such uneven retribution” (cf. 10:29–30).¹³²⁰

Regarding the motive of this use of ambiguity in parables, I note with Miquel that Mark 4:33–34 “confirms that Jesus’ use of parables is a strategic way of communication which enables him to dose people’s understanding of his message according to their disposition”.¹³²¹ Jesus spoke in parables “as they were able to hear” (4:33b). The aim of the ambiguity of the parables is understanding instead of misunderstanding. I disagree, however, with Miquel’s view that “ambiguity is put to the service of misleading unsympathetic readers, while covertly explaining to sympathetic ones the reason and gist of the gospel’s use of this type of resistance language”.¹³²² *Contra* Miquel, I contend that the ambiguity of the parables would help the unsympathetic readers to receive their political-critical meaning. The ambiguity softens the harshness of Jesus’ message. As mentioned earlier, ambiguity makes it easier for opponents to accept criticism and at the same time safeguards the speaker and his adherents from potential attacks.¹³²³ The ambiguity of Jesus’ parables enabled Jesus followers to explain the parables in terms of personal conversion and salvation. This safeguards them from potential attacks of enemies.

I conclude that the main motive of Jesus’ use of parables in Mark 4:1–34 is circumspection. It was probably not safe for Mark to directly claim that the triumph of the Jesus movement is inevitable. Therefore, he made use of the figured speech of Jesus’ parables. The next subsection will ask what motivates Jesus’ use of parables in Mark 12:1–9.

2.2.2 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 12:1–9

Through the parable of the vineyard and the tenants (Mark 12:1–9) Jesus indirectly criticises his élite opponents by equating them with the tenants. Although not all the aspects of the parable can be explained with reference to the polemic between Jesus and the religious leaders,¹³²⁴ the parable suggests the “spiritual sterility” of the religious leaders, “unmasks their murderous intentions, and prophesies that they will be destroyed when ‘the lord of the vineyard’ comes in power and judgment”.¹³²⁵ Given that Jesus is

¹³²⁰ Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 676.

¹³²¹ Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 672.

¹³²² Miquel, “Markan Parabolic Discourse,” 672.

¹³²³ See *supra*, §2.1

¹³²⁴ John S. Kloppenborg, *The Tenants in the Vineyard*, WUNT 195 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 222 mentions three aspects that cannot be explained in terms of this polemic: (i) the wounding of the second slave on the head (Mark 12:4); (ii) the raising of the issue of the inheritance (12:7); and (iii) what it is that is transferred to new tenants in 12:9. However, concerning (iii) I remark with Yarbrow Collins (*Mark*, 547) that “[g]iving the vineyard to others implies that a new leadership will emerge among those who accept Jesus as the messiah.” Yarbrow Collins suggests that “power” is transferred to the new tenants. She (*Mark*, 547) claims with reference to the polemic between Jesus and the religious leaders that the focus in Mark 12:9b–d “is on the removal from power of the leaders who oppose Jesus”.

¹³²⁵ Marcus, *Mark 8–16*, 810.

criticising his social superiors, he cannot use plain or direct language. This language would have violated good taste. Out of tact he addresses the religious leaders through a parable. The people appear to support Jesus, as the religious leaders did not succeed in arresting Jesus due to fear of the people (12:12).

In addition to tact, the motive of circumspection is, also, important to understand Jesus' use of the parable. The religious leaders perceive that Jesus has spoken the parable against them (Mark 12:12). Thus, Jesus succeeded in criticising them. The reason why the religious leaders fear the people is not mentioned. Given that Jesus had the support of the people, he could have easily explained his words in a different way and avoid being arrested by the religious leaders. That Jesus' parabolic language makes it impossible for the religious leaders to arrest Jesus is suggested by 12:13, where they send "some Pharisees and some Herodians to catch him by his words" (τινας τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ τῶν Ἡρῳδιανῶν ἵνα αὐτὸν ἀγρεύσωσιν λόγῳ).¹³²⁶ The religious leaders, apparently, needed to trick Jesus in formulating an unambiguous statement in order to arrest him. The question whether it is lawful to pay taxes to Caesar had this particular aim (12:14–15). If Jesus had replied yes, he would have been viewed as complying with the Romans. Jesus would then have lost the support of the people and the religious leaders would have arrested him. If Jesus had replied no, he would have been arrested as a revolutionary who contests the rights of the Roman occupiers. Jesus cleverly escapes the trap by telling them to bring a coin and asking them whose image and inscription is printed on it (12:15d–16c). When they reply "Caesar's" (12:16d–e), Jesus reacts with an ambiguous saying: τὰ Καίσαρος ἀπόδοτε Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ θεῷ (12:17b–c).¹³²⁷ As a result of the saying's ambiguity, Jesus' interlocutors react with amazement (12:17d). The ambiguity of Jesus' words protects him from danger.

I conclude that both the motive of tact and the motive of circumspection can be traced in Jesus' use of parables in Mark 12:1–9. On the basis of the results of the present and the previous subsection, I expect that safety is a necessary condition for Jesus to teach *παρρησία* instead of in parables. The next subsection will ask what conditions are required for Jesus to speak *παρρησία*.

2.2.3 Παρρησία and Safety in Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34

Jesus' use of *παρρησία* in Mark 8:31 takes place among the disciples who consider him to be the Christ (8:29). There is no reason for Jesus to veil his speech. He can speak *παρρησία* in complete safety. Jesus' charge "to tell no one about him" (8:30) implies that his identity as the Christ has to stay a secret until the events that he narrates in 8:31 will have taken place. Jesus is speaking *παρρησία* about his identity to the disciples (8:32a), but they are not allowed to communicate anything to others. Joel Marcus, correctly, notes

¹³²⁶ The verb ἀγρεύω in Mark 12:13 is a *hapax legomenon* in the NT. According to LSJ, 14, the verb, elsewhere, means "take by hunting or fishing, catch". When used in a metaphorical meaning, the verb means "hunt after, thirst for".

¹³²⁷ On this ambiguity, see, e.g., Marcus, *Mark 8–16*, 824–825.

that, like in 1:24–25 and 3:11–12, Jesus is prohibiting publicity in 8:30, because his interlocutors evaluate him correctly.¹³²⁸ Then, the question is why others are not allowed to know that Jesus is the Christ. The answer can be found in the next verse: Jesus does not want his enemies to know about what needs to take place (cf. *δεῖ*, 8:31). Instead of introducing a passion prediction, *δεῖ*, rather, qualifies Jesus as talking about what is necessary (or fitting) to his identity as the Christ. As noted by Peter-Ben Smit, the idea of a divine will is not explicit in *δεῖ* and is absent in the two other passion predictions (9:31; 10:33–34).¹³²⁹ Jesus, thus, prohibits the disciples in 8:30 to communicate to others what they themselves have been told *παρησία* by Jesus. If Jesus' enemies would know about his identity and what it entails, they might sabotage the things that need to take place for Jesus to do what is required by his messianic identity.¹³³⁰ His *παρησία* can only be directed to those sympathetic to him in secure situations that warrant the success of his messianic mission. We will see that the same condition can be observed in the second and the third passion prediction (9:31; 10:33–34), which, in agreement with 8:32a, can also be paraphrased as being spoken *παρησία*.

In Mark 9:30, the narrator states that Jesus “did not want anyone to know” that he and the disciples were leaving and going through Galilee. The causal *γάρ* in 9:31 indicates that his teaching about his coming death and resurrection is the cause of Jesus' concern to have no one following them. According to Joel Marcus, “this motivation is puzzling: why would Jesus try to prevent knowledge of his presence in Galilee, just because he is teaching his disciples about his death and resurrection”? Joel Marcus claims that Jesus could have easily taken the disciples aside “for a short period”, “as he does elsewhere in the Gospel, most recently in 9:28–29”.¹³³¹ In my view, the Markan Jesus' single-minded focus on having no one except the disciples following him can be explained with

¹³²⁸ See Marcus, *Mark 8–16*, 612.

¹³²⁹ See Peter-Ben Smit, “Questioning Divine *δεῖ*: On Allowing Texts *Not* to Say Everything,” *NovT* 61/1 (2019) 40–54: at 49. Smit (“Questioning”: 47–53) additionally argues that nowhere in Mark, *δεῖ* has a clear implied agent. I agree with Smit (“Questioning”: 55) that Mark opts for *δεῖ* in order to emphasise the action and obscure the identity of the agent. There is no reason to deify *δεῖ* in Mark.

¹³³⁰ I am conscious that this is one of many possible explanations of the function of Jesus' secrecy in Mark 8:30. On the theme of secrecy in Mark, see recently Christopher M. Tuckett, “The Disciples and the Messianic Secret in Mark,” in *Fair Play: Diversity and Conflicts in Early Christianity: Essays in Honour of Heikki Räisänen*, ed. Ismo Dunderberg – Christopher M. Tuckett – Kari Syreeni, *NovTSup* 103 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 131–149; Andreas Bedenbender, “Das ‘Messiasgeheimnis’ im Markusevangelium,” *T&K* 103–104 (2004) 1–96; David F. Watson, *Honor Among Christians: The Cultural Key to the Messianic Secret* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2010); Kelly R. Iverson, “‘Wherever the Gospel Is Preached’: The Paradox of Secrecy in the Gospel of Mark,” in *Mark as Story: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Kelly R. Iverson – Christopher W. Skinner, *SBL RBS* 65 (Atlanta GA: SBL, 2011), 181–209; Greg Steele, “The Theology of Hiddenness in the Gospel of Mark: An Exploration of the Messianic Secret and Corollaries,” *ResQ* 54/3 (2012) 169–185; Camille Focant, “Mystère et/ou secret chez Marc,” *RTL* 50 (2019) 498–516; Geert Van Oyen, “Du secret messianique au mystère divin: Le sens de la narratologie,” in *Reading the Gospel of Mark*, 3–37. The above-mentioned studies have not taken into consideration the use of *παρησία* in Mark 8:32a in their discussion of the function of secrecy in Mark 8:30.

¹³³¹ Marcus, *Mark 8–16*, 668.

reference to his intent to create a safe environment to speak *παρησιάζω* about what is going to take place (9:31). The disciples did not understand Jesus' saying and were afraid to ask him (9:32). I observe with Camille Focant that the reader expects that the topic of the discussions of the disciples among themselves (cf. 9:33) is what they did not understand of Jesus' saying in 9:31.¹³³² With hindsight, Jesus' single-minded focus on having no one following them can easily be explained. The discussions among the disciples on the road through Galilee could have easily been heard by people unsympathetic to Jesus. Mark, probably, implies that Jesus knew what the disciples were discussing, as Jesus is displayed with this gift elsewhere in the gospel (2:8; 3:4–5; 5:30; etc.). The fact that Jesus waited until they were “in the house” (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, 9:33b) to ask the disciples about their discussions shows that Jesus was still very cautious about other people hearing about his passion prediction.

Concerning the introductory comment (Mark 10:32) to the third passion prediction (10:33–34), Yarbrow Collins correctly notes that “[i]t is not clear who is going up to Jerusalem with Jesus, whom he is leading (προάγειν), who are astounded, and who are following him (v. 32a)”. Yarbrow Collins, additionally, notices the ambiguity in the textual tradition that “[i]t is not clear whether those who followed are identical with those ahead of whom Jesus went, a portion of that group, or a distinct group”.¹³³³ It is significant for the purpose of the present study that, in the same verse, Mark depicts Jesus as taking the Twelve aside again for private instruction on the coming events (cf. τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ συμβαίνειν, 10:32).¹³³⁴ Jesus is, again, very careful to not communicate anything *παρησιάζω* to people who are unsympathetic to him (10:33–34; cf. 8:32a). Safety is the condition for his *παρησία*.

I conclude that Jesus' use of *παρησία* in Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34 takes place in secure situations for the ears of the disciples. Jesus is single-mindedly occupied with not having anyone else hear what is said. This suggests that parables are used in situations in which it is not safe for Jesus to talk *παρησιάζω*. This is confirmed by the fact that Jesus only uses parables in public (2:21–22; 4:3–8, 21–25, 26–29, 30–32; 7:14–15; 13:28–31, 34–37). In public, it is too dangerous for Jesus to communicate his message directly. The context of Jesus' parables is often polemical and the addressees are often opponents (esp. 3:23–27; 12:1–11).

The previous subsection (2.1) has demonstrated that Mark understood the genre of *παραβολή* along the same lines as ancient rhetorical theory conceived of figured speech in general. The present subsection (2.2) has additionally confirmed that the Markan Jesus' use of parables can be understood in terms of the different motives/uses of figured speech depicted by ancient rhetorical theory. On the basis of the research results of the present

¹³³² See Focant, *Marc*, 356.

¹³³³ Yarbrow Collins, *Mark*, 484.

¹³³⁴ I agree with Ray McKinnis, “An Analysis of Mark 10:32–34,” *NovT* 18/2 (1976) 81–100: at 87 that αὐτῷ in Mark 10:32 explicitly identifies Jesus with the Son of Man mentioned in 10:33–34.

section (2), the following section will compare Mark's use of παραβολή and παρρησία to John's use of παροιμία and παρρησία.

3. COMPARISON OF παροιμία AND παρρησία IN JOHN TO παραβολή AND παρρησία IN MARK

The present section will, first, critically evaluate the initial attempts of scholarly literature to compare the Markan παραβολή to the Johannine παροιμία (3.1). Second, I will provide a historical-contextual approach to analyse the differences between the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία and the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία (3.2). Third, I will attempt to understand John's use of παροιμία and Mark's use of παραβολή against the background of ancient rhetorical theory (3.3).

3.1 INITIAL ATTEMPTS

Previous scholarly literature has stressed the similarities between the Markan παραβολή and the Johannine παροιμία while noting small differences between the terms. I will critically discuss three authors in a chronological order: Elian Cuvillier (i), Uta Poplutz (ii), and Enno Popkes (iii).

(i) For Cuvillier, the Johannine παροιμία has a meaning similar to the Markan παραβολή. Both terms denote “un mode de communication” that uses imagery, and both terms have “un contenu christologique”. The difference between both terms is that, in John, revelation and concealment are not intrinsic to Jesus' imagery: “c'est la décision de foi qui qualifie le discours de Jésus comme παρρησία et l'incrédulité qui le qualifie comme παροιμία”. Cuvillier observes that “l'opposition παροιμία/παρρησία fonctionne chez Jean d'une manière paradoxale”. In John 10:24–25, Jesus claims to have spoken παρρησία, yet he is perceived as speaking “en paraboles”.¹³³⁵ Jesus is speaking παρρησία throughout the Gospel (7:26; 18:20), but it is the faith or unbelief of the hearer that renders Jesus' language respectively παρρησία or παροιμία.¹³³⁶

I disagree with Cuvillier that this paradox is only present in John. When the Markan Jesus speaks παρρησία (Mark 8:31–32a; 9:31; 10:33–34), his disciples react with misunderstanding (8:32b–d; 9:32; 10:35–37). As argued above, Jesus' παρρησία has the same effect as his parabolic language on the disciples (cf. Mark 4:12). The disciples cannot distinguish Jesus' παρρησία from his parables.¹³³⁷ Yet, one has to distinguish between the effect Jesus' παρρησία has on the disciples in the Gospel narrative and the way the narrator highlights distinctions in Jesus' language by means of the terms παραβολή and παρρησία. The narrator makes clear that παραβολή and παρρησία do not refer to the same language of Jesus. The remark in Mark 8:32a that Jesus was speaking παρρησία while uttering his first passion prediction in 8:31 is contrasted with the

¹³³⁵ Cuvillier, *Le concept de παραβολή*, 234.

¹³³⁶ See Cuvillier, *Le concept de παραβολή*, 235.

¹³³⁷ See *supra*, §1.2.

comments that Jesus spoke ἐν παραβολαῖς (3:23; 4:2, 11; 12:1; cf. 4:10, 33–34; 7:17; 12:12; 13:28). There is not always a contrast between παρρησία and παροιμία in the Fourth Gospel, where the παρρησία of Jesus often makes use of παροιμίαι.¹³³⁸ This is a substantial difference from the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία.

(ii) Poplutz has observed that the understanding of the Markan παραβολή depends on the “Addressatenwechsel” between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Mark 4:11–12), whereas the understanding of the Johannine παροιμία is connected to the “Perspektivenwechsel zwischen vorösterlich verborgenem und nachösterlich christologisch und soteriologisch verständlichem Reden” (John 16:25). Despite this apparent difference between the Markan παραβολή and the Johannine παροιμία, Poplutz claims that “die Stoßrichtung” of Mark and John is similar.¹³³⁹ In Mark, the boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is porous. Understanding of the Markan Jesus can be obtained by following him to Golgotha (cf. Mark 8:34–38). The Roman centurion is in this sense presented as an ‘insider’ when he proclaims Jesus as the Son of God under the cross (15:39): he sees and understands. Similarly, the following of Jesus is an important topic in John 1:39. Before the elevation and glorification of Jesus, the disciples misunderstand him. The crucifixion of Jesus enables full understanding for the disciples (16:25).¹³⁴⁰

Poplutz rightly claims that the “Stoßrichtung” of Mark and John is similar. For both Gospel writers, the cross is the critical moment for understanding Jesus. If John knew a written version of the Gospel of Mark, it is possible that his view of the crucifixion as the καίρος/ῥα of Jesus’ παρρησία (John 7:6, 8; 16:25) was influenced by Mark. John could have observed that the παρρησία of the Markan Jesus was ineffective during his life time (Mark 8:32b–d; 9:32; 10:35–37) and that only at the time of his death on the cross, Jesus was understood (15:39).¹³⁴¹

Although I agree with Poplutz that there is no strict division between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in Mark, it still remains a fact that the Markan Jesus only speaks in parables in public and often towards opponents in polemical situations. This use of Markan parables is in strong contrast with the παρρησία of the Markan Jesus, which is only used towards the disciples in secure private settings.¹³⁴² I observe that Jesus’ use of parables is not just due to a shift in addressees, but because Jesus’ teaching adapts to broader circumstances. Among the disciples and in secure situations, the Markan Jesus teaches παρρησία. In public situations when direct teaching would endanger Jesus’ messianic mission, Jesus teaches ἐν παραβολαῖς. In the Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, Jesus

¹³³⁸ On the use of παρρησία in collaboration with παροιμία in John, see *supra*, Chapter Three and Eleven.

¹³³⁹ Poplutz, “Paroimia und Parabolē,” 117.

¹³⁴⁰ See Poplutz, “Paroimia und Parabolē,” 117–119.

¹³⁴¹ It remains, however, unsure whether the Roman centurion recognised Jesus as the Son of God. It is ambiguous whether the anarthrous υἱὸς θεοῦ in Mark 15:39 has the meaning of “the Son of God” referring to the only son of God. Another possibility is that the Roman centurion recognises Jesus as “a son of God” among other divine sons.

¹³⁴² See *supra*, §2.2.3.

teaches ἐν παροιμαῖς to the disciples in a private setting (John 16:25), but also to opponents in public (cf. 10:6). Jesus uses παρρησία among friends in a private situation (11:14) as well as to opponents in public situations (7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 11:54). The Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία is, thus, substantially different from the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία.

(iii) According to Popkes, there is an analogy between John 16:25 and Mark 4:10–12, 33–34. Both texts state “dass den Jüngern eine unmittelbare Einsicht in die Botschaft Jesu nicht möglich war”. Popkes speaks of a correlation between the Markan παραβολή and the Johannine παροιμία. He, additionally, notes that the small difference between both terms is “dass im Johannesevangelium noch deutlicher zwischen der vorösterlichen und nachösterlichen Deutung der Botschaft Jesu unterschieden wird” (John 16:25).¹³⁴³

I agree with Popkes that the use of παραβολή and παροιμία in respectively Mark 4:10–12, 33–34 and John 16:25 shows that the disciples were unable to understand Jesus directly. I have argued earlier that both terms can be understood in terms of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.¹³⁴⁴ Figured speech evades direct and simple understanding.

The present subsection has pointed out that previous scholarly literature did not observe the substantial differences between the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία and the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία. Against the background of the understanding of the Markan παραβολή and the Johannine παροιμία as forms of figured speech, the next subsection will provide a historical-contextual approach to examine these differences.

3.2 HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

The present subsection will analyse the two substantial differences between παραβολή and παρρησία in Mark and παροιμία and παρρησία in John against the background of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech:

(i) The first substantial difference concerns the different situations in which the Markan Jesus uses παραβολή and παρρησία and the Johannine Jesus παροιμία and παρρησία. Whereas the Markan παραβολή is used in public situations to secure the accomplishment of Jesus’ mission, the Johannine παροιμία is used both towards opponents in hostile public situations (John 10:6) and towards the disciples in secure private situations (16:25). There is also disagreement with regard to παρρησία: whereas the Markan παρρησία is only addressed to the disciples in secure private situations, the Johannine παρρησία is used among friends in John 11:14, but also towards opponents in polemical public situations (7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 11:54). The public character of

¹³⁴³ Enno E. Popkes, “‘Das Mysterion der Botschaft Jesu’: Beobachtungen zur synoptischen Parabeltheorie und ihren Analogien im Johannesevangelium und Thomasevangelium,” in *Hermeneutik der Gleichnisse Jesu*, 294–320, at 311.

¹³⁴⁴ For the Markan παραβολή, see *supra*, §2. For the Johannine παροιμία, see *supra*, Chapter Eleven.

Jesus' *παρρησία* towards opponents is best illustrated by John's interpretation of Jesus' death on the cross as an act of *παρρησία* (16:25).¹³⁴⁵

There appear to be radically opposed motifs at play. In Mark, only the disciples may hear Jesus' *παρρησία* (Mark 9:30; 10:32). The disciples are not allowed to communicate to anyone else what Jesus said (8:30). In contrast with this secrecy motif in Mark, we meet a public motif in John: Jesus has spoken *παρρησία* to the entire κόσμος (John 18:20) and everyone, including the disciples, is allowed to communicate further what Jesus said (18:21).¹³⁴⁶ When viewed through the lens of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, the probable reason why the Johannine Jesus allows others to communicate his *παρρησία* teaching to opponents is because this teaching is also characterised as *ἐν παροιμίαις* (16:25; cf. 10:6). The *παρρησία* of the Johannine Jesus is a form of doublespeak able to criticise others, and at the same time safeguarding the speaker through ambiguity.¹³⁴⁷ While Mark uses *παρρησία* and *παραβολή* to refer to distinct sayings of Jesus, *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Gospel of John refer to the same language of Jesus. This brings me to the second substantial difference between Mark and John.

(ii) In John, *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* collaborate with one another and refer to the same sayings of Jesus.¹³⁴⁸ Although *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* are not antonyms in Mark, they do not refer to the same sayings of Jesus.¹³⁴⁹ As argued in the previous chapter, Jesus' use of *παρρησία* through *παροιμίες* in the Fourth Gospel is paralleled by how Plutarch speaks of a former time when it was the custom of using *παρρησία* through *παροιμίες* and myths. Not only the Johannine Jesus but, also, Dio's Diogenes shows that this particular use of *παρρησία* was still in practice at the end of the first century CE and the beginning of the second century CE.¹³⁵⁰ The Markan use of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία*, on the other hand, is paralleled by how the relationship between *παρρησία* and figured speech is articulated in the ancient rhetorical theories of figured speech. In the latter theories, the plain or direct language of *παρρησία* is, although not opposed to, juxtaposed to figured language. These theories prescribe the use of figured language when it is unsafe or unseemly to speak directly through *παρρησία*.¹³⁵¹ As demonstrated above, Mark uses figured language (viz., *παραβολή*) and *παρρησία* along the same lines.¹³⁵²

¹³⁴⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §3.5, for my discussion of the public character of Jesus' *παρρησία* on the cross in John 19:19–22.

¹³⁴⁶ For the argumentation that κόσμος and πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in John 18:20 include a reference to the disciples, see *supra*, Chapter Ten, §3.

¹³⁴⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §4.1 and §4.2, for my discussion of Jesus' use of *παρρησία* through doublespeak in, respectively, John 7:32–36 and 10:1–6.

¹³⁴⁸ For the argumentation for this interpretation of the collaboration between *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* in John, see *supra*, Chapter Three.

¹³⁴⁹ *Supra*, §2.1, I have argued that *παραβολή* (as a form of figured speech) is the middle course between *παρρησία* and flattery.

¹³⁵⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, esp. §3.2, §4, and the intermediate conclusion.

¹³⁵¹ For my discussion of the ancient rhetorical theories of figured speech, see *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §2.

¹³⁵² See *supra*, §2.

The present subsection has argued that the first substantial difference between Mark and John can be explained from the perspective of the second substantial difference. Given that the Johannine *παρρησία* makes use of *παροιμίας*, *παρρησία* can be used in public without endangering the speaker. This is not the case for the Markan *παρρησία*, which does not make use of figured speech, but is contrasted with *παραβολή*. A parallel understanding of the relationship between *παρρησία* and figured speech can be found in the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. The combined use of *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* to refer to the same language of the Johannine Jesus is paralleled by another tradition mentioned in Plutarch in which *παρρησία* can be used through *παροιμίας* and myths. The next subsection will try to provide an explanation for why *παρρησία* can be used through *παροιμίας*, but not through *παραβολαί*.

3.3 THE JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND THE MARKAN *παραβολή* THROUGH THE LENS OF QUINTILIAN

The aim of the present subsection is to contextualise John's and Mark's use of respectively *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* against the background of ancient rhetorical theory. The main reference source will be Quintilian.¹³⁵³ Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* is known as a textbook "bringing together the inheritance of Greek and Roman rhetoric".¹³⁵⁴ His work has "kanonische Gültigkeit"¹³⁵⁵ and, thus, represents the rhetorical views of the first century CE.

Quintilian views *παροιμία* not as a "species of allegory", but as a trope in its own right, because "allegory is more obscure", whereas, in *παροιμία*, "our intentions are obvious (*aperte*)".¹³⁵⁶ This understanding of *παροιμία* explains why Plutarch was able to write about a former time in which *παρρησία* was used through *παροιμίας*.¹³⁵⁷ The latter figures can mediate *παρρησία* because it is not difficult for the audience to perceive the intended criticism. Unlike in allegories, the audience does not have to make inferences to bridge the distance between the object of comparison and the object of explanation. No explanation is required to elucidate what *παροιμίας* intend to say. This is not the case for *παραβολή*, which, according to the definition of Quintilian, "is often apt to compare

¹³⁵³ For previous discussions of the relevance of Quintilian for the interpretation of Synoptic parables, see Eckhard Rau, *Reden in Vollmacht: Hintergrund, Form und Anliegen der Gleichnisse Jesu*, FRLANT 149 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 44–107 and Detlev Dormeyer, *Das Neue Testament im Rahmen der antiken Literaturgeschichte: Eine Einführung*, Die Altertumswissenschaft (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), 143–146.

¹³⁵⁴ Zimmermann, "Jesus' Parables and Ancient Rhetoric," 247.

¹³⁵⁵ Hans-Josef Klauck, *Allegorie und Allegorese in synoptischen Gleichnistexten*, NTAbh 13 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1978), 41.

¹³⁵⁶ Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.57–58 (slightly adjusted LCL translation). For further discussion on *παροιμία* in Quintilian, see *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §2.2.

¹³⁵⁷ See Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406b–c and my discussion *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §3.2.

things whose resemblance is far less obvious”.¹³⁵⁸ Similitudes and, thus, παραβολαί,¹³⁵⁹ are distant comparisons drawn from, for instance, the animal world or inanimate objects.¹³⁶⁰ Among others, Quintilian provides the following example: “if you are talking about the cultivation of the mind, you can use the image of the earth, which produces thorns and thickets if it is neglected, and fruits if it is cultivated”.¹³⁶¹ As noted by Detlev Dormeyer, the parable of the sower in Mark 4:3–8 can also be understood as a distant comparison of this type.¹³⁶² The explanation of the parable (4:14–20) clarifies that the different soils correspond to different dispositions of the human mind. Due to the distance between the terms of comparison, Quintilian implies that παραβολαί are not easy to interpret and require minute attention. Παραβολαί might require additional explanation as in Mark 4:14–20. In παραβολαί, the intentions of the speaker are not obvious like in παροιμιαί. This suggests that παρρησία cannot be used through παραβολαί, but can only be supplemented to παραβολαί as a means of explanation. This is confirmed by the Markan παραβολαί. They are supplemented by an explanation in private for the disciples (Mark 4:33–34). As argued above, this explanation is expressed παρρησία, because Mark 8:32a uses παρρησία as a contrastive term of Jesus’ parable teaching.¹³⁶³

Quintilian’s discussion of similitudes of jest also suggests that παραβολή refers to language that requires from the audience that they make inferences:

Adhibetur autem similitudo interim palam, interim inseri solet parabola: cuius est generis illud Augusti, qui militi libellum timide porrigenti: “noli”, inquit, “tamquam assem elephanto des”.¹³⁶⁴

Such similitudes may be put to the service of wit either openly or allusively. Of the latter type is the remark of Augustus, made to a soldier who showed signs of timidity in presenting a petition, “Don’t hold it out as if you were giving a penny to an elephant.”¹³⁶⁵

Quintilian distinguishes between similitudes expressed “openly” (*palam*) and similitudes expressed “allusively” (*parabola*). The provided example shows that the comparison is

¹³⁵⁸ Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.23 (LCL): nam parabole, quam Cicero conlationem vocat, longius res quae comparentur repetere solet. Translation adopted from Zimmermann, “Jesus’ Parables and Ancient Rhetoric,” 250.

¹³⁵⁹ I follow the reading *similitudo* (LCL) at the end of Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.23. McCall (*Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 200) argues convincingly that *similitudo* is used here in the general sense as including also reference to *parabole*.

¹³⁶⁰ See Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.23.

¹³⁶¹ Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.24 (LCL translation). I agree with McCall (*Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 200–201) that Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.24–25 provides “more examples of the common *similitudo* of proof”, which includes reference to *parabole*.

¹³⁶² See Dormeyer, *Das Neue Testament*, 144.

¹³⁶³ See *supra*, §1.1.

¹³⁶⁴ Quint., *Inst.* 6.3.59. I follow the reading here that emends *inseri*: see McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 213.

¹³⁶⁵ I slightly adjusted the translation from McCall.

allusive and inferential. The distance between the terms of comparison is small in the example: a timid petition of a soldier to the emperor is compared to the giving of a penny to an elephant. The example is at odds with Quintilian's above-mentioned definition of παραβολή as a more far-fetched type of similitude. I note with McCall that "[t]he exact nature of the *similitudo* of jest stated by *parabola* remains vague."¹³⁶⁶ I can, however, say with certainty that the contrast between open and parabolic similitudes shows that Quintilian contrasted speaking directly with speaking parabolically. Παραβολαί require from the addressee(s) that they make inferences. Parables can, therefore, be supplemented by an explanation. This is not the case for similitudes which are formulated openly: e.g., "Publius Blessius called Julius, who was dark, thin, and round-shouldered, 'the iron buckle'".¹³⁶⁷ By calling someone directly "the iron buckle", "the white donkey", or "a wild horse", one directly mocks someone.¹³⁶⁸ No inference from the addressee(s) is required. The audience can easily understand the mockery without explanation.

The Johannine παροιμίαι are, definitely, more direct than the Markan παραβολαί. The ἐγώ εἰμι sayings with an explicit predicate complement directly identify Jesus as "the bread of life" (John 6:35), "the light of the world" (8:12), "the door" (10:9), "the Good Shepherd" (10:11), "the resurrection and the life" (11:25), "the way, and the truth, and the life" (14:6), and "the true vine" (15:1). These παροιμίαι simply identify Jesus with mostly inanimate objects, just like Publius Blessius is called the iron buckle in one of the above-mentioned examples of Quintilian. Although the Johannine παροιμίαι are figured speech challenging the reader/listener to look for a hidden meaning, they do not require supplementary explanation, but in themselves transfer Jesus' παρρησία. The Markan παραβολαί, on the other hand, require explanation, which is expressed παρρησία. In Markan parables, the object of explanation of the comparison is often not mentioned (e.g., Mark 3:23–27; 4:3–8; 12:1–9). Even if the object of explanation is mentioned ("the kingdom of God" in 4:26–29 and 4:30–32), the audience still has to make the inferences. This is often difficult and the parables require explanation (4:34), because the terms of comparison are distant (e.g., the kingdom of God and a mustard seed [4:30–32]).

The analogies that the present subsection has drawn between Quintilian's discussion of *parabole* and the Markan παραβολή do not imply that Mark was confined by ancient rhetorical theory.¹³⁶⁹ As shown in the previous section, Mark used and developed the genre of παραβολή further, and applied it as a means of persuasion in his own context in agreement with the ancient conventions of figured speech.¹³⁷⁰

The present subsection has contextualised John's use of παροιμία and Mark's use of παραβολή against the background of ancient rhetorical theory. Through the lens of this theory, John opted for παροιμία because the latter term is more apt to refer to the ability

¹³⁶⁶ McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 213.

¹³⁶⁷ Quint., *Inst.* 6.3.58 (LCL translation).

¹³⁶⁸ These are all examples mentioned by Quint., *Inst.* 6.3.58 (LCL translation).

¹³⁶⁹ Neither was John confined by the discussions of παροιμία by ancient rhetorical theory: see *supra*, Chapter Eleven.

¹³⁷⁰ See *supra*, §2.

of Jesus' language to transfer *παρρησία*. Unlike Mark, John does not make use of the rhetorical pattern of parable and explanation, but portrays Jesus as speaking *παρρησία* through *παροιμία*. I have explained this use of *παροιμία* in John with reference to how the term is explained by Quintilian. Mark, on the other hand, organised Jesus' teaching on the basis of another rhetorical pattern: parable and explanation. The Markan Jesus makes use of distant comparisons that require additional explanation. This caused Mark to opt for the term *παραβολή* in juxtaposition to *παρρησία*. *Παραβολή* requires of the audience to make inferences to bridge the distance between the object of comparison and the object of explanation. I have explained these characteristics of the Markan *παραβολή* with reference to Quintilian. Given that Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* is an assembly of the rhetorical views of the first century CE, the first readers of John and Mark, probably, understood *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* in the same way as depicted in the present subsection.

When viewed from the perspective of the Louvain hypothesis, John probably knew the rhetorical pattern of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* from the Gospel of Mark and creatively changed this pattern into the rhetorical model of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*.¹³⁷¹ This Johannine model for structuring Jesus' language can explain why John's language is so different from Mark's. It can be used to discern how John creatively reworks material from Mark.¹³⁷²

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

I conclude the present chapter by summarising the main research results:

(i) The *παρρησία* of the Markan Jesus is similar to the *παρρησία* of the Epicurean teacher in Philodemus' *Περὶ παρρησίας*. The term refers to the bold correction of students. *Παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a has the connotation of "publicly" in contrast to Peter's taking Jesus aside to rebuke him (8:32b–d). Like the *παρρησία* of the Epicurean teacher, Jesus' *παρρησία* has a public character limited to the group of students. *Παρρησία* is also a contrastive term of *ἐν παραβολαῖς* (4:11–12, 33–34a) and has the connotation of "plainly". The narrator characterises Jesus' self-identification in 8:31 as 'plain'; yet for the disciples, Jesus' language remains parabolic (8:32b–d; 9:32; 10:35–37). The disciples are unable to discern between Jesus' parables and his *παρρησία*. They are scandalised by Jesus' messianic self-understanding as a self-sacrificial and voluntarily servile leader.

¹³⁷¹ In the Louvain hypothesis, (i) the Gospel of John is a literary unity, (ii) John is dependent on the Synoptics, and (iii) John's use of the Synoptics is creative rather than servile. On this hypothesis, see Gilbert Van Belle, *Les parenthèses dans l'évangile de Jean: Aperçu historique et classification texte Grec de Jean*, SNTA 11 (Leuven: Leuven University Press – Peeters, 1985); Van Belle, *The Signs Source*; Van Belle, "Style Criticism and the Fourth Gospel"; Gilbert Van Belle – Sydney Palmer, "John's Literary Unity and the Problem of Historicity," in *John, Jesus, and History*, vol. 1, 217–228; Gilbert Van Belle, "Tradition, Exegetical Formation, and the Leuven Hypothesis," in *What We have Heard from the Beginning*, 325–337; Gilbert Van Belle, "Repetitions and Variations in Johannine Research: A General Historical Survey," in *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel*, 33–85; Gilbert Van Belle, "Theory of Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel: A Neglected Field of Research?," in *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel*, 13–32.

¹³⁷² This requires further study.

(ii) The rhetorical pattern of the teaching of the Markan Jesus can be explained with reference to the relationship between λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος and παρρησία in the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. Mark's understanding of παραβολή is similar to Demetrius' definition of figured speech. Both the Markan παραβολή and λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος are used to mitigate the harshness of παρρησία. The disciples are scandalised by Jesus' παρρησία because it is too harsh for them. This explains why not only the 'outsiders', but also they receive the parables (Mark 4:10–12, 33–34).

(iii) Parallel to the description of the motives/uses of figured speech in ancient rhetorical theory, the main motive of the Markan Jesus' use of parables is circumspection. This is illustrated by the use of parables in Mark 4:1–34 and 12:1–9. The ambiguity of Jesus' parables safeguards Jesus from being attacked by opponents (= literary level of the Gospel). The same can be said for the author of the Gospel of Mark with regard to the opponents of the early Jesus movement (= historical level). The political-critical meaning of the parables is softened by their ambiguity. Jesus uses parables in public situations in which it is too dangerous to communicate his message directly. The use of parables allows Jesus to fulfil his messianic mission and prevents him from being arrested and convicted before the events fulfilling his mission take place. Only in secure private situations among the disciples does Jesus teach παρρησία (8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34). Absolute secrecy is required (8:30) in order that opponents will not cross Jesus' mission.

(iv) By providing the first historical-contextual comparison of Mark's use of παραβολή and παρρησία to John's use of παροιμία and παρρησία I have found two substantial differences between them. The first difference concerns the different contexts in which the terms are used. The Markan παραβολή is used in public situations in which Jesus often directly addresses opponents (see, e.g., Mark 3:23–27; 12:1–11). This is not always the case for the Johannine παροιμία, which is directed to the disciples in private settings (John 16:25) as well as to opponents in public settings (cf. 10:6). The Markan παρρησία is used towards the disciples in secure private situations (Mark 8:30–31; 9:30–31; 10:32–34), whereas the Johannine παρρησία is used towards opponents in polemical public situations (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 11:54) as well as among friends (11:14). In Mark, only the disciples may hear Jesus' παρρησία, who are not allowed to communicate to anyone else what Jesus said (Mark 8:30). The Markan secrecy motif is contrasted with the Johannine public motif. The παρρησία of the Johannine Jesus addresses the whole κόσμος and Jesus' hearers are allowed to communicate everything to opponents (John 18:20–21). This difference between Mark and John can easily be explained with reference to the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. The παρρησία of the Johannine Jesus makes use of παροιμιαί. In the Fourth Gospel, Jesus' doublespeak safeguards not only Jesus, but also the disciples who will be questioned by Jesus' opponents.

(v) The second substantial difference between Mark's use of παραβολή and παρρησία and John's use of παροιμία and παρρησία concerns the rhetorical pattern that both authors use to present Jesus' language. Mark juxtaposes παραβολή to παρρησία. He presents Jesus' language through the rhetorical pattern of parable and subsequent

explanation. John, on the other hand, presents Jesus as employing *παρρησία* through figured language (viz., *παροιμίες*). The Johannine *παροιμίες* are not supplemented by an explanation, but only by other Johannine *παροιμίες*. For John, the medium is the message. The differences between both Gospels in the presentation of Jesus' teaching are guided by different understandings of how *παρρησία* relates to the figured language of Jesus. This aspect has to be taken into consideration for discerning how John used Markan material. John's understanding of the relationship between *παρρησία* and *παροιμία* is paralleled by a rhetorical tradition mentioned in Plutarch, whereas Mark's understanding of the relationship between *παρρησία* and *παραβολή* can easily be explained with reference to the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech.

(vi) Unlike previous scholarly literature, I have articulated the fundamental differences between the Markan *παραβολή* and the Johannine *παροιμία* through the lens of the rhetorical theory of Quintilian. The Johannine *παροιμία* is more direct than the Markan *παραβολή*. The Johannine Jesus *is* the Good Shepherd, the light of the world, etc. Johannine *παροιμίες* equate Jesus with mostly inanimate objects. The language is transparent enough to transfer Jesus' *παρρησία*. Although the Johannine *παροιμίες* are figured speech requiring of the reader/listener to look for a hidden meaning, they do not require a supplementary explanation, which is expressed *παρρησία*. The Markan *παραβολή*, on the other hand, refers to a distant comparison requiring of the audience to make inferences to bridge the distance between the object of comparison and the object of explanation. Often the object of explanation is not mentioned, which makes it exceedingly difficult to directly understand the comparisons. Due to the distance between the terms of comparison, the Markan *παραβολή* requires supplementary explanation, which is expressed *παρρησία*.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In addition to the intermediate conclusions provided above at the end of each chapter, I will summarise here the research results of the entire dissertation following the chronology of the twelve chapters (Sections 1–12). In the last section, I will outline some of the implications of my study for the broader field of Johannine studies and the potentially fruitful avenues of future research they entail (Section 13).

1. HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS AS THE METHODOLOGY OF BIBLICAL STUDIES

In Chapter One, I have depicted three criticisms against the use of modern-historical methodologies in the field of Biblical studies and theology. Historical objectivism or positivism is seen as: (i) a myth; (ii) detrimental for the contemporary (theological) relevance of biblical writings; and (iii) one of the causes of the “crisis of nihilism”.¹³⁷³ To counter these criticisms I have proposed, with Gadamer, to ground the knowledge claims of historical research in the historicity of the researcher. Not only the object of knowledge, but also the subject of knowledge is situated in history. Human consciousness is dispersed in time, and oriented towards the past, the present, and the future. Our consciousness of history is limited by a historical horizon. Historical research has to take our historicity into account by operating from within the limits of our historical horizon. As our historical horizon is constituted by the prejudices, or presuppositions, that we have inherited from tradition, the study of the reception history of biblical writings is an essential condition for self-critical historical study. The researcher is co-determined by the reception history of his or her object of research. Biblical scholars are only sporadically and partially aware of the need to transform historical objectivism into historical hermeneutics.¹³⁷⁴

Recent developments in reception-historical methodology either combine historical criticism with reception-historical methodologies (= model one) or reformulate historical criticism in terms of reception history (= model two). In the first model, historical-critical study of biblical writings either precedes the study of their reception history (e.g., Luz) or stands in a dialectic relationship with reception (e.g., Evans). In both cases, the historicity of the historical critic is neglected, as the study of biblical writings in their original historical context is not preceded by an extensive study of the presuppositions that constitute the historical horizon of the researcher. In the second model, there is no distinction between the original meaning of a text and the meaning that a text has obtained in history (e.g., Breed, Lyons). The proponents of this model relabel historical-critical methodologies as reception-historical methodologies. Biblical texts are defined by what they do in history. Their meaning is situated in their effects, and not in their alleged origin.

¹³⁷³ See *supra*, Chapter One, §1.

¹³⁷⁴ See *supra*, Chapter One, §2.

In my view, by taking this stance outside history to depict the reception of biblical writings, the proponents of this model, also, neglect the historicity of the researcher.¹³⁷⁵

To achieve the task of transforming historical objectivism into historical hermeneutics, I have renewed the dialogue between philosophy and Biblical studies. With Nietzsche, I have diagnosed modern historicism as ill, in as far as it neglects the historical horizon of the researcher. By positing the historian outside history, the historian cannot write history in the advantage of life. Modern historicism does not allow the past to have an effect on the present, since its objectivism requires that the subject of knowledge is absent. The personality of the historian is silenced as much as possible. Nietzsche's proposal to write history in the advantage of life entails that the historian's methodology operates from within the limits of his or her historicity. Nietzsche intends to transform history in an art form. His ideas on monumental, antiquarian, and critical historiography can be read along the lines of this intention. However, his static view of the historical horizon of the historian is problematic and self-defeating. On the one hand, Nietzsche considers human consciousness as limited by a closed historical horizon. On the other hand, speaking of our historical horizon and attaining self-knowledge is a way of totalising our life. Thereby, Nietzsche presupposes that we can transcend our historical horizon.¹³⁷⁶

With Gadamer, I have argued that it is more accurate to conceive of our historical horizon as open and forever in motion. The historical horizon of the researcher does not exist independently of the historical horizon of the text. Hence, the task of conducting historical research from within the limits of our historicity, and in the advantage of life, entails that we think of our historical horizon as being co-determined by the historical horizon of the text. Therefore, Gadamer does not consider the study of reception history and the study of a text in its original historical context to be two independent activities. Understanding, as an historically effected event, is determined by both the presuppositions (or prejudices) we have inherited from the reception history of our object of research and by the historical horizon of the text; the otherness of the text can correct, or alter, these presuppositions. Our historical horizon is, therefore, not only effected by the reception history of our object of research, but also by the confrontation with the otherness of the text. Therefore, grounding historical research in our historicity requires that we do not conceive of the study of reception history and the study of the meaning of a text in its original historical context as two independent activities. Reception-historical and historical-critical methodologies presuppose one another, and do not operate independently. The methodology of historical hermeneutics consists in a study of the text by *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*.¹³⁷⁷

My study of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in John's Gospel was conscious of how it was determined by the reception history of these two terms. Elucidating the presuppositions

¹³⁷⁵ See *supra*, Chapter One, §3.

¹³⁷⁶ See *supra*, Chapter One, §4.

¹³⁷⁷ See *supra*, Chapter One, §§5–6.

that have guided previous interpretations of these terms, at the same time, enabled me to become addressed by the otherness of the text. As a result of this confrontation with the text, new questions were formulated that allowed me to approach the text with a new perspective on *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*, and the Johannine views on language these terms contain.

2. STATUS QUAESTIONIS

In my analysis of the scholarly literature on *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel I have discerned four different approaches that were each guided by their own pre-understanding of genre. I will briefly summarise the results of my evaluation of the scholarly literature.

The authors of the genre-critical approach presupposed that *παροιμία* is a *terminus technicus* of a static literary genre that can be identified on the basis of formal criteria. As many definitions as there are authors following this approach can be mentioned. The authors of this approach do not agree among one another which literary features define the genre of *παροιμία*.¹³⁷⁸ The lists of *παροιμίες* they provide are very diverse. The only passage on which they all agree that it is a *παροιμία* is John 10:1–5, although there is disagreement about whether the passage contains one or two *παροιμίες*.¹³⁷⁹

The diversity of the collections of Johannine *παροιμίες* indicates the difficulty of determining the literary form of *παροιμία*. As John constantly repeats the same theme, but with variations, the literary form of the Johannine *παροιμίες* is elusive for a form-critical and genre-critical approach. Moreover, it is unclear to which sayings of Jesus, *παροιμία* in 10:6 and 16:25 refer. The shepherd imagery in 10:1–5 is familiar language in Jewish tradition and the imagery in 16:16–24 is explained. It is difficult to understand how this imagery can be responsible for the misunderstanding of Jesus' interlocutors referred to by the term *παροιμία*. The authors of the second approach, the hermeneutical approach, avoid this difficulty by assuming that *παροιμία* in 16:25 refers to all the sayings that the Johannine Jesus said during his life time.¹³⁸⁰

According to the hermeneutical approach, literary genres cannot be defined on the basis of literary features, because the genre of a text is co-constructed by the reader. Genres are dynamic and can have many features, without one of them being essential to their identity. The division between genres is not well-defined and their identity is open-ended (Zimmermann).¹³⁸¹ In this approach, *ἐν παροιμίαις* does not refer to particular sayings of Jesus as the denominator of a static and formal literary genre, but to all of Jesus' words as a *modus dicendi* of Jesus. The phrases *ἐν παροιμίαις* and *(ἐν) παρρησία* express the modality of Jesus' speech. Jesus teaches, respectively, in an ambiguous and a univocal way. As *modi dicendi* of Jesus' speech, *ἐν παροιμίαις* and *(ἐν) παρρησία*

¹³⁷⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §2.

¹³⁷⁹ See *infra*, Appendix Two.

¹³⁸⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §2.4.

¹³⁸¹ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §2.4.

correspond to two *modi intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners. At the hour of Jesus' death, not the *modus dicendi* of Jesus changes from ἐν παροιμίαις to παρρησία, but the *modus intelligendi* of his listeners: from misunderstanding to univocal Christological perception (John 16:25). The authors of this approach have interpreted these phrases from the presupposition that John considers Christological knowledge as a possibility.¹³⁸² A second presupposition is that they assume that the teaching of the Paraclete, who functions as the mouthpiece of Jesus' παρρησία, is purely retrospective and oriented to what has already been revealed in Jesus (2:22; 12:16; 14:26). The Paraclete teaches the words of Jesus in a univocal way and brings about the *modus intelligendi* of (ἐν) παρρησία in Jesus' listeners.¹³⁸³

Just as the genre-critical approach, the hermeneutical approach is not without difficulties: (i) Given that παροιμία and παρρησία are often used with *verba dicendi* and with Jesus as the speaker, it is unlikely that the terms refer to *modi intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners; (ii) the accusative παροιμίαν in John 10:6 cannot express modality; and (iii) the distinction between παρρησία as a *modus dicendi* of Jesus (10:24–25; 18:20) and παρρησία as a *modus intelligendi* of Jesus' listeners (16:25) is not justified by linguistic or textual observations.¹³⁸⁴ These criticisms suggest that the interpretation of παροιμία and παρρησία requires a historical-contextual approach that can do justice to these basic linguistic observations of how the terms are used in the Gospel.

The third approach, the post-hermeneutical approach, abandons the presupposition that John considers Christological knowledge as a possibility. For Chatelion Counet, ἐν παροιμίαις refers to the idea of the inexpressibility of Jesus' identity. His view that the hour of Jesus' παρρησία is an eternal promise is, however, problematic, because Jesus' hour is presented as both present and future (John 4:23; 5:25). A fusion of the pre- and post-paschal time can, also, be observed in the Farewell Discourse.¹³⁸⁵

In the fourth approach, the reader-response approach, the genre of παροιμία is not defined in terms of literary features, but is considered to be functional and reader-oriented. The genre of Jesus' language is described in terms of the function that it performs for the implied reader. Reinhartz depicts this function of παροιμία as leading the implied reader to read the Gospel in an allegorical way on the level of the cosmological tale. O'Day and Kysar, on the other hand, contend that παροιμία does not promote an allegorical reading of the text, but transform the assumptions of the implied reader, and enable the implied reader to participate in a new reality (O'Day, Kysar). One of the problems of this fourth approach is that it considers its reader-oriented methodology to be in opposition to historical study. However, John wrote for an actual audience with particular beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions. Instead of examining the potential reaction of the implied audience, one can better interpret John's Gospel as being written for the hypothetical and authorial audience that John had in mind when writing his Gospel. With

¹³⁸² This presupposition is abandoned by Chatelion Counet: see *supra*, Chapter Two, §4.

¹³⁸³ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.

¹³⁸⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.1.

¹³⁸⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §4.

Gadamer, I have stressed that the hermeneutical demand is to understand the text in terms of the specific situation in which it was written.¹³⁸⁶

A difficulty that faces all four above-mentioned approaches is that revelation (cf. *παρηρσία*) in the Gospel is also concealment (cf. *παροιμία*). Revelation is promised (John 14:26), withdrawn (15:15), and then promised again (16:12–13). Such a dynamic suggests, unlike previous scholarship assumes, that *παροιμία* and *παρηρσία* are not opposite terms in the Gospel.¹³⁸⁷ The text of the Gospel, ultimately, resists all four approaches. The question how Johannine language functions is unresolved. The presuppositions of the four approaches did not prove resourceful to deal with the paradox that Johannine language reveals and conceals at the same time. Nevertheless, they have prepared the ground for my historical-contextual approach to *παροιμία* and *παρηρσία*. The questions that guide this approach were all formulated on the basis of my analysis of the shortcomings and my elucidation of the presuppositions of previous scholarly literature on *παροιμία* and *παρηρσία*.¹³⁸⁸

3. *Παροιμία* AND *παρηρσία* IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF THE GOSPEL

Against the dominant view in scholarly literature, I have argued that there is no opposition between *παροιμία* and *παρηρσία* in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. John 10:6 forms an inclusion with 9:39–41 and functions as the realisation of the prophecy of Isa 6:9–10. The language of Jesus in John 10:1–5, characterised as *παροιμία* (10:6), blinded the Pharisees. As Jesus' language in 10:7–18 caused many of the 'Jews' to consider Jesus as having a demon and being mad (10:19–21), this language can also be said, in analogy with 9:39–41, to have a blinding effect. In agreement with 10:6, the language of Jesus in both 10:1–5 and 10:7–18 can be considered as *παροιμία*. In the next phase of the narrative, the 'Jews' urge Jesus to say *παρηρσία* that he is the Christ, if he truly is the Christ (10:24). The 'Jews' were unable to recognise Jesus' *παρηρσία*, although Jesus always taught *παρηρσία* about his identity (7:26; 10:25; 18:20). Jesus' reply that he already spoke *παρηρσία* about his identity (10:25) implies that his *παροιμία* language in 10:1–5, 7–18 was spoken *παρηρσία*. Jesus' use of shepherd and sheep imagery to explain the unbelief of the 'Jews' (10:26–28) reminds the reader of 10:1–5, 7–18. The same imagery is used there and the narrator also states that the 'Jews' did not understand (10:6). The reader is urged to view Jesus' language in 10:1–5, 7–18 as *παροιμία* language that is spoken *παρηρσία*.¹³⁸⁹

The interaction between *παροιμία* and *παρηρσία* is implicitly present in John 11:11–16, although the former term is not mentioned there. Against the dominant view that *Λάζαρος κεκοίμηται* is opposed to *Λάζαρος ἀπέθανεν* in the sense that *παροιμία* is opposed to *παρηρσία*, I have argued that this change of language cannot be understood as

¹³⁸⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §5.

¹³⁸⁷ One exception is O'Day: see *supra*, Chapter Two, §5.2.

¹³⁸⁸ For *παρηρσία* in particular, see *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.

¹³⁸⁹ See *supra*, Chapter Three, §1.

a switch from figurative to plain language. Λάζαρος κεκοίμηται cannot be a euphemism to embellish the harshness of Lazarus' death, because Jesus earlier said that the sickness of Lazarus will not lead to this death (11:4). In 11:11, 14, Jesus is speaking about Lazarus' death in an unconventional meaning. The image of sleep is implied in Jesus' παρρησία teaching about Lazarus' death and is used to redefine the meaning of death. As Lazarus' death and resurrection indirectly refer to Jesus' own death and resurrection, Jesus' παρρησία teaches that his own death is not the end, but can be compared to sleep. The reader is challenged to view Jesus' παρρησία as unconventional language that is informed by imagery instead of being opposed to it. Unlike previous scholarship claims, the passage of 11:11–16 suggests that Jesus' παρρησία is not opposed to his παροιμία teaching.¹³⁹⁰

With regard to the use of παροιμία and παρρησία in John 16:25, I have argued that this passage emphasises the opposition between Jesus' pre-paschal παροιμία teaching and his post-paschal παρρησία teaching in order to show that there is no opposition between both teachings. Within the context of 16:23–33, and more broadly John 14–16, John stresses the division between pre-paschal and post-paschal time, but at the same time presents them as fused with one another. For instance, John 16:27 presents the effects of Jesus' παρρησία teaching as already fulfilled in the present, as the passage characterizes the disciples as having loved Jesus and having believed that he came from the Father. The reader of the Gospel is challenged to view Jesus' παρρησία as taking place in his παροιμία teaching. He or she can only conclude that the παροιμία teaching of Jesus mentioned in 16:25 is the same teaching as his παρρησία teaching that was previously mentioned in 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14 and will later be summarised in 18:20.¹³⁹¹

4. THE ORIENTATION OF THE TEACHING OF THE PARACLETE

An assumption of the hermeneutical approach is that the teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective. On the basis of philological criteria, I have argued that John 14:25–26 and 16:12–13 can better be interpreted as characterising the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete as prospective. These passages present the reminding and the teaching function of the Paraclete as two distinct functions. Just as the earthly Jesus, the Paraclete has a revelatory function. This, however, does not imply that the Paraclete will teach anything that was not yet taught by the earthly Jesus. Although new and revelatory, the Paraclete's teaching can only repeat the teaching of the earthly Jesus. The teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective in accordance with his reminding function; prospective, in agreement with his teaching function.¹³⁹² With the help of Kierkegaard's categories of recollection and repetition, I have articulated how the teaching of the Paraclete can be considered as a movement that is both retrospective and prospective: retrospective, in as far as the Paraclete reminds the disciples of everything that Jesus has said (14:26d–e; cf. 2:19–22;

¹³⁹⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Three, §2.

¹³⁹¹ See *supra*, Chapter Three, §3.

¹³⁹² See *supra*, Chapter Four, §§1–2.

12:12–16); prospective, in as far as the Paraclete teaches “everything” (14:26aβ) and “the coming things” (16:13f).¹³⁹³

Given the prospective orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete, it is difficult to maintain that the Paraclete’s *παρρησία* provides the disciples with a univocal knowledge of Jesus’ words.¹³⁹⁴ Through the movement of repetition, the teaching function of the Paraclete rather has an existential effect on the disciples: instead of knowing the truth, they will be transformed into Jesus followers, who do what is true and designate the truth.¹³⁹⁵

5. THE USE OF *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* IN CONNECTION TO *ἐρωτάω* AND *αἰτέω* IN JOHN 16:23–27

Against the scholarly view that *ἐρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* are synonymous and are used to avoid monotony in John 16:23–27, I have argued that there is a subtle distinction between these verbs. Given that the disciples are already informed by the destination of Jesus (14:12, 28; 16:5), the disciples’ *ἐρωτᾶν* of Jesus in 16:5, 19, 23, 30 is not purely informative, but has a polemical connotation. Jesus’ going away does not conform to the Jewish expectation that the Christ will remain with them forever (cf. 12:34). Jesus’ *παροιμῖαι* baffle the disciples (16:17), who consider *παρρησία* to be in opposition with *παροιμῖαι* (16:29). As Jesus does not adapt to their standards of communication, they question (*ἐρωτάω*) him. The disciples understand the propositional content of Jesus’ *παροιμῖαι* (e.g., “I am going to the Father”), but resist Jesus’ attempt to criticise their messianic views by means of his *παροιμῖαι*. The verb *αἰτέω*, on the other hand, is characterised by confidence and an acceptance of Jesus’ criticism. The reader was prepared for this meaning of *αἰτέω* in John 16:23–27 by the similar use of the verb in 4:9, 10; 11:22; 14:13–14; 15:7, 16. The parallel use of *αἰτέω* in 11:22 to depict Jesus’ asking of the Father implies that the disciples are promised that they will be able to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus) with the same certainty of being given, just as Jesus asked and received everything from the Father throughout the Gospel (cf. 6:5, 11; 9:31; 11:41–42). The reader of the Gospel is challenged to reflect on how Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour (16:25) can bring about the change in the disciples from a disposition characterized by *ἐρωτάω* towards a disposition depicted by *αἰτέω* (16:23–24, 26).¹³⁹⁶

The abrupt positioning of John 16:25 in the discourse on the two forms of asking (16:23–27) can be explained when one envisages that the disciples will participate in Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour. The Spirit-Paraclete is the mouthpiece of Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour (cf. 14:25–26; 16:12–15), and will reside in the disciples (14:17). In 16:25, the informed reader reads between the lines that Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour dwells in the

¹³⁹³ See *supra*, Chapter Four, §3. The division of the Johannine passages is based on the sense line divisions provided in §§1–2 of the same chapter.

¹³⁹⁴ *Contra* the authors of the hermeneutical approach mentioned *supra*, Chapter Two, §3.

¹³⁹⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Four, §3.2.

¹³⁹⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §1.

disciples. Through Jesus' *παρρησία*, the disciples obtain the boldness and the confidence to ask (*αἰτέω*) the Father (and Jesus), and they will be given what they ask for (16:23–24, 26). John 16:27 specifies that the post-paschal love and faith of the disciples will allow them to ask the Father in this way. Through their keeping of the commandment of love, the disciples love Jesus, and will be loved by the Father (14:15–17, 21). To understand how the disciples' love for Jesus and their dedication to his commandment enable them to obtain *παρρησία* through the Spirit-Paraclete, I have referred to Philo, *Her.* 6–7, 26–27 and LXX Job 27:7–10. These texts claim that one can obtain *παρρησία* towards God if one is conscious of having not committed *ἁμαρτία* against him, but having loved him to his advantage. Following the logic of this train of thought, I have concluded that it is the disciples' commitment to Jesus through their keeping of his commandment that grants them with the boldness (cf. *παρρησία*) to ask everything of the Father (and Jesus), and be given it (John 16:23–24, 26–27). Just as Philo's Moses participates in God's *λόγος* and obtains *παρρησία*, the disciples will obtain a portion of Jesus' *παρρησία* through the Spirit-Paraclete. In comparison to John 16:23–27, the texts of 1 John 3:21–22 and 5:14–15 make this connection between *παρρησία* and *αἰτέω* more explicit.¹³⁹⁷

In John's conceptual world, one cannot *ἐρωτᾶν*, but only *αἰτεῖν* in Jesus' name (John 14:13, 14; 15:16; 16:23, 24, 26). Against the scholarly view that the phrase "in Jesus' name" means that the disciples cry out Jesus' name in order that Jesus will mediate their requests to the Father, I have argued for the position that the phrase can be paraphrased as being sent or commissioned by Jesus. Being sent by Jesus means being imbued by the Holy Spirit (20:22) and sanctifying oneself by living in accordance to Jesus' commandment unto death (cf. 17:17–19). The prepositional phrase "in Jesus' name" complementing *αἰτέω* indicates that the disciples' boldness and confidence to ask the Father is facilitated by their keeping of Jesus' commandment of sacrificial love.¹³⁹⁸

6. JESUS' *παρρησία* AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TEACHING METHOD

John claims that Jesus spoke and walked *παρρησία* during his life time (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54; 18:20), although the *καιρός/ῥα* of his *παρρησία* was not yet present (7:4–8; 16:25). The solution of scholarly literature to this ambiguity in the Fourth Gospel is that *παρρησία* is homonymic. The term either refers to the public and bold nature of Jesus' teaching (7:4, 26; 11:54; 18:20) or has the meaning of speaking plainly (10:24; 11:14; 16:25, 29). Although Jesus taught "in public" and "boldly" about his identity (7:4, 26; 11:54; 18:20), he was misunderstood (10:24–25). He will, therefore, speak "plainly" at the time of his death (16:25). I have argued that such a disambiguation of *παρρησία* in two different meanings is problematic and renders John's relationship with the contemporary Greek literature unclear, where the meaning of *παρρησία* is nowhere limited to "public".¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §2.2.

¹³⁹⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Five, §3.

¹³⁹⁹ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §2.1.

With reference to Philodemus' idea of *παρρησία* as an experimental ("stochastic") teaching method, I have provided a solution to the complex issue that the Johannine Jesus uses *παρρησία* during his life time while knowing that the *καιρός/ῥα* of his *παρρησία* is not yet present (John 7:4–8; 16:25). Philodemus compares *παρρησία* to the use of medicine to express its experimental nature. Just as the doctor prescribes medication and does not know in advance whether his or her approach will be effective, one aims for the *καιρός* of *παρρησία*, but can never be sure beforehand whether one will be effective.¹⁴⁰⁰ I have found similar theoretical views on *παρρησία* in Plutarch's *Adulator* and Clement's *Paedagogus*.¹⁴⁰¹

In my analysis of John 7:1–44 and 10:1–30, the following parallels were found between Jesus' use of *παρρησία* and Philodemus' understanding of *παρρησία* as an experimental teaching method: (i) Jesus does not wait for the *καιρός* of his *παρρησία* (cf. 7:6–8), but employs *παρρησία* towards his dialogue partners to improve their goodwill towards him, with good results in some occasions (e.g., 7:26, 31, 40–41b; 10:21); (ii) Jesus does not stop teaching his interlocutors *παρρησία*, if *παρρησία* does not work immediately (e.g., 7:16–19, 28–29; 10:26–30); (iii) Jesus' *παρρησία* affects his audience in a variety of ways (e.g., 7:43; 10:19); and (iv) Jesus does not know in advance how his audience will react to his *παρρησία*, but experiments and proceeds through trial and error, as can be seen in the reactions of his addressees (e.g., 7:15, 20; 10:6, 20, 24). He aims for the best results possible by adapting himself to circumstances.¹⁴⁰²

7. THE ADAPTABILITY OF JESUS' *παρρησία*

Parsenios has observed that, similar to how ancient authors consider *παρρησία* to be appropriate in the presence of friends and in the presence of enemies, Jesus' *παρρησία* equally occurs in two contexts: a public *παρρησία*, in which there is conflict (John 7:26; 10:24; 11:14, 54; 18:20), and a more intimate *παρρησία* among his disciples (16:25), whom he calls *φίλοι* (15:13–14).¹⁴⁰³ I have argued that the adaptability of Jesus' *παρρησία* to different addressees and different contexts can be understood against the background of Philodemus' depiction of the two different forms of *παρρησία*, or two distinct strategies of using *παρρησία*, that are to be used for two different types of students: for obedient students, a mixed or mild form of *παρρησία* involving both blame and praise is to be used; for recalcitrant students, a simple or harsh form consisting of only blame. The first group of students are characterised as "the tender" (*οἱ ἀπαλοί*), as they are able to learn by being taught with a mild form of *παρρησία*; the second group are called "the strong" (*οἱ ἰσχυροί*), because they are easily agitated and violently resist *παρρησία*, and can only be forced to learn by means of a harsh form of *παρρησία*.¹⁴⁰⁴

¹⁴⁰⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Six, §1. Important reference texts are, e.g., Phld., *Lib.* frs. 63:3–13; 64; 65:1–8.

¹⁴⁰¹ See *supra*, Chapter Six, §2.

¹⁴⁰² See *supra*, Chapter Six, §3.

¹⁴⁰³ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §6.2.

¹⁴⁰⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §1. Important reference texts are, e.g., Phld., *Lib.* frs. 7:1–10; 10.

I have demonstrated that similar ideas on *παρρησία* can be found in Philo, the Cynic Epistles, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Clement of Alexandria.¹⁴⁰⁵ Of particular importance is Plutarch, who distinguishes between a “therapeutic” *παρρησία* and a “practical” *παρρησία*. Each form of *παρρησία* follows a method that is opposite to the method followed by the other form of *παρρησία*. Therapeutic *παρρησία* is a mild form of *παρρησία* that corrects wrongdoers by providing a more tolerable cause than the one that actually caused the error. Praise is used to make a person susceptible to criticism. The praise projects an image of the person that is highly contrastive with the actual behaviour of the person. Through comparison with this image, the person realises how deplorable his/her current conduct is. At the same time, the person is encouraged to look upon him or herself as an example for imitation in order to improve his/her bad behaviour.¹⁴⁰⁶ Practical *παρρησία* follows the opposite method by looking for a less creditable cause than the one that is about to cause a person to commit error. Instead of being corrective, practical *παρρησία* is preventive in the sense that it seeks to prevent a person from committing errors in the future.¹⁴⁰⁷ For Plutarch, *παρρησία* should not only adapt to the psychological disposition of the addressees (cf. Philodemus), but also to broader circumstances. Is the error already committed, then the therapeutic form of *παρρησία* should be used; if the addressee is about to commit an error and needs to be driven back, it is better to use the practical form of *παρρησία*, which allows for more harshness. For both Plutarch and Philodemus, *παρρησία* should be as painless as possible. The use of *παρρησία* requires a stochastic talent, as there are no universal rules to use *παρρησία*. One has to make a reasonable guess about the correct intensity of *παρρησία*. The use of *παρρησία* is experimental. The experience and practical reasoning of the user are quintessential.

As Jesus is depicted as having a pre-knowledge of the psychological disposition of his addressees (John 2:25; cf. 6:64; 13:11; 16:30; 21:17) and intends to save the whole κόσμος (1:7; 3:14), the hypothetical first reader of the Gospel, who is (indirectly) informed by the contemporary conventions of *παρρησία*, expects that Jesus’ *παρρησία* teaching to the κόσμος (18:20) is not static, but adapts to the psychological disposition of his addressees and to broader circumstances. The disciples are willing to learn from Jesus (e.g., 1:46; 11:16; 14:5), and are, therefore, treated with a mixed form of *παρρησία* consisting of both blame and praise.¹⁴⁰⁸ Jesus praises the disciples in order to prepare them for criticism.¹⁴⁰⁹ Through praise Jesus creates an image of the disciples that is in contrast with their actual behaviour. By comparing this image with their actual behaviour,

¹⁴⁰⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §2.

¹⁴⁰⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §2.3.1. Important reference texts are, e.g., Plu., *Adulator* 72c–d; 73c–f.

¹⁴⁰⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §2.3.2. Important reference texts are, e.g., Plu., *Adulator* 74a–c.

¹⁴⁰⁸ See my analysis of John 1:46–51; 3:9–10; 13:36–14:10; 14:11–24; 14:25–28; 16:25–32; 20:24–29 in Chapter Seven, §§3.1–2.

¹⁴⁰⁹ For Jesus’ praise of the disciples, see, e.g., John 1:47; 14:1–4; 16:27; 20:29b–c. For Jesus’ criticism of the disciples, see, e.g., 1:50; 14:7a–b; 16:31–32; 20:29d.

the disciples are encouraged to improve themselves. He teaches them as painlessly as possible by reducing the amount of criticism to the limit they can bear (16:12).

The ‘Jews’, the Pharisees, and the crowd are characterised as recalcitrant to Jesus’ teaching (cf. John 9:39–41; 12:40) and are, therefore, treated with a pure form of *παρρησία* consisting of only blame.¹⁴¹⁰ Jesus explains their behaviour on the basis of discreditable explanatory grounds (e.g., 5:37–38, 41–42; 7:19a–b, 24, 28; 8:34, 38c–d, 44). He, thereby, provides his interlocutors with an image of themselves that is worse than they actually are in order to prevent them from committing the *ἁμαρτία* of killing him (e.g., 5:18; 7:19c–d; 8:37, 40). Jesus sometimes employs the strategy of gradually intensifying his *παρρησία* (John 8:12–47). He tries to teach his interlocutors with as little pain as possible. If the milder form of *παρρησία* is not effective, a harsher form will be tried. The aim of the severe criticism is to drive his dialogue partners back from doing wrong and to stir them into correct conduct. Jesus’ severe criticism is a pedagogical strategy to bring his interlocutors to believe in him. This strategy also functions in this way on the level of John’s addressees. The Jewish readers of the Gospel are challenged to identify themselves with οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι and are exhorted to become Jesus followers.

8. JESUS’ *παρρησία* AND THE SALVATION OF THE *κόσμος*

I have argued that Jesus’ *παρρησία* brings about the salvation of the recalcitrant *κόσμος* through the Paraclete’s *ἔλεγχος*. As the Paraclete functions as the mouthpiece of Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour (John 16:25), the Paraclete continues Jesus’ *παρρησία* through his *ἐλέγχειν* of the *κόσμος* concerning its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus (16:8–9). I have demonstrated that LXX Proverbs, Philodemus, Philo, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria viewed *παρρησία* as having the natural result that the reprovved person is ashamed and repents of his/her *ἁμαρτία*.¹⁴¹¹ Philo and Prov 13:5–6, further, attest that shame and awareness of one’s *ἁμαρτία* entail that one cannot have *παρρησία*. Vice versa, Philo claims that awareness of having not committed *ἁμαρτία*, and having lived in accordance with God’s commandments, provides one with *παρρησία*.¹⁴¹² Viewed from the perspective of these conventions of *παρρησία*, John and his readers probably assumed that the Paraclete’s *ἔλεγχος* (John 16:8–9), as the mouthpiece of Jesus’ *παρρησία* at the hour (16:25), will result in the repentance and salvation of the *κόσμος*. The disciples, who will keep Jesus’ commandments (15:8–10), will as agents of the Spirit-Paraclete, obtain *παρρησία* towards the *κόσμος*; whereas the *κόσμος*, aware of its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus, will lose the *παρρησία* that it would normally have towards the disciples on the basis of their socially superior status given that the disciples will be made *ἄποσυνάγωγος*

¹⁴¹⁰ See my analysis of John 5:37–38; 5:41–42; 6:26–27, 36; 7:14–31; 8:12–20; 8:21–30; 8:31–37; 8:38–47; 19:19–22 in Chapter Seven, §§3.3–5.

¹⁴¹¹ See, e.g., LXX Prov 3:12; 5:11–12; 10:10–12; Phld., *Lib. fr.* 7; Plu., *Adulator* 56a; 70a; 72d; *Virt. mor.* 452c; *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 810c; Clem., *Paed.* 1.7.58.2; 1.8.72.1; 3.12.86.1.

¹⁴¹² See, e.g., Ph., *Her.* 6–7, 26–27. Cf. Ph., *Prob.* 148–151.

(16:2). One can adequately speak of a social reversal between the disciples and the κόσμος.¹⁴¹³

Further attestation for the view that the Paraclete's ἔλεγχος (John 16:8–9) will lead to the repentance of the κόσμος can be found in Jesus' promise of peace to the disciples (14:24; 16:33). The fulfilment of this promise by Jesus' words εἰρήνη ὑμῖν (20:19, 21) shows that the disciples will be at peace with the κόσμος when they receive the Holy Spirit from Jesus (20:22). No longer will they have to hide behind locked doors for fear of the 'Jews' (cf. 20:19), as they are sent out, as agents of the Holy Spirit, with the task to forgive and overcome ἁμαρτίαι (20:21–23). This task of the disciples corresponds to the ἐλέγχειν of the Paraclete that was promised in 16:8–9.¹⁴¹⁴

Many other passages in the Fourth Gospel promise salvation/healing to the recalcitrant κόσμος (e.g., John 3:16–17; 8:28; 12:32, 39–40, 46–47; 19:37). These passages not only affirm that there will be peace between the disciples and the κόσμος, but, as I have argued, are all in accordance with the convention that παρρησία can save/heal everyone, including those who resist it.¹⁴¹⁵

9. Παρρησία AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE GOSPEL

In a critical dialogue with Puthenkandathil, I have argued that friendship with Jesus is not based on servile obedience, but on commitment (John 15:14), which depends on freedom and insight. Friendship in the Fourth Gospel is an emotional bond of intimacy (11:5, 35–36), which John does not depict in terms of obedience, as he does not use the verb ὑπακούω at all. Given that the disciples are recognised as friends, and are no longer called servants (15:15), obedience, and the inequality it implies, is not part of John's understanding of friendship. The term 'commitment' more accurately indicates that keeping Jesus' commandments is a condition for becoming friends of Jesus (15:14). Although inequality is the initial starting point in the relationship of the disciples to their teacher/lord Jesus (13:13; cf. 13:16; 15:20), the disciples become friends with Jesus through their commitment to his commandments (15:14) and the open communication between Jesus and the disciples (15:15). This open communication reminds us of the idea of παρρησία. On the basis of an analysis of the friendship language (φίλος, φιλέω, ἀγαπάω) in the Gospel, I have concluded that commitment and παρρησία are the two defining characteristics of John's understanding of friendship.¹⁴¹⁶

In order to explain the logic of how friendship can be defined by commitment and παρρησία, I examined the connection between friendship, παρρησία, and commitment in LXX Wisdom tradition and Philo.¹⁴¹⁷ There, allegiance to God and commitment to his commandments are viewed as the necessary condition for obtaining παρρησία, the

¹⁴¹³ See *supra*, Chapter Eight, §§1–2.

¹⁴¹⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Eight, §2.6.

¹⁴¹⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Eight, §3.

¹⁴¹⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Nine, §1.

¹⁴¹⁷ Important reference texts are, e.g., Prov 13:5–6; 25:8–9; 27:5–6; Job 27:7–10; Sir 19:13–17; Ph., *Her.* 6–7, 21.

necessary ingredient of friendship. John assumes the same logic when he claims that commitment to his commandments is required for becoming friends with him (John 15:14). This commitment would grant them with *παρρησία*, the defining feature of friendship. By entering into a relationship of open communication with Jesus, they will no longer be called servants, but friends (15:15).¹⁴¹⁸

Against the scholarly views that John 15:13 presents Jesus' death either as vicarious and expiatory (e.g., Frey) or as an effective death to protect the community (e.g., Schröter), I have argued that these interpretations do not take into account how the friendship motif is further developed in 15:14–15. The reference to the idea of *παρρησία* between friends (15:15) in combination with the depiction of Jesus' death as the *ῥα* of his *παρρησία* (16:25) suggest that the motif of laying down one's life for one's friends (15:13) is intrinsically connected to the idea that *παρρησία* is the discerning feature of a friend. With reference to Philodemus and Plutarch, I have argued that *παρρησία* can only be effective, and be authentic, if one persuades not only through speaking, but also through deeds. There has to be a consistency between one's teaching and one's conduct. Only then can a friend be recognised as such.¹⁴¹⁹ At the cross, Jesus reveals himself to be a genuine friend because he translates his teaching of love into action. The adequacy between his words and conduct authenticates his *παρρησία*. Thanks to this adequacy, John 15:13 is able to present Jesus as dying for his friends. Instead of an effective death or a vicarious death, John 15:13 and 16:25 present Jesus' death as an act of friendship and true *παρρησία*.

10. THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF JESUS' *παρρησία*

Many scholars of Greek antiquity distinguish between a public (or political) and a private (or ethical) use of *παρρησία*. With recent scholarly literature on *παρρησία* I have argued that this distinction was not in the mind of ancient authors and readers, but is based on the modern liberal distinction between private and public speech.¹⁴²⁰ My enquiries into Philodemus, Plutarch, and Lucian have demonstrated that there is no real distinction between a private use of *παρρησία* among friends and a public use of *παρρησία* by, for instance, politicians or satirists. Both uses of *παρρησία* should comply with the same prescriptions. It is, therefore, probable that the idea of a distinct private use of *παρρησία* and a distinct public use of *παρρησία* was not present in the mind of John's first readers.¹⁴²¹

I have defended the thesis that John's Gospel corrects our modern liberal understanding of what is to be considered as public and private. John 18:20 presents Jesus' *παρρησία* as fully public, including his use of *παρρησία* among the disciples (e.g.,

¹⁴¹⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Nine, §3.

¹⁴¹⁹ Important reference texts are, e.g., Phld., *Lib.* fr. 16:5–9; col. XXa:5–12; Plu., *Adulator* 66e–67a; 71e–f.

¹⁴²⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Ten, §1.

¹⁴²¹ See, *supra*, Chapter Ten, §2. Important reference texts are, e.g., Phld., *Lib.* fr. 40; Plu., *Adulator* 55c–d; 56a; 59c–d; 72c–e; *Phoc.* 2.2–9; *Praec. ger. reip.* 809d–e; 810c; Lucian., *Pisc.* 8, 19, 29.

11:14). The summary text states that Jesus never taught ἐν κρυπτῷ (“in secret”), but always παρρησία. The disciples are allowed to communicate Jesus’ teaching to the world (18:21). The κόσμος is both the home (1:11) and the public teaching room of the divine λόγος (cf. 7:4, 26; 18:20). Like the Cynic, Jesus can only teach παρρησία in public, since he has no private home to keep his teaching hidden from the world.¹⁴²²

11. JOHANNINE παροιμία AND παρρησία AND THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY OF FIGURED SPEECH

Through an analysis of παροιμία in LXX Prov 1:1–6 and the early reception of this passage I have established the view that παροιμία and the associated phrase στροφαι λόγων (“turns of words”) have a technical-rhetorical meaning that was later, in the early reception of the text, explained with terminology that can also be found in the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech. The term παροιμία refers to language that is at first sight clear, but actually signifies something else that is hidden. For instance, Clement comments that παροιμίαι are used by prophets who proclaim the Lord. Thanks to their παροιμίαι, they do not appear as blaspheming, when they are speaking against the assumptions of their addressees. Παροιμίαι allow them to speak the truth indirectly.¹⁴²³

In order to understand John’s use of παροιμία in combination with παρρησία, I have examined the rhetorical theory of figured speech as known to us through Demetrius, Quintilian, Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Ps.-Hermogenes. These authors juxtapose παρρησία (or direct speech) to figured speech. In their theoretical discussions, Quintilian and Ps.-Dionysius defend the thesis that all language is figured, including παρρησία. Strictly speaking, there is, therefore, no opposition between figured speech and παρρησία. As Demetrius puts it, figured speech is the middle course between flattery and open criticism. All authors agree that figured speech is mainly used when it is not safe to use παρρησία (or speak directly), or when it is improper to do so. Figured speech and παρρησία have in common that they both involve speaking one’s mind. The difference is that the former does this in an indirect and veiled way, whereas the latter is direct and plain.¹⁴²⁴

I have given special attention to Plutarch’s views on παρρησία in relationship to παροιμία. Plutarch claims that, like the currency of coinage in trade takes on a different value at different times, the use of language has changed in history. He speaks of a time in which παρρησία was not considered to be irreconcilable with παροιμίαι. In this ‘pre-scientific’ era, people attained their ends in exhortation through παροιμίαι and μύθοι. Plutarch draws attention to the benefit of this poetic use of language in the context of prophecy. The god lets the prophet use this language to remove its repellent harshness

¹⁴²² See *supra*, Chapter Ten, §3.

¹⁴²³ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §1. Important reference texts are, e.g., Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.127.4; 6.15.129.4–6.15.130.1.

¹⁴²⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §2. Important reference texts are, e.g., Demetr., *Eloc.* 287–293; Ps.-D.H., *Rhet.* 295:15–296:5; Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.66; Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 206.

and to guarantee the safety of the prophet. In order to be effective, *παρρησία* collaborates with *παροιμία*. *Παροιμία* mitigates the harshness of *παρρησία* through ambiguity and provides the speaker with the safety to speak his or her mind to despots and enemies.¹⁴²⁵

I have argued that the first readers of the Gospel, who were either acquainted with LXX Proverbs or (indirectly) influenced by the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, probably interpreted the rhetorical function of Johannine *παροιμίες* in a way comparable to the rhetorical concept of *ἔμφασις*. At first sight, Jesus' language is familiar and ordinary. In order that this ordinary language can reveal a hidden God, one has to distance oneself from the 'normal' meaning of this language, and search for a hidden meaning. As a form of figured speech, Jesus' *παροιμίες* allow him to teach *παρρησία* about his messianic identity (John 10:24–25; 18:20) in situations in which he does not have the required safety to do so due to the intention of the 'Jews' to kill him (e.g., 7:1; 10:31). The ambiguity of Jesus' *παροιμίες* provides the necessary safety for Jesus to use *παρρησία*, because it confronts the hearers with words that can be explained in more than one way. His *παροιμίες*, also, allow Jesus to soften the harshness of his *παρρησία*; for instance, towards the disciples, who cannot bear too much criticism (16:12). Jesus' *παροιμίες* present Jesus as an adaptable teacher who adjusts himself to the capacity of his addressees to accommodate criticism. I have illustrated this use of figured speech by Jesus with an analysis of John 7:32–36 and 10:1–6.¹⁴²⁶

12. A COMPARISON OF THE JOHANNINE *παροιμία* AND *παρρησία* TO THE MARKAN *παραβολή* AND *παρρησία*

In dialogue with scholarly literature, I have argued that *παρρησία* in Mark 8:32a is a contrastive term of both the parable teaching of Jesus (4:11–12, 33–34a) and Peter's taking Jesus aside (*προσλαμβάνω*) to rebuke him (8:32b–d).¹⁴²⁷

To understand this juxtaposition of *παρρησία* to *παραβολή* I have compared Mark's genre consciousness of *παραβολή* to Demetrius' definition of figured speech.¹⁴²⁸ Figured speech, as the middle course between the distorting language of the flatterer and the plain language of the adverse critic, establishes communication by concealing the speaker's intention.¹⁴²⁹ Similarly, for Mark, revelation takes place through the concealment by Jesus' parabolic language (Mark 4:11–12, 21–22). Figured speech and Markan *παραβολαί* communicate meaning indirectly through ambiguity and require from their audience to search for a hidden meaning. Jesus speaks in parables to adapt to the ability of his audience to receive the mystery (cf. 4:33). Just as figured speech, Jesus' parables mitigate the harshness of his message. My view that Markan *παραβολή* is a form of

¹⁴²⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §3. Important reference texts are, e.g., Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406b–c; 407d–e.

¹⁴²⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven, §4.

¹⁴²⁷ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §1.

¹⁴²⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §2.1.

¹⁴²⁹ Demetrius' definition of figured speech can be found in Demetr., *Eloc.* 294, but is also implicitly shared by the other authors discussed in Chapter Eleven, §2.

figured speech is supported by ancient rhetoricians, who often discuss παραβολή, and other terms denoting figurative comparison, as figures.¹⁴³⁰ Additionally, Clement mentions that παραβολή is a form of prophecy and figured speech used to keep the speaker from harm by those whose assumptions he or she violates.¹⁴³¹

Having established the view that Mark thought of παραβολή as a form of figured speech, I have compared the Markan Jesus' use of parables with the different motives/uses of figured speech mentioned by ancient rhetoricians.¹⁴³² I have argued that tact and especially circumspection play an important role in the motivation of Jesus' use of parables in Mark 4:1–34 and 12:1–9.¹⁴³³ I have demonstrated that, only if no opponents are listening and safety is absolutely guaranteed, Jesus speaks παρρησία about his identity as the Christ (8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34). Given that there is no danger, Jesus does not veil his speech. The disciples are not allowed to communicate anything to others (8:30), so that opponents will not cross Jesus' mission.¹⁴³⁴

Unlike scholarly literature, I have observed two fundamental differences between the Markan use of παραβολή and παρρησία and the Johannine use of παροιμία and παρρησία. The first difference concerns the different circumstances in which παρρησία and figured speech are used. The Markan παραβολή is used in public situations when direct teaching would endanger Jesus' messianic mission (e.g., Mark 3:23–27; 12:1–11), while παρρησία is reserved for the ears of the disciples in secure private situations (8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34). The Johannine παροιμία, on the other hand, is used in both hostile public situations (John 10:6) and in secure private situations among the disciples (16:25). The Johannine Jesus uses παρρησία among friends in 11:14, but also towards opponents in polemical public situations (7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 11:54). Two opposed motifs are at play in the two Gospels: a secrecy motif in Mark, and a public motif in John. In Mark, only the disciples may hear Jesus' παρρησία (Mark 9:30; 10:32), and the disciples are not allowed to communicate further what Jesus said (8:30). In John, Jesus' παρρησία is addressed to the entire κόσμος (John 18:20), and the disciples are allowed to communicate further what Jesus said (18:21).¹⁴³⁵

The second difference between Mark and John concerns the relationship between παρρησία and figured speech. In John, παροιμία and παρρησία refer to the same sayings of Jesus. The Johannine Jesus teaches παρρησία through παροιμίαι.¹⁴³⁶ In Mark, Jesus' παρρησία teaching (Mark 8:31–32a; 9:31; 10:33–34) is clearly distinguished from, and supplemented to, his parable teaching as an explanation (cf. 4:33–34). Mark's view on the relationship between παρρησία and figured speech can be explained with reference to the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech, where παρρησία is juxtaposed to figured

¹⁴³⁰ See, e.g., Rhet. Her. 4.59–61; Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.100–101; Ps.-Hermog., *Inv.* 179.3.

¹⁴³¹ See Clem., *Strom.* 6.15.127.4; 6.15.129.4–6.15.130.1.

¹⁴³² I have depicted the views of these ancient rhetoricians in Chapter Eleven, §2.

¹⁴³³ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §§2.2.1–2.

¹⁴³⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §2.2.3.

¹⁴³⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §§3.1–2.

¹⁴³⁶ See *supra*, Chapter Three and Chapter Eleven.

speech.¹⁴³⁷ John interacts with another rhetorical tradition of which Plutarch writes that its understanding of language was customary in former times, but was barely understandable for the majority of the people in his time.¹⁴³⁸

I have argued that Mark's and John's choice of different terms, namely παραβολή and παροιμία, is guided by different understandings of how παρρησία relates to figured speech. The Johannine παροιμία is transparent enough to transfer παρρησία, whereas the Markan παραβολή requires supplementary explanation that is expressed through παρρησία. I have explained these features of Johannine παροιμία and Markan παραβολή with reference to Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. Quintilian defines παραβολή as a distant comparison requiring of the audience to make inferences to bridge the distance between the object of comparison and the object of explanation. In παροιμία, however, the intention of the speaker is obvious and it is possible that the audience perceives the intended criticism without a supplementary explanation.¹⁴³⁹ Given this transparency of παροιμία, John present Jesus as teaching παρρησία through παροιμίαι. As the comparison in parables is more distant, the Markan parables require an additional explanation, which is expressed παρρησία.¹⁴⁴⁰

13. IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH

I will shortly outline five implications of the research results of the present study for the broader field of Johannine studies. These implications open up promising avenues for future research.

(1) Instead of demythologising John's language, one ought to do the opposite if one wants to read John's language in its original historical context. For John, truth (or Jesus) can only be revealed through the figured speech of παροιμίαι because the revelation of truth through παρρησία entails being critical of the presuppositions of the hearers/readers. The plurality of meanings of Jesus' παροιμίαι is ultimately necessary to enable communication between God and the world.¹⁴⁴¹ Informed by this new perspective on Johannine language, future studies are expected to provide original interpretations of Johannine imagery and their peculiarities in comparison to the Synoptic parables.

(2) When viewed from the ancient conventions of παρρησία in the period between the first century BCE and the second century CE, some of the much discussed incidences of anti-Jewish polemics in the Fourth Gospel can be evaluated differently. The severe criticisms of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι have the intention to change the behaviour of the Jewish readers of the Gospel and to turn them into Jesus followers.¹⁴⁴² Despite the problematic reception history of the Gospel, Jesus' criticisms of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι have the intention to save them. Although this may be in contradiction to our present-day pedagogical standards, ancients

¹⁴³⁷ The authors of the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech are discussed by Chapter Eleven, §2.

¹⁴³⁸ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §3.2. The main reference text is Plu., *Pyth. orac.* 406b–c.

¹⁴³⁹ See Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.23; 8.6.57–58.

¹⁴⁴⁰ See *supra*, Chapter Twelve, §3.3.

¹⁴⁴¹ See *supra*, Chapter Eleven.

¹⁴⁴² See *supra*, Chapter Seven, §§3.3–5.

believed that a harsh form of *παρρησία* was required for teaching the recalcitrant and that the latter benefitted from this harsh treatment. A question for future reflection is whether John's missionary effort provides the Jews with enough freedom to be who they are.

(3) My study of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel has argued that Jesus' revelation is indirect and concealed in order to secure the safety of Jesus and to guarantee that his revelation is accepted by his addressees. Given that revelation is equally concealment in the Gospel, the literary features of repetition, variation, and amplification are inherent to John's writing.¹⁴⁴³ The understanding of Jesus' *παρρησία* as being stochastic or experimental further substantiates that repetition is essential to Jesus' teaching.¹⁴⁴⁴ Hence, the repetition of imagery in the different parts of the Gospel is not due to different authors, but to the rhetorical structure of the Gospel. Future research has to further examine whether apparent contradictions and aporias in the Gospel can be explained with reference to John's views on revelation, as they are expressed by his use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*.

(4) Previous scholarship has, incorrectly, interpreted *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* as justifying their reading of the Gospel from the perspective of the socio-historical situation of the Johannine group as depicted by Martyn, Brown, and Meeks.¹⁴⁴⁵ I have advocated that this socio-historical situation of the Johannine group cannot be derived from John's use of these two terms. As John's Gospel is presented as being written by the Beloved Disciple (John 19:35; 21:24), it is an expression of Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour (16:25). Jesus' *παρρησία* at the hour is mediated by the Paraclete who dwells in the disciples (14:17; cf. 14:25–26; 16:12–15). Hence, John's writing is itself an act of Jesus' *παρρησία*. Given the public character of Jesus' *παρρησία* and its being addressed to the whole *κόσμος* (18:20), John's Gospel cannot be considered to be an esoteric teaching for a sectarian Johannine community. Through the text of the Gospel, Jesus followers reprove the *κόσμος* of its *ἁμαρτία* of not believing in Jesus in order to bring the world to repentance of this *ἁμαρτία* (16:8–9). The Gospel reflects the socio-historical reality of persecuted Jesus followers who have lost the social status that originally warranted their *παρρησία*, viz. their belonging to the synagogue (16:2). These Jesus followers reacted to this loss of *παρρησία* by authorising their *παρρησία* with reference to their keeping of Jesus' commandment of love unto death.¹⁴⁴⁶ Future research has to verify whether this proposed reading of the socio-historical situation of the Gospel can also shed a new light on other passages in the Gospel.

(5) Although John's understanding of language is not the only factor that is to be taken into account to answer the question how John relates to the Synoptic Gospels, it is an important indicator of how he rhetorically and narratively reworks Synoptic material. I have not demonstrated this with case studies in the present dissertation. The provided

¹⁴⁴³ See *supra*, Chapters Three and Eleven.

¹⁴⁴⁴ See *supra*, Chapter Six.

¹⁴⁴⁵ See *supra*, Chapter Two, §1.4.

¹⁴⁴⁶ See *supra*, "Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Fourth Gospel as an Act of *παρρησία*" in Chapters Six, Eight, Ten, and Eleven.

insights in (i) the semantic differences between Johannine *παροιμία* and Markan *παραβολή*; and (ii) the relationship of these terms to *παρρησία* will have to be taken into consideration by future studies on the literary dependency of John on Mark. John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*, at least, suggests that he knew Mark and creatively adapted the rhetorical pattern of *παραβολή* and *παρρησία* to the rhetorical pattern of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*.¹⁴⁴⁷ Future studies can further enquire how this might help to explain the fundamental differences between John's and Mark's presentation of Jesus' teaching.

In conclusion to this general conclusion, I summarise that the historical-hermeneutical approach of the present dissertation has provided original insights into how *παροιμία* and *παρρησία* in the Fourth Gospel can be interpreted in their ancient rhetorical context and against the background of ancient philosophical writings on *παρρησία*. Instead of an objective reconstruction of the meaning of these two terms, I have elucidated, as much as possible, the presuppositions that have guided previous scholarship. The critical confrontation with the otherness of the text has provided me with questions that allowed me to provide new perspectives on John's use of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. As it is only from within our own historical horizon that we can be confronted with the otherness of the text, I hope that future studies will provide a critical analysis of the presuppositions that underly my interpretations of *παροιμία* and *παρρησία*. Given that understanding is co-determined by our historicity, the task of interpretation is never finished.

¹⁴⁴⁷ See *supra*, Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

APPENDIX ONE¹⁴⁴⁸

Vers	MT	LXX	Aquila	Symmachus	Theodotion
Num 21:27	מש	αἰνιγματίστης	παροιμιαζόμενος	-	-
Num 23:7	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 23:18	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 24:3	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 24:15	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 24:20	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 24:21	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Num 24:23	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Deut 28:37	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
1 Sam 10:12	מש	παραβολή	παροιμία	-	-
1 Sam 24:14	מש	παραβολή	-	παροιμία	-
1 Kgs 5:12	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
1 Kgs 9:7	מש	λαλήμα	-	-	-
1 Chr 6:59	מש	μασαλ	-	-	-
2 Chr 7:20	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Job 13:12	מש	γαυρίαμα/ ἀγαυρίαμα	-	-	-
Job 17:6	מש	θρύλημα	παραβολή	παραβολή	παραβολή
Job 27:1	מש	προοιμίω	παραβολή	-	-
Job 29:1	מש	προοιμίω	-	-	-
Ps 43 (44):15	מש	παραβολή	διήγησις	παραβολή	-
Ps 48 (49):5	מש	παραβολή	παραβολή	-	-
Ps 68 (69):12	מש	παραβολή	παραβολή	παραβολή	-
Ps 77 (78):2	מש	παραβολή	παραβολή	παροιμία	-
Prov 1:1	מש	παροιμία	παραβολή	-	-
Prov 1:6	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Prov 10:1	מש	vacat.	-	-	-
Prov 25:1	מש	παιδεῖα	παραβολή	παροιμία	παραβολή
Prov 26:7	מש	παροιμία	-	παραβολή	-
Prov 26:9	מש	δουλεῖα	-	παραβολή	-
Ecc1 12:9	מש	παραβολή	παροιμία	-	-
Isa 14:4	מש	θρήνος	παραβολή	παραβολή	παραβολή
Jer 24:9	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-
Ezek 12:22	מש	παραβολή	παραβολή	παροιμία	παραβολή
Ezek 12:23	מש	παραβολή	-	-	-

¹⁴⁴⁸ Used sources: Field (ed.), *Origenis Hexaplorum*, 2 vols.; Alan E. Brooke – Norman Mclean – Henry St. John Thackeray (eds.), *The Old Testament in Greek: According to the Text of Codex Vaticanus, Supplemented From other Uncial Manuscripts. With a Critical Apparatus Containing the Variants of the Chief Ancient Authorities for the Text of the Septuagint*, 7 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906–1940); Joseph Reider – Nigel Turner (eds.), *An Index to Aquila: Greek-Hebrew, Hebrew-Greek, Latin-Hebrew with the Syriac and Armenian Evidence*, VTSup 12 (Leiden: Brill, 1966); Edwin Hatch – Henry A. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint and the Other Greek Versions of the Old Testament (Including the Apocryphal Books)* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Book House, ²1998); Rahlfs, *Septuaginta*; Ziegler et al., *Septuaginta*.

Ezek 14:8	משל	ěρημος	-	-	-
Ezek 16:44	משל	παραβολή	-	-	-
Ezek 17:2	משל	παραβολή	-	-	-
Ezek 18:2	משל	παραβολή	παροιμία	-	παραβολή
Ezek 18:3	משל	παραβολή	-	-	-
Ezek 20:49	משל	παραβολή	-	παραβολή	-
Ezek 24:3	משל	παραβολή	παροιμιάση	παροιμιάσαι	-
Mic 2:4	משל	παραβολή	-	-	-
Hab 2:6	משל	παραβολή	-	-	-

APPENDIX TWO

Kim E. Dewey	Hyunsok Doh	Tom Thatcher	Mira Stare
		1:15: ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος ἐμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν, ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν	
1:46: ἐκ Ναζαρετ δύναται τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;			
		2:4: οὕπω ἤκει ἡ ὥρα μου	
2:10: πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πρῶτον τὸν καλὸν οἶνον τίθησιν καὶ ὅταν μεθυσθῶσιν τὸν ἐλάσσω			
		2:16: μὴ ποιεῖτε τὸν οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς μου οἶκον ἐμπορίου	
	2:19: λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν	2:19: λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν	2:19: λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν
	3:3: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ	3:3, 5: ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ [ἄνωθεν/ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος], οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ	3:3–7: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ. [...]ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, οὐ δύναται εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ. τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστιν. μὴ θαυμάσης ὅτι εἶπόν σοι· δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν.
3:8: τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ’			3:8: τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ

οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει			ὑπάγει· οὕτως ἐστὶν πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος
3:20: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ φαῦλα πράσσων μισεῖ τὸ φῶς καὶ οὐκ ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸ φῶς, ἵνα μὴ ἐλεγχθῇ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ			
3:27: οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ ἐν ἑάν μὴ ἦ δεδομένον αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ			
3:29: ὁ ἔχων τὴν νύμφην νυμφίος ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ φίλος τοῦ νυμφίου ὁ ἐστηκὼς καὶ ἀκούων αὐτοῦ χαρᾷ χαίρει διὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ νυμφίου			
3:30: ἐκεῖνον δεῖ αὐξάνειν, ἐμὲ δὲ ἐλαττοῦσθαι			
		4:7, 10: δός μοι πεῖν	
			4:13–14 (par. 7:37): πᾶς ὁ πίνων ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος τούτου διψήσει πάλιν· ὃς δ' ἂν πίῃ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος οὗ ἐγὼ δώσω αὐτῷ, οὐ μὴ διψήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὕδωρ ὃ δώσω αὐτῷ γενήσεται ἐν αὐτῷ πηγὴ ὕδατος ἀλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον
		4:20: οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ προσεκύνησαν· καὶ ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος ὅπου προσκυνεῖν δεῖ	
	4:32: ἐγὼ βρωσὶν ἔχω φαγεῖν ἢν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε	4:32: ἐγὼ βρωσὶν ἔχω φαγεῖν ἢν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε	
4:35: ἔτι τετράμηνός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ θερισμὸς ἔρχεται 4:37: ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ σπεύρων καὶ ἄλλος ὁ θερίζων			4:34–38: ἐμὸν βρωμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιήσω τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με καὶ τελειώσω αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔργον. οὐχ ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι ἔτι τετράμηνός

			<p>ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ θερισμὸς ἔρχεται; ἰδοὺ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐπάρατε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν καὶ θεάσασθε τὰς χώρας ὅτι λευκαὶ εἰσιν πρὸς θερισμόν. ἤδη ὁ θερίζων μισθὸν λαμβάνει καὶ συνάγει καρπὸν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἵνα ὁ σπείρων ὁμοῦ χαίρῃ καὶ ὁ θερίζων.</p> <p>ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀληθινὸς ὅτι ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ σπείρων καὶ ἄλλος ὁ θερίζων. ἐγὼ ἀπέστειλα ὑμᾶς θερίσειν ὃ οὐχ ὑμεῖς κεκοπιάκατε· ἄλλοι κεκοπιάκασιν καὶ ὑμεῖς εἰς τὸν κόπον αὐτῶν εἰσεληλύθατε.</p>
4:44: προφήτης ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ πατρίδι τιμὴν οὐκ ἔχει			
5:19–20a: οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἄφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐὰν μὴ τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ. ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ φιλεῖ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ			<p>5:19–23: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἄφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐὰν μὴ τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ. ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ φιλεῖ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, καὶ μείζονα τούτων δείξει αὐτῷ ἔργα, ἵνα ὑμεῖς θαυμάζητε. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγείρει τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ υἱὸς οὕς θέλει ζωοποιεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ κρίνει οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τὴν κρίσιν πᾶσαν δέδωκεν τῷ υἱῷ, ἵνα πάντες τιμῶσι τὸν υἱὸν καθὼς τιμῶσι τὸν πατέρα. ὁ μὴ τιμῶν τὸν υἱὸν οὐ</p>

			τιμᾷ τὸν πατέρα τὸν πέμψαντα αὐτόν.
		6:5: πόθεν ἀγοράσωμεν ἄρτους ἵνα φάγωσιν οὗτοι;	
	<p>6:32–33: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου δίδωσιν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸν ἀληθινόν· ὁ γὰρ ἄρτος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ καταβαίνων ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ζωὴν διδοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ</p> <p>6,35: ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς· ὁ ἐρχόμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ πεινάσῃ, καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ πώποτε</p>	<p>6:32: οὐ Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου δίδωσιν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸν ἀληθινόν</p>	<p>6:32–40 (par. 6:48–51): ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου δίδωσιν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸν ἀληθινόν· ὁ γὰρ ἄρτος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ καταβαίνων ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ζωὴν διδοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ. [...] ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς· ὁ ἐρχόμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ πεινάσῃ, καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ πώποτε. Ἀλλ' εἶπον ὑμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἐώρακάτέ [με] καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε. πᾶν ὃ δίδωσίν μοι ὁ πατήρ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἥξει, καὶ τὸν ἐρχόμενον πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκβάλω ἔξω, ὅτι καταβέβηκα ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐχ ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θέλημα τὸ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶν ὃ δέδωκέν μοι μὴ ἀπολέσω ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸ [ἐν] τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ θεωρῶν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐγὼ [ἐν] τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.</p>

	6:51: ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς· ἐάν τις φάγη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἄρτου ζήσκει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ ὁ ἄρτος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω ἡ σὰρξ μου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς	6:51: ὁ ἄρτος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω ἡ σὰρξ μου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς	
	6:53: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πίνητε αὐτοῦ τὸ αἶμα, οὐκ ἔχετε ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς		
7:4: οὐδεὶς γάρ τι ἐν κρυπτῷ ποιεῖ καὶ ζητεῖ αὐτὸς ἐν παρρησίᾳ εἶναι			
7:18a: ὁ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λαλῶν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἰδίαν ζητεῖ			
		7:23: εἰ περιτομὴν λαμβάνει ἄνθρωπος ἐν σαββάτῳ ἵνα μὴ λυθῇ ὁ νόμος Μωϋσέως, ἐμοὶ χολᾷτε ὅτι ὅλον ἄνθρωπον ὑγιῇ ἐποίησα ἐν σαββάτῳ;	
	7:33–34: ἔτι χρόνον μικρὸν μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι καὶ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με. ζητήσετε με καὶ οὐχ εὐρήσετε [με], καὶ ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν	7:34: ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν	
	7:37b–38: ἐάν τις διψᾷ ἐρχέσθω πρὸς με καὶ πινέτω. ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, καθὼς εἶπεν ἡ γραφή, ποταμοὶ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ ρεύσουσιν ὕδατος ζῶντος	7:37–38: ἐάν τις διψᾷ ἐρχέσθω πρὸς με καὶ πινέτω ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ	
		8:4–5: αὕτη ἡ γυνὴ κατεῖληπται ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ μοιχευομένη· ἐν δὲ τῷ νόμῳ ἡμῖν Μωϋσῆς ἐνετείλατο τὰς τοιαύτας λιθάζειν. σὺ οὖν τί λέγεις;	

		8:18: ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ μαρτυρῶν περὶ ἐμαντοῦ καὶ μαρτυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ	
	8:21: ἐγὼ ὑπάγω καὶ ζητήσετέ με, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὑμῶν ἀποθανεῖσθε· ὅπου ἐγὼ ὑπάγω ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν	8:21: ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν	
		8:24: ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ πιστεύσητε ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν	
		8:26: καὶ ἐγὼ ἃ ἤκουσα παρ' αὐτοῦ ταῦτα λαλῶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον	
	8:31–32: ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μείνητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ μου ἔστε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς	8:31–32: ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μείνητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ μου ἔστε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς	
8:34: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν δοῦλός ἐστιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας			
8:35: ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μένει ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ὁ υἱὸς μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα			
		8:38: ἃ ἐγὼ ἐώρακα παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ λαλῶ· καὶ ὑμεῖς οὖν ἃ ἠκούσατε παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ποιεῖτε.	
	8:51: ἐάν τις τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον τηρήσῃ, θάνατον οὐ μὴ θεωρήσῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα	8:51: ἐάν τις τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον τηρήσῃ, θάνατον οὐ μὴ θεωρήσῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα	
	8:56: Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ἡγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν, καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐχάρη	8:56: Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ἡγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν, καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐχάρη 13:33: ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν	

	8:58: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμί		
		9:2: τίς ἥμαρτεν, οὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῇ;	
9:4: ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με ἕως ἡμέρας· ἐστὶν· ἔρχεται νύξ ὅτε οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐργάζεσθαι			
		9:39: εἰς κρίμα ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον ἦλθον, ἵνα οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ οἱ βλέποντες τυφλοὶ γένωνται	
10:1–3a: ὁ μὴ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀλλὰ ἀναβαίνων ἀλλαχόθεν ἐκεῖνος κλέπτῃς ἐστὶν καὶ ληστής· ὁ δὲ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας ποιμὴν ἐστὶν τῶν προβάτων. τούτῳ ὁ θυρωρὸς ἀνοίγει 10,3b-5: καὶ τὰ πρόβατα τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει καὶ τὰ ἴδια πρόβατα φωνεῖ κατ' ὄνομα καὶ ἐξάγει αὐτά. ὅταν τὰ ἴδια πάντα ἐκβάλῃ, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορεύεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὅτι οἶδασιν τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ φεύξονται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδασιν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν φωνήν.	10:1–5: Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ μὴ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀλλὰ ἀναβαίνων ἀλλαχόθεν ἐκεῖνος κλέπτῃς ἐστὶν καὶ ληστής· ὁ δὲ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας ποιμὴν ἐστὶν τῶν προβάτων. τούτῳ ὁ θυρωρὸς ἀνοίγει καὶ τὰ πρόβατα τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει καὶ τὰ ἴδια πρόβατα φωνεῖ κατ' ὄνομα καὶ ἐξάγει αὐτά. ὅταν τὰ ἴδια πάντα ἐκβάλῃ, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορεύεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὅτι οἶδασιν τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ φεύξονται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδασιν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν φωνήν.	10:1–5: Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ μὴ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀλλὰ ἀναβαίνων ἀλλαχόθεν ἐκεῖνος κλέπτῃς ἐστὶν καὶ ληστής· ὁ δὲ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας ποιμὴν ἐστὶν τῶν προβάτων. τούτῳ ὁ θυρωρὸς ἀνοίγει καὶ τὰ πρόβατα τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει καὶ τὰ ἴδια πρόβατα φωνεῖ κατ' ὄνομα καὶ ἐξάγει αὐτά. ὅταν τὰ ἴδια πάντα ἐκβάλῃ, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορεύεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὅτι οἶδασιν τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ φεύξονται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδασιν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν φωνήν.	10:1–5: Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ μὴ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀλλὰ ἀναβαίνων ἀλλαχόθεν ἐκεῖνος κλέπτῃς ἐστὶν καὶ ληστής· ὁ δὲ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας ποιμὴν ἐστὶν τῶν προβάτων. τούτῳ ὁ θυρωρὸς ἀνοίγει καὶ τὰ πρόβατα τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει καὶ τὰ ἴδια πρόβατα φωνεῖ κατ' ὄνομα καὶ ἐξάγει αὐτά. ὅταν τὰ ἴδια πάντα ἐκβάλῃ, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορεύεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὅτι οἶδασιν τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ φεύξονται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδασιν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν φωνήν.
			10:7, 9: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ θύρα τῶν προβάτων. [...] ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ θύρα· δι' ἐμοῦ ἐάν τις

			εισέλθῃ σωθήσεται καὶ εἰσελεύσεται καὶ ἐξελεύσεται καὶ νομὴν εὐρήσει.
10:11b–13: ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλὸς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ τίθησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων· ὁ μισθωτὸς καὶ οὐκ ὢν ποιμὴν, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ πρόβατα ἴδια, θεωρεῖ τὸν λύκον ἐρχόμενον καὶ ἀφίησιν τὰ πρόβατα καὶ φεύγει· καὶ ὁ λύκος ἀρπάζει αὐτὰ καὶ σκορπίζει· ὅτι μισθωτὸς ἔστιν καὶ οὐ μέλει αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν προβάτων			10:12–13: ὁ μισθωτὸς καὶ οὐκ ὢν ποιμὴν, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ πρόβατα ἴδια, θεωρεῖ τὸν λύκον ἐρχόμενον καὶ ἀφίησιν τὰ πρόβατα καὶ φεύγει· καὶ ὁ λύκος ἀρπάζει αὐτὰ καὶ σκορπίζει· ὅτι μισθωτὸς ἔστιν καὶ οὐ μέλει αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν προβάτων.
		10:34–36: οὐκ ἔστιν γεγραμμένον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ὑμῶν ὅτι ἐγὼ εἶπα· θεοὶ ἔστε; εἰ ἐκείνους εἶπεν θεοὺς πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι ἡ γραφή, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἡγίασεν καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι βλασφημεῖς, ὅτι εἶπον· υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἰμι;	
11:9–10: οὐχὶ δώδεκα ὥραί εἰσιν τῆς ἡμέρας; ἐάν τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οὐ προσκόπτει, ὅτι τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου τούτου βλέπει· ἐὰν δέ τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ νυκτί, προσκόπτει, ὅτι τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ.			11:9–10 (par. 8:12; 9:4–5; 12:35): οὐχὶ δώδεκα ὥραί εἰσιν τῆς ἡμέρας; ἐάν τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οὐ προσκόπτει, ὅτι τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου τούτου βλέπει· ἐὰν δέ τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ νυκτί, προσκόπτει, ὅτι τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ.
	11:11: Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν κεκοίμηται	11:11: Λάζαρος ὁ φίλος ἡμῶν κεκοίμηται	

		11:23: ἀναστήσεται ὁ ἀδελφός σου	
		11:25–26: ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ ἀποθάνη ζήσεται, καὶ πᾶς ὁ ζῶν καὶ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνη εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα	
12:24: ἐὰν μὴ ὁ κόκκος τοῦ σίτου πεσὼν εἰς τὴν γῆν ἀποθάνη, αὐτὸς μόνος μένει· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνη, πολὺν καρπὸν φέρει 12:25a: ὁ φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολλύει αὐτήν			12:24–25: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁ κόκκος τοῦ σίτου πεσὼν εἰς τὴν γῆν ἀποθάνη, αὐτὸς μόνος μένει· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνη, πολὺν καρπὸν φέρει. ὁ φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολλύει αὐτήν, καὶ ὁ μισῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον φυλάξει αὐτήν.
	12:32: καγὼ ἐὰν ὑψωθῶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πάντας ἐλκύσω πρὸς ἐμαυτόν	12:32: καγὼ ἐὰν ὑψωθῶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πάντας ἐλκύσω πρὸς ἐμαυτόν	
12:35c: καὶ ὁ περιπατῶν ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ οὐκ οἶδεν ποῦ ὑπάγει			
	13:8: ἐὰν μὴ νίψω σε, οὐκ ἔχεις μέρος μετ' ἐμοῦ		
13:10: ὁ λελουμένος οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν εἰ μὴ τοὺς πόδας νίψασθαι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν καθαρὸς ὅλος	13:10: ὁ λελουμένος οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν εἰ μὴ τοὺς πόδας νίψασθαι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν καθαρὸς ὅλος· καὶ ὑμεῖς καθαροὶ ἐστε, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ πάντες	13:10: καὶ ὑμεῖς καθαροὶ ἐστε, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ πάντες	
13:16: οὐκ ἔστιν δοῦλος μείζων τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ ἀπόστολος μείζων τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτόν			
13:17: εἰ ταῦτα οἴδατε, μακάριοί ἐστε ἐὰν ποιῇτε αὐτά			
	13:21c: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι εἷς ἐξ ὑμῶν παραδώσει με	13:21: εἷς ἐξ ὑμῶν παραδώσει με	
	13:27b: ὁ ποιεῖς ποιήσων τάχιον		

	13:33: τεκνία, ἔτι μικρὸν μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι· ζητήσετέ με, καὶ καθὼς εἶπον τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὅτι ὅπου ἐγὼ ὑπάγω ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ὑμῖν λέγω ἄρτι.		
	13:36b: ὅπου ὑπάγω οὐ δύνασαι μοι νῦν ἀκολουθήσαι, ἀκολουθήσεις δὲ ὕστερον		
		14:4: καὶ ὅπου [ἐγὼ] ὑπάγω οἶδατε τὴν ὁδόν	14:1–4: Μὴ ταρασσέσθω ὑμῶν ἡ καρδία· πιστεύετε εἰς τὸν θεὸν καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ πιστεύετε. ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς μου μοναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, εἶπον ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι πορεύομαι ἐτοιμάσαι τόπον ὑμῖν; καὶ ἐὰν πορευθῶ καὶ ἐτοιμάσω τόπον ὑμῖν, πάλιν ἔρχομαι καὶ παραλήμψομαι ὑμᾶς πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ἵνα ὅπου εἰμι ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς ᾤτε. καὶ ὅπου [ἐγὼ] ὑπάγω οἶδατε τὴν ὁδόν.
		14:7: καὶ ἀπ' ἄρτι γινώσκετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐώρακατε αὐτόν	
	14:19: ἔτι μικρὸν καὶ ὁ κόσμος με οὐκέτι θεωρεῖ, ὑμεῖς δὲ θεωρεῖτέ με, ὅτι ἐγὼ ζῶ καὶ ὑμεῖς ζήσετε	14:19: ἔτι μικρὸν καὶ ὁ κόσμος με οὐκέτι θεωρεῖ, ὑμεῖς δὲ θεωρεῖτέ με	
15:1–2, 6: Ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἄμπελος ἡ ἀληθινή καὶ ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ γεωργός ἐστιν. πᾶν κλῆμα ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴ φέρον καρπὸν αἶρει αὐτό, καὶ πᾶν τὸ καρπὸν φέρον καθαίρει αὐτὸ ἵνα καρπὸν πλείονα φέρῃ. [...] ἐὰν μὴ τις μένη ἐν ἐμοί, ἐβλήθη ἔξω ὥς τὸ κλῆμα καὶ ἐξηράνθη καὶ			15:1–8: Ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἄμπελος ἡ ἀληθινή καὶ ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ γεωργός ἐστιν. πᾶν κλῆμα ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴ φέρον καρπὸν αἶρει αὐτό, καὶ πᾶν τὸ καρπὸν φέρον καθαίρει αὐτὸ ἵνα καρπὸν πλείονα φέρῃ. ἤδη ὑμεῖς καθαροὶ ἐστε διὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν λελάληκα ὑμῖν· μείνατε ἐν ἐμοί, καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν. καθὼς τὸ

συνάγουσιν αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πῦρ βάλλουσιν καὶ καίεται			κλῆμα οὐ δύναται καρπὸν φέρειν ἂφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐὰν μὴ μένη ἐν τῇ ἀμπέλῳ, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὑμεῖς ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ μένητε. ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἄμπελος, ὑμεῖς τὰ κλήματα. ὁ μένων ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ οὗτος φέρει καρπὸν πολὺν, ὅτι χωρὶς ἐμοῦ οὐ δύνασθε ποιεῖν οὐδέν. ἐὰν μὴ τις μένη ἐν ἐμοί, ἐβλήθη ἔξω ὡς τὸ κλῆμα καὶ ἐξηράνθη καὶ συνάγουσιν αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πῦρ βάλλουσιν καὶ καίεται. ἐὰν μείνητε ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμῖν μείνη, ὃ ἐὰν θέλητε αἰτήσασθε, καὶ γενήσεται ὑμῖν. ἐν τούτῳ ἐδοξάσθη ὁ πατήρ μου, ἵνα καρπὸν πολὺν φέρητε καὶ γένησθε ἐμοὶ μαθηταί.
15:13: μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ			
15:15b: ὁ δοῦλος οὐκ οἶδεν τί ποιεῖ αὐτοῦ ὁ κύριος			
15:20: οὐκ ἔστιν δοῦλος μείζων τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ			
	16:5a[10b]: ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με		
	16:16: Μικρὸν καὶ οὐκέτι θεωρεῖτέ με, καὶ πάλιν μικρὸν καὶ ὤψεσθέ με	16:16: Μικρὸν καὶ οὐκέτι θεωρεῖτέ με, καὶ πάλιν μικρὸν καὶ ὤψεσθέ με	
16:21: ἡ γυνὴ ὅταν τίκτη λύπην ἔχει, ὅτι ἤλθεν ἡ ὥρα αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ γεννήσῃ τὸ παιδίον, οὐκέτι			16:21: ἡ γυνὴ ὅταν τίκτη λύπην ἔχει, ὅτι ἤλθεν ἡ ὥρα αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ γεννήσῃ τὸ παιδίον, οὐκέτι

μνημονεύει τῆς θλίψεως διὰ τὴν χαρὰν ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν κόσμον			μνημονεύει τῆς θλίψεως διὰ τὴν χαρὰν ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν κόσμον.
20:27: καὶ μὴ γίνου ἄπιστος ἀλλὰ πιστός			
20:29: μακάριοι οἱ μὴ ἰδόντες καὶ πιστεύσαντες			
21:18: ὅτε ἦς νεώτερος, ἐζώννυες σεαυτὸν καὶ περιεπάτεις ὅπου ἤθελες· ὅταν δὲ γηράσῃς, ἐκτενεῖς τὰς χεῖράς σου, καὶ ἄλλος σε ζώσει καὶ οἴσει ὅπου οὐ θέλεις	21:18: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ὅτε ἦς νεώτερος, ἐζώννυες σεαυτὸν καὶ περιεπάτεις ὅπου ἤθελες· ὅταν δὲ γηράσῃς, ἐκτενεῖς τὰς χεῖράς σου, καὶ ἄλλος σε ζώσει καὶ οἴσει ὅπου οὐ θέλεις	21:18: ὅτε ἦς νεώτερος, ἐζώννυες σεαυτὸν καὶ περιεπάτεις ὅπου ἤθελες· ὅταν δὲ γηράσῃς, ἐκτενεῖς τὰς χεῖράς σου, καὶ ἄλλος σε ζώσει καὶ οἴσει ὅπου οὐ θέλεις	
		21:22: ἐὰν αὐτὸν θέλω μένειν ἕως ἔρχομαι, τί πρὸς σέ;	

APPENDIX THREE¹⁴⁴⁹

	1. Unambiguous <u>mis</u> understanding	2. Unambiguous <u>fail</u> ure to understand, believe, receive	3. Implicit misunderstanding or failure to understand	4. Failure set in context of some who do understand, believe, etc.	5. Content: Who Jesus is	6. Content: Nature, purposes, timing, etc. of Jesus' mission	7. Content: Word(s), usually of Jesus, is (are) misunderstood	8. Content: Jesus' deeds or other symbols are misunderstood	9. Person(s) who fail: Disciples	10. Person(s) who fail: Family	11. Person(s) who fail: Jew(s)	12. Person(s) who fail: Others	13. Solution: Action or special revelation by God/Jesus	14. Solution: Faith, commitment	15. Solution: Depends on passage of time	16. Solution: Depends on explanation of participant (usually Jesus)	17. Shallow confession: either fledgling faith or false faith/understanding	18. Explanatory aside by evangelist in context of misunderstanding
1:5		x?			x							x						
1:10-13		x		x	x							x						
1:29-34		x			x							x	x					
1:40-42			x		x				x								x	
1:49-50			x		x				x								x	
2:3-7			x			x				x								
2:9-10			x	x				x										x
2:11			x?		x				x								x?	
2:19-22	x (Jews)		x (Disc)	x	x	x	x				x			x	x		x	x
2:23-25			x		x			x			x						x	x

¹⁴⁴⁹ Source: Carson, "Understanding Misunderstandings"; 91. Disc = Disciples.

3:3–6	x				x		x						x		x (13–15)	x		
3:25–30			x		x?	x					x	x			x	x		
4:10–15	x				x		x					x	x	x	x (24–26)	x		
4:31–34	x					x	x		x							x		
4:35–38			x			x			x							x		
4:46–54			x			x						x?						
5:36–47			x		x						x							
6:14–15 (v. 25–27)					x						x		x					
6:32–35	x				x	x	x				x		x		x	x		
6:41–42		x			x	x					x		x	x	x			
6:51–53	x				x	x	x				x			x	x			
6:60			x		x	x			x				x	x	x			
7:2–10			x		x	x				x								
7:12		x	x	x	x						x						x	
7:14–31		x	x	x	x	x		x			x		x	x			x	
7:33–36	x					x	x				x				x			x
7:37–43			x	x	x						x				x		x	
8:12–13		x			x						x							
8:18–20			x		x		x				x				x			x
8:21–22	x					x	x				x							
8:27–28		x				x					x				x	x		
8:31–33	x					x	x				x					x		
8:38–40	x					x	x				x				x	x		
8:51–53	x				x	x	x				x					x		

8:56–58	x				x		x				x					x		
9:17, 35–38					x				x				x	x			x	
10:1–6		x			x	x			x?						x	x		
10:42					x?								x				x?	
11:1–44			x		x			x						x				
11:11–14	x					x	x						x				x	
11:21–44	x					x	x						x	x		x		
11:49–53			x		x	x					x				x			x
12:5–8			x			x			x							x		
12:12–17		x	x								x				x		x	x
12:27–33			x			x			x?		x				x	x		
12:32–33			x			x			x		x				x			x
12:37–43		x	x	x	x						x						x	x
13:6–10	x					x	x	x	x						x			
13:18–19, 21			x			x			x						x	x		
13:27–30	x		x			x	x		x						x			x
13:36–38			x			x	x		x						x	x	x	
14:4–6	x				x	x			x						x?	x		
14:7–10	x				x		x		x							x		
16:1–4		x				x	x		x						x			
16:7, 12–15		x			x	x			x						x			
16:16–26		x				x	x		x						x	x		
16:27–33			x		x	x			x						x			
18:10–11			x			x			x						x			
18:36–37	x						x					x				x		

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DUTCH SUMMARY

Onderzoekers hebben de taal van het Johannesevangelie als onbegrijpelijk, warrig en contradictorisch omschreven. De laatste dertig jaren is er veel aandacht geweest voor de classificatie van de verschillende types van figuratieve taal in het Johannesevangelie en hoe deze taal gebruikt werd in eerdere Bijbelse tradities en de wereld rondom het Nieuwe Testament. Deze aandacht heeft geleid tot een bewustzijn van het eigen karakter van de Johanneïsche taal in vergelijking met de parabels van de Synoptische evangelies. De huidige dissertatie is uit dit bewustzijn gegroeid en vraagt naar de taalopvattingen die in het Johannesevangelie aanwezig zijn, zoals deze tot uiting komen in Johannes' karakterisering van Jezus' taal met de begrippen *παροιμία* (Joh 10:6; 16:25[2], 29) en *παρησία* (7:4, 13, 26; 10:24; 11:14, 54; 16:25, 29; 18:20). Door deze twee begrippen in hun historische context te lezen, overschrijd ik de grenzen en beperkingen van vorige studies.

De methodologie van deze studie is met Gadamer historisch-hermeneutisch te noemen voor zover ze zowel de historische horizon van de tekst als de historische horizon van de onderzoeker onderzoekt en beide met elkaar in verband brengt. Op basis van een grondige analyse van de interpretatiegeschiedenis van het onderzoeksobject van deze studie werden de vooronderstellingen verhelderd die mijn historische horizon als onderzoeker vormen. Deze vooronderstellingen hebben vooral betrekking op het verstaan van de notie van genre. Ieder voor-verstaan van genre heeft in de interpretatiegeschiedenis geleid tot bepaalde interpretaties van *παροιμία* en *παρησία*. Door aan te tonen hoe elke benadering bepaalde aspecten van de tekst blootlegt, maar andere aspecten verduistert of niet verklaart, werden nieuwe vragen geformuleerd, die mij in staat stelden om de historische horizon van de tekst op een nieuwe manier te bevragen en nieuwe inzichten te bieden in mijn onderzoeksobject. Ik vat deze vragen en de verkregen antwoorden kort samen in het vervolg van deze samenvatting.

Ten eerste werd de vraag gesteld hoe *παροιμία* en *παρησία* zich ten opzichte van elkaar verhouden in de literaire context van het Johannesevangelie. Tegen de gangbare opvatting in de secundaire literatuur werd er geargumenteed dat deze twee begrippen geen antoniemen zijn in Johannes 10, Joh 11:11–16 en Joh 16:23–33, maar naar dezelfde taal van Jezus verwijzen. Jezus' openbaring van de waarheid door middel van *παρησία* is tegelijk een versluiering van de waarheid door middel van *παροιμία*.

Ten tweede heb ik de vraag gesteld naar de oriëntatie van het onderricht van de Parakleet in het Johannesevangelie. Tegen de gangbare opvatting dat deze oriëntatie retrospectief is, heeft mijn analyse van Joh 14:25–26 en 16:12–13 aangetoond dat deze oriëntatie prospectief is, voor zover de herinnerende en de onderrichtende functie van de Parakleet als twee van elkaar gescheiden functies worden weergegeven. De Parakleet herinnert de leerlingen aan alles wat Jezus heeft gezegd (14:26d–e; cf. 2:19–22; 12:12–16) en onderricht tegelijkertijd “alles” (14:26aβ) en “de komende dingen” (16:13f). Deze zowel retrospectieve als prospectieve beweging heb ik filosofisch gearticuleerd aan de

hand van Kierkegaards concept van herhaling. Aangezien het onderricht van de Parakleet prospectief is en de Parakleet het mondstuk van Jezus' *παρρησία* tijdens het uur is (Joh 16:25), dient de gangbare opvatting dat *παρρησία* leidt tot een eenduidige kennis van Jezus' woorden, gecorrigeerd te worden. Op basis van Kierkegaards begrip van herhaling heb ik beargumenteerd dat Jezus' *παρρησία* een existentieel effect heeft op de leerlingen en de leerlingen transformeert in levende tekens van de waarheid.

Ten derde heb ik de vraag beantwoord hoe men de verbanden dient te verstaan die er zijn tussen enerzijds *ἐρωτάω* en *αἰτέω* en anderzijds *παροιμία* en *παρρησία* in Joh 16:23–27. Tegen de heersende opvatting dat de twee werkwoorden synoniemen zijn en Johannes ze gebruikt om monotonie te vermijden, heb ik beargumenteerd dat *ἐρωτάω* een polemische betekenis heeft en op het verzet van de leerlingen wijst tegen Jezus' poging om hun messianistische opvattingen te bekritisieren door middel van *παροιμία*; het werkwoord *αἰτέω* duidt daarentegen op vertrouwen en de acceptatie van Jezus' kritiek door de leerlingen. Om deze wijziging in de dispositie van de leerlingen te begrijpen is de connectie tussen Jezus' *παρρησία* en het vragen (*αἰτέω*) van de leerlingen essentieel. De Geest-Parakleet is het mondstuk van Jezus' *παρρησία* tijdens het uur (cf. 14:25–26; 16:12–15) en zal in de leerlingen verblijven (14:17). Bijgevolg concludeert de lezer uit 16:25 dat Jezus' *παρρησία* tijdens het uur door middel van de Parakleet in de leerlingen aanwezig zal zijn. Dankzij Jezus' *παρρησία* zullen de leerlingen de moed en het vertrouwen verkrijgen om de Vader (en Jezus) om alles te vragen en het te verkrijgen (16:23–24, 26). Johannes 16:27 verduidelijkt dat het de post-paschale liefde en het geloof van de leerlingen is dat hen in staat stelt om zich op deze manier tot de Vader te wenden. Op basis van een vergelijking met Philo, *Her* 6–7, 26–27 en LXX Job 27:7–10 stel ik vast dat Johannes de logica aanneemt dat de leerlingen *παρρησία* verkrijgen (door de Parakleet) doordat ze zich aan Jezus gewijd hebben en zijn gebod van de liefde hebben nageleefd. Hierdoor kunnen ze van de Vader (en Jezus) alles vragen (*αἰτέω*) en het verkrijgen. In vergelijking met Joh 16:23–27 maakt 1 Joh 3:21–22 en 5:14–15 deze band tussen *παρρησία* en *αἰτέω* meer expliciet. In de uitdrukking 'vragen in Jezus' naam' wijst 'in Jezus' naam' er op dat men enkel alles kan vragen aan de Vader, indien men gezonden is door Jezus. Gezonden zijn door Jezus betekent dat men vervuld is van de Heilige Geest (Joh 20:22) en zichzelf heiligt door conform Jezus' gebod van de liefde te leven (cf. 17:17–19).

Als vierde vraag heb ik gevraagd hoe men de ambiguïteit in Johannes dient te verstaan dat de Johanneïsche Jezus tijdens zijn leven *παρρησία* gesproken (Joh 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14) en gewandeld (cf. 11:54) heeft, terwijl hij beweert dat het moment van zijn dood het *καιρός/ῥα* van zijn *παρρησία* is (7:6–8; 16:25). Onderzoekers menen dat Jezus' *παρρησία* tijdens zijn leven de betekenis 'openbaar' of 'moedig' heeft als antoniem van *ἐν κρυπτῷ*, terwijl het begrip een andere betekenis heeft tijdens Jezus' kruisiging, namelijk 'eenduidig' of 'simpel' als antoniem van *ἐν παροιμίαις*. Ik heb beargumenteerd dat een dergelijk tegenover elkaar stellen van twee verschillende betekenissen van *παρρησία* problematisch is en dat *παρρησία* nergens anders in antieke teksten enkel 'openbaar' betekent. Aan de hand van Philodemus' idee dat *παρρησία* een experimentele

of stochastische onderwijsmethode is heb ik plausibel gemaakt dat Jezus tijdens zijn leven tentatief *παρρησία* gebruikt, terwijl hij weet dat het moment dat zijn *παρρησία* effectief is, er nog niet is. Het experimentele karakter van *παρρησία* wordt in de eerste eeuw v.C. tot en met de tweede eeuw n.C. vaak gearticuleerd door *παρρησία* te vergelijken met het gebruik van medicijnen. Aan de hand van een analyse van Joh 7:1–44 en 10:1–30 heb ik gewezen op de vele parallellen tussen Jezus' gebruik van *παρρησία* en Philodemus' omschrijving van *παρρησία* als een stochastische methode.

Ten vijfde heb ik de vraag gesteld hoe Jezus' *παρρησία* zich aanpast aan zijn gesprekspartners in de literaire context van het Johannesevangelie. Philodemus schrijft voor dat men een harde, simpele vorm van *παρρησία*, die enkel uit kritiek bestaat, dient te gebruiken tegen studenten die zich verzetten, terwijl een zachte, veelzijdige vorm van *παρρησία*, die met lof vermengd is, gebruikt dient te worden voor studenten die de leraar gehoorzamen en zich inzetten. Vergelijkbare ideeën over twee verschillende strategieën om *παρρησία* te gebruiken zijn wijd verbreid in de antieke cultuur van de eerste eeuw v.C. tot de tweede eeuw n.C. Naast Philodemus is vooral Plutarchus belangrijk voor mijn analyse van het Johannesevangelie. Plutarchus maakt het onderscheid tussen een therapeutische en een praktische *παρρησία*. Therapeutische *παρρησία* is een milde vorm van *παρρησία* die fouten corrigeert door een acceptabelere oorzaak van de fout in kwestie te formuleren dan de eigenlijke oorzaak die de fout veroorzaakt heeft. Lof wordt gebruikt om een persoon vatbaarder voor kritiek te maken. Het geprojecteerde beeld van de persoon contrasteert sterk met zijn/haar feitelijke gedrag. Door deze vergelijking te maken ziet de persoon in hoe slecht zijn of haar gedrag was; tegelijkertijd wordt de persoon aangemoedigd om zijn/haar gedrag te verbeteren aan de hand van het geprojecteerde beeld van zichzelf. Praktische *παρρησία* volgt daarentegen de tegenovergestelde methode om een persoon er van te weerhouden een fout te maken. Er wordt gezocht naar een minder acceptabele oorzaak om de fout te verklaren die de persoon op het punt staat te begaan. De persoon wordt zo als slechter voorgesteld dan hij of zij eigenlijk is. Kort samengevat, kan men stellen dat Philodemus en Plutarchus zowel de psychologische dispositie van de gesprekspartners als de omstandigheden waarin *παρρησία* wordt gebruikt in rekening brengen om te bepalen hoe en met welke intensiteit *παρρησία* gebruikt dient te worden.

Op basis van een analyse van een groot aantal teksten in Johannes heb ik aangetoond dat ook Jezus *παρρησία* strategisch gebruikt op een manier die overeenstemt met de boven geschetste conventies. De leerlingen, die bereidwillig zijn van Jezus te leren, worden behandeld met een mengeling van *παρρησία* en lof. De 'Joden', de Farizeeën en het volk verzetten zich daarentegen heftig tegen het onderricht van Jezus. Jezus onderwijst hen daarom met een harde, simpele vorm van *παρρησία*, die enkel kritiek bevat. Om hen ervan te weerhouden een fout te begaan, verklaart Jezus hun gedrag op basis van minder acceptabele oorzaken dan diegene die hun gedrag feitelijk veroorzaken (e.g., "Jullie zijn zonen van jullie vader, de duivel, en jullie willen de begeerten van jullie vader doen" [Joh 8:44]). Ze worden slechter voorgesteld dan ze feitelijk zijn om hen er van te weerhouden de fout/zonde te begaan Jezus te doden.

Ten zesde heb ik de vraag beantwoord hoe Jezus' *παρρησία* verbonden is met het idee van de verlossing van de *κόσμος* in het Johannesevangelie (e.g., Joh 3:16–17; 8:28; 12:32, 39–40, 46–47). Ik heb beargumenteerd dat Jezus' *παρρησία* deze redding tot stand brengt door middel van de *ἔλεγχος* van de Parakleet. De Parakleet is het mondstuk van Jezus' *παρρησία* tijdens het uur (16:25) en zet in deze hoedanigheid het *παρρησία* onderricht van Jezus verder door de wereld te berispen (*ἐλέγχω*) wat betreft haar fout/zonde (*ἁμαρτία*) dat ze niet in Jezus gelooft (16:8–9). Ik heb aangetoond met verwijzing naar LXX Spreuken, Philodemus, Philo, Plutarchus en Clement van Alexandrië dat het gebruik van *παρρησία* in de antieke cultuur opgevat werd als resulterend in de schaamte en het berouw van de berispte persoon over de begane fouten. Dit verwachtingspatroon van de antieke lezer dient men in rekening te brengen bij het lezen van Joh 16:8–9, 25. De eerste lezer van Johannes vooronderstelde waarschijnlijk dat de *ἔλεγχος* van de Parakleet als mondstuk van Jezus' *παρρησία* resulteerde in de bekering en de redding van de *κόσμος*. Deze lezing wordt ook gesuggereerd door Jezus' belofte van vrede aan de leerlingen (14:24; 16:33). De vervulling van deze belofte in 20:19, 21 toont aan dat de leerlingen in vrede zijn met de *κόσμος*, wanneer ze de Heilige Geest van Jezus ontvangen (20:22). Ze dienen zich niet langer te verbergen achter vergrendelde deuren uit angst voor de 'Joden' (cf. 20:19). Hun opdracht om fouten/zonden te vergeven en te overwinnen (20:21–23) stemt overeen met het *ἐλέγχειν* door de Parakleet dat beloofd was in 16:8–9. Het idee van de verlossing van de *κόσμος* in het Johannesevangelie is mogelijk op basis van Johannes' implementatie van de antieke conventie dat *παρρησία* iedereen kan genezen, zelfs diegenen die zich er tegen verzetten.

Ten zevende heb ik een antwoord geboden op de vraag hoe Jezus' *παρρησία* zich verhoudt tot de vriendschapstaal in Johannes, gegeven dat Jezus' dood als een daad van vriendschap (Joh 15:13) en *παρρησία* (16:25) wordt weergegeven. Op basis van een analyse van de vriendschapstaal in Johannes (*φίλος*, *φιλέω*, *ἀγαπάω*) heb ik geconcludeerd dat toewijding en *παρρησία* vriendschap in het Johannesevangelie definiëren. Om de samenhang tussen deze twee componenten van vriendschapsrelaties in het Johannesevangelie te begrijpen heb ik verscheidene teksten uit de LXX wijsheidstraditie en Philo besproken. In deze teksten wordt toewijding aan God en zijn geboden als de noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het verkrijgen van *παρρησία* beschouwd. *Παρρησία* is op haar beurt noodzakelijk om van een authentieke vriendschapsrelatie te spreken. Johannes neemt dezelfde logica aan, wanneer hij beweert dat toewijding aan Jezus' geboden noodzakelijk is om vrienden van Jezus te worden (Joh 15:14). Deze toewijding verleent hen *παρρησία* in de relatie met Jezus. Door in een dergelijke open relatie met Jezus te treden, zijn zij niet langer dienaren, maar vrienden van Jezus (15:15).

Mijn interpretatie van vriendschapsrelaties in het Johannesevangelie heeft mij in staat gesteld om op basis van Joh 15:13 een innovatieve interpretatie van Jezus' dood te geven. Tegen de heersende opvattingen dat dit vers Jezus' dood als plaatsvervangend en verzoenend of als een effectieve dood ter bescherming van de gemeenschap voorstelt, heb ik beargumenteerd dat deze interpretaties geen recht doen aan hoe het vriendschapsmotief van 15:13 zich verder ontwikkelt in 15:14–15. De verwijzing naar het idee van *παρρησία*

tussen vrienden (15:15) in combinatie met de omschrijving van Jezus' dood als het ὥρα van zijn παρρησία (16:25) suggereren dat het motief van het neerleggen van het leven voor vrienden (15:13) intrinsiek verbonden is met het idee dat παρρησία het onderscheidende kenmerk van een vriend is. Met verwijzing naar Philodemus en Plutarchus heb ik vastgesteld dat παρρησία enkel effectief en authentiek kan zijn, wanneer er coherentie is tussen iemand zijn woorden en daden. Enkel dan kan een vriend als vriend erkend worden. In overeenstemming met dit idee geeft Johannes de kruisdood van Jezus weer als het kritieke moment (καιρός/ὥρα) van zijn παρρησία. Dankzij de overeenstemming tussen de woorden van Jezus over het liefdesgebod en zijn eigen dood aan het kruis is Jezus' παρρησία effectief ten tijde van zijn dood: aan het kruis openbaart Jezus zich als een echte vriend. Dankzij deze overeenstemming is Joh 15:13 dus in staat om Jezus te presenteren als stervende voor zijn vrienden. In plaats van een plaatsvervangende of effectieve dood, presenteren 15:13 en 16:25 Jezus' dood als een handeling van ware vriendschap en παρρησία.

Ten achtste heb ik gevraagd of Jezus' παρρησία als openbaar en/of privaat wordt voorgesteld in het Johannesevangelie. Tegen de opvatting onder onderzoekers dat er in de Griekse oudheid een onderscheid was tussen een publiek (of politiek) en een privaat (of ethisch) gebruik van παρρησία, heb ik met recente secundaire literatuur beargumenteerd dat dit onderscheid niet in de antieke cultuur zelf aanwezig was, maar gebaseerd is op het modern liberale onderscheid tussen private en publieke rede. Mijn onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat auteurs zoals Philodemus, Plutarchus en Lucianus geen onderscheid maakten tussen een privaat gebruik van παρρησία onder vrienden en een publiek gebruik van παρρησία door bijvoorbeeld politici en satirici. Beide gebruiken van παρρησία zijn onderhevig aan dezelfde regels en voorschriften. Het is daarom waarschijnlijk dat het idee van twee verschillende gebruiken, een publiek en een privaat gebruik van παρρησία, niet gekend was bij de eerste lezers van het Johannesevangelie.

Ik heb verder verdedigd dat het Johannesevangelie ons modern liberaal begrip van wat behoort tot het private en het publieke, corrigeert. Johannes 18:20 vat samen dat Jezus' παρρησία altijd publiek was, dus inclusief het gebruik van παρρησία onder de discipelen (e.g., 11:14). Jezus heeft nooit “in het geheim” (ἐν κρυπτῷ) onderwezen, maar altijd παρρησία. De discipelen mogen bovendien alles wat Jezus gezegd heeft verder communiceren (18:21). Jezus vertoont verwantschap met de Cynicus, die ook geen privaat huis heeft om zijn/haar onderwijs te verbergen voor de wereld. De κόσμος is zowel de thuis (Joh 1:11) als het publieke klaslokaal van de goddelijke λόγος (cf. 7:4, 26; 18:20).

Als negende vraag werd de vraag gesteld naar hoe de eerste lezers van Johannes waarschijnlijk diens gebruik van παροιμία in relatie tot παρρησία geïnterpreteerd hebben. Voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag werd uitgegaan van de onderzoeksresultaten van onze eerste vraag, namelijk dat παροιμία en παρρησία geen antoniemen zijn, maar naar dezelfde taal van Jezus verwijzen (zie *supra*).

Eerst werd een onderzoek gedaan naar παροιμία in LXX Spr 1:1–6 en de vroege receptiegeschiedenis van deze tekst. Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat παροιμία en de

hiermee geassocieerde uitdrukking *στροφὰὶ λόγων* (“wendingen van woorden”) een retorisch-technische betekenis hebben die later, in de vroege receptie van Spreuken, verklaard werd op basis van terminologie ontleend uit de antieke retorische theorie van gefigureerde taal (*λόγος ἐσχηματίσμενος*). De term *παροιμία* refereert naar taal die op het eerste gezicht helder is, maar eigenlijk verwijst naar iets dat verborgen is. Volgens Clement van Alexandrië wordt deze taal in de profetie gebruikt. Dankzij *παροιμίας* verschijnen profeten niet als blasfemerend wanneer ze tegen de aannames van hun geadresseerden spreken. *Παροιμίας* staan hen toe indirect de waarheid te spreken.

Ten tweede werd gekeken naar de antieke retorische theorie van gefigureerde taal die we kennen door middel van Demetrius, Quintilianus, Ps.-Dionysius van Halicarnassus en Ps.-Hermogenes. Deze auteurs bespreken de verschillende gebruiken van gefigureerde taal in relatie tot *παρρησία*. In hun theoretische discussies, verdedigen ze de thesis dat alle taal gefigureerd is, inclusief *παρρησία*. Volgens Demetrius is gefigureerde taal het midden tussen vleierij en open kritiek. Alle auteurs zijn het er over eens dat men gefigureerde taal dient te gebruiken wanneer het onveilig of ongepast is om *παρρησία* te gebruiken (of direct te spreken). Gefigureerde taal en *παρρησία* hebben gemeenschappelijk dat ze beide betrekking hebben op het uitspreken van wat men denkt. Het verschil tussen beide is dat gefigureerde taal dit op een indirecte en versluierde manier doet, terwijl *παρρησία* direct en helder is.

Ten derde werd gekeken naar Plutarchus, die beweert dat het taalgebruik veranderd is doorheen de geschiedenis. Vroeger was het conventioneel om *παρρησία* te gebruiken door middel van *παροιμίας* en *μύθοι*. Nu, aldus Plutarchus, verstaat de meerderheid van de mensen nauwelijks iets van een dergelijk taalgebruik. Plutarchus wijst ons op de voordelen van een dergelijk taalgebruik. De god laat een profeet op een dergelijke manier spreken om de scherpe kantjes er af te halen en de veiligheid van de profeet te garanderen. Om effectief te zijn heeft *παρρησία* de ambiguïteit van *παροιμίας* nodig. Een spreker kan zijn/haar gedachten tegen despoten en vijanden uitspreken doordat *παροιμίας* de spreker van veiligheid voorzien door de hardheid van *παρρησία* weg te nemen.

Aangezien de antieke retorische theorie van gefigureerde taal zo ver verbreid was in de antieke cultuur en de eerste lezers van Johannes mogelijk bekend waren met LXX Spreuken, is het waarschijnlijk dat de eerste lezers van Johannes de retorische functie van de Johanneïsche *παροιμίας* in termen van het retorische concept *ἔμφασις* begrepen hebben. Op het eerste gezicht is de taal van de Johanneïsche Jezus bekend en gewoon. Om deze taal een verborgen God te laten openbaren, dient men zich te distantiëren van de ‘gewone’ betekenis van deze taal en te zoeken naar een verborgen betekenis. Als een vorm van gefigureerde taal stellen *παροιμίας* Jezus in staat om *παρρησία* over zijn messianistische identiteit te onderrichten (Joh 10:24–25; 18:20) in situaties waarin hij niet de nodige veiligheid heeft om dit te doen, aangezien de ‘Joden’ hem willen doden (e.g., 7:1; 10:31). De ambiguïteit van Jezus’ *παροιμίας* voorziet Jezus van de noodzakelijke veiligheid om *παρρησία* te gebruiken doordat Jezus’ woorden op meer dan één manier verklaard kunnen worden. Tegelijkertijd verzachten *παροιμίας* de hardheid van Jezus’ *παρρησία*; hierdoor is Jezus in staat de leerlingen te onderrichten, die niet veel kritiek

kunnen verdragen (16:12). Door gebruik te maken van παροιμία past Jezus zich aan de capaciteit van zijn toehoorders aan om kritiek te aanvaarden. Ik heb dit gebruik van gefigureerde taal geïllustreerd met een analyse van Joh 7:32–36 en 10:1–6.

Als laatste vraag heb ik de tiende vraag beantwoord, namelijk hoe het gebruik van παροιμία en παρρησία in Johannes zich verhoudt tot het gebruik van παραβολή en παρρησία in Marcus. Naast het veelvuldige gebruik van παρρησία in Johannes, komt het begrip één keer voor in de andere canonieke evangelies, namelijk in Mc 8:32, waar het begrip gebruikt wordt om de zogenaamde eerste lijdensvoorspelling van Jezus te omschrijven (8:31). Marcus verschilt echter van Johannes doordat hij de taal van Jezus niet met παροιμία, maar met παραβολή karakteriseert.

In dialoog met secundaire literatuur heb ik beargumenteerd dat παρρησία in Mc 8:32a gecontrasteerd wordt met zowel het parabelonderricht van Jezus (4:11–12; 33–34a) als het apart nemen van Jezus door Petrus (8:32b–d). Om het contrast tussen παρρησία en παραβολή te begrijpen heb ik Marcus' genre bewustzijn van παραβολή vergeleken met Demetrius' definitie van gefigureerde taal. Volgens Demetrius is gefigureerde taal het midden tussen de vervormende taal van de vleier en de klare taal van de scherpe criticus. Als zodanig maakt gefigureerde taal communicatie mogelijk door de intentie van de spreker te verbergen. Op een vergelijkbare manier vindt volgens Marcus openbaring plaats in en door de versluiering teweeggebracht door Jezus' parabolische taal (Mc 4:11–12, 21–22). Gefigureerde taal en Marciaanse παραβολαί communiceren betekenis indirect door middel van ambiguïteit. Beide verlangen ze van de toehoorders dat deze zoeken naar een verborgen betekenis. Jezus spreekt in parabels om zich aan te passen aan het vermogen van zijn toehoorders om het mysterie te ontvangen (cf. 4:33). Net zoals gefigureerde taal verzachten parabels de hardheid van de boodschap van Jezus. Mijn opvatting dat de Marciaanse παραβολή een vorm van gefigureerde taal is, wordt ondersteund door antieke retorici die vaak παραβολή en verwante begrippen als retorische figuren bespreken. Bovendien vermeldt Clemens dat παραβολή een vorm van profetie en gefigureerde taal is die de spreker veilig houdt voor diegenen wiens aannames hij of zij bekritiseert.

Na de opvatting te hebben verdedigd dat Marcus παραβολή als een vorm van gefigureerde taal beschouwd, heb ik het gebruik van parabels door de Marciaanse Jezus vergeleken met de verschillende motieven/gebruiken van gefigureerde taal vermeld in de antieke retorische theorie. Uit mijn analyse blijkt dat tact en vooral behoedzaamheid een belangrijke rol spelen in de motivatie van Jezus' gebruik van parabels in Mc 4:1–34 en 12:1–9. Verder blijkt dat Jezus enkel παρρησία over zijn identiteit als de Christus spreekt (8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34), wanneer geen tegenstanders meeluisteren en de veiligheid absoluut gegarandeerd is. Aangezien er dan geen gevaar is, versluiert Jezus zijn taal niet. Het is verder de leerlingen niet toegestaan om Jezus' identiteit met anderen te communiceren (8:30), zodat Jezus' vijanden zijn missie niet zullen dwarsbomen.

In tegenstelling tot vorig onderzoek, heb ik twee fundamentele verschillen vastgesteld tussen het gebruik van παραβολή en παρρησία in Marcus en παροιμία en παρρησία in Johannes. Het eerste verschil heeft betrekking op de verschillende omstandigheden waarin παρρησία en gefigureerde taal gebruikt worden. De Marciaanse

παραβολή wordt gebruikt in publieke situaties wanneer direct onderricht de messianistische missie van Jezus in gevaar zou brengen (e.g., Mc 3:23–27; 12:1–11), terwijl παρρησία zich richt tot de oren van de leerlingen in veilige private situaties (8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34). De Johanneïsche παροιμία, daarentegen, wordt zowel in vijandige openbare situaties (Joh 10:6) als in veilige private situaties onder de discipelen (16:25) gebruikt. De Johanneïsche Jezus gebruikt παρρησία onder vrienden in 11:14, maar ook tegen vijanden in polemische publieke situaties (7:26; 10:24–25; 18:20; cf. 11:54). Twee onderling tegengestelde motieven zijn terug te vinden in de twee evangeliën: een geheimhoudingsmotief in Marcus en een publiek motief in Johannes. In Marcus mogen enkel de discipelen Jezus' παρρησία horen (Mc 9:30; 10:32), en het is de discipelen niet toegestaan verder te communiceren wat Jezus gezegd heeft (8:30). In Johannes richt Jezus' παρρησία zich tot de hele κόσμος (Joh 18:20), en het is de discipelen toegestaan verder te communiceren wat Jezus gezegd heeft (18:21).

Het tweede verschil tussen Marcus en Johannes heeft betrekking op de relatie tussen παρρησία en gefigureerde taal. In Johannes verwijzen παροιμία en παρρησία naar dezelfde uitspraken van Jezus. De Johanneïsche Jezus onderricht παρρησία door middel van παροιμίαι. In Marcus is Jezus' παρρησία onderricht (Mc 8:31–32a; 9:31; 10:33–34) helder onderscheiden van, en als verklaring toegevoegd, aan zijn parabelonderricht (cf. 4:33–34). De verhouding tussen παρρησία en παραβολή in Marcus kan verklaard worden met verwijzing naar hoe παρρησία gecontrasteerd wordt met gefigureerde taal in de antieke retorische theorie. Johannes staat in wisselwerking met een andere retorische traditie, waarvan Plutarchus schrijft dat het in deze traditie conventioneel was om παρρησία door middel van παροιμίαι te gebruiken. Volgens Plutarchus was een dergelijk gebruik van taal in zijn tijd nauwelijks te begrijpen voor de meerderheid van de mensen.

Ik heb beargumenteerd dat Marcus' en Johannes' keuze voor verschillende begrippen, namelijk παραβολή en παροιμία, gestuurd is door twee verschillende opvattingen van hoe παρρησία zich verhoudt tot gefigureerde taal. De Johanneïsche παροιμία is transparant genoeg om παρρησία over te brengen, terwijl de Marciaanse παραβολή een supplementaire verklaring nodig heeft, die παρρησία uitgesproken wordt. Ik heb deze eigenschappen van de Johanneïsche παροιμία en de Marciaanse παραβολή verklaard aan de hand van Quintilianus' *Institutio Oratoria*. Quintilianus definieert παραβολή als een verre vergelijking die aan het publiek vraagt om inferenties te maken om de afstand tussen het object van vergelijking en het object van verklaring te overbruggen. In παροιμία, daarentegen, is de intentie van de spreker duidelijk en is het mogelijk dat het publiek de geïntendeerde kritiek begrijpt zonder een supplementaire verklaring. Dankzij deze transparantie van παροιμία kan Johannes stellen dat Jezus παρρησία onderrichtte door middel van παροιμίαι. Doordat de afstand in de vergelijking bij parabels groter is, vereisen Marciaanse parabels een supplementaire verklaring, die παρρησία uitgesproken wordt.

Tot slot concludeer ik dat ik op basis van de tien hierboven geschetste vragen innovatieve inzichten heb geformuleerd in hoe παροιμία en παρρησία in het Johannesevangelie geïnterpreteerd kunnen worden tegen de achtergrond van hun antieke

retorische context en de antieke filosofische geschriften over παρρησία. In plaats van een objectieve reconstructie van de betekenis van deze twee begrippen te hebben gegeven, heb ik zoveel mogelijk de vooronderstellingen van de secundaire literatuur blootgelegd, die mede de historische horizon van de onderzoeker uitmaken. De kritische confrontatie met de alteriteit van de tekst heeft mij de tien boven besproken vragen opgeleverd, die mij in staat stelden om nieuwe perspectieven op παροιμία en παρρησία in Johannes te leveren. Aangezien we enkel vanuit onze historische horizon geconfronteerd kunnen worden met de alteriteit van de tekst, hoop ik dat toekomstige studies een kritische analyse zullen leveren van de vooronderstellingen die mijn interpretaties van παροιμία en παρρησία mogelijk hebben gemaakt. Doordat alle verstaan mede bepaald is door onze “Geschichtlichkeit”, is de taak van interpretatie nooit volbracht.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Thomas Tops was born in Lier (Belgium) at the 26th of March 1988. He obtained bachelor and master degrees in philosophy at the University of Antwerp (2008–2012, both *cum laude*), bachelor (*magna cum laude*), master (*summa cum laude*), and research master (*magna cum laude*) degrees in Theology and Religious Studies at KU Leuven (2012–2016), along with academic teacher degrees at KU Leuven (2012–2014, *magna cum laude*) and Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (2018–2019) and 41 ECTS credits in courses of Ancient Greek at the Arts Faculty of KU Leuven (2015–2020). From April 2017 until April 2021 he worked on a Joint PhD project at the Protestant Theological University of Groningen and KU Leuven under the supervision of Prof. dr. Annette Merz (PThU) and Prof. dr. Reimund Bieringer (KU Leuven). During his doctoral research, he benefitted from two research stays at Notre Dame (US) under the supervision of Prof. dr. John T. Fitzgerald. At PThU, Thomas Tops taught two courses on the Gospel of Mark, two courses on Pauline literature, and one course on the Gospel of John. He presented his research on many international conferences (e.g., SBL, EABS) and published in leading international peer-reviewed journals (New Testament Studies, Novum Testamentum [forthcoming], Biblica, Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie).